MAHAFFEY, M.: A Social Worker-Politician Creates a New Service.In: Mahaffey, M.3Hanks, J.W.,Social Work&PoliticalResponsibility, NASW} Silver Spring 1982 possible for a social worker to be effective in politics without violating professional values and without losing sight of our commitment to the interests of those we serve as social workers. Notes andHeferences 1. See Chester G. Atkins et ah. Getting Elected: A Guide to Winning State and Local Office (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973); and Edward Schwartzman, Campaign Craftsmanship (New York: Universe Books, 1973) and Campaign Workbook (Washington, D.C.: National Women's Education Fund, 1978). 2. For a discussion of voters' views on the responsiveness of women candidates, see Irene Diamond, Set Roles in the State House (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 86-88. 3. "Single Issue Politics," Newsweek, November 6,1978, pp. 43 and 60. 4. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Political Woman (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 91. 5. See ibid., pp. 3-23. 6. Alan D. Wade, "The Social Worker in the Political Process," in Socio/ Welfare Forum, 1966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 52-67. 7. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., pp. 48-50. 8. Ses Allen Pincus and Anne Minahan, Social Work Practice: Model and Method (Itasca, 111.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1973), pp. 37-52; Charles S. Levy, "The Value Base of Social' Work," Journal of Education for Social Work, 9 (Winter 1973), pp. 34-42; and Charles S. Prigmore and Charles H. Atherton, Social Welfare Policy-Analysis and Formulation (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1979), pp. 23-36. 9. See Rino J. Patti and Ronald B. Dear, "Legislative Advocacy: One Path to Social Change," Social Work, 20 (March 1975), pp. 108-114; and Pincus and Minahan, op. cit., pp. 76-78. 10. S. K. Khinduka and Bernard J. Coughlin, "A Conceptualization of Social Action," Social Service Review. 49 (March 1975), p. 9. 11. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 131. 12. Ibid., p. 119. 13. See Daniel Thursz, "Social Action as a Professional Responsibility and Political Participation," inj. Roland Pennock and Jahn W. Chapman, eds., Participation in Politics (New York- Leiber-Athertan, 1975), pp. 213-232; and Charles Levy, Socio/ Work Ethics (New Yorlc Human Sciences Press, 1976). 14. George A. Brager, "Advocacy and Political Behavior," Socio/ Work, 13 (April 1968), p. 14. 194 KLBINKAUF A Social Worker-Politician Creates a New Service MARYANN MAHAFFEY A CCORDING to the 1975 Uniform Crime Report of the Federal XjLBureau df Investigation (FBI), .poUce across the country received more calls for f amilyconflict .than for murder, aggravated assault, and all other serious crimes. Incidents of wjfejMating outnumbered those of rape by three to one. Responding to calls related to wife abuse accounted for 13 percent of all homicides of police officers and 40 percent of all injuries sustained by police officers.1 Families caught in patterns of jecumng.;riQlencej)fienJurn to the,pol^erThXpólicTäre~éäsíÍy available through a phone call, and they come quickly. They handle the violence because they have the authority—the uniform and the badge. They are the twenty-four hour service of last resort. The director of the Police Foundation has publicly stated that such social.problems _qccurjy_a major portion of police.officers.' time anajhataltoough officers aj:e_ not trained for such. woricJhey should be.2 Police officers across „the nation know families that_expe-/ rience 'řepeaterí instances of domesjic^yipjence. Such families are ■ familiar to the local precinct and to the officer on the beat. These / families are often not known^to tjiosejvjip_pcoyide^ojmseling.ser;' 195 r"\ is líúť- é jdces., however^nor arre..the„families familiar with the services thai: E^^ä£^£^^^^J?^£ÍO£y*n^ďľFar too^oHen^KedeatiTór handicapping of a family member is the "solution" to the conflict. &_variety of responses to the problem of domestic violence have developed. Social workers in the army in Europe worked with__c3nmandmg^fficers and mÍH|äg^j)5líceTb""äetüse^~šucBľ situations and to_begmJ^J^řiseling^^ States,. spcml^qrjcecs_in jgme_cpmmumties have been__assigned . fuUjdrne^Jo^pQjice stations. In other commum^íes'rusychologišís havejTjajjieü^p^Hceoäic^rs in de^sjonjechniques. In other cases, - PJ^_chQ,loj£sjsJiaY,ej3^n^^ yj0. lenceJoTsociaLagencies. ) Despite the existence and success of such programs, social tESäSE!^ and they have questioned the value ofj^jaljgp^ter.s^gQ^ on „"family.