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Part 2

Social processes and practices

Doing the work of God

Home schooling and gendered labor

Michael W. Apple

Introduction

In *Educating the "right" way* (Apple, 2006; see also Apple *et al.*, 2003), I spend a good deal of time detailing the world as seen through the eyes of "authoritarian populists." These are conservative groups of religious fundamentalists and evangelicals whose voices in the debates over social and educational policies are now increasingly powerful. I critically analyzed the ways in which they construct themselves as the "new oppressed," as people whose identities and cultures are ignored by, or attacked in, schools and the media. They have taken on subaltern identities and have (very selectively) re-appropriated the discourses and practices of figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King to lay claim to the fact that they are the last truly dispossessed groups. A considerable number of authoritarian populist families have made the choice to home school their children.

Home schooling is growing rapidly. Although I shall focus on the United States in this chapter, it is witnessing increasingly large rates of growth in many nations in Europe, in Australia, in Canada, and elsewhere (see Beck, 2008, 2006). However, it is not simply an atomistic phenomenon in which, one by one, isolated parents decide to reject organized public schools and teach their children at home. Home schooling is a *social movement*. It is a collective project, one with a history and a set of organizational and material supports (Stevens, 2001: 4).

While many educators devote a good deal of their attention to reforms such as charter schools, and such schools have received a good deal of positive press, there are far fewer children in charter schools than there are being home schooled. In 1996, home school advocates estimated that there are approximately 1.3 million children being home schooled in the United States. More recent estimates put the figure even higher. Given the almost reverential and rather romantic coverage in national and local media of home schooling, the numbers may in fact be much higher than this, and the growth curve undoubtedly is increasing. At the very least, more than 2.2 percent of school-age children in the United States are home schooled (Sampson, 2005).

The home schooling movement is not homogeneous. It includes people of a wide spectrum of political/ideological, religious, and educational beliefs. It cuts across racial and class lines

(Sampson, 2005). As Stevens notes, there are in essence two general groupings within the home school movement, "Christian" and "inclusive." There are some things that are shared across these fault lines, however: a sense that the standardized education offered by mainstream schooling interferes with their children's potential; that there is a serious danger when the state intrudes into the life of the family; that experts and bureaucracies are apt to impose their beliefs and are unable to meet the needs of families and children (Stevens, 2001: 4-7). These worries tap currents that are widespread within American culture and they too cut across particular social and cultural divides.

Demographic information on home schoolers is limited, but in general home schoolers seem to be somewhat better educated, slightly more affluent, and considerably more likely to be White than the population in the state in which they reside (Stevens, 2001: 11). Although it is important to recognize the diversity of the movement, it is just as crucial to understand that the largest group of people who home school have conservative religious and/or ideological commitments (Apple, 2006). Given the large number of conservative Christians in the home schooling movement, this picture matches the overall demographic patterns of evangelical Christians in general (Smith, 1998).

Based on a belief that schooling itself is a very troubled institution (but often with widely divergent interpretations of what has caused these troubles), home schoolers have created mechanisms where "horror stories" about schools are shared, as are stories of successful home schooling practices. The metaphors that describe what goes on in public schools and the dangers associated with them, especially those used by many conservative evangelical home schoolers, are telling. Stevens puts it in the following way:

Invoking the rhetoric of illness ("cancer," "contagion") to describe the dangers of uncontrolled peer interaction, believers frame the child-world of school as a kind of jungle where parents send their kids only at risk of infection. The solution: keep them at home, away from that environment altogether.

(2001: 53)

Given these perceived dangers, through groups that have been formed at both regional and national levels, home schooling advocates press departments of education and legislatures to guarantee their rights to home school their children. They have established communicative networks—newsletters, magazines, and increasingly the Internet—to build and maintain a community of fellow believers, a community that is often supported by ministries that reinforce the "wisdom" (and very often godliness) of their choice. And as we shall see, increasingly as well the business community has begun to realize that this can be a lucrative market (Stevens, 2001: 4). Religious publishers, for-profit publishing houses large and small, conservative colleges and universities, Internet entrepreneurs, and others have understood that a market in cultural goods—classroom materials, lesson plans, textbooks, religious material, CDs, and so forth—has been created. They have rushed both to respond to the expressed needs and to stimulate needs that are not yet recognized as needs themselves. But the market would not be there unless what created the opportunity for such a market—the successful identity work of the evangelical movement itself—had not provided the space in which such a market could operate.

Conservative Christian home schoolers are part of a larger evangelical movement that has been increasingly influential in education, in politics, and in cultural institutions such as the media (Apple, 2006; Binder, 2002). Nationally, White evangelicals constitute approximately

25 percent of the adult population in the United States (Green, 2000: 2). The evangelical population is growing steadily (Smith, 1998), as it actively provides subject positions and new identities for people who feel unmoored in a world where, for them, "all that is sacred is profaned" and where the tensions and structures of feeling of advanced capitalism do not provide either a satisfying emotional or spiritual life. The search for a "return"—in the face of major threats to what they see as accepted relations of gender/sex, of authority and tradition, of nation and family—is the guiding impulse behind the growth of this increasingly powerful social movement (Apple, 2006).

Home schooling and compromising with the state

A large portion of social movement activity targets the state (Amenta and Young, 1999: 30), and this is especially the case with the home schooling movement. Yet, although there is often a fundamental mistrust of the state among many religiously conservative home schoolers, there are a considerable number of such people who are willing to compromise with the state. They employ state programs and funds for their own tactical advantage. One of the clearest examples of this is the growing home schooling charter school movement in states such as California. Even though many of the parents involved in such programs believe that they do not want their children to be "brainwashed by a group of educators" and do not want to "leave [their] children off somewhere like a classroom and have them influenced and taught by someone that I am not familiar with" (Huerta, 2000: 177), a growing number of Christian conservative parents have become quite adept at taking advantage of government resources for their own benefit. By taking advantage of home school charter programs that connect independent families through the use of the Web, they are able to use public funding to support schooling that they had previously had to pay for privately (pp. 179-180). This is also one of the reasons that the figures on the number of parents who home school their children are unreliable.

But it is not only the conservative evangelical parents who are using the home schooling charter possibilities for their own benefit. School districts themselves are actively strategizing, employing such technological connections to enhance their revenue flow but maintaining existing enrolments or by actively recruiting home school parents to join a home school charter. This can be expected to increase given the economic crisis currently being experienced by so many nations. By creating a home school charter, one financially pressed small California school district was able to solve a good deal of its economic problems. Over the first two years of its operation, the charter school grew from 80 students to 750 (Huerta, 2000: 180). Since there are only very minimal reporting requirements, conservative Christian parents are able to act on their desire to keep government and secular influences at a distance, and, at the very same time, school districts are able to maintain that the children of these families are enrolled in public schooling and meeting the requirements of secular schooling.

Yet, we should be cautious of using the word "secular" here. It is clear from the learning records that the parents submit that there is a widespread use of religious materials in all of the content. Bible readings, devotional lessons, moral teachings directly from online vendors, and so on were widely integrated by the parents within the "secular" resources provided by the school.

Such content, and the lack of accountability for it, raises serious question about the use of public funding for overtly conservative religious purposes. It documents the power of Huerta's claim that "In an attempt to recast its authority in an era of fewer bureaucratic controls over

schools, the state largely drops its pursuit of the common good as public authority is devolved to local families" (Huerta, 2000: 192). In the process, technologically linked homes are reconstituted as a "public" school, but a school in which the very meaning of public has been radically transformed so that it mirrors the needs of conservative religious form and content.

Home schooling as gendered labor

Even with the strategic use of state resources to assist efforts, home schooling takes hard work. But to go further we need to ask an important question: *Who* does the labor? Much of this labor is hidden from view. Finding and organizing materials, teaching, charting progress, establishing and maintaining a "proper" environment, the emotional labor of caring for, as well as instructing, children—and the list goes on—all of this requires considerable effort. And most of this effort is made by *women* (Stevens, 2001: 15).

Because home schooling is largely women's work, it combines an extraordinary amount of physical, cultural, and emotional labor. This should not surprise us. As Stambach and David (2005) have powerfully argued, and as Andre-Bechely (2005) and Griffith and Smith (2005) have empirically demonstrated, assumptions about gender and about the ways in which mothers as "caretakers" are asked to take on such issues as educational choice, planning, and, in the case we are discussing here, actually doing the education itself underpin most of the realities surrounding education. But home schooling heightens this. It constitutes an intensification of women's work in the home, since it is added on to the already extensive responsibilities that women have within the home and especially within conservative religious homes, with their division of labor in which men may be active, but are seen as "helpers" of their wives, who carry the primary responsibility within the domestic sphere. The demands of such intensified labor have consistently led women to engage in quite creative ways of dealing with their lives.

This labor and the meanings attached to it by women themselves need to be situated into a much longer history and a much larger context. A number of people have argued that many women see rightist religious and social positions and the groups that support them as providing a non-threatening, familiar framework of discourse and practice that centers directly upon what they perceive to be issues of vital and personal concern: immorality, social disorder, crime, the family, and schools. Yet, the feelings of personal connection are not sufficient. Rightist action in both the "public" and the "private" spheres (see Fraser (1989) regarding how these concepts themselves are fully implicated in the history of gendered realities, differential power, and struggles) empowers them as women. Depending on the context, they are positioned as "respectable, selfless agents of change deemed necessary, or as independent rebels" (Bacchetta and Power, 2002: 6).

Usually, fundamentalist and evangelical women are depicted as essentially dedicated to acting on and furthering the goals of religiously conservative men (Brasher, 1998: 3). This is much too simplistic. Rather, the message is more complex and compelling—and connected to a very clear understanding of the realities of many women's lives. Women are to have not a passive but a very active engagement in their family life and the world that impinges on it. They can and must "shape their husband's actions and alter disruptive family behaviors." Further, only a strong woman could mediate the pressures and the often intensely competitive norms and values that men brought home with them from the "world of work." Capitalism may be "God's economy" (see Apple, 2006), but allowing its norms to dominate the home could be truly destructive. Women, in concert with "responsible" men, could provide the alternative but

complementary assemblage of values so necessary to keep the world at bay and to use the family as the foundation for both protecting core religious values and sending forth children armed against the dangers of a secular and profane world.

Divine creation has ordained that women and men are different types of being. Although they complement each other, each has distinctly different tasks to perform. Such sacred gender walls are experienced, not as barriers, but as providing and legitimating a space for women's independent action and power. Interfering with such action and power in this sphere is also interfering in God's plan (Brasher, 1998: 12–13).

This vision of independence and of what might be called "counter-hegemonic thinking" is crucial. Bringing conservative evangelical religion back to the core of schooling positions secular schooling as hegemonic. It enables rightist women to interpret their own actions as independent and free thinking—but always in the service of God. Let me say more about this here.

Solving contradictions

One of the elements that keeps the Christian Right such a vital and growing social movement is the distinctive internal structure of evangelical Protestantism. Evangelicalism combines orthodox Christian beliefs with an intense individualism (Green, 2000: 2).

This is a key to understanding the ways in which what looks like never-ending and intensified domestic labor from the outside is interpreted in very different ways from the point of view of conservative religious women, who willingly take on the labor of home schooling and add it to their already considerable responsibilities in the domestic sphere. Such conservative ideological forms see women as subservient to men and as having the primary responsibility of building and defending a vibrant, godly "fortress-home" as part of "God's plan" (Apple, 2006). Yet, it would be wrong to see women in rightist religious or ideological movements as only being called upon to submit to authority *per se*. Such "obedience" is also grounded in a call to act on their duty as women (Enders, 2002: 89). This is what might best be seen as *activist selflessness*, one in which the supposedly submerged self reemerges in the activist role of defender of one's home, family, children, and God's plan. Lives are made meaningful and satisfying—and identities supported—in the now reconstituted private and public sphere in this way.

Protecting and educating one's children, caring for the intimate and increasingly fragile bonds of community and family life, worries about personal safety, and all of this in an exploitative and often disrespectful society—these themes are not only the province of the Right and should not be only the province of women. Yet, we have to ask how identifiable people are mobilized around and by these themes, and by whom.

The use of a kind of "maternalist" discourse and a focus on women's role as "mother" and as someone whose primary responsibility is in the home and the domestic sphere does not necessarily prevent women from exercising power in the public sphere. In fact, it can serve as a powerful justification for such action and actually *reconstitutes* the public sphere. Educating one's children at home so that they are given armor to equip them to transform their and others' lives outside the home establishes the home as a perfect model for religiously motivated ethical conduct for all sets of social institutions (see Apple, 2006). This tradition, what has been called "social housekeeping," can then claim responsibility for non-familial social spaces and can extend the idealized mothering role of women well beyond the home. In Marijke du Toit's words, it was and can still be used to forge "a new, more inclusive definition of the political" (2002: 67).

All of this helps us make sense of why many of the most visible home school advocates devote a good deal of their attention to “making sense of the social category of motherhood.” As a key part of “a larger script of idealized family relations, motherhood is a lead role in God’s plan” for authoritarian populist religious conservatives (Stevens, 2001: 76). Again in Stevens’ words, “One of the things that home schooling offers, then, is a renovated domesticity—a full-time motherhood made richer by the tasks of teaching, and [by] some of the status that goes along with those tasks” (p. 83).

Yet it is not only the work internal to the home that is important here. Home schooling is outward looking as well in terms of women’s tasks. In many instances, home schooling is a collective project. It requires organizational skills to coordinate connections and cooperative activities (support groups, field trips, play groups, time off from the responsibilities that mothers have, etc.) and to keep the movement itself vibrant at local and regional levels. Here too, women do the largest amount of the work. This has led to other opportunities for women as advocates and entrepreneurs. Thus, the development and marketing of some of the most popular curriculum packages, management guides, self-help and devotional materials, and so on has been done by women. Indeed, the materials reflect the fact that home schooling is women’s work, with a considerable number of the pictures in the texts and promotional material showing mothers and children together (Stevens, 2001: 83–96). A considerable number of the national advocates for evangelically based home schooling are activist women as well.

Marketing God

Advocacy is one thing, being able to put the advocated policy into practice is quite another. In order to actually *do* home schooling, a large array of plans, materials, advice, and even solace must be made available. “Godly schooling” creates a market. Even with the burgeoning market for all kinds of home schooling, it is clear that conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists have the most to choose from in terms of educational and religious (the separation is often fictional) curricula, lessons, books, and inspirational material (Stevens, 2001: 54). Such materials not only augment the lessons that home schooling parents develop, but increasingly they become *the* lessons in mathematics, literacy, science, social studies, and all of the other subjects that are taught. This kind of material also usually includes homework assignments and tests, as well as all of the actual instructional material. Thus, a complete “package” can be assembled or purchased whole in a way that enables committed parents to create an entire universe of educational experiences that is both rigorously sequenced and tightly controlled—and prevents unwanted “pollution” from the outside world. Much of this material is easily ordered on the Web and is based in an inerrantist approach to the Bible and a literalist reading of Genesis and creation, one in which, for example, evolution is dismissed (Apple, 2006; Numbers, 2006). The difference between right and wrong is seen as answerable only through reference to biblical teachings (Stevens, 2001: 55).

While there are pedagogic differences among these sets of materials, all of them are deeply committed to integrating biblical messages, values, and training throughout the entire curriculum. Most not only reproduce the particular biblically based worldviews of the parents, but they also create an educational environment that relies on a particular vision of “appropriate” schooling, one that is organized around highly sequenced formal lessons that have an expressly moral aim. Technological resources such as videos are marketed that both provide the home schooler with a model of how education should be done and the resources for actually carrying it out (Stevens, 2001: 56).

The *organizational form* that is produced here is very important. As I have argued elsewhere (Apple, 2006), since much of the religiously conservative home schooling movement has a sense of purity and danger in which all elements of the world have a set place, such an organization of both knowledge and pedagogy embodies the ideological structure underlying the evangelical universe. As Bernstein (1977) reminds us, it is often in the form of the curriculum that the social cement that organizes our consciousness at its most basic level is reproduced.

Importance is given to structured educational experiences that are infused with strong moral messages. This is not surprising given the view of a secular world filled with possible sins, temptations, and dangers. The emphasis then on equipping children with an armor of strong belief supports a pedagogical belief that *training* is a crucial pedagogic act. Although children’s interests have to be considered, these are less important than preparing children for living in a world where God’s word rules. This commitment to giving an armor of “right beliefs” “nourishes demands for school material” (Stevens, 2001: 60). A market for curriculum materials, workbooks, lesson plans, rewards for doing fine work such as merit badges, videotapes and CDs, and so many other things that make home schooling seem more doable is not only created out of a strategy of aggressive marketing and of using the Web as a major mechanism for such marketing, but it is also created and stimulated because of the ideological and emotional elements that underpin the structures of feeling that help organize the conservative evangelical home schooler’s world (see Apple, 2006).

Technology and the realities of daily life

Of course, parents are not puppets. Although the parent may purchase or download material that is highly structured and at times inflexible, by the very nature of home schooling parents are constantly faced with the realities of their children’s lives, their boredom, their changing interests. Here, chat rooms and Internet resources become even more important. Advice manuals, prayers, suggestions for how one should deal with recalcitrant children, and biblically inspired inspirational messages about how important the hard work of parenting is and how one can develop the patience to keep doing it—all of this provides ways of dealing with the immense amount of educational and especially *emotional* labor that home schooling requires.

The technology enables women, who may be rather isolated in the home owing to the intense responsibilities of home schooling, to have virtual but still intimate emotional connections. It also requires skill, something that ratifies the vision of self that often accompanies home schooling parents. We don’t need “experts.” With hard work and creative searching, we can engage in a serious and disciplined education by ourselves. Thus, the technology provides for solace, acknowledging and praying for each other’s psychic wounds and tensions—and at the same time enhances one’s identity as someone who is intellectually worthy, who can wisely choose appropriate knowledge and values. What, hence, may seem like a form of anti-intellectualism is in many ways exactly the opposite. Its rejection of the secular expertise of the school and the state is instead based on a vision of knowledgeable parents, and especially mothers, who have a kind of knowledge taken from the ultimate source—God.

Higher education and an expanded mission field

So far I have focused on elementary and secondary level education. But home schooling’s reach has extended to higher education as well. A prime example is Patrick Henry College. Patrick

Henry is a college largely for religiously conservative, home schooled students. With its motto of "For Christ and for liberty," it has two major emphases—religion *and* government. The principles that animate its educational activities are quite clear in the following description:

The Vision of Patrick Henry College is to aid in the transformation of American society by training Christian students to serve God and mankind with a passion for righteousness, justice and mercy, through careers of public service and cultural influence.

The Distinctives of Patrick Henry College include practical apprenticeship methodology; a deliberate outreach to home schooled students; financial independence; a general education core based on the classical liberal arts; a dedication to mentoring and disciplining Christian students; and a community life that promotes virtue, leadership, and strong, life-long commitments to God, family and society.

The Mission of the Department of Government is to promote practical application of biblical principles and the original intent of the founding documents of the American republic, while preparing students for lives of public service, advocacy and citizen leadership.

(www.phc.edu/about/FundamentalStatements.asp)

These aims are both laudable and yet worrisome. Create an environment where students learn to play active roles in reconstructing both their lives and the larger society. But make certain that the society they wish to build is based wholly on principles that themselves are not open to social criticism by non-believers. Only those anointed by their particular version of God and only a society built upon the vision held by the anointed are legitimate. All else is sinful.

Thus, for all of its creative uses of technology, its understanding of "market needs" and how to fill them, its personal sacrifices, the immense labor of the mostly women who are engaged in the work of actually doing it, and its rapid growth fostered by good press and creative mobilizing strategies, a good deal of home schooling speaks the language of authoritarian populism. There's an inside and an outside. And for many authoritarian populists, the only way to protect the inside is to change the outside so that it mirrors the religious impulses and commitments of the inside. Doing this is hard political, educational, and emotional work. And new technologies clearly are playing a growing role in such personal and social labor.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined a number of the complexities involved in the cultural and political efforts within a rapidly growing movement that has claimed subaltern status. I have argued that we need to examine the social movement that provides the context for home schooling and the identities that are being constructed within that social movement. I have also argued that we need to analyze critically the kind of labor that is required in home schooling, *who* is engaged in such labor, and how such labor is interpreted by the actors who perform it. Only in this way can we understand the lived problems that home schoolers actually face and the solutions that seem sensible to them. And I have pointed to how the space for production of such "solutions" is increasingly occupied by ideological and/or commercial interests who have responded to and enlarged a market to "fill the needs" of religiously conservative home schoolers.

A good deal of my focus has been on the work of mothers, of "Godly women," who have actively created new identities for themselves (and their children and husbands) and have found in such things as new technologies solutions to a huge array of difficult personal and political problems in their daily lives. Such Godly women are not that much different from any of us. But they are "dedicated to securing for themselves and their families a thoroughly religious and conservative life" (Brasher, 1998: 29). And they do this with uncommon sacrifice and creativity.

The picture I have presented is complicated, but then so too is reality. On the one hand, one of the dynamics we are seeing is social disintegration, that is, the loss of legitimacy of a dominant institution that supposedly bound us together—the common school. Yet, and very importantly, what we are also witnessing is the use of things such as the Internet, not to "de-traditionalize" society but, in the cases I have examined here, to *re-traditionalize* parts of it. However, to call this phenomenon simply re-traditionalization is to miss the ways in which such technologies are also embedded, not only in traditional values and structures of feeling. They are also participating in a more "modern" project, one in which self-actualized individualism intersects with the history of social maternalism, which itself intersects with the reconstitution of masculinities as well.

But such maternalism needs to be seen as both positive and negative, and not only in its partial revivification of elements of patriarchal relations—although obviously this set of issues must not be ignored in any way. We need to respect the labor and the significant sacrifices of home schooling mothers (and the fathers as well, since the question of altered masculinities in home schooling families is an important topic that needs to be focused upon in a way that complements what I have done here). This sensitivity to the complexities and contradictions that are so deeply involved in what these religiously motivated parents are attempting is perhaps best seen in the words of Jean Hardisty when she reflects on populist rightist movements in general:

I continue to believe that, within that movement, there are people who are decent and capable of great caring, who are creating community and finding coping strategies that are enabling them to lead functional lives in a cruel and uncaring late capitalist environment.

(Hardisty, 1999: 2–3)

However, recognizing such caring, labor, and sacrifice—and the creative uses of technologies that accompany them—should not make us lose sight of what this labor and these sacrifices also produce. Godly technologies, godly schooling, and godly identities can be personally satisfying and make life personally meaningful in a world in which traditions are either destroyed or commodified. But at what cost to those who don't share the ideological vision that seems so certain in the minds of those who produce it?

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New states, new governance and new education policy

Stephen J. Ball

In national settings of various kinds across the world, there is underway a set of general and highly significant experimental and evolutionary 'moves' that involve the modernisation of public services, state apparatuses, the overall institutional architecture of the state and its scales of operation.

The most basic and general of these moves is what Jessop (2002) calls 'decentralization', which 'involves redrawing the public-private divide, reallocating tasks, and rearticulating the relationship between organisations and tasks across this divide' (p. 199). This redrawing and reallocation has various aspects – some older, some new – such as the creation of executive agencies, the establishing of private-public partnerships (of many different kinds), contracting out state services to private providers (see Burch, 2006), the use of think tanks, consultants and knowledge companies for policy research and evaluation, philanthropic activity and sponsorship to fund educational programmes and innovations, the involvement of the voluntary sector (charities, NGOs, trust and foundations etc.) in service provision, and the use of social entrepreneurs to address intractable social problems – sometimes in complex combinations. In other words, tasks and services previously undertaken by the state are now being done by various 'others', in various kinds of relationship among themselves and to the state and to the remaining more traditional organisations of the public sector, although in many cases the working methods of these public sector organisations have also been fundamentally reworked, typically by the deployment of market forms (competition, choice and performance-related funding). Thus, new voices and interests are represented in the policy process, and new nodes of power and influence are constructed or invigorated. All of this involves an increased reliance on subsidiarity and 'regulated self-regulation', or what Stoker (2004: 166) calls 'constrained discretion', but typically involves deconcentration rather than devolution. It drastically blurs the already fuzzy divides between the public/state, the private and the third sectors and produces a new mix of hierarchies, markets and *heterarchies*. That is, it replaces or combines bureaucracy and administrative structures and relationships with a system of organisation replete with overlap, multiplicity, mixed ascendancy and/or divergent-but-coexistent patterns of relation. Heterarchy is an organisational form, somewhere between hierarchy and network, that draws upon diverse horizontal links that permit different elements of the policy process to cooperate (and/or

complete) while individually optimising different success criteria. Embedded in this shift, as indicated above, and in many ways fundamental to it are processes of privatisation – endogenous and exogenous. The first making state organisations more business-like and like businesses. The second replacing state organisations with private providers (public service businesses) or voluntary organisations or social enterprises. As put by Tony Blair, ‘market mechanisms are critical to meeting social objectives, entrepreneurial zeal can promote social justice’ (1998: 4).

There are now various manifestations of policy heterarchies in education, in many different settings (different parts of the public sector, sectors of education, regions and localities, nation states – some are transnational, as in the examples below), working on and changing the policy process and policy relations, each of which combines elements of destatization, and which involve a limited range of new players, stakeholders and interests in state education, education planning and decision-making and education policy conversations.

This chapter will discuss and examine some of these changes in the state and the policy process as they are evident in relation to education particularly, but by no means exclusively, and later give some examples.

Violence and bio-politics

These changes need to be situated in relation to a broader set of social and political changes in the techniques and modalities of government, which have the aim and effect of producing new kinds of ‘active’ and responsible, entrepreneurial and consenting citizens and workers – an explosion in modes of governing. However, this is only a partial description of contemporary government. In thinking about these changes while I shall be focusing on those new strategies and technologies that are involved, I do not in anyway want to suggest that older, more direct methods of government and governing have been totally displaced. The ‘methods’ and relations of heterarchy do not totally displace other forms of policy formation and policy action, but rather take their place in ‘the judicious mixing of market, hierarchy and networks to achieve the best possible outcomes’ (Jessop, 2002: 242) – ‘best’ that is from the point of view of the state. Sovereignty and violence are very much with us. Indeed, rather, ‘there is a contemporary proliferation of the techniques of arrest, incarceration, punishment, expulsion, disqualification and more broadly coercion’ (Dean, 2008: 104). These are what Jessop (2002: 201) calls ‘countertrends in the state’, drawing on Poulantzas’s notion of ‘conservation-dissolution’ effects. Such effects ‘exist insofar as past forms and functions of the state are conserved and/or dissolved as the state is transformed’ (Jessop, 2002: 201). Thus, alongside the use of new techniques of governing that rely upon the ‘conduct of conduct’, existing methods based upon the sovereign and biopolitical powers of life and death remain firmly in place, and new ones are being invented. Indeed, Dean and others argue that forms of sovereign power are increasingly exercised through ‘states of exception’ – the use of decisive authority beyond the limits of the law and the state itself – Guantanamo is the paradigm case. Broadly speaking, alongside what Foucault called ‘the government of souls and consciences . . . or of oneself’ (Foucault, 1997), that is an emphasis upon the use of freedom and choice in relation to those deemed responsible and productive, there is a continuing or indeed increased discriminate use of violent power, forms of ‘micro-violence’, in relation to particular social groups such as asylum seekers and welfare recipients, unemployed or troublesome youth, who are seen as a threat to social order, together with, generally, more intrusive forms of surveillance and scrutiny. While economic competitiveness and the production of certain forms of entrepreneurial citizenship have become

primary ‘necessities’ of contemporary government, ‘the diagnoses of disorder and pathology require the reimposition of authority and the reinscription of not only the poor but all groups and classes with a hierarchy’ (Dean, 2008: 105). Dean refers to this new form of hybrid rule as ‘authoritarian liberalism’. Furthermore, and relatedly, ‘countering the denationalization of statehood are attempts of national states to retain control of the articulation of different spatial scales’ (Jessop, 2002: 201). That encompasses both a ‘defence’ of national borders through immigration controls, and ‘tougher’ refugee regulations and the imprisonment of suspected terrorists, and the use of military power to counter ‘threats’ to national security. The point is that we should not expect nor look for a consistency between sovereign forms of government and governmentality, nor should we be surprised by failures of government and that the mixes involved are sometimes unstable. The particular form of hybridity of government in any setting requires empirical mapping. It is also important to bear in mind that the state has always been a site of struggle, in which resources and ‘voice’ have been differentially distributed across genders, ethnicities and classes.

From government to governance

The concern here is with one particular dimension of what is a whole set of wide-ranging and fundamental ‘moves’ across the terrain of government – that is education policy and the delivery of public education services – which are particularly but not exclusively ongoing in the West. Only some aspects of the range of new techniques of governing are directly relevant here. Dean (2008: 101) sums up these ‘moves’ as a whole, the changing mix of modalities of governing and the shift of emphasis from sovereignty to governmentality, in the form of a ‘thought experiment’ – see Table 14.1.

The various dimensions of the shift from government to governance (Rhodes, 1995, 1997; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Marinetto, 2005), which are outlined in Dean’s table, are achieved in the government of unitary states (and increasingly regions) in and by heterarchies. That is, a new form of ‘experimental’ and ‘strategic’ governance that is based upon network relations within and across new policy communities, designed to generate new governing capacity and enhance legitimacy. These new policy networks bring some new kinds of actor into the policy process, validate new policy discourses – discourses flow through them – and enable new forms of policy influence and enactment and in some respects disable or disenfranchise or circumvent some of the established policy actors and agencies. These new forces are able to colonise, to an extent, the spaces opened up by the critique of existing state organisations, actions and

Table 14.1 Contemporary governing in liberal democracies

Governing through freedom	↔	Powers of life and death
Shaping of choice	↔	Sovereign decision
Techniques of contract	↔	Deployment of violence
Management of risk	↔	Securitisation of threats
Multiple communities	↔	Society as a realm of defence and source of obligation
Global economy and reform	↔	Imposition of authority
New forms of citizenship	↔	Obligation and techniques of subjection
Dissolution of the territorial state	↔	Protection of borders and assertion of sovereignty

actors (Apple, 2006). This is a means of governing through governance, or the exercise of metagovernance. That is, the management of 'the complexity, plurality and tangled hierarchies found in prevailing modes of coordination' (Jessop, 2002: 243). However, in deploying and discussing such changes, I need to be clear that I am not suggesting that this involves a giving up by the state of its capacity to steer policy, this is not a 'hollowing out' of the state; rather, it is a new modality of state power, agency and social action and indeed a new form of state. That is, the achievement of political ends by different means: 'States play a major and increasing role in metagovernance' (Jessop, 2002: 242). It also needs to be pointed out that governance networks, or heterarchies, as indicated above, do not tell us everything we need to know about policy and the policy process.

As noted already, these heterarchies 'enlarge the range of actors involved in shaping and delivering policy' (Newman, 2001). Governance involves a 'catalyzing of all sectors – public, private and voluntary – into action to solve their community problems' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 20); it is achieved on 'the changing boundary between state and civil society' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 42) – and between state and the economy. In general terms, this is the move towards a 'polycentric state' and 'a shift in the centre of gravity around which policy cycles move' (Jessop, 1998: 32) – the deconcentration and dispersal of policy locations. All of this suggests that both the form and modalities of the state are changing. 'The state, although not impotent, is now dependent upon a vast [or perhaps vaster, SJB] array of state and non-state policy actors' (Marinetto, 2005).

In the UK, these heterarchies form 'new kinds of educational alliance' (Jones, 2003: 160), which 'New Labour seeks to create' around 'its project of transformation' (p. 160) and which in turn provide support and legitimation for reform. They are examples of what Kickert et al. (1997) refer to as 'loosely-coupled weakly-tied multi-organisational sets'. They are a policy device, a way of trying things out, getting things done, changing things and avoiding established public sector lobbies and interests. They are a means of interjecting practical innovations and new sensibilities into areas of education policy that are seen as change-resistant and risk-averse, and in general terms they 'pilot' moves towards a form of service provision that increasingly the state contracts and monitors, rather than directly delivering services, using the mundane practices of 'performance' measurement, benchmarking and targeting to manage a diversity of providers and forms of provision. New forms of power, authority and subjectivity are brought to bear in shaping governable domains and governable persons.

While heterarchies are justified in terms of innovation, risk-taking and creativity, they are also often selective and exclusive, both in terms of memberships and discourses. They serve to 'short-circuit' existing policy blockages. Some potential or previous participants in policy are specifically excluded – trades unions for example – and challenges from outside the shared basis of discourse 'may be easily deflected or incorporated' (Newman, 2001: 172). Heterarchies also work to disperse and re-spatialise policy, creating new sites of influence, decision-making and policy action. That is, the 'territory of influence' (Mackenzie and Lucio, 2005) over policy is expanded, and at the same time the spaces of policy are diversified and dissociated. As a result, as these new sites within the contexts of influence and text production (Ball, 2002) proliferate, there is a concomitant increase in the opacity of policy making. Within their functioning, it is unclear what may have been said to whom, where, with what effect and in exchange for what (see Cohen, 2004). Heterarchies are in part defined by commercial interest in particular policy outcomes, and some of the relationships within them are specifically contractual and financial, but they also encompass social commitments by volunteers and philanthropists. Sometimes the two are blurred.

These policy networks give space within policy for new kinds of talk. New narratives about what counts as a 'good' education are articulated and validated (see Ball, 2007); in particular, the network members enact, embody and disseminate narratives of enterprise and enterprising solutions to social and educational problems (see below). New linkage devices and lead organisations are being created over and against existing ones, excluding or circumventing but not always obliterating more traditional sites and voices. The public sector generally is worked on and in by these new policy actors, from the outside in and the inside out. Linkages and alliances around policy concerns and new policy narratives cross between the public and the private sector. New values and modes of action are thus instantiated and legitimated, and new forms of moral authority are established, and again others are diminished or derided.


Partnerships

Partnerships are a key policy trope within emerging heterarchies. Partnerships are what Jessop calls a 'linkage device' and they encourage 'a relative coherence among diverse objectives' (2002: 242). They can bring about a form of values and organisational convergence and they reshape the context within which public sector organisations work. Davies and Hentschke (2005: 11) describe partnerships as 'a third form of organizational activity' that have 'elements of both hierarchies and markets as well as unique features'. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) were about to document 5,500 local level service delivery partnerships in Britain. In practice, they vary enormously in form and in terms of their power relations and contractual conditions (Cardini, 2006). Some forms of partnership and consortia bring 'the private' into the public sector in the form of joint ventures and profit sharing, without wresting 'ownership' entirely from public sector hands. Nonetheless, the relations of power within partnerships vary quite markedly. Although within these relationships there may be ambiguities and 'differences in language, culture and perceptions of strategic interests' (Newman 2001: 121), partnerships can work to colonise local government and public bodies and re-interpolate public sector actors as entrepreneurs. In some versions, they imply 'a process of incorporation into the values of the dominant partner' (Newman, 2001: 125–126), but they may also be fragile and short-lived.

Two examples

I want to put some flesh onto this account with two examples of heterarchies, in two very different locations, chosen from a wide variety on which I am currently working, to highlight different features of heterarchy. To a great extent, the details, the substance of these examples do not matter; it is the form, the changes in the architecture of governance that they illustrate and display and forms of relationships and flows of narrative that they contain that are important. More in-depth discussion and analysis of each can be found in Ball (2008) and Nambissan and Ball (2009). In both cases, the representations of the relationships involved are of necessity simplified.

The first example is drawn from one small part of research I am currently undertaking in the UK on the role of philanthropy in education policy (Ball, 2008); specifically, it is a set of links and exchanges between Scottish business philanthropists and the government of Scotland (see Figure 14.1).



