
The Psychology of Globalization

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The influence of globalization on psychological functioning is examined. First, descriptions of how globalization is occurring in various world regions are presented. Then the psychological consequences of globalization are described, with a focus on identity issues. Specifically, it is argued that most people worldwide now develop a bicultural identity that combines their local identity with an identity linked to the global culture; that identity confusion may be increasing among young people in non-Western cultures as a result of globalization; that some people join self-selected cultures to maintain an identity that is separate from the global culture; and that a period of emerging adulthood increasingly extends identity explorations beyond adolescence, through the mid- to late twenties.

Globalization has existed for many centuries as a process by which cultures influence one another and become more alike through trade, immigration, and the exchange of information and ideas. However, in recent decades, the degree and intensity of the connections among different cultures and different world regions have accelerated dramatically because of advances in telecommunications and a rapid increase in economic and financial interdependence worldwide. For example, exports as a proportion of world gross domestic product grew from 8% in 1950 to 26% by 1998 (“The Battle in Seattle,” 1999), and international travel has increased by 700% since 1960 (Held, 1998). Consequently, in recent years, *globalization* has become one of the most widely used terms to describe the current state of the world.

Globalization encompasses a wide range of issues and phenomena. In the proliferation of recent books on the topic, the focus has been mainly on economics (e.g., Friedman, 2000; Gray, 1998), but books on globalization have also addressed issues such as the influence of globalization on urban life (e.g., Sassen, 1998) and on cultural practices (e.g., Appadurai, 2000; Giddens, 2000; Tomlinson, 1999). However, psychology’s contribution to an understanding of globalization has been mostly indirect. Psychological theory and research on acculturation, identity, and other topics have implications for the effects of globalization, but thus far these implications have not been thoroughly described.

In this article, I discuss how globalization influences psychological functioning. I argue that globalization has its primary psychological influence on issues of identity. However, my goal is not only to support this thesis but to provoke thought and investigation among psychologists on


the topic of the psychology of globalization. Because psychologists have rarely addressed globalization directly, there are at least as many questions as answers. For this reason, I end each section of the article by proposing some research questions.

My focus is on issues related to adolescence, because adolescents have a pivotal role in the process of globalization (Dasen, 2000; Schlegel, 2001). Unlike children, adolescents have enough maturity and autonomy to pursue information and experiences outside the confines of their families. Unlike adults, they are not yet committed to a definite way of life and have not yet developed ingrained habits of belief and behavior; they are more open to what is new and unusual. They tend to have more interest than either children or adults in global media—recorded music, movies, television, the Internet—and, to a considerable extent, global media are the leading edge of globalization (Schlegel, 2001), the foot in the door that opens the way for other changes in beliefs and behavior. According to a 1998 United Nations Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme, 1998), market researchers now try to sell to “global teens” (p. 6) because urban adolescents worldwide follow similar consumption patterns and have similar preferences for “global brands” (p. 6) of music, videos, T-shirts, soft drinks, and so on. Adolescents are also viewed by adults in some cultures as being especially vulnerable to the allurements of the global culture, and adolescent problems such as substance use and premarital pregnancy are sometimes blamed by adults on the intrusion of Western values through globalization (Nsamenang, 2002; Stevenson & Zusho, 2002; Welti, 2002).

The focus on adolescence highlights the identity issues that are of key importance in the psychology of globalization, given that identity issues have long been regarded as central to adolescent development. However, I also include information on people of other ages, and even the material on adolescents has implications for other ages.

Before proceeding, it is important to specify both the extent and the limitations of globalization. Although globalization has intensified dramatically in recent years, the world is a long way from being one homogeneous global culture. In many ways, the gaps in technology and lifestyle between rich and poor countries and between rural and urban areas within countries have persisted or even grown

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in recent years, even as poor countries have moved in the direction of rich countries.

Table 1 provides an illustration of this pattern. It shows that enrollment in secondary school has increased all over the world during the past 20 years but remains considerably lower in developing countries than in industrialized countries. Overall, the proportion of adolescents in secondary school in developing countries rose from 23% in 1970 to 52% in 1997 (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1999), but the proportion is now above 90% in industrialized countries. Table 2 provides some information on technology, which is often portrayed as the driving force behind globalization. Again, an increase in access to technology has taken place all over the world in recent decades, but far more in some parts of the world than in others. There is also considerable variation within regions and within countries, especially between rural and urban areas (United Nations Development Programme, 2001). Thus, globalization is influencing every part of the world, but cultures differ greatly in how much they have been affected by it. This article is based on the premise that globalization is influencing many of the world's people and is likely to influence an increasing number of them in the years to come.

