

Chapter 5

Modernity and Holiday-Making

Tourists are often treated as a homogeneous category. This is misleading; in fact, all tourists are not the same. A most obvious distinction is that between sightseers and vacationers (Cohen 1974). The primary analytical difference between these two types of tourists is "that sightseers seek novelty, while vacationers merely seek change, whether or not this brings novelty in its train" (1974:544-545). Novelty is relative to sightseers' experiences. "A novelty is, in principle, new only once—when one sees or experiences it for the first time" (Cohen 1974:544). Hence, sightseeing tends to be non-recurrent. Change, in contrast, does not necessarily imply novelty. Thus, "one can experience the transition from office work in the city to leisure on the beach as a welcome change, even though it is one's accustomed way of holiday-making" (1974:544). Hence, vacations can be recurrent.

Self-evidently and to a larger extent, the need for change arises within the context of the temporal structure of modernity, since it is this temporal structure which tends to fasten people to a regularized, routinized, and structured everyday life. For those who have full-time jobs, everyday life (including leisure) is usually organized around work and is thus highly temporally structured and routinized. Consequently, work experience is "a key cultural factor" in creating or modifying an individual's need for a holiday (Burns and Holden 1995:41). In this sense, the sociogenesis of holiday-making has to do with the temporal structure of modernity. It is within this temporal structure that the need for change gains significance.

The temporal structure of modernity can also be understood from a phenomenological perspective, that is, from the standpoint of common-sense understanding and experiences. In this sense, time is no longer an abstract concept or form but an amalgam of experiences. Thus, the rhythm of modernity, as exemplified in the case of either Fordism or post-Fordism in the twentieth century, is reflected in people's experience

of everyday life. Tourism is a cultural response to the rhythm of modern life. It must be noted that, here, Fordist rhythm and post-Fordist rhythm are understood as two ideal types of work-related experience. Fordism dominated until the mid 1970s, but thereafter post-Fordism tended to gain ascendance. However, they continue to coexist. For example, Fordism still exists in the service industry. In mass tourism, itself a form of service industry, Fordism still survives to a certain extent, though it may be argued that it has lost its dominant position.

Interestingly, when the rhythm of Fordism led to a demand for change and escape through holiday-making, in response to tourists' demands the *organization* of tourism first assumed a Fordist pattern. Its heyday was the age of mass tourism, characterized by the standardization, homogenization, and inflexibility of the product. Although it dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century, mass tourism triumphed in the post-war period. This type of tourism treats tourists as homogeneous. It supplies the tourism package in a standard form and on a large scale. Economy of scale (large scale, lower price) is the goal of mass tourism. Under this the specific and unique demands of individuals are ignored.

However, since the 1980s, various forms of "alternative" tourism have emerged. The tourist market is becoming more segmented and diverse, and demand has become less homogenized. The changes in tourist demand have been identified by Poon (1993 quoted in Burns and Holden 1995:223), as follows:

Table 5.1 Old Tourists and New Tourists

Old tourists	New tourists
Search for the sun	Experience something new
Follow the masses	Want to be in charge
Here today, gone tomorrow	See and enjoy but do not destroy
Show that they have been	Go just for the fun of it
Having	Being
Superiority	Understanding
Like attractions	Like sport and nature
Cautious	Adventurous
Eat in the hotel dining room	Try out local fare
Homogeneous	Hybrid

In response to the new market, producers and suppliers are increasingly supplying tourism in a post-Fordist fashion (Urry 1990a, 1994a). This does not imply that Fordist patterns of mass tourism have completely disappeared. However, as tourists have become maturer and their demands more flexible, diverse, and changeable, the tourist market seems to have become fragmented. So while package beach holidays

and other mass tourism products still have a significant market, post-Fordist types of tourism will, it is often argued, be the general trend for the future. Urry has identified the characteristics of post-Fordist tourism as follows:

consumers are increasingly dominant and producers have to be much more consumer-oriented: the rejection of certain forms of mass tourism (holiday camps and cheaper packaged holidays) and increased diversity of preferences; a greater volatility of consumer preferences with fewer repeat visits and the proliferation of alternative sights and attractions; increased market segmentation with the multiplication of types of holiday and visitor attractions based on lifestyle research; the growth of a consumers' movement with much more information provided about alternative holidays and attractions through the media; the development of many new products each of which has a shorter life so that there is the rapid turnover of tourist sites and experiences because of fashion changes; and increased preferences expressed for non-mass forms of production/consumption such as the increased demand for refreshment and accommodation services which are individually tailored to the consumer (such as country house hotels) (1994a:236).

One of the aims of "alternative" tourism may be to avoid the negative consequences associated with mass tourism. This does not mean that mass tourism is necessarily "bad" and leads invariably and solely to negative consequences. Rather, whether the consequences of tourism are positive or negative is more an issue of planning and management. However, the shift from Fordist ones to post-Fordist ones does reflect, from the tourism supply side, a change in taste and demand on the part of tourists, one which in turn reflects the structural and cultural changes in contemporary Western societies (1994a).

This chapter examines the relationship between holiday-making and the temporal structure, along with the associated experiences of time in modernity. It consists of three sections. The first analyzes the temporal order of modernity. The second outlines the phenomenology of the rhythms of modernity, and discusses how the temporal structure of modernity modifies and creates the need for holiday-making and for a change from everydayness. The third section elucidates how holiday-making is tied to cultural meaning and experienced as escape.

Modernity and its Temporal Structure

Time is an obvious and important factor in the constitution of society, especially in modern society (Giddens 1979, 1981, 1984). But what is time? It is still an enigma (Jaques 1990). Some philosophers (e.g., Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Bergson, Heidegger) have defined time in an abstract way, as a form without social content. For sociologists in con-

trast, time is all about social stories: time is thought of as collective rhythm (Bourdieu 1977; Durkheim 1995; Young and Schuller 1988; Zerubavel 1981), as social time differentiated from natural or astronomical time (Gurwitsch 1990; Lewis and Weigart 1990; Mukerjee 1990; Sorokin and Merton 1990), as capitalist time-consciousness (Thrift 1990), as a means of social ordering, regulating, and coordinating (Bourdieu 1977; Lewis and Weigart 1990; Moore 1963; Mumford 1934; Starkey 1988; Zerubavel 1981), as a structuring life-project (Roche 1990; Schutz and Luckmann 1974), as a commodifiable resource and the medium of commodification of both goods and labor (Giddens 1981), as a cultural phenomenon (Bourdieu 1990; Coser and Coser 1990; Kern 1983; Malinowski 1990; Zerubavel 1990), as a symbol referring to the social activity of timing (Elias 1992), and as the complex of various time phenomena (Adam 1990).

