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chris argyris: theories of
action, double-loop learning
and organizational learning
The work of Chris Argyris (1923-) has
influenced thinking about the
relationship of people and organizations,
organizational learning and action
research. Here we examine some key
aspects of his thinking.
contents: introduction | life | theories of action: theory in use and espoused theory | single-loop and
double-loop learning | model I and model II | organizational learning | conclusion | further reading and
references | links | cite
Chris Argyris has made a significant contribution to the development of our
appreciation of organizational learning, and, almost in passing, deepened
our understanding of experiential learning. On this page we examine the
significance of the models he developed with Donald Schön of single-loop
and double-loop learning, and how these translate into contrasting models
of organizational learning systems.
Life
Chris Argyris was born in Newark, New Jersey on
July 16, 1923 and grew up in Irvington, New Jersey.
During the Second World War he joined the Signal
Corps in the U.S. Army eventually becoming a
Second Lieutenant (Elkjaer 2000). He went to
university at Clark, where he came into contact with
Kurt Lewin (Lewin had begun the Research Center
for Group Dynamics at M.I.T.). He graduated with a
degree in Psychology (1947). He went on to gain an
MA in Psychology and Economics from Kansas University (1949), and a
Ph.D. in Organizational Behavior from Cornell University (he was
supervised by William F. Whyte) in 1951. In a distinguished career Chris
Argyris has been a faculty member at Yale University (1951-1971) where he
served as the Beach Professor of Administrative Science and Chairperson of
the department; and the James Bryant Conant Professor of Education and
Organizational Behavior at Harvard University (1971- ). Argyris is currently
a director of the Monitor Company in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Chris Argyris' early research explored the impact of formal organizational
structures, control systems, and management on individuals (and how they
responded and adapted to them). This research resulted in the books
Personality and Organization (1957) and Integrating the Individual and the
Organization (1964). He then shifted his focus to organizational change, in
particular exploring the behaviour of senior executives in organizations
(Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness, 1962; Organization
and Innovation, 1965). From there he moved onto a particularly fruitful
inquiry into the role of the social scientist as both researcher and actor
(Intervention Theory and Method, 1970; Inner Contradictions of Rigorous
Research, 1980 and Action Science, 1985 - with Robert Putnam and Diana
McLain Smith). Much of the focus on this page lies with his fourth major
area of research and theorizing ­ in significant part undertaken with Donald
Schön ­ around individual and organizational learning. Here the interest lies
in the extent to which human reasoning, not just behaviour, can become the
basis for diagnosis and action (Theory in Practice, 1974 ; Organizational
Learning, 1978; Organizational Learning II, 1996 ­ all with Donald Schön). He
has also developed this thinking in Overcoming Organizational Defenses
(1990), Knowledge for Action (1993).
As well as writing and researching, Chris Argyris has been an influential
teacher. This is how Peter Senge (1990: 182-3) talks about his own
experience of Argyris as a teacher.
Despite having read much of his writing, I was unprepared for
what I learned when I first saw Chris Argyris practice his
approach in an informal workshop... Ostensibly an academic
presentation of Argyris's methods, it quickly evolved into a
powerful demonstration of what action science practitioners call
`reflection in action'.... Within a matter of minutes, I watched the
level of alertness and `presentness' of the entire group rise ten
notches ­ thanks not so much to Argyris's personal charisma, but
to his skilful practice of drawing out... generalizations. As the
afternoon moved on, all of us were led to see (sometimes for he
first time in our lives) subtle patterns of reasoning which
underlay our behaviour; and how those patterns continually got
us into trouble. I had never had such a dramatic demonstration of
own mental models in action... But even more interesting, it
became clear that, with proper training, I could become much
more aware of my mental models and how they operated. This
was exciting.
The ability, demonstrated here, to engage with others, to make links with the
general and the particular, and to explore basic orientations and values is
just what Argyris talks about when exploring the sorts of behaviours and
beliefs that are necessary if organizations are to learn and develop.