Questions for future research include the following: First, how should globalization be defined for empirical purposes? How should the effects of globalization be measured for a given population, and how should exposure to globalization be measured on the level of the individual? Second, what age differences exist in exposure to globalization and in responses to it?

The Process of Globalization: Regional Snapshots

Let us proceed with illustrations of how globalization is taking place in various regions of the world. In Latin America (Welti, 2002), most of the population has access to global information through radio and television, which now reach into even the small towns. People are aware of distant wars and the intimate details of the lives and deaths of global celebrities. Young people copy the clothing and hairstyles of popular singers from the United States, as well as Latin America, and learn the lyrics of songs in English even if they do not understand them. E-mail is the preferred form of communication among urban middle-class adolescents.

However, it remains true that in rural areas, education ends early and the marriage age is young (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000). In these areas, many groups still celebrate a girl's *quincinera* when she turns 15, thus signifying that she has reached marriageable age. In urban areas, globalization is more evident but is not always welcome. There have been widespread protests—led by university students in Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and Santiago, among other cities—against the economic disruptions caused by shifts in global financial markets and against the cutbacks in government services demanded by global lending institutions, with globalization specified as the enemy (Welti, 2002).

In Arab countries (Booth, 2002), young people in the middle and upper classes in urban areas are similar in many ways to young people in the West, with access to extended education and a variety of leisure opportunities, including dating, playing electronic games, and surfing the Internet. Cafés are popular meeting places for playing board games

Table 1
*Changes in Secondary School Enrollment
in Selected Countries*

| Country | 1980 (% enrolled) | | Latest year (% enrolled) | |
|---------------|----------------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|
| | Boys | Girls | Boys | Girls |
| United States | 91 | 92 | 98 | 97 |
| Germany | 93 | 87 | 99 | 99 |
| Italy | 73 | 70 | 94 | 95 |
| Poland | 75 | 80 | 98 | 97 |
| Argentina | 53 | 62 | 73 | 81 |
| Egypt | 66 | 41 | 83 | 73 |
| China | 54 | 37 | 74 | 67 |
| Turkey | 44 | 24 | 68 | 48 |
| Mexico | 51 | 46 | 64 | 64 |
| India | 39 | 20 | 59 | 39 |
| Nigeria | 25 | 13 | 36 | 30 |

Note. The data are from the Population Reference Bureau (2000). Percentages reflect the proportion of students enrolled in secondary school in the applicable age group in each country.

Table 2
Changes in Technology in World Regions

| Region | Televisions (per 1,000 persons) | | Telephones (per 1,000 persons) | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------|--------------------------------|------|
| | 1970 | 1995 | 1975 | 1995 |
| Industrialized countries | 280 | 525 | 178 | 414 |
| East Asia | 5 | 255 | 4 | 49 |
| Latin America and the Caribbean | 70 | 220 | 34 | 86 |
| Southeast Asia and the Pacific | 5 | 155 | 3 | 29 |
| Arab States | 28 | 127 | 8 | 49 |
| South Asia | 1 | 60 | 2 | 16 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 1 | 33 | 6 | 12 |

Note. The data are from the United Nations Development Programme (1998).

and watching satellite television with friends. In contrast, young people in rural areas typically leave school early to help with the family land or herds. Among some of the urban people who are experiencing the influence of globalization directly, a backlash against globalization has begun, with Western influences blamed for a decline in moral standards (Esposito, 1997). Calls have grown for a reassertion of Islamic identity and for resistance to what is believed to be the corrupting influence of the Western-dominated global culture.

In sub-Saharan Africa (Nsamenang, 2002), indigenous cultures are increasingly linked to the global culture, and “the global political economy is in sight even from the food gardens of the most peripheral settlements” (Moore, 1993, p. 4). Rates of premarital sex and pregnancy are rising as traditional systems of sexual control through initiation rites, chaperones, and folklore lose their relevance in the eyes of the young. This problem is sometimes blamed on the introduction of Western media, with their relentless sexual stimulation (Songue, 1998).