In this chapter, a philosophical conception of time will not be adopted. Rather, time will be considered sociologically as a *socially constructed* temporal structure or collective rhythm that establishes order in social life and its activities on four fronts: sequential structure, which tells people in what order social actions take place; duration, which informs persons how long an action lasts; temporal location, which refers to when actions take place; and rate of recurrence, which means how often individuals perform certain actions (Zerubavel 1981:1). This temporal structure must be understood as temporal structuration in a Giddensian sense. It is a collective time-structuring or social timing activity (Roche 1990), but it is simultaneously a temporally structured order. The temporal structure of a society has two interrelated dimensions. First, it involves an institution or organization of time, which is exhibited as collective rhythm, schedules, or pace of life. Second, it involves a "time habit". While this time habit is shaped by a given temporal structure in society, it produces or reproduces that structure at every moment. A time habit can be either reflexive or non-reflexive. At the reflexive level, time-habit is time conception or time consciousness.

Industrialization and the Modern Rhythm

Generally speaking, modernity has dramatically transformed social time. In traditional societies "the experience of time is not separated from the substance of social activities" (Giddens 1981:9), whereas in modern societies, clock time exists alongside experienced time. This "public, objectified time of the clock" functions as the "the organising measure of activities of day-to-day life" (1981:9). The emergence of clock time (abstract, objectified time) indicates the increased complexity of society (based on the division of labor), which entails temporal coordination and

synchronization. In his essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life", Simmel (1950b) analyzes how the appearance of impersonal time plays an important role in the structuring of urban life and consequent alienation. Indeed, modernity would not come into being without a corresponding modern time or modern temporal structure. This temporal structure exhibits four major characteristics.

Synchronization. The advent of industrial civilization implies an increase in organic solidarity, system complexity, division of labor, and the urgency of temporal synchronization and coordination within and between various organizations and their functional parts (Elias 1992; Hassard 1990; Moore 1963; Starkey 1988; Thrift 1990; Zerubavel 1981). Thus, Mumford argues that it is the clock, not the steam engine, that is the key machine of the industrial age (Mumford 1934:14). Time is thus a medium of synchronization and coordination in the modern industrial age. The synchronization of social activities becomes more self-evident under the condition of late modernity. Moreover, such a synchronization has been extended to the global level due to advances in the technology of telecommunication (Friedland and Boden 1994) and an increasing "separation of time from space" (Giddens 1990). The advent of post-Fordism assigns to time a much more crucial role. Flexible accumulation, ephemeral consumer demand, reductions in turnover time in production, the increasing significance of "just-in-time" inventory systems (cf., Harvey 1990), all presuppose time as a crucial medium in concerted actions and in the production and reproduction of social order.

Pace of Life. On the one hand, the modern industrial system employs machines and modern technologies in the production process. Without humans the machine is dead. The birth of modern industry required a new time-habit, if machines and humans were to be integrated (Thrift 1990:114). The factory imposed an artificial "time discipline" upon humans (Marx 1954; Thompson 1967:90), which then brought about a new pace of life. Humans were, to some extent, forced to follow the rhythm of the machine rather than vice versa (e.g., on assembly lines). On the other hand, the modern pace of life is an indicator of the increased complexity and flexibility of society as a whole.

Efficiency and Productivity. Under the conditions of industrial capitalism, the drive for profit requires that work be scientifically designed and managed in terms of time and the efficiency principle (Hassard 1990). Taylorism, Fordism, and the more flexible post-Fordism all regard efficiency and productivity as their principal goals.

Routinization. As mentioned above, time is a very important medium of synchronization (based on the division of labor), pace of life (based on machine production and a money economy), and efficiency (based on scientific management). Time under modernity becomes an "ordering principle" (Zerubavel 1981). Its result is the temporal structure of day-to-

day life, which appears as routine. On the one hand, work, at least a considerable amount of work, has been routinized, as illustrated, for example, by work on assembly lines, in bureaucratic offices, in supermarkets, in hotels, and in fast-food chains. On the other hand, everyday life as whole has also been routinized and organized around work, daily commuting and housework. Thus, there arises a routinized separation between working time and free time.

Routinization, moreover, can be considered a universal phenomenon. It exists not only in modern society but also in traditional society, albeit with certain differences. In traditional agricultural society, daily routines were regulated by *natural rhythms* or seasonal tasks rather than by an artificial timetable (Bourdieu 1990; Mukerjee 1990). There was no clear institutional *temporal* demarcation that separated work from leisure. In the busiest season, such as harvest time, the length of the working day was extended to such an extent that the time left for sleep was far from adequate, whereas in a slack season, such as winter, the whole period could be used as leisure time. Moreover, once routines were stabilized as tradition, little could be allowed to change, for tradition had become a moral authority to which later generations were subject. By contrast, within modern society, as Giddens argues, routinization in modern life is largely subject to the dictates of "dull economic compulsion" (1981:11). It is economic rationality, rather than natural rhythm, that makes time function as a segmenting principle, that separates one kind of activity from others, for example the private sphere from the public sphere, and work from leisure (Hassard 1990:7; Moore 1963; Zerubavel 1981:141). The oscillation between work and leisure—or the routinization of daily life—under modernity is thus organized around the rational way of allocating "objectified" time units which the modern organization of capitalist production entails.

Rationality, which is embedded in the modern industrial order, therefore brings about a fundamental transformation of social timing, the temporal order and the structure of everyday life. As a result, modern routinization embodies a relatively stable form of temporal order and structure. It is through routinization that social structure is constantly reproduced. Time is thus an integral element of the social construction of reality. In brief, modernity, in the name of efficiency and instrumental rationality, brings about a modern rhythm that replaces traditional rhythms. This modern rhythm is enabling because it gives rise to greater efficiency, productivity, and constant innovation. It is also constraining because it brings about deadening routines and stressful deadlines. Modern rhythm is therefore ambivalent: it gives people order, but at the expense of spontaneity (Zerubavel 1981:47).

The Commodification of Labor and Modern Time Consciousness

Modernity brings about not only a new temporal order (schedules, routinization, pace of life and collective rhythm, etc.), but also a new consciousness of time (Thompson 1967; Thrift 1990). Quite different from the people of traditional agricultural societies, who assumed a *task-oriented* time habit, modern people share a common conception of time. Time is no longer confused with substantial experiences but rather regarded as linear, quantitative, objectified, measurable, and divisible time—as abstract clock time. Most importantly, people in the context of modernity widely adopt the dictum that "time is money", an idea that Weber quoted from Benjamin Franklin in order to exemplify the "Protestant ethic" (Weber 1970:48). As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest, the modern conception of time is illustrated by three widely accepted metaphors—time as money, time as a limited resource, and time as a valuable commodity.

Such conceptions of time have obvious connections with the *commodification of time* which characterizes modern capitalism. According to Giddens (1981), capitalist commodity production is made possible by the prevalence of two processes of commodification: the commodification of goods and of labor. Goods and labor power become interchangeable commodities. What permits this interchangeability is the commodification of time itself, which acts as an underlying medium of these two processes. "'Commodities' exist only as exchange values which in turn presuppose the temporal equation of units of labor" (1981:8).

Time, as perceived by modern people, has thus gained emergent values, properties, and features. As Hassard observes:

one is exchanging time rather than skill: selling labor-time rather than labor. Time becomes a commodity to be earned, spent or saved.... Time had a value that could be translated into economic terms.... Time was a major symbol for the production of economic wealth (1990:13).

