a main point (which is used to link this class with the next one on DEE) of the class is that HE is
problematic for using it in environmental decision-making (so: in next class, i present them with
an alternative model of 'rationality' both for understanding how humans behave + for making
environmental decisions/ governance) There are two ways of making this argument: 1. explain that
decisions premised upon HE generate unfair outcomes (in terms of distributive and procedural
environmental justice). This is what i did this year, by using the Komodo example to point out
unfairness and power assymetries generated by GEF mechanisms based upon/ premised on HE 2. Use the
ecological economics literature to argue that there exist multiple other models of human action and
that values are multiple and plural OR/ AND that envirornmental behaviour (values) is best
understood as 'ethical' action and that utiltarianist HE is just one ethical stance and that there
exist multiple ones -> so, we need a system that can accomodate plural environmental values and
behaviours. I did not use this this year, but perhaps it could link better with the idea of
commuicative rationality as a premise to bring together plural values (which leads to an argument
in favour of deliberative decision-making arrangements as best) FINALLY, ON REFLECTION, PERHAPS
IT'S MORE INTERESTING/ SENSIBLE TO KEEP THE COMMONS DISCUSSION AS A REASON WHY WE 'REJECT' HE, BUT
SHOULD SOMEHOW DO FOLLOWING AS WELL A. CHANGE TITLE AND INSERT WORD 'COMMONS' AS WELL B. AFTER
DISCUSSING ISSUES WITH COMMONS, ALSO SAY THAT THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF HUMAN ACTION/
BEHAVIOUR FOUND BY ECONOMISTS AND OTHER SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, MARKEDLY ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION AS
'ETHICAL' ACTION (FROM ECOECO), SO WE NEED TO FIND A GOVERNANCE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS CAPABLE OF
ACCOMMODATING MULTIPLE AND PLURAL ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES/ BEHAVIOURS (IF WE WANT TO BE DEMOCRATIC AND
EFFECTIVE) RATHER THAN WORK (GOVERNANCE) ON THE ASSUMPTION OF HE

Nadia's comment: i said too much to explain mainstream approach (Hardin and Wolfersohn) and had
less time to explain implications (e.g. in terms of environmental management/ governance) and
criticise them (e.g. from an environmental justice perspective). Should try to avoid doing this

Class 6: Rationality and environmental decision-making
Christos Zografos, PhD
Institute of Environmental Science & Technology (ICTA)
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
christos.zografos@uab.cat
Environmental Change and Governance
MA Environmental Humanities 2011-12
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Introduction to course Section II (EE)
•Before starting, remind you section focus:
•
•Looks at some ways in which we could:
–‘balance’ power within formal system of environmental decision-making
–Deal with “asymmetrical power” (we saw on PE Section I of the course)
–Normative issues: “what should we do”: how to take environmental decisions
–
•Socio-Ecological Economics (SEE) ‘sub-field’
–environmental decision-making processes
–
1

Introduction
•Main point
–Understand applications, implications, and limitations of homo economicus rationality for
environmental governance
•Reason why you should know this
–Because this understanding of how humans operate provides a powerful rationale/ basis to justify a
way of making powerful and problematic environmental decisions
•Class outline
–Describe homo economicus rationality as a model of human action (why people behave way they do)
–Explain its use in environmental governance
–Discuss its shortcomings and implications
2

ASSIGNMENT QUESTION
•Monbiot explains that Hardin’s model of individual action (how the herdsman acts in the commons
pasture) has provided a rational argument for multi-lateral institutions and governments to pursue
widespread privatisation of natural resources and massive transfers of communal lands to the state
or individuals around the world.
•How does Wolfensohn use Hardin’s model to explain why biodiversity declines?
•According to him (Wolfensohn), what sorts of mechanisms are established to help avoid this
decline?
3

HARDIN’S MODEL
•Block 1
4

Hardin’s pasture
•“Picture a pasture open to all”
•Argument: in a finite world, one‘s decision to give birth implies reducing available resources for
the rest
–Just like in a ‘commons’
5
David Cox ‘The Shepherd, Return of the Flock' (source: http://www.1st-art-gallery.com)

“Picture a pasture open to all”
oWith this quasi-bucolic image, Garrett Hardin starts his description of how the Tragedy of the
Commons unfolds in his well-known 1968 article in Science.
oAddressing the Pacific Division of the American Association for the Advancement of Science which
he presided over at the time (the article is a reprint of his address)
oHardin used the parable of the commons‘ to support his argument on the need to effect a moral
transformation in governance through regulation and education in order to deal with the issue of
overpopulation.
Hardin argued that in a finite world, one‘s decision to give birth implied reducing available
resources for the rest, and paralleled this decision to that of using resources in what he called a
commons.