The size of rural African households is shrinking as young people migrate to urban areas in search of work. Many urban families resemble their counterparts in other regions, as groups of individuals pursuing personal goals in work, school, and social life, in contrast to the family cohesion of African tradition. Schooling lasts longer for many young people than it did in the past, reducing the extent to which they can participate in family economic enterprises. But schooling has also opened up many new work opportunities, especially for women, who make up an increasing proportion of the work force (Nsamenang, 2002). Altogether, the people of Africa are facing the challenge of maintaining their traditions while adopting many of the ways of the global culture. As Nsamenang (2002) observed,

The process of acculturation and globalization has bestowed on contemporary Africa a dual politico-economic and cultural system of old indigenous traditions and imported legacies . . . This has produced a marginal population whose adults, teenagers and children are groping desperately to reconcile within individual

and collective psyches the ambivalences and contradictions of a confusing cultural braid. (p. 63)

In Southeast Asia (Santa Maria, 2002), the average ages of people entering marriage and parenthood are rising in urban areas, although they remain low in rural areas. Gender roles are undergoing dramatic changes, as young women seek jobs outside the home and even outside their native country. An increasing number of young people seek employment abroad, as domestic helpers or construction workers, or with international agencies (United Nations, 1997). This emigration is usually temporary and is viewed as a promising opportunity to make a substantial amount of money and raise the economic well-being of the family. Although this aspect of globalization is viewed positively, globalization is also seen as the source of problems. Companies seeking to compete in the global marketplace exploit labor, especially the labor of the young, through low-paying “subcontracting” arrangements that offer little in the way of benefits or job security. Western values are seen as invading through the media and are blamed for increases in premarital pregnancies. Juvenile delinquency is also rising, especially in urban areas, and the increase is attributed to the erosion of traditional social norms and institutions by global forces.

Japan and China have a tradition of collectivistic values (Naito & Gielen, in press; White, 1993). Filial piety has long been ranked among the highest virtues. Parents traditionally have expected deference, even reverence, from their children, and children (especially eldest sons) have been taught that they would have the responsibility for caring for their parents in old age. A similarly strict hierarchy of authority has existed in the workplace and in schools. Even now, Japanese secondary schools regulate students’ behavior closely within the school—some even specifying acceptable colors for girls’ underpants (White, 1993)—as well as outside of school, prohibiting dating and part-time work (Stevenson & Zusho, 2002).

However, in the past two decades, Chinese and Japanese societies have changed rapidly. The tradition of interdependence has been shaken by economic changes and by increasing contact with the West, and values have become notably more individualistic (Naito & Gielen, in press; Stevenson & Zusho, 2002). Relatively few young people in Japan are interested in continuing the tradition of lifelong employment with a single company, entailing great job security but very long hours and few holidays (White, 1993). They would prefer to have more time for leisure and family life. In China, young people who are able to obtain an education have widening opportunities in the country’s rapidly expanding economy, whereas unskilled workers find themselves in dire conditions as unprofitable state-run companies collapse or are privatized. In both societies, the increasing individualism of the young is viewed with concern by their elders, who decry their materialism, hedonism, and selfishness (Stevenson & Zusho, 2002; White, 1993). Japanese adults refer to young people who postpone or forgo marriage in order to pursue self-development with

the derisive term *parasite singles* (Naito & Gielen, in press).

Across regions, several common features can be discerned. First, there has been a notable increase in recent years in the frequency and intensity of the contacts that people in various cultures have with the global culture led by the West and defined by free markets, consumerism, and individualism. Second, globalization reaches virtually everywhere, but people in urban areas experience it with much greater intensity than people in rural areas do. Third, the values of the global culture often collide with traditional cultural values, causing people to face the challenge of adapting to both the global culture and their local culture, even as their local culture may be changing rapidly. Finally, globalization is seen in most places as a source of opportunities but also as a source of problems, and organized resistance has developed to the economic and cultural disruptions it causes. But how does all this influence psychological functioning?

The Psychological Consequences of Globalization

The central psychological consequence of globalization is that it results in transformations in identity, that is, in how people think about themselves in relation to the social environment. Four aspects of identity stand out as issues related to globalization. First, as a consequence of globalization, most people in the world now develop a *bicultural identity*, in which part of their identity is rooted in their local culture while another part stems from an awareness of their relation to the global culture. Second, the pervasiveness of *identity confusion* may be increasing among young people in non-Western cultures. As local cultures change in response to globalization, some young people find themselves at home in neither the local culture nor the global culture. Third, in every society there are people who choose to form *self-selected cultures* with like-minded persons who wish to have an identity that is untainted by the global culture and its values. Fourth, identity explorations in love and work are increasingly stretching beyond the adolescent years (roughly from ages 10 to 18 years) into a postadolescent period of *emerging adulthood* (roughly from ages 18 to 25 years).