* Columba 1400 is a transnational change agency working with Grampian secondary schools
 ** Former journalist and entrepreneur

Figure 14.1 Philanthropy, business and education policy in Scotland

There are many different sorts of relationship involved here, focused on the involvement of Sir Tom Hunter, a Scottish businessman and philanthropist, whose money was made from a chain of sportswear shops, who has pledged to give away £1 billion before he dies and become 'one of the greatest philanthropists of his time' (Scotsman.com). His activities have generated a number of partnerships between his charitable foundation and the Scottish government, local government, schools, universities and various parastatal organisations. Several of the programmes represented in Figure 14.1 are based upon 'matched funding' from the Scottish Executive. Sir Tom himself sits on various groups and committees. In a very straightforward way, money buys voice and influence within the policy process and can also be used to attempt to change the culture and priorities of organisations in decisive ways. There are two primary themes that run through these relationships and interventions – they are change and the narrative of enterprise. That is, various attempts to 'modernise' public sector schooling (Schools of Ambition, 'radical change in East Ayrshire', Leadership Development, Teachers for a New Era) and, related to this, the insertion of forms of enterprise and enterprise education into schools and universities. These insertions carry with them a set of values values that are 'fundamentally premised on the construction of moral agency as the necessary ontological condition for ensuring an entrepreneurial disposition in the case of individuals and socio-moral authority in the case of institutions' (Shamir, 2008: 7). That is, the enterprising self and business-like organisations that display creativity, risk-taking, flexibility, innovation and adaptation.

Compared with England, there is very little direct privatisation or involvement of education businesses in this heterarchy, but 'the private' is indirectly represented through the actors themselves (virtually all White and male) and their 'interests' and the forms of discourse that they articulate. Other successful entrepreneurs and philanthropists such as Sir Ian Wood, Charles Skene and Chris van der Kuyf are also drawn into the construction of this narrative and serve to embody it and its virtues. Indeed, the discourse of enterprise and entrepreneurship has many points of articulation and many institutional sites and powerful agents and organisations in this heterarchy to provide for its reiteration and legitimation.

This heterarchy, through the work of the Clinton-Hunter Development Initiative, also illustrates the international flow of philanthropy and its influence through international policy networks in late developing countries. Clearly, the governments of such countries, and crisis states in particular, can be particularly susceptible to external, non-governmental influence, and the work of 'destatization' and public sector transformation is an international phenomenon (see Larbi, 1999). As Larbi points out in relation to developing societies and 'crisis' states, the

large international management consultants, accountancy firms and international financial institutions . . . have been instrumental in the increasing 'importation' of new management techniques into the public sector. They have played an important role in packaging, selling and implementing NPM techniques, as state agencies contemplating institutional change or strengthening often enlist the services of expert consultants to clarify available options – and recommend courses of action.

(Larbi, 1999: 5)

In many late-developing countries and crisis states, 'NGOism' is now an important factor in policy formation and the delivery of government services – such as education (e.g. see 'From NGOism to creating a movement', a talk of Nooria Haqnigar delivered on 26 April in Kabul during the seminar *Strengthening Women's Movements: National and Transnational Experiences*. Available online at www.mazefilm.de/dokupdf/haqnigar.pdf (accessed 17 April 2009)).


The second example comes from work done with Geetha Nambissan (also a chapter author in this collection). This shows the relationships between a group of international (US- and UK-based), pro-market, pro-choice, policy think tanks and a set of local Indian think tanks and businesses, which together are seeking to change the policy architecture of schooling in India by introducing the possibility of private schooling to supplement or replace state schooling. One of the ways pro-market, pro-choice advocacy works is through the circulation and recirculation of ideas and joining up of points of articulation. Foundations and think tanks and the media are important in the take-up and dissemination of ideas and their establishment within policy thinking.

The Indian choice policy network is linked by a complex of funding, exchange, cross-referencing, dissemination and sponsorship (see Figure 14.2). The Centre for Civil Society, the Educare Trust and the Liberty Institute (India) are key points of the local articulation and inward flow of choice policy ideas, but are also engaged in a bigger enterprise of neo-liberal state reform. The majority of studies of policy borrowing and policy transfer tend to pay little attention to the role of advocacy and philanthropy networks (apart from NGOs) in the flow of and influence of policy ideas, but these groups and individuals often have very specific and very effective points of entry into political systems. Stone (2000: 216) points out, quite rightly, that: 'The authority and legitimacy for think tank involvement in global affairs is not naturally given but has been cultivated and groomed through various management practices and intellectual activities'. She goes on to note that, 'In some cases, however, the think tank scholarly "aura" and independence may be misleading . . . in reality ideas become harnessed to political and economic interests'.

The Indian pro-choice think tanks are linked to a number of other co-belief organisations in other countries. They are members of a global network of neo-liberal organisations run by the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, which has its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, and has launched or nurtured 275 such think tanks in seventy nations around the world. Atlas believes that 'the prospects for free societies all over the world depend upon "intellectual entrepreneurs" in civil society, who wish to improve public policy debates through sound research' (<http://atlasnetwork.org/>). Its mission is 'To discover, develop and support "intellectual entrepreneurs" worldwide who can advance the Atlas vision of a society of free and responsible individuals.' This is a formidable network of power, influence, ideas and money, which presents a simple message easily understood by politicians and policymakers in diverse locations.

The Indian pro-choice think tanks are involved in sponsoring choice campaigns, introducing school-voucher schemes and lobbying at the state and city level for the legalisation of 'for-profit' private schooling. The 'School choice campaign', launched in January 2007 by the Centre for Civil Society (CCS), awards school vouchers to poor children across seven states in India. In Delhi, applications were invited from parents in poor settlements (through local NGOs active in these areas), and around 400 children were chosen through a lottery. The vouchers were awarded at a venue frequented by the cultural elite of the city, and this was duly reported by the media. Significantly, the chief minister of Delhi state was present to give away the vouchers. The CCS website appeals to prospective donors in India, UK and US to contribute to the voucher fund and also has forms for donations posted on its website. The website says:

Each voucher worth up to INR 6000 will fund one child's education in the school of their choice for a year. The voucher will be given until they complete their primary education from their preferred school . . . You can support this pioneering effort by sponsoring one or more vouchers. You will thus brighten a child's future by giving her the power to choose her school. You had a choice, give her a choice.



* National Institute for Information and Technology

Figure 14.2 Advocacy networks, choice and schooling of the poor in India

Alongside such local efforts to invigorate choice and private schooling, multinational banks such as HSBC, Standard Chartered and Citicorp are providing micro-finance loans for private school 'start-ups', in the case of HSBC, through a programme called EQUIP (Enabling Quality Improvement Programmes in Schools). *Business Line* (19 July 2004) reported that 'about 30 private schools [in Hyderabad] have shown interest in joining the initiative. Of them, 16 will be given loans in the first phase'. The minister for school education of the Andhra Pradesh government was quoted as asking HSBC 'to expand the scheme to government schools that form more than 80 per cent of the 91,000 schools in the State'.

Further to all this, there are a range of corporate efforts in school education in India, especially at the elementary stage, and private participation in government-run schools in the provision of infrastructure and facilities, the supply of meals, as well as involvement in the development of curriculum, pedagogy and assessment. Information technology (IT) in schools is also a key area of entry for the corporate sector – in the provision of computers and software, as well as technical support and training in state schools. In 2007, the Ministry of Human Resource Development launched a policy initiative on 'ICT in school education', with significant participation by private companies and 'facilitated' by two private organisations, Gesso and CSDMS, which have associations with technology vendors.

In addition, charitable Foundations established by corporations such as the APF (Wipro) and Pratham (ICICI) are an increasingly visible presence in the arenas of education policy making and in initiatives aimed at quality improvement in government schools in some states. A more recent phenomenon is the contracting out of 'under-performing' schools by state governments to corporate foundations. Among other examples, *Akshara*, an NGO established by the wife of the CEO of Infosys (a leading corporate organisation), now runs schools for the poor in Bangalore.

Within all of this there is a newly emerging set of 'policy' relationships between the state, philanthropy (local and international), think tanks and businesses (local and multinational), which are increasingly complex – a newly emerging heterarchy within which philanthropy and business are tightly intertwined. A variety of direct and indirect, commercial, financial and ideological interests are now able to 'voice' their concerns in contexts of policy influence and in contexts of practice. Set over and against the 'failure' of the Indian state to provide schooling for all children and the poor quality of many state schools, this is beginning to change the landscape of state schooling in India, bringing in increasing numbers of private providers (sole-traders and chains) and creating opportunities for business in all sectors of education. In a recent interview, Krishna Kumar sketches out a set of relations between liberalisation, privatisation and modernisation in the government of India and suggests that education has become 'a significant arena to study liberalisation' (LaDousa, 2007: 139) and that 'privatisation has become a major force' (p. 139).

Discussion

Two sorts of related change are going on here. One is in forms of government, and the other in the identity and interests of the participants in processes of governance. These new forms constitute, in the language of political science, 'network governance' – that is 'webs of stable and ongoing relationships which mobilise dispersed resources towards the solution of policy problems' (Pal, 1997); of course, these relationships do not completely overturn conventional policy instruments, as argued above, but they are placed within the context of new interests

and sensibilities. Increasingly, policymaking occurs 'in spaces parallel to and across state institutions and their jurisdictional boundaries' (Skelcher et al., 2004: 3), and, in the process, parts of the state and some of its activities are privatised.

Heterarchies are indicative of a new 'architecture of regulation', based on interlocking relationships between disparate sites in and beyond the state, and display many of the characteristics of what Richards and Smith (2002) call a 'postmodern state', which is dependent, flexible, reflexive and diffuse, but centrally steered. Policy is being 'done' in a multiplicity of new sites 'tied together on the basis of alliance and the pursuit of economic and social outcomes' (MacKenzie and Lucio, 2005: 500); although the strength of such alliances should not be overstated.

Although steering may have become more complicated across the 'tangled web' of policy networks, as Marinetto (2005) and Holliday (2000) argue the 'core executive' retains substantial authoritative presence over policy, and in some respects (certainly in education) the central state has achieved an enhancement of capacity through its monopoly and deployment of very particular powers and resources. The paradox is that, at the heart of contemporary politics, there is actually a 'filling in' rather than a 'hollowing out' (Taylor, 2000) of the state, exercised through a studied manipulation of the conditions and possibilities under which networks operate and the careful, strategic use of financial controls and allocation of resources. Relations here are complex but clearly asymmetric. There is an important shift of *emphasis* involved, but it is not an absolute break or rupture; bureaucracies continue to be the vehicle for a great deal of state activity, and the state does not hesitate to regulate or intervene when its interests or objectives are not served. The process of governance through heterarchies is increasingly significant but always contingent.¹

Note

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Towards a sociology of pedagogies¹

Bob Lingard

Introduction

Some years ago, it might have been unusual to find a chapter on pedagogy in a handbook on the sociology of education. In the past, within the sociology of education, pedagogical concerns would have focused largely on critical pedagogy. This is a tradition that can be traced to Paulo Freire's (1973) *Pedagogy of the oppressed*, linked to actual pedagogical practices in literacy, which sought 'conscientization' as a goal and rejected a banking conception of pedagogy. This pedagogy of the oppressed has had real impact in literacy programmes around the world, particularly, but not exclusively, in post-colonial countries. A literature on feminist pedagogy also emerged from the 1980s (e.g. Luke and Gore, 1992; Weiner, 1994), the political intentions of which were similar to those of Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed, but focused on women's liberation.

As the theory framing critical pedagogy became more arcane, its connections to actual pedagogy in actual classrooms became somewhat attenuated. Giroux (2003: 83), a leading theorist of critical pedagogy, stated: 'I use pedagogy as a referent for analyzing how knowledge, values, desire, and social relations are constructed, taken up and implicated in relations of power in the interaction among cultural texts, institutional forms, authorities, and audiences.' This definition of critical pedagogy indicates the need for a sociological approach and the distance of the genre from teachers in classrooms. Indeed, much of the critical pedagogy literature in the sociology of education involved largely exhortatory calls for teachers to work against the grain and resist dominant constructions of knowledge and produce critical citizens. This work was based much more theoretically and politically, rather than empirically and practically. There were some challenges in the sociology of education to its effectiveness and critique of its masculine orientation (Ellsworth, 1989).

There have been, however, more recent reconsiderations of critical pedagogies that have widened their purview to take account of new social movements and that also seek to document some actual practices of critical pedagogy. For example, Trifonas's (2003) edited collection, *Pedagogies of difference*, works with the 'identity construction' element of pedagogies, while also acknowledging their knowledge construction aspect. At the same time, it wants to create a community of difference across feminist, antiracist, post-colonial and gay and lesbian

critical pedagogues. This collection articulates pedagogies of difference, which aim to 'create an openness toward the horizons of the other' (p. 4). Writing about educational developments in the USA, Dimitriadis and McCarthy (2001) note how, in a time of multiplicity and difference, most pedagogies seek to tame and regulate as a response – pedagogies of the same, rather than pedagogies of difference. Peter McLaren and Joe Kincheloe's edited collection (2007), *Critical pedagogy: where are we now?*, deals with the theoretical, pedagogical and political aspects of critical pedagogy, demonstrating its eclectic character and illustrating some actually existing critical pedagogies.

This chapter argues that a sociology of pedagogies demands a more empirically grounded approach, yet one that works with the political aspirations of critical and feminist pedagogy. This stance recognizes the veracity of Michael W. Apple's position that critical pedagogies ought not simply be about 'academic theorizing'. Rather, he notes, 'Critical approaches are best developed in close contact with the object of one's analysis' (Apple, 2006: 210).

In what follows, the renewed interest in pedagogy within the sociology of education is considered, as is some of the emerging literature. The chapter then turns to definitions of pedagogy and the emergence of issues of public pedagogy. Next, the research that developed the concept of 'productive pedagogies' is outlined. This is done to exemplify a possible way forward for sociological research about pedagogy that is empirically based, theoretically and politically informed, and of potential use to teachers. Such a sociological account of pedagogy recognizes that pedagogies can make a difference in an opportunity sense, but not all the difference (Apple, 2000, 2006; Hayes *et al.*, 2006), and thus need to be accompanied by broader redistributive policies. The productive pedagogies research fits within what has been called 'new pedagogy studies' (Green, 2003), which recognize that pedagogical change is at the heart of effective school improvement.

Renewed interest in sociology of pedagogy

Pedagogy is endemic to schooling – it is through pedagogy that schooling gets done – and thus understanding pedagogy is central to the sociology of education. Some contemporary factors have also sparked a renewed interest in pedagogies within the sociology of education. These include policy developments over the last two decades in Anglo-American countries, which have introduced tight accountabilities into schooling systems that have affected teachers' pedagogical work. High stakes testing has become a central policy for steering schools' and teachers' practices, with negative effects on pedagogic possibilities. These policy-driven changes to pedagogies have provoked a renewed sociological interest.

These policy developments have seen greater usage of outcomes testing, both nationally and internationally, as a way of framing education policy and of steering schools. This has been about making teachers and their work more accountable and auditable (Mahony and Hextall, 2000) as part of the audit culture (Power, 1997), which suffuses state practices under the new public management and which has been very evident in schooling systems. In an influential study of teachers' work, published more than two decades ago, Connell (1985) argued that teaching was a labour process without a product. In the context of the introduction of new outcomes accountabilities, this observation does not hold true today, at least in Anglo-American models of school reform. Smyth (1998: 193) observed, in respect of such outcome accountability: 'A crucial element of this educational commodity approach to teachers' work is the attention to calculable and measurable aspects of the work, especially educational outputs.' This has had

reductive effects on pedagogy, as McNeil (2000) has demonstrated in respect of the US, where test-driven schooling has led to what she calls 'defensive pedagogies'. Hursh (2008) similarly has demonstrated the reductive effects on pedagogies, what he calls the decline of teaching and learning, of George Bush's No Child Left Behind reform and associated testing regime.

This accountability development has been accompanied by reductionist accounts within policy of teachers as the most significant school-based factor for 'determining' student learning outcomes. These policies see teachers as decontextualized practitioners and as both the 'cause' of, and 'solution' to, any problems with learning outcomes, often reduced to student performance on high stakes testing. School effectiveness research in its earlier iterations gave some intellectual or 'evidence base' to this framing of education policy. These accounts decontextualized the factors involved in school performance, particularly for disadvantaged young people, and failed to recognize or acknowledge that it is those societies with low Gini coefficients of social and economic inequality that achieve high quality and high equity in schooling outcomes (Green *et al.*, 2006).

In this policy context, pedagogy has also come to the attention of policymakers and teacher registration agencies. Thus, for example, in New South Wales, Australia, there is a quality pedagogy policy endorsed by the state department. In England, for example, with the literacy hour, there is almost a state- or nationally sanctioned, technicist form of pedagogy (Marsh, 2007).

These policy developments have brought pedagogy under the purview of sociologists of education again. Thus, we have seen a range of sociological studies of pedagogy (e.g. Alexander, 2008; Comber and Nixon, 2009; Hayes *et al.*, 2006; Munns, 2007; Sellar, 2009; Yates, 2009; Zipin, 2009), special issues of journals on pedagogies (e.g. *International Journal of Inclusive Education* 11(3), 2007; *Discourse* 30(3), 2009; *Pedagogy, Culture & Society* 17(1), 2009) and a new Taylor & Francis journal entitled *Pedagogies: An international journal*.

The renewed focus on pedagogy by sociologists of education has also been linked to some influential research. There is Robin Alexander's monumental (2000) study of pedagogy in relation to culture in five countries, *Culture and pedagogy*, which is also distinctive within its field of comparative education in its focus on classroom practices and their embeddedness in broader culture. Alexander acknowledged the relationships between pedagogy and social control and recognized the 'truth' of Bernstein's (1971: 47) well-known observation that: 'How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both the distribution of power and principles of social control.' Alexander assumed and documented the linkages between pedagogies and different cultural and historically bound 'ideas and values, habits and customs, institutions and world views' (2000: 5). His research worked with a very broad and culturally based definition of pedagogy, extending its meaning well beyond teaching or instruction.

Alexander's account follows Bernstein in its conceptualization of pedagogy as 'cultural relay'. Bernstein (2004: 196) observed that 'pedagogic practice can be understood as relay, a cultural relay: a uniquely human device for both the production and reproduction of culture'. Alexander's comparative research clearly demonstrated the veracity of this observation. Elsewhere, Alexander (2008) has provided stinging attacks on the negative effects of New Labour school reform, particularly consequential accountability, on pedagogy in England, reducing its meaning and neglecting its connections to culture. Alexander's work also insinuated the necessity of a sociological approach to pedagogy.

This reference to Bernstein also makes us aware that there is another tradition of pedagogical work in the sociology of education, that of Bernstein (1990, 1996) and his deeply theoretical constructions of the message systems of schooling, curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation.

Bernstein argued that changes in one message system effected changes symbiotically in the other, a reality obvious in the effects of new testing and accountability arrangements on pedagogy in England. In his later work, Bernstein was also concerned with the relations internal to schooling systems of the message systems and 'the recontextualising field of pedagogic discourse'. Such a pedagogic discourse recontextualizes knowledge into curricula, syllabuses and pedagogical knowledge and practices.

Within a similar intellectual field and related to considerations of social and cultural reproduction, Bourdieu saw pedagogies as necessarily involving power relations and as also central to the reproductive mechanisms, in social structural terms, of schooling systems. This was particularly so for those pedagogies that assumed a cultural homology between the capitals of schooling and pedagogy and those of the home. These are pedagogical practices that regarded school performance as a function of individual capacity, rather than cultural experience and the possession of particular school-relevant cultural capitals, and thus misrecognized a 'social gift treated as a natural one' (Bourdieu, 1976: 110).

As Bernstein (2004: 205) has noted, academic success at school demands two complementary sites of pedagogic acquisition, that of the home and that of the school. Bernstein also suggests that the pacing of curricula and the amount of material to be covered in a finite period of time mean that school success demands complementary 'official pedagogic time at home'. And, of course, the capacity to offer this pedagogic time is social class based.

Working within a different intellectual tradition, that of US school reform, Newmann *et al.*'s work (1996) on authentic pedagogy has also been influential in the US and Australia and was the background to the large Queensland School Reform Longitudinal Study, which developed the concept of productive pedagogies. This concept was taken up by the Queensland government and used as the basis for professional development for teachers, while it also formed the basis of the development of a quality pedagogy model framing schooling in New South Wales, as well as being influential elsewhere. Contemporary research in Singapore, for example, has built on productive pedagogies to consider more closely the pedagogies-knowledges relationship (Luke and Hogan, 2006). The Teaching and Learning Research Programme in the UK, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, has also provoked a renewed research interest in pedagogy.

The policy-driven construction of pedagogy presents a thinned out version that eschews these broader definitions and that rejects the notion of theory attached to teaching. It is this effect that has attracted sociological attention. From within a theoretical and research frame, some have also recognized the difficulty of making pedagogy a stable object of theory and research (e.g. Sellar, 2009). In the next section, definitions of pedagogy and the changing contexts of pedagogy will be considered.

Definitions of pedagogy

Here, I will make an attempt at definitions and, given the width and complexity of these, briefly consider the different literatures that considerations of pedagogy are located within. Alexander makes a very clear distinction between teaching and pedagogy. Put succinctly, he asserts that pedagogy is the art of teaching *plus* its associated discourses to do with learning, teaching, curriculum and much else. For Alexander (2000: 540), pedagogy is both an act (teaching) *and* a discourse. This is pedagogy as cultural relay and its multiple and associated discourses. As Alexander (2000: 540) states: 'Pedagogy connects the apparently self-contained act of teaching

with culture, structure and mechanisms of social control.' While noting that the field is quite muddled concerning a definition, Alexander (2008: 3) suggests the complex field of pedagogy includes 'culture and classroom, policy and practice, teacher and learner, knowledge both public and personal'. Pedagogy is thus more than what is usually implied by the use of instruction to refer to teaching in US teacher professional discourses and is also more than teaching, the more common term used in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Pedagogy could be seen also to link closely to the other message systems of schooling, curriculum and evaluation and through them to culture. This broader definition of pedagogy suggests the need for a sociological account. However, the use of pedagogy in this way is also culture bound, as Alexander (2000) demonstrates. In much of Europe, especially in the Nordic countries, and in Russia, pedagogy refers to both the act and idea of teaching framed by a very broad knowledge base (Alexander, 2000: 542).

While this chapter is concerned with pedagogy as linked to schooling and teacher practices, pedagogies have seeped out of educational institutions to other social institutions and workplaces. This is part of the de-differentiation associated with the knowledge economy and the pedagogizing of many aspects of work and public policy. Bernstein (2001a,b) has spoken of the 'totally pedagogised society' to refer to the ways in which social policy and professional practice today have become pedagogized. What we have is 'pedagogic inflation' (Bernstein, 2001a: 367), where 'the State is moving to ensure that there's no space or time which is not pedagogised' (Bernstein, 2001b: 377). This is why Bernstein suggests that a sociology of the transmission of knowledge is now required, which is focused on the broader changes towards the totally pedagogized society; this is an enterprise that would subsume the narrower sociology of pedagogy.

In terms of the features of the totally pedagogized society, think for example of public health policies of a preventative kind. Think of mandatory courses for single parents and welfare recipients. Think of policies that require all young people to be in education, training or work or a combination of these, rather than being welfare beneficiaries. Think of the pedagogic functions of art galleries and museums, of the Web and the Internet.

This broadened conception of pedagogy is also linked to the effects of the new technologies and the potential globalization of pedagogies (Edwards and Usher, 2008). The older technologies of pedagogy were bounded by classrooms and the technology of the book, while new technologies have seriously challenged these pedagogies of enclosure. These challenges link more broadly to social theory as well, with a conception of public pedagogy linked to social theory and a politics of change. It is almost as if, today, social theory needs a public pedagogy as a bearer of change (Lingard *et al.*, 2008).

The remainder of this chapter will deal, however, with a narrower conception of pedagogy, namely that associated with schooling, while being aware of insights that can be gained for a sociology of pedagogy from broader considerations of public pedagogy in social theory. I turn now to a consideration of the productive pedagogies research, which worked across the critical and empirical traditions in the sociology of pedagogy.

Productive pedagogies

The Queensland School Reform Longitudinal Study (QSRLS) (Lingard *et al.*, 2001), from which the concept of productive pedagogies was derived, was commissioned by the state government in 1997. The QSRLS developed out of Newmann and Associates' (1996) US research on

'authentic pedagogy' and backward mapped from classroom practices to structures, with priority given in the research design to classroom practices. As Rose has noted: 'The vantage point from which you consider schools – your location physically and experientially – will affect what you see and what you can imagine' (1995: 230). The model of productive pedagogies was derived from long periods of observation in actual classrooms across Queensland government primary and secondary schools. The model derived from maps of teacher pedagogies developed from a classroom observation tool, in turn developed out of the relevant research literature and from an interrogation of the classroom data. The point to stress here is that the model has come from observing *actual* teachers at work in *actual* classrooms.

Although the QSRLS was developed out of Newmann and Associates' (1996) research on 'authentic pedagogy', it was recontextualized to take account of the Queensland context. The Newmann research identified the concept of 'authentic pedagogy' to refer to teacher classroom practices that promoted high-quality learning and boosted achievement for all students. Newmann found that authentic pedagogy boosted the achievement of students from disadvantaged backgrounds, closing to some extent the equity gap in performance.

In the Newmann research, authentic pedagogy incorporated the concepts of authentic instruction and authentic assessment.² The QSRLS research differentiated between pedagogies and assessment, while at the same time recognizing the importance of aligning the two. Authentic instruction requires higher-order thinking, deep knowledge, substantive conversations and connections to the world beyond the classroom. Authentic assessment involves students being expected to organize information, consider alternatives, demonstrate knowledge of disciplinary content and processes, perform elaborate communication, solve problems that are connected to the world beyond the classroom and present to an audience beyond the school.

The QSRLS augmented the concepts of authentic pedagogy and assessment so as to take account of social as well as academic student outcomes. Consequently, the elements of authentic instruction were expanded into a broader grid consisting of twenty items for productive pedagogies (and authentic assessment into seventeen items for productive assessment), each mapped on a five-point scale.

There were twenty-four carefully selected research schools, selected because of their reputations for reform; half were primary and half secondary. Eight schools were studied in each year of the research, with each being visited twice, for a week at a time. Classes observed in these schools were Year 6 (penultimate primary year), Year 8 and Year 11 (penultimate secondary year), in the subject areas of English, maths, science and social science.

The expanded elements of productive pedagogies were derived from a literature review and included work from the sociology of education, critical readings of school effectiveness and school improvement research, socio-linguistic studies of classrooms, social psychology including sociocultural approaches, social cognition, learning communities and constructivism, critical literacy, critical pedagogies, along with Freirean, indigenous, post-colonial and feminist pedagogies.

It was in the construction of the twenty-element model of productive pedagogies from the literature, which also formed the basis of the classroom observation manual, that the attempt was made to construct a progressive pedagogy for contemporary times. This was evident in the emphasis upon the constructed nature of knowledge and multiple perspectives on things and also in the constructivist and collectivist approach to learning. It was also evident in the connectedness of the pedagogies, to biographies, to previous knowledge, to the world in which students currently learn and play, and to students' everyday/everynight practices. Derived from Bourdieu (1990), the contemporary and progressive characters of productive pedagogies were

also evident in the required explicitness of criteria and in the substantive conversations, which were conceived as being central to the distribution of multiple capitals to all students.

The emphasis upon working with and valuing difference attempted to construct a pedagogy of difference (ethnic, indigenous, gender, disability, sexuality), in terms of representation in texts and examples utilized in classroom pedagogies, and also in student inclusion in classroom activities, and in the creation of activist citizens who saw the global space as that for contemporary politics, but who would also work on the local and national. Thus, productive pedagogies sought to work with, not against, multiplicity (Dimitriadis and McCarthy, 2001) and 'with a culture of respect for the history, the language and culture of the peoples represented in the classroom' (Rose, 1995: 414). Stuart Hall (2000: 216) has insightfully captured the stance taken on difference in the research: 'This is not the binary form of difference between what is absolutely the same, and what is absolutely 'Other'. It is a 'weave' of similarities and differences that refuse to separate into fixed binary oppositions'. Despite the strong theoretical underpinnings of the difference dimension of productive pedagogies, it was difficult to operationalize the concept for the classroom mapping exercise.

On the basis of about 1,000 classroom observations in twenty-four case study schools, over three years (1998–2000) (about 250 teachers, each observed four times), statistical analysis

Table 15.1 Relationships between productive pedagogies and productive assessment

<i>Dimensions</i>	<i>Productive pedagogies</i>	<i>Productive assessment</i>
Intellectual Quality	Problematic knowledge Higher order thinking Depth of knowledge Depth of students' understanding Substantive conversation Metalinguage	Problematic knowledge: construction of knowledge Problematic knowledge: consideration of alternatives Higher-order thinking Depth of knowledge: disciplinary content Depth of knowledge: disciplinary processes Elaborated written communication Metalinguage
Connectedness	Connectedness to the world beyond the classroom Knowledge integration Background knowledge Problem-based curriculum	Connectedness: problem connected to the world beyond the classroom Knowledge integration Link to background knowledge Problem-based curriculum Connectedness: audience beyond school
Supportiveness	Students' direction Explicit quality performance criteria Social support Academic engagement Student self regulation	Students' direction Explicit quality performance criteria
Engagement with and valuing of difference	Cultural knowledges Active citizenship Narrative Group identities in learning communities Representation	Cultural knowledges Active citizenship Group identities in learning communities

supported a multidimensional model of pedagogy – what we called ‘productive pedagogies’. The twenty elements of productive pedagogies fitted into four dimensions, as shown in Table 15.1, which the research team named: intellectual quality, connectedness, social support and working with and valuing of difference. Table 15.1 outlines the four dimensions, including the way the twenty elements fall under each of the dimensions, as well as the reconceptualization of authentic into productive assessment.

Pedagogies of indifference

Each of the elements that made up the dimensions of productive pedagogies was measured on a five-point scale, with a score of five representing high presence and quality of an element. The ‘findings’ in relation to productive pedagogies suggest that, across the entire sample, there was a high degree of support for students (although very few opportunities for them to affect the direction of activities in the classroom), but not enough intellectual demandingness, connectedness to the world or engagement with, and valuing of, difference (see Table 15.2). In relation to intellectual quality and connectedness, there was a high standard deviation, indicating that these dimensions were present in some classrooms. In contrast, there was a high mean and a low standard deviation for supportiveness (see Table 15.2). What we saw were very supportive and caring teachers, teachers practising an almost social-worker version of teachers’ work.

In the context of growing inequality, we believe that teachers should be congratulated for the levels of social support and care they offered to students. This care was particularly evident in schools located in disadvantaged communities. Schools do contribute to what contemporary public policy likes to call ‘social capital’, that is, the creation of social trust, networks and community – the collective (but also dangerous) ‘we’ of local communities (Sennett, 1998). However, the research would suggest that such support is a necessary, but not sufficient requirement for enhancing student outcomes, both social and academic, and for achieving more equality of educational opportunity. Following Bourdieu and the research findings, socially just pedagogies must work with a more equitable distribution of cultural capital through explicitness.

Table 15.2 Mean ratings of dimensions of productive pedagogies from 1998 to 2000

	1998 (n=302)		1999 (n=343)		2000 (n=330)		TOTAL (n=975)	
	Mean	Std dev.	Mean	Std dev.	Mean	Std dev.	Mean	Std dev.
Intellectual quality	2.16	.77	2.17	.73	2.47	.91	2.27	.82
Connectedness	1.84	.77	1.97	.79	2.39	.97	2.07	.88
Supportive classroom environment	2.75	.63	3.05	.67	3.26	.67	3.03	.69
Engagement with difference	1.79	.51	1.89	.50	2.13	.54	1.94	.54

The actual pedagogies mapped, then, could be classified as pedagogies of indifference, in their non-connectedness, their lack of intellectual demand and their absence of working with and valuing difference. They were pedagogies of indifference in failing to make a difference, particularly for students from families not possessing the requisite cultural capital. However, it should be stressed that the teachers who were observed were not indifferent in terms of their care, concern and indeed support for students.

There are structural reasons for these findings, including class sizes, contemporary policy pressures (earlier social justice policies, which perhaps emphasized care *over* intellectual demand) and contemporary testing policies, which reduced intellectual demand, a crowded curriculum, time demands of curriculum coverage, pacing, pressures on teachers, a focus on structural change and so on. Allan Luke (2006), a member of the QSRLS research team, observed that interviews with teachers supported an explanation that ‘the testing, basic skills, and accountability push had encouraged narrowing of the curriculum’ and was affiliated with the finding of ‘a shaving off of higher order and critical thinking and a lowering of cognitive demand and intellectual depth’ (p. 123).

The lack of intellectual demand (particularly in schools serving disadvantaged communities and particularly in secondary schools) had serious social justice implications. Indeed, this absence of intellectual demand works in the way in which Bourdieu suggests schools reproduce inequality, that is, by demanding of all that which they do not give, those with the requisite cultural capital are advantaged in schooling. Such a lack probably reflects the substantial amount of curriculum content teachers felt they had to cover in a finite period of time; thus coverage became more important than the pursuit of higher-order thinking, citizenship goals and so on. This pedagogy for success requires a complementary pedagogy at home, thus reproducing class-based inequalities around familial cultural capital.

The lack – indeed absence – of engagement with difference perhaps reflected teacher doubt about what the appropriate responses were and a serious lack of effective professional development on such matters. In our view, this did not reflect so much a failure to recognize that something had to be done, but rather not knowing what to do in an increasingly xenophobic political environment. From its election in 1996 through until its defeat in 2007, the Howard government in Australia shifted ‘the public gaze and preoccupation to global events such as the War on Terror, the potential avian flu epidemic and, at the micro level, encourages its population to be wary of strangers, to be conscious of the vulnerability of Australia and Australian shores to illegal immigrants’ (Crowley and Matthews, 2006: 6), provoking a fear of difference, rather than robust multiculturalism and robust reconciliation with Indigenous Australians. We also found (apart from the Aboriginal community school) an inverse relationship between the extent of engagement and valuing of difference in pedagogical practices and the ethnic diversity of the school’s population, a counter-intuitive finding.

Conclusion

This development towards a sociology of pedagogies has suggested that there have been two traditions within the sociology of education in respect of pedagogies. The first was that of critical and feminist pedagogy, largely political approaches, which has also continued to develop in parallel to the diversification of social theory across a range of social differences. Gaby Weiner (2007), in a review of feminist pedagogies, suggested that they remain an aspiration rather than a set of actual practices. The second is that associated with the work of Bernstein and Bourdieu, located within considerations of social and cultural reproduction.

I have also suggested that contemporary education policy developments have again brought sociological considerations of pedagogy to the fore. These policy developments around accountability and high stakes testing have ushered in enhanced sociological interest in pedagogies and what has been called new pedagogy studies. At the same time, some research, particularly that of Alexander, has contributed to a revitalization of the sociological study of pedagogies.

The Queensland productive pedagogies research was dealt with because it sought to cut across the critical pedagogy tradition, including feminist pedagogy, and more empiricist accounts such as that of Newmann and Associates (1996). Jennifer Gore (1993), in *The struggle for pedagogies*, established another binary in her account of critical and feminist pedagogies: between the social vision of these approaches and the more explicit instructional focus of empiricist accounts. Rejecting this opposition, she argued that 'instruction and vision are analytical components of pedagogy, insofar as the concept implies both, each requires attention' (1993: 5). Productive pedagogies,³ politically aware and empirically based – working with both vision and instructional concerns – would appear to offer potential for future pedagogical research from a sociological perspective.

Notes

- 1 Although pedagogy is both singular and plural, I have used pedagogies in this chapter to pick up on multiple approaches to pedagogy both in its narrower construction in relation to schooling and broader conceptions in contemporary social theory.
- 2 The concept of 'authentic' was rejected in the QSRLS because of its modernist overtones. Pedagogy was pluralized to indicate that many pedagogical styles could be aligned with productive pedagogies, while acknowledging that pedagogy, like sheep, is pedantically both singular and plural. Productive resonated with the idea of teachers actually producing something in a positive sense.
- 3 There has been critique of the productive pedagogies model and research design (see Ladwig, 2007; Mills *et al.*, 2008).

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Families, values, and class relations

The politics of alternative certification

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Social organizations play a powerful role in the reproduction of social inequality. According to critical sociologists Perrucci and Wysong (2003), the perpetuation of class inequalities is linked closely to scripts of organizations controlled by the privileged (pp. 32–33). While often espousing democratic ideals, these organizations advantage children, friends, and associates of privileged classes who have the orientations, credentials, and social ties to "fit" such organizations. Although he includes micro-level analyses, theories of deep-rooted inequality scripts are consistent with Ball's (2003) critical, post-structural analysis of policy and class power relations.

