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possible for a social worker to be effective in politics without violating professional values and without losing sight of our commitment to the interests of those we serve as social workers.

Notes and References

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A Social Worker- Politician Creates a New Service

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ACCORDING to the 1975 Uniform Crime Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), police across the country received more calls for family conflict than for murder, aggravated assault, and all other serious crimes. Incidents of wife beating outnumbered those of rape by three to one. Responding to calls related to wife abuse accounted for 13 percent of all homicides of police officers and 40 percent of all injuries sustained by police officers.¹

Families caught in patterns of recurring violence often turn to the police. The police are easily available through a phone call, and they come quickly. They handle the violence because they have the authority—the uniform and the badge. They are the twenty-four hour service of last resort. The director of the Police Foundation has publicly stated that such social problems occupy a major portion of police officers' time and that although officers are not trained for such work, they should be.²

Police officers across the nation know families that experience repeated instances of domestic violence. Such families are familiar to the local precinct and to the officer on the beat. These families are often not known to those who provide counseling ser-

vices, however, nor are the families familiar with the services that provide the counseling they need. Far too often the death or hand-capping of a family member is the "solution" to the conflict.

A variety of responses to the problem of domestic violence have developed. Social workers in the army in Europe worked with commanding officers and military police to defuse such situations and to begin the counseling process.³ In the United States, social workers in some communities have been assigned full time to police stations. In other communities, psychologists have trained police officers in defusion techniques. In other cases, psychologists have trained police to refer cases of domestic violence to social agencies.

Despite the existence and success of such programs, social agencies in many communities have insisted that the family in trouble visit the agency only during regular office hours, and they have questioned the value of social workers going with police on "family trouble runs." The validity of this approach is questionable. The knowledge, ethics, and skills of social work are needed wherever individuals and families interface and problems are created. This implies that the problems and needs of families trapped in domestic violence can only be addressed if social workers develop strategies of change in close cooperation with the governmental agency most directly involved—the police department. Moreover, because any change process requires identifying and mobilizing support both inside and outside the systems targeted for change, attempts to influence the police department or any other department of government require attention to political considerations—to balancing the needs and interests of the elected officials who make policy with the interests of their constituencies and other sources of political power.

Events throughout the country in recent years have increased social workers' awareness not only of the importance of public policy in solving such social problems as family violence, but also of the need to take an active part in the political processes that shape governmental policies. As a result, increasing numbers of social workers have become involved in politics, some as campaign workers or lobbyists, others as elected or appointed officials.

In 1973, such considerations drew me to become a candidate for the Detroit City Council and to make family violence one of several human service problems I chose as campaign issues. At the time, there was some public recognition of family violence as a

problem, and demands were mounting that the Detroit Police Department find a solution. By focusing attention on the public safety aspect of domestic violence, by proposing a rational effort to deal with the problem, and by drawing a large vote as a candidate for the city council, I hoped to show that a solution involving the provision of additional police and counseling services to families in crisis had broad public support.

This article describes my efforts, as a social worker, to create such services through direct involvement in the political process. Intended to provide a model for incremental change through political action, the article highlights the importance of understanding power in bringing about change—expert power, referent power, charismatic power, and the power of numbers. It also demonstrates the need for resourcefulness and flexibility in defining objectives and revising strategies and tactics.

Emergence of a Political Issue

In 1973, Detroit was caught in a political cross fire. The black mayoral candidate—with my support and that of the black community and progressive whites—had fought for and won changes in the city charter to create a civilian police commission, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, charged with making policy for and controlling the police department. The other candidate for mayor was the white police chief. Hysteria was rising in the community as the media focused on crime, muggings, and property damage. One headline screamed "Detroit Is Murder City." The media portrayed the problem as one of strangers killing strangers, creating fear among city residents. In the suburbs, hostility was rising toward the city as Detroit's black population crept toward a 51 percent majority. Some people were calling for more police and for "untying their hands." Others were campaigning against the police and for black control of the city. The black community viewed the police as a white occupying force, and verbal attacks by blacks had many police paranoid. In this climate, a political strategy of open confrontation would have been inflammatory and counterproductive.