Theories of action: theory in use and espoused theory
Our starting point is Argyris and Schön's (1974) argument that people have
mental maps with regard to how to act in situations. This involves the way
they plan, implement and review their actions. Furthermore, they assert that
it is these maps that guide people's actions rather than the theories they
explicitly espouse. What is more, fewer people are aware of the maps or
theories they do use (Argyris, 1980). One way of making sense of this is to
say that there is split between theory and action. However, Argyris and
Schön suggest that two theories of action are involved.
The notion of a theory of action can be seen as growing out of earlier
research by Chris Argyris into the relationships between individuals and
organizations (Argyris 1957, 1962, 1964). A theory of action is first a theory:
`its most general properties are properties that all theories share, and the
most general criteria that apply to it ­ such as generality, centrality and
simplicity - are criteria applied to all theories' (Argyris and Schön 1974: 4).
The distinction made between the two contrasting theories of action is
between those theories that are implicit in what we do as practitioners and
managers, and those on which we call to speak of our actions to others. The
former can be described as theories-in-use. They govern actual behaviour and
tend to be tacit structures. Their relation to action 'is like the relation of
grammar-in-use to speech; they contain assumptions about self, others and
environment - these assumptions constitute a microcosm of science in
everyday life' (Argyris & Schön 1974: 30). The words we use to convey what
we, do or what we would like others to think we do, can then be called
espoused theory.
When someone is asked how he would behave under certain
circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory
of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he
gives allegiance, and which, upon request, he communicates to
others. However, the theory that actually governs his actions is
this theory-in-use. (Argyris and Schön 1974: 6-7)
Making this distinction allows us to ask questions about the extent to which
behaviour fits espoused theory; and whether inner feelings become
expressed in actions. In other words, is there congruence between the two?
Argyris (1980) makes the case that effectiveness results from developing
congruence between theory-in-use and espoused theory. For example, in
explaining our actions to a colleague we may call upon some convenient
piece of theory. We might explain our sudden rush out of the office to
others, or even to ourselves at some level, by saying that a 'crisis' had arisen
with one of 'our' clients. The theory-in-use might be quite different. We may
have become bored and tired by the paper work or meeting and felt that a
quick trip out to an apparently difficult situation would bring welcome
relief. A key role of reflection, we could argue, is to reveal the theory-in-use
and to explore the nature of the 'fiť. Much of the business of supervision,
where it is focused on the practitioner's thoughts, feelings and actions, is
concerned with the gulf between espoused theory and theory-in-use or in
bringing the later to the surface. This gulf is no bad thing. If it gets too wide
then there is clearly a difficulty. But provided the two remain connected
then the gap creates a dynamic for reflection and for dialogue.
To fully appreciate theory-in-use we require a model of the processes
involved. To this end Argyris and Schön (1974) initially looked to three
elements:
Governing variables: those dimensions that people are trying to
keep within acceptable limits. Any action is likely to impact upon
a number of such variables ­ thus any situation can trigger a
trade-off among governing variables.
Action strategies: the moves and plans used by people to keep
their governing values within the acceptable range.
Consequences: what happens as a result of an action. These can
be both intended - those actor believe will result - and
unintended. In addition those consequences can be for the self,
and/or for others. (Anderson 1997)
Where the consequences of the strategy used are what the person wanted,
then the theory-in-use is confirmed. This is because there is a match between
intention and outcome. There may be a mismatch between intention and
outcome. In other words, the consequences may be unintended. They may
also not match, or work against, the person's governing values. Argyris and
Schön suggest two responses to this mismatch, and these are can be seen in
the notion of single and double-loop learning.
Single-loop and double-loop learning
For Argyris and Schön (1978: 2) learning involves the detection and
correction of error. Where something goes wrong, it is suggested, an initial
port of call for many people is to look for another strategy that will address
and work within the governing variables. In other words, given or chosen
goals, values, plans and rules are operationalized rather than questioned.
According to Argyris and Schön (1974), this is single-loop learning. An
alternative response is to question to governing variables themselves, to
subject them to critical scrutiny. This they describe as double-loop learning.