Reassured of their own strengths, the privileged class focuses on subordinated class deficits (Ryan, 1971). Privileged people do not acknowledge or recognize how their control of institutions structures the advantages that lead to the superior outcomes of their class (Brantlinger, 2003). They claim that playing fields are level, or can be made level, and opportunity is available to those who put forth an effort. Privileged people are confident that their advancement and the school circumstances that facilitate it result from their own efforts and merits. Higher status and achievement are attributed to family values rather than family privilege. Because superiority myths are reified through the supposed objectivity of science, subordinate classes are persuaded about the others' superiority, or they are silenced; hence, inequality is perpetuated.

Critical sociologists and scholars of color have turned explanations about distinctive school outcomes from the personal and cultural deficits of the poor to structural bias. A number of ethnographies refute claims to lower-income people's intellectual inferiority, lack of effort, and not valuing education (e.g. Brantlinger, 2003; Carter, 2005). Other studies illustrate the absence of opportunity in low-income US schools on a national level (Kozol, 2005). Theories about the reproduction of social status through class-distinctive K–12 institutional arrangements are well known (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). However, this phenomenon is rarely addressed in teacher development programs and broader education policy.

Privileged class organizations define social problems narrowly and offer narrow solutions to these problems. Because they are far more palatable than direct solutions (e.g. the redistribution of wealth), elites have long promoted educational solutions to poverty and other social ills (Tyack, 1974). President Johnson's War on Poverty featured massive federal expenditures on

such educational programs as Title 1 and Head Start, yet economic inequality is greater today than it was in the 1960s (Perrucci and Wysong, 2003). Rather than reducing disparities, governmental and philanthropic interventions mostly maintain and intensify them (McDermott, 2007).

In this chapter, we explore how class dominance permeates new organizations and innovations in teacher recruitment and training. Alternative certification (AC) is at the heart of current education reforms designed to uplift the poor. Young AC teachers from privileged families are seen as “change agents” who will reform troubled schools and ameliorate social inequality. Yet, while there is little evidence that AC has benefited the poor, there is clear evidence that it benefits the wealthy. In this chapter, we focus on non-profit AC organizations that have garnered lucrative relationships with urban districts. While using democratic rhetoric in describing their mission, organizational leaders provide elites like themselves unobstructed access to jobs in urban education.

Our assertions are based on research on the New York City Teaching Fellows (NYCTF) conducted by MetroMath at the City University of New York. This research includes hundreds of surveys, classroom observations, and several dozen interviews. We also include an analysis of print media and Internet information on NYCTF, The New Teachers Project (TNTP), and Teach for America (TFA). The impact of privileged class dominance on these organizations, their teacher recruitment policies, and the effectiveness of graduates are addressed in this chapter.

Organizations created to improve the quality of the teaching force

In spring of 2000, Harold Levy became NYC schools chancellor. A former corporate lawyer, Levy was the first non-educator to hold this position (Goodnough, 2004). As with most urban areas, poor neighborhoods in New York City (NYC) were, and still are, plagued by various educational woes, including the persistent scarcity of a stable, qualified teaching force (Boyd *et al.*, 2005). State pressure compelled Levy to replace uncertified teachers with certified ones in the city’s “lowest performing” schools. Though it would not become law until 2001, No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation heightened concerns about teacher quality in NYC and other urban areas (No Child Left Behind, 2001).

Shortly after Levy began, state education commissioner Mills threatened to sue NYC leadership for their reliance on uncertified teachers. In response, Levy petitioned the state to approve an alternative route to teaching:

Levy told Vicki Bernstein [at the NYC Board] to do whatever it took to get a career-changer program up and running by September [of 2000] . . . Levy was confident that he could persuade Mills to recognize his recruits as certified if he could prove they were well-educated and committed.

(Goodnough, 2004: 34)

Mills and the state complied, creating a “transitional” license that allowed “career changers” and recent college graduates to be paid as teachers of record after they completed a short preservice program.

Working with Bernstein and TNTP, Levy fashioned the NYCTF program in his own image. NYCTF attracted privileged class outsiders to a school system that Levy and others believed was badly mismanaged by educationist insiders. While verbalizing interest in minorities,

NYCTF primarily sought upper-class candidates with elite credentials. In a *New York Times* opinion piece titled “Why the Best Don’t Teach,” Levy (2000) complained,

a quarter of those teaching in [NYC] public schools earned their bachelor’s degrees from institutions that “Barron’s Rankings of Colleges and Universities” describes as “less competitive or noncompetitive” . . . Our children need teachers with outstanding abilities and rigorous academic training.

Social class was a subtext of Levy’s push for AC teachers. Levy assumed schools would be better run by elites and corporate-types. Levy saw Fellows as “change agents” who would reform a troubled school system from the bottom-up (Goodnough, 2004: 197).

NYCTF was good public relations. New AC policy allowed the Fellows to be counted as “certified” after they completed only 200 hours of preservice training. While they were less prepared to teach than many of the uncertified teachers they replaced, the Fellows were also considered “highly qualified” under NCLB guidelines. NYCTF was selective, with some 2300 applicants applying for 320 positions in the first year. Large percentages of Fellows graduated from top-tier universities, had professional experience, and passed state certification exams. Further, the term “Fellow” sounded exclusive and attracted elites who would not consider teaching without special recognition and other privileges (Goodnough, 2004).

Despite a lack of evidence, NYCTF was readily heralded as a success and it expanded tenfold in the next two years. TNTP began to partner with districts and states around the country to replicate the Fellows program. Founded in 1997 by former TFA “core members,” TNTP was created to “eliminate school inequality” (TNTP website, 2008). TNTP reports the following on their website:

[TNTP] is a national nonprofit dedicated to closing the achievement gap by ensuring that high-need students get outstanding teachers . . . Since its inception, TNTP has trained or hired approximately 33,000 teachers, benefiting an estimated 4.8 million students nationwide. It has established more than 70 programs and initiatives in 28 states and published three seminal studies on urban teacher hiring and school staffing.

TNTP assumes that AC recruits have superior educational backgrounds and, hence, need little, if any, preparation to teach. This is an assumption shared by many AC advocates. For example, Raymond, Fletcher and Luque (2001) assert that TFA teachers are a “select group of college graduates, culled from the finest universities [and that it’s] possible that traditional certification programs and pedagogical training are less necessary for them than they are for the typical teacher” (p. 68). Contradicting such arguments, Darling-Hammond (1994) provides strong evidence that TFA training leaves its privileged class recruits woefully unprepared for their first year of urban teaching.

Both TFA and TNTP cloak class-biased recruitment and training strategies in language of scientific neutrality and objectivity. The TNTP website advertizes:

[TNTP helps] select outstanding teachers by using: A proven set of selection criteria based on achievement, character, leadership and other fundamental qualities and personality traits. Trained selectors use a continually refined, research-based selection model. A highly professional, rigorous and competitive application process maximizes our ability to assess candidates’ qualifications and inspires candidates to teach. Carefully-structured and

normed rating tools promote consistent assessment of candidates. Rigorous training and quality control ensure that the selection process is implemented effectively and fairly.

As Perrucci and Wysong (2003) note, such supposedly “rigorous, neutral, scientific methods to determine merit” present a facade that disguises privilege (p. 76). TFA uses a similar “objective” formula for selecting their AC teachers (Foote, 2008). Pretensions to science and technical expertise allow elites and “experts” to quash democratic impulses and monopolize control of educational decision-making (Tyack, 1974).

TNTP, TFA, other non-profit educational organizations (e.g. New Leaders for New Schools), and think tanks (e.g. the Education Trust) are closely linked. They serve on one another’s executive boards and share a similar philosophy of reform that narrowly focuses on “reducing the achievement gap.” Leaders of these organizations attended Ivy League universities and generally came from privilege. As such, they have close ties to powerful people (e.g. wealthy philanthropists, politicians, lawyers) who lend financial and political support. TNTP and TFA board members also transition easily into leadership positions in other educational and governmental organizations. The best-known example is Michelle Rhee, the first president of TNTP, who became DC Schools Chancellor in 2007, in spite of the fact that she only taught for two years.

Lesser-known TFA members have garnered prestigious jobs, often in education, after similar short stints as teachers. Because they have greater cultural, social, and financial capital, Fellows and TFA teachers are able to profit off of short experiences as teachers in ways that others cannot. Fellows are paid a stipend to attend preservice training, receive a publically subsidized Masters degree, and become paid teachers of record after fulfilling minimal preservice requirements. Foote (2008) describes how TFA partners new recruits with wealthy donors who serve as future connections for employment.

The privileged class increasingly identifies with private rather than public interests (Reich, 2007). While not private, TFA and TNTP are non-profit organizations that conform to neo-liberal trends in education (Apple, 2006). Funded with both philanthropic and public monies, leadership teams make corporate-level salaries (\$120,000–250,000) and earn additional income through outside consulting. However, rather than being seen as welfare programs for the privileged, TFA and TNTP are advertised and generally perceived as benevolent ventures that serve the needs of underprivileged students.

Facts about NYCTF

Despite being the biggest AC program in the country, research on NYCTF is scarce. However, the extant research is troubling. Stein (2002) finds close to 90 percent of the first-year Fellows she surveyed were already considering leaving their initial placements in high-needs schools. She concludes that NYCTF “is an unqualified success at producing certified teachers; however, it is unlikely that it will reduce the problem of teacher turnover and lack of certified teachers at [failing] schools” (p. 1). Others observe that Fellows are thrust into the classroom with minimal formal training and struggle to teach effectively (Costigan, 2004; Goodnough, 2004; Meagher and Brantlinger, under review). While many have the potential to become effective and committed teachers, novice Fellows focus on daily survival and often teach in a control-centered fashion.

In an analysis of pupil achievement data from NYC, Boyd *et al.* (2006) find that Grades 4–8 students of Fellows have lower achievement gains on mathematics tests than do comparable students of traditionally certified teachers. They also find that less experienced teachers—and Fellows are disproportionately inexperienced—are far less effective than mathematics teachers with three or more years’ experience. Further, NYCTF teachers have considerably lower rates of retention than college-recommended or temporary-license teachers at similar NYC schools. Attrition of Fellows is particularly acute in the highest-poverty schools. Boyd *et al.* (2005) find that, in NYC, “highly qualified teachers are more likely to quit or transfer than less-qualified teachers, especially if they teach in low-achieving schools” (p. 167). It should be noted that these researchers equated “highly qualified” with a score in the upper quartile of those who took state certification exams (i.e. many Fellows). In sum, NYCTF has not been shown to improve the academic and life chances of lower SES urban students. This is important given the links between teacher quality and student achievement (Sanders and Rivers, 1996).

Preliminary MetroMath research results

In the summer of 2007, MetroMath surveyed 269 of approximately 300 mathematics Fellows in the newest “cohort.” Closed items asked respondents to report both demographic and school background information. Open-response items asked about their perceptions of urban teaching, relationships to students in high-needs urban schools, and reasons for becoming an AC mathematics teacher.

The demographic data reveal little experiential or contextual commonalities between Fellows and students in the high-needs schools in which they teach. Only about 20 percent of survey respondents reported attending such schools themselves. Five in six report attending a selective school (both private or public) or being placed in a selective program within a non-selective school. Less than 15 percent of survey respondents reported growing up lower income or working class. Approximately one third of the math Fellows were black or Latino. However, the racial composition of the mathematics Fellows does not come close to reflecting the ethnic composition of children in high-needs NYC schools.

Fellows’ lack of connection to high-needs urban districts is problematic. Qualified teachers should be able to relate constructively to pupils and their guardians (O’Connor and McCartney, 2007). Yet, the MetroMath survey indicates that many preservice mathematics Fellows appear unable to do so. One open-ended survey item asked respondents to report similarities and differences between students in high-needs urban schools and the students they went to school with. Respondents named more than twice as many differences than similarities (Table 16.1). The three most common themes were the following: (1) outside distractions and difficult home lives that interfere with students’ academic success; (2) students’ academic skills, engagement, and behavior; and (3) school resources (e.g. financial and human capital) and educational access.

The approximately fifty-five hours of fieldwork the mathematics Fellows completed in their summer prior to teaching appeared to solidify the dominant view that youth in high-needs schools have more outside distractions, less supportive families, and were less academically able and engaged than students with whom the Fellows had attended school themselves. Many survey respondents, though certainly not all, openly articulated deficit views blaming urban communities, guardians, and youths for lesser educational outcomes, while generally failing to name school context distinctions. One Fellow elaborated: “I went to school with kids who knew they were there to study and who seemed self-motivated to do their best. In high needs

Table 16.1 Fellows as students and students in high-needs urban schools

	<i>Outside distractions or difficult home life</i>	<i>Academic skills or engagement</i>	<i>School resources or access</i>
Similar	16	35	4
Different	101	95	82

schools, even if the kids are able to do better, the culture doesn't seem to motivate excellence." Another wrote that at his childhood schools: "Parents were more involved and paid tuition! Students wore uniforms. There was more discipline!" Criticism of urban families included: "dysfunctional," "lack of attention from guardians/parents," "education not a high priority," and "clash between home and school expectations." Despite limited contact with urban communities, many Fellows wrote that students had no one: "pushing them," "stressing the importance of education," or "involved in their lives." In contrast, when in secondary school they experienced: "white peers with structured lives," "fear of disappointing parents," and "more self-motivation." Academic differences were generally attributed to students' drive, (mathematics) ability, intelligence, engagement, interest, values, tastes, attention span, emotional stability, and respect for others and school.

Discussions of socioeconomic inequality, systemic institutional failure, racism, and class bias generally were muted or absent in these responses. However, as Table 16.1 also indicates, slightly more than one third of respondents brought up issues of equity and access when comparing high-needs urban schools with schools of their own youth. One said: "I went to school with no diversity. My classrooms were equipped with everything above and beyond what was needed." Another remarked: "We had more technology, more sports, more programs to keep us interested in education." Another concluded: "I went to a very good school in Brooklyn, but those in the high needs schools are usually given the short end of the stick. They are not given the tools they need to succeed in this society." Yet, even those who identified gaps between resources in high-needs urban schools and the schools of their own formative years (i.e. contextual lacks) as reasons for distinctive student outcomes generally did not espouse theories of generalized structural inequalities.

Some of the above results are attributable to a survey methodology that limits opportunities for extended responses. However, interviews with twenty-seven mathematics Fellows conducted by MetroMath provide further evidence that mathematics Fellows generally hold meritocratic views of educational achievement. Though privilege was a subtext, interviewees give versions of hard work, motivation, and intelligence as reasons for superior school outcomes. Many verbalize that their goal in entering NYCTF is to impart the ethic of "hard work pays off" to low-income minority students—a principal goal of TFA and TNTP.

MetroMath data indicate that their meritocratic idealism is generally shaken once they began as teachers of record. In particular, surveys with 167 and interviews with 18 mathematics Fellows with one or two years of teaching experience show that experience makes mathematics Fellows fatalistic about their inability to change school conditions or students' fates. Many of these Fellows planned to move to a "better" school as soon as they could. Of the fraction who wished to remain in teaching, the majority planned to apply to suburban, private, or selective public schools within the next five years. Other Fellows aspired to higher-paying and more prestigious leadership positions within their schools, districts, universities, or governmental or non-profit organizations.

Large numbers of younger mathematics Fellows—and over two thirds are between the ages of 21 and 27 when they begin—see urban teaching as temporary. When asked why they became a Fellow, twelve such Fellows candidly admitted to a lack of decent wage alternatives and a need for employment. Others confessed they knew from the beginning that their commitment would be short term: one "needed a break before graduate school," eight "wanted to live in NYC." A few reported that the experience would look good on their résumé.

Downward mobility and an intensification of opportunity hoarding

Teaching has rarely been considered high status or lucrative enough to attract privileged classes. Individuals who are first in their family to attend college understand teaching as a secure, respectable, and fairly well-paid career (Brantlinger, 2003). With the exception of middle-class women, who see teaching as a reasonable way to accommodate child rearing and supplement a husband's salary, public school teaching has been eschewed as below the capability of children from professional families. Societal instability, however, has caused a downward trajectory for the middle class (Reich, 2007). Objective measures and subjective impressions indicate that young workers today find it difficult to match the living standards achieved by previous generations (Lasch, 1995; Perrucci and Wysong, 2003). The number and type of applicants to NYCTF suggest that unemployment and underemployment among the educated class has led to aspiration reduction.

We contend that the privilege-class response to occupation scarcity is to create new post-baccalaureate opportunities, such as NYCTF and TFA, for their children (Devine, 2004). Even Fellows with no intention of staying in the teaching profession still earn an income on the short run, a publicly subsidized Masters degree, and experience that enhances their résumé. This teaching experience, however brief, enables them to compete for higher-status and lucrative jobs in a credentialed society. Of course, there has also been an even greater decline in reasonable employment opportunities for subordinated groups—even college graduates from less privileged backgrounds (Smiley, 2008). Yet, the types of non-profit organization discussed here do not represent them or their interests. African Americans, Latinos, and the working class do not control the messages or organizations that respond to such downward trends—that is the domain of the privileged. Despite the dominant class's protest against affirmative action, obviously such programs as NYCTF selectively privilege the dominant class.

Who designs alternative routes? And why?

Traditional teacher education programs face a barrage of criticism for insufficiently preparing teachers and allowing the wrong people into the field. Ruminations that teacher education is unnecessary because good teachers are born, raised by good (affluent) parents, or educated at elite universities periodically surface. In response to the perceived lacks in undergraduate programs, the Holmes Group tried to establish teacher education as a post-baccalaureate degree. This approach was rejected by some university officials, who argued that, given the expense of higher education, adding a fifth year would eliminate potential candidates, particularly minorities, children of the working class, and first-generation college attenders.

The current neo-liberal approach has been to bypass teacher education and concentrate on recruiting teachers from tier one colleges. Proponents have convincingly argued that tuition

waivers and stipends are needed to attract these qualified individuals and high-quality minority candidates. Candidates in mathematics, science, and special education are of particular interest. Urban schools are targeted because of their persistent teacher shortages. Because they are funded by property taxes, schools in low-income districts lack equivalent human and physical resources (Kozol, 2005). Hence, teacher shortage in urban areas is largely due to class discrimination. Attrition is not only the result of resource gaps, but repressive demands at "failing schools." Teachers at these schools are often subjected to draconian scrutiny from administrators and are required to enact scripted curriculum aimed at high-stakes tests (Goodnough, 2004). Diminished conditions lead to a dearth of applications from qualified candidates and high faculty turnover (Boyd *et al.*, 2005). The continuation of deep school inequalities leads the authors to be skeptical that, without redressing the ubiquitous and pernicious economic and social inequities, recruiting teachers from any teacher education program will solve the problem of lack of qualified teachers in impoverished urban schools.

The impact of the new teacher education programs

While privileged-class members do work hard, they are not self-made. Unlike less-privileged classes, they have the capital and clout to facilitate aspirations for status maintenance and upward mobility. Instead of recognizing how organizations are biased toward them, they see schools and society as fair and just. As the epitome of super-class advantage, the policies and practices of NYCTF and TFA that privilege the elite must be changed to allow access by residents of poor urban neighborhoods and the types of candidate who traditionally have made a longtime career of effective teaching in high-needs urban schools. Our evidence and a review of the literature reveal that the better-known and most selective alternative programs we studied result in the following:

Social class displacement

Teaching Fellows take the place of uncertified or temporary licensed teachers who have staffed high-needs schools since the early 1980s or before. Some of these teachers had backgrounds in the fields that they taught. Many had more teaching experience and educational training than first-year Fellows. Most had strong ties to the schools and communities where they worked. As noted earlier, novice uncertified teachers appear to be about as effective in mathematics as Fellows (Boyd *et al.*, 2006).

Middle-class welfare

NYCTF spends approximately \$25,000 per Fellow for training for a Master's degree (Goodnough, 2004). Given that there are 2500–3500 new Fellows annually, this translates into tens of millions of taxpayer dollars going to Master's coursework and other professional support for new Fellows. Less-privileged candidates who hold temporary licenses must pay for their own training and Master's degree. Prior to 2004, new teachers in NYC did not receive mentoring unless they came through an AC route. Although most are needier than NYCTF recruits, once again the career building of middle-class people has become a priority. Granted this phenomenon resulted from social and economic conditions in which privileged students have been unable to find acceptable jobs in the areas of their earned degrees. It is no surprise

that NYCTF applications would increase substantially in lean times. Levy has called NYCTF "an opportunity for people to make good on their altruistic desires," without identifying the "people" to whom he referred. Lower SES people are likely to see teaching as a long-term career, an attitude that is healthier than the missionary-savior complex that our evidence shows will soon be thwarted.

Absence of high qualifications

Our data suggest that the claim that the mathematics Fellows are more "highly qualified" and especially "talented" does not hold true. Contradicting NYCTF rhetoric about recruiting the "best and the brightest," well over three quarters of mathematics Fellows do not have adequate backgrounds in mathematics (Donoghue *et al.*, 2008). If rapport with, and respect for, students are judged, then Fellows also fall short.

Negative side effects and lack of improvement

The NYCTF program claims to "tap professional class idealism" (Keller, 2000: 1). Levy saw NYCTF recruits as a vanguard that would work against the status quo culture in schooling. Our research and that of others (e.g. Boyd *et al.*, 2005; Costigan, 2004) document that Fellow optimism and idealism are short lived, that teachers rarely identify with their urban students, rarely understand the actual constraints on their lives, and do not remain in high-needs schools.

Alternative certification as a business solution to complex social problems

Writing from a liberal perspective, Robert Reich (2007) sees members of the privileged class as increasingly identifying with private rather than public interests and producing "secessionist ideas and consequences" (cited in Perrucci and Wysong, 2003: 65). Workers involved in production have declined from 33.1 percent in 1970 to a projected 11.6 percent in 2008 (Perrucci and Wysong, 2003). This decline is accompanied by a corresponding rise in moderate- to low-paid service-sector jobs at firms with a small number of highly paid "core" workers, such as "managers and symbolic analysts," and a large group of moderate- to low-paid "peripheral" workers who are viewed as less central to organizational needs and goals.

Temporary agencies and contract or contingent laborers

Viewed increasingly as peripheral and contingent, "temp workers" fill in as teachers (Perrucci and Wysong, 2003 p. 73). These interlocked organizational networks are directed by privileged, credentialed-class leaders who use them to pursue strategies and objectives that reinforce the shared economic, political, and cultural interests of their class. The super-class shares values, worldviews, and a commitment to maintaining the status quo. From where privileged-class leaders stand, life is good, and the corporate market model of the magic of the market works (p. 76).

Despite consolidating considerable amounts of philanthropic and government funds, TFA, TNTF, and NYCTF have done little, if anything, to eliminate educational inequality, even in schools they directly serve (Boyd *et al.*, 2006; Darling-Hammond, 1994). The rhetoric is about serving the poor, yet it is the privileged class that benefits most directly from these new teacher education organizations and the policies and practices that enable them. It is appropriate to

conclude that the values of the super-class are aimed at preserving class advantage, and, hence, are self-centered, self-serving, and exclusive as they prevent subordinates' access to a level playing field and social mobility.

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Popular culture and the sociology of education

Greg Dimitriadis

Understanding the connections between school life and broader social structures today necessitates understanding the worldwide prevalence of popular culture and media forms and their increasingly pronounced role in the lives of youth.¹ Contemporary cultural shifts and dislocations raise new kinds of questions for education, including how the everyday cultural practices of youth intersect with the imperatives of school life today. As is well known by now, the technocratic imperatives of No Child Left Behind and other high stakes testing mechanisms have narrowed the curricula today in ways that have squeezed out much beyond the basic “skill and drill” types of pedagogy. The disjuncture between in-school and out-of-school culture has become increasingly pronounced—prompting many to take on questions of popular culture in new ways. Yet, it is important to note that these dislocations and disjunctures between everyday cultural practices and school life have been a longstanding concern for many in sociology and related disciplines—racing back over seventy-five years. While our moment is specific in many ways, then, several generations of scholars have taken on these questions. In particular, many have acknowledged the ways young people gravitate towards popular culture in the absence of compelling or legitimate school knowledges and structures. In this chapter, I will trace three traditions and bodies of work—the Chicago School of Sociology, the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, and the new sociology of education. Each of these traditions evolved in distinct though overlapping ways. Taken together, they offer a productive set of resources for understanding the intersections between popular culture and the sociology of education.

Chicago School of Sociology

In many respects, the first efforts to understand popular culture were undertaken by scholars of the Chicago School of Sociology. The Chicago School of Sociology rose to prominence in the early part of the twentieth century. Like many cities, Chicago at the turn of the last century was marked by unprecedented expansion. Urban life meant new divisions of labor, as well as new modes of association, new kinds of human connection around a wide range of

tastes, dispositions, and lifestyles. Under the direction of Robert Park, early sociologists at the University of Chicago looked to understand many of the new forms of association first-generation immigrant youth created. This work was an early manifestation of what came to be known as “subculture” theory. Perhaps most notably, Thrasher’s *The gang: a study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago* (1927) looked to understand how young people formed “gangs” in the “in-between” or “interstitial” spaces newly emerging in Chicago. Other notable books are Nel Anderson’s *The hobo: the sociology of the homeless man*; Paul Cressey’s *The taxi-dance hall: a sociological study in commercialized recreation and city life*; Louis Wirth’s *The ghetto*; and Harvey Zorbaugh’s *Gold Coast and slum: a sociological study of the near north side*.

Thrasher famously studied many aspects of youths’ lives, including their reading and viewing habits—what we would call today “popular culture.” Movies, in particular, were a new and unexplored medium around this time and were the source of keen attention by Thrasher and others. Here, Thrasher notes that film is “a cheap and easy escape from reality” and that gang boys consumed films voraciously (p. 102). Thrasher acknowledged the fact that boys picked up certain “patterns” of behavior from these films, often providing fodder for their fantasy lives. Yet, he does not claim that these films “influenced” these boys in simple, direct ways. Thrasher resists the “hypodermic needle” theory of media influence so prevalent at the time. According to this hypothesis, there is a one-to-one correlation between media representation and individual actions. Around this time, moral panics around the effects of film, books, and comics proliferated, causing many to postulate a simple relationship between these media and juvenile delinquency. While Thrasher argued that films do, in fact, have effects in young people’s lives, he resists this one-to-one correlation. Towards the end of the chapter, Thrasher argues against the idea of censorship, as he would do elsewhere. He argues here that “new” media such as the movies always have the potential to “disturb social routine and break up the old habits upon which the superstructure of social organization rests” (p. 114). Yet, abolishing film would be akin to banning automobiles. While boys in gangs are perhaps more “susceptible” to media influence, these forces can only be understood against a social backdrop. Thrasher would become the first professor to hold a position in the sociology of education in the US, at NYU.

While at NYU, Thrasher was commissioned to conduct a larger study of the Boys’ Club in New York City. The goal was to situate this club and its effects in radical community context. Thrasher built an important piece of this study around the question of movies and their effects. It was funded, in part, by the Payne Fund, an initiative taken up and funded by William Short, as detailed in the book *Children and the movies* (Jowett *et al.*, 1996). Thrasher would soon bring fellow sociologist Paul Cressey (author of *Taxi-dance hall: a sociological study in commercialized recreation and city life*) to help with this study. Their resulting manuscript, “Movies, delinquency, and crime,” has never materialized. However, some portions of Cressey’s text have turned up. Arguing against dominant logic of the time, he sums up much: “Social causation [of movie effects] is entirely too complex a problem to be explained by any . . . simplistic interpretation of incomplete data” (Jowett *et al.*, 1996: 126). He also acknowledged, importantly, the pedagogical value of popular culture—including the ways it eclipsed traditional such institutions. Popular culture “should not be linked to boys’ delinquency, but must instead be viewed as a powerful source of ‘informal education’ that served boys in a far more direct and practical way than did schools or the Boys’ Club” (p. 350).

Importantly, this work was girded by normative, functionalist underpinnings—ones perhaps best described as “Durkheimian.” That is, scholars were interested in the ways groups came to the US and undertook the process of assimilation. While Thrasher painted rich, sympathetic portraits of young “gang boys,” he ultimately saw such gangs as a functional reaction to living

in so-called “in-between” city spaces—what he called interstitial spaces. The goal was to figure out ways to more efficiently integrate these young men into what he perceived as a dominant American culture. This would be a theme picked up by others in the Chicago School, including William Whyte in his classic *Street corner society*. Although these theoretical underpinnings would come to be challenged in some fundamental ways, the Chicago School of Sociology prefigured how popular culture would be taken up by sociologists in years to come. In particular, we see an effort to understand the cultural dimensions of young people’s lives in times of social and technological upheaval. We see a stress on the educative function of popular culture—the ways popular culture steps into the void of traditional school life for many. We see, finally, an effort to look at popular culture in the context of young people’s lives. Perhaps most importantly, we see the impulse to apply the insights of sociology—an emerging, empirical discipline—to the lives of youth. Popular culture was one part of situating these lives in broader social and economic context.

Cultural studies

Emerging from the UK in the 1960s and 1970s, work in cultural studies took up such questions around youth culture, though in specific and somewhat distinct ways. Drawing more explicitly on the work of Gramsci, cultural studies saw culture and ideology as a site of struggle, with young people both actively resisting and reproducing the class positions in which they found themselves. Scholars such as EP Thompson, Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, all opened up important questions about the role of “culture” in the lives of young people—work extended by Paul Willis, Dick Hebdige, Angela McRobbie, and others. This work drew upon an explicitly critical and theoretical tradition to help explain the role of popular culture in reproducing and resisting dominant ideology and hegemony, especially around class. If work in the Chicago School was concerned with questions of assimilation in a plural society, work in cultural studies would come to offer a more fundamental critique of capitalism.

Stuart Hall’s *The popular arts* (1964) (co-authored with Paddy Whannel) is an early and important text out of this Birmingham School of Cultural Studies. Importantly, this book was rooted in Hall’s experience as a teacher attempting to understand the range of cultural resources and influences young people bring to the classroom. For Hall and Whannel, popular culture is an important site for the young—in many ways, a more important site than traditional school settings. They write, “Their symbols and fantasies have a strong hold upon the emotional commitment of the young at this stage in their development, and operate more powerfully in a situation where young people are tending to learn less from established institutions, such as the family, the school, the church and the immediate adult community, and more from one another” (Hall and Whannel, 1964: 276). We see, of course, echoes of Cressey and other Chicago School sociologists here. However, like much of the work that would follow, this book was concerned with popular culture as “text,” and brought a traditional literary lens to the subject. Much of this text was concerned with understanding a question that would haunt scholars for generations to come—how to understand “popular culture” and its continuities and discontinuities with so-called folk culture and emerging mass culture. This would be taken up by others, including, most notably, Raymond Williams. In a series of influential texts, Williams talked about the complex distinctions at work in the term—from everyday folk culture to mass mediated culture. All laid claim to the term “popular culture.” While Thrasher was not concerned with drawing conceptual distinctions between the stories and songs young people

told each other and the mediated culture produced in more centralized spaces, such conceptual concerns were central to Williams and others. Williams, Hall and others came to see “popular culture” not as a transcendent category—it could not be—but as a “terrain of struggle” over which young people contested. If work in the Chicago School was influenced by Durkheim, work in cultural studies was influenced by Marx and Gramsci—in particular, the latter’s notion of popular culture as a terrain of struggle. In sum, work in the Chicago School was concerned with how young people carved identities out of the instabilities of immigrant identities, while work out of the Birmingham School was concerned with the ways young people lived out the instabilities of class across generations.

Resistance through rituals: youth subcultures in post-war Britain, edited by Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (1976), was in many ways a watershed book of the movement and moment. Drawing together many of the figures who would be central to these debates in following years (Hall, Hebdige, McRobbie, and Willis, among them), the editors and authors focused on youth subcultures—groups, as Clarke *et al.* write, “which have reasonably tight boundaries, distinctive shapes, [and] have cohered around particular activities, focal concerns and territorial spaces” (Hall and Jefferson, 1976: 13). These include those of the mods, skinheads, Rastafarians, punks, and teddy boys. As the authors demonstrate, such subcultures are a way for youth to carve out symbolic space between the “parent” or working-class culture and the dominant culture. “For our purposes,” they write, “sub-cultures represent a necessary, ‘relatively autonomous’, but inter-mediary level of analysis” (Hall and Jefferson, 1976: 14). Through these symbolic, subculture forms, youth try to solve (or “magically resolve”) the problems of their class position. They are a way for youth both to resist against the dominant order—and also to be incorporated into it.

Subculture: the meaning of style (Hebdige, 1979) was another key text here. In particular, *Subculture* took the everyday cultural lives of young people seriously, looking at everyday “style” as a site of resistance to dominant culture and its logics. Hebdige’s study was closely focused on the “semiotics” of youth culture. That is, he was interested in how young people took the symbols and signs available in everyday life and used them in new and different ways to carve out their own, distinctive subcultural identities. Hebdige gave us a language of “appropriation” and “re-appropriation.” In this study, Hebdige focused on the range of “spectacular” subcultures that emerged in London after World War II—skinheads, punks, mods, teddy boys, Rastafarians, and others. For Hebdige, as with others noted above, these cultural forms were a response to instability around how “class” was lived in England in a post-war context. In the absence of firm foundations, young people developed a set of subcultures to help “resolve” the contradictions around class. He writes

The persistence of class as a meaningful category within youth culture was not . . . generally acknowledged until fairly recently and, as we shall see, the seemingly spontaneous eruption of spectacular youth styles has encouraged some writers to talk of youth as the new class.

(Hebdige, 1979: 75)

This raises the question of style as bricolage and style as homology—two central concerns of Hebdige. For Hebdige, youth subcultures are key sites where different cultural signs and symbols can be “mixed and matched” in new and creative ways. This is bricolage. Drawing on Levi-Strauss, he argues that young people can draw “implicitly coherent, though explicitly bewildering, systems of connection between things which perfectly equip their users to ‘think’

their own world." He continues, "These magical systems of connection have a common feature: they are capable of infinite extension because basic elements can be used in a variety of improvised combinations to generate new meanings within them" (p. 103). For Hebdige, young people are like artists, drawing together distinct signs and symbols and creating a coherent meaning system among them. Recall the punk use of the safety pin, the spiked haircut, the dramatic collages—all helped form a coherent meaning system.

Work in cultural studies helped open up critical questions about the cultural dimensions of young people's lives—questions that would be taken up around the world in important ways throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Grossberg *et al.*, 1992). Much of this work was concerned with understanding the ways young people's everyday lives were saturated with social and political meanings, often expressed as "style." This work was useful in opening a new conversation about how politics works in the lives of youth. In particular, this work helped open up a space to think about how popular culture and everyday life were a terrain upon which young people struggled over the politics of meanings—in ways often unrecognized or ignored. Popular culture itself became a pedagogical site—one that both helped reproduce and resist hegemonic norms (Giroux, 1996, 2000).

New sociology of education

Coming out of the UK, beginning in the 1970s, work in the "new sociology of education," looked more specifically at all the ways in which curricula worked to effect social and economic reproduction. This work shares much with the work noted above—in particular, the ways distinctions between "elite" and "everyday" knowledge served to reproduce distinctions that marginalized working-class youth. Much of this work was drawn together in the highly influential volume, *Knowledge and control: new directions for the sociology of education* (1971), edited by M.F.D. Young. This collection included contributions by (among others) Young, Basil Bernstein, and Pierre Bourdieu—all of whom would be critical for the field. All of this work was concerned with similar such questions as those in cultural studies—most specifically, the ways in which different knowledges are stratified. Such scholars were concerned with the ways in which working-class youth's culture was marginalized in school—pushing them out in unfair ways (Bernstein, 1973, 1977). In many respects, this work can be seen as one of the earliest iterations of the "popular culture and education" question, which would come to mark the field in years to come.

Like many neo-Marxist curriculum scholars, M.F.D. Young was interested in the connections between social stratification and knowledge stratification. In particular, he was interested in the ways schools marginalized working-class youth by producing arbitrary and unfair distinctions between "high" and "low" status knowledge. The former is so-called "pure," not applied, knowledge. Such knowledge operates at the level of broad generalities, not specificities. This distinction helps explain why vocational education is typically marginalized in school settings. Often attractive to working-class youth, this kind of education is often marked as low status. For M.F.D. Young, these distinctions between high- and low-status knowledge help explain why schools do not serve the needs and interests of working-class youth.