As a candidate for city council, I defined as public safety issues the need to free police officers for crime fighting by filling more jobs with civilians and the need to reduce the injuries and

deaths among police and citizens by training police to deal with domestic violence and social conflicts. I knew the deaths were mostly results of arguments among acquaintances. My objective was to pair social workers and police, namely, Family Service of Detroit and Wayne County and the Detroit Police Department, to defuse incidents of domestic violence and to provide social services to the disputants. The project I proposed would (1) train the police in crisis intervention to defuse domestic violence, (2) involve social workers in providing this training for the police, (3) have social workers on call in precinct stations, and (4) have the police make referrals to social workers. The success of the project depended on its acceptance by the decision makers in city government who had responsibility for training police and managing the police department and by the leadership in the family services agency and in the private social service system.

My position was strengthened by the large vote I received in November 1973. From a field of eighteen candidates, I was elected to the nine-member city council with the fifth highest vote. Soon after the new city council was sworn in, we marched, with the new black mayor, in a funeral for a police officer killed in the line of duty during a social conflict situation. The emotional impact on the council members was forceful—the dirge, the lines of silent officers, the crowds along the parade route, the rifle salute, and the solidarity of officers and families as they rallied around the widow, who was herself in police training. In June 1974, the council adopted my resolution establishing a task force to investigate the issue of social conflict among families, friends, and acquaintances, particularly the question of domestic violence, and find ways to reduce police and civilian injuries.

The resolution instructed the Social Conflict Task Force to report to the city council and the mayor within three months with recommendations for referral mechanisms to handle situations involving social conflict and with proposals for training Detroit police officers to deal with such situations. The task force, by resolution, was to be composed of representatives from a number of organizations and agencies, including Family Service, the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), the Association of Black Social Workers, community counseling and mental health coordinating agencies, the Detroit Police Department, and the department's corps of chaplains. The task force was also to include three people named by the mayor and the Detroit Board of

Police Commissioners. By asking the mayor and the board of commissioners to name three people, I hoped to avoid turf problems, lend credibility to the task force, ensure that the new mayor would feel involved, and avoid giving the community the impression that the council and the mayor were at odds.

The idea of a task force was new for the Detroit City Council. Although the council met every day of the year in committee of the whole, subcommittees were prohibited by the charter from 1918 to 1974. Some members of the council were reluctant to establish committees or task forces, for they felt it would then be impossible to know everything that was going on. Others thought establishing such bodies would reduce the power of the city council president, a position many members wanted. It seemed wise, therefore, to make this a task force with a time limit and, because it was a first, to have someone other than a council member chair it. A priest who was a trained community social worker was asked to head the task force in the hope that this would reduce turf-related problems. He would also do better, I believed, with the police department because his gender and priestly identification would help in dealings with the police chief.

It was also essential to involve a diverse group of human service professionals to avoid leaving the project to police department traditionalists or to professionals advocating one particular method, such as peer group counseling, which is based on the idea that one does not need professional training to deal with problems involving human relationships, but needs only to be a peer with a loving, caring heart. (In Detroit in 1973, untrained women were running rape counseling services without professional consultation; by 1975, such services throughout the country were applying for money to hire professionals because the problems to be dealt with called for more skills and training than the volunteers had.)

A central objective of my resolution was to address the lack of understanding between the social work professional and the police. I was convinced that if social work professionals were involved in the project from the beginning, some of the artificial barriers between the two professions would be eliminated, and the services developed would be better for it. However, some social workers had serious doubts about the project. They questioned whether a change from traditional social agency practices would improve the situation and whether social workers would

lose their identity and begin to emulate police officers. They also wondered what the physical dangers would be. Many social workers see their role as one of offering therapy in traditional office settings. Neither psychiatrists nor social workers have traditionally worked with the police, although, as will be discussed later, some psychologists have begun to develop crisis intervention programs designed for police work.

