

“From Defamilization to Degenderization: toward a New Welfare Typology”

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Ever since Esping-Andersen wrote his seminal book *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, feminist scholars have been debating appropriate welfare typologies, which take into account the influence of welfare policies on gender relationships. They began by criticizing Esping-Andersen's typology and then tried to develop different typologies. Moreover, although Orloff (1996: 51) could still complain in 1996 that “comparative study has so far given little systemic attention to gender,” today many such studies exist (e.g. Gornick, Meyers and Ross, 1997; Hantrais 2004; Sainsbury 1996); however, still no consensus has emerged on how to categorize countries in a gender-based typology. Nevertheless, in recent years it has been more common to group countries in terms of degree of familialization and defamilialization. This article critically examines this development and propose a typology which more clearly allows us to differentiate family polices and their influence on gender relationships.

The Critique of Esping-Andersen

Feminist scholars were quick to question Esping-Andersen's criterion of decommodification as the main criterion for classifying welfare regimes. They noted that for most Western feminists one of the main goals has traditionally been to help women enter the labor market, which requires them to *become* commodified. For while many working men might have the goal of becoming less dependent on the labor market for their incomes, the goal of many women is to become less dependent on their husbands (See for example the articles in Sainsbury 1994a and Lewis 1993b). Moreover, they also pointed out that like the majority of researchers writing about social policy, Esping-Andersen concentrated on the labor market and social benefits, while neglecting the family. As Jane Jenson (1997:184) writes: “If ... we change our lens and claim that welfare programs are primarily about care, then unemployment insurance is no longer the flagship program of the welfare state.” Tamara Hervey and Jo Shaw (1998:44) assert: “Many would argue that the key to citizenship is independence, and that they key to independence is employment, leading to questions about responsibilities (private and public) for child care and other dependent relatives. Hence care-giving and the labour market should never be separated.” Thus, family policy affects gender relations as much as it affects female labor market participation and family policy is at least as important for women as pure labor market policies.

Family policies influence the labor market by making it easier or more difficult for women to gain employment. They also influence the length of time in which women leave the labor market when they have children. If childcare facilities are affordable and easy to access, mothers can return to work more quickly after giving birth. Family policies can even make it easier for women to return ore quickly to the labor force if they encourage fathers to stay at home with their children. If policies encourage fathers to spend long periods of time at home while taking care of their children while also encouraging mothers to stay in the labor market, then family policies can greatly increase the degree of gender equality both within the family and within the labor market (Saxonberg 2003). Such policies obviously influence gender relations at the home if they result in a situation in which men share rather equally in the household and childraising tasks. However, they also influence the labor market by encouraging men to leave it for periods of parental leave and encouraging mothers

to remain in paid employment for longer periods. When employers no longer expect women to leave the labor market for long periods of childraising while men continue to work and no correlation exists between gender and parental leave, then employers lose their economic incentive to discriminate against women in favor of men.

Alternative Typologies

Even though it was relatively easy for feminist scholars to agree on their criticisms of Esping-Andersen and traditional welfare research, it became much more difficult to agree on alternative typologies.

Jane Lewis (1993a) presented one of the first attempts at creating a gender-based typology. However, these concepts tend to be rather vague in describing welfare regimes.¹ As Diane Sainsbury (1994b:154, italics added) notes, the term “weak male breadwinner states... seems to indicate what a country’s policies are *not* rather than what they are.” Similarly, Anne Lise Ellingsæter (1998:60) remarks, “the breadwinner/gender regime model makes the boundaries of the different regime types difficult to establish, leading to problems in the classification of countries. A good typology should be more specific about what the different types of welfare regimes in fact *are* rather than emphasizing what they are moving away from. In addition, we want to add to our classification system an ideal-type welfare regime that would promote gender equality, so that instead of only discussing what countries might move away *from* we also can discuss what they could be moving *toward*. Jane Lewis (1997:168), herself, admitted in a later article: “It may be that we want to think more about measures that are clear statements of the ‘ought’ with respect to women....”

Diane Sainsbury (1999) developed one of the most ambitious attempts at creating a genderized model of welfare policies. She broke down countries into three categories: individual earner-carer, male breadwinner and separate gender roles. Her individual earner-carer model presents an excellent guide to understanding the dynamics of the Swedish model in particular. For in contrast to several authors, who characterized Scandinavian policies as promoting dual-earner families (e.g. Ellingsæter 1998; Korpi 2000), her categorization emphasizes the fact that Swedish policies also encourage dual-*caring* families. This is extremely important, since women cannot hope to achieve equality with men even if they work, as long as men do not share in the caring tasks. The state-socialist experience shows that it is possible to develop policies which force most women to work without making it possible for men to spend any time at home caring for their children (Gucwa-Leśny 1995: 128; cf. Heinen 1997: 179). Such policies prevent most women from concentrating on their careers, as they suffer too much from the “double burden” of working and caring. Under such conditions, women work, but only men have careers (Čermáková 1997). The Swedish model tries to break this pattern by treating fathers as carers. Interestingly, even though Sainsbury’s earner-carer model characterizes Swedish policy more accurately than the dual-earner category, her model leaves out the state socialist policies pursued by the former communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, which *did* have a dual earner but not a dual earner-carer model.

Another problem with Sainsbury’s typology was that it was rather confusing. It includes so many criteria that few countries fit one of the models. In addition, although the term earner-carer makes it easier to understand the Swedish model, the other two terms are not so clear. Intuitively it is difficult to see a difference between the phrases “male breadwinner” and “separate gender roles.” Isn’t the male breadwinner model based on the idea that men and women have separate roles?