In arguing for this, Young underscores a point that would be critical to the new sociologists of education—that knowledge itself was a social construction. This insight opened up a critical space to think about the curricula as a politically contested construct. Curricular knowledge is not simply "given" but a function of power. This raised a series of questions, including:

Who controls curricular knowledge? And whose interest does it serve? For Young and others, this is not only a question of curricula content. It is a question of how knowledge itself was organized. More specifically, Young was interested in the question of how knowledge becomes specialized, and how this specialized knowledge falls under the purview of the elite. Indeed, the separation of knowledge into discrete disciplines was itself a function of power. All of this worked to create specific kinds of knowledge stratification that helped to maintain broader kinds of social stratification. For Young and others, the pressing question was one of social class.

Another key thinker in the new sociology of education is the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Beginning in the 1970s, including in the volume, *Knowledge and control*, Bourdieu raised a series of questions and issues that would prove central to neo-Marxist curriculum studies. In 1977, he published, with Jean-Claude Passeron, the seminal *Reproduction in education, society, and culture* (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). This volume brought together and crystallized many of his most central insights for the field. Like others in neo-Marxist curriculum studies, Bourdieu was centrally concerned with showing how school curricula served the interests of the elite, even as they appeared neutral and disinterested. More than anyone, Bourdieu opened up important questions about the nature of "elite" cultural activities and the process by which they become legitimated. As Bourdieu argued, so-called "high art" forms enter a certain intellectual field that is controlled by and serves the interests of the elite (Bourdieu, 1984). This intellectual field—and its associated critics, teachers, other artists, etc.—works to confer a particular kind of legitimacy upon these forms. These elite art forms are often quite different from those privileged by the working classes. So, for example, classical music is privileged over and above interior design or cookery. The particular power of these distinctions, of course, is that they do appear as "elite." Their power is made to appear natural and immutable. Schools play a particular role in this process. For Bourdieu (and Passeron), schools reward the cultural dispositions of the elite, translating them into different kinds of success and achievement. In particular, schools translate the "cultural capital" that elites typically grow up with into "economic capital." In turn, schools marginalize working class youth—committing a kind of "symbolic violence" upon them. For Bourdieu, this violence is arbitrary, as are these cultural distinctions. They work only to reproduce the power of elites—here, through school knowledge.

As this work traveled to the US—in particular, with the work of Michael Apple (2006)—these questions began to look beyond class as the only stable reference point. Questions of race and gender moved to the fore, as did other ideological predispositions that helped form school life and curricular knowledge in the US. Perhaps most notably, Apple has focused on how the Right has produced a certain kind of "common sense" that has drawn together various factions—those of Christian evangelicals, the new middle classes, cultural conservatives, and neo-liberals—under a common umbrella. There has been an "accord" between these groups that has produced a certain kind of common sense about the role of education in the world. In particular, a set of business logics have deeply lodged themselves in the popular imagination around education—one of vouchers, high stakes testing, as well as related interventions. All of these have drawn on and mobilized a popular knowledge and common sense in specific ways.

Curriculum scholars today face several new challenges. As M.F.D. Young (2007) argued in a recent retrospective, the field has never developed a viable, alternative curriculum to the one offered in school settings. For Young, the work has remained largely critical, often assuming the primacy of a de facto "common curriculum" of the people. That is, if schools offered a largely "pure" and disconnected curriculum that did not draw on the lives of the working-classes, the solution would be an applied, vocational curriculum that drew on the strengths of these groups.

As Young argued, this was largely a fruitless effort to “flip the binary,” and did not answer more fundamental questions about which knowledge is most worth teaching. This remains a central question for those in popular culture in education—how does one draw distinctions in what is most valuable to teach? How does one decide what is better or worse curricular knowledge? While Young’s concerns resonate (at least partially) in the UK context, Apple and others have worked hard to develop responses to this challenge on a global stage. With nearly 500,000 copies in print, the two editions of *Democratic schools* (Apple and Beane, 1995, 2007) are perhaps the best examples of popular, curricular alternatives developed from within the new sociology of education tradition.

Future directions

The methods and theories discussed above are brought to bear on much work on popular culture and education today. But many of its defining constructs are proving insufficient to address the specificities of our moment—in particular, around the complexities of globalization and new technologies (Huq, 2006). Many of the projects described above rely upon fairly stable notions of the nation-state and the political projects and theories that gird them—whether functionalist or Marxist. Yet, many wrestle with constructs that have remained stable over time.

The question of “sub-cultures” is key. Anita Harris (2008) sums this up nicely in her collection *Next wave cultures: feminism, subcultures, activism*:

Nowadays, subcultures are not perceived simply as singular, fixed categories that youth are affiliated to in order to work out their class identities or to resist dominant culture. Instead, theorists talk about neotribes, youth lifestyles, scenes, new communities and so on as momentary and changeable expressions of identity.

(Harris, 2008: 3)

Subculture theory assumed that groups had seemingly stable boundaries that could be explained both in terms of their resistance to, and incorporation in, an industrial economy. With the rise of post-industrial, neo-liberal economic regimes and the destabilizing cultural effects of globalization, however, much more is “up for grabs” today, as evidenced by this and related work (Dolby and Rizvi, 2008). Indeed, the shifts and dislocations associated with globalization are registering for young people in often disorientating and paradoxical ways. Young people are growing up in a world increasingly marked by new, massive disparities in wealth, the worldwide circulation of (often rigidly fundamentalist) ideologies and belief systems, a dizzying array of signs and symbolic resources dislodged from their traditional moorings, as well as a veritable explosion of new technologies. Youth are now trying to find their “place(s)” in this world, “moving” across this terrain in ways we are only beginning to understand and appreciate. As recent work is making clear, young people are crafting new identities and social networks using a range of globally generated and proliferating resources. Young people are “moving,” both literally and figuratively, crossing national borders with their bodies as well as imaginations, crafting new and unexpected kinds of identity.

Key ethnographic work continues to open up interesting questions about the worldwide circulation of popular texts. These studies highlight the ways in which “urban” cultural texts are circulating around the world, landing in particular ways in particular contexts, in ways that allow youth to articulate their own contemporary circumstances (see Condry, 2006; Dimitriadis,

2001; Dolby 2001; Mitchell, 2001; Tempelton, 2006). I recall here the work of Brett Lashua (2005). For several years, Lashua worked with First Nations youth in the city of Edmonton, Alberta, helping to construct a studio for these youth to record their own rap songs. As Lashua demonstrated, these young people both drew on the dominant tropes and themes in rap music while linking them to specificity of life on “the rez.” Like others, Lashua shows how these young people address their contemporary concerns through contemporary “urban” art forms such as hip hop. Linked closely to notions of place, these texts have traveled the world, allowing young people to carve out their own senses of self in often hostile sets of social circumstances. Lashua’s study throws these issues into sharp relief—highlighting the ways First Nations youth bring their concerns into the urban present through hip hop, challenging often debilitating stereotypes about indigenous youth.

Other studies take on more traditional questions about youth “learning” through popular culture, though in new ways (see, for example, Buckingham, 1996, 1998, 2000; Buckingham and Sefton-Green, 1995; Goodman, 2003; Mahiri, 1998; Morrell, 2004, 2008; Sefton-Green, 1998, 1999). For example, Leif Gustavson’s (2007) important book *Youth learning on their own terms* carefully traces the out-of-school creative practices of three youth in the US around the urban East—Ian, Miguel, and Gil—immersing himself in their complex and multifaceted life-worlds, teasing out how they understand the particulars of their crafts. In looking at these creative practices through three very specific biographies, Gustavson highlights their deep and often ignored cognitive components and dimensions. In each of these cases—Ian’s zine writing and slam poetry, Miguel’s graffiti writing, and Gil’s turntable work—we see creative minds at work, making choices and decisions as they work through the intricacies of their media. We see, as well, the particular, productive intersections between these practices and their specific raced and classed backgrounds—not as determining but as constitutive of their material and aesthetic lives.

This underscores the importance of new modes of distribution and circulation of popular culture. This is a debate taken up, among other places, in “fandom” studies but it is one education would do well to explore (Gray *et al.*, 2007). Indeed, the global proliferation of contemporary media forms has allowed young people around the world to tailor their own leisure practices in very specific and particular ways. If the dominant media model used to be “broadcasting,” today’s world of inexpensive cable and widespread Internet penetration is perhaps one of “narrowcasting.” Young people around the world are carving out new, unpredictable, and in some ways rhizomatic, forms of cultural identification in ways often invisible (and typically inexplicable) to adults. Sometimes these are defined by taste. Sometimes these are defined by race or ethnic identity. Sometimes—often—they are marked by both. Inextricably intertwined with this are new articulations of technology, including the emergence of what Henry Jenkins calls “convergence culture.” Here, Jenkins refers to

the flow of content across multiple media platforms, the cooperation between multiple media industries, the search for new media financing that fall at the interstices between old and new media, and the migratory behavior of media audiences who would go almost anywhere in search of the kind of entertainment experiences they want.

(Jenkins, 2006: 282)

If the media landscape used to be divided fairly clearly between the “producers” and “consumers” of popular culture, young people today occupy a new, middle ground. Using largely inexpensive forms of technology, young people are creating their own self-styled cultural

texts across multiple platforms—as evidenced by the explosion of MySpace, YouTube, Facebook, Blogger, and other such sites. These texts are both proliferating in their own specific communities as well as “speaking back” to corporate culture in ways that can have constitutive effects on the material production of culture.

Benefiting from the theoretical and methodological advances of the last decade, work on contemporary youth culture is moving in several directions at once, opening up multiple and complex notions of identity as it is lived in the everyday. In particular, this work looks towards the ways in which young people are navigating their everyday lives using popular cultural texts in complex and unpredictable ways. None of this work reduces the lives and experiences of these youth to tight, subcultural boundaries. At its best, such work can force us closer and closer to the lives of young people, showing us unexpected vistas for thought and reflection. Indeed, much of the best work in popular culture and education has done exactly this—decentering the presumed and presumptive authority of the researcher and educator. Such work allows us to see the affective investments young people have in the texts and practices most salient in their lives. Such work can destabilize the ways in which educators choose to organize and control knowledge.

Note

- 1 This chapter explores issues further elaborated upon in my book *Studying urban youth culture* (2008, Peter Lang).

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18

Schooling the body in a performative culture

John Evans, Brian Davies and Emma Rich

The body is a great intelligence, a plurality with one mind, a war and a peace, a flock and a shepherd.

And thy little intelligence, my brother, which thou callest 'spirit' – is a tool of the body, a little tool and a plaything of thy great intelligence.

I thou sayest, and art proud of the word. But a greater matter – which thy wilt not believe – is thy body and its great intelligence. It saith not I, but it doeth I.

(Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Bozman, 1957)

I have always written with my whole body: I do not know what purely intellectual problems are.

(Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Pascal, 1952)

In many respects, the sociology of education is quintessentially 'of the body', though it has not always articulated its mission as such. Historically, it has sought to document how individuals are fashioned and inscribed with social meaning, status and value through organizational and pedagogical practices reflecting particular cultural and class interests and ideals. Much less frequently, it has sought to understand how material flesh and blood, thinking, feeling, sentient beings are written on to social and cultural landscapes utilizing attributes variously defined as habits, aptitudes, abilities or intelligences, which may be recognized as of value in and outside schools. But either we understand the social world as the intersection of embodied agency and structure, critically as a dialectic of biology and culture (Evans *et al.*, 2009; Grosz, 1995; Shilling, 2008a,b) or we fail to understand human existence and its reproduction at all.

The founding figures of sociology were, as Chris Shilling (2008a,b) has pointed out, keenly interested in how 'corporeal processes could be interpreted as actual indicators of social reproduction and change'. He noted, for example, that both Durkheim (1995, originally 1912) and Weber (1991, originally 1904–1905) sought explication of the social importance of what he termed 'the cultural *body pedagogics* characteristic of a society' based on recognition that culture is 'not just a matter of cognitive or symbolic knowledge, but entails an education into socially sanctioned bodily techniques, dispositions and sensory orientations to the world (Mauss, 1973,

originally 1934)' (Shilling, 2008a: viii). They explored those forms of 'body pedagogics' central either to the inception and development of *industrial* society, or those minimal forms that could be associated with the consolidation of *any* social group. However, as Shilling pointed out, it was Heidegger (1993, originally 1954: 320, 329, 333) who provided the most relevant and disturbing vision of 'body pedagogics' associated with the culture of advanced, technological society in the West, the defining property of which was that '*people* themselves are regarded as a standing-reserve for the demands of a system that prioritizes production over all else' (Shilling, 2008a). Such a situation could go unrecognized by the majority of those subject to it, used to regarding the world through the prism of rational instrumentalism, 'failing to see that they have become the object of this logic' (Shilling, 2008a: x). In such a culture, our bodily selves are increasingly subject to, not only the performative expectations of the labour market, but those of consumer culture centred around visions of physical perfection, usually articulated as slender body ideals (Evans *et al.*, 2008b; Gordon, 2000; Grogan, 1999; Shilling, 2008a; Shilling and Mellor, 2007; Wright and Harwood, 2009). The characteristic experience associated with this instrumental orientation towards life is that:

the body becomes *objectified* as an absent-present raw material that we are responsible for controlling in line with external standards (rather than as the vehicle of our sensuous and creative being-in-the-world) . . . the embodied subject is either positioned as a '*standing reserve*' for the demands of productivity or is stigmatised and viewed as morally suspect.

(Shilling, 2008a: xi)

The precise manner in which this 'enframing' of the body proceeds varies across institutions and is clearly exemplified in contemporary approaches to health.

Sociological interest in 'the body' is, then, nothing new, although most sociologists of education have been less than universally eager to embrace it directly in their analyses. Yet, long before the likes of Foucault, Bernstein, Elias, Bourdieu, Derrida, Douglas, Grosz, Butler or their contemporary, school-focused apostles depicted it rather prosaically as a shadowy, ghostly, disembodied figure in the educational machine, Wallard (1932) had already pointed out in seminal detail that schools were complex social organizations comprising people in roles and motion, living 'an organismic interdependence' (p. 6). It was not possible to affect them in part without altering the shape of the whole; schools were manifestly social bodies, whose inherently relational and contingent elements had ripple effects on others within and beyond them. Within them, those in authority were set to work on others' bodies, essentially to socialize, skill, organize and differentiate them by age, ability, sex and potential occupational status. Patently, they sorted 'able' from 'less able', boys from girls, one religious affiliation from another, or none, and even black from white. Such corporeal categories were regularly writ large in school names and signage above many a school door. Manipulating classrooms, corridors, playgrounds and time-tabled time, schools variously sifted and sorted, segregated and differentiated, ordered and classified, imposing geographies of the body, nurturing social relations that celebrated either a sense of '*similarity to*' or '*difference from*', depending on the philosophy, ideology and nature of the privileging educational code (Evans and Davies, 2004). The body, then, has always been writ large in the organization of schooling, via its classifications and framing of pedagogy, curriculum and assessment techniques, by virtue of their mission to allocate position and privilege and distribute success, failure, status and value. In simultaneously disciplining, punishing or privileging in terms of myriad rules and evaluations, schools inevitably either affirm, damage or enhance individuals' corporeality in place, space and time.

Against a backdrop of near global economic, medical and technological change, of a kind alluded to by Shilling, *pace* Heidegger, governments across affluent Western and westernized societies have sought, not only to alter surface features of education so as to ensure the electoral allegiance of the already privileged and aspirant, but also to reach into and manipulate its deeper structures. In recent decades, there has been a significant step change in attention paid to the body by purveyors of popular culture and burgeoning body/health industries, and central governments have been increasingly tempted to claim control of its underlying ethics, codes and principles, which regulate communication and embodied consciousness and their location. Such inclinations have often been sanctified as being necessary in order to control and better 'educate' potentially volatile and, purportedly, increasingly unhealthy (overweight and obese) populations. A new and pervasive form of 'surveillance education' has emerged in which 'perfection codes' (Evans and Davies, 2004) (which centre attention on one's 'relationship to one's embodied self') and 'surveillance medicine and health' (Armstrong, 1995), reaching way beyond schools, feature prominently. Its narratives are neither arbitrary nor socially innocent. Although couched in good intent, they serve, nonetheless, to fashion and alter individuals' consciousness and relationships to their bodies in such a way that existing social hierarchies and westernized, affluent, white, middle-class cultural values are celebrated within a particularly narrow version of 'being healthy' (Azzarito and Solomon, 2006). In the process, the lifestyles, cultures and embodied characteristics of many are 'abjectified' (Kenway *et al.*, 2006), while those of relatively few (slim, active, independent individuals) are privileged and portrayed as corporeal exemplars of desirable aspirational ideals. It is hardly surprising, then, that we find in countries across such societies a ubiquitous fear, especially among the middle classes, of being defined as 'overweight', inactive and manifestly insufficiently thin.

'Body pedagogics' and the medicalization of our lives

In what some refer to as the *medicalization* of people's lives (Furedi, 2005), the reclassification of populations globally as 'at risk', in perpetual states of being 'potentially unwell', has no more been accident than conspiracy on the part of science or health educators' malicious intent. It has owed as much to changing approaches in medicine to 'health' over the last forty years as to the way in which nation-states have increasingly sought to exercise authority and control over potentially recalcitrant populations, while simultaneously serving global capitalism's interests. Generating surplus value rests on increasing consumption, even when dieting. In late twentieth-century medicine, the quest for *cures* for ill health gave way to a search for its *causes* (see Le Fanu, 1999). This shift was driven by two very different specialties: 'new genetics' opened up possibilities of identifying abnormal genes in social diseases; and 'epidemiology' insisted that most common diseases, such as cancer, heart disease and diabetes, are caused by social factors connected to unhealthy lifestyles and are preventable by changing behaviour, such as switching diets, taking more exercise and reducing exposure to risk factors. Together, these approaches, especially when recontextualized through the ideologies of neo-liberalism and free market economics, generated policies that provided the basis for a radical shift from solving health problems through therapeutic measures to *intervention* – the earlier the better – making the lives of children and young people and their families and schools primary targets of health and education policies. Though driven by genuinely altruistic desire to improve the health of individuals and populations, when framed within an ideology of 'liberal individualism' and 'performativity' (see Ball, 2003, 2004) 'health' has taken on particularly narrow connotations

around weight loss and slenderness, serving the interests not of education but surveillance and new forms of social control.

At the same time, in Western (and westernized) societies, coercive means of manipulating populations using explicit force and oppressive rule of law have given way to more subtle and less certain means of control involving a combination of mass surveillance and self-regulation, which Foucault (1978, 1979, 1980) called 'disciplinary power'. Here, individuals and populations are ascribed responsibility for regulating and looking after themselves, though often according to criteria over which they have very little say or control, while, at the same time, being more or less relentlessly monitored in their capacity to do so, in some respects from cradle to grave (see Foresight Commission, 2007: 63). As nation-states have become 'more concerned about the management of life (biopower) and the governing of populations' (Howson, 2004: 125), particularly in relation to health, disease, sexuality, welfare and education, individuals and communities become objects of 'surveillance, analysis, intervention and correction across space and time' (Nettleton, 1992, quoted in Howson, 2004). Biopower, however: 'depends on technologies through which the state and its agencies can manage "the politics of life to shape the social to accord with the tasks and exigencies faced by the state"' (Hewitt, 1983: 225, quoted in Howson, 2004). Foucault's reference 'to the knowledges, practices and norms that have been developed to regulate the quality of life of the population as bio-politics' indicates that the body becomes 'the raw material for this undertaking'. Distinct physical spaces become locations in which people are monitored by those in authority who may observe them with minimum effort: 'Relations within such spaces are based on the observation of the many by the watchful eyes of the few, or on the "gaze" which judges as it observes and decides what fits – what is normal – and what does not' (Howson, 2004: 126).

One unfortunate legacy of the Foucauldian moment in the sociology of education, health and physical education, however, is the tendency (not altogether mitigated in the concept of biopower) to characterize the aforementioned processes dichotomously and somewhat misleadingly as either external or internal forms of regulation of the body politic and the body's corporeality, rather than as the intersection of two mutually reinforcing modes of achieving order and control. Societies are depicted as having shifted from exercising imposed, disciplinary power to 'technologies of the self', whereby individuals or populations are 'encouraged' to regulate and continually work on their own bodies and 'self regulate'. Calling on a variety of government-provided expertise enjoined 'to shape, guide, direct the conduct of others' and 'bridle the individual's passions', individuals are induced to control their own instincts; they 'govern themselves' (Rose, 1999: 3). This rather caricatures the way in which order and control are pursued in advanced technological societies, obfuscating how different forms of embodiment may be nurtured when external and internal forms of regulation work conjointly on the body to 'enframe' subjectivity and embodied action, a process in which some bodies may achieve 'authenticity' and are compliant, while others are 'abjectified' and alienated and offer dissent.

But exercise of biopower neither assumes nor guarantees acceptance or internalization of its normalizing roles, rules and codes, not least because it cannot foresee or regulate the unintended consequence of policies, for example, with respect of individual or population failure to adopt 'correct' behaviours relating to weight, exercise and food. Pursuit of 'self induced' order always occurs within frameworks of disciplinary control. Moreover, given that disciplinary power and surveillance may vary across settings, individuals may experience corporeal 'authenticity' or 'abjection' across different sites of practice, depending on the proximity of their cultural values to prevailing social (corporeal) norms and/or their willingness to 'self regulate' within given or perceived zones of influence: psycho-social locations (communities of encoded practice) that

are experienced somatically by individuals to have various levels of meaning, significance and/or control over their behaviour and development (Walkerdine, 2009). For example, some young people may experience 'the family' (or particular relations within it) or websites as having greater influence than schools on their understanding of health, food and body issues. Others may experience their peers as having greater influence on their developing corporeality than, say, teachers (De Pian, 2008; McLeod and Yates, 2006).

How governments or other institutions respond to weaknesses or invoke changes in their chosen or inherited modes of control should, therefore, reside high among the concerns of an embodied sociology of education (Gard and Kirk, 2007). In 'totally pedagogized societies' (TPS) (Bernstein, 2001) and totally pedagogized schools,¹ there is contingent intersection rather than shift or dislocation of external and internal forms of control in the interests of ensuring that populations are both orderly and controlled. Hence, where the pursuit of internal regulation fails (as surely it must if the majority population has little or no control over, or say in, the normalized, corporeal states they are expected to achieve), levels of surveillance and intervention can be activated and intensified to ensure conformity to stated ideals. Indeed, in plural, secular societies, such as the UK, where 'inner regulation' drawn either from theological or ethical codes is sometime depicted as either weak, dissonant or absent, the failure of certain populations to embrace state-manufactured, alternative ideologies, such as those of 'liberal individualism' and its guiding rules (e.g. around diet, exercise and weight), has been accompanied by increasing levels of coercive intervention and heightened levels of surveillance of populations in and outside schools.

It is in such contexts of heightened surveillance that new forms of normalizing practices emerge and prevail in many sites of social practice through the exercise of *body pedagogies* (Shilling, 2005, 2007), *bio-pedagogies* (Wright and Harwood, 2008) and *body pedagogies* (Evans and Davies, 2004; Evans *et al.*, 2008b), and their specific variants in schools. Such practices work as part of the bio-politics of contemporary Western cultures, steeped in body centric (e.g. obesity) discourse (see Campos, 2004; Gard and Wright, 2001, 2005; Halse *et al.*, 2007; Rich and Evans, 2005). Bio-pedagogies shape and form the body pedagogies of popular culture and schools and are infused with performance and perfection codes. How individuals interpret and recontextualize the inherent meanings and principles of such discourse determine how the body is schooled. We need ask: what forms of corporeality emerge, or rather, are induced and enacted in such contexts? Are some bodies privileged (authenticated), while others are abjectified, damaged or defiled (see Figure 18.1)? How are the possibilities for experiencing health and other forms of fulfilment governed by different levels of surveillance and one's value position in relation to preferred social norms? How is the *corporeal device* (see below) enacted within various zones of influence or 'networks of intimacy' (e.g. including relationships between parents and siblings, friends and partners (Heath and Cleaver, 2003: 47; Heath and Johnson, 2006; Paton, 2007a,b; De Pian, 2008)), mediating somatically their signs, meanings and message systems and how is 'proximal development' (Vygotsky, 1978) embodied in such contexts? Again, sociology of education, properly 'embodied', would begin to throw light on these concerns.

Where does work on the body occur?

Pedagogical activity thus occurs not only in formal education and schooling but in other socio-political and cultural sites, such as families, schools, churches, mosques and doctors' surgeries, in which work on the body occurs, and in emerging socio-technological landscapes of new media such as the Internet. Lupton (1999), for example, has argued that, for many lay people,




Figure 18.1 Zones of proximal influence – psych-social locations (of encoded meanings, signs and symbols) in which individuals somatically experience 'authenticity' or 'abjection' depending on the proximity of their cultural values (and other relevant dispositions) to those prevailing and valued within the particular social setting. Where the value systems are ubiquitous and inescapable such as in TPS, some individuals or populations may experience a profound and potentially destructive sense of anomie or alienation from their embodied selves as resentment or disaffection is turned inward toward the embodied self.

mass media now constitute *the* most important sources of information about health and medicine. As Lyons (2000: 350) contends: 'previously, medical practitioners dominated coverage of health and illness information, whereas today there are a variety of voices to be heard, including dissident doctors, alternative therapists, journalists, campaigners, academics and so on'. Miah and Rich (2008) have shown that many young people access health information not just from traditional medical sources but from newspapers, magazines, television and other electronic media. Research continues to highlight the importance of 'media representations of health and illness in shaping people's health beliefs and behaviors' (Giles, 2003: 318), critiquing many for their 'ability to mislead and misinform the public about health issues' (Giles, 2003: 217). Furthermore, Miah and Rich (2008) argue that, with the advent of a range of digital platforms that merge entertainment with the regulation of the body, such as Internet-based nutrition games and the use of games consoles such as the Nintendo Wii Fit, cyberspace may be providing a forum for new forms of regulative practices concerning health. (Armstrong, 1995). Environments, for example the Wii Fit, provide contexts that allow the individual to 'virtualize' his or her identity, leading to a 'prostheticisation of the body within cyberspace', through which it is projected. Cyberspace has thus extended the means through which body pedagogies and mechanisms of self-surveillance of the body can be articulated. In so doing, these contexts invoke a particular ontology of the body as materiality and flesh, but also as a prosthetic that represents itself in some fixed capacity within cyberspaces (Rich and Miah, 2009).

Body-centred discourses (e.g. around obesity) do not, then, reach straightforwardly into the lives of young people and certainly not only through formal educational practices, but circulate globally through the media and websites as forms of 'popular pedagogy' before finding their

way into schools, both through official policies and initiatives (Evans *et al.*, 2008b). Health discourse as popular pedagogy is formed as part of a relentless cycle of policy and spin, generating initiatives that reach way beyond the school setting. In this context, formal education constitutes a relatively small, yet extremely significant, element in the configuration of processes by which the body is now schooled. It both refracts and helps forge global 'healthscapes', the 'symbolic universes' and meaning systems that reconfigure people's lives. As others have pointed out, such scapes know no physical nor geographical boundaries, are almost always hierarchical and linked to 'global ideoscapes and mediscapes of abjection', now commonly 'associated with food, waste and sexual difference' (Kenway *et al.*, 2006: 129, citing Kristeva, 1982). They also note that, in popular culture, 'the abject' has 'come to be associated with those bodily fluids, people, objects and places that are depicted as unclean, impure, and even immoral':

The 'abject' disturbs 'identity, system, order' (Kristeva, 1982: 4) and provokes the desire to expel the unclean to an outside, to create boundaries in order to establish the certainty of the self. It involves the erection of social taboos and individual defences. Insofar as the abject challenges notions of identity it must be cast out. Abjection involves the processes whereby that or those named unclean are reviled, repelled, and resisted.

(Kenway *et al.*, 2006: 120)

Increasingly, 'the abject' in affluent cultures are those who either cannot or will not ascribe to health discourse and its 'slender body' ideals, more often than not the working-class poor, or those who, because of their ethnicity, culture or lifestyles (e.g. single-parent families), are blamed and shamed for purportedly prohibiting their offspring to exercise regularly and eat the correct foods at the correct time. Whether inadvertently or intentionally, such 'scapes of abjection' 'justify injustice, draw attention away from social suffering and thus deny the social reality of the marginalized . . . while constructing the poor as "the source of pollution and moral danger"' (Sibley, 1995: 55) (Kenway *et al.*, 2006: 120–121). Transmitted uncritically through the informal and formal practices of communities and schools, contemporary health discourse may serve such social functions, reproducing social hierarchies while damaging the identities of the most vulnerable.

The complexity of embodied social reproduction

Given that complex processes of socio-cultural reproduction involve multiple sites of practice, multiple agencies and meaning systems and the need to avoid overdetermination in accounts of how health discourse is reproduced as pedagogy, any sociology of education interested in the body would need to explore how obesity and wider body-centred discourse are translated into principles of communication. How are they recontextualized within particular social settings, afforded different levels of influence, and how are prevailing meaning systems, rules and resources within them either adopted, adapted, resisted or reshaped through individual 'knower structures' (Maton, 2006) given by culture and social class? In the flow and recontextualization of discourse within and between sites of practice, such as translation of government policies into school policy/initiatives, gaps open up, creating a space in which 'ideology can play' (Bernstein, 1996: 47). Individuals can read, interpret and recontextualize received wisdom or 'sacred' health knowledge that schools and other sites of practice convey through the cognitive filters of their culture and class. Research has persistently emphasized that young people are neither cultural dopes nor dupes, recontextualizing health knowledge

critically through their own 'knower structures', their personal, culturally encoded, affective understandings of their own and others' bodies and health, within the framework of the imperatives of health education policy and the performative cultures of their schools.

The corporeal device

Used insensitively, a Foucauldian perspective may foster the notion that our individual subjectivity is merely an epiphenomenon, a discursive production of multiple knowledge(s) brought into play on the body by various 'technologies of truth'. This is not altogether unhelpful, enabling us to register differences between knowledge and ideology and to see that some ('health') knowledge(s) may be considered 'sacred' (objective, detached, unambiguous, predictive and reliable), others profane (contaminated by the subjectivities and immediacies and values systems and ideologies of everyday life) and of little value in formal education. All such discourses, however, are always, inevitably, mediated for individuals through their material, flesh and blood, sentient, thinking and feeling bodies, their actions and those of their peers, parents/guardians and other adults, usually within complex networks of relative intimacy that exercise various levels of influence over them. As a way of articulating the materiality of the *lived experiences* typically associated with acquiring the attributes required by obesity discourse and 'the actual embodied changes resulting from this process' (Shilling, 2005: 13), we have been inclined, *pace* Bernstein, to talk of the 'corporeal device', to focus on the body as not just a discursive representation and relay of messages and power relations external 'to itself' but as a voice 'of itself' (Evans *et al.*, 2009). As a material/physical conduit it has an internal grammar and syntax given by the intersection of biology, culture and the predilections of class, which regulate embodied action and consciousness, including the ways in which discursive messages (and all other social relations) are read and received. This concept, we suggest, privileges neither biology nor culture and endorses Frank's (2006: 433) view that neither 'the experience of embodied health nor the observation of signs of health circulating outside bodies has to trump the other as being the real point of origin, rather, each is understood as "making the other possible"'. Others have rediscovered *Pragmatism* (Shilling, 2008b) and the works of John Dewey (1997) (Quennerstedt, Öhman and Ohman, 2010, forthcoming) to articulate similar concerns. How the corporeal device finds expression as conscious and subconscious embodied action and is subjectified (given shape, form and definition as 'personality') in and outside schools should be an enduring concern. At one level, it signals a concern with how body-centric health knowledge(s) produced in the primary field of knowledge production in science communities comes to be considered 'the thinkable' and 'sacred'; that is to say, 'official truth' as to what we ought to believe about the body and its capacity for health, fit to be purveyed in schools. At another level, it involves an exploration of embodied subjectivity, tracing how health knowledge(s), recontextualized within popular culture (through TV, websites and other media imagery), translate into education/health policies directed at schools. Mediated by teachers' and pupils' class and cultures, official health knowledge may become separated or dislocated from everyday health knowledge, which may become reclassified and read as unhealthy or 'profane'.

Conclusion

Across affluent Western and westernized worlds, young people are being both privileged and marginalized by popular cultural practices and their education and schooling. Increasingly, they

have to deal with the normalizing expectations and requirements of performative culture and body-centred health (e.g. obesity) discourse. Understanding how they evade, accommodate or recontextualize relentless and penetrating surveillance of their bodies in school time and space requires us to press beyond analyses of the intrinsic content of body-centred health 'messages' to consider 'the voice' of education itself and how it is shaped by the *pedagogic device*.² Contemporary health discourse nurtures a language, grammar and syntax with regulative and instructional principles and codes that define thought and embodied action, a 'meaning potential' for 'health', largely in terms of weight, size and shape, where the solution to 'problems' is a matter of weight loss through taking more exercise and eating less food. Its language relates to global trends in policy and pedagogies on education and health that inadvertently endorse actions which both sustain social hierarchies and may be damaging for some young people's education and health.

Globally, an increasing number of educational issues, conversations, programmes and curricula are organized and operationalized on the basis of body-centred concerns with weight. As a consequence, certain problems are arising in relation to the well-being of young people. As Shilling (2008a) and others (e.g. Campos, 2004; Evans *et al.*, 2008b; Grogan, 1999; Halse *et al.*, 2008) have noted, the first is that the emphasis on shape, weight and 'fitness' concerns in school overlooks or marginalizes a whole series of other considerations that are important to young people, which are not provided with a place in this schema. Second, the effects of focusing on body and weight issues in school environments, already saturated by particular expectations regarding educational achievement, can be potentially devastating. It is hardly surprising that research is documenting young people increasingly constructing their identities and subjectivities, health and illness, through the language of performativity and health discourses that dominate contemporary culture in and outside schools. But they are not simply duped, nor are their problems merely discursive reflections of pressures endemic in society and schools. Young people neither simply read nor internalize these body-centric messages uncritically or merely 'cognitively' through disembodied 'knower structures'. They are mediated somatically and within their sub-cultural location in a specific time and space. Research evidence attests that young people tend to locate their difficulties viscerally and relationally in antecedent experiences of their fast-changing, sometimes awkward, less than 'perfect' bodies, among their families, teachers and peers. Within these networks of relative intimacy, their changing bodies are inescapably subjected to their own and others' evaluative gazes. For some, engaging in 'deviant' actions, for example, radical body modification involving excessive exercise and eating little or no food, experiencing the joy of achieving the distinction of 'thin' beyond the slender ideal, becomes a perfectly rational, morally acceptable goal that avoids the pain of being 'othered', made to feel different, less worthy and excluded. The sociology of education has barely begun to investigate and understand how these processes enter the lived experiences of children and young people through popular and formal pedagogies that feature in and outside school.

The growing pressure wrought through contemporary body-centric policies and their associated pedagogies to obtain 'the right' body size/shape is not, then, simply about being healthy, but carries moral characterizations where the 'obese' or 'overweight' become lazy, self-indulgent and greedy. Body-centric narratives, infused with performance and perfection codes, sieve, separate, celebrate and vilify manifest body shape and form. They simultaneously celebrate and abjectify particular lifestyles, people, positions and actions. Such a performative culture, for example, induces individuals from a disturbingly young age to learn to fear and loathe bodies that are not the correct shape or weight; control, virtue and goodness (hence, 'acceptance', employability and trainability) are to be found in slenderness and processes of

becoming excessively thin. Responsibility falls upon individuals to accept that correct diet, involvement in physical activity and the pursuit of 'perfection' academically are moral as well as corporeal obligations. Given the social sanctions that accompany this discourse, including bullying, stigma and labelling, particularly reported by young people defined by their peers as 'fat', it is hardly surprising that some not only take drastic action to lose weight but became seriously depressed, as well as physically ill.