Police traditionally view their work as the pursuit of criminals and the performance of patrol duties. Intervening in social conflicts is often seen as social work and as a less desirable assignment for the police officer. However, many police, like the public, are intrigued by the police activities portrayed in such television shows as "Baretta" and "Starsky and Hutch," although police admit that a show like "Barney Miller" is closer to reality. Police officers usually want to get the family trouble runs off their backs, but the programs to accomplish this are often ignored and the victims told that the problem is a civil matter: "Sorry, lady, there's nothing we can do."

As the task force began its work, it became known that a command officer in the Detroit Police Department had researched domestic violence in preparing a doctoral dissertation on the police emergency phone system. His findings highlighted the lack of crisis intervention training for the police operators and the low priority police gave to domestic violence. Although this officer was regarded by police officers, both black and white, as fair, tough, and a true police professional, the chief refused to appoint him to the Social Conflict Task Force. Instead, the chief intimated that the officer was being investigated by the FBI because of criminal contacts. This new, white chief was intent on proving his ability to rule the department. Therefore, the police officers appointed to the task force included one assigned to the Criminal Justice Institute (the local police academy) and an officer in headquarters command who was held in low esteem by the chief. The officers in charge of the institute were from outside the city and had little credibility in some levels of the police department. These appointments reflected the low priority the mayor assigned to the task force. The only hope was to use the task force to develop a base and a degree of understanding of family violence in the police department, social agencies, and the community and to develop a model for later program development.

Work of the Task Force

The task force studied crisis intervention programs conducted by police departments and other law enforcement agencies, examining them for their training techniques, their referral mechanisms, and their effectiveness. In 1974, most of the published work in this field had been done by psychologists, with the two major training packages having been developed by Bard from the Psychology Department of City College of New York and by Schwartz and Liebman, psychologists based in San Francisco. The Bard model emphasized teaching officers techniques for defusing conflict and for referring people to agencies.⁴ This package was designed for special units in police departments, but, unfortunately, such units tend to be elitist and to arrive at the scene after other officers have already performed the difficult and sensitive parts of the assignment. Moreover, when problems with funding arise, special units are the most likely to be eliminated.

The Schwartz-Liebman model used in San Francisco's Bay Area also emphasized defusing conflict.⁵ Although this approach involved the training of all police officers, the relationship between police and social service agencies was limited to the making of referrals and the developing of pocket-size referral books for officers. The police also tested whether the agency was receptive to police referrals and whether people were taken care of. Such referral mechanisms seemed to be afterthoughts. Both models had sexist overtones in how they viewed women victims of violence, and they built on the machismo emphasis of police training.

I joined a task force team that included representatives from the Detroit Police Department and the Criminal Justice Institute in conducting on-site research in California with police departments using the Schwartz model. The visit won support among some of the police officers for such a program and gave me additional information regarding links to community agencies and the experience of community agencies in social conflict interventions. For example, the experience of the program in Oakland, California, indicated that the peaks for conflict occurred on weekends and paydays and that once a situation was defused, 75 percent of the people being dealt with could wait until Monday morning for further intervention. Most families successfully referred needed from one to three interviews, and only 5 percent became long-term clients.⁶ The task force also consulted extensively with the Police

Foundation in Washington, D.C., and one member of the task force attended an FBI seminar on social conflict in Virginia. Others attended a regional Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) conference in Chicago.

The task force also examined the policies and practices of the Detroit Police Department in handling family violence. In 1974 the department gave a low priority to "domestic calls" on 911, the emergency line. People soon caught on that calls describing family problems brought a slow response, and callers began claiming there was "a man with a gun," which made the call a high priority and prompted a quick police response.