Walter Korpi (2000) makes a clearer distinction between two types of welfare models that encourage gender inequality, by dividing them between the general

family support and market-oriented policies. In addition, he uses the term “dual-earner support” for the Scandinavian countries. As already noted, the term “dual-earner” is a bit misleading, because as Sainsbury (1999) notes, the Swedish model more actively promotes gender equality by treating both parents also as *carers*. Otherwise, an advantage of Korpi’s typology is that it stays close to Esping-Andersen’s original typology in differentiating between policies that actively promote the continuation of the gender hierarchy in society (Korpi’s “general family support” and Esping-Andersen’s conservative-“corporative” model) and laissez-faire policies that indirectly support continued gender inequality (Korpi’s “market-oriented” and Esping-Andersen’s “liberal” model”). Thus, Korpi’s typology is instinctively easier to understand than Sainsbury’s, since it more clearly corresponds to the main political ideologies that dominate Europe’s political landscape (liberal, conservative and social democratic).

Despite these advantages some problems arise with his typology because the misleading title of “dual-earner.” For example, in measuring the degree of general family support, he neglects the issue of parental leaves, even though they play a major role in traditional conservative family policies. For while the Scandinavian countries, with the exception of Finland, rely mainly on one insurance-based parental leave that is open to both parents (and in the case of Sweden and Norway reserves some period only for the father), the continental conservative countries tend to have one income related maternity leave that is only reserved for mothers to be followed by a flat-rate parental leave, which is rather long and at too low a level to encourage fathers to share in the leave. Korpi does include parental leaves in measuring support for the dual-earner model, but his methodology is not clear and he does not report final scores. Instead he only supports his rankings. Thus, it is difficult to understand how he grades paid maternity leaves, which he merely defines as “a multiplicative variable reflecting the percentage of replacement of previous earnings, duration of benefit, and coverage in the relevant population” (Korpi 2000: 146). Furthermore, Korpi’s typology makes it difficult to classify the state-socialist regimes, which as already noted supported the dual-earner family, but also supported traditional gender roles when it comes to caring for children and the household.

Even though the above mentioned scholars all made major contributions to the debate on genderizing the welfare state, none of them have been able to convince a large number of researchers to use their typologies.² Instead, in recent years the notions of “familialization” and “defamilialization” have gained in prominence. This article proceeds by discussing the main components of this typology, before critically analyzing Leitner’s (2003) attempt at further developing this model. Then it presents an alternative typology that does not share the pitfalls of the familialization-defamilialization typology.

Familization and Defamilization

Slowly, the dichotomy of “familialization” and “defamilialization” has emerged as the most common manner of genderizing welfare policies (i.e. Esping-Andersen 1999; Hantrais 2004; Lewis 1997; McLaughlin and Glendinning 1994) Defamilializing policies are policies which relieve parents of their caring duties, mostly by having the state take over such activities by such methods as providing childcare and care for the elderly, while familializing policies force parents (normally the mother) to take care of family members. The concept of defamilialization has the advantage of presenting a simple genderized alternative to Esping-Andersen’s measurement of decommodification. Even Esping-Andersen himself (1999) accepted the feminist

criticism of his reliance on decommodification and added an index of defamilialization.

Despite its advantages, defamilialization has certain disadvantages. One obvious disadvantage is that it implies that the goal of the modern feminist movement is to have the state immediately take over control of childcaring. According to this scenario, the feminist utopia would be a system in which mothers immediately handed over their children to institutionalize childcaring institutions the minute their children were born. Even if some feminists, such as Firestone, originally suggested that women would be liberated only if they could avoid being pregnant and children were created in test-tubes, the vast majority of parents and prospective parents would find such a solution unpalatable.

This emphasis on the provision of childcare shifts the focus away from the important issue of which parent takes care of the children. For if the goal is for women to have the same possibilities of participating in public life as men and for them to become autonomous and financially independent from men, then theoretically this could be achieved without the existence of any childcare facilities at all *if* on the average, childcaring was shared equally by men and women.

Of course, this is not to imply that childcare does not comprise an essential component of welfare policy. For even if men shared equally in taking care of children, it is likely that most parents would want to return to work before their children begin school. Furthermore, given today's situation, where women are much more likely than men to stay at home with children, childcare provision *does* greatly influence gender relations. Thus, a gender-sensitive typology must take into account access to childcare, but it also must pay close attention to parental leave schemes.

In addition to overemphasizing childcare at the expense of parental leaves, another problem with classifying regimes according to the familization/defamilialization dichotomy is that it blurs the distinction between conservative policies that openly support the male-breadwinner model and laissez-faire policies, which only indirectly support the male-breadwinner model in the sense that given the present patriarchal society, free-market policies will likely allow current gender inequalities to continue because it forces many mothers to stay at home, when they cannot find affordable daycare and when their male partners cannot afford to miss their jobs to stay at home with the children. Despite some similarities, it is still fruitful to distinguish between policies which actively support a particular outcome and policies that only indirectly support it. Moreover, at least under certain conditions, these different types of policies also cause different types of outcomes. At least among the most highly industrialized western countries, those with more laissez-faire, market-oriented policies tend to have greater female labor market participation rates and higher fertility rates than countries with conservative policies (Boje 2007; Esping-Andersen 1990; Gornick 1999; Korpi 2000; Saxonberg and Szelewa 2007). However, among post-communist countries, studies suggest that both conservative and laissez-faire, market-oriented policies lead to similar outcomes: a radical drop in fertility rates, as women cannot afford to leave the labor market when they no longer have access to publicly financed daycare and instead leave the reproductive market. Even paid extended leaves cannot induce women in these countries to have more children (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006; Saxonberg and Szelewa 2007).