Historically, such a conception of time was first learnt by capitalist entrepreneurs and then gradually taken over by the working class, as a weapon in the labor movement. Relatedly, Thompson notes that:

The first generation of factory workers were taught by their masters the importance of time; the second generation formed their short-time commitments in the ten-hour movement; the third generation struck for over-time and time-and-a-half. They had accepted the categories of their employers and had learned to fight back with them. They had learned their lesson, that time is money, only too well (1967:86).

Time, then, becomes both a medium of increasing organic solidarity (e.g., synchronization) and a medium of weakening social integration in Lockwood's (1964) sense (e.g., chronic class conflicts). If *industrializa-*

tion largely gives rise to increased temporal synchronization and organic solidarity (hence shapes people's time-habits), then the *commodification of time*, underlying the commodification of both labor and goods, plays a considerable role in changing people's time consciousness. Time becomes a resource for which both the upper class and the working class struggle.

For employers, workers are the commodities of labor power; they are bought from the labor market, but only for limited use in the twenty-four hours of each day (it is a banality that there is an absolute limitation in labor time because of biological needs—sleep, eating, etc.). Employers use these purchased commodities to the maximum possible level. Thus, they have to calculate carefully the most efficient way in which their workers should use their working time. Therefore, theoretically speaking, in the eyes of the employers, employees are only the means to an end—the maximization of profit. They must be used properly and efficiently. Since the exploitation of workers is realized through obtaining the surplus labor time that creates surplus value or so-called "profit" (Marx 1954), there are two ways of squeezing out surplus value. As Marx argues, under early capitalism "absolute surplus value" was the major source of profit and was gained by maximizing the absolute length of the working day. With an increase in productivity, and partly due to the pressure of the labor movement, the source of profit then mainly came from the "relative surplus value" that was created through intensifying the pace of work and increasing the efficiency and productivity of labor (see Starkey 1988). As for leisure, from the standpoint of capitalists, employers, or managers it is needed only on the ground that it allows workers to recover from physical and mental fatigue and thereby improve their work efficiency and productivity. For them, leisure time has to be controlled; it should not be used to engage in getting drunk or any other hedonistic activity.

For employees the story is altogether different. Work is only a means of earning subsistence, denuded of inherent meaning. In the typical words of one laborer, "The things I like best about my job are quitting time, pay day, days off, and vacations" (Chinoy 1955:85). Working time, then, for most employees, especially workers on assembly lines, is alienating time. It is in free time that they feel at home (Marx 1977). Thus, it is no wonder that the length of the working day or the number of weeks worked per year also becomes a target which the working class use their labor movements to try to reduce. Leisure time becomes one of the goals for which workers struggle. If, under early modernity, leisure was the upper class's privilege (Veblen 1925), then based on increases in productivity and with the unfolding of the class struggle, universal leisure has gradually become a higher priority (Pimlott 1976).

Time is money and value. This is an emerging modern consciousness. Time thus becomes one of the essential elements of class bargaining.

conflict, and struggle, of industrial relations in the labor movement (Starkey 1988:101). Capitalist employers wish to extend the length of the working day and increase the number of weeks worked. Employees, however, wish to reduce these. Thus, generally speaking, the actual length of the working day or the number of weeks spent in working is in fact the result of a power balance or functional interdependence (to borrow Elias' term) between both sides, as well as regulation by the state. Historically, the general tendency is towards a constant increase in leisure time.

The Emergence of the Institution of the Paid Holiday in Britain

One of the essential elements of the labor movement and industrial relations that directly relates to tourism is paid holidays. Holiday-making, looked at from a historical perspective, is not merely the result of increased productivity and enhanced living standards, but also the product of collective bargaining and class struggle. As Böröcz observes:

A primary focus of working class struggles in the mid-nineteenth to early-twentieth centuries was precisely the issue of the reduction and regulation of labor time, that is, rephrased from our point of view, struggle for the provision of ample free time to be expended on leisure activities. The standardization, normalization, and commercialization of free time is one of the most obvious outcomes of this struggle. Thus, industrial capitalism is a key factor in the emergence of the institution of leisure migration (1996:28).

Pimlott (1976) has traced the social history of the Englishman's holiday. In England, domestic holiday-making can be traced to the 17th century visits to spas (e.g., Bath) and seaside resorts (Blackpool, Scarborough, etc.) for the purpose of improving health (Hern 1967; Urry 1990a: 16–39). International tourism can be traced to the same century's Grand Tour. These journeys were the privilege of only the wealthy elite at that time, and the majority of the masses could not afford them. Only with the development of the railways, increasing income, and the emergence of the economic organization of travel by train at a low price, as shown in Thomas Cook's tourism enterprises, could a greater number of people afford to participate in tourism and seaside holidays. Holiday with pay, however, was not merely the product of technological advance (the rail age), an increase of income, or the emergence of commercial organization (e.g., the tours organized by Thomas Cook), though these factors were important; it involved an extra factor—industrial relations and class struggle. Holiday with pay began in the second half of the 19th century, propelled particularly by The Bank Holiday Act of 1871. Although in the 1880s holiday with pay as a practice began slowly to spread, it was mainly the privilege of the middle classes rather than manual workers because it

involved growth in the real wages of workers, something which employers were reluctant to offer (Pimlott 1976:214). It was not until the 1930s that paid holidays spread to a wider range of classes and became more of an institutionalized practice. The major obstacles to its diffusion were the capitalist employers' opposition and the government's reluctance, but pressure from below (the working class and trade unions) and from without (international pressures, e.g., statutory provisions for holiday with pay in foreign countries) gradually forced employers and politicians to accede to the demands of workers.

In a report addressing the issue of whether holiday with pay should become statutory, presented by the Ministry of Labour to Parliament in 1938, it was suggested that "an annual holiday contributes in a considerable measure to workpeople's happiness, health and efficiency" (Report 1938:54). The report treated "health" and "happiness" as contributory factors to industrial efficiency, and claimed that the current increase in industrial productivity was so great as to be able to absorb in a short time the cost of holiday pay, arguing that the full benefit of increased productivity should go to the workers (1938:25). The report also pointed out that for various reasons there was opposition by employers and, the National Confederation of Employers' Organizations to any statutory enactment of holiday with pay, despite the fact that it already existed to a limited extent. The main reasons for this opposition were that it would increase the burdens of industry and that its cost would adversely affect the competitiveness of British industry *vis-à-vis* foreign industries (1938:28-34). However, the report strongly recommended "that an annual holiday with pay should be established, without undue delay, as part of the terms of the contract of employment of all employees" (1938:60). The holiday, it was suggested, should consist of at least as many days as are in the working week and these days should be taken consecutively (1938:60).