The General Orders of the Detroit Police Department in 1974 described social conflict situations as civil matters and not as a police responsibility. Several reasons were given for this point of view: (1) the large volume of other service demands for emergencies involving immediate physical danger and crimes in progress, (2) the lack of specific training for police mediating social conflicts, and (3) the service award system that emphasized arrests and convictions. Police recruits in Detroit received a total of seven hours of lecture-type training in topics related to social conflicts, a three-hour lecture on domestic complaints, and four hours of lecture on handling abnormal individuals, all of which constituted a tiny portion of the recruits' six-month training. Nevertheless, an estimated 25 to 30 percent of the calls to the 911 number in Detroit each week related to social conflicts.

Recommendations

In October of 1974, the Social Conflict Task Force reported to the Detroit City Council and the mayor, pointing out problems in many areas. The task force cited the lack of a legal way, in situations of marital conflict, to force a separation or to evict a violent person from the situation. It also criticized the failure of the police to treat with the same seriousness as crimes occurring between strangers domestic conflict or social conflict situations that involved people who knew each other; this problem was particularly noteworthy in instances of violence between husbands and wives. The lack of understanding and cooperation between social agencies and the police department was another problem discussed in the task force's report. Social agencies offered services during cer-

tain evening hours and ran some limited shelters for people who needed a place to spend the night. This was not enough, however, and what was available was often not made known to police officers. In Detroit, as in many communities, there are twenty-four-hour mental health clinics, but these are intended to deal with psychiatric emergencies, not problems in relationships, such as family conflicts. In addition, most of Detroit's social agencies did not set aside blocks of time during which clients caught in a conflict situation could walk in and receive services; with few exceptions, agencies had waiting lists for services. Two friends threatening to shoot each other do not need to be told to get at the end of the waiting list.

The task force also faulted the 911 priority list, which placed property crimes and crimes involving a weapon higher than family calls. An example of the 911 calls to which the operator could not send a car in 1974 was as follows: A 15-year-old girl called, screaming that her mother was hitting her and beating her up. She cried that she was frightened that her mother would kill her. The operator said that this was not a police matter and hung up. In turn, the police complained that when the calls came in at midnight on Friday or at 2:00 A.M. on Sunday from a family involved in physical violence, no social worker or social work agency was available.

The task force's report made five major recommendations: (1) that all officers be exposed to a forty-hour crisis intervention training program rather than just members of special units, (2) that a community resource referral system be established, (3) that social agencies set aside blocks of time and have extended hours to assist those calling the police department, (4) that changes be made in the police priority system and in the allocation of personnel, giving a higher priority to family calls and training 911 operators in basic interviewing and crisis intervention skills, and (5) that a service award system be established to recognize officers for their abilities to defuse volatile situations without injury to themselves or others.

When the report of the Social Conflict Task Force was completed in November 1974, I used my elected position to obtain media coverage for the report's findings. I also presented the report to the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners at a public meeting. Several members of the board believed in what we were trying to do; others thought it a minor matter. However, the police

chief said that the recommendations of the task force could not be acted on until social work agencies were available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. He was unwilling to consider employing social workers in the police department unless they were uniformed officers; if they were uniformed officers, he was not willing to give them the assignment of working with domestic violence.

Other obstacles included the mayor's continuing to view the project as a low priority. It seemed obvious that the recommendations of the task force were not going to get far without better cooperation from the top of the police department. Therefore, the strategy became one of keeping the issue alive through meeting with the police chief and the mayor and through involving other community groups, including women's groups. For example, when representatives of the task force met with the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, additional members of the Social Conflict Task Force and others were rounded up to be present as a show of support. The head of the task force organized an NASW committee on social conflict, and both of us continued to talk to the police, the police unions, and the corps of police chaplains. We also continued to work on the issue of 911 priorities, to talk with professionals and agencies about the necessity of closer work between social agencies and the police department, and to work with the National Organization for Women (NOW) and other community groups to keep the pressure on.