Finally, this typology still has the problem of classifying the formerly communist-led regimes in East and Central Europe. They would score high on defamilialization as they provided relatively high access to childcare; yet, their leave policies still promoted traditional gender roles, because they offered long extended leaves, which were not open to fathers (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006; Saxonberg

and Szelwa 2007). Consequently, women had strong incentives to stay at home for several years per child, which prevented them from competing with men in the public sphere.

Varieties of Familialism

Sigrid Leitner (2003) provides an ambitious attempt to deal with one of the problems mentioned above: the inability of the term “familialization” to differentiate between different types of policies. She creates four categories: “optional familialism,” “explicit familialism,” “implicit familialism” and “de-familialization.” At first glance, her typology appears extremely promising. Her distinction between implicit and explicit familialism is particularly innovative, as it *could* capture the difference between conservative policies that explicitly promote separate gender roles and laissez-faire, market-oriented policies that only implicitly support the male-breadwinner model. As already noted, laissez-faire policies promote the male breadwinner model only indirectly in the sense that given present conditions, women cannot achieve equality with men on the labor market if policies do not openly enable women to work by making access to childcare readily available and affordable, while at the same time encouraging men to share in the childraising and household tasks through generous parental leave policies (which include periods reserved only for fathers).

It soon becomes apparent, however, that Leitner’s typology runs into problems. She comes to the surprising conclusion that Ireland and the UK comprise the group of defamilialized welfare regimes, while the Nordic countries belong to her new group of optional familialism. Her results contrast the vast majority of authors who place the Scandinavian countries in the defamilialized category and the Anglo-Saxon familialized category (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1999; Siim 1990). She considers Ireland and the UK to be defamilialized because although they have similar laissez-faire policies as the southern European countries of Spain, Portugal and Greece, the private sector provides childcare for a relatively large number of children, while the private sector fails in the southern countries. Meanwhile, although the percentage of children under 3 under formal care is higher in Sweden and Denmark than in Ireland and the UK, the Nordic countries also promote familialism, since they provide paid parental leaves. This combination of access to childcare and the ability to take parental leaves gives parents the “option” of staying at home, thus making it possible to choose to have the family take care of the children.

However, if we want to be able to influence policy-making – and most social scientists do hope that their research can have some influence on the real world – then it is important to analyze why the same policies have different results in different contexts (Saxonberg and Szelewa 2007) If we confuse policies and outcomes we lose much of our ability to influence policy-making, as we cannot be sure how certain policies will influence society in a particular situation.

When it comes to the Nordic countries, Leitner gives the false impression that mothers can choose to become housewives. Yes, it is true that parents can receive payment to stay at home, but the length of leave is much too short to constitute child-caring as a realistic alternative to working. For example, even though the length of parental leave in Sweden is actually longer than Leitner writes (13 months paid leave based on the social insurance rate rather than 12) and even though the benefit level is actually higher than she writes (80% not 75%), this period is hardly long enough to allow mothers to choose to become housewives. In fact, although Leitner does not mention this, two months are reserved for the father, which only leaves 11 months at maximum for the mother to stay at home at the social insurance level. Even though

she could also choose to stay at home another 3 months at the low flat-rate level, 14 months of leave hardly provides the option of letting the family take over long-term caring needs for children.³ In addition, as can be seen in her table (2003: 361) Denmark provides even less generous leave options than Sweden. Thus, the “familialistic” policies in Sweden and Denmark differ radically from the leave policies in countries like Austria and Germany. According to Leitner’s table the parental leave periods in Austria and Germany are much longer (3 years and 2 years) than in the Nordic countries and are paid at a flat-rate, which gives father’s little economic incentive to take these leaves, given the fact that in most families fathers earn more than mothers. In addition, Leitner leaves out the fact that these more truly familialist countries strengthen the separation of gender roles by providing maternity leaves that are only available to mothers. (Here I am leaving out the fact that Germany has changed its policies since Leitner’s article was published). Consequently, Leitner does not show in her typology the fact that Sweden actively promotes gender equality by providing a parental leave that is generous enough to encourage fathers to take leaves and gives even greater encouragement to gender equality by reserving two months onl for the father. Furthermore, Norway, which is not included in her study, has rather similar leave policies to Sweden.

Leitner’s characterization of the Nordic countries show the problems of using familialization as a measurement of welfare policies, while her differentiation between the Anglo-Saxon countries and southern European countries show the problems of using regimes rather than policies as the criteria for describing welfare policies. For if she were to concentrate on the *policies* of the various countries, then the Anglo-Saxon countries would fall under the same category of implicitly familialized as the do the Southern European countries. The fact that the *outcomes* of similar policies are different in different socioeconomic contexts make it interesting to study why different policies cause different outcomes in different contexts, but if our typologies are only based on outcomes, then we can no longer study the impact of policies. Leitner tries to solve this dilemma by differentiating between “gendered” and “de-gendered familialism,” but this only makes her typology more confusing. Rather than having the simplicity of one typology that makes clear the influence of policies on gender relationships, she resorts to including a typology within a typology.

An Alternative Model

In summary, the familialization/defamilialization dichotomy has several critical problems. First, by emphasizing the degree in which caring is done outside of the family, it risks saying more about caring ideologies than on gender relations and it implies that the goal should be to have families hand over their children to non-family institutions as soon as their babies are born. Second, it has difficulty differentiating between policies that implicitly support separate gender roles and those that explicitly do so. Third, although Leitner’s model addresses this issue somewhat, her typology becomes confusing and fails to differentiate between policies and outcomes.