^SpulKepiínST^Ťne^řalMitý of this approach is questibtia-ble. The knowledge, ettacs, and sldljs„.pt.sociaI .worJc.ar.e_needed ,crgaJte4. This implies that the problems and needsTôT families trapped m^domes tic^violence canonly^^aü^es^e^J^o^al _merit. Moreover, because ajiy_cbjm=ge^nPi£Sjäj'e^^ geted for change, attempts to influence the police department or any other department of government require attention to political gansiderations—to balancing the needs and interests, of „the elected'""' officials who mate pj)Ucy_.w|^^ and other sources of political power. "" " "~ """ Events throughout the country in recent years have increased social workers' awareness not only of the importance of public policy in solving such social problems as family violence, but also of the need to take an active part in the political processes that shape governmental policies. As a result, increasing numbers of social workers have become involved in politics, some as campaign workers or lobbyists, others as elected or appointed officials. In 1973, such considerations drew me to become a_candidate_H Í°ZJk^^stjrojt^j^CoujiciI áno1 to'make familV-yiolgnce oneof... several humaaugj^.ce^Drnfifem^ campaign issuesTXt the time, there was some public recognition of family violence as a 190 MAHAFFEY problem, and demands were mounting that the Detroit Police Department find a solution. By focusing attention on the public gafgjx aspect qfjiomestin yioIence,~Py proposing a''rational effort to deal with the problem, and by drawing a large vote as a candidate for the city council, I hoped to show that a solution involving the j /], provision of additional police and counseling services to families in \ \\ crjgis.frad proaatjublicsupport. Ir This article describes my efforts, as a social worker, to create such services through direct involvementia..the-political process. I Intended to provide a model for ingrejnental change through polit- ' ical action, the article highlights the importance of^ udders t anting powegjn^ bringing .about change—expert Jjower, referent power, cnarismatic power, and the power of numbers. ÍFalso'demon-sfrates the need for resourcefulness" and flexibU objectives and revising, strategies andtacticj. Emergence of a Political Issue In 1973, Detroit was caught in a political cross fire. The black mayoral candidate—with my support and that of the black community and progressive whites—had fought for and won changes in the city charter to create a civilian,police,.commission, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, charged with making policy for and controlling the police department. The other candidate for mayor was the white police chief. Hysteria was rising in the community as the media focused on crime, muggings, and property damage. Oné headline screamed "Detroit Is Murder City." The media portrayed the problem as one of sjTangersJrilling strangers, creaj^g_fearanicji^^ In the suburbs, hos- tilify-wáš' rising, jtow^dj£e;c^ crept*" toward, a. 51 percent majority. Some people were calling for more police and for "untying their Hands." Others were canioaign-ingjgamšt the polige,andJoX-blackcontr.q]^of the city. The blick community viewed the police as a white occupying force, and verbal attacks by blacks had many police paranoid. In this climate, a political strategy of open confrontation would have been inflammatory and counterproductive. As a candidate for city council, ^efíned_as..public_safety issues the need to free, ppjiceofficersJnr_cjrime^ghting..by.-filling-môŕeTjóbs with civilians^ anal. the. need .to. reduce the injuries and Creating a New Service 197 deaths among police and citizens by training police Jo deal with domestic v51e5cji and,_ social corHíičtš.T lčhéw the deaths were í mostly results of argument's among acquaintances. My objective j was..t£j3gkrS£^jdjgg^^ of i Detroit and Wayne. Cpun^and.ttieJQßtroit Police Department!*) | defu^Tncments ofjdomestic=yj[plen-ce,a^ services :, toüiedüsßffinjj^ The project I proposed wouMTl) train the pohce "l in cnsisjutervention to defuse domestic violence, (2) involve social ) workers in providing this training for the police, (3) Jjavesggal. ', woŕke^ôn^^jn/preonct stations, and (4) hayéthe poBcejnake fŕelíerra^^ "success of the project depended on •' its acceptance by the decision makarsjncity government who had rej^i!25SiKfl^ managingjjie police depart- ment and by theleadership inuie^íamily services agency "ana1 in the*priyate social service systein?~™~~^~^ "** ' " My position'was strengthened by the large vote I received in November 1973. From a field of eighteen candidates, Ijvas elected to the nine-member city council with the fifth. Mghes t vote. Soon after the Hew"čHycounôTwas"sworn in, we marched^with the new black mayor, in a funeral for a police officer killed in the line of duty during a social conflict situation. The emotional impact on the council members was forceful—the dirge, the lines of silent officers, the crowds along the parade route, the rifle salute, and the solidarity of officers and families as they rallied around the widow, who was herself in pohce training. In June 1974, the council adopted my resolution establishing a tasOprcěT to investigate .tanc^^jž^^^^^ffi^quesibon of domestic^^y^le^e^ana^tol ~w^S^ÖSüS3oüce and Svina^u^ffies. ^^The resolution mstructed theSocial Conflict Task Force to report to the city council and the mayor" wífEm three months with recommendations for referral mechanisms to handle situations involving social' conflict and with propösals_ for training Detroit police