Elements of the model
•For example: a commoner deciding whether to add one more animal to his herd :
–As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.
–Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks:
–“What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?”
•Rational being:
–Utilitarian
–Individualist
6

Using the example of a commoner deciding whether to add one more animal to his herd, Hardin posed
that:
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or
less consciously, he asks, ―What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?
Utilitarian: “What is the utility...?”
‘Utility’: “a measure of relative satisfaction”
    total satisfaction received by herdsman (in econs: by consumer)
herdsman = utilitarian person: judges his actions (i.e. whether to do something or not) by looking
if it maximises overall ‘good’ (satisfaction)
Individualist: “What is the utility to me…?”
Profit-maximiser: “What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?”

Individualist utility
•Utility: measure of relative satisfaction
–positive component: benefit from selling additional animal products
–negative component: overgrazing created by additional animal
•But adverse effects of overgrazing = shared by all commoners
–Herdsman: only fraction of –ve effect – but whole benefit of one more unit!
–Only rational decision: add one more animal -> constantly add animals
•But: what reasonable for our herdsman is reasonable for all herdsmen
–So: all add more and more animals to their herd
7
Overgrazing in Alxa League, western Inner Mongolia (source: http://www.adb.org)

Result: tragedy
•“Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd
without limit—in a world that is limited
•“Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons
•“Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all”
8
Camels graze in a destroyed village in Western Darfur (source:
http://postconflict.unep.ch/sudanreport)

Rationality
•Rationality = individualist utilitarian profit-maximiser
–brings tragedy
•We stick on with Hardin’s model of rational human action
–model suggests that rationality means being an individualist utilitarian profit-maximiser
•
9

HOMO ECONOMICUS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
•Block 2
10

Monbiot 1994
•Hardin’s model of human action: a ‘rational’ argument for multi-lateral institutions and
governments to pursue widespread privatisation of natural resources and massive transfers of
communal lands to the state or individuals (private ownership) around the world (e.g. developing
countries)
11
Source: http://www.rozsavage.com/

Wolfensohn
•Logic for ‘new’ category of commons:
•The ‘global environmental commons’ (e.g. biodiversity)
•The WB approach: Wolfensohn explaining to UNEP readers
–environmental services such as biodiversity constitute invaluable global commons that are not
effectively protected by individual countries
–because these countries have ―limited economic incentives for taking action on the global
environment
–
•But, this is something to be expected
–it is in the nature of a global public good such as environmental services to attract decisions
taken at the country level
–that do not adequately reflect their global impacts
12

Institutions such as the World Bank still put forward this logic in order to defend such natural
resource management strategies as regards a new category of commons: the ‘environmental commons’.
Then president of the World Bank James D. Wolfensohn explained to the readers of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) official magazine
environmental services such as biodiversity constitute invaluable global commons that are not
effectively protected by individual countries
because these countries have ―limited economic incentives for taking action on the global
environment‖.
But, Wolfensohn tells us, this is something to be expected
it is in the nature of a global public good such as environmental services to attract decisions
taken at the country level
that do not adequately reflect their global impacts
Consider for example a developing country rich in biodiverse rainforests but drawn into poverty
Its government would be happy to deplete all resources available in these forests for the country‘s
economic development
no matter if in the course of this use, several ecologically valuable species disappear

Wolfensohn
•Consider for example a developing country rich in biodiverse rainforests but drawn into poverty
[DRC: 1/17 mega-diverse countries; UN (2008): population > 57.5 million people – 75% live below
poverty line]
–Its government would be happy to deplete all resources available in these forests for the
country‘s economic development
–no matter if in the course of this use, several ecologically valuable species disappear
•
13
Poverty in the Congo (source: http://shs.westport.k12.ct.us)