Such learning may then lead to an alteration in the governing variables and,
thus, a shift in the way in which strategies and consequences are framed.
Thus, when they came to explore the nature of organizational learning. This
is how Argyris and Schön (1978: 2-3) described the process in the context of
organizational learning:
When the error detected and corrected permits the organization
to carry on its present policies or achieve its presents objectives,
then that error-and-correction process is single-loop learning.
Single-loop learning is like a thermostat that learns when it is too
hot or too cold and turns the heat on or off. The thermostat can
perform this task because it can receive information (the
temperature of the room) and take corrective action. Double-loop
learning occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that
involve the modification of an organization's underlying norms,
policies and objectives.
This process can be represented quite easily by a simple amendment of our
initial representation of theory-in-use.
Single-loop learning seems to be present when goals, values, frameworks
and, to a significant extent, strategies are taken for granted. The emphasis is
on `techniques and making techniques more efficienť (Usher and Bryant:
1989: 87) Any reflection is directed toward making the strategy more
effective. Double-loop learning, in contrast, `involves questioning the role of
the framing and learning systems which underlie actual goals and strategies'
(op. cit.). In many respects the distinction at work here is the one used by
Aristotle, when exploring technical and practical thought. The former
involves following routines and some sort of preset plan ­ and is both less
risky for the individual and the organization, and affords greater control.
The latter is more creative and reflexive, and involves consideration notions
of the good. Reflection here is more fundamental: the basic assumptions
behind ideas or policies are confronted... hypotheses are publicly tested...
processes are disconfirmable not self-seeking (Argyris 1982: 103-4).
The focus of much of Chris Argyris' intervention research has been to
explore how organizations may increase their capacity for double-loop
learning. He argues that double-loop learning is necessary if practitioners
and organizations are to make informed decisions in rapidly changing and
often uncertain contexts (Argyris 1974; 1982; 1990). As Edmondson and
Moingeon (1999:160) put it:
The underlying theory, supported by years of empirical research,
is that the reasoning processes employed by individuals in
organizations inhibit the exchange of relevant information in
ways that make double-loop learning difficult ­ and all but
impossible in situations in which much is at stake. This creates a
dilemma as these are the very organizational situations in which
double-loop learning is most needed.
The next step that Argyris and Schön take is to set up two models that
describe features of theories-in-use that either inhibit or enhance doubleloop
learning. The belief is that all people utilize a common theory-in-use in
problematic situations. This they describe as Model I ­ and it can be said to
inhibit double-loop learning. Model II is where the governing values
associated with theories-in-use enhance double-loop learning.
Model I and Model II
Argyris has claimed that just about all the participants in his studies
operated from theories-in-use or values consistent with Model I
(Argyris et al. 1985: 89). It involves `making inferences about another
person's behaviour without checking whether they are valid and
advocating one's own views abstractly without explaining or
illustrating one's reasoning' (Edmondson and Moingeon 1999:161).
The theories-in-use are shaped by an implicit disposition to winning
(and to avoid embarrassment). The primary action strategy looks to
the unilateral control of the environment and task plus the unilateral
protection of self and others. As such Model I leads to often deeply
entrenched defensive routines (Argyris 1990; 1993) ­ and these can
operate at individual, group and organizational levels. Exposing
actions, thoughts and feelings can make people vulnerable to the
reaction of others. However, the assertion that Model I is
predominantly defensive has a further consequence:
Acting defensively can be viewed as moving away from
something, usually some truth about ourselves. If our actions are
driven by moving away from something then our actions are
controlled and defined by whatever it is we are moving away
from, not by us and what we would like to be moving towards.
Therefore our potential for growth and learning is seriously
impaired. If my behaviour is driven by my not wanting to be seen
as incompetent, this may lead me to hide things from myself and
others, in order to avoid feelings of incompetence. For example, if
my behaviour is driven by wanting to be competent, honest
evaluation of my behaviour by myself and others would be
welcome and useful. (Anderson 1997)
It is only by interrogating and changing the governing values, the
argument goes, is it possible to produce new action strategies that can
address changing circumstances.