The sociogenesis of holidays with pay mirrored the emergence of socially, culturally, and politically accepted values concerning health and happiness, which were seen as leading to industrial efficiency and improved industrial relations. Relatedly, there also emerged a modern leisure consciousness, that is, there was "a change of mental attitude" with regard to leisure (Pimlott 1976:23). Leisure travel or holiday-making was no longer seen as a waste of time, and contradictory to the work ethic. Rather, it was viewed as a necessary complement to and a compensation for work, as a means of enhancing productivity and efficiency, and as an essential element of a reasonable standard of living (Pimlott 1976). If the commodification of time led to temporal alienation, then, paid holidays were an institutional antidote to and compensation for such alienation.

The Phenomenology of the Modern Rhythms

Phenomenology, when applied to sociological studies, is a perspective where social life is examined from the standpoint of everyday common-sense understanding and "native" social actors. Time can be investigated not only from a structural perspective as above, but also from a phenomenological perspective (see Roche 1973, 1990; Schutz and Luckmann 1977), in order better to appreciate how people actually experience the time, tempos, and rhythms of modernity. Two points need to be noted here. First, although some phenomenological sociologists use terms that lay persons never employ, these expressions are nevertheless valid to describe lay persons' experiences since they involve "second order" interpretations of their "first order" experiences (Giddens 1976). Second, on an experiential level, time ceases to be a purely abstract concept; rather "clock time" is reified and forms part of the experience of social processes. Hence, a persons' phenomenological experience of time may contain "substances" of other experiences (at the pre-reflective level). Time is not only conceived of as *empirical* clock time, timetables, schedules, deadlines, routines, time budgets, and punctuality, but is also associated with various "feelings" that involve the "quality of time", such as "busy" or "free", a "good" time or a "bad" time. Monotony or novelty, boredom or excitement, slowness or speed, ease or urgency, certainty or uncertainty, security or anxiety, all involve a "feeling" of time, tempos and rhythms.

The modern pace of life has shaped people's feelings of time. For those enduring long-term unemployment, time is a burden (Roche 1990). For those who are a "cog" in the economic machine, time is a source of pressure. Thus, modernity includes the phenomenological experience of modern time and rhythm. As Roche explains, modern people may "feel that they 'have' either too much or too little time, situations in which the *pace* of life seems either too fast or too slow for comfort" (1990:73). In other words, modern rhythm and tempo often cause psychological discomfort. Time is a typical source of ambivalence within modernity.

The modern pace of life reflects the structural determination of modernity. Collective rhythms, rigid schedules and timetables, stressful deadlines, and fast tempos all constitute the structuring temporal order to which members of society are subject. Moreover, personal socialization entails temporal socialization which makes individuals adapt to a given collective rhythm and failure to keep up with this results in career failure. Furthermore, the modern temporal order is reinforced by the collective values and norms in modern societies. For example, the Western value of individualism, the capitalist ideology of free and fair competition, and the Protestant work ethic are all in one way or another motivational forces

John's method of the force function

whereby individuals aim to keep up with the normal tempo, or at least not to fall behind it. In Bourdieu's terms, they must have "respect for collective rhythms" (1977:162).

The Phenomenology of Routinization

Recently, a debate has arisen on the question of whether the West has undergone or is undergoing a transition from "Fordism" to "post-Fordism". This controversy is related to the debate on the broader issues of modernity and postmodernity. Usually, Fordism is linked to modernity and post-Fordism to postmodernity. The debate is ongoing, but it is believed that Fordism has not yet entirely disappeared; many of its elements are still alive and coexist with post-Fordism (such as McDonaldization) (Ritzer 1996:150-153). Both Fordism and post-Fordism can be treated as analytical devices. Each has its own rhythms. Ideal-typically speaking, the work rhythm of Fordism can be characterized by routinization. By contrast, the work rhythm of post-Fordism is typically exhibited by the uncertainty that is associated with flexibility. Even so it is not denied that Fordism can also display uncertainty, just as post-Fordism can also contain an element of routine.

Fordism—named after Henry Ford, inventor of the assembly line, which is representative of the modern mass-production system—grew throughout the 20th century in the West, reaching its peak in the 1950s and 1960s, and showing signs of decline from the mid 1970s and during the oil crisis of 1973. The major features of Fordism include the mass production of homogeneous products, the use of inflexible technologies (such as the assembly line), economies of scale, the deskilling, intensification, and homogenization of labor, a mass market for the homogenized products of mass-production industries (Ritzer 1992:313; Kumar 1995: ch.3). Fordism also appears to be characterized by the principle of full and long-term employment with high wages (Keynesian economic policies). Clearly the period in which Fordism triumphed was also the time in which mass tourism reached its peak. There is a close link between Fordism and mass tourism. On the one hand, mass tourism is itself a Fordist pattern of tourism (the homogenization of tourist experiences). However, mass tourism emerges as a cultural response to working conditions and the rhythm of Fordism (alienation, monotony, routinization, deskilling, etc.). The phenomenological experience of time and tempo in Fordism is certainly one of the reasons for the emergence of the democratic demand for "escape" and for "periodical change from the routine and environment of everyday life" (Pimlott 1976:213).

Alienation due to the Routinization of Work. In the age of Fordism the experiences of time and work by the working class, particularly those long-term employees who toiled on the assembly line, were ambivalent. Individuals needed to work because they had to earn a living. In this sense work had a meaning for a laborer. However, the experiences of work and the rhythms associated with work could also be negative. Time relating to work was for the employee perhaps too rigid, too structured, too routinized, or too monotonous. Fragmentation, monotony, and alienation were the main problems resulting from the routinization of work.

There is abundant literature on this topic. If Durkheim's *The Social Division of Labour* (1964) implied the notion of the routinization of work, then Max Weber's (1978) theory of bureaucracy and the "iron cage" was a clear and direct example of its existence (i.e., the bureaucratization of work). Another classic example of such studies is Adam Smith's (1910) discussion of the methods of reducing costs and increasing output in a pin factory through the detailed technical division of tasks. In later industrial practices, informed by the doctrines and principles of Taylorism and Fordism, the routinization of work became part of a compelling and fundamental managerial logic.

Most studies of the topic centre on manufacturing work (Beynon 1973; Blauner 1964; Braverman 1974; Burawoy 1979; Walker and Guest 1952) and clerical work (Braverman 1974; Garson 1975; Mills 1951), but more recently the subject matter has been extended to include "interactive service work", such as work in McDonalds or Combined Insurance (Leidner 1993; Ritzer 1996). As suggested by these studies, the routinization of work has become widespread since it brings many benefits to both capitalists and managers—increasing efficiency, cost reduction, uniform quality of products, and increasing control over workers and the working enterprise (Leidner 1993).

Several characteristics of this routinization have been identified. First, work is broken down into routines, specifically, the fragmentation of tasks is based on the division of labor, which confines workers or clerical staff to narrowly defined aspects of production or work. Thus, work is transformed into a simplistic, monotonous, and repetitive process. This process is most vividly described by Gillespie:

In industry the person becomes an economic atom that dances to the tune of atomistic management. Your place is just here, you will sit in this fashion, your arms will move x inches in a course of y radius and the time of movement will be .000 minutes (Gillespie 1948; quoted in Fromm 1956:125).