The sociology of education needs to engage with changing worlds in which health and other body-centred discourses are configured. Further theoretical and empirical work on such issues is badly needed, to engage with the paradox of rejecting the performative values that are driving social change and current conceptions of health while accepting that there are immediate problems to deal with in the form of poor diets, too few opportunities for play and exercise, and ill health, having origins in the impoverished and inequitable social conditions of people's lives in a context of global capitalism. In Apple's (2006) terms, unless we honestly confront and think tactically about neo-liberal-inspired market proposals and neo-liberal purposes, we will fail to create counter-hegemonic common sense about health or build counter-hegemonic alliances. As Apple implores, our analyses have to be sufficiently connected to ways in which conservative modernization has altered common sense and transformed material and ideological conditions surrounding schooling, including those relating to the body and health. They also have to be aware of, and draw on, alternative belief systems and conceptions of 'health' and embodiment and strategies for disseminating them when contesting current health policy orthodoxies and pedagogic modalities. Doing so would locate 'the body' and embodied learning as central to sociology of education's concerns.

Notes

- 1 In such contexts, concern for the shape and 'health' of 'the body' is no longer the preserve only of those areas of the curriculum historically concerned with body issues, such as physical education, health education or personal and social education, but is regarded as everyone's concern in classrooms, playgrounds, dining halls and corridors. No one and 'no body' escapes the evaluative gaze. These changes, then, concern internal and external forms of regulation and the range and reach of authority and control into the lives of individuals and populations (Evans *et al.*, 2008b).
- 2 Bernstein (1990: 190) refers to the voice of pedagogy that is constituted by the *pedagogic device*: 'a grammar for producing specialized messages (and) realizations, a grammar which regulates what it processes: a grammar which orders and positions and yet contains the potential of its own transformation'. Body-centred discourses constructed *outside* schools help form pedagogic discourse, foregrounding its instructional and regulative dimensions whose understanding needs to precede our attempts to understand how body pedagogies nurtured *inside* schools are infused with *competence, performance and perfection codes*, whose principles regulate but cannot 'determine' the embodied actions and positions of individuals. The discursive intersection of instructional and moral imperatives forms pedagogic discourse and provides principles that configure body pedagogies and implicit pedagogic positions and identities that circulate in popular culture and schools' health curricula and young people's responses to them.

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Tracking and inequality

New directions for research and practice

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For more than a century, educators and researchers have debated the merits of separating students for instruction into different tracks, classes, and groups, according to their purported interests and abilities (for historical perspectives, see Loveless, 1998, 1999; Oakes, 2005; Oakes *et al.*, 1992; Powell *et al.*, 1985). The practice, known as "tracking" and "ability grouping" in the US and "streaming" and "setting" in the UK, is intended to create conditions in which teachers can efficiently target instruction to students' needs.² Despite this intended benefit, tracking has been widely criticized as inequalitarian, because students in high tracks tend to widen their achievement advantages over their low-track peers, and because measures of school performance commonly used to assign students to tracks typically coincide with the broader bases of social disadvantage such as race/ethnicity and social class, leading to economically and/or ethnically segregated classrooms. Yet tracking has been highly resistant to lasting change and remains in wide use in various forms in the US, the UK, and in school systems around the world.

Although struggles over tracking involve instructional and political challenges that play out in schools and classrooms, the persisting debate reflects not only local concerns but also broader tensions inherent in education systems (Oakes *et al.*, 1992). On the one hand, schools are charged with providing all students with a common framework of cognitive and social skills essential for full participation in the civic and economic activities of adult society. On the other hand, schools are structured to sort and select students for different trajectories aligned with their varied orientations and capacities. This ongoing tension between commonality and differentiation is at the heart of the tracking debate: Is the purpose of schooling to provide all students with a common socialization? Or is it to differentiate students for varied futures? The former aim is consistent with mixed-ability teaching, whereas the latter is consistent with tracking, and the debate has no simple resolution because school systems embody both goals.

Building on past research, recent work on tracking has advanced in three areas that indicate promising new directions for research and practice. First, new international scholarship has extended knowledge about the consequences of tracking for student achievement to contexts beyond the US and UK, where most prior research had been conducted. Second, recent studies of attempts to reduce or eliminate tracking and ability grouping have yielded important insights about why tracking is resistant to change and how some of the obstacles to detracking may be

surmounted. Third, a new wave of research on classroom assignment and instruction has pointed towards approaches that, while not resolving the tension between commonality and differentiation, may capture the benefits of differentiation for meeting students' varied needs without giving rise to the consequences for inequality that commonly accompany tracking and ability grouping. These findings in turn call for new research and experimentation in practice.

Before turning to these latest findings, I summarize the earlier literature on the effects of grouping and tracking on student achievement. This research has been well covered in prior reviews (e.g. Gamoran, 2004; Gamoran and Berends, 1987; Hallam, 2002; Harlen and Malcolm, 1997; Kulik and Kulik, 1982; Oakes *et al.*, 1992; Slavin, 1987, 1990), but I begin with it here because it sets the stage for the promising work of the present and the new directions for the future. Thus, the remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections: a review of findings about tracking and achievement that links work from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to updated studies in the same vein; a discussion of recent international research on tracking, both between and within schools; an analysis of new studies of efforts to reduce or eliminate tracking; and a conclusion calling for new research and practice based on the latest findings.

Tracking and achievement: increased inequality without benefits to productivity

Following Gamoran and Mare (1989), one may distinguish between two possible consequences of tracking for achievement: it may affect *productivity*, that is, the overall level of achievement in the school or class; and it may affect *inequality*, that is, the distribution of achievement across the different tracks, classes, or groups. Although not all studies have reached the same conclusions about these outcomes, the weight of the evidence indicates that tracking tends to exacerbate inequality with little or no contribution to overall productivity. This occurs because gains for high achievers are offset by losses for low achievers. A compelling example of this pattern comes from Kerckhoff's (1986) study of ability grouping between and within schools in England and Wales. Kerckhoff used data from the National Child Development Study, which followed for more than thirty years all children born in the UK in the first week of March in 1958. He examined secondary school achievement in reading and mathematics among students enrolled in schools for high achievers (grammar schools), low achievers (secondary modern schools) and those of widely varying achievement levels (comprehensive schools). He also compared students assigned to high, middle, low, and mixed-ability classes within the different types of school. Comparisons between and within schools told a consistent story: There were no overall benefits to average achievement in contexts that differentiated students for instruction as compared with mixed-ability contexts. However, sorting students into selective schools and classes was associated with increasing gaps between high and low achievers over time (see also Kerckhoff, 1993). The comparison of tracking to mixed-ability teaching has received less attention in the US because tracking has been nearly universal at the secondary level (Loveless, 1998), but comparisons of ability-grouped with mixed-ability classes in middle school mathematics and science (Hoffer, 1992) and English (Gamoran and Nystrand, 1994) have yielded the same pattern. National survey analyses in the US also demonstrated that, over the course of high school, students assigned to high and low tracks grow farther and farther apart in achievement (e.g. Heyns, 1974; Alexander, Cook and McDill, 1978; Gamoran, 1987a, 1992; Gamoran and Mare, 1989; Lucas and Gamoran, 2002).

Because track location is correlated with traditional bases of socio-economic disadvantage, tracking not only widens achievement gaps but also reinforces social inequality (Lucas and Berends, 2002; Oakes *et al.*, 1992). In contrast to socio-economic status, which has direct effects on track assignment, race and ethnicity affect track assignment indirectly: Minority students whose test scores and socio-economic background match those of Whites are no less likely to be placed in high tracks (Gamoran and Mare, 1989; Lucas and Gamoran, 2002; Tach and Farkas, 2006). However, because minority students tend to reach high school with lower test scores and less advantaged socio-economic circumstances, tracking works to the disadvantage of minority students and contributes to achievement gaps.

As the demographic make-up of US schools has changed, new patterns of inequality associated with tracking have become more salient. With regard to language minority students, Callahan (2005) argued that schools often conflate limited proficiency in English with limited ability to master academic content. As a result, English language learners are tracked into classes with modified curricula that are less rigorous than those of regular classes, which prevents these students from gaining access to advanced instruction even as their language skills develop. While Callahan supported these assertions with a study of a rural California school, Paul (2005) reached a similar conclusion based on her study of five diverse urban schools. Paul noted that enrollment in algebra 1, the gateway to the college-preparatory curriculum, was stratified by race and ethnicity, with Asian American and White students enrolled in higher proportions, and African American and Hispanic students enrolled in lower proportions. When English language learners enrolled in the same levels of algebra as fluent English speakers, they had similar rates of college-preparatory course work. Foreshadowing this work, Padilla and Gonzales (2001) argued that one reason recent immigrants to the US from Mexico outperform second-generation students is that the immigrants have spent less time in low tracks in US schools.

New forms of tracking in the US have exhibited patterns of inequality comparable with those of earlier forms. Using high-school transcripts from a national sample of students, Lucas (1999) showed that students were grouped on a subject-by-subject basis rather than by broad curricular programs. Nevertheless, students' course levels tended to correlate across subject areas, and this more subtle version of tracking still resulted in achievement inequality. Mitchell and Mitchell (2005) demonstrated that multi-track, year-round schools also tended to stratify students by social origins. Both Lewis and Cheng (2006) and Mickelson and Everett (2008) found that the transformation of vocational education into career and technical education, though accompanied by greater emphasis on academic work within technical courses of study, still resulted in stratified class enrollments.

Generally, elementary and middle schools have witnessed a pattern of increasing inequality similar to that observed at the high school level (e.g. Gamoran *et al.*, 1995; Hoffer, 1992; Rowan and Miracle, 1983). Until recently, national data have been available only at the secondary level, so it was not possible to examine the generalizability of patterns of inequality associated with elementary school ability grouping. However, recent analyses of data from a national sample of children who entered kindergarten in 1998 have confirmed the pattern of widening gaps for within-class reading groups in kindergarten (Tach and Farkas, 2006). Using later waves of the same data, Lleras and Rangel (2009) reported similar findings for between-class ability grouping in Grades 1 and 3. Taking exception to the general pattern, Slavin (1987) reported, based on a synthesis of research on elementary school grouping, that within-class grouping for mathematics had positive effects for students in low-ranked as well as those in high-ranked groups. Slavin also noted that, when students were regrouped for specific subjects, rather than being tracked for the entire school day, ability grouping had positive effects for students at all

achievement levels. On the basis of these findings, Slavin proposed that elementary school ability grouping can have positive effects when assignment is based on criteria relevant to the subject, when students can be moved from one group to another as appropriate to their progress, and when curriculum and instruction are differentiated to meet the needs of students assigned to the different groups.

Slavin's conclusions have recently been reaffirmed by Connor and her colleagues (Connor *et al.*, 2007; Connor *et al.*, 2009). Connor's work shows that small reading groups can be used effectively to tailor reading instruction to students' needs. In a randomized comparison, Connor *et al.* (2007) reported that students taught by teachers who arranged students into reading groups according to carefully assessed student performance levels, and who aimed instruction at students' specific needs, performed much better by the end of first grade than those taught by teachers who did not have access to the systematic approach to assigning students and differentiating instruction. Though based on less precise evidence, Tomlinson *et al.* (2003) advanced similar claims about the value of within-class differentiation of instruction as a strategy for effective teaching of students with varied interests and skills.

Challenges in measuring track effects

Two methodological challenges have confronted researchers studying the impact of tracking and ability grouping on student achievement. One challenge has been to measure accurately students' group and track locations. At the secondary level, research from the 1970s and 1980s often relied on students to report whether their curricular programs could best be described as academic/college-preparatory, vocational, or general. This *social-psychological* measure of tracking was useful as an indicator of students' perceptions, but did not necessarily represent students' actual learning opportunities. Lucas (1999) developed a *structural* measure of track location by using students' transcripts to identify tracks based on the courses students had taken. Lucas and Gamoran (2002) showed that structural and social-psychological dimensions of tracking had independent effects on student achievement, and both contributed to achievement gaps. Other researchers have used network analysis techniques to identify tracks through the configuration of courses in which students enroll (Friedkin and Thomas, 1997; Heck *et al.*, 2004), reaching similar conclusions about tracking and inequality. More recent studies have also uncovered inequality using teacher reports to distinguish among ability groups at high, middle, and low levels (Carbonaro, 2005; Tach and Farkas, 2006).

The second methodological challenge has been to distinguish the effects of track assignment from the effects of pre-existing differences among students assigned to different tracks. Obviously, students in high and low tracks are on different achievement trajectories to begin with; that is how they came to be located in different tracks. All the analyses discussed here have controlled for prior achievement and social background, but owing to unreliability and measurement error, not all pre-existing conditions may have been captured by the controls, and the potential for selectivity bias remains. Researchers have endeavored to respond to this challenge in two ways. First, a few studies, mainly prior to 1970, used random assignment to tracked or untracked settings to rule out selectivity bias (Slavin, 1987, 1990). These studies yielded widely varying estimates of track effects that centered around zero. Because they provided little information on what was going on inside the tracks, it is difficult to assess the generalizability of these small and long-ago experiments. In at least some cases of zero effects, teachers designed instruction and curriculum to be the same across tracks, in contrast to the real world where tracking is typically accompanied by curricular and instructional differentiation. These

findings led Gamoran (1987b) to argue that the effects of tracking depend on how it is implemented, a conclusion later supported by both case study (Gamoran, 1993) and survey analyses (Gamoran, 1992).

Second, researchers have used econometric techniques to mitigate selectivity bias. Gamoran and Mare (1989) estimated endogenous switching regressions that model track assignment and track effects simultaneously, allowing for correlated errors among unobserved predictors of assignment and outcomes. Their results, which focused on mathematics achievement and high school completion for the high school class of 1982, indicated that the pattern of increasing inequality observed in standard regression analyses with rich controls was upheld in the more complex technique. Lucas and Gamoran (2002) replicated these results for the high school class of 1992, as well as the class of 1982, and with course-based as well as self-reported indicators of track location. Again, the main findings were upheld. However, Betts and Shkolnik (2000), who estimated both propensity models and two-stage least squares regression models of track effects on mathematics achievement, concluded that the differential effects of tracking for students in high and low tracks were much smaller than reported in earlier studies that relied on simple regressions. Figlio and Page (2002) similarly called into question the inequality consequences of tracking on secondary school math achievement, on the basis of two-stage least squares regression models.³ While it is premature to conclude that tracking is not harmful to low achievers, these studies, combined with the early experimental research, suggest the effects may be smaller than is typically assumed. Since Gamoran and Mare focused on broad curricular tracking, while Betts and Shkolnik and Figlio and Page examined between-class ability grouping, the findings may also indicate that the latter are less consequential for inequality than the former.

Mechanisms of track effects on achievement

With few exceptions, the evidence indicates that tracking tends to magnify inequality. Why is that the case? Conceptually, researchers have identified mechanisms of social comparison as well as differentiated instruction, but empirically it appears that instructional variation across tracks and groups at different levels is the more prominent reason for increases in achievement gaps between tracks. A number of studies have concluded that students in high tracks encounter more challenging curricula, move at a faster pace, and are taught by more experienced teachers with better reputations, while students in low tracks encounter more fragmented, worksheet-oriented, and slower-paced instruction provided by teachers with less experience or clout (for reviews, see Gamoran, 2004; Oakes *et al.*, 1992). These findings have emerged at the elementary, middle, and high school levels. Instructional differences reflect not only what teachers do in classrooms, but also how students respond. A recent finding along these lines comes from the work of Carbonaro (2005), who demonstrated that achievement diverges in part because high-track students put forth more effort on their schoolwork than low-track students. While this finding reflected, in part, low-track students' responses to instruction that was less intellectually stimulating than the instruction given to high-track classes, it also stemmed from differences that students brought with them to class.

Other new examples of instructional mediation of track effects come from both hypothesis-testing and interpretive research. In a study of sixty-four middle and high school English classes, Applebee *et al.* (2003) reported greater use of discussion-based approaches to literature instruction in high-ability than in low-ability classes, and this difference accounted for just over one third of the effect of ability group assignment on writing performance. Discussion-based

approaches included authentic questions and uptake (questions with no prespecified answer and those that build on prior statements), open discussion, drawing in multiple perspectives (envisionment-building), and conversations that connected different curricular topics. Watanabe (2008) reported parallel instructional differences based on in-depth analyses of 68 hours of classroom observation in two teachers' language arts classes. In high-ability classes, she found more engagement with challenging and meaningful curricula, more writing assignments in more diverse genres, and more feedback from teachers, as contrasted with more emphasis on test preparation in low tracks.

Findings that instructional differentiation accounts for much of the effect of tracking have led some observers to conclude that tracking per se does not generate inequality, but rather inequality has emerged because of the way in which tracking has been implemented (e.g., Hallinan, 1994). If instruction in low tracks could be effectively geared towards students' needs, this argument states, then tracking might mitigate rather than exacerbate inequality. While reasonable in principle, this goal has proven difficult to accomplish in practice, and there are few examples of effective instruction in low-track classes (for exceptions, see Gamoran, 1993, and Gamoran & Weinstein, 1998). At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that most studies of ability grouping and curriculum tracking have found that high-achieving students tend to perform better when assigned to high-level groups than when taught in mixed-ability settings. Proponents of tracking tend to emphasize the benefits of high-level classes for high-achieving students, with little attention to implications for inequality, while critics tend to focus on inequality without acknowledging the effects for high achievers. As a result, proponents and critics are apt to talk past one another with little chance for resolution, and student-assignment policies often lurch from one system to another, without recognition of the strengths and shortcomings of each (Boaler *et al.*, 2000; Gamoran, 2002; Tsuneyoshi, 2004).

New international research on tracking and achievement

An emerging body of international work is largely consistent with the findings from the US and the UK. Perhaps the most revealing results come from new cross-national studies of international achievement data. Analyses from PISA 1999 (Program on International Student Assessment), a study conducted in twenty-eight OECD countries, indicated that countries with more differentiated school systems are characterized by greater inequality by social origins in reading achievement (OECD, 2002). Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) reinforced this conclusion by comparing twenty countries that participated in both PISA and PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study), showing that achievement inequality tends to increase more between the primary and secondary grades in countries that practice early tracking than in countries that do not. Similarly, research on twenty-four countries that participated in TIMSS 2003 (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Survey) at Grades 4 and 8 showed that countries that rely on between-class ability grouping for mathematics exhibit more growth in achievement inequality from Grades 4 to 8 than countries that make less use of ability grouping (Huang, *in press*). These findings are consistent with numerous single-nation studies showing that tracking tends to reinforce inequality.

A recurring theme in the international work is that grouping and tracking come in many forms, a point that is easily missed when one focuses on a single nation. For example, countries differ on whether tracking occurs largely between schools (e.g. Japan, Germany), within schools (Australia, Belgium, Israel, US), or both (Taiwan, UK). In these different tracking systems, the

scope of tracking may be wide (covering many subjects) or narrow (implemented on a subject-by-subject basis). Countries also differ on whether differentiation is introduced early or late, and whether or not the system is flexible enough to allow mobility between tracks. These structural differences were anticipated by Sorensen (1970), but have been greatly elaborated as international differences have become evident (LeTendre *et al.*, 2003). What is striking about the variation in the *forms* of tracking, however, is that the *results* are broadly similar: where tracking systems are present, achievement tends to diverge, and to reinforce initial differences by social class. New studies from Japan (Ono, 2001), Korea (Park, 2009), South Africa (Hoadley, 2008), Israel (Ayalon, 2006), Germany (Cheng *et al.*, 2007), Belgium (Van de Gaer *et al.*, 2006; Van Houtte, 2004), and the UK (Boaler *et al.*, 2000; Iverson and Duveen, 2005; Ireson *et al.*, 2002) all identify aspects of increasing inequality associated with grouping between or within schools. Moreover, as ethnic minority groups increase in size, and ethnic inequality is increasingly recognized in nations that were formerly relatively homogeneous (such as European countries with new populations of guest workers), researchers are finding that tracking reinforces ethnic inequalities (Cheng *et al.*, 2007). Iverson and Duveen (2005) in the UK and Ayalon (2006) in Israel also demonstrated that horizontal differentiation (i.e. divisions between subjects) tend to stratify students by social origins, just as does vertical differentiation (divisions between levels). Finally, Van Houtte (2004) presented findings from Belgium that supported the conclusion from US research that track effects are driven by instructional differences to an important degree.

Within this common framework, interesting differences also emerge. For example, in countries with well-articulated standards tied to curriculum and assessment, the harmful effects of tracking may be mitigated by incentives for success in lower level classes. Brooded (1997) reported that high-stakes exams targeted at different achievement levels in Taiwan led all students, including those in low tracks, to work hard at their studies, and, as a result, tracking contributed to *smaller* achievement inequalities. Similarly in the case of Israel, Ayalon and Gamoran (2000) found that schools with multiple ability levels within college-preparatory mathematics programs tended to have *less* inequality by social origin than schools with only a single level. They attributed this result to meaningful incentives attached to lower level mathematics courses that, like higher level courses, led to high stakes assessments at the end of high school. Likewise, a secondary curriculum reform in Scotland that raised standards for lower level students resulted in declining inequality of achievement over time (Gamoran, 1996), and in Australia, a reform in secondary English that reduced the number of tracks and simultaneously raised standards in low tracks may have boosted test scores overall (Stanley and McCann, 2005). In the US, a parallel finding is that Catholic schools, which place more academic demands on students in lower tracks than public schools, tend to exhibit less achievement inequality between tracks than public schools (Gamoran, 1992). These findings reinforce Brooded's (1997) conclusion that the impact of tracking is context-dependent and suggest that, in principle, tracking's pernicious effects on low achievers can be reduced or eliminated. Thus far, however, attempts to use ability grouping to raise achievement in the context of high standards in US public schools have met with limited success (Lewis and Cheng, 2006; Mickelson and Everett, 2008; Sandholtz *et al.*, 2004).

New insights from US research on detracking

More than fifteen years ago, Oakes (1992) insightfully identified three challenges to detracking: normative challenges, based on long-standing beliefs that young persons differ by ability and

that schools should be structured to meet those differences; political challenges, reflecting the difficulty of overcoming vested interests in tracking such as those held by parents of high-achieving students and by teachers who enjoy teaching honors classes; and technical challenges, reflecting the difficulty of instructing students of widely varying levels of performance, a task for which few teachers are prepared. Most of the emphasis in Oakes' subsequent work (see especially the 2005 edition of her classic book, *Keeping track*) and that of her colleagues and students (e.g. Oakes and Wells, 1998; Wells and Serna, 1996; Welner, 2001; Yonezawa *et al.*, 2002) has been on the normative and political challenges, reasoning that if these challenges could be met, the technical difficulties could be overcome. Recent evidence, however, suggests the opposite: failure to solve the technical problems of mixed-ability teaching is a major impediment to addressing the normative and political challenges. While the technical challenges have defied easy solution, recent work has identified conditions under which effective teaching in mixed-ability contexts may be more successful than in the past.

Challenges of detracking

Loveless's (1999) analysis of detracking reforms in California and Massachusetts revealed substantial resistance from teachers who believed that they were not equipped to succeed in instructing students at widely varying performance levels within the same classrooms. Teachers' attitudes towards detracking tended to differ by subject matter, with mathematics and foreign language teachers more resistant than teachers in other subjects, owing to beliefs about the sequential nature of knowledge in these disciplines (see also Ball, 1987; Gamoran and Weinstein, 1998). Even in social studies, however, a subject area that might be viewed as particularly conducive to mixed-ability teaching because of the potential for discussion of topics from diverse viewpoints, detracking efforts have run into technical difficulties. One case study found that teachers struggled to engage students in classes with widely varying achievement levels: low-achieving students had difficulty with assignments, while high-achieving students were bored (Rosenbaum, 1999). In another study, Rubin (2008) found that detracking in social studies seemed to work well in a middle-class suburban school with a relatively homogeneous population, as teachers emphasized active learning and differentiated assignments for students at different performance levels. However, detracked social studies classes appeared less effective in a more diverse school, where teachers aimed more for relevance than for high standards; and in an inner-city school with a low-income population, detracking resulted in a highly routinized curriculum with little challenge for students. Rubin's observations in the inner-city school mirrored earlier findings by Gamoran and Weinstein (1998) from an urban school in which tracking in mathematics was eliminated by diluting the curriculum in mixed-ability classes to a level that all students could follow, with the result that teachers complained students were not being prepared to move to more advanced mathematics.

Ironically, findings from all three of these case studies (Gamoran and Weinstein, 1998; Rosenbaum, 1999; Rubin, 2008) suggest that high-achieving minority students may have the most to lose when detracking is unsuccessful. These students are often found in urban schools where detracking has not resulted in challenging instruction in mixed-ability classes, and they may lack the support outside of school to succeed in the absence of a challenging curriculum. Rubin (2003) brought this problem to life based on interviews and observations of a high-achieving minority student in a detracked school, who socialized with a small group consisting of less academically oriented peers, to the detriment of her academic work.

Some schools have attempted to reduce the use of tracking by allowing students to select their own track assignments. Recent case studies suggest, however, that student choice is not an effective detracking mechanism, because students tend to sort themselves into classes in much the same way as a traditional tracking system, and with the corresponding results for social class and race/ethnic divisions (Watanabe, 2007). Yonezawa *et al.* (2002) proposed that differential access to information and varied aspirations among students contributed to this pattern. In addition, they noted that minority students preferred classes in which they were not racially isolated and in which their cultural backgrounds were valued. These findings reflect the familiar tension between commonality and differentiation: while there may be benefits to students' academic performance from pursuing a common curriculum, students are motivated by their interests and social concerns, which may result in ethnic as well as academic divisions among students.

Boaler and Staples (2008) uncovered mixed success in another detracking case study. Initially, achievement gains appeared in one detracked school compared with two others that did not detrack. However, the gains were not sustained over the three years of the study. Moreover, the achievement benefits were not evident on the high stakes state standardized test, and it is difficult at any rate to attribute achievement trends to any single reform in a sample of three schools. Nonetheless, the study is enticing in its call for further examination of instruction in detracked schools.

Addressing the technical challenge: differentiated instruction in mixed-ability classes

Not all cases of mixed-ability teaching have met with frustration. In the same research project that uncovered a case of diluted curriculum in a detracked school (discussed in the last section), Gamoran and Weinstein (1998) also identified a successful instance of detracking in secondary school mathematics. In this urban, east-coast high school, in which half the students were eligible to receive free or reduced-price lunch, student performance on authentic assessments was the highest of all the twenty-five highly restructured schools from which this case was drawn. In this school, mathematics and science instruction were integrated in the same class, and student work was project-oriented; for example, researchers observed students applying principles of mathematics and physics in completing an assignment to design rides in an amusement park. Students were assessed based on portfolios of work in a variety of subjects, and expectations for students took into account their progress as well as the levels of excellence they had attained. Moreover, students were expected to have mastered elementary mathematics, and, if they had not, a Saturday tutoring program was available to help them along. Key elements that supported a rigorous curriculum in a mixed-ability setting in this school were small classes (limited to fifteen students), the supplemental tutoring program, a visionary leader who had selected a staff with congruent attitudes, and the opportunity to interview students prior to students' admission to the school.

More recently, Burris and her colleagues (Burris *et al.*, 2006, 2008) also identified cases of high achievement in mathematics that resulted from a move to mixed-ability teaching. The authors used an interrupted time series design to assess the impact of the reform, comparing the achievement trajectories of schools before the reform with their trajectories afterwards, as well as with the trajectories of other schools that did not undergo the reform over the same time period. At the middle school level in this New York school district (Burris *et al.*, 2006), teachers implemented an accelerated curriculum for all students paired with a supplemental

workshop to support students who had trouble keeping up. They also introduced common preparation time for teachers and increased the use of calculators in class. At the high school level, the low-track non-Regents class was eliminated, and all students were placed in mathematics classes that led to the Regents diploma. Students who struggled with this class had available to them a supplementary class that met three times each week. At both levels, student achievement rose following the introduction of the reform. Achievement gaps narrowed as low achievers gained more than high achievers, but there was no evidence that high achievers suffered in their performance as a result of the reform. Achievement gains did not reflect increasing high-school dropout rates; on the contrary, dropout rates declined over the period of the reform. It should be noted that this case involved an economically advantaged school district with relatively few high-needs students compared with other New York school districts. The supplemental class also provided about 50 percent more mathematics instruction to low-achieving students.

The new research by Burris and colleagues is extremely important because it demonstrates that detracking *can* result in gains for low achievers *without* the losses for high achievers observed in earlier attempts. As in the case study reported by Gamoran and Weinstein (1998), however, success was based in part on favorable circumstances, particularly the resources that enabled the school to offer extra mathematics instruction for struggling students. This accomplishment calls for replication in other contexts to assess its broader viability.

Conclusion: new directions for research and practice

While definitive solutions remain elusive, the present time is witness to exciting new prospects for balancing the aims of commonality and differentiation in arranging students for instruction. Recent findings lend support to two approaches that merit further experimentation in research and practice: raising standards for low achievers in differentiated classrooms; and providing differentiated learning opportunities in mixed-ability classrooms. The key to evaluating both approaches will be careful monitoring of the nature and quality of instruction and the relation between instruction and achievement, however students are arranged for class.

Raising standards for low-achieving students

The practical conclusion from years of tracking research that low-level, dead-end courses should be eliminated is no longer seriously debated. High-school courses such as general math and business English do not prepare students for post-secondary opportunities and are less effective than regular courses such as algebra and college-preparatory English, even for students with low skill levels in these areas. This conclusion still leaves open the possibility, however, that meaningful instruction at all skill levels could make differentiated classes an effective way to organize students for learning.

Critics of tracking such as Oakes (2005) argue that, because tracking is inherently stratifying, it is just not possible to offer effective instruction to low-achieving students in ability-grouped classes. Indeed, examples of high-quality instruction in low-ability classes are rare. Yet recent international research shows that differentiated class settings for low achievers can be effective when they are tied to meaningful outcomes, such as assessments that are aligned to the curriculum, and provide access to jobs and further education. Studies from Taiwan (Broaded, 1997) and Israel (Ayalon and Gamoran, 2000) demonstrated that differentiation within academic

programs in which meaningful instruction and valued incentives are present at all ability levels can result in less inequality than systems of fewer levels in which low-achieving students lack access to meaningful incentives. Other research from Scotland (Gamoran, 1996) and Australia (Stanley and McCann, 2005) observed that the negative effects of tracking for low achievers diminished when the degree of tracking was reduced and when academic standards in the lower level classes were elevated. The common ingredient in all four cases was a meaningful assessment that had value for students in lower-level as well as higher-level classes.

Do these findings have any bearing on the US, where classes for low achievers typically lack meaningful incentives for effort or performance? The finding that Catholic schools obtain smaller achievement gaps between tracks than public schools by providing more rigorous instruction in low tracks, and cases of successful low-track instruction in Catholic schools (Gamoran, 1993) and restructured public schools (Gamoran and Weinstein, 1998) merely show that exceptions are possible, not that making low-track instruction more effective by raising standards overall is a viable reform strategy for the US. The current emphasis on test-based accountability in the US might, in principle, lead schools to create effective low-ability classes in order to meet accountability requirements. However, the evidence so far suggests that accountability-driven tracking is no more effective for low achievers than other forms of tracking (Sandholtz *et al.*, 2004). Based on insights from the international work, one can identify at least three elements that would need to change to make low-track classes more effective: First, the assessments towards which students were striving would need to be tied to futures that were more visibly meaningful to students than is currently the case. At present, students are prodded to perform on multiple-choice tests whose underlying standards are not evident to students and which demand fragmented knowledge rather than coherent mastery of subject matter that has relevance beyond the test itself. Second, the assessments would need to offer incentives for students as well as schools; at present, schools are held accountable for student performance, but the students themselves are not. Positive incentives such as access to jobs and/or post-secondary education would need to be offered, not merely negative sanctions such as denial of a high school diploma. Third, the alignment between the course curriculum and the assessment would need to be tighter than has typically been the case in the US.

Differentiating instruction in mixed-ability settings

Although detracking remains a challenging solution, with more examples of failure than success, the findings of recent studies are positive enough to warrant further efforts. An examination of reports of effective instruction in mixed-ability classes yields several common ingredients. First, the success stories all recognize that students differ in the skills and interests they bring with them to class. Successful cases reported by Burris, Gamoran, and Connor and their colleagues are not instances in which teachers acted as if students were all alike. Instead, teachers responded to variation among students in their teaching. Second, and correspondingly, all the successful cases involved differentiated instruction within the mixed-ability setting. In the secondary school cases reported by Burris, Gamoran, and their colleagues, differentiation involved supplemental instruction that was available for students who struggled with class materials. In Connor's elementary school research, differentiation meant carefully analyzing students' skill levels, matching skills to particular instructional strategies, and arranging students for instruction within classes in such a way as to match the skill levels with instructional approaches. Third, teachers in each of these cases had access to important resources that allowed them to supplement instruction and tailor it to students' needs. Future efforts would do well to keep these elements in mind.

Combining research on tracking with research on teaching

After a century of research on tracking and ability grouping, one might expect to see a definitive answer to the question of how best to organize students for instruction. Yet the dilemma persists, because the goals of commonality and differentiation lie in uneasy proximity to one another, because every approach has disadvantages as well as advantages, and because the consequences of different solutions vary by context. Research in the last decade has made important progress, however, by focusing on the instruction provided to students assigned to class in different ways. Ultimately, how students are arranged matters less than the instruction they encounter, so bringing together research on tracking with research on teaching offers the most useful way to continue to shed light on this topic of continuing interest.

Notes

- 1 The author is grateful for helpful research assistance from Michelle Robinson and exceptional editing from Cathy Loeb.
- 2 US writers often use the terms "tracking" and "ability grouping" interchangeably. For brevity I use the single term "tracking" to capture all the various forms of structural differentiation for instruction. When distinguishing among different forms, I use the term "tracking" to refer to the practice of dividing students into separate classes (or clusters of classes) for all of their academic subjects, and the term "ability grouping" to mean the division of students into classes on a subject-by-subject basis. This use parallels the different meanings of the terms "streaming" and "setting" used in the UK. I use the terms "within-class ability grouping" to refer to the use of instructional groups within class for a particular subject, and "between-school grouping" to refer to systems in which students are assigned to separate schools targeted to different futures on the basis of varied academic performance.
- 3 Models estimated by Betts and Shkolnik (2000) and Figlio and Page (2002) rely on very strong assumptions, so their results should be interpreted with particular caution. Betts and Shkolnik's conclusions rest on comparisons of classes at similar ability levels as reported by teachers but located in schools that differed on whether the principal reported that tracking was used for mathematics. Yet teacher reports of class ability levels may reflect between-class ability grouping irrespective of the principal's report. Figlio and Page (2002) used as instruments for track assignment indicators that, on the face of it, seem far-fetched: two- and three-way interactions between the number of courses required for graduation, the number of schools in the county, and the fraction of voters in the county who voted for President Reagan in 1984. Weak instruments would undermine the estimates of track effects and could bias them towards zero.

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Economic globalisation, skill formation and the consequences for higher education

Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder

Introduction

There are striking parallels between the stories that were told to justify economic policy over the past decade in Britain and America and the stories that have been told about the benefits of globalisation and the knowledge economy. Just as we have been told that the business cycle could be abolished – the end to boom and bust – so the advent of the 'knowledge' economy was accompanied by claims that, for those who invested in education, the rewards would be great. The management guru Peter Drucker (1993) argued that we were in a new stage of capitalist development that would lead to a fundamental shift in power from the owners and managers of capital to knowledge workers. Not only would they assume power, but with it would come greater autonomy, creativity and rewards.

This is a story that politicians and policy makers have sold to the public and it has placed education at the centre of questions of economic competitiveness and social justice. In this scenario, Drucker's thinking echoes the pioneering work of Bell (1973), who predicted that the growing importance of 'knowledge' work, reflected in the historical shift from blue-collar to white-collar work, would significantly raise the demand for educated workers and give them greater autonomy in paid work.

The fundamental problem with this beguiling vision is that it does not take into account the power relations and imperatives of capitalist economies. There is little doubt that there have been significant changes in the division of labour and the nature of work in developed capitalist economies, in which issues relating to the control of knowledge work have been linked to economic globalisation. But rather than these changes leading to greater creativity and autonomy for the majority of knowledge workers, only a minority has benefitted, while the majority is being confronted by routinisation created by intense global competitive pressures and a resulting labour market for high-skilled, low-waged work. Routinisation has been developed through the process of *digital Taylorism*, which we describe below, while the labour market for high-skilled, low-waged work has created a *global auction* in which high-skilled work goes to those who offer the lowest price. These processes challenge existing theories of the

education–economy relationship. In turn, a fundamental recasting of existing theories is required. However, the argument made here is particularly relevant to the West, while, in the economies of India and China, the picture is different, as these same trends have resulted in a growing middle class alongside a new class of the super rich.