Model I theory-in-use characteristics
The governing Values of Model I are:
Achieve the purpose as the actor defines it
Win, do not lose
Suppress negative feelings
Emphasize rationality
Primary Strategies are:
Control environment and task unilaterally
Protect self and others unilaterally
Usually operationalized by:
Unillustrated attributions and evaluations e.g.. "You seem
unmotivated"
Advocating courses of action which discourage inquiry e.g..
"Lets not talk about the past, thaťs over."
Treating ones' own views as obviously correct
Making covert attributions and evaluations
Face-saving moves such as leaving potentially embarrassing
facts unstated
Consequences include:
Defensive relationships
Low freedom of choice
Reduced production of valid information
Little public testing of ideas
Taken from Argyris, Putnam & McLain Smith (1985, p. 89)
Chris Argyris looks to move people from a Model I to a Model II orientation
and practice ­ one that fosters double-loop learning. He suggests that most
people, when asked, will espouse Model II. As Anderson (1997) has
commented, Argyris offers no reason why most people espouse Model II. In
addition, we need to note that the vast bulk of research around the models
has been undertaken by Argyris or his associates.
The significant features of Model II include the ability to call upon good
quality data and to make inferences. It looks to include the views and
experiences of participants rather than seeking to impose a view upon the
situation. Theories should be made explicit and tested, positions should be
reasoned and open to exploration by others. In other words, Model II can be
seen as dialogical ­ and more likely to be found in settings and
organizations that look to shared leadership. It looks to:
Emphasize common goals and mutual influence.
Encourage open communication, and to publicly test assumptions
and beliefs.
Combine advocacy with inquiry (Argyris and Schön 1996; Bolman
and Deal 1997: 147-8).
We can see these in the table below.
Model II characteristics
The governing values of Model II include:
Valid information
Free and informed choice
Internal commitment
Strategies include:
Sharing control
Participation in design and implementation of action
Operationalized by:
Attribution and evaluation illustrated with relatively
directly observable data
Surfacing conflicting view
Encouraging public testing of evaluations
Consequences should include:
Minimally defensive relationships
High freedom of choice
Increased likelihood of double-loop learning
Taken from Anderson 1997
As Edmondson and Moingeon (1999:162) comment, employing Model II in
difficult interpersonal interactions `requires profound attentiveness and skill
for human beings socialized in a Model I worlď. While they are not being
asked to relinquish control altogether, they do need to share that control.
Organizational learning
Chris Argyris and Donald Schön suggest that each member of an
organization constructs his or her own representation or image of the
theory-in-use of the whole (1978: 16). The picture is always incomplete ­ and
people, thus, are continually working to add pieces and to get a view of the
whole. They need to know their place in the organization, it is argued.
An organization is like an organism each of whose cells contains a
particular, partial, changing image if itself in relation to the
whole. And like such an organism, the organization's practice
stems from those very images. Organization is an artifact of
individual ways of representing organization.
Hence, our inquiry into organizational learning must concern
itself not with static entities called organizations, but with an
active process of organizing which is, at root, a cognitive
enterprise. Individual members are continually engaged in
attempting to know the organization, and to know themselves in
the context of the organization. At the same time, their continuing
efforts to know and to test their knowledge represent the object
of their inquiry. Organizing is reflexive inquiry....
[Members] require external references. There must be public
representations of organizational theory-in-use to which
individuals can refer. This is the function of organizational maps.
These are the shared descriptions of the organization which
individuals jointly construct and use to guide their own inquiry.
Organizational theory-in-use, continually constructed through
individual inquiry, is encoded in private images and in public
maps. These are the media of organizational learning. (Argyris
and Schön 1978: 16-17)
With this set of moves we can see how Chris Argyris and Donald Schön
connect up the individual world of the worker and practitioner with the
world of organization. Their focus is much more strongly on individual and
group interactions and defenses than upon systems and structures (we could
contrast their position with that of Peter Senge 1990, for example). By
looking at the way that people jointly construct maps it is then possible to
talk about organizational learning (involving the detection and correction of
error) and organizational theory-in-use. For organizational learning to occur,
`learning agents', discoveries, inventions, and evaluations must be
embedded in organizational memory' (Argyris and Schön 1978: 19). If it is
not encoded in the images that individuals have, and the maps they
construct with others, then `the individual will have learned but the
organization will not have done so' (op. cit.).