Second, in association with routinized work, workers or clerical staff are deskilled, degraded, and devalued. Gillespie continues:

Work is becoming more repetitive and thoughtless as the planners, the micromonitors, and the scientific managers further strip the worker of his right to think and move freely. Life is being denied; needs to control, creativity, curiosity, and independent thought are being hauled, and the result, the inevitable result, is fight or flight on the part of the worker, apathy or destructiveness, psychic regression (Gillespie 1948; quoted in Fromm 1956:125).

Third, workers and clerical staff are denied control over the overall production process or overall work function. In Braverman's (1974) terms, one of the principles of the routinization of work is the separation of conception from execution. Workers or clerical staff are excluded from initiative, creativity, and responsibility for conceiving, planning, and designing their work tasks. This, as Simmel points out in *Philosophy of Money* (1990) makes employees feel that work is external to and estranged from their own lives. "When work is not inherently involving, it will be felt as monotonous" (Blanner 1964:28). Thus, such work increases the possibility of subjective monotony.

Fourth, workers and clerical staff face constraints in quitting their jobs. Some people accept work not because it is interesting, but simply because they have no other choice. Employees may have to, or are socialized to, accept and tolerate fragmentation, monotony, and estrangement from work for the sake of material rewards (wages) (Goldthorpe and Lockwood 1968). Discursive satisfaction with a job does not mean that there is no psychological discomfort in work; rather, such discomfort is counted as a necessary sacrifice in order to earn a wage. However, such constraints on available work may trigger off demands for complementary or opposite experiences, usually free, individuated, interesting, and exciting experiences, in the world of leisure.

All these features are the embodiment of "alienation" in the routinization of work (Blanner 1964). According to Blanner, alienation is a "quality of personal experience which results from specific kinds of social arrangements" (1964:15) (for a conceptual clarification of the category of alienation see Lutz 1973). Such alienation has its structural sources, such as the routinized pace and rhythm of industrial work. Blanner identifies alienation in four areas. First, there is powerlessness. This is the situation in which a person is downgraded as "an object controlled and manipulated by other persons or by an impersonal system (such as technology)" (Blanner 1964:16). Second, there is meaningfulness, the situation where a worker may "lack understanding of the co-ordinated activity and a sense of purpose in his work" (1964:22). Third, there is isolation, that is to say, the workers lack a sense of membership of an industrial community or organization. Fourth, there is self-estrangement, the notion "that a worker may become alienated from his inner self in the activity of work", and the "con-

sequence of self-estranged work may be boredom and monotony" (1964:26).

All four of these dimensions involve the routinization of work (repetition, monotony, deskilling, etc.) in industrial environments. Routinized work in industry or a bureaucracy imposes a constraining, compelling, and rigid tempo and rhythm, a situation in which individuals become automated, robot-like, de-individualized, repetitively doing Sisyphus-like wearing tasks. Tolling under such a working rhythm, employees' acts, pace, and speed are set by machines and managers' scientific calculations, and must be geared to the requirements of machines or scientific management (Mukerjee 1990). Under such conditions workers experience temporal alienation as well as structural alienation.

Reflections on the Routinization of Life. People not only experience the malaise caused by the routinization of work. They may also pause and reflect on the meaning of the routinization of life as a whole that is dictated by work. Certainly, routine is not itself "bad". On the contrary, it is fundamental to life. As Anthony Giddens argues, "routine occupies a very important place in the reproduction of practices" (1979:218). Routinization gives rise to "ontological security", taken-for-granted order and a psychological sense of safety (Giddens 1979, 1990, 1991). Ontological security "is sustained primarily through routine itself... when routines, for whatever reason, become radically disrupted... existential crises are likely to occur" (Giddens 1991:167). Clearly, without such an ontological security, life would be full of anxiety and fear.

However, routine is also ambivalent. Although it leads to a sense of security, it can also bring about a sense of boredom and monotony, as demonstrated by Cohen and Taylor (1992) (for psychological studies of boredom see Apter 1992; Berlyne 1960; Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Fenichel 1951; Getwitz 1966; Hill and Perkins 1985; Mikulas and Vodanovich 1993; O'Hanlon 1981; Perkins and Hill 1985). "Why is each day's journey marked by feelings of boredom, habit, routine?" ask Cohen and Taylor (1992:46). For them, this situation relates to the routine of life, where people are "forced" to exist in conformity with "paramount reality". Routinization leads to "the predictability of the journey", to the knowledge "that today's route will be much like yesterday's", and therefore to "an awful sense of monotony" (1992:46). According to Cohen and Taylor,

the ideal state is some equilibrium between the routinized and indeterminate aspects of our existence; if too many of our actions feel repetitive and determined then we become "fed up" and feel the need to break away a little, to shake off some routines (1992:49).

However, modernity often overdetermines its pace of life, and work often obliges individuals to structure their daily lives into routines.

Therefore, people may sometimes be obsessed by a sense that is so ubiquitously routine that not only everyday life, but existence itself, is trapped in the prison of the mundane, the trivial, and the readily predictable. "This is the experience we call boredom, monotony, tedium, despair" (1992:50). These feelings may be corrosive. They threaten individuality and identity. Thus, people may feel that "something must be done about it" (1992:48). Rather than seeking a solution in paramount reality itself, they "look elsewhere to cope with routine, boredom, lack of individuality, frustration" (1992:112). Individuals search for "free areas", somewhere to flee to and temporarily escape paramount reality, anticipating "that its arrangements must be toyed with, its rules relaxed, its gates opened" (1992:113). Cohen and Taylor classify three different free areas: activity enclaves, which include hobbies, games, gambling, and sex; new landscapes, which consist of holidays and adventures; and mind-escape, which refers to drugs and therapy. All these free areas convey the escape message, the message of the will to escape the mundane, the routine, boredom, and paramount reality.

Cohen and Taylor demonstrate the possibilities of encapsulating tourism and holidays in terms of the sociology of everyday life. Holidays are "temporal excursions away from the domain of paramount reality" (1992:131). Such excursions are best understood in terms of the effects of paramount reality, including boring routines. This approach of boredom-avoidance can also be found in many other researchers' studies, for example in Krippendorf's (1987:ch.10) study of the holiday-maker, in Mitchell's (1983, 1988) exploration of mountain experiences, and in Elias and Dunning's (1986) analysis of leisure and sport.

Varying from Cohen and Taylor, Cannus (1995), in a reflection on the routinized rhythm of life, treats constraining routines not as boredom but as "absurdity". The absurd is a sense of the meaninglessness of life, which is derived from reflection on the meaning of life. For Cannus, such reflection often leads to a questioning of routines that are taken for granted as natural and normal and thus reveals the "ridiculous character" of routine life, namely "the absence of any profound reason for living" (1995:13). Cannus writes:

It happens that the stage-sets collapse. Rising, tram, four hours in the office or the factory, meal, tram, four hours of work, meal, sleep and Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, according to the same rhythm—this path is easily followed most of the time. But one day the "why" arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement. "Begins"—this is important. Weariness comes at the end of the arts of a mechanical life, but at the same time it inaugurates the impulse of consciousness. It awakens consciousness and provokes what follows. What follows is the gradual return into the chain or it is the definitive awakening. At the end of the awakening comes, in time, the consequence: suicide or recovery (1995:18).