Institutions such as the World Bank still put forward this logic in order to defend such natural
resource management strategies as regards a new category of commons: the ‘environmental commons’.
Then president of the World Bank James D. Wolfensohn explained to the readers of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) official magazine
environmental services such as biodiversity constitute invaluable global commons that are not
effectively protected by individual countries
because these countries have ―limited economic incentives for taking action on the global
environment‖.
But, Wolfensohn tells us, this is something to be expected
it is in the nature of a global public good such as environmental services to attract decisions
taken at the country level
that do not adequately reflect their global impacts
Consider for example a developing country rich in biodiverse rainforests but drawn into poverty
Its government would be happy to deplete all resources available in these forests for the country‘s
economic development
no matter if in the course of this use, several ecologically valuable species disappear

Hardin’s herdsman resuscitated
•Here, Hardin‘s all-powerful ‘rational‘ herdsman forcefully emerges again
•Do you see this??
–Only in this case he comes in the guise of an ‘individual country‘
–
14
Source: http://madderhatters.org/
Source: www.worldatlas.com
Source: http://www.tcf-me.com

Classroom question
•Is it clear?
–As individuals do, so do countries
•What does Wolfersohn suggest should be done?
–Externalities
–Internalisation of externalities
–Markets
•What real-life, practical examples does he bring in?
–GEF
–We will discuss some real-life, practical limitations of this
15

Internalising externalities
•The World Bank president explains: this (what government of a country such as DRC does) is what
economists describe as a situation where ― regional and global externalities are not internalised
at the national level
•Externality
–unintended detrimental (e.g. pollution) consequence associated with the production of a commodity
(good) or an economic activity
–and nobody accounts for (pays for) this effect
•Detrimental effect in DRC?
–Loss of biodiversity
16

Internalising externalities
•Internalise externalities: make someone pay for externality
–If they pay, they will not do it
•How can you do this?
–Create a “market”: a physical or virtual place where someone can pay for creating externality
•
17

Internalising positive externalities
•Biodiversity loss: a negative externality
•Biodiversity protection: a positive externality
–A socially beneficial effect that nobody accounts/ pays for
•If people pay for protecting biodiversity
–Positive effects (protect bd) of this externality will be accounted/ paid for
–Government will not go ahead to chop forest in order to create wealth (econ dvpt) for population
–Biodiversity protection: creates wealth/ econ dvpt
•What you need do: create ‘market’ for bd protection
•Create conditions for someone to pay to protect bd
–E.g.: ecotourism in the Park
–
18

The answer
•The Bank‘s task is precisely to generate those—previously absent—markets in which global
environmental goods and services and global non-market values can be traded
–
•One such example is the Global Environment Facility (GEF) where those values are captured
primarily through international resource transfers
•
19

The Global Environment Facility
•Griffiths, 2005:
•main intergovernmental mechanism for addressing “global” environmental problems incl. biodiversity
loss
•Main vehicle for international funding for the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
–“cornerstone” of GEF biodiversity projects are those that promote protected areas – many or most
of which overlay the lands and territories of indigenous peoples
–
20

Indonesia-Komodo National Park Collaborative Management Initiative
•
•Implemented by International Finance Corporation (IFC)
–private sector arm of the WB
–IFC also preparing a significant number of projects for GEF co-financing
–which aim to promote “private sector investments in biodiversity-related businesses”
–
•IFC = lead agency
–The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
–local tourism company = local implementing partners
21

Indonesia-Komodo National Park Collaborative Management Initiative
•“As well as being home to the Komodo dragon, the Park provides refuge for many other  notable
terrestrial species such as the orange-footed scrub fowl, an endemic rat, and the Timor deer”
•Funding: ‘Ecotourism Concession’:
–Concession responsible for financial management, investments in Park infrastructure and marketing
–Joint Venture company established to run the concession
•Activities: e.g. diving
–List of ‘preferred agents’
22
Source: www.komodonationalpark.org/

9 November 2002
•Two men suspected of hunting illegally on Komodo island are shot dead, by security staff of the
park
•
•TNC states that greatest immediate threat to park (i.e. Komodo dragon, for whose protection park
was originally established back in 1980) comes from fishermen engaged in destructive fishing
practices
–TNC has helped form a team consisting of park rangers, navy, police and fishery services, which
works together to carry out routine patrolling
23