In this organizational schema single-loop learning is characterized as when,
`members of the organization respond to changes in the internal and
external environment of the organization by detecting errors which they
then correct so as to maintain the central features of theory-in-use' (ibid.: 18).
Double-loop learning then becomes:
... those sorts of organizational inquiry which resolve
incompatible organizational norms by setting new priorities and
weightings of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves
together with associated strategies and assumptions. (Argyris and
Schön 1978: 18)
The next step is to argue that individuals using Model I create
Organizational I (O-I) learning systems. These are characterized by
`defensiveness, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-fuelling processes, and
escalating error' (Argyris 1982: 8). O-I systems involve a web of feedback
loops that `make organizational assumptions and behavioural routines selfreinforcing
­ inhibiting "detection and correction of error" and giving rise to
mistrust, defensiveness and self-fulfilling prophecy' (Edmondson and
Moingeon 1999:161). In other words, if individuals in an organization make
use of Model I learning the organization itself can begin to function in ways
that act against its long-term interests. Indeed, in a very real sense systems
can begin to malfunction. As Argyris and Schön (1996: 28) put it, `The
actions we take to promote productive organizational learning actually
inhibit deeper learning'. The challenge is, then, to create a rare phenomenon
­ an Organizational II (O-II) learning system.
Here we come to the focus of organizational effort ­ the formulation and
implementation of an intervention strategy. This, according to Argyris and
Schön (1978: 220-1) involves the `interventionisť in moving through six
phases of work:
Phase 1 Mapping the problem as clients see it. This
includes the factors and relationships that define the
problem, and the relationship with the living
systems of the organization.
Phase 2 The internalization of the map by clients. Through
inquiry and confrontation the interventionists work
with clients to develop a map for which clients can
accept responsibility. However, it also needs to be
comprehensive.
Phase 3 Test the model. This involves looking at what
`testable predictions' can be derived from the map and
looking to practice and history to see if the
predictions stand up. If they do not, the map has to
be modified.
Phase 4 Invent solutions to the problem and simulate them
to explore their possible impact.
Phase 5 Produce the intervention.
Phase 6 Study the impact. This allows for the correction of
errors as well as generating knowledge for future
designs. If things work well under the conditions
specified by the model, then the map is not
disconfirmed.
By running through this sequence and attending to key criteria suggested by
Model II, it is argued, organizational development is possible. The process
entails looking for the maximum participation of clients, minimizing the
risks of candid participation, starting where people want to begin (often
with instrumental problems), and designing methods so that they value
rationality and honesty.
Conclusion
How are we to evaluate these models and line of argument? First, we can
say that while there has been a growing research base concerning the models
and interventionist strategy, it is still limited ­ and people sympathetic to the
approach have largely undertaken it. However, as Peter Senge's experience
(recounted at the top of the page) demonstrates, the process and the focus on
reflection-in-action does appear to bear fruit in terms of people's connection
with the exercise and their readiness to explore personal and organizational
questions.
Second, it is assumed that `gooď learning `takes place in a climate of
openness where political behaviour is minimizeď (Easterby-Smith and
Araujo 1999: 13). This is an assumption that can be questioned. It could be
argued that organizations are inherently political ­ and that it is important
to recognize this. Organizations can be seen as coalitions of various
individuals and interest groups. `Organizational goals, structure and policies
emerge from an ongoing process of bargaining and negotiation among major
interest groups' Bolman and Deal 1997: 175). Thus, perhaps we need to
develop theory that looks to the political nature of structures, knowledge
and information. Here we might profitably look to games theory, the
contribution of partisan and political institutions (Beem 1999) and an
exploration of how managers can make explicit, and work with, political
processes (Coopey 1998). Perhaps the aim should be `to incorporate politics
into organizational learning, rather than to eradicate iť (Easterby-Smith and
Araujo 1999: 13).