Education and capitalism

We can identify two theoretical approaches to the education–economy relationship, those of consensus and conflict. Drucker's (1993) view is representative of the consensus approach, which assumes that the knowledge economy represents the pinnacle of a historical process in which, as new technologies have been developed, so education has played an increasingly central role in economic development and social justice. This is because it is assumed that, as technologies become more complex, so a more highly educated workforce is required. In turn, this leads to greater opportunities for upward social mobility and a reduction in poverty as more people gain the education required for higher paid work. For Drucker, the advent of what he considers to be the knowledge economy also changes the power relationships between the highly educated and capital, since the latter now depends on the expertise of the former. The consensus approach has a long pedigree, dating back at least to the work of Kerr *et al.* (1973), and has been embraced by policy makers because it represents a 'win-win' approach to economic development and social justice. Underlying these views is the theory of human capital and its contemporary variant, skill bias theory.

Human capital theory makes the claim that if individuals invest in education they will be suitably rewarded in the labour market, because their education will reflect their enhanced capacity for productivity, and it is on this basis that they will earn high wages (Baker, 2009; Becker, 2006).

Skill bias theory (Acemoglu, 2002) can be seen as a more sophisticated variant of human capital theory. It has become popular because it sees new technology as the driver of the demand for educated labour: it recognises that some uses of technology can be skill-replacing, that is, workers are deskilled, either as technologies make their jobs simpler through routinisation, or as they are simply replaced by machines. However, skill bias theorists have argued that, as a matter of fact, the introduction of new technologies has increased the demand for educated labour, for the reasons that human capital theory predicts. Here, then, is a range of sophisticated theories that all view the education–economy relationship as crucial to social and economic progress.

In contrast to the consensus approach, conflict theorists have argued that education should be considered a site of struggle between groups, in which not only are economic development and social justice divorced, but the links between education and economic development are far more complex than consensus theorists assume. Perhaps for these reasons, most conflict theorists have focused on the inequalities in education in relation to social class, patriarchy and racist structures, and to state policies, rather than on the economic processes underlying them.

If we turn first to the issue of social justice, there is broad agreement across the two major conflict traditions, neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian, that education is a site of struggle, although the nature of the struggle is conceived in different ways. For the former, as represented most starkly in the correspondence principle of Bowles and Gintis (1976), education serves to discipline and socialise future workers into capitalist work and their social class station in life.

In doing so, it also reproduces the inequalities in life chances between working-class students and their wealthier counterparts from the executive and managerial ruling class. There is, therefore, a correspondence between the nature of a socially classed education system and the demands of capitalist work.

Neo-Weberian and related theorists have viewed education as a struggle for credentials between competing groups. They point to a range of strategies, intended and unintended, by which professional and managerial elites have loaded the competition for credentials in their favour (see, for example, Ball, 2003; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). But they can also explain why the connection between credentials and the labour market is also problematic in a way that consensus theorists cannot. For a start, they argue that any kind of direct relationship between education, productivity and economic growth is implausible because of the key role of credentials in linking education to the labour market. Credentials may not reflect the understandings and skills that workers have and they may not reflect the kinds of skill necessary for the workplace: they are a rather blunt instrument for the selection and sorting of workers (Livingstone, 1998). Most significantly, however, credentials are a positional good, which means that their value is socially determined (Brown, 2006; Hirsch, 1976). When there is an oversupply of a particular educational qualification, say a bachelor's degree, then it will lose its value in the marketplace, and students will have to gain a higher degree in order to restore their value as skilled workers; inevitably it is those students with access to the resources to pursue their studies that will gain, for example, those from professional middle-class backgrounds. Studies that have been undertaken of the degree to which the demand for a particular credential is driven by the associated inflation with positional competition, as opposed to the upskilling of jobs, suggest that both play a significant role in the level of credential that employers demand (Collins, 1979; Weedon, 2002).

Finally, we should note that these key elements in the relationship between education and nation-state capitalism are likely to be contradictory (Dale, 1989). In what follows, we will show how new forms of contradiction are clearly visible in the West, as capitalism has moved from being centred on the nation-state to economic globalisation. However, before examining the source of these contradictions, some comments on the limitations of both consensus and conflict approaches in the light of economic globalisation are appropriate.

One of the strengths of the consensus approach is that it has a theory of how education contributes to economic development through the impetus given by new and more sophisticated forms of technology. But it is a theory confined either to national boundaries (Baker, 2009; Goldin and Katz, 2008b; Heckman, 2008) or to a view of economic globalisation in which the superior education systems of America and Britain will enable graduates to win in the competition for high-skilled work (Reich, 1991; Rosecrance, 1999). However, the account of the global restructuring of work and the labour processes we present here suggests inadequacies in both consensus and conflict theories. While existing conflict theories have clear strengths in explaining why education gives advantage to professional and managerial elites at the expense of working-class students (the social justice question), they have little or no theoretical resources to explain the impact of economic globalisation on national education systems and job markets.

Changes in the global division of labour

In order to show why economic globalisation challenges both consensus and conflict theorists and to identify the trends that have led to the contradictions between higher education and

the labour market in the West, we shall turn to an exposition of a study of the skill formation strategies of transnational companies (TNCs), because they have been at the heart of the changes in the global demand for skilled workers (Brown *et al.*, 2009; Lauder *et al.*, 2008).

There are three elements to the new phase of economic globalisation that we would identify from our study that challenge both consensus and conflict theories of the education–economy relationship, particularly in relation to higher education. These are: first, the advent of a global auction for high-skilled work, which in part has been made possible by large numbers of high-quality graduates from emerging economies, especially in the East; second, the development of digital Taylorism, which has the potential to routinise much of what was once considered knowledge work; and, third, the consequent new divisions within managerial and technical jobs. In turn, these changes have threatened many middle-class jobs while intensifying the positional competition for entry to elite universities, creating a significant mismatch between higher education and demand for ‘knowledge’ workers.

Higher education and the global auction for high-skilled jobs

The pace of expansion of higher education in China, India and Russia has contributed to the rapid increase in the global supply of high-skilled workers. Based on our analysis of enrolment figures for ninety-eight emerging and developed countries, we found that tertiary-level enrolments (undergraduate and postgraduate) virtually doubled within a decade, from 33.4 million in 1995 to 62.9 million in 2005.¹

Figure 20.1 shows that, in 2006, China had almost six million more students than the United States and ten times as many students as Britain. But perhaps the most extraordinary statistic on education in China was enrolment to senior secondary schools, which has increased from 26 per cent to almost 60 per cent since 1990. To achieve this expansion, over 250 new teacher-training colleges were established, and qualified graduate teachers were offered better housing, remuneration and healthcare by the Ministry of Education.² Equally, participation in higher




Figure 20.1 The expansion of tertiary education in selected emerging and developed economies (enrolments) (in thousands).

Source: Brown *et al.* (2008).

education increased from a little over 3 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 2006.³ These figures reflect a broader strategy presented in an official policy statement on employment prospects to 2020, which recognized the need to ‘make efforts in improving education quality, so as to train millions of high-caliber workers, thousands of special talents and a large number of outstanding innovative talents for the socialist modernization drive’.⁴

While these data should be treated as indicative, and remembering that enrolment figures do not tell us how many actually enter the global job market on an annual basis, owing to high levels of drop-out in some countries, it is nevertheless salutary to consider that the expansion of higher education has not been limited to OECD member states or the BRIC nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Ukraine and Mexico have more people enrolled in higher education than the United Kingdom, with Poland and Turkey gaining rapid ground, doubling their participation rates between 1995 and 2005.

When we look at the subjects being studied, we can see a marked increase in numbers in Asia taking sciences and engineering (see Figure 20.2).

This supply of educated labour has enabled TNCs to create a new spatial division of labour for high-skilled activities, including research, innovation and product development. Whereas once it was assumed that the ‘brain’ work would be done in the West, especially the United States because of the high quality of higher education, while the ‘body’ work would be done in East Asia (Reich, 1991; Rosecrance, 1999), it is clear from the skill strategies of TNCs that this is no longer the case. In turn, this has led to the possibility of a global auction in which the same quality high-skilled work can be undertaken in East Asia for a fraction of the price of labour charged in the West. For example, a chip designer costs \$300,000 per year in the United States, as against \$28,000 in Shanghai (UNCTAD, 2005). This global auction, in which TNCs can choose where to locate high-skilled work, knowing that the quality of the work will be the same, whether it is performed in Shanghai, Los Angeles or Stuttgart, has profound implications for middle-class aspirations in America and Western Europe: middle-class students in these countries are no longer guaranteed the kind of work described by Drucker in which




Figure 20.2 First university degrees in science and engineering fields in Asia, Europe and North America, by field: 2004 or more recent years (in thousands).

Note: Natural sciences include physical, biological, earth, atmospheric and ocean sciences.

Source: Science and Engineering Indicators 2008. Available online at www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/c2/fig02-34.xls.

graduates could expect high-paying, high-status jobs with a high degree of autonomy. But there are other processes at work that also undermine such expectations.

Digital Taylorism

One of the fundamental problems with the standard account of the knowledge economy and knowledge workers is that it is a-historical (Brint, 2001). Bursts of creativity are followed by the routinisation of work to enable profits to be made. In today's global competitive environment, knowledge workers are too expensive and difficult to control, so various attempts are now being made to codify, standardise and translate knowledge work into working knowledge. Rather than knowledge being locked into one person's head for which he/she can charge a premium, working knowledge is available to corporations in the form of software programmes and prescripts that can be utilised by lower-skilled workers. We call the routinisation of production platforms and processes in both offices and factories *digital Taylorism*, because innovations can be translated into sets of routines that might require some degree of education but not the kind of creativity and independence of judgement that is often associated with the rhetoric of the knowledge economy: the technical revolution in software that can translate knowledge work into working knowledge has been crucial to this process (Brown *et al.*, forthcoming).

Hence, when knowledge work has been standardised by software protocols, it is then possible for TNCs to ship work across the globe to where routinised knowledge work is cheapest. Where it once seemed impossible for high-skilled work to be codified, it is clear that even highly skilled jobs are being targeted in much the same way that craft knowledge was captured by companies in the development of Fordist assembly-line production. For example, law firms now send an increasing amount of their preparatory case work to places such as Manila.

This routinisation of knowledge work has contributed to a fundamental division within what were once considered high-skilled, middle-class jobs. But there are further sources of fracture within the middle classes created by the ideology of the 'war for talent'.

Divisions within managerial and technical occupations

Within the processes we have described above, the nature of skills and reward is fundamentally changing, creating significant divisions in what were once considered middle-class careers for graduates. Instead of a career ladder, it is clear that corporations are distinguishing between those they consider the 'talented', who are, typically, fast-tracked into senior managerial positions, and those who are considered worthy, loyal and committed, but who do not have the key ingredients for leadership positions. Beneath them are the workers who engage in routine knowledge work. The ideology of the 'war for talent' asserts that, despite mass higher education, there are only a few especially talented graduates who can take on leadership roles in large companies. It is claimed that global corporations now need a range of skills in leadership positions that were not in demand when companies were embedded in national economies (Brown and Hesketh, 2004). These new skill sets, which only the small minority of 'talented' are deemed to have, are therefore highly rewarded. In turn, this is exacerbating the positional competition for entry to elite universities around the globe.

Leading TNCs gravitate towards the global elite of universities because they are believed to have the best and brightest students. This view is actively promoted by universities, as higher

education has become a global business. The branding of universities and faculty members is integral to the organisation of academic enquiry. Claims to world-class standards depend on attracting 'the best' academics and forming alliances with elite universities elsewhere in the world, while recruiting the 'right' kinds of student. Universities play the same reputational games as companies, because it is a logical consequence of global market competition between universities.

Social class and the intensification of positional competition

Both British and American higher education is differentiated by institution and social class. The advent of the global auction for high-skilled jobs has the effect of intensifying the competition for access to elite universities, because it is only those who gain entry to them (the 'talented') who can avoid a reverse (Dutch) auction for knowledge work. Recent figures for the socio-economic profile of British universities show that those from the upper end of the socio-economic scale dominate elite universities. For example, the university with the highest percentage of students from top socio-economic backgrounds (bands 1, 2 and 3) in 2006–2007 was Oxford, with 90.2 per cent, followed by Cambridge with 88.5 per cent (HESA, 2008).

A similar story applies in America. Bowen *et al.* (2005) have documented the inequalities in participation in higher education in the United States. There are several reasons for this, but they include the preferential treatment given to alumni of the elite universities, along with high costs. In 2000, the cost of a year at the big three universities, Harvard, Yale and Princeton, had reached \$35,000, an amount that less than 10 per cent of American families could afford. By 2004, this had risen to \$40,000. And while there was some assistance for less well-off students, the majority paid full fees. Even then, better-off families seemed to have captured the scholarships available. At Harvard, the majority of scholarship recipients had a family income of over \$70,000, with a quarter having an income of over \$100,000.⁵ When this is translated into the share of family income that goes on tuition fees, even though there is a reduction for low-income families, the latter pay an estimated 49 per cent of family income. In contrast, the proportion of family income paid in tuition fees for unaided students, those that come from wealthy families, is 21 per cent.⁶

Not surprisingly, among the dominant classes in America there is over-representation in terms of degrees, especially from the elite universities. David Rothkopf (2008), writing of the new super-class, notes that, among the CEOs of America's leading corporations, 30 per cent attended one of only twenty elite universities, led by Stanford, Harvard and Chicago. He estimates that 91 per cent have an undergraduate degree, and 47 per cent a postgraduate degree, which makes them far better educated than the general population. He shows how these elite universities provide the basis for forging networks between students and alumni, listing the number of high-profile CEOs that graduated from the Harvard Business School Class of 1979.

Given that TNCs are seeking the most 'talented' from the elite universities, there is a clear difference in wages between those who have attended elite universities and those who have attended less prestigious institutions. In Britain, Hussain *et al.* (2008) calculate that those from elite universities earn double the wages of those from lower-ranked institutions, while in America Goldin and Katz (2008a) report that graduates from Harvard attract a massive premium with those, for example, entering finance occupations earning 195 per cent above other occupations.

Just as there are differences in the earnings of those attending elite universities when compared with those who do not, so not all graduates will have the same life chances in the labour market, nor will they have the same experience at university. Rather, it can be argued that there is a

loose correspondence between social-class background, the type of university attended, extracurricula networking and labour market opportunities.

Naidoo and Jamieson have sought to examine the impact of consumerism on higher education, exploring both the field of higher education in Bourdieucian terms (Naidoo and Jamieson, 2006) and the impact on teaching and learning of where an institution is positioned within the higher-education field. They argue that lower-ranked universities are more likely to engage in pre-packaged learning materials, for example through e-learning type strategies, and forms of assessment and pedagogy that narrow the tasks that students need to accomplish. In turn, the knowledge that is 'transmitted' will be pre-packaged and divided into modular form. In other words, there appears to be a correspondence between the type of pedagogy and curriculum that lower-ranked universities offer and the creation of digital Taylorist work, because much of the latter is based on pre-packaged modular routines.

The opportunity trap

The analysis developed above suggests a scenario where the polarisation in professional middle-class jobs leads to an intensification of positional competition for access to universities. The consequence is that students will have to pay more in fees for less return in the labour market. This is a trap because, if students do not enter the higher-education game, they have even less chance of securing good work and reasonable pay (Brown, 2006). In the United States, male college graduates have seen a decline in their wages from the mid 1970s through to now, for all except those at the 90th percentile. Women have fared a little better, but their wages still lag behind those of men, as shown in Table 20.1 below (Mishel *et al.*, 2007).

While graduates in the United States have not fared as well as the knowledge economy rhetoric suggests, the wages of non-college graduates have declined dramatically over the same forty-year period, so that, even if the wages of university graduates fall, they will still earn a premium over non-university or college graduates, which is why those who have the possibility of going to university are trapped.

In Britain, a similar story can be told: graduate wages flat-lined for all groups through 1991–2000, while the hours worked increased by half a day a week (Lauder *et al.*, 2005). A more recent study has shown that a third of graduates, who started university in England at the

same time as student fees were introduced in 1998, are, by 2008, not repaying their fees.⁷ In England, graduates only start to pay back their state-backed loans when they earn £15,000 or above before tax. This is not surprising, given the data on graduate incomes.

Moreover, the present economic crisis is unlikely to bring any respite to the majority of graduates. We are undergoing a financial crisis that will impact on the higher-education sector. In turn, there is a question as to whether the present participation target of 50 per cent of an age cohort attending university in the UK can be met. It may be that some universities will be closed because public debt is so high. In this case, positional competition will further intensify. On top of this, fees are likely to rise, especially in the elite universities. Even without the economic crisis, this will act as a deterrent to many middle-class, far less working-class students. Finally, governments will always support the elite universities, because their research is seen as a source of global competitive advantage, so again the positional competition to gain entry to elite universities will intensify.

The theoretical implications for changes in education and the global division of labour

The developments we have described in this paper raise fundamental problems for both consensus and conflict theorists. We identified a number of strands to the consensus theory tradition: Drucker's claim that knowledge workers would move to the centre of power; human capital theory, which assumes that graduate returns to education will be highly rewarded because of higher productivity; and skill bias theory, which has claimed that new technology is complementary to skills upgrading, because more highly skilled workers are required, especially in relation to ICT, to operate the new technology. But we can see immediately that the processes we have described have not given power to knowledge workers, quite the opposite: the fracturing of the middle classes has meant that the returns on an investment in higher education are variable and, with the loss of middle-class jobs overseas, are likely to fall. The process of digital Taylorism is what skill bias theorists call skill replacing, because much the knowledge and capability for independent decision-making and initiative have been taken away. Finally, when we look at recent research by human capital and skill bias theorists, it is clear that there has been no acknowledgement of the way the global division of labour for knowledge workers has impacted on national, in this case American, graduate prospects (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Heckman, 2008).

Turning to the conflict tradition, the focus has been on the social justice agenda, and, in particular, on the inequalities of resources, financial and cultural, that are created through social class, patriarchal and racist structures and that impact on children's education. Equally, on the way that the interests of the professional and managerial social classes interact with state policies (Apple, 2006; Ball, 2003) to produce the well-documented inequalities in life chances (Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2008).

One motivation for this agenda has been to mobilise debate about educational inequalities within nations and how they might be addressed. However, we would make two points in relation to the arguments presented here: first, social classes are structured through the labour market in interaction with nation-state policies, therefore, unless we understand the changing nature of the labour market, we cannot comprehend the changing relationship between class and education. Second, changes in the global division of labour are having a fundamental impact on the nature of the class struggle for credentials and, hence, on the issues of social justice,

Table 20.1 Hourly wages for low, median and high earning college graduates: 1979–2005

	1979	1989	1995	2000	2005
Men					
High	38	39	41	45	48
Median	21	21	21	23	23
Low	11	10	10	11	11
Women					
High	23	28	31	35	36
Median	14	16	17	18	18
Low	8	8	8	9	9

Source: Mishel *et al.* (2007), Table 3.2, p. 160.

which raise questions about the role of the nation-state and the focus of conflict theorists in seeking to redress inequalities in education.

Conclusion

We have had two aims in writing this paper: to argue that existing theories of the education–society relationship have been challenged by economic globalisation and to explain why this is so through an account of recent changes in the global division of labour. Here, we showed that these developments would lead to tensions, if not outright contradictions, between higher education and capitalism. There are two, related tensions that we have highlighted. The first concerns the opportunity trap: here, middle-class families will invest more heavily in higher education for less return in the labour market for their children. The second relates to the wages, lifestyles and opportunities that those in Britain and America can expect. A majority of Americans no longer believes that a good education and hard work are enough to find good jobs and financial security (Kusnet *et al.*, 2006). In turn, this breaks the basic contract between citizens and the state by which Americans, and arguably Britons, over the past thirty years have seen education as the key to opportunity and prosperity: a contract in which the state provided the educational opportunities to enable workers to become employable, so long as they were highly motivated and invested in their education. It is hard to tell precisely, at this time of economic depression, what the consequences of the breaking of this contract will be, but we believe they will be profound.

Notes

- 1 For details see Brown *et al.* (2008).
- 2 This represented a 41 per cent increase in the number of full-time teachers in secondary education since 1988. See China Education and Research Network (CERNET), available online at www.edu.cn/english_1369/index.shtml.
- 3 See Jack Chang (2008).
- 4 See Government White Paper (2004).
- 5 See Jerome Karabel (2005).
- 6 See Hill *et al.* (2003).
- 7 *The Guardian*, '1 in 3 graduates not repaying student loans', 3 October 2008.

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Education and the right to the city

The intersection of urban policies, education, and poverty

Pauline Lipman

In this chapter, I discuss the relationship of urban education and urban political economy. I focus on the intersection of education policy and globalized neoliberal political and economic processes that are reshaping cities. After a general overview of urban restructuring, I turn to a specific case. This case illustrates that education policy is not only shaped by neoliberal urbanism but may be productive of the intensified economic, social, and spatial inequalities that characterize cities in the global economy.

Neoliberal globalization and urban restructuring

Neoliberalism is the defining political and economic paradigm of our age (Apple, 2006). The neoliberal agenda extends the logic of the market to all corners of the earth and all spheres of social life, liberalizes trade, drives down the price of labor, and employs financialization as a principle strategy of capital accumulation. The result is a massive transfer of wealth upward, concentrated in the hands of a tiny global elite, and increased economic inequality on a world scale (Harvey, 2005; Jomo and Bodot, 2007). Cities across a range of economic contexts are concentrated expressions of these inequalities, with new geographies of centrality and marginality (Sassen, 2006). In economically "developing" countries, structural adjustment policies mandated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and the deregulation of international commodity markets have destabilized peasantry and further impoverished rural areas. As a result, cities have become meccas for millions of dispossessed and impoverished farmers and workers (Davis, 2006; Harvey, 2005).

As economic activity is reterritorialized at all spatial scales (Robertson and Dale, 2006), cities and large urbanized areas have become fundamental geographical units in the spatial reorganization of the new international division of labor and sites of a range of diverse political, economic, and cultural global connections. On one hand, "global cities," such as New York, London, Tokyo, and São Paulo, are command centers of the global economy, key nodes in global circuits of finance and production (Sassen, 2006). From this perspective, global cities are the pinnacle of an urban hierarchy that includes global niche cities, such as Miami; international

cultural meccas such as Bilbao; small cities defined by capital accumulation typical of global cities; and declining, post-industrial cities such as Adelaide. On the other hand, post-colonial theorists (King, 1990; Rizvi, 2007; Robinson 2002; Smith, 2001) foreground transnational connections among “ordinary cities” in formerly colonized countries. They draw attention to multiple global urban functions, such as Manila’s role as hub of global circuits of low-paid migrant labor (Robinson, 2002). Extended urban areas in the global South have also emerged as the “production hearths” of the global economy (Smith, 2002). Global economic and political processes also intersect, in specific ways, with local and national institutions, ideologies, and relations of power, as well as with specific histories of colonialism, imperialism, post-colonialism, and socialism.

Yet there are common trends, with significant implications for those who live in cities and for urban education. In the following sections, I turn to some of these trends and their relationship to education in one kind of urban context—a “global city” in North America. My discussion is meant to be illustrative of an approach to understanding intersections of education and neoliberal urbanism.

Urbanization and inequality

The world is experiencing an unprecedented level of urbanization. Writing in 2006, Mike Davis noted that, for the first time, the urban population of the world would soon exceed the rural. (At the time of writing, in 2008, this milestone has probably been passed.) Virtually all the world’s population increase will occur in cities, and 95 percent of the increase will be in urban areas of (economically) “developing” countries. Urban areas are also being reshaped as megacities of over 8 million (e.g. Jakarta and Delhi); extended hypercities of over 20 million (e.g. Mexico City and New York); conurbations of urban areas (e.g. the West African Gulf of Guinea, with Lagos as its center); extended urban networks and metropolitan regions (e.g. the Rio/São Paulo extended metropolitan region); and many more mid-sized cities are emerging (China is a key example) (Davis, 2006; Pastor *et al.*, 2000; Scott *et al.*, 2002; Simmonds and Hack, 2000).

Urban areas are concentrated expressions of the dynamics of extreme inequality, marginality, and centrality that characterize the global economy as a whole. While the new world order has spawned increased wealth and advantage for cities in the USA, its Western allies, and some Eastern Europe and Asian countries, most former European colonies have lost ground. Davis (2006) notes that, unlike urbanization fed by the growth of capitalism in Europe in the nineteenth century, cities in the developing world are low-wage labor intensive, rather than capital intensive. However, inequality has increased in both rich and poor states (Jomo and Baudot, 2007), with enclaves of hyper-affluence, transnational knowledge workers, and global elites juxtaposed with concentrations of low-wage and informal workers living in extreme poverty (Amin, 1997). This pattern is evident in cities as diverse as Mumbai, São Paulo, Beijing, and Los Angeles. In short, cities in the global North and global South are characterized by: accelerating urbanization; new patterns of social and spatial exclusion; increased inequalities and degradation of the quality of life for those living in poverty, which in many cities are the vast majority; informalization of labor and housing; and cultural mixes and transnational identities produced by migrations of labor and displacement of peasantry (Davis, 2006; Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000; Sassen, 2006; Valle and Torres, 2000).

Urban education systems tend also to inequalities in educational provision, access, outcomes, and valorized languages, cultures, and identities (see Pink and Noblit 2008). Schools are certainly

impacted by the economic and political processes and policies that are reshaping their contexts (Anyon, 1997; Thompson, 2002). But educational policies are also constitutive of these contexts as well as important sites of resistance.

The political economy of urban education

In *Social justice and the city*, Harvey (1973) argues the urban is “a vantage point from which to capture some salient features operating in society as a whole—it becomes as it were a mirror in which other aspects of society can be reflected” (p. 16). In particular, (Western) metropolitan cities are “the locus of the accumulated contradictions of a society.” They concentrate major cultural, financial, social, and political institutions in close proximity with concentrations of low-income and marginalized populations that are excluded from these institutions (p. 203). This observation is even more prescient at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the present social conjuncture of neoliberalism and resistance (Gill, 2003). In urban areas, this dialectic is unfolding in economic, political, and cultural struggles over what Henri Lefebvre (1996) famously framed as “the right to the city.” Education is integral to these struggles.

In a germinal book on the critical study of urban education, Gerald Grace (1984) argued against the prevailing “policy science” approach to the study of urban education problems in the USA and UK. Drawing on C. Wright Mills’ critique of “abstracted empiricism” in sociology, Grace rejected “technical and immediately realizable,” within-the-system solutions to urban education problems abstracted from the urban context (p. 32). He called for “critical policy scholarship” that situates urban education theoretically and socially in the larger framework of the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts of society. Critical policy scholarship illuminates the material and cultural struggles in which schooling is located and is generative of social action towards social justice (p. 41). An underlying assumption is that policy is an expression of values arising out of specific interests and relations of power. Grace notes that this requires a multidisciplinary approach that draws on urban studies as well as urban sociology. In a somewhat analogous critique, Rury and Mirel (1997) argued that “educational researchers [in the USA] too often accept the urban environment as a given natural setting, rather than one that has itself been determined by larger economic and political processes” (p. 85). They proposed a political economy of US urban education that places at the center of the urban research agenda questions of power, particularly the role of capital and race in structuring urban space.

Building on these insights and extending Grace’s multidisciplinary method, I bring in scholarship in urban studies, critical geography, and urban sociology to shed light on the role of education in restructuring urban space, materially and culturally, along multiple dimensions of power. The spatial restructuring of urban education and its relationship to urban development is illuminated by the work of critical geographers who see space as a constitutive aspect of capitalist accumulation (Harvey, 2005; Smith, 1996). This dynamic is located in what Harvey (2001) calls the “spatial fix.” The territorial organization of capital—the physical location of production facilities, the built environment of cities, places of consumption—is destroyed and rebuilt elsewhere in order to establish a “new locational grid” for the accumulation of capital. Investment and disinvestment in schools, class and race-based school funding inequities, and policies that engineer student social mix are all implicated in this process. Cultural geographers also attend to ways power is reproduced (and contested) and daily life is regulated through socially produced meanings about specific places (Keith and Pile, 1993; Soja, 1999). Again, contested representations of urban schools are implicated in claims on the city.

Neoliberal urbanism

Beginning with the economic crisis of the 1970s, social democratic urban policies in the USA and UK were systematically eliminated. In ensuing decades, across a range of cities globally, capital employed neoliberal policies to ensure capital accumulation (Smith, 2002). "In this context, cities—including their suburban peripheries—have become increasingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for a variety of neoliberal policy experiments . . ." (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 368). Despite neoliberal theory of reduced government, actually existing neoliberalism involves the intervention of the state on the side of capital, first to destroy existing institutional arrangements, and then to create a new infrastructure for capital accumulation. Discursively, urban governance has shifted from equity and redistribution to markets and entrepreneurship. In the global competition for investment, tourism, highly skilled "creative" workers, and production facilities, including the business services that drive globalization (Sassen, 2006), cities from Madrid to Beijing are engaged in place marketing.

Neoliberal urban initiatives include:

- downtown mega-developments, "theme parks," and spectacles;
- gentrification of disinvested urban areas and working-class communities;
- demolition/renovation of public (social) housing and displacement of residents;
- privatization of public institutions and spaces;
- public-private partnerships and state subsidies to developers and corporations;
- governance by experts and corporate boards, with democratic "participation" relegated to citizen advisory groups;
- surveillance and policing of marginalized, racialized communities.

The role of education in these urban policy initiatives and the implications for equity and justice in the city are the subjects of the remainder of this chapter. I focus primarily on US urban policy, with Chicago as illustration.

Education and neoliberal urbanism

Urban school systems have been in the forefront of neoliberal education policy shifts in the USA. As in much of the world, public school policy is dominated by accountability, markets, and privatization in the service of "effectiveness" and global competition (Hursh, 2008). Under the banner of school choice, there is a turn towards greater differentiation and stratification of educational experiences and to militarization of schools serving low-income students of color (Lipman, 2004). Although contested, these policies and practices facilitate the production of neoliberal subjects through education (Demerath *et al.*, 2008). What is less examined is their relationship to the neoliberal restructuring of cities.

Chicago exemplifies this relationship. Over the past three decades it has morphed from industrial hub to center for global business services and finance, international tourism, downtown development, and gentrification. A contender for first-tier global city, Chicago has achieved this transformation largely through neoliberal policies, including a rich menu of incentives to real estate developers and corporate and banking interests, privatization of public institutions, marketing to the middle class and investors, and intensified policing and surveillance of communities of color (Lipman, 2004).

Chicago is also in the forefront of neoliberal education initiatives (Lipman, 2004; Lipman and Haines, 2007). Chicago's education accountability policies, begun with the "reform" of 1995, were a prototype for national policy. Accountability was coupled with a stratified system of school choice, with new selective enrolment speciality schools alongside public military schools, vocational high schools, and basic skills schools. In 2004, Chicago initiated Renaissance 2010, a plan to close "failing" public schools and replace them with schools of choice, most privately run but publicly financed charter and contract schools. Under the Obama administration, Chicago is a national model to be copied by other urban school systems. Although these initiatives reflect national and global trends, they also have specific consequences for the city.

The importance of education to interurban competitiveness can be gauged by the involvement of corporate and financial elites in urban school policy. Chicago is an exemplar. The Commercial Club of Chicago (CCC), an organization of leading CEOs and civic elites, takes a direct hand in school policy. Over the past twenty years, the CCC has issued a series of reports laying out an education agenda geared to global competitiveness. A 2003 report was the blueprint for Renaissance 2010 school closings, charter schools, and choice. The mayor announced the plan a year later at a CCC event. The CCC also created the Renaissance Schools Fund, a partnership with the public school system to oversee major aspects of the reform. There is also direct corporate governance through a mayoral appointed school board and administration comprised of corporate leaders, including a former vice president of Bank One and CEO of the Chicago Board of Trade, who took an unpaid position as chief administrative officer, overseeing seven departments. Mayoral control is now a national agenda.

Education policy and gentrification

In the neoliberal rollback of the early 1980s, the US federal government reduced funding for cities while devolving greater responsibility to city governments. To make up for shortfalls and driven by market ideologies, city governments adopted entrepreneurial measures. To address budgetary shortfalls, they looked to public-private ventures, privatization of public services, and revenue from real estate taxes repackaged as municipal bonds. As they became far more reliant on debt to finance public projects and ongoing functions, city bond ratings became more significant in determining policy than in the Keynesian period of more generous federal funding (Hackworth, 2007). In the USA, reliance on property tax revenues makes cities more dependent on, and active subsidizers of, the private real estate market, with developers benefiting from public giveaways of land through urban tax initiatives (Weber 2002). In turn, real estate development is a key form of speculative activity, with real estate properties essentially operating as financial instruments. This is a critical factor in the production of spatial inequality, displacement, homelessness, and racial containment. Facilitated by municipal governments, gentrification has become a pivotal sector in urban economies generally.

Gentrification as a process has rapidly descended the urban hierarchy; it is evident not only in the largest cities but in more unlikely centers such as the previously industrial cities of Cleveland and Glasgow, smaller cities like Malmö or Grenada, and even small market towns such as Lancaster, Pennsylvania or Čveské Krumlov in the Czech Republic. At the same time, the process has diffused geographically as well, with reports of gentrification from Tokyo to Tenerife, São Paulo to Puebla, Mexico, Cape Town to the Caribbean, Shanghai to Seoul.

(Smith, 2002: 439)

In this period, gentrification merges local, national, and transnational capital, lubricated by local government through re-zoning, diversion of tax dollars to infrastructure improvements, and the construction of public amenities such as parks, transit, and libraries (Smith, 2002). Moving beyond city centers, it transforms whole neighborhoods into gentrification “complexes” of consumption, recreation, cultural venues, and schools, as well as housing. In turn, increases in property taxes push out low-income and working-class renters and homeowners.

Selective public schools and choice are integral to this process. Good schools and choice within the public school system are important to market the city to middle-class home buyers and knowledge workers. They are also essential to attract investors to potential sites of gentrification and to subsequently market gentrified and gentrifying areas to new middle- and upper-middle-class residents. For the middle class, education is central to class formation and reproduction (Butler with Robson, 2003). Like new libraries, police stations, and streetscapes, new schools are infrastructure improvements, enhancing the real estate value of specific areas. “Education markets are now rivalling those in housing and employments as determinants of the nature, extent and stability of middle class gentrification of inner city localities” (Butler with Robson: 157). In Chicago, new selective schools opened through the 1995 and 2004 school reforms map onto patterns of gentrified and gentrifying neighborhoods, while basic skills, military, and vocational schools are all located in low-income communities of color (Greenlee *et al.*, 2008; Lipman and Haines, 2007). The school district has closed schools in low-income African American and Latino communities undergoing gentrification and replaced them with selective public schools or charter schools, marketed to middle- and upper-middle-class families, which neighborhood children often cannot attend. Cucciara (2008) describes a similar strategy in Philadelphia.

In the USA, central cities experienced decades of public and private disinvestment (Anyon, 1997), opening them up as “soft spots” of neoliberal experimentation (Hackworth, 2007). The failure to adequately fund and support schools in these low-income African American and immigrant areas further devalued them and made them prime targets for a new round of investment. Education accountability served to index the schools as failures, then close and reopen them for the middle class or outsource them to private operators as charter schools. Closing schools and transferring students outside their neighborhoods, as has happened in Chicago, further contributes to the displacement of families, facilitating gentrification.

Thus, the policy serves capital accumulation and increases educational inequality. But it is also an intervention in the race- and class-inflected meaning of urban space (Leonardo and Hunter, 2008). Labeling “failing” schools in marginalized communities (e.g. low-income African American and Latino in the USA, Aboriginal in Sydney, Gulson, 2008) contributes to defining the communities as “dysfunctional” and “dangerous.” Yet for those who live there, schools can be centers of historically rooted, culturally centered communities of sustenance and resistance against race and class oppression (Leonardo and Hunter, 2008). Dismantling them is part of dismantling the communities as a whole, materially and symbolically (Lipman and Haines, 2007). Conversely, reopening schools with middle-class inflected identities is part of symbolically reconstituting the city for the middle and upper-middle classes.