Bicultural Identities

Several of the most prominent writers on globalization have argued that many children and adolescents now grow up with a global consciousness. According to Giddens (1991), children and adolescents have “phenomenal worlds [that are] for the most part truly global” (p. 187). Robertson (1992) argued that children today gradually develop “the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (p. 8). Tomlinson (1999) wrote that the world as a whole “increasingly exists as a cultural horizon within which we (to varying degrees) frame our existence” (p. 30).

From a psychological perspective, this consequence of globalization can be usefully conceptualized in terms of bicultural identities. The concept of bicultural identities has

so far been discussed only in relation to the identities developed by immigrants and members of ethnic minority groups (e.g., Berry, 1993, 1997; Phinney, 1990; Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997), but it can also be applied to globalization. What it means in this context is that in addition to their local identity, young people develop a global identity that gives them a sense of belonging to a worldwide culture and includes an awareness of the events, practices, styles, and information that are part of the global culture. Their global identity allows them to communicate with people from diverse places when they travel from home, when others travel to where they live, and when they communicate with people in other places through media technology (such as e-mail). Television is crucial in the process of developing a global identity, because it provides exposure to people, events, and information from all over the world. However, for future generations of children and adolescents, the Internet is likely to be even more important, because it allows direct communication with other people worldwide (e.g., in e-mail chat rooms or through interactive computer games) and because it provides direct access to information about every part of the world.

Alongside their global identity, people continue to develop a local identity as well, one based on the local circumstances, local environment, and local traditions of the place where they grew up. This is the identity they are likely to use most in their daily interactions with family, friends, and community members. For example, among the Inuit in northern Canada (Condon, 1988), adolescents watch TV daily and learn about what is happening in Canada and the rest of the world, and they are avid fans of televised pro hockey games. Some leave their hometowns for a while to pursue educational and occupational training in larger cities. However, they also maintain a local identity that is distinctively Inuit. Their local identity is defined partly by their environment—they go ice fishing and race snowmobiles; they stay outside until all hours during the long summer days when it stays light well past midnight and spend more time indoors during the winter days when it is light for only a few hours. Their local identity is also defined by their traditional values of reticence, modesty, and family obligations. Thus, they retain an Inuit identity even as they also develop an identity as members of the global culture.

Another example of retaining a local identity even as a global identity is developed can be found among young people in India. India has a growing, vigorous high-tech economic sector, led largely by young people. However, even the better educated young people, who have become full-fledged members of the global economy, still mostly prefer to have an arranged marriage, in accordance with Indian tradition (Verma & Saraswathi, 2002). They also generally expect to care for their parents in old age, again in accordance with Indian tradition. Thus, they have one identity for participating in the global economy and succeeding in the fast-paced world of high technology, and another identity, rooted in Indian tradition, that they maintain with respect to their families and their personal lives.

Although developing a bicultural identity means that a local identity is retained alongside a global identity, there is no doubt that local cultures are being modified by globalization, specifically by the introduction of global media, free market economics, democratic institutions, increased length of formal schooling, and delayed entry into marriage and parenthood. As the regional descriptions earlier in this article show, these changes greatly alter traditional cultural practices and beliefs. Such changes may lead less to a bicultural identity than to a *hybrid identity*, combining local culture and elements of the global culture (see Hermans & Kempen, 1998; for an example, see Ivory, 1999).

Increasing immigration has been specified as one of the forces promoting globalization (Hermans & Kempen, 1998), and identities become even more complicated for immigrants. They may develop identities that combine their native culture, the local culture to which they have immigrated, and the global culture, thus leading to a multicultural identity or a complex hybrid identity. (A similar situation may be experienced by people who are members of cultural minorities but are not immigrants.) Furthermore, people living in a culture to which immigrants have come may incorporate aspects of the immigrants' culture into their own identities. Thus, for an increasing number of the world's people, as Hermans and Kempen (1998) observed, "different and contrasting cultures can be part of a repertoire of collective voices playing their part in a multivoiced self" (p. 1118).

Questions for future research include the following: First, to what extent do people in various cultures develop a bicultural identity, with one rooted in the local culture and one based in the global culture? Does the tendency to develop such a bicultural identity vary with age? Second, under what circumstances do people develop a hybrid identity rather than a bicultural identity? Third, for immigrants and members of cultural minorities, what is the range of multicultural and hybrid identities they may develop? Fourth, in studies of immigrants, Berry (1997) has found that those who adapt a bicultural identity (who achieve *integration*, in his terms) generally show better psychological adaptation than those who assimilate to the new culture, separate themselves from the new culture, or identify with neither the new culture nor their former culture. Is this also true with respect to globalization, when the new culture is the global culture?