A simple alternative to Leitner’s complicated two-dimensional typology would be a typology which from the very beginning emphasizes the degree to which policies support separate gender roles or support the disappearance of gender roles, by examining childcare leave policies and public support for childcare. Thus, rather than discuss familialization and defamiliaization is makes more sense to discuss genderization and degenderization. Following Leitner’s example, we can divide genderized policies into those that are explicitly and implicitly genderized.

Table 1 shows how we can create a typology of degenderization based on the two most important policies for influencing gender roles: the level of paid parental

leaves and state support for childcare. Parental leaves can contribute to the degenderization of society by encouraging fathers to share in the leaves, so that caring no longer remains a domain reserved for mothers. Policies can encourage fathers to share in leaves both by making the benefit-levels high and insurance based and by reserving part of the leave period for fathers. Since benefit levels are high, families do not lose much money if the father shares in the leave; consequently, the economic incentive for lower paid mothers to partake in the entire leave period disappears. Moreover, fathers receive even greater encouragement to take leaves, because part of the period is reserved only for them. Besides encouraging fathers to share equally in the caring leaves, family policies contribute to degenderizing society by providing easy access to publicly financed childcare, so that mothers can more easily go back to work when fathers are not staying at home with the children.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Parental Leaves

On the issue of parental leaves, as table 2 shows, Sweden, Iceland and Norway do the most to encourage fathers to share in the leaves because parental leaves are insurance-based and parts of the leave periods are only reserved for the fathers (one month in Norway, two months in Sweden, and three months in Iceland). Thus, if the fathers do not utilize their leave quotas, the family loses the entire benefit sum for that period.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

After the grand coalition government in Germany recently introduced parental leave reforms, that country has now joined the group of countries, whose parental leaves encourage degenderization. The previous system of a maternity leave followed by a means-tested and flat has been replaced by a one-year, insurance based parental leave. Even though the level might seem lower than in Sweden and Norway, in Germany one received 67% of ones net salary, while in the Nordic countries one receives a percentage of ones gross salary and then pays taxes on it. Thus, the after tax benefit is similar to the Nordic countries, especially if one takes into account that Germany has a lower tax level. In addition, although no father quota exists in Germany, fathers have an extra incentive to take at least two months leave, because if they do the family received benefits for another two months.

Interestingly, post-communist Hungary presents a borderline case, which can be seen as having moderately degenderized leave policies, because after the initial maternity leave, a 2-year leave is available with a 70% replacement rate, although in line with traditional conservative policies it also offers a universal 3-year flat rate payment for those ineligible for the two-year leave (those taking two-years at 70% can still utilize the flat-rate leave for the third year). However, in contrast to Iceland, Sweden and Norway, no father quota exists. Furthermore, the maximum payment is rather low at twice the minimum wage. Yet, only 24% of recipients in 2007 received the maximum payment, which is about the same as in Sweden.⁴ Consequently, for most families the 2-year leave offers almost as generous conditions as Sweden although it pays a 10% lower replacement rate and no months are reserved for fathers. Of course, another important difference is that the Hungarian state does not actively encourage fathers to partake in the leaves as Sweden does through ad campaigns or letters to fathers encouraging them to take their leaves. Nevertheless, Hungary is clearly the post-communist country that gives the greatest incentives for fathers to share in the parental leave and it is interesting to note that despite the absence of a public discourse encouraging fathers to take leaves, around 6-7% of those on parental

leave are fathers.⁵ While far from achieving gender equality, this rate of 6-7% is actually higher than in such social democratic Nordic welfare states as Denmark and Finland in 2001.⁶

While degenderized parental leave policies encourage the abolishment of gender roles by encouraging fathers to share in the leave periods, explicitly genderized welfare policies encourage mothers to use the entire leave period. First, they usually have a maternity leave that is only available to mothers or at least nearly the entire period is only available to mothers. Then they have an extended period of leave which during the 1990s has been opened for men in all West and Central European countries. However, their benefit level is so low that it discourages men from sharing in the leave period, since families would lose a large portion of their income in the vast majority of cases, in which the fathers have higher salaries than the mothers. Most of the west European continental countries in Leitner's study would fit into this group, as would most of the countries under communist rule in the 1980s and their post-communist replacements. In the Hungarian case, the benefit levels today are basically the same as in the 1980s, but since the communist regime did not allow men to take parental leaves, the relatively high benefit level did not encourage a degenderization of parental roles,⁷ until the benefit was opened for men in the 1990s.

Perhaps surprisingly, two Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Finland, fall into the category of explicitly genderized, although they represent borderline cases. Denmark fits into this category, as it has a maternity leave followed by a universal, but lower-paying parental leave. For, even though it pays 90% of one's salary, the ceiling is quite low. In addition, the length of the leave is relatively short, which further discourages men from going on leave. Since mothers often want to stay at home for the first 6-9 months to breastfeed their children, leave periods shorter than one year make it more difficult for men to share in the childcaring. Similarly, in the Finnish case, the insurance-based leave period is not only rather modestly paid at 60% of the parent's salary, it is also too short to encourage many fathers to go on leave. As is typical for the explicitly gendered parental leave schemes, a long (3-year) flat-rate period follows the more generously paid period.

Belgium and Luxembourg provide two more borderline cases. They both encourage fathers to stay at home by reserving portions of the parental leave only for fathers. However, they both have flat rates, which mean that in the majority of cases, in which the father earns more than the mother, families still suffer economically if the father stays at home, since they will lose more income than if the mother stays at home. Still, it is important to point out that Luxembourg pays such a high flat rate – at 1840 Euros per month – that we could expect the leave benefits to compensate for a large portion of the loss of income when the father stays at home.