School policy and dismantling public housing

Throughout much of the English-speaking world, national and local governments have responded to the problem of neglected public (social) housing by demolishing or remodelling it as “mixed-income” developments, with considerable displacement of low-income tenants

(Lees, 2008). In the USA, the 1992 HOPE VI national housing law called for the demolition of distressed public housing units and their replacement with privately developed, mixed-income housing or vouchers for rentals in the private housing market. HOPE VI is a high-level, public-private partnership that provides millions of public dollars in subsidies to developers. A 1995 revision eliminated the one-to-one replacement requirement. At the same time, strict eligibility requirements exclude many public housing tenants from new developments, and only a fraction of the units are reserved for them. In Chicago, miles of dense, hi-rise public housing on the city’s South Side have been razed and are being replaced by low-density mixed income developments, with fewer than one third of the units for public housing. This parallels other cities where the majority of original residents have been unable to return (e.g. Oakley *et al.*, 2008).

In the USA, most urban public housing residents are people of color—in Chicago, almost entirely African Americans. Public housing restructuring serves capital accumulation, while it is also a form of racialized exclusion. US cities have begun to resemble those in Western Europe, with the center claimed by the middle and upper classes (particularly whites), ringed by low-income suburbs (mainly people of colour). One cause is the state’s failure to maintain public housing until it became uninhabitable, justifying its demolition and dispersal of the residents, some out of the city altogether. Chicago, where transformation of public housing and closing schools under Renaissance 2010 are coordinated, provides an example of the role education policy plays in the displacement of African American public housing residents through mixed-income development.

In Chicago and other US cities, razed public housing is being replaced by privately developed, mixed-income developments. (See also social mix strategies in the UK: Lupton and Turnstall, 2008). The strategic role of new, purposely designed, mixed-income schools with a middle-class majority was made explicit by the MacArthur Foundation, a major player in Chicago’s transformation of public housing: “The city has made a commitment to improving the local schools, without which the success of the new mixed-income communities would be at great risk” (2005). Underlying this strategy is the deconcentration thesis: concentrations of poverty supposedly breed social isolation and social pathologies, which reproduce a cycle of poverty. Dismantling hi-rise public housing and creating socially mixed schools supposedly give low-income people access to middle-class values and resources to lift themselves out of poverty and improve academic achievement (Imbroscio, 2008; Kahlenberg 2001). This strategy has been critiqued for its normative assumptions that middle-class lifestyles are superior and lifestyles of low-income people of color are pathological. Moreover, mixed-income schools and housing exclude the majority of displaced residents, as redevelopment is primarily for the middle and upper-middle classes. In Chicago, about 20 percent of former public housing tenants are expected to relocate to the new developments (Wilén and Nyak, 2006).

Social mix is nonetheless a hegemonic legitimating discourse. Drawing on the neoliberal shift to individual responsibility and personal behavior as explanations for inequality, mixed-income solutions erase the structural roots of disinvestment in urban schools and inner-city communities and the state’s responsibility to improve schools for the low-income students of color who live there. They also instantiate the idea that low-income people of color need cultural and social renovation, negating wider social processes of cultural differentiation and exclusion and ignoring strengths of public housing communities (Bauder, 2002). Public housing is iconic for racialized and pathologized representations of urban African Americans in particular. Mixed-income schools, like mixed-income housing solutions contribute to these representations and support the systematic displacement of public housing, even when initial gentrifiers are African American, as in Chicago’s Midsouth (Smith and Stovall, 2008).

New urban governance—public–private partnerships, democratic deficits, and education markets

Quasi-private bodies that supersede the authority of elected government and democratic processes are a distinguishing feature of neoliberal urban governance. Large-scale European development projects have been used to establish new urbanist governance regimes defined by public–private partnerships, collaborations among networks of elites, lack of public accountability, and exclusion of real public participation. These regimes run “the public sector like a business,” with the goal of enhancing the competitive advantage of cities and furthering neoliberal economic and social priorities (Swyngedouw *et al.*, 2004). Similar arrangements in the USA govern the planning and oversight of urban development projects, public housing, schools, and other public services (Bennett *et al.*, 2006; Lipman and Haines, 2007). HOPE VI, for example, creates partnerships of developers and public housing authorities to build and manage public housing and mixed-income projects with little genuine public voice (Bennett *et al.*, 2006). Typically, new urbanist governance disenfranchises public-housing residents, parents, workers, and community residents, reducing their civic participation to appointed advisory boards with no authority to make decisions.

Chicago’s Renaissance 2010 is a high-level partnership of the Commercial Club and the public schools. The CCC’s Renaissance Schools Fund typifies the increased corporate role in urban governance. Simultaneously, Renaissance 2010 eliminates democratically elected local school councils (LSCs) in all new Renaissance schools. LSCs, comprised primarily of parents and community residents with authority to select principals and approve the school improvement plan and budget, are the most radical democratic form of local school governance in the USA. Their elimination disenfranchises the mostly low-income parents of color whose children comprise 90 percent of public school students. Neoliberal governance also blurs lines between public and private goods, as municipal governments, strapped for funds and propelled by the logic of public inefficiency, sell off public assets and turn over public institutions to corporate management, e.g. sale or lease of bridges, highways, and airports to be run for profit. Market-oriented school policies—choice and quasi-privatization through charter schools—encourage the growth of an education industry and set a precedent for the marketization of urban public services generally. Charter and contract schools are run by private boards, and many are franchised out to corporate education management organizations. In Chicago, fifty-one of seventy-five schools created under Renaissance 2010, as of fall 2008, were charter or contract schools. Privatization of schools in New Orleans after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is the leading edge of neoliberal restructuring in that city. An influential report by the Urban Institute (Hill and Hannaway, 2006) hailed New Orleans as an opportunity for a grand experiment to decentralize and privatize the school system through vouchers and charter schools. Less than a month after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, the US Department of Education gave the state of Louisiana \$20.9 million to reopen existing charter schools and open new ones, and nine months later the Department gave the state an additional \$23.9 million for new charter schools, most in New Orleans. Prior to Katrina, there were only five charter schools in New Orleans. Of the fifty-five schools open in New Orleans in 2006–2007, thirty-one were public charter schools (Alexander, 2007).

Market-oriented school policies intensify polarization (Reay, 2007) and advance the middle-class conquest of the city (Smith, 2002). School choice provides an opportunity, not available through regular public school provision, for middle-class parents to strategically deploy multiple

forms of capital to gain educational advantages for their children (Ball *et al.*, 1995; Butler with Robson, 2003). Thus choice, particularly options that appeal to the middle class, is a policy tool to attract the middle-class school consumer and home buyer. Governance of charter schools by private boards also advantages middle-class parents. Their political and economic power potentially gives them access and influence not enjoyed by working-class parents, who might otherwise hold public officials accountable and exercise collective influence through democratic processes such as elected LSCs in Chicago.

The Punitive State

Neoliberalism requires a strong enforcement state to suppress actual and potential dissent in the face of the disciplining of labor, growing inequality and impoverishment, and the redundancy of fractions of the working class (Gill, 2003). Thus, in Western Europe and the USA, there is a turn to increased state surveillance, constriction of civil liberties, and policing and incarceration of immigrants and, in the USA, African Americans and Latinos in particular (Wacquant, 2001). Aggressive urban policing to make the city “safe” for the middle class, made famous by New York Mayor Giuliani in the 1990s, has been exported globally (Fyfe, 2004). In the USA, the politics of race are central to the workings of the enforcement state, and schools are a strategic site. This logic is evident in the militarization of schooling in African American and Latino areas, where schools are characterized by lockdown conditions, electronic surveillance, metal detectors and police stations inside school buildings, and military programs. In this way, schools are implicated in racialized policies of containment and discipline as an aspect of political and cultural control of urban space.

Conclusion

Neoliberal economic and social policies are reshaping cities globally, producing greater social polarization and inequality and new urban geographies of exclusion and marginalization. It is impossible to fully examine the sociology of urban education without accounting for these global processes and their localization in specific cities. Taking this a step farther, education is also implicated in solidifying the neoliberal urban agenda, materially and discursively, through policies that support displacement and gentrification, privatization, democratic deficits, and the pathologization and policing of economically and racially marginalized inhabitants. Neoliberal education policies have important implications for the future of the city—politically, economically, culturally, and spatially. This makes it clear that education is an important site of contestation over the right to the city, that is, the need to restructure the power relations that underlie the production of urban space, fundamentally shifting control away from capital and the neoliberal state and towards the vast majority of urban inhabitants. It also makes clear the importance of multidisciplinary analyses that merge the insights of critical sociology of education with political and cultural geography, urban sociology, and urban studies. We also need a critical scholarship that documents and theorizes forms of urban resistance that connect struggles for equitable education with struggles for housing, jobs, cultural recognition, access to urban resources, and democratic participation.

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A revisited theme – middle classes and the school

Maria Alice Nogueira

In the early 1990s, I wrote an article about "Middle-class families and the school," humbly subtitled "Preliminary bases for an object in construction" (Nogueira, 1995). Two principles grounded that prudent gesture: (a) the heterodoxical nature of the object, which in a scientific context (international and national)—for acceptable, although sociologically insufficient reasons—prioritized (it still does today) the study of less favored social environments; and (b) the risks of stepping on uncertain terrain, beginning with the definition of "middle class," which is always controversial owing to its place on the social ladder and the heterogeneous nature of its internal composition. The first two sections showed my hesitation in going straight to the subject without first seeking the answers to two preliminary questions: "why study the middle class?" and "what is the 'middle class'?" These questions, idiosyncrasies aside, expressed the state of knowledge at the time.

Today, almost two decades later, I see this situation as partially altered. This is what this essay aims to outline, in general terms, namely, the change this issue has undergone in our day due to both new social dynamics and advances in the sociological mindset.

I will start by addressing the first question formulated initially (the "why") and argue that, today, it is certainly easier to defend a topic that has become more legitimate and carries less-negative connotations in terms of relevance.

As contemporary education sociologists admit, among the processes of theoretical-methodological reorientation the discipline has undergone from the 1980s onward to date, one stands out: the one that "shifts the glance of social disadvantage to the privileged" (Sirota, 2000: 166). Influenced by this movement, studies have appeared in different countries whose interests lie in investigating new modes of elite formation (Almeida and Nogueira, 2002; Fonseca, 2003; Wagner, 1998),¹ as well as the educational conduct of the middle class (Ball, 2003; Crozier *et al.*, 2008; Lareau, 2003; Power *et al.*, 2003; van Zanten, 2002, 2007).² I suppose this boom—and its fruitful results—weakens the suspicions of scientific futility around attempts to study the educational practices and strategies of these favored social groups.

Yet, this does not mean that this topic has completely lost its marginal status. In England, Power (2001) detects the continuing gap that Ball (2003) abhors when arguing for the fundamental role played by the middle class in the process of the permanent reconstitution of

the inequalities in schools. In France, van Zanten (2002) encounters the same lacuna and suggests epistemological reasons as explanations:

In fact, among the reasons suggested to explain the small number of studies on middle classes is the recurrent aversion of sociologists to carry out a self-analysis, since great is the proximity they have with the social strata they belong to.

(van Zanten, 2002: 40)

As to the second question (what is the middle class?), it is worth keeping in mind that a definition remains problematic, even arbitrary, at least when it comes to the literature in Brazil, which could be compared to an arch going from the material to the symbolic pole, starting with the economist—who focuses on income level and consumption potential—then the anthropologist—who zooms in on the group's life styles and worldviews—and sociologists who give special attention to the group's place in the socio-occupational structure and access to material goods such as education, health, housing, etc. These are very different perspectives indeed.

However, it is worth noting that the reduction of any social group to a statistical income category may dissimulate important differences in lifestyle and patterns of thought, even when, in dealing with this population segment, both dimensions—the material and the symbolic—are strongly articulated. As Brazilian economists warn us, if the association of the middle class and consumption is so common in Brazilian literature, it is because this consumption above popular standards is key in the formation of identity of this class (Guerra *et al.*, 2006: 17).

Finally, as far as the internal heterogeneity of the middle class is concerned, everything indicates that the usual distinction established by social theory between the traditional fraction, composed of small owners and professionals (*petite bourgeoisie*), and the “new” middle class, composed of salary workers, makes even less sense for current educational research than it did in the time Bourdieu developed his analyses of the reproduction strategies of this group. Keep in mind that, for the French sociologist, the examination of the middle class–school relation should be carried out in the three levels into which he believed this group was divided: the *petite bourgeoisie traditionnelle* (in decline), the *petite bourgeoisie d'exécution*, and the *petite bourgeoisie nouvelle*, each one of them presenting certain attitudes towards culture and school.³

In contrast, more recent research resorts to forms of differentiation considered more efficient to deal with the complex system of relations established amongst the different segments within the middle class and the education of children in the present. For Power *et al.* (2003), guidelines and family attitudes towards school become more intelligible when three criteria (related to “employment sector,” “field of production,” and “parents' occupational resource basis”) are taken into account:

- 1 the one that separates parents who work in the public sector and those who work in the private sector:

The relevance of sector of employment is attributed to whether economic and ideological support is derived from the state or the market, competition between them for resources and legitimacy in the provision of services producing different positionings for those working in each.

(p. 32)

- 2 the one (already present in Bernstein's classical analyses) that distinguishes parents whose occupation involves the production of material goods and those engaged in the production of symbolic goods:

We have also analyzed our evidence in terms of the distinction between the 'old' middle class employed in the production and distribution of material goods and services, and the 'new' and rapidly expanding middle class engaged in the production, exploitation and distribution of symbolic knowledge.

(p. 32)

- 3 the one that differentiates families according to the types of activity the parents are engaged in, classified by the authors as “professional,” “managerial,” and “entrepreneurial”:

The divide between managerial and professional occupations is seen as especially significant because it is those working in the latter who are likely to rely most on capital cultural to secure or enhance their children's social position.

(p. 31)

Partially siding with the English authors, van Zanten (2007) makes the sector of employment the main divide among French middle-class families:

The most important diversions are those occurring between parents who work in the public sector and have at their disposal a relatively high cultural capital . . . and the parents working in the private sector who have more economic capital.

(p. 258)

According to her, significant distinctions between these two segments take place both at the level of the parents' views on the internal practices of schools and their attitudes towards the choice of educational institutions for the children. While parents in the private sector prioritize family interests (i.e. school competitiveness and the children's well-being), those in the public sector—although not without conflict—place more importance in the state and are prone to regard the school as a socially oriented institution.

The massification of education and its consequences

In general, researchers consider the contemporary changes—economical, political, ideological—as foundations for the current transformations at the educational level. They argue that economic restructuring—derived from the globalization of the economy—raised uncertainties and risks in the marketplace, especially the instability and vulnerability of skilled jobs offer. They affirm that the political reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, which originated in the deregularization and shrinking of the state, led to reforms in the public services based on the market and free choice by the users. Furthermore, combined with these factors, changes in mentality exacerbated individualism by placing personal interests over collective values.

In the educational sphere, researchers highlight the phenomenon—triggered at the end of World War II—of elevation of general instruction level, which affected all social class groups, although not indistinctly.⁴ The result of this process—they all agree—is the increase of competition in education and the contemporary demand for a longer educational trajectory.

As Dubet remarks (2007), school competition increases simply because there are more competitors, thereby bringing

two important consequences teachers condemn, but which resulted from the very massification they supported: the formation of an education market on the very bosom of the public school, and the development of utilitarianism . . . with families seeking better school results.

(pp. 54–55)

Here, Dubet is referring to the fact that, in a context of massification of the school system, families will “legitimately” demand for their children the type of education, the teaching premises, and, many times, the classrooms thought to be more efficient. The result is the formation of an education market at the very center of public school systems,⁵ which become vulnerable to social demand and lose the power to impose norms on parents more and more transformed into “rational” users in search of the most profitable asset.

If Dubet calls our attention to the fact that, in all social class groups, the investment in education increases, other authors will deal, in particular, with its impact on the middle class by stressing how they have further intensified and refined their educational strategies to take advantage of the resources (cultural and economic) they have in favor of their children’s education:

I suggest a number of ways in which the context of class competition in education has changed and intensified in the past twenty years and the class perspectives and strategies of the middle classes have changed with them . . . The response of the middle classes to the increase in insecurity and risk involved in their established strategies of reproduction has been an intensification of positional competition.

(Ball, 2003: 18–20)

These remarks echo Dubet’s and Martuccelli’s (1996: 119) earliest findings that “it is in the middle classes, more than in the upper ones, that the school is strongly integrated in a strategy of social reproduction.”⁶

Yet, it is van Zanten (2007) who best outlines the scenario of the recent changes that produced a more *empowered class—conceptually and strategically—to face these new social and educational risks*. In fact, bearing in mind the middle class’s intermediary situation (which allows it to move up or down the social ladder), its inner heterogeneity, and “close” relation to knowledge (highlighted by a greater openness to the divulgation and vulgarization by the media of scientific knowledge emerged mainly from education sociology and psychology) the author affirms that middle-class parents tend, more than others, to imagine themselves as

masters of their own destiny, capable of fighting against social pressure and altering the course of their individual experiences. In the field of education, this results in stronger and more sophisticated educational involvement when preparing and following up their children’s education, and, in general, in a process of planning, rationalization, and growing individuation of the child’s cultural experience with the important intervention of knowledge produced by psychology and sociology.

(van Zanten, 2007: 250–251)

In sum, after reaping the benefits—qualitatively—of the process of democratization of education, the middle class saw its “strategic capacity” increase, which resulted in the “sophistication” (that is, intensification and diversification) of its educational investments.

When it comes to intensification of investments, sociologists continue stressing “activism,” “interventionism,” and preventive attitudes; that is, “the enormous amounts of time and energy devoted to ensuring social reproduction. For the middle-class privilege requires continuous and intensive work” (Ball, 2003: 95).

This mobilization is manifested today at different levels. Here, I mention what scholars have discussed the most:

- practices of intense monitoring of school activities (including the activities of education professionals); help with homework; participation in the school’s administration (Ball, 2008; Crozier *et al.*, 2008);
- attitudes when choosing schools that involve a variety of skills such as: access to information about the school system (including evaluation results and rankings); capacity to differentiate and interpret different educational establishments; power to deal with sectorization laws, be it to “colonize” public institutions with “mixed” clientele or influence recruiting and streaming policies, curriculum content, etc. (Power *et al.*, 2003; van Zanten, 2007);
- actions aiming to stimulate the cognitive development of their children. For this purpose, parents set up an intense schedule to structure out-of-class time (sports, arts class, foreign languages, etc.), which becomes an integral part in the logic of childrearing, called by Lareau (2003) *concerted cultivation*.

As for diversification of investments, the new trend seems to be the growing appeal of strategies of internationalization of children’s education, even if with variations depending on the class segment and country of origin. If this is not a new phenomenon,⁷ it presents, at least today, differences as to:

- change of scale, with a strong quantitative increase of mobility;
- extension to a new public, for it is no longer the privilege of upper-class youth;
- the range, which today encompasses all school levels. Although college level is still the most internationalized, there exists today early strategies of internationalization involving choice of pre-school, bilingual or multilingual primary and secondary school (Darchy-Koechlin, 2008);
- diversification of country of destiny, although a “tropism” towards developed English-speaking countries prevails (van Zanten and Darchy-Koechlin, 2005a).

This seems to be the reply of middle-class families to the demands of the globalization of different social spheres (economic, political, and cultural), so as to produce individuals with specific skills and international competence. Yet, this internationalization is not homogeneous for all countries and social class groups. It is stronger in less developed countries (culturally and economically) and in wealthier social groups.

However, even in countries whose dominant position, culturally and linguistically, make them more resistant to the advantages of internationalization, sociologists have noticed that in the middle class:

The parents are also trying to fashion new identities for their children as citizen of the multiethnic and multicultural twenty-first century, without which they fear they will not be able to cope adequately.

(Crozier *et al.*, 2008: 11)

Although the literature on this subject is still scarce, a few studies have already suggested the hypothesis that it is the process of accumulation or updating of capital, expressed in the idea that today “cosmopolitanism (cosmopolitan capital) is a form of social and cultural capital” (Weeninck, 2005) or that “multiculturalism is increasingly a source of cultural and social capital” (Reay *et al.*, 2007). The latter observe:

The white middle-class interest in difference and otherness can thus be also understood as describing a project of cultural capital through which these white middle-class families seek to display their liberal credentials and secure their class position . . . The ability to move in and out of spaces marked as “other” became part of the process through which this particular fraction of the white middle-classes comes to know themselves as both privileged and dominant.

(Reay *et al.*, 2007: 1046–1047)

In Brazil, researchers have noticed a growing expansion in the demand for this educational asset on the part of the middle class, which sees the international dimension of cultural capital as an indispensable component to expand and validate their cultural assets (Nogueira and Aguiar, 2008). Surveys on the impact of education abroad on students’ educational trajectory as well as parents’ expectations and motivations have revealed both instrumental goals, as a way to increase competitiveness, and identity objectives, targeting their children’s enhancement and personal achievement. They try to develop in their offspring a group of attitudes (openness, autonomy, mobility willingness, tolerance to alterity, etc.), besides providing them with cultural (linguistic competence, general and specialized culture) and social (international contacts) capitals. Not to mention the fact that these strategies of internationalization also set a distinction between those who benefit from international capital and those who limit themselves to national resources (Nogueira *et al.*, 2008: 371).

From meritocracy to parentocracy: a new problem arises

All of these groups of investments mentioned before illustrate, according to some sociologists, a contemporary transitional trend from meritocracy to a parentocracy (Ball, 2003, 2008; van Zanten and Darchy-Koechlin, 2005a).

To support such a claim, sociologists rely on P. Brown’s (1990) article “The third wave: education and the ideology of parentocracy.” In this text, Brown argues that the British school would be moving to a third “wave,” after a first in the nineteenth century, characterized by the universalization of primary school (strongly permeated by social and gender factors), and a second that encompassed most of the twentieth century and placed individual merit as the main classification principle.⁵ For him, the last decades of the twentieth century, thanks to neoliberal reforms—with free-market principles and *parental choice*—ended up weakening meritocracy by allowing

the rise of the educational “parentocracy,” where a child’s education is increasingly dependent upon the wealth and wishes of parents, rather than the ability and efforts of pupils.

(Brown, 1999: 66)

But Brown does not limit his rationale to the United Kingdom. He extends it to other Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. In turn, van Zanten and Darchy-Koechlin (2005b) also believe in the pertinence of the model for countries as diverse as France, Japan, and Brazil. Elaborating on Brown’s rationale, both authors affirm that two phenomena threaten meritocracy today: policies of positive discrimination, which suppress *financial, institutional, and pedagogical barriers*, and, with greater weight, the logic of markets to which families are subjected.

In sum, for these thinkers, a student’s school results would be more and more dependent on his parents’ financial resources and strategic capacity, and less and less on his or her own school merits:

Parents try to re-direct the future determined by school results (through private lessons, for instance) and subject themselves less and less to the logics of the educational institution (they do their best to make sure their children attend the best school). This is parentocracy. It means the school competes with parents’ strategies.

(van Zanten and Darchy-Koechlin, 2005b: 18)

This multiplication of parental strategies to provide their children with the best opportunities for access and success in the noblest sectors of the school system has been Glasman’s object of study (1994, 2005, 2008). He states that, in the last twenty-five years, a “school out of the school” has developed, namely, a current expansion of support mechanisms to provide aid to school actions, so as to prepare the student to face obstacles encountered in school. It is an arsenal constituted of para-school materials and outsourcing domestic help: private classes, psychopedagogy offices, specialized companies to follow up homework activities, etc. In a recently published article, the author summarizes:

When we see these support devices flourishing in the school periphery, it seems something else besides the school is necessary for success. It seems that, more than ever, students and parents find it indispensable—to have better chances of success in an increasingly competitive school environment—to resort to external support as a complement to carry out activities or training.

(Glasman, 2008: 631)

In sum, this new reality has led researchers to question whether the privilege of the cultural elite would not be undergoing erosion or, in other words, if their cultural advantages would not be losing power. If this hypothesis is taken, caution is necessary not to underestimate the importance of the cultural component, as a number of important sociological studies have demonstrated that families’ cultural competences play a significant role when it comes to taking advantage of cultural investments. The studies of Gewirtz *et al.* (1995) stand out, in this sense, for drawing our attention to the power of intellectualized families when it comes to school choice, as they are capable of telling the difference between schools and the characteristics of each child, thereby allowing them to make adjustments and choose the “right” school for their children.

New sociological sensibilities: the individual’s point-of-view

Among the transformations—originated in the very way of doing sociology—seen in recent literature on the relation between middle classes and school, one change stands out. If former

studies placed the emphasis on family practices and insisted on describing typical group patterns of investment behavior in school life, more recent studies have examined the phenomenon from another perspective: the meaning the actors place on these behaviors and how they live up to those ideas. By doing this, sociologists have done nothing more than echo the evolution taking place in sociology, namely, the question of individualization at the center of contemporary societies.

That is why van Zanten (2007), not disregarding “structural determinant” parental actions, is concerned with—inspired by authors such as A. Giddens and U. Beck—the reflexive capacity of parents, namely, their ability to employ the results divulged by scientific research (their perspectives being, evidently, different from those of the researcher) to analyze their current educational reality” and ponder the consequences of their acts (in particular, the choice of an educational institution):

By reflexivity we understand the capacity of subjects to recognize, demonstrate and make visible the rational nature of their concrete practices, without implying an awareness or permanent attention to this dimension or, in Giddens’ terms, the capacity of individuals as well as institutions and social systems to carry out continuous self-regulation through critical distance.

(van Zanten, 2007: 247)

In sum, the author notices that the “middle and upper classes,” more than the “bourgeoisie or low class,” present a greater tendency to adopt a “distanced, informed, strategic and politically conscious position regarding their social experience” (p. 249). Yet, she will insist on the fact that all this strategic capacity produces, along with it, an “opposite effect,” as these families are also more vulnerable to doubts and anxieties:

These social class groups are also subject, more than the others, to doubts as to what is the best way of acting and their consequences—for example, what is the best school for each child. This leads to a great amount of anxiety and triggers an intense search of information which, in turn, increases anxiety.

(van Zanten, 2007: 251)

Feeling, most of the time, ambivalent between prioritizing the child’s interest or the collective good, or, in other words, between being a “good parent” or a “good citizen,” these actors become victims of tension that will lead them to reason and act, as the author suggests, according to a logic of “cognitive dissonance,” as, for instance:

the cognitive dissonance these social classes experience between “social mixing” values, to which they adhere in different degrees, and their practices of avoiding socially heterogeneous schools.

(van Zanten, 2002: 48)

In the Anglo-Saxon world, we find the same tendency to relativize the advantages of the middle class by focusing on the negative side represented by the “risks, uncertainties and fears” these families experience. Ball (2003) calls our attention to the fact that:

The absence of complacency and the constant activity of distinction and status maintenance is the best and the worst of the middle class. They are in a sense their own worst enemies.

The commitment to individualism and “putting the family first,” the defense of borders and strategies of social closure undermine both security and moral vision and encourage fearfulness.

(p. 179)

Reay *et al.* (2007)—in a study about White middle-class families that chose public schools with a high contingent of immigrant students, aiming to make them more tolerant and open to difference—noticed that these parents “feared” in particular: the pernicious influence of classmates from lower social class on their children; and the negative impact, on the children’s school performance, of peers who do not value academic success.

Crozier *et al.* (2008), likewise, on investigating English White middle-class families that, despite possessing the financial means to afford a private school, opt—for ideological reasons—for a *comprehensive-school*, show that these parents

are thus caught in a web of moral ambiguity, dilemmas and ambivalence, trying to perform “the good/ethical self” while ensuring the “best” for their children.

(Crozier *et al.*, 2008: 261)

In my opinion, these authors have made the most progress in this matter, as they incorporate in their analysis the way parents deal with the anxiety they feel at placing their children along with “the Other,” with those “not like us.” Their texts account for the way families compensate for the supposed evils of a school environment seen as unsatisfactory from some perspectives. Through the use of several resources, they work to reduce the risks of a frustrating school experience by monitoring school activities, participating in the school administration, and incentivating out-of-school activities, trips, etc.

Final remarks

Based on a partial review of current sociological literature on middle-class family relations and the school system, this essay aimed at capturing the evolutionary trends social and educational reality have suffered and the theoretical-methodological treatment they have been given in recent decades. In this sense, the essay sees an effective renewal of the problem.

Bourdieu’s analysis, which insisted on ascetic dispositions and attitudes of cultural goodwill to which middle-class families would tend to ascribe so as to compensate for their lack of capital, seems to give room now to an analytical emphasis on utilitarianism and the strategic capacity of the actors to utilize, for their own interest, their resources in favor of privileged school destinies.

However, in this final part of the essay, I would like to raise an issue that originates from the data and interpretation presented here, which, in my opinion, has not been properly researched yet. I refer to the growing protagonism of contemporary families—through choices and educational strategies—in the production and functioning of the school systems themselves. This means that focusing only on the state and limiting the analysis of educational policies are not sufficient to understand how the school system works. That is what the middle-class case teaches us.

While we perceive the family as a mere passive user suffering from the actions of the state, we will prevent ourselves from seeing its role as co-producer of educational reality and—

indirectly—of public educational policies. It is up to the sociologist to sharpen the data and arguments to show that families today represent “key actors in the course of educational acts” (van Zanten, 2002).

Notes

- 1 In French, the *Revue Internationale d'Éducation* (no. 39, September 2005) presents the dossier “La formation des élites;” and the periodical *Éducation et Sociétés* (no. 21, 2008/1) brings the dossier “Former des élites dans un monde incertain.”
- 2 The book *La montée de la parentocratie. Le choix éducatifs des classes moyennes* (Paris: PUF), by van Zanten, is in print.
- 3 I dealt with the middle class–school relations in Bourdieu’s work, in Nogueira (1997).
- 4 van Zanten (2007: 250) distinguished between a process of “massification,” which she defines as the “quantitative expansion” of access to high education on the part of working classes, and a true “democratization” reserved to middle and upper classes who have benefited from a “qualitative” increasing, that is, a “real and more extensive access to high levels of knowledge.”
- 5 Scholars talk today of a “quasi-market” to account for the differences existing among public schools when referring to reputation and dispute for vacancies by families.
- 6 At this point, it is important to acknowledge that Bourdieu continues to be the conceptual reference to think about the middle class–education relationship. His thesis remains irrefutable that, if this social category is the one that most invests in school values, it is not only because it sees the diploma as the beginning of social success, but also because of the objective possibilities of success and mobility that are reasonable through it.
- 7 Student mobility around the globe has taken place since medieval Europe.
- 8 Brown (1990) reminds us, however, that the meritocracy never promised equality, only that inequalities would be distributed more fairly.
- 9 The author gives as an example “‘short surveys’ parents from middle and upper classes claim to make about the quality of schools near their homes, which the ‘sectoring’ system in France obliges them to send their children to; also, the analysis they make of supposed cause of bad quality of some of these schools and the positive and negative consequences of the strategies they adopt to avoid them” (p. 249).

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23

Governing without governing

The formation of a European educational space

António Nóvoa

Europe must be seen as a problematic entity. The concepts of European construction or integration cannot be taken for granted. The same applies for the European educational space. No member state will abdicate its right to govern its education. The very notion of 'Europeanization of education' causes concern in most countries, raising fears of homogenization and of loss of national identity. But, at the same time, it is undeniable that the European Union is increasingly intervening in the educational field, leading to orientations and guidelines that tend to organize a European educational space and even to configure a European educational policy.

The title of this chapter, 'Governing without governing', tries to address these tensions and ambiguities. At a formal level, there is no EU policy on education, but only cooperation and inter-governmental policy coordination. But after the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and especially after the Lisbon Strategy (2000), it is hard to understand the resistance to look at these coordination efforts as one of the most effective European policies.

The chapter is split into three sections:

- In the first section I present a brief historical overview of the changes that have occurred in the Community action in education, since the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community in 1957.
- In the second section I focus especially on the current situation that is defined by an umbrella programme, called *Education and Training 2010*, which sets up the educational agenda of the European Union for the first decade of the twenty-first century.
- In the third section I will explain the process of governing without governing, that is, of elaborating sophisticated ways of producing policies, in each member state and at the European level, but always pretending that no policy is being implemented.

My intention is to provide a critical perspective of the formation of a European education space that is, at the same time, a process of fabricating a European educational policy (Nóvoa and Lawn, 2002). It is obvious that this process is interconnected with globalization issues as well as with national policies. But the purpose of this chapter is to illuminate a layer of analysis – the role of the European Union – that is often neglected in the analysis of educational policies.¹

Historical overview of the European educational policies (1957–2010)

Since its beginnings, in 1957, the European Economic Community has been reluctant to accept intervention regarding educational affairs at Community level. The fragile architecture of powers in the European space required that there were domains that remained under the exclusive responsibility of each member state. Even nowadays, after hundreds of EU texts and programmes that have led to profound changes in all the national education systems, the official discourse remains unchanged: 'Responsibility for education and training policy lies with Member States. Europe's role is to support the improvement of national systems through complementary EU-level tools, mutual learning and exchange of good practice' (Commission of the European Communities (CEC), 2008a: 3).

The unionization process in the educational field cannot be viewed through the lens of traditional politics (Nóvoa and DeJong-Lambert, 2003). Of course, education has been one of the most contested arenas in Europe, not only owing to its symbolic value in national imaginaries but also because of public resistance to a 'common policy'. Yet, it is not difficult to establish the main phases of EU policy making in education, taking as turning points the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Lisbon Strategy (2000).

Some of the most emblematic programmes, such as Erasmus, launched in the 1980s, were characterized by a certain voluntarism and the need to abolish borders in Europe, between states and between people. At the same time, extending the concept of vocational training, it has been possible to include virtually all forms of education in the Community action. It led to a kind of *vocational bias* in the way educational policies were overcharged by a discourse related with human resources and workforce qualifications.

Quality as a pretext for a common educational policy (1992–2000)

An important turning point took place in 1992, with the inscription in the Maastricht Treaty of articles 126 and 127, creating the political and legal conditions for a more overt action of European entities in education and vocational training. Throughout the 1990s, a large body of literature was produced opening a space for future policies: 'Green Paper on the European dimension of education' (1993); 'White Paper on Growth, competitiveness, employment' (1993); 'Teaching and learning: towards the learning society' (1995); 'Accomplishing Europe through education and training' (1997); 'Towards a Europe of knowledge' (1997); 'Learning for active citizenship' (1998), etc.

It is possible to distinguish two different approaches, both contributing to build a European educational space. First, the emphasis on lifelong learning that is not only invoked with reference to education and schooling, but also to the problems of unemployment and preparation for the job market. Second, the idea of developing 'quality education', leading to the organization of data and statistics at European level. The invention of comparable indicators is not only an operation to describe reality; it is also a powerful way of constructing new ideas and practices in education.

The Lisbon Strategy as a turning point in the construction of a European educational space (2000–2010)

Since the very beginning of European cooperation in the field of education, ministers of education have underlined the diversity of their systems of education (Ertl, 2006). The Lisbon

European Council, in 2000, broke with this by asking the ministers to concentrate their reflection on what is common (European Council, 2000). The definition of a European educational space began to be clearly outlined, and, at its core, the educational policies influenced the set of national policies. It is difficult to imagine a member state that will not 'freely adhere' to this game, which is defined by *lifelong learning* as its overriding principle and by *quality* as its implementation method (i.e. appraising the performances of each member state).

The report from the Commission, *The concrete future objectives of the education systems* (CEC, 2001), expresses this shift. Throughout the document we are presented with a series of common concerns, methods for policy implementation and evaluation indicators. In 2002, the Barcelona European Council agreed upon the *Education and Training 2010* work programme, which serves as the basis for the European Union's political action in the field of education in the first decade of the twenty-first century (European Commission, 2009).

Education and Training 2010: the formation of a European educational space

The *Education and Training 2010* work programme clearly establishes a European educational space, taking into account 'that the development of education and training systems in a lifelong learning and in a worldwide perspective has increasingly been acknowledged as a crucial factor for the future of Europe in the knowledge era' (Council of the European Union (CEU), 2002: 4). The main purpose of the programme is to organize EU educational standards into a 'single comprehensive strategy'.