officers tardea] withssuch situations. The task force, by resolution, was to be composed of representatives from a number of organizations and agencies, including Family Service, the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), the Association of Blade Social Workers, community counseling and mental health coordinating agencies, the Detroit Police Department, and the department's corps of chaplains. The task force was also to include three people named by the mayor and the Detroit Board of 198 MAHAPFEY Police Commissioners. .By asking the mayor and the hoard of commissioners to name three people, I hoped to avoid turf problems, lend credibility to the task force, ensure that the new mayor would feel involved, and avoid giving the community the impression that the council and the mayor were at odds. The idea of a task force was new for the Detroit City Council. Although the council met every day of the year in committee of the whole, subcommittees were prohibited by the charter from 1918 to 1974. Some_ members of_the ^council were reluctant to establish. committeesjDr task forces,^jgr theyj^dtjt .would then be impossible toknpw.evJrythin^naXwas^going_m. Others thought establishing such bodies wojilgLr^duceJhe power of the_city council president, a position many, members wanted. It seemed wise, therefore, to make this a task force with a time limit and, because it was a first, to have someone other _than^cQundl_m.e,mber chair it. A priest who was^jraíned\coirniuiiuty^aEÍaÍ worker was asked" Jtg head the task force in the hope that this woTtfcTreduce turf-related problems. He would also do better, I believed, with the police department because his gender and priestly identification would help in dealings with the police chief. It was also essential tojnvolve adiverse group of human service^professionals. tp_jnraidjj^ym^ partment braditionaHsts or to professionals advocating onej^ar-ticularmethod, such aspeer group counseling, which is based on_ tfiejdeajhat^n^foejsj^ to deal, with pjijblejnsjnjralyjng. ^ needs only to_be a, peer_with a loving, caring heart'(In Detroit" in 1973, untrained women were running rape counseling services without professional consultation; by 1975, such services throughout the country were applying for money to hire professionals because the problems to be dealt with called for more skills and training than ŕ / the volunteers had.) ^-(tt^u ^central objective of my resolution was to address thejack i ď'l^ of understanding between the social work professional and the,I AQ í i Stu .. ■ - ■—. 7----i'H-----M*-h......-----1' ľ.....•" . " .; . j'__ ' - '—?■'—.....■-.........i ■■.■•) [ I £ o .policemi was convinced „that., if social jvork.pr.ofes5ionalsjwere ! inyolveo,.hl the project.fr9^_tiie_^ghirJiiig4.some.of.the_artificial barriers, between, the two professions would be eliminated, and the services developed would"' blTTJetter for it However, some : /_ sociaj_wqrkers frad serious doubts about the project. They quesrf ;■ ■ * tioned whether a change from "traditional social' agency practices | would improve .the situation and whether social workers^nuld j Creating a New Service 199 j ÍSS&illáuägy&S,^^ They also ; Wjarjŕlerj^whatih^ Many social work- j ers agsjieir„rglci as one^Qi^offmng^therapy "in traditionaI_office : .settings. Neither psychiatrists nor sÔcľáTworkers have tradition-I ally worked with the police, although, as will be discussed later, ! some psychologists have begun to develop cris^Jnteryention pro- Police traďtiongily view their work as the pursuit of criminals and the performance of patrol duties. Intervening in social conflicts is often seen_as ^social work and aj a íes^ďejiräble assignment for the p.piice..pfficer. However, many police, like the public, are intrigued by the police activities portrayed in such television shows as "Baretta" and "Starsky and Hutch," although police admit that a show like "Barney Miller" is closer to reality. Police officers usually want to get the family trouble runs off their backs, jut the programs to_a^comphsntms are often ignored and the victims fold-that the problem is a civil matter: "Sorry, ladv, there's nothing we can do." "Äs the task force began its work, it became known that a command' officer in the Detroit Pqjice Department _had_ researched dom^s^c_vioJe'nj;eľIňT^prepanng ..a^pcjmŕ^ dissertation on the police emergency phone system. His findings highlighted ÍOGj^ÍL^_^§Ä?