Countries with implicitly genderized policies provide no parental leaves, or if they do, they are short and often either without pay or means-tested. The Anglo-Saxon countries, including Australia, Ireland, the UK and USA fall into this category. Using this current typology, the southern European countries of Portugal and Spain no longer comprise groups separate from the UK, as all these countries have rather laissez-faire leave policies that implicitly encourage genderized caring roles, as mothers either must stay at home with the children or if they can afford private daycare they must hope that the market will provide them an alternative; but, they cannot expect the state to support their leave nor can they expect their male partners to help them with the childcaring tasks. Poland and Germany (before its recent reforms) fall on the borderline between explicitly and implicitly genderized policies, since they both have generous maternity leaves,⁸ but their parental leaves are means-tested.

Access to Childcare

The next dimension is access to childcare. On this issue it is a bit more difficult to differentiate between policies and results, although if one restricts the typology to publicly financed childcare, then policies and results will usually be about the same, the reason being that in most countries the supply of public daycare is lower than the demand. Moreover, even if the supply of publicly financed daycare were to exceed the demand during a period, governments would be likely to cutback on daycare expenditures, so we can assume that that the actual usage of publicly financed childcare facilities approximates the level of government support.

Otherwise, ideally it would be good to create index similar to Kangas and Rostgaard (2007), which includes such factors as access to daycare (measured by the share of an age group in public daycare measured in full-time equivalents), whether there is a public guarantee of daycare provision, the social expenditure for daycare, the cost for parents to send their children to daycare, and the quality of daycare (measured in the staff-child ratio), as well as the opening hours. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain all this data. In addition their results did not differ from the usual measurements of access to daycare, i.e. the percentage of children in a certain age group who attend publicly financed childcare.

It is not as easy to find reliable data about the percentage of children attending publicly financed childcare as it is for parental leave schemes. For example, the OECD database includes all forms of “licensed” caring, including family members who take care of the children or private nannies (see OECD 2007). As a result their database does not say much about public policies and includes unreliable results. For example, it shows Norway as having more children in childcare than Sweden, although it is well-known that Norway does not fund childcare nearly as much as Sweden. Or in the Central European case, Slovakia appears to be the most generous country with an enrolment rate of 17.7% for children 0-2 years compared to 3% in the Czech Republic, 6.9% in Hungary and 2% in Poland. Yet, we know that daycare for children below 3 has nearly disappeared in that country (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006).

To make matters more confusing, one could assume that the high level of children in care in Slovakia is due to the inclusion of grandmothers taking care of their grandchildren. However, it is well-known that Poland is the most-communist country, where it is most common for grandmothers to take care of their grandchildren (cf. D browska-Caban 1997; Siemienska 1994). Nevertheless, the OECD database ranks Poland the lowest among the post-communist countries with only a small portion of the Slovak level (3% compared to 17%).

Finally, it rates Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the UK high, because even though little public support for childcare exists, many families employ private nannies. Nevertheless, the database does provide important information in that it includes statistics about government spending as a percentage of GDP for childcare both for children under 3 and for children 3-5.

The most reliable calculations available on children attending publicly financed childcare appear to be Meyers and Gornick (2003) for Western Europe and Saxonberg and Sirovátka (2006) for Central Europe, although this has the disadvantage that Gornick’s data are based on the mid-1990s (see Table 3 for the results). In addition, the table also includes the most recent OECD statistics on public expenditures on daycare facilities both for children under 3 and for those between 3 and 5. The table shows that shows that a high correlation exists between children under attending publicly financed childcare facilities and the level of public spending

on childcare, which again indicates that the level of children attending public facilities represents a reasonable approximation of the level of state support.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Even though the lack of reliable data presents a problem, it does not present such a great problem for this current article, because the goal of this article is to present a new theoretical framework for classifying welfare states. Thus, even if more current and reliable data might lead to slightly different empirical results, the theoretical arguments of this article would still be equally valid.

Again, the degenderized welfare states provide the greatest support for public childcare, since that makes it easier for women to more quickly return to their jobs after giving birth (see table 3). One problem emerges that there seem to be four clusters and not just three: the most generous countries have public childcare facilities for over 30% of children under 3, over 70% for children 3-5 and except for Belgium spend more than 0.8% of their GDP on formal daycare for children under 3. These countries are clearly following degenderized policies, which make it easier for women to work and thus decrease their disadvantage in competing with men on the labor market. A second group is making a moderate effort at degenderizing society by providing public childcare for over 20% of children under 3, providing high access to publicly funded kindergartens for children 3-5 and spending 0.5-1% of their GDP for supporting childcare for children under 3. These countries comprise a subgroup called “moderately degenderized.” The explicitly genderized countries basically follow the traditional, conservative continental model of providing some basic access to public childcare for the very needy families with children under 3, while providing very high levels of support for public childcare for children over 3. In fact, for children over 3, access levels are similar to the degenderized countries. Finally, we have a group of implicitly genderized countries, which also provide some basic childcare to the neediest families with children under 3, but provide much more modest support for children 3-5 and do not have caring facilities that are open all day.

Among the Nordic countries, Iceland, Sweden and Denmark give the greatest support for public childcare, while Norway gives less support, although it gives enough support to be considered moderately degenderized. Thus, we see already in the table that Iceland and Sweden provide fully degenderized policies, while Norway provides moderately degenderized policies. Furthermore, Denmark and Finland fall into a hybrid category.

Denmark and Finland combine degenderized childcare with explicitly genderized parental leaves. This hybrid receives the name “gendered institutionalized,” because its high support for childcare allows public institutions to take over family duties, while leave policies are still gendered, because they discourage fathers from sharing in the leave. This hybrid is rather unusual for western European countries – although it includes Belgium – but it was the most common combination for the communist regimes, such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany, which actively promoted the usage of public daycare facilities, while following traditional, conservative, explicitly genderizing mother-leave schemes. These examples show another advantage of the present typology: it more easily deals with hybrid models than previous typologies and it allows us to more clearly categorize the state-socialist policies that were widely practiced in Central and Eastern Europe before the collapse of the communist-led regimes.