Identity Confusion

As local cultures change in response to globalization, most people manage to adapt to the changes and develop a bicultural or hybrid identity that provides the basis for living in their local culture and also participating in the global culture. However, for some people, adapting to the rapid changes taking place in their cultures is more difficult. The images, values, and opportunities they perceive as being part of the global culture undermine their belief in the value of local cultural practices. At the same time, the ways of the global culture seem out of reach to them, too foreign to everything they know from their direct experience. Rather than becoming bicultural, they may experience

themselves as excluded from both their local culture and the global culture, truly belonging to neither.

In terms of Erikson's (1950, 1968) theory of identity formation, it could be said that in facing the issue of identity versus identity confusion in adolescence, globalization increases the proportion of young people in non-Western cultures who experience a state of identity confusion rather than successfully forming an identity. Erikson's idea of identity confusion has been mostly ignored in identity research in favor of Marcia's (1994) identity status paradigm, but it is worth reviving for application to the psychology of globalization.

A number of observers of globalization have discussed this issue using the term *delocalization* (Thompson, 1995), also called *dis-placement* (Giddens, 1990) or *deteritorialization* (Tomlinson, 1999). What this means is that as the young increasingly grow up with a global consciousness, they are likely to have diminished ties to the specific place they live in. Where a child grows up now matters less than in the past in determining what the child knows and experiences. Again, electronic media such as television and computers are at the heart of this transformation, because of the way they penetrate local experience and allow access to information and persons in many other places. For most young people, because they will grow up this way, it is likely that they will simply experience this sense of delocalization as the way life is, rather than having a sense of loss or deprivation (Tomlinson, 1999). For some young people, however, delocalization may result in an acute sense of alienation and impermanence as they grow up with a lack of cultural certainty, a lack of clear guidelines for how life is to be lived and how to interpret their experience.

In rapidly changing cultures, young people may conclude that the worldview that was part of their cultural tradition is irrelevant to the new global culture they are entering. Worldviews are based on ways of life; as traditional ways of life change in response to globalization, traditional worldviews may lack compelling emotional and ideological power for young people. The decline in the power of collectivism for young people in Japan and China is a good example of this (Naito & Gielen, in press; Stevenson & Zusho, 2002). At the same time, some young people may have trouble finding meaning in the worldview that is the basis of the global culture, with its values of individualism and consumerism. This new worldview is not indigenous to their culture and, in fact, may directly contradict their cultural traditions.

The cross-cultural psychologist John Berry (1993, 1997, 1998; Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998) has a number of ideas, based on decades of research on immigration and acculturation, that can be applied to globalization, especially to this issue of identity confusion. *Marginalization* is Berry's term for the acculturation pattern in which a person has little interest in maintaining the original culture but also rejects or is rejected by the new culture. Applied to globalization, marginalization is also the condition of the person who experiences identity confusion as a consequence of losing faith in the local culture in the course of exposure

to globalization but also feeling excluded from the global culture.

Culture shedding is Berry's (1997) term for "the unlearning of aspects of one's previous repertoire that are no longer appropriate" (p. 13, italics in original). Globalization could be said to require some degree of culture shedding, as the global culture alters local cultures. For example, cultures that have a tradition of patriarchal family authority are becoming more egalitarian as a consequence of globalization, in places as diverse as Africa (Nsamenang, 2002) and Japan (Naito & Gielen, in press). It may be that for some people, the culture shedding that results from globalization contributes to identity confusion, especially if it is involuntary. This seems to be suggested in Nsamenang's (2002) observation about the changes in African families, in which he called the father "the net loser. His once undisputed authority is declining as teenagers and their mothers find their ways around the world without depending on his guidance or intervention" (p. 73).

Acculturative stress is Berry's (1998) term for experiencing conflict between one's original culture and a new culture. Globalization could be said to result in such conflict when the norms and practices of the local culture are incompatible with the norms and practices introduced by the global culture. Acculturative stress may in turn contribute to identity confusion.

Finally, *cultural distance* is Berry's (1997) term for the degree of dissimilarity between cultures in their beliefs and practices. The greater the cultural distance, the more difficult the adaptation process. Applied to globalization, it could be predicted that the people most likely to suffer identity confusion as a result of globalization are those in cultures with the greatest cultural distance from the global culture.