-JB^^en^i°ií-£^:^,l? for the police operators and the low j?ripxlix.pohcei gave to domestic _yiolence. Although this officer was regarded by police officers, both black and white, as fair, tough, and a true police professional, the chief refused to appoint him to the Social Conflict _.Tas_k_Eorce. In-s'féäci, the chief intimated that the officer was being investigated by the FBI because of criminal contacts. This new, white chief was intent on proving his ability to rule the department. Therefore, the police officers appointed to the task-force included one assigned to the Criminal Justice Institute (the local police academy) and an officer in headquarters command who was held in low esteem by the chief. The officers in charge of the institute were from outside the city and had little credibility in some levels of the police department. These appointments reflected jthe low priority the mayor assigned to the täšuTEorce. The only 'h^ewcts^ij^^^TäskTórce to develop a Base and ä degrée'oP unaelitanoingof family vIöie^icTm^rB^police department, social a^naesuandjh^ic^^mja0fcand to develop a model for later progr_anj^ydo^inent. ". " 300 MAHAFFEY Work of the Task Force The task force studied crisis intervention programs conducted by police departments and other law enforcement agencies, examining them for their trainingjechnigjies^their referral mechanisms, and their effectiveness^,!]! 1974, most of the published work in this field had been done by psychologists, with the two major training packages having been developed by Bard from the Psychology Department of City College of New York and by Schwartz and Liebman, psychologists based in San Francisco. The Bard model emphasized teaching officers techniques for defusing conflict and for referring people to agencies.'1 This package was designed for special units in police departments, but, unfortunately, such units tend to be elitist and to arrive at the scene after other officers have already performed the difficult and sensitive parts of the assignment. Moreover, when problems with funding arise, special units are the most likely to be eliminated. The Schwartz-Liebman model used in San Francisco's Bay Area also emphasized defusing conflict.5 Although this approach involved the training of all police officers, the relationship between police and social service agencies was limited to the making of referrals and the developing of pocket-size referral books for officers. The police also tested whether the agency was receptive to police referrals and whether people were taken care of. Such referral mechanisms seemed to be afterthoughts. Both models had sexist overtones in how they viewed women victims of violence, and they built on the machismo emphasis of police training. I joined a task force team that included representatives from the Detroit Police Department and the Criminal Justice Institute in conducting on-site research in California with police departments using the Schwartz model. The visit won support among some of the police officers for such a program and gave me additional information regarding links to community agencies and the experience of community agencies in social conflict interventions. For example, the experience of the program in Oakland, California, indicated that the peaks for conflict occurred on weekends and paydays and that once a situation was defused, 75 percent of the people being dealt with could wait until Monday morning for further intervention. Most families successfully referred needed from one to three interviews, and only 5 percent became long-term clients.6 The task force also consulted extensively with the Police Creating a New Service 201 Foundation in Washington, D.C., and one member of the task force attended an FBI seminar on social conflict in Virginia. Others attended a regional Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) conference in Chicago. The task force also examined the policies and practices of the Detroit Police Department in handling family violence. In 1974 the department gave a low priority to "domestic calls" on 911, the emergency line. People soon caught on that calls describing family problems brought a slow response, and callers began claiming there was "a man with a gun," which made the call a high priority and prompted a quick police response. The General Orders of the Detroit Police Department in 1974 described social conflict situations as civil matters and not as a police responsibility. Several reasons were given for this point of view: (1) the large volume of other service demands for emergencies involving immediate physical danger and crimes in progress, (2) the lack of specific training for police mediating social conflicts, and (3) the service award system that emphasized arrests and convictions. Police recruits in Detroit received a total of seven hours of lecture-type training in topics related to social conflicts, a three-hour lecture on domestic complaints, and four hours of lecture on handling abnormal individuals, all of which constituted a tiny portion of the recruits' six-month training. Nevertheless, an estimated 25 to 30 percent of the calls to the 911 number in Detroit each week related to social conflicts. Recommendations In October of 1974, the_Sociai.Conflict_Task ForceJre^^Edjto the Detroit City Council and the mayor, pointing outproolems in » many areas. The task force cited thejackof a legal way, in situations of marital conflict,.to force a separatipn~pr to evict a violent * perspn from the situation. It also criticized the failure of the police to treat "with the same seriousness as_j^3mes..occurring between strangersjdomestic conflict or social conflict situations that in- » volved-peopje who Kneyjacn^Üier: tffis~pröbiern wäš"pafBcularly nptew^rthy ín instances of .violence between husbands, and wives. The lack of understanding ancf.cooperatign^etweejusjKia^agen-cies.and the police department was another problem discussed in -j the task force's rápo'ftTSpciaľagencies offered services during cer- 202 MAHAFFEY ff" _tain^TCmngJiours_and. ran somejimj^shdters for people who needed a place to spend the night. This was not enough, however and wjiat^s__a^lable„waa oftei^^ ^ownj^police offi- * cers. In Detroit, as in many communitiesT there are"t^enry^ourľ hour mental health clinics, but these are intended to deal with -psychiatric emergencies, not problemsJn_rejg^hÍ^luďr--:fc family conflicts. In addition, most of Detroit's social agencies did * noÍLseLajajdeJ?