The Criminal Justice Institute had the officers most interested in the project. They even invited Schwartz and Liebman to conduct a week-long demonstration course on handling social conflicts. Not long afterwards, however, the institute was closed as a result of police department politics and Detroit's 1975-76 depression, during which every department of city government, including the police, took a 20-percent budget cut. The projection was that there would be no police to train for at least six months. It appeared the project was dead.

Breakthrough

Events quite apart from any efforts in behalf of the task force recommendations offered an opportunity for some progress. The police chief overreached himself in a departmental dispute and

was fired. A new police chief was appointed. Also, the officer who had become the expert within the department on the issue of social conflict calls became deputy executive chief for several months.

In November 1976, in an effort to break through the stalemate, I held a meeting in my office to discuss social conflict calls. I invited the deputy executive chief of the police department, a representative of United Community Services, the priest who had headed the task force, the two area directors of Family Service of Detroit and Wayne County, and a representative of the Detroit unit of NASW's Michigan Chapter. Discussion at this meeting identified the two major areas of unmet need: emergency shelters to house and protect children in danger as a result of family trouble, and professional counseling. Family Service responded with a proposal for the Police Referral Project of Family Service of Detroit and Wayne County, which eventually became known as the Family Trouble Clinic. The agency's willingness to engage in this project was partly a result of community pressure and NASW involvement. A speech by the deputy executive police chief at a local NASW meeting on the issue of family violence and the police had interested many social workers in the problem.

The project was conceived as a three-month pilot effort. Family Service was to provide the finances for a social worker to be present in the precinct station and offer immediate service to clients during the peak periods for incidents of domestic violence, which were Friday and Saturday evenings from 8:00 P.M. until midnight. In addition, one or two visits by a social worker to the precinct during the week were planned to facilitate, coordinate, and direct referrals to Family Service. Objectives of the project were to demonstrate that referrals are expedited by precinct-based activities, make social services better known to more police officers, increase professional staff's appreciation of the problems police officers have in domestic relations calls, and give police officers a better understanding of the services offered. It was also hoped that the results of this police referral project would lend support to the task force recommendation of establishing night service for family counseling.

No movement took place regarding the proposal for several months. Finally, I discovered that the deputy executive chief had not seen the proposal, so I forwarded another copy to him. I then called him several times, and he finally agreed it was worth pur-

suing. At a brief meeting in March 1977, the acceptance of the project was confirmed and its location established for the Sixteenth Police Precinct, whose commander had volunteered to house the project. The precinct was the largest in the city, its population presented a racial and economic cross section, and the precinct station was close to an office of Family Service. As responsibility for the development and implementation of the project shifted from one step to the next, it was repeatedly necessary to confront obstacles, defuse emotions, and solve problems to keep the project moving toward the final goal. Social work skills and the modest power of my elected office were valuable assets during this stage.

Although an early problem arose when the precinct commander publicly supported a mayoral candidate in opposition to the incumbent mayor in the 1977 election, the officers working with the project were convinced of its value, and the two social workers assigned to the project by Family Service were pleased with their work. Everyone involved became supportive of the project, and both the police and the human service professionals said they had begun to appreciate each other. I lobbied the mayor and his staff in support of the project and, in my reelection campaign, described it as a success, thus building public acceptance and support. In the end, the project survived both the internal politics of the police department and electoral politics.

An ad hoc committee of Family Service studied the experiences of the police referral project and compiled useful information:

- Social workers and the police were received differently by families in crisis.
- All direct referrals resulted in clients' receiving crisis counseling services within three hours of the complaint.
- Follow-up counseling occurred in 89 percent of all situations in which families received crisis counseling from the social worker.
- In all situations of family conflict, at least one member of the family received some form of direct service from a social worker.
- The number of referrals the project generated in the test precinct would have doubled Family Service's total annual intake if the rate of referral were projected to all the city's police precincts.