Third, and this might be my prejudice, I think we need to be distrustful of
bipolar models like Model I and Model II. They tend to set up an `either-or'
orientation. They are useful as teaching or sensitizing devices, alerting us to
different and important aspects of organizational life, but the area between
the models (and beyond them) might well yield interesting alternatives.
Fourth, the interventionist strategy is staged or phased ­ and this does bring
with it some problems. Why should things operate in this order.
Significantly, this does highlight a tension between Argyris's orientation and
that of Schön (1983). Schön in his later work on reflection-in-action draws
on his pragmatist heritage (and especially the work of Dewey) and presents
the making of theory-in-action and the expression of professional artistry in
a far less linear fashion. Rather than there being phases, we could argue that
intervention of this kind involves a number of elements or dimensions
working at once.
This said, the theorizing of theory-in-action, the educative power of the
models, and the conceptualization of organizational learning have been, and
continue to be, significant contributions to our appreciation of processes in
organizations. The notion of `double-loop learning' does help us to approach
some of the more taken-for-granted aspects of organizations and
experiences. It provides us with a way of naming a phenomenon (and
problem), and a possible way of `learning our way ouť (Finger and Asún
2000). Argyris and Schön have made a significant contribution to pragmatic
learning theory (following in the line of Dewey 1933; Lewin 1948, 1951; and
Kolb 1984). First, by introducing the term `theory' or `theory in action', `they
provide the function of abstract conceptualization (see experiential
learning) `more structure and more coherence' (Finger and Asún 2000: 45).
Abstract conceptualization `becomes something one can analyze and work
from' (op. cit.). Second, through the notion of `learning-in-action' Argyris
and Schön rework the experiential learning cycle.
Unlike Dewey's, Lewin's or Kolb's learning cycle, where one had,
so to speak, to make a mistake and reflect upon it ­ that is, learn
by trial and error ­ it is now possible thanks to Argyris and
Schön's conceptualization, to learn by simply reflecting critically
upon the theory-in-action. In other words, it is no longer
necessary to go through the entire learning circle in order to
develop the theory further. It is sufficient to readjust the theory
through double-loop learning. (Finger and Asún 2000: 45-6)
This is a very significant development and has important implications for
educators. In the experiential learning model of Kolb (1984) the educator is
in essence a facilitator of a person's learning cycle. To this role can be added
that of teacher, coach or mentor, the person who `helps individuals
(managers, professionals, workers) to reflect upon their theories-in-action'
(Finger and Asún 2000: 46). It is a significant development ­ but it has gone
largely unnoticed in the adult education and lifelong learning fields. This is
a result, in part, of rather blinkered reading by professionals and academics
within that area, and because Argyris and Schön did not address, to any
significant degree, the arena directly (Argyris's continued to focus on
organization and management, and Schön's on professional thinking).
Further reading and references
Argyris, M. and Schön, D. (1974) Theory in Practice. Increasing
professional effectiveness, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Landmark
statement of 'double-loop' learning' and distinction between
espoused theory and theory-in-action.
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1978) Organizational learning: A theory of action
perspective, Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley.
Argyris, C., Putnam, R., & McLain Smith, D (1985) Action Science, Concepts,
methods, and skills for research and intervention, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
[The entire book is available for download from: Action Design:
http://www.actiondesign.com/action_science/index.htm].
Argyris, C. (1993) Knowledge for Action. A guide to overcoming barriers to
organizational change, San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
References
Anderson, L. (1997) Argyris and Schön's theory on congruence and learning [On
line]. Available at http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/sawd/arr/argyris.html
Argyris, C. (1957) Personality and Organization, New York: Harper Collins.
Argyris, C. (1962) Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness,
Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press.
Argyris, C. (1964) Integrating the Individual and the Organization, New York:
Wiley.
Argyris, C. (1965) Organization and Innovation, Homewood, Ill. : R. D. Irwin.