ÍPc.ks octíme durmg^which clients caughQnVom-fl^situjnipn_CDuldJwalk^^ tions, agejirie£jiad_w^ Two friends threat- ening to shoot each other do not need to be told to get at the end of the waiting list. The task force also faulted the 911 priority list, which placed property crinles and crimes involving a weapon higher than family calls. An example of the 911 calls to which the operator could not send a car in 1974 was as follows: AJ5-y_ear-oid girl called, scream- j ing that her mother was hitting her and beating heřúp. She cried that she was_jrighte_ned-th.at_.her morlienjwotildUcUL.Jaer, ~T~he operätor_saidJhatjhi^wag.not.a police matter and hung up. In turn, the police complained „that, when lhelcali£came in at mid- - ÍÍI^Íry^caWiplencer„np spcialji^ker or_SDcial,wqrI^gency was available. ~~" ~ " The task force's report made five major rr&mffiělíaationší (1) that an_pfficers_be_expos^dJo^. forty-hour cS^lňTggěntíon* ,j ^S£.PI5Hi?jnj^erjfian just members'ofspecial urníšT(2J tlŤätacornmunity resourcej;ef e^al^svstejm wVt-á hliij wT(3) that p socialj^ge^ncj^es^set aside blocks of time and have extended hours to * asšíštrihoj^^ (4) tnat changes!!, n^e^the ppfc aUocaüonii^ersÖrr * riel, giving a higjierjttiorit^tq "family calls and training_911 opera-tEIJ5^ÍÍ^jntOTie_wing_and^ and <5) that a service a^^^xstem_be_estabus.hed torecognize officersfor •* řhejrjbilities fo"oeFuse volatile situations~withnnt- in^ry to themselves of others. """ When the report of the Social Conflict Task Force was com- ^ pleted in November 1974, Ijised my elected posjtion to obtain media coverage for the, report!s.findings. T~aTso presented "the *3IČ£OÉQE^ aLajubHc meeting. Several members of the board believed in what we were trying to do; others thought it a minor matter. However, the police Creating a New Service 203 SbMtíá that the recommendations^otthejask force could n , u acted_on until Rnnäl-^rüTr-^S^T™____ ľ~^T~^£2HiaB£tbe. ^d^ZuntJLsca^ JiQuíÄ-a-jiaäs^seysnjdays a_wjefc. He was un^uhn^toconsider employing, social workersJn the police department uníessj35y-were uniformed .officers; if^ei^w^jiinif^eí^^g^^J noX^Ín-£ to give them the assignmeňľof worldngwiy^domesüc violence.. ""....." '" " '" *~" " *~ Othertobs^cles>included the mayor's continuing to view the project as a low priority. It seemed obvious that the recommenda tions of the task force were not going to get far without better cooperation from the top of the police department. Therefore, the stratggEjagcaine!one_of_ keeping the issuejaiiyj^&rjaugh meeting i CQJEQUtfÜt&grQiig^^ exampleT^eri 1 representatives of the task force "met with the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, additional members of the Social Conflict Task Force and others were rounded up to be present as a show of support. The head of the task force organized an NASW commit J^ojl^OcjaLcDolflict, and both of us continued tq_tajk to the police, the p?lice_ijujipjis*-žu3djjw We also con tinued to work on the issue of 911 priorities, to talk with profes sionals and agencies^apgii.t the .necessi.ty Jjf closer work between sacial_agendes^and_the police, department, and to work with the National Organization for Women (NOW) and other community groups to keep the pressure on. The Criminal Justice Institute had the officers most inter ested in the project. They even invited Schwartz and Liebman to conduct a week-long demonstration course on handling social con flicts. Not long afterwards, however, the institute was closed as a result of police department politics and Detroit's 1975-76 depression, during which every department of city government, including the police, took a 20-percent budget cut. The projection was that there would be no police to train for at least six months. It appeared the project was dead. Breakthrough Events quite apart from any efforts in behalf of the task force recommendations offered an opportunity for some progress. The pohce_chief overreached^ himself in^ ^departmental dispute and_ 304 3YLAHAFFEY m nhp Was fired. A new police chief was appointed. Also, the officer who £äčn5ecome the expert within the department on the issue of social conflict calls became deputy executive chief for several months. In November 1976, in an effort to break through the stalemate, I heldj^mggfcirjgjn my office to discuss, social conflict calls. I invited the deputy executive chief of the