The document defines three strategic objectives, broken down into thirteen associated objectives:

- improving the quality and effectiveness of education and training systems in the EU;
- facilitating the access of all to education and training systems;
- opening up education and training systems to the wider world.

To pursue these objectives, the EU implemented the 'open method of coordination', that is a process of policy making based upon 'the identification of shared concerns and objectives, the spreading of good practice and the measurement of progress through agreed instruments, comparing achievements both between European countries and with the rest of the world' (CEU, 2002: 3).

Three strategic objectives: quality, access, openness

The *Education and Training 2010* work programme always comes back to the same topics, building a narrative that is intentionally circular and redundant. Two terms appear repeatedly, defined and redefined according to context: quality and lifelong learning. On the one hand, they define a strong tendency towards logics of evaluation, leading to rankings and classifications that consecrate as 'inevitable' a particular way of conceiving education and schooling. On the other hand, they introduce a new approach to educational matters, at both the personal and the social level.

'Improving quality and effectiveness' is the first strategic objective. The work programme focuses on key competencies for the so-called knowledge society. The attention is directed

towards three key competencies: 'Learning to learn', an old pedagogical concept that is redefined by constructivism, but also by the economic world, in terms of lifelong learning; 'social skills', which relates to personal relations and networks, as well as to principles of self-responsibility and citizenship; and 'entrepreneurship', which underlines the importance of initiative, management and risk.

The intention to ensure and to monitor quality education leads to the evaluation of progress and achievement through comparable benchmarks and indicators. The intention is to move towards a more knowledge-based policy and practice, providing policymakers with reference points based on indicators and standards that are 'commonly' defined and 'freely' accepted. These benchmarks are governing principles that construct an educational policy lying in specific forms of knowledge and expertise.

The formulation of the second strategic objective – 'facilitating access for all' – intentionally emphasizes issues related to lifelong learning. On the one hand, it redefines 'employment' as a learning problem that should be solved by each individual. On the other hand, it creates the illusion that the 'crisis of schooling' will be solved if individuals simply continue to expose themselves to education and training throughout their entire lifetime. The Lisbon Strategy did invent the concept of employability in order to link employment to education, and to interpret unemployment as a problem of 'uneducated' people (CEU, 2008).

Active citizenship, entrepreneurial culture and lifelong learning are part of a process of reconfiguring the *self*. Thus, the responsibility for solving the crisis of the welfare state (and/or the European social model) shifts to citizens who are invited to become responsible for 'constantly updating their knowledge' in order to enhance employability and consolidate the process of unionization.

The goal of the third strategic objective – 'opening up education and training systems to the wider world' – is to create an open 'European area for education' and to promote the 'European dimension of teaching and training'. Mobility within the European space is described as not simply movement, but rather as a process that develops awareness of what it means to be a citizen of Europe.

The idea of experiencing Europe is concurrent with programmes of mobility and the project of reinforcing European citizenship. The politics of identity is formulated in terms of qualification and disqualification. Such a policy in effect exiles all those not endowed with the requisite attributes, as well as those simply unable to acquire them, producing at once new forms and new impediments to mobility.

Education and Training 2010 work programme: analysis and progresses

Between the Lisbon European Council (March 2000) and the Brussels European Council (March 2009), hundreds of documents have been issued by different European bodies. They all reveal a double meaning: on the one hand, the need to make up for lost time and improve education and training in Europe, as a whole; on the other hand, the need to accelerate 'the pace of reforms of education and training systems', whereby the European programmes 'should be duly taken into account in the formulation of national policies' (CEU, 2004: 6).

Adopting different structures and perspectives, these documents tend to focus on three main points. First, the need to concentrate reforms and investment on the key areas. There is a persistent call to channel more resources to the area of education, taking into account that 'most governments seem to recognize that the necessary reforms cannot be accomplished within the

current levels and patterns of investment' (CEU, 2006: 2). Over the years, there has been a level of disappointment with the progress made in this field. At the end of 2008, it was pointed out that 'the current focus on the economic crisis must not divert attention from setting the right long-term, strategic education and training policies', because 'Europe has to address a number of educational shortfalls if it is to avoid falling behind globally' (CEC, 2008a: 16).

Second, the need to make lifelong learning a concrete reality. The intention is to equip 'all citizens with the key competencies they need'. The approval in 2007 of a very important document entitled *New skills for new jobs* again placed the issue in terms of employment and the job market (CEU, 2009). But also, here, there has been a degree of disappointment. The Council says that progress has been achieved in defining lifelong learning strategies, but implementation is far from being achieved satisfactorily (CEU, 2006: 3).

Third, the need finally to establish a Europe of education and training (Antunes, 2008). The Council of the European Union recognizes that many countries are establishing their own policies in relation 'to the reference levels of average European performance for education and training' (CEU, 2006: 2). But the European Commission explains, in a 2008 communication, that despite the impressive range of innovation and excellent policy practice in many countries, it is too often still locked behind national borders, and that is why 'Member States should cooperate to capitalise better on it' (CEC, 2008b: 12).

Progress towards the Lisbon objectives

The Commission publishes a detailed report annually analysing the progress made on an agreed set of statistical indicators and benchmarks in the framework of the *Education and Training 2010* work programme. It is impossible to analyse these lengthy reports in detail, which are justified due to the fact that 'educational policies and practices require a stronger evidence base' (CEC, 2007: 3).

Despite the frequent changes, a substantial proportion of the reports are based on five EU-level benchmarks set for 2010. By the end of 2008, it is obvious that most of these benchmarks will not be reached:

The EU set itself the overall ambition of achieving 5 benchmarks by 2010, on literacy, reduction of early school-leaving, upper secondary attainment, maths, science and technology graduates and participation in adult learning. Only the benchmark on mathematics, science and technology graduates is likely to be exceeded. Indeed, low performance in reading literacy, which was benchmarked to decline by 20% by 2010, has actually increased by more than 10% between 2000 and 2006 and has reached 24.1%. (CEC, 2008c: 9)

The Commission's appraisal is especially critical with regard to the fact that too little progress has been made on those benchmarks related most closely to social inclusion. It is an important reference, when it becomes obvious that there is a need for a new generation of policies to respond to the economic and social crisis. The only indicator in which real progress has been made is in science and technology, an area that was given a big boost with the Lisbon Strategy. This perspective is coherent with the proposal for 'Energising Europe's knowledge triangle of research, education and innovation', which is finding its place into European policies.

The knowledge triangle is a strategy to attract more funds to research and innovation and to enhance the competitiveness of the economy. But the 2008/2009 economic crisis tends to

lead people to underline the third dimension of the triangle: education. In March 2009, the Brussels European Council called for an improvement of member states' cooperation and an advancement in the member states' and the Union's methodological, analytical and mutual learning capacities for jobs and skills anticipation.

As the last year of the *Education and Training 2010* work programme approaches, one can note a critical feeling concerning its results. The response is, obviously, to strengthen European cooperation and take another step forwards towards concerted policies at European level: 'These challenges should be addressed in a joined-up policy across the systems as a whole (schools, higher education, vocational education and training and adult learning). Lifelong learning is therefore a fundamental perspective underpinning all the above challenges' (CEC, 2008a: 6).

The main objectives for the next phase (2010–2020) are not very different from the ones defined for the current decade, 2000–2010, even if they are defined with a new focus: (i) make lifelong learning and learner mobility a reality; (ii) improve the quality and efficiency of provision and outcomes; (iii) promote equity and active citizenship; (iv) enhance innovation and creativity, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training (CEC, 2008a: 6). The way to achieve these aims is to deepen European cooperation, driving forward the dynamics of joint work: 'there is, more than ever, a need for an effective open method of coordination supporting the improvement of education and training policies' (CEC, 2008a: 16).

Governing without governing: fabricating educational policies at the European Union

The processes that we have just described are not specific to the European context. They are part of broader developments, which have been popularized by the imperfect concept of 'globalization'. But, inside the European Union, they are strengthened by a historic project that tends to integrate national states into a political union. And this fact gives them a different status, opening up new political possibilities. This is the main reason why this 'unidentified political object' known as the European Union is such an interesting object of study, both for comparative politics and for the socio-historical analysis of educational policies (Dale and Robertson, 2009).

The *Education and Training 2010* work programme emphasizes four verbs: identify, spread, measure and compare. To identify means to agree on shared objectives and guidelines for educational policies. To spread refers to the diffusion and transfer of the most successful practices from one country to another. To measure is to establish precise benchmarks and to evaluate the performance of each education system. To compare means to organize a way of assessing the progress made by each country. The goal of this process is described as 'to help Member States to develop their own policies progressively' (CEU, 2002: 5), but always in accordance with the objectives defined at European level.

To achieve this goal, an *open method of coordination* has been implemented in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy (Lange and Alexiadou, 2007). This method is built on the use of tools 'such as indicators and benchmarks as well as comparing best practice, periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review etc. organized as mutual learning processes' (CEU, 2002: 5). Cohesion and configuration of policy are not achieved through sanctions, but through a much more sophisticated approach. Voluntary participation by each member state serves to legitimize these arguments. Yet it is hard to imagine how a member state could stand outside of this 'playing field'.

Comparison as a mode of governance

The issues that are being raised at the European Union do not direct our attention to a deepening of democratic decisions, but instead to a reinforcement of 'new means' (governance, benchmarking, good practices etc.) and 'new powers' (networks, informal groups, mass media etc.). The current approach to European affairs clearly reveals a strategy to shift the discussion away from matters of *government* (inhabited by citizens, elections, representation etc.) and place it in the more diffused level of *governance* (inhabited by networks, peer review, agreements etc.).

Policy is constructed through a logic of perpetual comparison, which is legitimized and put into action through 'new means' that are intended to find the most beneficial or efficient solutions. Benchmarking – and, for that matter, *comparability* – is seen as a solution that will become *the* policy. The last documents issued at European level are very precise in underlining the 'challenge of data and comparability':

Mutual learning is a central element of the open method of coordination in education and training. It provides input for European policy initiatives and support to national policy development . . . For the future, the aim should be to strengthen peer learning in order to ensure that it fully respects the priority challenges identified above and to increase its impact at the political level.

(CEC, 2008a: 12)

Thus, comparison can be understood as a mechanism to legitimize EU interference in national educational issues. The logic of comparison produces a vocabulary consisting of positive terms such as 'exchange', 'joint reflection' and 'agreement'. What is presented as a strategy to improve education should be understood as a mode of governance (Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal, 2003).

Governing by data

Benchmarking practices are tied in with data and quality assurance. They are not only a technique or a method, but also one of the most successful tools for implementing governance policies. Therefore, it is obvious that these kinds of policy need data that can allow the establishment of aims and the monitoring of progress. It is not simply a matter of collecting and organizing data; rather, it is a process that constructs educational realities as much as it describes them. Through the arrangement of categories and classifications, a definition of the 'best system' is proposed. Each member state will act in accordance with these goals and ideals.

By the end of 2007, a very important working document asked for a stronger knowledge base for developing policy and practice at national and EU levels in order to improve the quality and governance of education systems: 'Member States and the EU institutions need to use evidence-based policy and practice, including robust evaluations instruments, to identify which reforms and practice are the most effective, and to implement them most successfully' (CEC, 2007: 3).

It is a very interesting document, based upon the idea that 'educational research currently appears to have a lower impact on policy and practice than research in other policy fields, such as social care or employment policy' (CEC, 2007: 25). The challenge of data and comparability has now been reworked from the point of view of knowledge and research (Ozga, 2008).

The new modes of governance are based on logics of contracting and networks, heavily backed up by data, assessments, impacts, benchmarking, best practices and mutual learning.

Research was the missing link for redefining policy formulation in the European Union. The reasoning is clear: on the one hand, the EU needs policies that are strongly oriented by research and knowledge; on the other hand, 'education and training are a prerequisite for a fully functioning knowledge triangle (education – research – innovation)' (CEC, 2007: 3). Along with this line of thought, one finds the rationale for the new phase of European education policies, in the 2010–2020 period.

Concluding comments

My argument is that Europe functions like a *regulatory ideal* that tends to influence, if not organize, national policies. It is obvious that no 'homogenization' will occur. Talk of the diversity of national education systems is almost a tautology. And, meanwhile, we continue to witness the development of tendencies towards defining common goals, similar strategies and, therefore, identical policies.

The example of the Bologna Process is extremely enlightening. On the one hand, it is a process that involves countries that do not belong to the European Union, and it is a process that cross-references trends that are expressed worldwide. But, on the other hand, it has gained an extremely relevant role in the EU policies, restructuring higher education and research. There is no legal obligation to take part in the Bologna Process, but it is unthinkable for any country to stay outside its dynamics, networks and connections, which are at the core of the modernization agenda of the universities. If one permits me the paradox, I would say that it is a 'compulsory option'.

The complexity of the debate calls for more theoretical tools and critical approaches. It is useless to reproduce distinctions and dichotomies that cannot raise new understandings. We must not look at this debate as a conflict between 'national states' and 'European institutions'. This is not a zero-sum game, where giving more power to 'Europe' will automatically lead to a weakening of the 'nation-state', or vice versa. An arithmetical conception of power is totally inaccurate.

New ways of governing without governing have proven to be extremely attractive. They are very sophisticated in naturalizing policies, in raising a sense of inevitability. It is as if they 'only' construct data, or identify good practices, or compare best methods, whereas, in truth, these data, practices and methods are in themselves powerful tools in the formation of a European educational space.

European policies should be understood as part of an expert discourse that is redefining educational issues globally. This movement of experts creates and circulates concepts and ideas without structural roots or social locations. We are faced with a strange 'worldwide bible' whose vocabulary, of unknown origin, is on the tip of every tongue. In this sense, the process of 'learning from one another' is a way of thinking and acting that establishes an educational policy without specifically formulating it.

The European educational space defines its own borders in the framework of this 'mutual learning', which brings, at the same time, a sense of increased competition on a global scale. The European Union seeks to attract students and academics from other world regions, aimed at turning European educational institutions into 'recognised worldwide centres of excellence' (CEU, 2002: 16). This objective is formulated against a background in which the United States of America and Asian countries are regarded as the main competitors in the world education market.

One of the main political undertakings of the European educational space is to build an internal identity among citizens and countries. According to the main driving force of the European construction, it is without surprise that employment and social cohesion are at the core of educational policies. That is why the European Union first adopted orientations strongly inspired by human capital theories and vocationalism, subsequently shifting to employability and lifelong learning.

The restructuring of the European educational space is related both to a new conception of the responsible citizen and the role of education for a new organization of the labour market. The former dictates that individuals should be able to 'manage their learning with self-discipline, working autonomously and collaboratively' (CEC, 2008b: 5). As regards the new organization of the labour market, this even involves a new way of looking at jobs, as well as personal and professional lives.

Notes

- 1 The European Union publishes hundreds of documents, every year, about education and training. Most of these documents have several versions, according to their status in the process of taking decisions at EU level. For this reason, I limited myself to documents issued by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) and by the Council of the European Union (CEU) (See also Council of the European Communities, 1987–1993). The European Union provides extended versions of all documents online. I recommend the consultation of two sites:
- 'European strategy and cooperation in education and training', available online at http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/doc28_en.htm;
 - 'Education and Training 2010 – Main policy initiatives in education and training since the year 2000', available at http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/compendium05_en.pdf.

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The university in the twenty-first century Toward a democratic and emancipatory university reform¹

Boaventura de Sousa Santos

In an essay published fifteen years ago,² I identified three crises facing the university (Santos, 1994). First, the crisis of hegemony was the result of contradictions between the traditional functions of the university and those that had come to be attributed to it throughout the twentieth century. When it stopped being the only institution of higher education and research production, the university entered a crisis of hegemony. The second crisis was a crisis of legitimacy, provoked by the fact that the university ceased to be a consensual institution, in view of the contradiction between the hierarchization of specialized knowledge through restrictions of access and credentialing of competencies, on the one hand, and the social and political demands for a democratized university and equal opportunity for the children of the working class, on the other. Finally, the institutional crisis was the result of the contradiction between the demand for autonomy in the definition of the university's values and objectives and the growing pressure to hold it to the same criteria of efficiency, productivity, and social responsibility that private enterprises face.

What has happened since I wrote that essay? How can we characterize the situation in which we find ourselves? What are possible responses to the problems that the university faces today? In this chapter, I will try to provide answers to these three questions. In the first part, I will undertake an analysis of recent transformations in the system of higher education and their impact on the public university. In the second part, I will identify and justify some of the basic principles of a democratic and emancipatory reform of the public university, that is, a reform that allows the public university to respond creatively and efficiently to the challenges it faces at the outset of the twenty-first century.

Transformations in higher education

The last fifteen years

The predictions I made fifteen years ago have come to pass, beyond my expectations. Despite the fact that the three crises were intimately connected and could only be confronted jointly

and by means of vast reform programs, generated both inside and outside the university, I predicted (and feared) that the institutional crisis would come to monopolize reformist agendas and proposals. This is in fact what happened. I also predicted that concentrating on the institutional crisis could lead to the false resolution of the two other crises, a resolution by default: the crisis of hegemony, by the university's increasing loss of specificity; the crisis of legitimacy, by the growing segmentation of the university system and the growing devaluation of university diplomas, in general. This has also happened.

Concentrating on the institutional crisis was fatal for the university and was due to a number of factors, some already evident at the beginning of the 1990s, while others gained enormous weight as the decade advanced. The institutional crisis is and has been, for at least two centuries, the weakest link of the public university, since its scientific and pedagogical autonomy is based on its financial dependency on the state. While the university and its services were an unequivocal public good that was up to the state to ensure, this dependency was not problematic, any more than that of the judicial system, for example, in which the independence of the courts is not lessened by the fact they are being financed by the state. However, contrary to the judicial system, the moment the state decided to reduce its political commitment to the universities and to education in general, converting education into a collective good that, however public, does not have to be exclusively supported by the state, an institutional crisis of the public university automatically followed. If it already existed, it deepened. It can be said that, for the last thirty years, the university's institutional crisis, in the great majority of countries, was provoked or induced by the loss of priority of the university as a public good and by the consequent financial drought and disinvestment in public universities. The causes and their sequence vary from country to country. In countries that lived under dictatorships for the previous four decades, there were two reasons for the onset of the institutional crisis: to reduce the university's autonomy to the level necessary for the elimination of the free production and diffusion of critical knowledge; and to put the university at the service of modernizing, authoritarian projects, opening the production of the university-as-public-good to the private sector and forcing the public university to compete under conditions of unfair competition in the emerging market for university services. In the democratic countries, the onset of the crisis was related to this latter reason, especially beginning in the 1980s, when neoliberalism was imposed as the global model of capitalism. In countries that made the transition from dictatorship to democracy in this period, the elimination of the former reason (political control of autonomy) was frequently invoked to justify the goodness of the latter (creation of a market for university services). In these countries, the affirmation of the universities' autonomy was on a par with the privatization of higher education and the deepening of the public universities' financial crisis. It was a precarious and deceiving autonomy, because it forced the universities to seek new dependencies much more burdensome than dependence on the state, and because the concession of autonomy was subject to remote controls finely calibrated by the ministries of finance and education. Consequently, in the passage from dictatorship to democracy, unsuspected continuities ran beneath the evident ruptures.

The onset of the institutional crisis by way of the financial crisis, accentuated in the last twenty years, is a structural phenomenon accompanying the public university's loss of priority among the public goods produced by the state. The fact that the financial crisis was the immediate motive of the institutional crisis does not mean that the causes of the latter can be reduced to the financial crisis. The analysis of the structural causes will reveal that the prevalence of the institutional crisis was the result of the impact upon it of the two other unsolved crises, the crises of hegemony and of legitimacy. And in this domain, there have been, in the last fifteen years, new developments in relation to the picture I described at the beginning of the 1990s.

The public university's loss of priority in the state's public policies was, first of all, the result of the general loss of priority of social policies (education, health, social security) induced by the model of economic development known as neoliberalism or neoliberal globalization, which was internationally imposed beginning in the 1980s. In the public university, it meant that its identified institutional weaknesses—and they were many—instead of serving as justification for a vast political-pedagogical reform program, were declared insurmountable and used to justify the generalized opening of the university-as-public-good to commercial exploitation. Despite political declarations to the contrary and some reformist gestures, underlying this first collision of the university with neoliberalism is the idea that the public university is not reformable (any more than the state) and that the true alternative lies in the creation of the university market. The savage and deregulated way in which this market emerged and was developed is proof that there was a deep option in its favor. And the same option explained the disinvestment in the public university and massive transferences of human resources that, at times, looked like a “primitive accumulation” on the part of the private university sector at the cost of the public sector.

The two defining processes of the decade—the state's disinvestment in the public university and the mercantile globalization of the university—are two sides of the same coin. They are the two pillars of a huge global project of university politics destined to profoundly change the way the university-as-a-public-good has been produced, transforming it into a vast and vastly profitable ground for educational capitalism. This mid- to long-range project includes different levels and forms of the mercantilization of the university. As for the levels, it is possible to distinguish two. The primary level consists in inducing the public university to overcome the financial crisis by generating its own resources, namely through partnerships with industrial capital. On this level, the public university maintains its autonomy and its institutional specificity, privatizing part of the services it renders. The second level consists of the biased elimination of the distinction between public and private universities, transforming the university as a whole into a business, an entity that not only produces for the market but which is itself produced as a market, as a market of university services as diverse as administration, teaching programs and materials, certification of degrees, teacher training, and teacher and student evaluation. If it will still make sense to speak of the university as a public good when this second level is attained is a rhetorical question.

The disinvestment of the public university

The crisis of the public university as a consequence of disinvestment is a global phenomenon, although its consequences are significantly different at the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery of the world system. In the central countries, the situation is differentiated. In Europe, where, with the exception of England, the university system is almost totally public, the public university has had the power to reduce the extent of the disinvestment at the same time that it has developed the ability to generate its own income through the market. The success of this strategy depends in good measure on the power of the public university and its political allies to block the significant emergence of the private university market. For instance, in Spain, this strategy has so far been more successful than in Portugal. However, it is important to bear in mind that, throughout the decade, a private, non-university sector emerged in almost every European country, aimed at the professional job market. This fact led the universities to respond by structurally modifying their programs and by increasing their variety. In the United States, where private universities occupy the top of the hierarchy, public universities were motivated

to seek alternative funding from foundations, in the market, and by raising tuition fees. Today, in some North American public universities, the state funding is no more than 50 percent of the total budget.

On the periphery, where the search for alternative income in the market is virtually impossible, the crisis attains catastrophic proportions. Obviously, the ills are long-standing, but they have been seriously aggravated in the past decade by the state's financial crisis and the structural adjustment programs. A UNESCO report from 1997 about the majority of African universities drew a dramatic picture of all sorts of shortages: the collapse of infrastructures, almost total lack of equipment, miserably remunerated, unmotivated, and easily corruptible teaching personnel, and little or no research investment. The World Bank diagnosed the situation in a similar way and, characteristically, declared it irreparable. Unable to include in its calculations the importance of the university in the building of national projects and the creation of long-term critical thinking, the Bank concluded that African universities do not generate sufficient “return” on their investment. As a consequence, the African countries were asked to stop investing in universities, concentrating their few resources on primary and secondary education and allowing the global market of higher education to resolve the problem of the university for them. This decision had a devastating effect on the universities of the African countries.

This is a global process and it is on this scale that it should be analyzed. The development of university instruction in the central countries, in the thirty or forty years after World War II, was based, on the one hand, on the successes of the social struggles for the right to education, translated into the demand for a more democratic access to the university and, on the other hand, on the imperatives of an economy that required a more highly qualified workforce in key industrial sectors. The situation changed significantly, starting with the economic crisis that peaked in the mid 1970s. Since then, there has been a growing contradiction between the reduction of public investment in higher education and the intensification of the international economic competition based on the search for technological innovation and, hence, on the techno-scientific knowledge that makes it possible, as well as on the training of a highly qualified workforce.

As for the demand of a qualified workforce, the 1990s revealed another contradiction: the growth of the qualified workforce required by an economy based on knowledge coexisted with the explosive growth of very low-skilled jobs. The neoliberal globalization of the economy has deepened the segmentation of the labor markets between countries and within countries. At the same time, it has allowed both the qualified worker and the unqualified worker *pools* to be recruited globally—the former, predominately through *brain drain* and *outsourcing* of technically advanced services, the latter, predominately through businesses delocalizing across the globe and (often clandestine) immigration. The global availability of skilled labor permits the central countries to lower the priority of their investment in public universities, making funding more dependent on market needs. Actually, there is another contradiction in this domain between the rigidity of university training and the volatility of the qualifications required by the market. This contradiction was shaped, on one hand, by the creation of modular, non-university, tertiary training systems and, on the other, by shortening the periods of university training and making the latter more flexible. Despite ad hoc solutions, these contradictions became enormously acute in the 1990s and had a disconcerting impact on higher education: the university was gradually transformed from a generator of conditions for competition and success in the market into an object of competition, that is, into a market of university services.

From university knowledge to pluriversity knowledge

The developments of the past decade presented the university with very demanding challenges, especially the public university. The situation is near collapse in many countries on the periphery, and it is difficult in the semi-peripheral countries. Although the expansion and transnationalization of the market for university services has contributed decisively to this situation in recent years, they are not the only cause. Something more profound occurred, and only this explains why the university, while still the institution par excellence of scientific knowledge, has lost its hegemony and has been transformed into an easy target for social criticism. I think that, in the past decade, the relations between knowledge and society began to change significantly, and these alterations promise to be profound to the point of transforming the way we conceive of knowledge and of society. As I said, the commercialization of scientific knowledge is the most visible side of these alterations. However, and despite their enormity, they are the tip of the iceberg, and the transformations now in progress have contradictory meanings and multiple implications, some of them epistemological.

University knowledge—that is, the scientific knowledge produced in universities, or institutions separate from the universities but that retain a similar university *ethos*—was, for the whole of the twentieth century, a predominantly disciplinary knowledge whose autonomy imposed a relatively decontextualized process of production in relation to the day-to-day pressures of the societies. According to the logic of this process, the researchers are the ones who determine what scientific problems to solve, define their relevance, and establish the methodologies and rhythms of research. It is a homogeneous and hierarchically organized knowledge insofar as the agents who participate in its production share the same goals of producing knowledge, have the same training and the same scientific culture, and do what they do according to well-defined organizational hierarchies. It is a knowledge based on the distinction between scientific research and technological development, and the autonomy of the researcher is translated as a kind of social irresponsibility as far as the results of the application of knowledge are concerned. Moreover, in the logic of this process of the production of university knowledge, the distinction between scientific knowledge and other kinds of knowledge is absolute, as is the relation between science and society. The university produces knowledge that the society does or does not apply, an alternative that, although socially relevant, is indifferent or irrelevant to the knowledge produced.

The university's organization and *ethos* were created by this kind of knowledge. It happens that, throughout the past decade, there were alterations that destabilized this model of knowledge and pointed to the emergence of another model. I designate this transition, which Gibbons *et al.* (1994) described as a transition from "type 1 knowledge" to "type 2 knowledge," as the passage from *university knowledge to pluriversity knowledge*.

Contrary to the university knowledge described above, pluriversity knowledge is a contextual knowledge insofar as the organizing principle of its construction is its application. As this application is extramural, the initiative for formulating the problems to be solved and the determination of their criteria of relevance are the result of sharing among researchers and users. It is a transdisciplinary knowledge that, by its very contextualization, demands a dialogue or confrontation with other kinds of knowledge, which makes it more heterogeneous internally and allows it to be more adequately produced in less perennial and more open systems, organized less rigidly and hierarchically. All the distinctions upon which university knowledge is based are put in question by pluriversity knowledge but, most basically, it is the relation between science and society that is in question. Society ceases to be an object of scientific questioning and becomes itself a subject that questions science.

The tension between these two models of knowledge highlights the extremes of two ideal types. In reality, the kinds of knowledge produced occupy different places along the *continuum* between the two poles, some closer to the university model, others closer to the pluriversity model. This heterogeneity not only destabilizes the current institutional specificity of the university, it also questions its hegemony and legitimacy in such a way as to force it to evaluate itself by self-contradictory criteria.

Pluriversity knowledge has had its most consistent realization in university–industry partnerships in the form of mercantile knowledge. But, especially in the central and semi-peripheral countries, the context of application has been non-mercantile as well—cooperative and dependent on the solidarity created by partnerships among researchers and labor unions, NGOs, social movements, particularly vulnerable social groups (women, illegal immigrants, the unemployed, people with chronic illnesses, senior citizens, those afflicted with HIV/AIDS, etc.), working-class communities, and groups of critical and active citizens. There is a growing sector of civil society developing a new and more intense relationship with science and technology, demanding greater participation in their production and in the evaluation of their impact. In multi-ethnic and multinational countries, pluriversity knowledge begins to emerge from inside the university itself, when incoming students from ethnic and other minority groups understand that their inclusion is a form of exclusion. They are confronted with the *tabula rasa* that is made of their cultures and of the traditional knowledge of their communities. All of this leads scientific knowledge to confront other kinds of knowledge and demands a higher level of social responsibility from the institutions that produce it and, consequently, from the universities. As science becomes more ingrained in the society, the society becomes more a part of science. The university was created according to a model of unilateral relations with society, and it is this model that underlies its current institutionalism. Pluriversity knowledge supplants this unilateral notion with interactivity and interdependence, both processes enormously invigorated by the technological revolution of information and communication.

Democratic and emancipatory reform of the public university

What is to be done?

In the second part, I will try to identify some of the master-ideas that should preside over a creative, democratic, and emancipatory reform of the public university. Perhaps the first step is to identify the subjects of the actions that need to be undertaken efficiently to confront the challenges that face the public university. In the meantime, in order to identify the subjects, it is first necessary to define the political meaning of the response to such challenges. In light of the precedent, it becomes clear that, despite the fact that there are multiple causes of the university crisis and some of them are long standing, they are currently being reconfigured by neoliberal globalization, and the way they affect today's university reflects that project's intentions. As I have suggested for other areas of social life (Santos, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007), I think the only efficient and emancipatory way to confront neoliberal globalization is to oppose it with an alternative, counter-hegemonic globalization. Counter-hegemonic globalization of the university-as-public-good means that the national reforms of the public university must reflect a country project centered on policy choices that consider the country's insertion in increasingly transnational contexts of knowledge production and distribution. These will become increasingly polarized between two contradictory processes of globalization: neoliberal

globalization and counter-hegemonic globalization. This country project has to be the result of a broad political and social pact, consisting of different sectoral pacts, among them an educational pact in the terms of which the public university is conceived of as a collective good. The reform must be focused on responding positively to the social demands for the radical democratizing of the university, putting an end to the history of exclusion of social groups and their knowledges, for which the university has been responsible for a long time, starting long before the current phase of capitalist globalization. From now on, the national and transnational scales of the reform interpenetrate. Without global articulation, a national solution is impossible.

The current global context is strongly dominated by neoliberal globalization but is not reduced to it. There is space for national and global articulations based on reciprocity and on the mutual benefit that, in the case of the university, will reconstitute and broaden long-lasting forms of internationalism. Such articulations should be cooperative even when they contain mercantile components; that is, they should be constructed outside the regimes of international trade policy. This alternative transnationalization is made possible by the new information and communication technologies and is based on the establishment of national and global networks, within which new pedagogies, new processes of construction and diffusion of scientific and other knowledges, as well as new social (local, national, and global) commitments circulate. The goal is to resituate the role of the public university in the collective definition and resolution of social problems that are now insoluble unless considered globally. The new university pact starts from the premise that the university has a crucial role in the construction of its country's place in a world polarized by contradictory globalizations.

The counter-hegemonic globalization of the university-as-public-good is, thus, a demanding political project that, in order to be credible, must overcome two contradictory but equally rooted prejudices: on the one hand, that the university can only be reformed by the university community and, on the other, that the university will never reform itself. These are very powerful prejudices. A brief examination of the social forces potentially committed to confront them is in place. The first social force is the public university community itself; that is, those within it interested in an alternative globalization of the university. The public university today is a very fractured social field within which contradictory sectors and interests fight each other. In many countries, especially peripheral and semi-peripheral ones, such contradictions are still latent. Defensive positions that maintain the status quo and reject globalization, whether neoliberal or alternative, predominate. This is a conservative position, not just because it advocates the maintenance of the status quo, but mainly because, deprived of realistic alternatives, it will sooner or later surrender to plans for the neoliberal globalization of the university. University personnel who denounce this conservative position and, at the same time, reject the idea that there is no alternative to neoliberal globalization will be the protagonists of the progressive reform that I am proposing.

The second social force of such reform is the state itself, whenever it is successfully pressed to opt for the university's alternative globalization. Without this option, the national state ends up adopting, more or less unconditionally, or succumbing, more or less reluctantly, to the pressures of neoliberal globalization and, in either case, transforming itself into the enemy of the public university, regardless of any proclamation to the contrary. Given the close, love-hate relationship that the State carried on with the university for the whole of the twentieth century, the options tend to be dramatized.

Finally, the third social force to carry out the reform are citizens collectively organized in social groups, labor unions, social movements, non-governmental organizations and their networks, and local progressive governments interested in forming cooperative relationships

between the university and the social interests they represent. In contrast to the state, this third social force has had a historically distant and, at times, even hostile relationship with the university, precisely because of the latter's elitism and the distance it cultivated for a long time in relation to the so-called "uncultured" sectors of society. This is a social force that has to be won through a response to the question of legitimacy, that is, via non-classist, non-racist, non-sexist, and non-ethnocentric access to the university, and by a whole set of initiatives that deepen the university's social responsibility in line with the pluriversity knowledge mentioned above (more on this below).

Beyond these three social forces there is, in the semi-peripheral and peripheral countries, a fourth entity that may be loosely called national capitalism. Certainly, the most dynamic sectors of national capital are transnationalized and, consequently, part of the neoliberal globalization hostile to the emancipatory reform of the university. However, in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, the process of transnational integration of these sectors is filled with tensions. Under certain conditions, such tensions may lead these sectors to see an interest in defending the project of the public university as a public good, especially in cases where there are no realistic alternatives to the public university for the production of the kind of technological knowledge needed to strengthen their insertion in the global economy.

Conclusion

The university in the twenty-first century will certainly be less hegemonic but no less necessary than it was in previous centuries. Its specificity as a public good resides in its being the institution that links the present to the medium and long term, through the kinds of knowledge and training it produces and by the privileged public space it establishes, dedicated to open and critical discussion. For these two reasons, it is a collective good without strong allies. Many people are not interested in the long term, and others have sufficient power to be wary of those who dare to suspect them or criticize their interests.

The public university is, thus, a permanently threatened public good, which is not to say that the threat comes only from the outside; it comes from the inside as well (I emphasized this aspect in previous work).

The conjunction between factors of internal threat and factors of external threat is quite obvious in evaluating the university's capacity for long-term thinking, perhaps its most distinctive characteristic. Those who work in today's university know that university tasks are predominately short term, dictated by budget emergencies, interdepartmental competition, professorial tenure, and so forth. The management of such emergencies allows for the flourishing of types of conduct and professional that would have little merit or relevance were it possible and urgent to focus on long-term questions. This emergency-ridden state of affairs, which is surely due to a plurality of factors, must also be seen as a sign that powerful outside social actors are influencing the university.

The proposal I have presented in this chapter is antipodal to this global and external logic and seeks to create conditions to prevent it from finding a welcoming plot for its local and internal appropriation. The university is a public good intimately connected to the country's project. The political and cultural meaning of this project and its viability depend on a nation's ability to negotiate, in a qualified way, its universities' insertion into the new transnational fields. In the case of the university and of education in general, this qualification is the condition necessary for not making the negotiation an act of surrender and thus marking the end of the

university as we know it. The only way to avoid surrender is to create conditions for a cooperative university in solidarity with its own global role.

Notes

- 1 This chapter has been translated by Peter Lownds of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). The first version of this text was presented in Brasilia, on April 5, 2004, in the context of the official calendar of debates about university reform organized by the Brazilian minister of education, Tarso Genro. A much larger version of this text was published in: Rhoads, R. and Torres, C.A. (eds) (2006) *The university, state and markets – the political economy of globalization in the Americas*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- 2 A chapter in the book *Pela Mão de Alice* (1994) Oporto: Afrontamento.

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Part 3

Inequalities and resistances