Recent reforms in the German parental leave scheme are moving the country up to another hybrid category, termed “degendered moderately institutionalized” that

combines degenderized parental leave policies with genderizing, familialized childcare policies that explicitly give the family responsibility for caring for children under 3. While Germany's parental leave policies encourage fathers to share in the childcaring, its relative lack of daycare encourages mothers to stay at home for longer periods than in Sweden and Iceland. That is, since the majority of parental leave time is still taken by mothers, mothers are more likely than fathers to remain at home with their children if they do not have access to childcare facilities. However, the government plans to build out its access to public childcare, so if the trend continues, Germany might eventually join the group of degenderized countries.

Post-communist Hungary also fits into this category "degendered moderately institutionalized," since it follows the explicitly genderized childcare policy of combining rather low access to publicly funded daycare for children under 3 with high access for children 3-5. As already noted it is the only post-communist country in Central Europe that has an parental leave that functions as insurance covering a large portion of one's loss of income, which can degenderize parental caring by giving fathers to spend some time at home with their children.

Meanwhile, explicitly genderized welfare policies do tend to provide some minimal level of support for public childcare for children under 3 and can be rather generous in their support for children above 3. With the exception of Spain and Germany (before its recent reforms), these countries provide public childcare for 5-11% of children below 3 years and in all cases they provide public childcare for over two-thirds of children between 3-5 years and spend 0.4-0.8% of their GDP on such facilities, which is less than the degenderized countries, but more than the implicitly genderized countries, which spend 0.3-0.5% of GDP on childcare for children 3-5.

The vast majority of countries with explicitly gendered parental leave policies also have explicitly gendered childcare policies and the majority of these countries also fall under Leitner's (2003) category of explicitly familialized. This includes communist Hungary (where around 15% of children under 3 attended public nurseries or kindergartens, see Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006), Italy and Luxemburg as well as post-communist Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the vast majority of children 3-6 attend kindergartens, although access to childcare for children under 3 has radically decreased (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006, Saxonberg and Szelwa 2007), which is why they no longer belong to the group having degendered childcare policies.

Implicitly genderized laissez-faire welfare policies provide little support for childcare, as they expect either the market or family to take solve caring needs. In contrast to Leitner's (2003) typology, Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Australia, the USA and the UK belong to the group with the least support for families. Although large numbers of American and British children attend privately financed daycare arrangements (such as nannies), few attend publicly financed childcare and public spending on childcare is lower than for the other two groups. Poland also falls into this category as support for childcare is much lower than in the other Central European countries, especially concerning children 3-6. Poland, however, is the only country within this group that provides full-day childcare fore children under 6.

Germany before 2007, Spain and the Netherlands appear to provide another hybrid model that combines laissez-faire, implicitly genderizing parental leave policies (including means-testing in Germany and unpaid parental leaves in the Netherlands) with moderately high access to publicly-funded daycare at a level, which approximates the explicitly genderized welfare states. That is, both countries have more than two-thirds of children over 3 attending publicly funded daycare (71% in the Netherlands and 78% in Germany), while the Netherlands also clears the 5% level for

children under 3, even though Germany presents a borderline case, since it fails to meet this criteria. It is also interesting to note that when one considers policies rather than results, then in contrast to Leitner's study, Spain enjoys more generous benefits than Anglo-Saxon countries, as the UK. Since 84% of children 3-5 in Spain attend publicly funded kindergartens, it also belongs to the same group as Germany and the Netherlands and follows the typical explicitly genderized childcare model of combining low support for children under 3 with high public support for children above 3. This hybrid model can be called "gendered moderately institutionalized" as the market-oriented parental leave policies implicitly promote genderization as do the childcaring policies for children under 3, while access to public institutionalized care is rather high for children 3-5.

Summary

This article presents an alternative typology to the common one based on familization and defamilization. It is more fruitful to think in terms of genderization and degenderization, because these terms focus more clearly on the issue of how policies influence gender roles. It also corresponds more directly to Esping-Andersen's measurement of commodification and decommodification. Esping-Andersen claims that the goal of social democratic social policy has been to make workers independent of the market for determining their incomes. Similarly, the goal of many feminists (at least those pursuing the "women-friendly" state-feminist approach to social policy) has been to promote policies that promote the dissolution of gender roles.

If the goal of women is to become independent of men and to be able to compete with men on the labor market, then they must advocate policies that degenderize the family by having men sharing in the household tasks, including childraising, while also giving parents access to childcare facilities, so that women can more quickly return to the labor market after giving birth. The terminology of familization and defamilization implies that the goal of feminists has been to encourage women to hand over their children to childcare institutions the minute their children are born.

Even though not all feminists support the dissolution of gender roles and some favor the idea of allowing women to remain the main carers, on the condition that they are paid by the state for their caring, those promoting the degenderization of gender roles constitute the majority of those trying to influence policy-making, while few would seriously claim that the goal is for women to immediately hand over their children to public institutions as soon as their children are born. Moreover, regardless of where one stands normatively on the issue of gender roles and childcare, the familization terminology neglects parental leave schemes by focusing on daycare. Consequently, even when scholars such as Leitner try to provide a more nuanced view of family policies, they can come to the surprising (and empirically incorrect) conclusion that the Swedish model allows for familization. We would expect a gender-based typology to make it clear which countries go the farthest in promoting gender equality and Leitner's typology confuses the matter by making it appear that the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon countries go the furthest in promoting gender equality.