police department^ a representative of United Community Services, the priest who had headed the task force, the two area directors of Family Service of Detroit and Wayne County, and a representative of the Detroit unit of NASW's Michigan Chapter. Discussion at this meeting identified thejwojmajpjkaje^^ to house and protect children in danger__as a resi^o.lfamilyRouble, and_pj^jgio^^^ responded_witha propos alforihfi-^olice^ Referral Project of Family Service of -. Detroit and Wayne County, which eventually became Icnown as the Family Trouble Clinic. The agency's willingness to engage in this project was partly a result of community pressure and NASW myQiyejnent. A speech by~ffie deputy executive police chief at a local NASW meeting on the issue of family violence and the police had interested many social workers in the problem. The project was conceived as a_t&ree-month pilot effort. > Family Service was to provide the finances fpr_a^pnäTworßrtq :-be present "In the precinct station and offer^raxnediatelservice- .to clients during the peak ^neriods for incidents of dp^esticxifllence,, wTucTTw^re^nday and^ ima'nighOn addition, one or two. vjsilsJiy^._sriciaijy^^ 'precincT during the weekwere planned to facilitate, coordinate, and direct referrals to Family Service. Objectives of the project were to demons^ateJ^^eierr^^e_e^edatied By precinct:based activities, make social services..better known.to.more ppjice.jrffi-cers,_íhčŕéase professional staff's appreciation of_ the,.problems pohce_^ŕficeŕs have-in[Hbmestic relations c^jis,._anď..giye..police officers a betterllnde^anding of tfie"š^yTces„offered. It was also hoped that the results of this police referral project would lend support to the tas k Jpjro^ recommendation of,.establishingjijght servicefcr .family_counsehng. No movement toök"pface regarding the proposal for several months. Finally, Ij^scpvexecLthat^ not_seen the^prpposaí, so I forwarded another copy to him. I then called rum several times, and he finally agreed it was worth pur- Creating a New Service 205 suing. At a brief meeting in March 1977, the acceptance _of_the project, was confirmed ;rgnd_Jts location established for the Sixteenth Police Precinct, whose commander had volunteered to house the project. The precinct was the largest in the city, its population presented a racial and economic cross section, and the precinct station was close to an office of Family Service. As responsbiíity for the development and implementation of the project shifted from one step to the next, it was repeatedly necessary, to confront obstacles, defuse emotions, and solve problems to keep the,project moving toward the final goal. Social work skills and the modest power of my elected office were valuable assets during this stage. Although an early problem arose when the precinct commander publicly supported a mayoral candidate in opposition to the incumbent mayor in the 1977 election, Üiejfficei^.w.axkijig with the project were convinced of its value, and the two social workers assigned to Jhe projecjMyy Fam_ily_S^^e_wer^pIeased wjth their work. Everyone involved became supportive of the project, and both.the police and the human service.professionals^ aid they had begun toap^recjate^each other,J lobbied the mayor and his staff in support of the project and, in my reelection campaign, described it as a success, thus building public acceptance and support. In the end, the project survived both the internal politics of the police department and electoral politics. An ad hoc committee of Family Service studied the experiences of the policy referral project and compiled useful information: « Social workers and the police were received differently by families in crisis. • All direct referrals resulted in clients' receiving crisis counseling services within three hours of the complaint. • Follow-up counseling occurred in 89 percent of all situations in which families received crisis counseling from the social worker. e In all situations of family conflict, at least one member of the family received some form of direct service from a social worker. e The number of referrals the project generated in the test precinct would have doubled Family Service's total annual intake if the rate of referral were projected to all the city's police precincts. 206 MAHAFFBY Ninety_-nine percent of the people referred haaL.not.visited^a human service agency" before'. Police officers were concerned about domestic violence, but most felt helpless and powerless in confronting the problem. Perceived as the authority in the community, police can force cessation of a violent situation, but they cannot keep people apart. In some situations, for a variety of reasons, the next day the wife would say that she wanted her abuser home. Social workers know and deal with the dynamics of relation- / ships, the police officer with cessation of_ the immediate i froüBIe. With the inception of the pilot project"tHe]police píficer~h¥d~šométhing to say, to recommend, after stopping .the hostile actions. Most disputants lacked communication skills and were not used to talking