Therefore, a sense of the absurd occurs when the "mechanical" routine life is called into question. Here Cannus reveals a *reflective absurdity*, an absurdity that is derived from the collapse of meaning and purpose in mechanical routines. Life under modernity can become a problem. Therefore, against this background, it is understandable that tourism or a holiday, like religion and pilgrimage, functions as an institution that bestows meaning on life (Graburn 1983a).

The Phenomenology of Uncertainty

From the 1970s onwards post-Fordism gradually emerged as a new order of the political economy. The features associated with post-Fordism include: segmentation of the market with the growth of interest in more specialized products, consumer-led, more flexible specialization in production and shorter production runs, taking full advantage of new technologies in order to make profits; a destandardization of labor which entails additional diverse skills, more responsibility, and greater autonomy, and hence leads to the differentiation and individualization of the labor force (Kumar 1995:36–65; Ritzer 1992:314, 1996:151–152). Furthermore, if Fordism adopts a *long-term* employment strategy, such a strategy can increasingly be replaced by a pattern of short-term employment contracts and part-time work, thereby increasing the risk of unemployment (Beck 1992).

The uncertainty, flexibility, accelerating tempos and rhythms, and the growth of social risk (e.g., unemployment) linked to post-Fordism lead to a different kind of experience of time. If in the Fordist age the major problem for workers was alienation, monotony, and boredom, then in the post-Fordist age, flexible, uncertain, and destandardized work can be extremely challenging. For many the challenges of work can lead to self-fulfilment. However, the other side of the coin is not pleasant: stress, pressure, and anxiety may overwhelm people. Indeed, such experiences of work and time may lead to several psychological and social problems. True, these experiences are subjective and psychological. However, a collective concern for them is a social fact, indicating the seriousness of the problem. According to an electronic literature search (by means of BIDS ISI—Bath Information and Data Services, the social sciences section, UK) for the period 1981 to August 1996, in the journals included by BIDS there are nearly eleven thousand article titles containing the key word "stress", over two thousand including the key word "pressure", and nearly seven thousand containing the key word "anxiety". These statistics certainly do not exhaust all the academic and public treatments of "stress", "pressure", and "anxiety" (for example they do not include book chapters), but these figures are nevertheless quite telling. They

indicate that stress, pressure, and anxiety are really serious endemic problems in modern life (Cooper and Marshall 1980; Cooper and Payne 1978; 1980; Forgas, Sonowiski and Wznesniowski 1992; Goldberger and Breznitz 1993; Gray 1971; Levitt 1968; Spielberger 1972).

Stress, pressure and anxiety are also related to modern "time panic". According to Lyman and Scott, time panic

is produced when an individual or a group senses it is coming to the end of a track without having completed the activities or having gained the benefits associated with it, or when a routinized spatio-temporal activity set is abruptly brought to imminent closure before it is normally scheduled to end (1970:207).

One of the causes of "time panic" is a series of scheduled deadlines and timetables. In contemporary society, especially under post-Fordism, temporal requirements are more constraining than ever before, since post-Fordism entails not only synchronization but also "just-in-time" production and delivery. As a result, individuals or groups face increasing stress and pressure. Time panic is one of the major discomforts of contemporary life. It is therefore evident and understandable that people suffering from chronic stress and worry need change and relaxation via holiday-making.

For many individuals, including workers, stress grows under the condition of post-Fordism. For managers, executives, and professionals, stress and pressure may be even higher. For them the tempo of life is, or often has to be, very fast because of their higher organizational responsibilities. As Wachtel (1983) observes, over some fifty years, as the number of hours worked has consistently decreased for the labor force at large, the number of hours worked by managers and professionals has actually increased. "In many western countries, professionals and managers now work close to 50% more hours a week than ordinary workers" (1983:46). Why do they work more hours when they are in a position to set their own hours of work? Part of the reason is that "they enjoy their work more. Much of the work of executives and professionals is challenging and stimulating, and leaves room for creativity and self-expression" (1983:46). But for Wachtel this is far from the whole story. A more important reason behind such pressure is the result of competition and the high value placed on individualism. As Wachtel states:

we live in a highly competitive and individualistic society, and the pressures on us to strive, to achieve, and "get ahead" are enormous, moreover, when everyone else is racing to get ahead, not to do so is to fall behind. Although the advantages of being able to set one's own working hours, to determine when and how much one will work, are obvious, there is a compensating price to be paid as well—having continuously to face the question "Am I doing enough?" and, for many, *never* quite having the sense of one's work being done and it being time to relax (1983: 47).

Thus, even if enjoyment of work is real, "the pressured quality often remains and reveals itself in psychological and psychical symptoms and in a generally high level of tension and irritability" (1983:47). The fast tempo and the stress of work are therefore mutually reinforcing. Stress (responsibilities, competition, success, reputation, etc.) enforces a faster tempo (doing more hours of work, working harder, etc.), and increased tempo in turn brings about further stress. Thus, the only way of escape is to get out of the rhythm. Therefore, holiday-making becomes a functional institutional respite from the stressful tempo of life. It is no wonder that former American President George Bush continued his preplanned holiday when the the Gulf War broke out in 1992.

Holidaying and the Differentiation of Time

Holiday-making involves a particular way of spending free time (Böröcz 1996:28; Ryan 1997b; Vukonic 1996:14). It "presupposes that free time be regulated and packaged in weekly and annual blocks" (Böröcz 1996:28). Thus, the sociology of holiday-making can in a sense be translated into a sociology of free time. Although the concrete forms of holiday-making are various they all share a common feature—they all "consume" a concentrated block of free time annually or semi-annually.

Changes in the Social Ethic of Free Time

Greater efficiency indicates a higher output within a given unit of time (temporal input), namely enhanced productivity. Many factors contribute to the growth of productivity and efficiency of work under modernity, such as the introduction of new technologies, the division of labor, and scientific management. Among other factors, the rational use of time (time management) is also significant. Under modernity time is seen as a resource, commodity, and value, and hence is subject to the principle of rationalization. The temporal order of modernity is rational in the sense that it goes beyond natural rhythms, and is mainly subject to the dictates of economic constraint.

An increase in personal leisure time has certainly to do with higher efficiency and productivity as well as industrial relations. Self-evidently, once a society can produce many times more output for a given temporal input than before, this situation indicates that the production of a given amount of output requires much less time (temporal input) than previously. This increased productivity implies that there exists a potential for increased leisure time. As mentioned above, unionization, together with other factors such as the intervention of the state, has turned this

potential into reality. Thus, the post-war era has witnessed the emergence of "universal leisure" in many economically advanced nations. "Paid leave, holidays, and free time are actually written as rights into the constitutions of 65 nations, while others reflect rights to leisure and travel in their legislation" (Richter 1989:16). It is claimed that the West has entered the so-called "leisure society". The emergence of holidays with pay, then, is an embodiment of "universal leisure".