Argyris, C. (1970) Intervention Theory and Method: A behavioral science view,
Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley.
Argyris, C. (1974) Behind the front page, San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Argyris, C. (1976) Increasing leadership effectiveness, New York: Wiley-
Interscience.
Argyris, C. (1980) Inner contradictions of rigorous research, New York:
Academic Press.
Argyris, C. (1982) Reasoning, learning, and action: Individual and organizational,
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Argyris, C. (1985) Strategy, change & defensive routines, Boston: Pitman.
Argyris, C. (1985) Action Science, Concepts, methods, and skills for research and
intervention, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Argyris, C. (1987) Reasoning, action strategies, and defensive routines: The
case of OD practitioners, in Woodman, R. A. & Pasmore, A.A. (eds.),
Research in organizational change and development. Volume 1, Greenwich: JAI
Press.
Argyris, C. (1990) Overcoming Organizational Defenses. Facilitating
organizational learning, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Argyris, C. (1991) Teaching smart people how to learn. Harvard Business
Review, May-June.
Argyris, C. (1993) Knowledge for Action. A guide to overcoming barriers to
organizational change, San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1974) Theory in practice: Increasing professional
effectiveness, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1978) Organizational learning: A theory of action
perspective, Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley.
Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1996) Organizational learning II: Theory, method and
practice, Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley.
Argyris, C., Putnam, R., & McLain Smith, D. (1985) Action science: concepts,
methods, and skills for research and intervention, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Beem, C. (1999) The Necessity of Politics. Reclaiming American public life,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bulman, L. G. and Deal, T. E. (1997) Reframing Organizations. Artistry, choice
and leadership, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Coopey, J. (1998) `Learning to trust and trusting to learn: a role for radical
theatre' Management Learning 29(3): 365-82.
Dewey, J. (1933) How We Think. A restatement of the relation of reflective
thinking to the educative process (Revised edn.), Boston: D. C. Heath.
Easterby-Smith, M. and Araujo, L. `Current debates and
opportunities' in M. Easterby-Smith, L. Araujo and J. Burgoyne (eds.)
Organizational Learning and the Learning Organization, London: Sage.
Edmondson, A. and Moingeon, B. (1999) `Learning, trust and
organizational change' in M. Easterby-Smith, L. Araujo and J.
Burgoyne (eds.) Organizational Learning and the Learning Organization,
London: Sage.
Finger, M. and Asún, M. (2000) Adult Education at the Crossroads.
Learning our way out, London: Zed Books.
Kolb, D. A. (1984) Experiential Learning. Experience as the source of
learning and development, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Lewin, K. (1948) Resolving Social Conflicts. Selected papers on group
dynamics, New York: Harper and Row.
Lewin, K. (1951) Field Theory in Social Science, New York: Harper and
Row.
Senge, P. (1990) The Fifth Discipline. The art and practice of the learning
organization, London: Random House.
Schön, D. A. (1983) The Reflective Practitioner. How professionals think in
action, London: Temple Smith.
Usher, R. and Bryant, I. (1989) Adult Education as Theory, Practice and
Research, London: Routledge.
Links
An interview with Chris Argyris ­ includes discussion of model I and
model II organizations. (from Thought Leaders)
Action Science Network ­ includes an outline of action science (and model I
and model II) and a detailed bibliography of Argyris' work.
Chris Argyris ­ useful, short biography by Bente Elkjaer
Chris Argyris ­ brief biography from Harvard Business Review.
Good communication that blocks learning ­ article by Argyris for Harvard
Business Review, 1994
Motivation Theory ­article reviewing Argyris' concern with increasing
interpersonal competence.
Chris Argyris ­ Page from the Monitor Group (where Argyris is a director)
with links to some of his publications.
How to cite this article: Smith, M. K. (2001) 'Chris Argyris: theories of
action, double-loop learning and organizational learning', the encyclopedia of
informal education, www.infed.org/thinkers/argyris.htm. Last update:
January 28, 2005
 Mark K. Smith 2001
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