- Ninety-nine percent of the people referred had not visited a human service agency before.
- Police officers were concerned about domestic violence, but most felt helpless and powerless in confronting the problem. Perceived as the authority in the community, police can force cessation of a violent situation, but they cannot keep people apart. In some situations, for a variety of reasons, the next day the wife would say that she wanted her abuser home. Social workers know and deal with the dynamics of relationships, the police officer with cessation of the immediate trouble. With the inception of the pilot project the police officer had something to say, to recommend, after stopping the hostile actions.
- Most disputants lacked communication skills and were not used to talking about feelings. There are also problems when only one of two marital partners is verbal.

Focus on Publicity

Once this information had been compiled, my office announced on a Friday that there would be a report to the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners. A newspaper reporter called me on Sunday afternoon, desperately looking for a story, and, as a result, the police referral project received a front-page headline Monday morning. Fortunately, the writer of the newspaper article spoke with a police sergeant who had worked with Family Service on the pilot project. The sergeant was pleased with the project and praised it, and the article had the effect of broadening public support. As planned, the report was presented to the board with two resolutions: (1) that the board approach the local United Foundation and its planning agency for the money to make the work of the pilot project permanent and to expand it to another precinct and (2) that the police department be instructed to work with Family Service to prepare a proposal to get funding for a similar program in all the precincts.

Time, place, and situation all influence process and strategy. As a result of Family Service's report and of the media coverage received by a national conference on domestic violence held in Detroit by NOW, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, on my recommendation, set up a task force on social conflict. A

woman commissioner was to chair the task force, and I was to be vice-chair. We thus developed a publicly mandated support network as well as an entrée to the board of commissioners, the policymaking body for the police department.

Part of my function was to maintain community interest in the police referral project and to save the police from having to get into major battles with all kinds of groups in the community that might want to latch on to a hot topic. For example, after the task force was formed by the board of commissioners, two local feminists wrote a proposal for crisis intervention training for the police. One of them, a person with experience in sociological research, was to spend two months supervising a police sergeant in the development of a program to train police officers in defusion techniques. The researcher planned to develop a referral manual. The focus was on the victim without real consideration of the problems of the police officer. No mention was made of the training the police were already receiving or of any cooperation with other training programs. The sociological researcher and the other feminist, a planner in the city's planning department, did their political homework, and by maneuvering and taking advantage of internecine rivalry in the police department, they managed to obtain an LEAA grant despite the objections of several top officials in the police department and of the board of commissioner's task force. The grant was subsequently rewritten to incorporate the police officials' concerns.

Other groups also went to the board of commissioners to demand changes in police procedures. Some representatives of these groups were made members of the board's task force.

In 1977, I built my successful reelection campaign presentation on the theme "promises made and promises kept." One of the promises made in 1973 had been to do something about domestic violence. The promise had been kept: the police referral project had demonstrated that help could be given to families and to police officers and had resulted in some lessening of domestic violence. There was evidence that recidivism was lower among cases diverted to Family Service.

The pilot project demonstrated the need to spread the police referral program throughout the city. In November of 1977, the local United Foundation gave Family Service money to continue the program in the Sixteenth Police Precinct and to expand it to the Tenth Precinct. When the Criminal Justice Institute resumed

training in 1977, it incorporated into its curriculum for all officers some of the material that was prepared as a result of the studies by the Social Conflict Task Force. As a whole, the project documented the overwhelming need for money to involve additional social workers in social conflict work.

Principles of Political Practice

It would have been impossible to establish the police referral system had there not been support inside the police department, as well as considerable support on the outside. Confrontation was avoided. The changing climate in relation to women contributed immensely to this. Despite the mayor's placing low priority on human services, his recognition of the general support the issue attracted, of my expertise in this area, and of my support for his administration kept the task force and the police referral project from being seen as too great a threat. In addition, success was ensured by using existing structures and by keeping small the amount of money initially requested. Sources of funding outside city government were relied on heavily until police acceptance of the idea for a different kind of training had been established. It was also important to the success of the program that the police department benefited through the positive publicity it received for its eagerness to find solutions to help people.