Another advantage of the genderization typology is that it allows for hybrid models, so it can explain more clearly, for example, the unique communist era policies more clearly and it can also show more clearly how the Scandinavian countries diverge somewhat from each other.

Yet another advantage of the methodology of this article is that it shifts the focus from results to policies. For example, several authors such as Leitner (but also Hantrais 2004) claim that the UK has defamilialized policies, because many parents use private nannies to take care of their children. By confusing the difference between policies and outcomes, we are less able to analyze how policies influence outcomes. As social scientists with the goal of influencing policy-makers, we want to be able to analyze what effects different policies have in different situation. If market-oriented, implicitly genderized policies have different results in the UK than in Portugal or Poland then we should analyze the reasons for these differences. Perhaps similar policies work better in the UK (in the sense of higher female labor-market participation rates, greater income equality between the sexes, greater usage of private caring alternatives, higher fertility rates, etc.) simply because it is a wealthier nation, so that market-liberal policies create a great deal of wealth for middle-class women, who can afford to pay for private alternatives. Meanwhile, perhaps poorer countries such as Portugal and Poland do not have a large enough and a wealthy enough middle-class to be able to afford private alternatives.⁹ In this case, we could advise governments in Poland and Portugal against following the British example, since the British model would not work well under their national conditions.

TABLE 1: GENDERIZED WELFARE TYPOLOGY

Benefit Level of Paid Leaves	State Support for daycare		
	high	Medium	Low
High income replacement rate, usually with father quotas	Degendered (Norway, Sweden, Iceland)	Degendered moderately institutionalized (Hungary, Germany 2007)	
Maternity leaves, Medium level for additional flat-rate leaves	Gendered institutionalized (communist Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France)	Explicitly gendered (Austria, communist Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Czech Republic, Slovakia)	
Low, means-tested, none		Gendered moderately institutionalized (Germany before 2007, Netherlands, Spain)	Implicitly gendered (Australia, Poland, Communist Poland, USA, UK)

Non-bold categories are hybrids

Table 2: Parental Leaves

	Maternity Leave (length + replacement rate)	Paternity Leave	Payment of Parental Leave	Type of Policy
Iceland	Part of parental leave, 13 weeks reserved for mother	13 weeks reserved for father, part of parental leave	80%	<i>Highly degendered</i>
Sweden	Part of parental leave, 2 months reserved for mother plus 7 weeks pregnancy leave	10 days at birth, 2 months reserved for father (part of parental leave)	80% for 390 days, then low flat rate for next 90 days	<i>Highly degendered</i>
Norway	Part of parental leave, 9 weeks reserved for mother	4 weeks reserved for father if the mother has worked more than 50%	100% if parents take 42 weeks or 80% if they take 52 weeks	<i>Moderately-high degenderized</i>
Germany 2007		Part of parental leave. 2 months bonus if father takes at least 2 months of leave	67% of net salary up to 1800 Euro for 12 months. 14 months if father takes at least 2 months leave.	<i>Moderately-high degenderized</i>
Hungary	24 weeks at 70% replacement rate		70% of previous salary for 2 years ^c	<i>Moderately degenderized</i>
Belgium	4 weeks at 82% then 11 weeks at 75%	3 months part of parental leave	Low flat rate (537 Euro/month), 3 months for each parent	<i>Moderately Explicitly genderized^a</i>
Denmark	18 weeks at 100%		32 weeks at 90%, but with low ceiling ^d	<i>Moderately Explicitly genderized</i>
Finland	105 days at 60-100% (decreases with earnings)	18 weekdays at 60-100% (decreases with earnings). Bonus if father takes longer leave	158 days at around 60% then Flat rate until child is 3.	<i>Moderately Explicitly genderized</i>
Italy	21 weeks at 80%	5-6 months plus bonus if father takes leave ^c	11 months per child. 30% for first 6 months, then 30% only if income under a minimum level.	<i>Moderately Explicitly genderized^a</i>
Luxembourg	16 weeks at 100%	2 days at 100% at birth, then 6 months for each parent	High flat rate (1840 Euro per month)	<i>Moderately Explicitly genderized^b</i>
Austria	16 weeks at 100%		2 years flat rate, 4 years if lone parent	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
France	16 weeks at 100%	Two weeks at birth at 100% for first 3 days, then up to a max for remaining 11 days	Flat rate of 521 Euro/month at 3 years per parent	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Czech Rep.	28 weeks at 69%		3 years, Low flat rate	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Slovakia	28 weeks at 55%		2 years Low flat rate	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Communist Czechoslovakia	28 weeks at 90%		2 ½ year extended maternity rate, universal low flat rate	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Communist Hungary	6 months at 100%		Two year extended maternity leave at 75% of previous salary plus 6 month flat rate or only a 2 ½ -year flat-rate	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Australia			52 weeks unpaid	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Germany,	14 weeks at 100%		Means tested with low	<i>Implicitly</i>

2006			maximum benefit ^f	<i>genderized</i>
Ireland	18 weeks at 70% with a maximum plus 14 weeks unpaid	3 paid days at birth, 14 weeks unpaid	unpaid	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Netherlands	16 weeks at 100%	2 days at birth at 100%. Each parents receives a 3 month unpaid leave	Unpaid except for civil servants	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Poland	16 weeks at 100%		Means-tested, 103 Euro/month	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Communist Poland	16 weeks at 100%		Means-tested extended maternity leave	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Portugal	17 weeks at 100%, plus 3 months unpaid	5 days at birth at 100%, 3 months unpaid	unpaid	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Spain	16 weeks at 100%	2 days at birth at 100% paid by employer, 3 years unpaid	unpaid	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Switzerland	16 weeks at 100%		none	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
UK	6 weeks at 90%, then 20 at max 154 Euro, plus 26 weeks unpaid		Unpaid, 13 weeks/child, max 4 weeks/year	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
USA	12 weeks unpaid			<i>Implicitly genderized</i>

^a Payment too low to encourage men to utilize it.