Identity confusion among young people may be reflected in problems such as depression, suicide, and substance use. A variety of cultures have experienced a sharp increase in suicide and substance use among their young people since their rapid move toward joining the global culture (e.g., Burbank, 1988; Condon, 1988; Liechty, 1995; Rubinstein, 1995). For example, three investigators in Ivory Coast studied changes in problems among young people ages 16 to 20 years during the period from 1980 to 1991 (Delafosse, Fouraste, & Gbobouo, 1993). Using clinical interviews and data from police and social workers, they reported an increase over this period in suicide, drug abuse, armed aggression, and male and female prostitution. The authors of the study attributed the increase in problems to the conflict young people experienced between the values of their traditional cultures and the values of the West.

Several questions remain for future research: First, how should identity confusion be measured? How is it distinct from Marcia's (1994) idea of identity diffusion (measured as low exploration and low commitment)? Second, is identity confusion more pervasive in cultures where globalization is contributing to rapid social change than in the industrialized societies that are the major forces behind globalization? Or do industrialized societies still have more identity confusion because they are the most globalized?

Third, to what extent are people in various cultures experiencing acculturative stress as a consequence of globalization? Fourth, is identity confusion related to cultural distance from the global culture? Specifically, is identity confusion more pervasive and more intense in cultures that have the greatest cultural distance from the global culture but are being influenced by globalization?

Self-Selected Cultures

The values of the global culture are based on individualism, free market economics, and democracy and include freedom of choice, individual rights, openness to change, and tolerance of differences (Friedman, 2000; Giddens, 2000). These values dominate the global culture in part because they are the values that prevail in the countries that provide the driving energy behind globalization (i.e., the West, especially the United States). Also, because the global culture crosses so many cultural and national boundaries, in order to unify people across these boundaries the values of the global culture necessarily emphasize tolerating and even celebrating differences. This means that the values of the global culture are defined in part by what they are not: They are not dogmatic; they are not exclusionary; they do not condone suppression of people or groups who have a point of view or a way of life that is different from that of the majority.

For most people worldwide, what the global culture has to offer is appealing. Except where nondemocratic governments have assiduously attempted to prevent their citizens from adopting the practices of the global culture—countries such as Saudi Arabia, North Korea, and Cuba—people all over the world have demonstrated that they will embrace the global culture if given the chance (Friedman, 2000). Indeed, one of the most vehement criticisms of globalization is that it threatens to create one homogeneous worldwide culture in which all children grow up wanting to be like the latest pop music star, eat Big Macs, vacation at Disney World, and wear blue jeans, baseball caps, and Nikes.

However, this dire forecast is unlikely to come completely to pass, and not just because most people are likely to develop a bicultural identity that includes a local identity alongside their global identity, as described above. The other way that cultural diversity will continue to exist is that some people will choose to become part of a self-selected culture that provides more meaning and structure than the global culture. Most young people jump with enthusiasm onto the global bandwagon, but there will always be those who will seek deliberately to mark themselves off as different, as people who refuse to join the crowd. Some do this by joining a self-selected culture of fellow dissenters.

Often these self-selected cultures have a religious basis. The global culture is relentlessly secular. Mostly, religious issues are ignored in favor of consumerism, entertainment, and the pursuit of individual enjoyment. To the extent that religious issues exist at all in the global culture, they do so only in the form of the value of tolerance, the idea that religious beliefs should not be a source of dis-

crimination or conflict. But for some people, such not-values fail to provide the structure and meaning they need. They turn instead to religious systems that reject secular values and promise eternal, transcendent truths.

One example of a religiously based self-selected culture is found in the work of Debra Kaufman (1991), who described “newly-Orthodox Jewish women.” These are women who grew up in secular Jewish homes in the United States, but as they arrived at womanhood they concluded that the secular values they were raised with provided an inadequate foundation for living. They turned instead to Orthodox Judaism, converting in their teens or early twenties. Despite the strict sex roles of Orthodox Judaism and the limitations it places on women, they embraced it because it offered them the structure of a definite place in the world, the meaning conferred by Orthodox Jewish theology, and the roots of a long, durable tradition.