Another view…
•Investigation conducted by Indonesian NGO (PIAR) + human rights organisation (Kontras) urge:
–TNC (National Park manager): stop all forms of violence and intimidation against people whose
livelihoods depend on area
–forestry minister: review policies regarding Komodo National Park
•-> cause hardship to local people +traditional fisherfolk
•->  whose livelihoods and futures depend on this area
24
Source: http://dte.gn.apc.org/57Kom.htm

Controversy: property rights
•Company proposing to manage the park for 25 years
•wants to generate more cash for conservation from eco-tourism
–Idea supported by World Bank and some communities in the park
•But strong objections from other local people and local NGOs
–neither they, nor the local government have been consulted about plan
–will not have a share in the benefits
–
25
Source: http://dte.gn.apc.org/57Kom.htm

Griffiths, 2005
•Research suggests that several GEF projects overlook critical land tenure and property rights
issues and remove control over decision-making and access to areas traditionally used by local
indigenous communities (e.g., as hunting sites)
–GEF projects regularly treat local populations as beneficiaries rather than rights holders
–
•Whole initiative should adopt policies which
–secure local people‘s rights to lands and territories
–their free prior and informed consent
26

Griffiths, 2005
•Property rights issues with land and natural resources are at the heart of conflicts and concerns
with economic institutions for sustainable development (such as the GEF, CDM, etc.)
•These mechanisms seem to
–limit local access to the ‘global commons’
–reduce local control over decisions made concerning them
•The removal of property rights over these NR: a form of environmental injustice
–these mechanisms re-distribute costs and benefits from using resources (‘global commons‘) to the
disadvantage of poorer local population
27

Classroom question/ activity
•The Bull Ring
•Is, then, giving money to set up ‘ecotourism’ projects a bad way to support biodiversity loss?
Your views
•Is, then, “making consumers pay” (e.g. through Park entry fees) a bad way to support biodiversity
loss?
•And, what about co-financing? GEF (WB) creates ‘conditions’ (market) for trading (internalising)
externalities
28

CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
•Block 3
29

Rationality implications
•HE model of action (individual, state)
–logic used to promote policies, initiatives, funding, activities, etc. that deprive communities
from their means of subsistence and development
–relegate communities to resources users and not owners
–Take away property rights from communities
•As with ‘agricultural’ so with ‘global environmental’ commons
–Indeed: ‘global commons’ implies/ establishes that extra-local actors have a stake/ right upon
local resources
•
30

Overexploitation not in commons
•Hardin‘s explanation of producing & avoiding environmental degradation criticised
•Hardin’s model does not describe a common property regime
–but an open access situation: use of NR not regulated by any rules at all
–
•‘Commons‘ are well-defined systems
–governed by mutually beneficial and compelling regulations
–Owned by communities (i.e. not “open to all”)
–
31

HE implications: property rights
•Privatising commonly-held resources = best solution for protecting valuable resources as it gives
a private incentive to conserve them for private benefit
–commons have successfully supported populations and fragile environments living in marginal
(fertility potential) areas (e.g. peri-desert areas in Africa)
•Enclosure of commons results in private appropriation of what used to be a common benefit
–commons privatisation results in making a few already rich landowners even richer while
transforming commoner populations to social and economic pariahs (via resource take-over)
•
32

HE implications: nature’s degradation
•It is actually private owners (enclosers) who
–not only benefit from destroying commons
–but also contribute to the demise of the commons (environment)
•They first move in to aggressively exploit resources to their full potential and then quickly sell
them off in order to acquire more promising resources in other areas
•
33

HE implications: power
•HE: a model of rationality
•HE: at basis of (i.e. supports, produces) policies
–Unfair (environmental justice): take away means of livelihood from communities
•Reduce them to ‘users’ than owners
•Power issue: take away control of their environment (NR)
–Wrong conceptual-analytical starting point
•based on understanding of commons that applies to open access (not common property)
34

Beyond implications
•This implies that from a justice and fairness point of view:
–We want an alternative model of understanding human action/ rationality (how humans decide)
•that can be used for
–analysing environmental policy (how it happens)
–Suggesting how environmental decisions should be taken
35