^b genderized because flat-rate

^c The mother can only take a maximum 6 months of the 11 parental leave months, leaving a minimum of 5 for the father. If the father takes at least 3 months, the family receives an extra month of paid leave

^d The maximum payment is 3115 DKR per week

^e But with a relatively low ceiling of twice the minimum wage

^f 450 Euro during 12 first months or 300 Euro for 24 months

Sources: OECD (2007). For the recent German reforms

http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_66124/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/Reformprojekte/familienpolitik-2006-08-21-eltern-geld-1.html, for Hungary under Communist rule Haney (2002: 178), for Poland and Czechoslovakia Saxonberg and Szwela (2006).

Table 3: Public Support for Childcare Facilities						
Country	% under 3 in public care	Public expenditures on formal daycare for children 0-3 as % of GDP (2003)	% 3-5 in public care	Access to care for 3-5 year olds	Public pre-school expenditures on for children 3-5 % of GDP (2003)	Type of policy
Denmark	48	1.0	82	Full day	0.7	<i>Degenderized</i>
Iceland	38	1.2	94	Full day	0.6	<i>Degenderized</i>
Sweden	33	0.8	72	Full day	0.5	<i>Degenderized</i>
Belgium	30	0.2	95	Full day	0.6	<i>Degenderized</i>
France	23	0.5	99	Full day	0.7	<i>Moderately Degenderized</i>
Finland	21	1.0	53	Full day	0.3	<i>Moderately Degenderized</i>
Norway	20	0.7	63	Full day	0.3	<i>Moderately Degenderized</i>
Communist Czechoslovakia (1989)	20.3% in the Czech lands and 17.7% in Slovakia	—	78.9% in Czech and 88.6% in Slovakia	Full Day	—	<i>Moderately Degenderized</i>
Czech Rep.	10.3	0.1	94.7	Full day	0.4	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Hungary	10.1	0.1	87.8	Full day	0.8	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Netherlands	8	0.2	71	Full day	0.4	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Italy	6	0.1	91	Full day	0.4	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Slovakia	5.6	0.1	80.1	Full day	0.5	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Luxemburg	3	0.4	67	Full day	0.5	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Spain	5	0.1	84	Full day	0.5	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Germany	2	0.0	78	Full day	0.4	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Communist Hungary (1989)	11.7 %	—	85.7 %	Full day	—	<i>Explicitly genderized</i>
Poland	5.1	0.0	49.9	Full day	0.5	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Australia	5	0.2	40	Part day	0.4	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Austria	3*	0.2	74	—	0.4	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
USA	5	0.3	54	Part day	0.3	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Portugal	6	0.4	—	—	0.4	—
UK	2	0.2	60	Mixed	0.3	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>
Communist Poland	9.1	—	48.2	Full day	—	<i>Implicitly genderized</i>

Sources: Pettit and Hook (2005: 790), Meyers and Gornick (2003) and Saxonberg and Sirovátka (2006). Portugal and Spain come from Rydell (2002), Spain 3-6 comes from The Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies at Columbia University. Statistics on

spending for daycare comes from www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database. Statistics on children attending kindergartens in Austria comes from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/55/38969007.xls>.

NOTES

¹ The breadwinner model has also been criticized for being descriptive rather than analytical. “It does not seek to examine notions of process—terms and conditions under which people engage in the labour market or in non-market caring activities” (Jarvis and Redmond 1997: 277). They are paraphrasing S. Duncan (1995: 263-84).

² Which is not to imply that these typologies have not had any impact. For example, Sjöberg (2004) uses Korpi’s typology to ascertain the relationship between welfare regimes and gender attitudes.

³ I am leaving out the fact that the new center-right government has proposed a caring benefit for children 1-3, which parents can receive if the children do not attend publicly financed childcare facilities. I have left this out first, because at the time of writing the article, it has not yet been implemented. Second, so far only around one-fourth of the municipalities have said they will actually pay out this benefit. Third, the benefit is so low (a maximum of 3,000 crowns) that it is doubtful that many parents will use it. Finally, all the public opinion polls have showed the center-right consistently trailing by extremely large margins. Thus, we can expect the center-left to win the elections in 2010 and promptly eliminate this benefit. Consequently, I do not expect this benefit to have much influence in Sweden.

⁴ This data comes from the Hungarian Ministry of Labor, Social and Family Affairs, given to me during a visit there in January, 2008. The statistics for Sweden come from Nyman and Pettersson (2003).

⁵ Again, the statistics come from a visit to the Ministry of Labor, Social and Family Affairs in Hungary. They in turn received these statistics from the national statistical office. They noted that these statistics were for the flat rate benefit, but claimed that even though they did not have exact statistics for the 2-year income-based leave, it was about the same percentage of men.

⁶ For statistics on Denmark and Finland, see Batljan, Tillander, and Sjöström (2004).

⁷ In 1995 the new socialist-led government changed the parental leave system by eliminating the flat rate and the 70-rate income replacement leave and replaced it with a means-tested leave. However, the conservative government that came to power in 1998 re-instated the previous system and the successive socialist-led governments that have ruled the country since 2002 have not dared to tamper with this system of leaves (Saxonberg and Sirvátka 2006).

⁸ Although Poland’s maternity leave is only 4 months, compared, for example, to 6 months for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006).

⁹ For a discussion of the Czech and Polish cases, see Saxonberg and Szelewa (2007).

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