The generalization of holiday-making implies an overall growth of disposable income and free time, on the one hand, and a change in the social ethic of free time on the other. As Pimlott puts it, one of the essential requirements for the rise of modern holiday-making is

that there should be an increase in the number of persons with a surplus over bare subsistence which they could spend on amenities; and that they should want to spend part of any such surplus on holidays (1976:212).

Thus, the emergence of mass holiday-making entails not only the "declining marginal urgency" of survival caused by affluence (Galbraith 1958) but also a change of mentality and ethic regarding time and income, that is, people want to spend part of their increased free time and increased income on holidays. Seen from the perspective of the work ethic, holidaying is non-productive and hence waste of time. However, with the increase in disposable time and income the negative side of the temporal order under modernity is gradually defined as "intolerable", and hence holiday-making is no longer regarded as a waste of time. It is instead seen as necessary to personal welfare, informed by a changing ethic regarding the non-productive use of time.

Therefore, the rise of institutional holiday-making implies a "normative differentiation of time", that is, a relative short period of time *set aside* from the mainstream tempo and rhythm for a non-productive purpose that is accepted by society and culture. The differentiation of time is related to different ethics. If working time is informed by a work ethic (doing things), then leisure or holiday time is dictated by the need for relaxation, change, play, and freedom. Holiday time is culturally, socially, and politically approved of as exempt from work, obligations, and the work ethic, and may be used for non-productive purposes. Holidays away from the home for the purpose of pleasure are no longer regarded as contradictory to the work ethic, but rather as complementary to it (Pimlott 1976).

A change in the social ethic of free time is the outcome of modernization, including its temporal form. It is the negative experience of the temporal form, as well as other aspects of modernity that produce the desire for differential time, namely holiday time. As Pimlott writes:

Many forces contributed to put holidays high amongst the items on which increased incomes were spent. The faster tempo, higher degree of mechan-

ization, and enhanced scale of modern industry increased the desire for periodical change from the routine and environment of everyday life (1976:213).

It is against this background of modernity, particularly its temporal order, that a change in attitudes regarding the non-productive use of time can be understood. In addition, modernity also creates sufficient material conditions to sustain a short concentrated period of time each year for holiday purposes.

Holiday-Making as an Institution of Escape

Holiday-making is not only an escape from the space of the home society, but also an escape from the tempos and rhythms of home. Thus, it has its own temporal boundaries. As Graburn observes, a holiday

is limited in duration and is a contrast with the longer periods of ordinary life. Thus it has a beginning, a period of separation characterized by "travel away from home;" a middle period of limited duration, to experience a "change" in the non-ordinary place; and an end, a return to the home and the workaday (Graburn 1983a:11-12)

Graburn (1983a:12) further identifies the temporal structure of holidaying with the structure of ritual behavior. Both of them have their temporal boundaries through which the sacred is separated from the profane. Holiday-making thus offers people entry into another kind of "moral state in which mental, expressive, and cultural needs come to the fore", and in which "normal 'instrumental' life and the business of making a living" are left behind (1983a:11). Such a moral state has its own temporal boundaries.

Holiday-making relates to time in another three ways. First, as a regular occurrence on an annual or semi-annual basis, holiday-making is an institution. It is an institution by definition because of its regular occurrence. Second, it is temporary and of limited duration—most people cannot be on holiday all the time. Third, it follows a different tempo from the rhythm of home. It is, in a sense, "time off".

More appropriately, holiday-making is an institution of *escape*. Holidaying can be seen as "a mass retreat of square pegs from the round holes of their uncongential occupations to the square holes in which the best that is in them comes uppermost" (Michael 1950b:14). As a way of escape, holiday-making can be further defined as both "escape from" and "escape to" (Brown 1950). Holiday-makers escape from X to Y (1950:276). For Brown, X mainly consists of the daily environment, daily duties and obligations, daily routines, and daily social relations, while Y consists of those that promise opposite, or different,

features in relation to X. "Escape from" and "escape to" can be translated into "freedom from" and "freedom to" respectively. As regards the former, holidaying is a socially and culturally approved way of spending a certain period of time exempt from daily duties and their associated tempos. As Neumann writes:

People take to the world of travel and nature to flee the routines of work, home, and family and seek out ways of living that involve them in situations where they find they can be closer to some primary and basic mode of life. The river, the trail, and the road are places where the alienating rhythms, routines, and boredom of modern life seem less imposing. They are places where people may find individually, excitement, flexibility, and freedom (1992:186).

Thus, in more general terms, holiday-making is freedom from the modernized mode of existence that is associated with rigid schedules, deadening routines, and stressful deadlines.

As regards "freedom to", people on holiday have entry into an alternative track of tempos and rhythms. The routines and constraining schedules relating to home are placed in abeyance. Holiday-making thus becomes freedom to change. It follows a metaphorically temporal "rhetoric" that relates to the experiences of change. Holiday-making is a *re-organization of experiences*. It is a cultural construction of alternative temporality.

Besides alternative tempos and rhythms, holidaying involves the freedom to pursue alternative lifestyles, namely holiday lifestyles which are different from the daily forms of life. "Lifestyle" (or "life-style", or "style of life") is a widely used but ambiguous, concept. For Weber (1978) it is used in relation to "status honour". For Simmel (1990) it is akin to "the form of life" and refers to the modern objective form of life, such as lack of character, the calculating feature of modern life, and so on, shaped by the money economy. For Bourdieu (1984) it is linked to the "habitus" and "tastes" of various social classes, which run parallel to various conditions of class existence and economic capital. For Giddens it is related to choice and self-identity. Lifestyle gives "material form to a particular narrative of self-identity" (1991:81). Based on a literature review, Veal defines lifestyle as "the distinctive pattern of personal and social behaviour characteristic of an individual or a group" (1993:247).

According to Veal (1993), there are several points regarding lifestyle which must be taken into account. First, it involves activities, but does not include paid work or occupations. Second, it comprises values and attitudes. However, these are not necessarily part of lifestyle itself, rather they are *influences* on it. Third, whereas lifestyle is often a group phenomenon, it is also an individual matter. A person has a unique lifestyle. Fourth, individuals share a common lifestyle. They do not necessarily

have any social contact although most probably they will. Group interaction is not therefore a necessary feature of lifestyle, for example a person can share a common lifestyle with remote urban dwellers. Fifth, coherence is likely to be a key variable in analyzing lifestyle. However, it is not a necessary component of the definition of lifestyle, for some lifestyles may lack coherence. Sixth, people's perceptions of others' lifestyles are often partial, superficial, and inaccurate. Thus, while recognizability may be a feature of some lifestyles, it is not a necessary part of its definition. Seventh, lifestyle involves choice, and the degree of freedom of choice varies from individual to individual, from group to group, and from time to time. Consequently, the concept of "lifestyle" is different from that of "way of life". The latter is associated with a low degree of choice and the characteristic of "being imposed" (e.g., the situation of poverty or powerlessness), whereas the former is linked to high degrees of free choice (as in the situation of affluence or powerfulness).