about feelings. There are also problems when only one of two marital partners is verbal. Focus on Publicity Once this information had been compiled, my office announced on a Friday that there would be a report to the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners. A newspaper reporter called me on Sunday afternoon, desperately looking for a story, and, as a result, the police referxal-pE&fect received a front-page headline Monday^moni-ing. Fortunately, the writer of the newspaper article spoke with a police sergeant who had worked with Family Service on the pilot project. The sergeant was pleased with the project and praised it, and the article had the effect of broadening, public support. As planned, thejrepprtwas presented to the board with t^ö_resglu-tions^ (1) that the board approach the local United Foundation and its planning agency for thFmqnexij^^ project permanenťand^q^expajiíLit to another precinct and (2) that the police department be instructed to work with,Family Service to prepänTa proposal to get funding for_a._sijnüax^prxgOin-in ajljhe precincts. Time, place, and situation all influence process and strategy. As a result of Family Service's report and of the media coverage received by a national conference on domestic violence held in Detroit by NOW, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, on my recommendation, set up a task force on social conflict. A Creating a New Service 207 woman commissioner was to chair the task force, and I was to be vice-chair. We thus developed a publicly mandated support network as well as an entree to the board of commissioners,.the policymaking body for the police department. P aitjDf.my Junction 3faj^^ in t&e^gJicjej^JxaXp^ might_w,ant.tpJatch,..on_to a^Hoj^^iCjJtorexaraple, after the task force was formed by the board of commissioners, two local feminists wrote a proposal for crisis intervention training for the police. One of them, a person with experience in sociological research, was to spend two months supervising a police sergeant in the development of a program to train police officers in defusion techniques. The researcher planned to develop, a referral manual. The-íocus- ■ was-on. the victim without real consideration 'of TiHe prgj3leins:o£,Ü\e^^ was mlídeltí Uiétráiiv ing the^Dolice were abeady receiving orj^anýjčbôpeŕ^ pt^TJrainingypjograms. The sociological researcher and the other feminist, a planner in the city's planning department, did their political homework, and by maneuvering and taking advantage of internecine rivalry in the police department, they managed to obtain an LEAA grant despite the objections of several top officials in the police department and of the board of commissioner's task force. The grant was subj3equjir^^ police ořficíalš^oncerňs. Other groups also went to the board of commissioners to demand changes in. police procedures. Some representatives of these groups were made members of the board's task force. In 1977,1 built my successful reelection campaign presentation on the theme "promises made and promises kept." One of the promises made in 1973 had been to do something about domestic violence. The promise had been kept: the police referral project had demonstrated that help could be given to families and to police officers and had resulted in some lessening of domestic violence. There3ŕas_&ddjejncejjiaí-^ lower among ca3es_a> v^tedJo^amjlyService. The_DÜpl_pipject_demojxsJ^ to spread the_police referrd^pxogcamJhT^ghojLUthe-city. In November of 1977, the Jocal_Umte^Eojar^ money to^continue thj^rograjnJnJhe,Srxteeiith-M the Tenth Precinct. When the Criminal Justice Institute resumed 208 MAHAFFEY training in 1977, it incorporated into its curriculum for all officers some ôf the material that was prepared as a result of the studies by the Social Conflict Task Force. As a whole, the project documented the overwhelming need for money to involve additional social workers in social conflict work. Principles of Political Practice i XAßJ It would have been impossible to establish the police referral sys- iV),~-/g tern had there not been support inside the police department, as ^ '" ( well as considerable support on the outside. Confrontation was (jyJ^K avoided. The changinj|^cjuna^^ to^womgn contributed '^aaä*** immenselyTo^Ss. Desp^ low priority on TitunarTservices, his recognitipn_of the general support the_issue attracted, of my expertise in this"area, and'of'my"support for his Administration kept the task force and the police referral project from being seen as too great a threat. In addition, success was ensured by using existing structures and by keeping small the amount of money initially requested. ^purees of funainj^outside_ city, .government were relied on heavily_untň3sfé..aí¥PPt3Jipe of the idea for a different kind ortralninghad been.estabHshed. It was äl'šo important to" the success of the program that thejolice a^rJärün£tiUienefitedt^^ its eagerness to find solutions^to help people. "*" "Given "the dynamics Involved "in working with the Detroit Police Department, the mayor, and various elements of city