Orthodox Jews are a relatively small group, but fundamentalist movements of various stripes have been observed worldwide, in both Western and non-Western societies (Marty & Appleby, 1993). Many of these movements arose in the late 20th century as a direct response to the changes caused by globalization (Giddens, 2000; Marty & Appleby, 1993). Usually, fundamentalists are a minority culture within their society composed of persons who have chosen to reject social changes in search of unchanging, eternal truths. Although fundamentalist movements differ in many ways, they have in common an adherence to a rigorous code of conduct, a belief in a sacred past superior to the present, a sense of being besieged by the rest of the world, and a belief in a hierarchy of authority, with men over women, adults over children, and God over all (Marty & Appleby, 1993).

The values espoused by fundamentalists are directly opposed to the values of the global culture (Appadurai, 2000; Giddens, 2000; Marty & Appleby, 1993). Against the secularism of global culture, fundamentalists assert their desire to ground all of their actions in their religious beliefs. Against the consumerism of the global culture, fundamentalists discourage greed and conspicuous consumption. Against the tolerance and inclusiveness of the global culture, fundamentalists assert their belief that there is one true faith and that all who fail to accept it place their lives and souls at risk.

Self-selected cultures may also be nonreligious. For example, a youth culture grew up around heavy metal music in the 1980s and 1990s (Arnett, 1996). The young *metalheads* who were part of this culture set themselves off from the rest of society not only by their enthusiasm for heavy metal music but by wearing black concert T-shirts displaying the logos of heavy metal bands. Although heavy metal songs sometimes addressed topics of global concern, such as environmental destruction and the power of multinational corporations, the values of the heavy metal culture were not explicitly opposed to the values of globalization. Rather, the worldview expressed in heavy metal songs was cynical and pessimistic, asserting opposition to all institutions, global or not (Arnett, 1996). Nevertheless, participation in the heavy metal culture by millions of

young people worldwide can be seen as an attempt to carve out an identity in a self-selected culture separate from the global culture that now defines what is mainstream, safe, and conventional. Ironically, the worldwide popularity of heavy metal music also reflects the economic and merchandising reach of globalization, with young people in all parts of the world obtaining access to the same media products.

Another type of self-selected culture defines itself explicitly against globalization. Vigorous organized protests, mostly by young people, against the perceived globalization efforts of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have taken place in recent years (e.g., the university students in Latin America described earlier; Welti, 2002). Although the number of people involved in such protests thus far has been small, the number may grow if the perception grows that globalization leads to cultural disenfranchisement, political and economic instability, and an increasing gap between rich and poor (Larson, 2002; Saraswathi & Larson, 2002).

In a related development, ethnic, religious, and national identities have become more salient and explicit in many places in recent years—in places as diverse as Russia (Stetsenko, 2002), Latin America (Welti, 2002), and the Arab world (Booth, 2002)—as a direct and conscious counterresponse to the homogenizing force of globalization (Guillén, 2001; Larson, 2002). For example, Samoans have recently revived the traditional rite of passage of decorating the bodies of adolescent males with tattoos in elaborate geometric patterns from the midsection to the knees (Arnett, 2001). Previously, this ritual was considered essential to sexual attractiveness and was necessary for being accepted as a legitimate candidate for adult status, but now it is seen as part of an explicit attempt to resist the total absorption of their indigenous culture into the global culture (Coté, 1994). Thus, aspects of identity that may have been assimilated without reflection in previous generations have become consciously self-selected as the pressure of globalization has grown.

Questions for future research include the following: First, what proportion of people in various societies can be said to have joined a self-selected culture that is marked off both from their local culture and from the global culture? Does this proportion vary with age? Second, what kinds of characteristics lead some people to join a self-selected culture when others do not? Do self-selected cultures appeal especially to people who have suffered from identity confusion as a consequence of globalization?

The Spread of Emerging Adulthood

Another worldwide change promoted by globalization is evident in the timing of transitions to adult roles, such as work, marriage, and parenthood. These transitions are occurring at later ages in every part of the world. The global economy is highly technological and information based, which means that the amount of education required for young people to prepare for the best jobs is stretching steadily longer. As they pursue education for longer periods, they postpone transitions into adult roles. Also, as traditional hierarchies of authority weaken under the pres-

sure of globalization and young people increasingly gain control over their own lives, they generally choose to wait longer to enter marriage and parenthood. Now the median ages for these transitions are in the late twenties in every industrialized society and rising rapidly in developing countries (Arnett, 2000).