Undoubtedly the whole range of life can be stylized, and holiday-making is one characteristic of a larger lifestyle. Therefore, lifestyles in an industrialized or post-industrialized society include holiday lifestyle as an integral element. Holiday-making itself can also be regarded as a specific lifestyle separate from the routines of daily lifestyle. The regular and circular inversion of holiday lifestyles and daily lifestyles are characteristic of the forms of life under the conditions of modernity and postmodernity.

A Phenomenology of Holiday Time

Ryan states that: "holidays do not make sense without reference to non-holiday time" (1997b:200). Indeed, in order to understand the phenomenology of holiday time, one needs to understand the experience of working time and daily routine. As Saram points out, people have "the need for experiential contrast, to states of boredom. Contrast is achieved primarily in two ways, as deviance, and secondly, what is termed 'time-out' and 'institutionalized evasion'" (1983:92). Greenblat and Gagnon (1983:95) also argue that, with many of the competence-enhancing aspects of life formally associated with work having subsided into routine, people tend to search for such experiences in leisure activities and holiday experiences. Holiday time is thus a kind of experience of time contrary to the experience of working time.

In contrast with working time and daily routines, holiday time is an *unusual* time. Voase claims that a holiday is "abnormal" in the sense that "it is infrequent, a break from routine, and arouses expectations of pleasure and interest which the daily round does not offer" (1995:32). The

experience of holiday time is exemplified by Gottlieb's description of American tourists' experience of holiday rhythm in a resort:

Many Americans like to envision vacations as "time off"—in a sense, the denial of time as one conceives it. One should make love all day, or stay up all night and sleep in the day, denying the "normal" rituals of the temporal sequence. Some vacationers even leave their watches home as a clear symbol of adapting to a non-normal "schedule", eating when they are hungry instead of when the clock tells them to, and so on (1982:170).

Similarly, Michael suggests that, for an ideal holiday, there should be no "arbitrary time-limit" and timetables. People "must have plenty of time, time to stop, to look and to investigate, time to turn aside and follow his nose or his intuition, and above all, the time to linger where delight is" (1950b:5). Although Michael is referring to sightseeing, his comments can also be applied to other kinds of holiday. Of course, the duration of a holiday may be constrained by daily responsibilities and time budgeting. In Ryan's words, "while the holiday-maker may seek to free him or herself from the normal constraints of time, it is done so within a constrained period" (1997b:202). In this sense, holiday time is planned and manipulated time. However, within the temporal boundary of holiday, to achieve an alternative experience of time, namely free time, holiday-makers tend to forget time, deroutinize it, and take a differential lifestyle free from the constraints of regulatory time. Ryan (1997b:201) has identified the experiential time characterizing a holiday as follows:

- Possible freedom from the usual regulatory constraints of time.
- The sense of time is shaped by the vividness of the experience of events.
- Time is a social construct, and thus within holidays is sensed as a consequence of the social interactions that take place.
- Holidays provide the potential to experience time in a way more akin to that associated with indigenous people—that is, time as a natural phenomenon associated with the rhythms of the season, or at least rhythms not imposed by daily work patterns.
- Holidays represent the opportunity to, within a short period of calendar time, experience time as other than fixed units of measurement—that is, time seems to speed up or slow down.
- Holidays provide the opportunity to create memorable time.
- Thus holiday time can be used to create positive memories which are assets for the future.
- That time which is a social construct contributes to concepts of self, thereby reinforcing the importance of holidays as periods of potential self-awareness.

Ryan's account of holiday time is phenomenological in nature. This account describes a sense and a kind of experience of time that are both "time off" from daily rhythms and "time for" an alternative experience and existence.

It is suggested here that another feature can be added to holiday time, that is, the consumption of time itself. If in daily life time is something that is to pass, then on holiday it is something for consumption. Holiday-makers are consuming a "good" or "happy" time (this point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9). Thus, time on holiday is highly subjective. It is the duration of particular kinds of feeling derived from holiday-making which can not be measured by clock time. The effects of a holiday transcend the moment of holidaying and continue well into the post-holiday period.

Holiday-making is an art-like experience of time and echoes the essence of art. The vitality of art lies in creation, freedom, and change. Once art becomes routine it loses its vitality. Similarly holiday-making is a quest for change and escape from the daily routine. Whereas an artist seeks change and creativity with the aid of imagination, holiday-makers experience change mainly through mobility. Metaphorically speaking, holidaying is an experiential time drama. Holiday-makers are mobile audiences who leave home and routine behind by traveling. "Performed as an art, travel becomes one means of 'worldmaking'" (Adler 1989b:1368). For holiday-makers the world becomes a gradually unfolding picture with the passage of time. The synchrony of the world is translated into the diachrony of itineraries. It is thus through the consumption of holiday time that space, as an unfolding landscape, is also visually consumed. The consumption of holiday time thus implies the consumption of space as well. As a result an individual's relationship with the world changes. The world is no longer a totality beyond the reach of the individual, but rather becomes negotiable, flexible, and accessible when the holiday-maker sets out on a holiday journey. The consumption of holiday time, as a kind of leisure movement, indicates that the world can be experienced as a series of spectacles. Holiday-makers, by consuming time, rebuild a relationship with the world. The world becomes an open, accessible book for them.

In summary, holiday-making is a particular culture of time. It is a social and cultural construction of free time, which is typically understood to be exempt from dominant modern tempos, rhythms, and temporal constraints, on the one hand, and duties, obligations, and the work ethic on the other. It also provides access to alternative experiences of time and lifestyle.

The sociogenesis of modern holiday-making has to do with the emergence of the modern individual's legitimate right to leisure, travel, and

holidays with pay. Such rights are gained not merely because of advances of technology or improvements in the standard of living, but are also due to an increased functional interdependency between classes and groups. Holidays with pay are one of the consequences of modern industrialization and industrial relations.

Holiday-making is in a sense a culturally constructed "need" set against the background of the negative side of modern tempos (such as time constraints, pressures of schedules and deadlines, and dulling routines). It is, however, only based on increasing productivity related to the modern temporal order that the negative side of the same temporal order is collectively and culturally defined as "intolerable". Hence, there has been a collective legitimization and naturalization of the "need" for escape and holiday-making as an annual or semi-annual event.

Holiday-making entails a newly emerged social ethic of free time. It is a socially and culturally approved way of spending a certain period of time that is legitimately exempt from the work ethic, obligations, and working tempos. It is both an institutionalized "freedom from" work and everyday rhythms, and a "freedom to" pursue a specific lifestyle contrary to the daily ways of life. A holiday lifestyle involves the consumption of qualitative and differential time. It is an alternative mode of "being-in-the-world", an alternative belonging to the world and others, and an alternative experience of self.