government, a strategy that included picket lines and mass demonstrations would have been counterproductive. However, the strategy used did include a great deal of individual assessment, persuasion, expert information and documentation, lobbying, and the implied pressure of budget power, particularly the power to hold up contracts. It further required the ability to create publicity. The value of coordinating various forces was also demonstrated, because the Detroit Police Department has expert politicians in its ranks. Injiddition^.pQÜcj^terjar^ a membezjQtJ±j24^^ putfic^iscujsipj3LP^ Like most tiuřéaucFats, they dreaded rhTpossSulty^liaTCrse publicity. Apparent throughout the long campaign for the referral system was the importance of timing and of keeping the issue alive during the many periods of waiting Creating a New Service 209 for favorable conditions and opportunities for progress. A social worker entering politics cannot overlook the importance of conviction and assertiveness. In the Detroit CítyCoun cíl, where the members are elected simultaneously and atlarge, there is a natural competition for constituencies and for votes. Thergjs_ also, a JSöLägreejnj^^ an isjsiLe_ofj^^ia]_cjm^^ not seriously: interfere with his, or her leadership on thatissue. ) Social workers are £ranedj£jm|ü^& ; sjdes. TKisToí cbursejTs both a^t^ni^^bilj^.Sgajgniiiqj^oJ ; cpjn^lejcities_can '^Jpj^decjsjvjrjeg^^ whereas.pojice^ejxajned ; ro^q^isjve^tojiein command,.and to^v^^ggí^gjjjgjf^nswgrs. .' A consequence of thesed^e/encesjsj^^ ; arejrftenjnföl^^ needed..is,an.infegra- : tion pFskills. Social workers as a whole, and human service agencies as well, need to understand that if they have an idea for a solution to a problem and the professional expertise to carry it out, they must be prepared to fight to get the problem solved in a professional way. Social workers sometimes take the position that the best program will eventually win and so do not fight for proposals that would assure social work services. Too often, non-social workers become attracted by a social work idea and are allowed to take it over for personal gain as it becomes popular. It is important that social workers commit themselves to engage in action for the client's benefit and for equitable treatment to ensure the availability of social work services. The solution to a problem on a limited scale creates new"demands. As the police referral service demonstrated that it worked, the police in Detroit's Sixteenth Police Precinct made more referrals, and satisfied clients and others called the Family Trouble Clinic instead of the police. Those_who returned seemed to want Jonger. term counseling. Eventually,J^ Avorkers and money. The worker.^ kerame spoyeHoaded they had trouble following^p_on_ca!Is__ana^^ counseling via_teJepjic^nj|JIie-SQÍution^^ new ones, which had to be addressed in new ways. Flexibility is an essential complement to stability of purpose. The scientific method of problem solving—assessing anddefining the problem, analyzing the forces involved, establishing goals and objectives, planning and implementing intervention strategies, and constantly 210 MAHAFFEY reevaluating process and substance to identify the need for any corrective action—provides a valid model for developing and delivering services to a needy population. The steps outlined in this article can be translated for use by other sociai workers elected to office, by the many social workers who work with elected officials, and by community groups who have been successful in selling an issue to an elected official. The problem of domestic violence—its impact on the police as well as on families—was identified and then further defined through the use of a task force to gather information and bring various forces in the community together. At each step in the process, strategies were developed to continue the forward movement of the project. When some forces threatened to sidetrack the project, other routes were found and counterforces developed. Most important, throughout this long process, the goal was kept in focus and the pressure was continued. Perhaps the old maxim that change is slow should be extended to affirm that achieving the goal reached through long and persistent effort is even sweeter. Notes and References 1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). 2. Interview with Patrick V. Murphy, executive director, Police Foundation, Washington, D.C.June 1974. 3. Interviews with United States Army social workers, Fifth Army, Frankfurt, Germany, June 1975. 4. See Morton Bard and Joseph Zacker, The Police and Interpersonal Conflict: Third-Party Intervention Approaches (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1976). 5. See Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Donald A. Liebman, "Domestic Crisis Intervention" (Mountain View, Calif.: Law Enforcement Training and Research Association, Inc., 1971). (Photocopied.) 6. Interview with Betty Terrell, director of professional services, Family Service of the East Bay, Oakland, Calif., September 1974. Creating a New Service 211