Given the dynamics involved in working with the Detroit Police Department, the mayor, and various elements of city government, a strategy that included picket lines and mass demonstrations would have been counterproductive. However, the strategy used did include a great deal of individual assessment, persuasion, expert information and documentation, lobbying, and the implied pressure of budget power, particularly the power to hold up contracts. It further required the ability to create publicity. The value of coordinating various forces was also demonstrated, because the Detroit Police Department has expert politicians in its ranks. In addition, police department officials were aware that, as a member of the city council, I had the power to call them to a public discussion or hearing. Like most bureaucrats, they dreaded the possibility of adverse publicity. Apparent throughout the long campaign for the referral system was the importance of timing and of keeping the issue alive during the many periods of waiting

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for favorable conditions and opportunities for progress.

A social worker entering politics cannot overlook the importance of conviction and assertiveness. In the Detroit City Council, where the members are elected simultaneously and at large, there is a natural competition for constituencies and for votes. There is also a tacit agreement that if a member successfully stakes out an issue of special concern and is firm and assertive on it, others will not seriously interfere with his or her leadership on that issue.

Social workers are trained to analyze complexity and see all sides. This, of course, is both a gift and a liability. Recognition of complexities can lead to indecisiveness, whereas police are trained to be decisive, to be in command, and to give short, quick answers. A consequence of these differences is that police and social workers are often intolerant of one another. What is needed is an integration of skills.

Social workers as a whole, and human service agencies as well, need to understand that if they have an idea for a solution to a problem and the professional expertise to carry it out, they must be prepared to fight to get the problem solved in a professional way. Social workers sometimes take the position that the best program will eventually win and so do not fight for proposals that would assure social work services. Too often, non-social workers become attracted by a social work idea and are allowed to take it over for personal gain as it becomes popular. It is important that social workers commit themselves to engage in action for the client's benefit and for equitable treatment to ensure the availability of social work services.

The solution to a problem on a limited scale creates new demands. As the police referral service demonstrated that it worked, the police in Detroit's Sixteenth Police Precinct made more referrals, and satisfied clients and others called the Family Trouble Clinic instead of the police. Those who returned seemed to want longer term counseling. Eventually, the clinic needed increases in workers and money. The workers became so overloaded they had trouble following up on calls and resorted to conducting most counseling via telephone. The solution to one problem thus created new ones, which had to be addressed in new ways. Flexibility is an essential complement to stability of purpose. The scientific method of problem solving—assessing and defining the problem, analyzing the forces involved, establishing goals and objectives, planning and implementing intervention strategies, and constantly

reevaluating process and substance to identify the need for any corrective action—provides a valid model for developing and delivering services to a needy population.

The steps outlined in this article can be translated for use by other social workers elected to office, by the many social workers who work with elected officials, and by community groups who have been successful in selling an issue to an elected official. The problem of domestic violence—its impact on the police as well as on families—was identified and then further defined through the use of a task force to gather information and bring various forces in the community together. At each step in the process, strategies were developed to continue the forward movement of the project. When some forces threatened to sidetrack the project, other routes were found and counterforces developed. Most important, throughout this long process, the goal was kept in focus and the pressure was continued. Perhaps the old maxim that change is slow should be extended to affirm that achieving the goal reached through long and persistent effort is even sweeter.

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2. Interview with Patrick V. Murphy, executive director, Police Foundation, Washington, D.C., June 1974.
3. Interviews with United States Army social workers, Fifth Army, Frankfurt, Germany, June 1975.
4. See Morton Bard and Joseph Zacker, *The Police and Interpersonal Conflict: Third-Party Intervention Approaches* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1976).
5. See Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Donald A. Liebman, "Domestic Crisis Intervention" (Mountain View, Calif.: Law Enforcement Training and Research Association, Inc., 1971). (Photocopied.)
6. Interview with Betty Terrell, director of professional services, Family Service of the East Bay, Oakland, Calif., September 1974.