The fact that transitions into adult roles have become so delayed and stretched out in many societies has led to the spread of a new period of life, *emerging adulthood*, that extends from the late teens to the midtwenties and is characterized by self-focused exploration of possibilities in love, work, and worldviews (Arnett, 2000). Instability is also a characteristic of emerging adulthood, because of the many changes that take place during these years in residence, love partners, and jobs. This period now exists for most young people in industrialized societies and is growing in prevalence for young people in developing countries. It is possible that as a result of globalization, emerging adulthood will eventually become a normative period of life for young people worldwide.

The spread of emerging adulthood is related to issues of identity. Where a period of emerging adulthood is present, young people have a longer period for identity explorations in love and work before they commit themselves to long-term choices. By experiencing different love relationships, different educational possibilities, and different jobs, they learn more about themselves and they clarify their preferences and abilities.

Globalization spreads emerging adulthood because globalization promotes economic development (if unevenly and sometimes with abrupt reversals), and a high level of economic development is necessary for the existence of a period of emerging adulthood. Emerging adulthood is possible only in societies where economic development is high enough that the labor of young people is not urgently needed. They are allowed to spend their late teens and early to midtwenties exploring possibilities for self-development because there is no pressing need for them to contribute to the economic well-being of their families. Economic development also expands the range of occupations that exist in a society. This provides emerging adults with enhanced opportunities to find a job they believe fits well with their developing identity. However, in some regions, the number of university graduates is increasing more rapidly than the available jobs, so that many find themselves unemployed after graduation (e.g., Booth, 2002; Nsamenang, 2002). Even in countries where jobs are plentiful, as the number of possible jobs expands emerging adults face the challenge of sorting through a sometimes daunting range of options in the search for one that matches their interests and abilities. This prolonged search may be a source of identity confusion for some young people in industrialized societies.

For young people in developing countries, emerging adulthood exists only for the wealthier segment of society, mainly in urban areas, whereas the rural poor have no emerging adulthood and may even have no adolescence because they begin adultlike work at an early age and also begin marriage and parenthood relatively early. Young

people who are poor and/or live in rural areas are more likely to suffer from what Amartya Sen (1999) has called the “unfreedoms” of poverty, lack of education, and restricted economic opportunities. As Saraswathi and Larson (2002) observed, “In many ways, the lives of middle-class youth in India, South East Asia, and Europe have more in common with each other than they do with those of poor youth in their own countries” (p. 344). However, as globalization proceeds and economic development proceeds along with it, the proportion of young people who experience the emerging adulthood now normative in the middle class is likely to increase as the middle class expands.

Questions for future research include the following: First, how should the existence or prevalence of emerging adulthood in a given society be defined for empirical purposes? To what extent is the existence or prevalence of emerging adulthood in various societies related to exposure to globalization? Second, to what extent does the existence of emerging adulthood differ within countries because of urban–rural differences, wealth differences, and exposure to globalization?

Conclusion

Globalization is likely to be one of the dominant forces in the psychological development of the people of the 21st century. In some ways, it has been going on for centuries: Cultures have long influenced each other through trade, migration, and war. In other ways, it is just beginning: In many cultures today, people who are middle-aged or older can remember a time when their culture was firmly grounded in enduring traditions, barely touched by anything global, Western, or American. However, few young people growing up today will have such memories in the decades to come. Young people in every part of the world are affected by globalization; nearly all of them are aware, although to varying degrees, of a global culture that exists beyond their local culture. Those who are growing up in traditional cultures know that the future that awaits them is certain to be very different from the life their grandparents knew.

As a consequence of globalization, the challenges of creating a viable identity are perhaps greater than they have been in the past. When globalization alters and erodes traditional ways, as Giddens (2000) observed, identity “has to be created and recreated on a more active basis than before” (p. 65). Identity becomes based less on prescribed social roles and more on individual choices, on decisions that each person makes about what values to embrace and what paths to pursue in love and work. Some people react to this responsibility with identity confusion or seek refuge in a self-selected culture that offers more structure and takes over some decisions.

Nevertheless, most people embrace the opportunity to make such decisions for themselves. When people are allowed to make their own choices about values, love, and work, the likelihood may be enhanced that they will find a psychologically rewarding match between these choices and their individual desires and abilities. Globalization will

gradually expand the proportion of the world's population that has a wide range of identity choices. At the same time, cultural diversity will continue to exist as local cultures adapt global influences to local circumstances (Hermans & Kempen, 1998) and as people continue to create self-selected cultures distinct from and sometimes in opposition to the global culture. For individuals, diversity of identity will only grow as globalization results in increasingly complex bicultural, multicultural, and hybrid identities. For psychologists, the psychology of globalization presents itself as a challenging, complex, and important area for theory and research.

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