MAHAFFEY, M.: A Social Worker-Politician Creates a New Service.In: Mahaffey, M.,Hanks, J. W.,Social Work ^Political Responsibility, NASW, ' Silver Spring 1982
possible for a social worker to be effective in politics without violating professional values and without losing sight of our commitment to the interests of those we serve as social workers.
Notes and References
1. See Chester G. Atkins et al.. Getting Elected: A Guide to Winning State and Local Office (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973); and Edward Schwartzman, Campaign Craftsmanship (New York: Universe Books, 1973) and Campaign Workbook (Washington, D.C.: National Women's Education Fund, 1978).
2. For a discussion of voters' views on the responsiveness of women candidates, see Irene Diamond, Sex Roles in the Slate House (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 86-88.
3. "Single Issue Politics," Newsweek, November 6,1978, pp. 48 and 60.
4. JeaneJ. KJrkpatrick, Political Woman (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 91.
5. See ibid., pp. 3-23.
6. Alan D. Wade, "The Social Worker in the Political Process," in Social Welfare Forum, 1966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 52-67.
7. Kirlcpatrick, op. cit., pp. 48-50.
8. See Allen Pincus and Anne Minahan, Social Work Practice: Model and Method (Itasca, III.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1973), pp. 37-52; Charles S. Levy, "The Value Base of Social Work," Journal of Education for Social Work, 9 (Winter 1973), pp. 34-42; and Charles S. Prigmore and Charles H. Atherton, Social Welfare Policy-Analysis and Formidatian (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1979), pp. 23-36.
9. See Rino J. Patti and Ronald B. Dear, "Legislative Advocacy: One Path to Social Change," Social Work, 20 (March 1975), pp. 10B-114; and Pincus and Minahan, op. cit., pp. 76-78.
10. S. K. Khindulca and Bernard J. Coughlin, "A Conceptualization of Social Action," Social Service Review, 49 (March 1975), p. 9.
11. Kirlcpatrick, op. cit., p. 131.
12. Ibid., p. 119.
13. See Daniel Thursz, "Social Action as a Professional Responsibility and Political Participation," inj. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Participation in Politics (New York- Leiber-Atherton, 1975), pp. 213-232; and Charles Levy, Socio/ Work Ethics (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1976).
14. George A. Brager, "Advocacy and Political Behavior," Social Work, 13 (April 196B), p. 14.
A Social Worker-Politician Creates a New Service
MARYANN MAHAFFEY
AC CORDING to the 1975 Uniform Crime Report of the Federal .tjLBureau df Investigation (FBI), jLQiice across the country received mojreaills for f amilyjzonflict .than for murder, aggravated assault, and all other serious crimes. Incidents of wjfejbeating outnumbered those of rape by three to one. Responding to calls related to wife abuse accounted for 13 percent of all homicides of police officers and 40 percent of all injuries sustained by police officers.1
Families caught in patterns r^jrecurring..violencejDflen^turn to_^.ppljceTTh^police anTeasiiy available through a phone call, and they come quickly. They handle the violence because they have the authority—the uniform and the badge. They are the twenty-four hour service of last resort. The director of the Police Foundation has publicly stated that such social problems occupy_a major portion of police.officers.' time and,that.aithough officers are not trained for suchworkjjhey should^be.2
Police officers across _the nation know families that expe-j rience repeatsrl inst&ncgs of. domestic yiolence. Such Families are familiar to the local precinct and to the officer on the beat. These families are often not known to ^osej^Q_proyid^ojn^ling-ser;
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J jjces,, however^nor jtfa tí^familie^fan^^
' icapping of a family member is the "solution" to the conflict.
^..variety of responses to the problem of domestic violence have developed. Social workers in the army in Europe worked withj^mim^ding^ffi^ mi&äj^^1íc^^""^iíš^su3r situaiipjis_and_ tOL begin J^Jctmmfghry^
States,. spaal^qrJceLS_iri. jgme_cpmmuiiities have b^njissigned . f^l_jirne_to_.pfllice stations. In other" commurntírs^^p^chologišfs have^ajned^police officers in defjasjojijechniques. In other cases, «• PjychologjsJ^Jba^ vio-kr^eJo.social,agencies.
Despite the existence and success of such programs, social agencies, in many^cgmmunitíes have, jnsjsj^^ iíôu|3^ and they
have questioned the valuejrfj^jal^^ on 'family^Sp15Bp^'ip7r*T^hTvah^rý ôf this approach is questionable. The knowledge, ethics, and skills.,pjLsocial. .wpr.k_arAjieeded ^^vecjndiyid^
created. This implies that the problems and needsôf famifies trapped in domestic violence can ordy beadďegsed ft ir social "f^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^áviťii the
_men|. Moreover, because any change process remjires^jdentifying
geted for change, attempts to influence the police department or any other department of government require attention to political considerations—to balancing the needs and interests of the elected^ officialswho^make pjiU^^
and other sources of political power. ~
Events throughout the country in recent years have increased social workers' awareness not only of the importance of public policy in solving such social problems as family violence, but also of the need to take an active part in the political processes that shape governmental policies. As a result, increasing numbers of social workers have become involved in politics, some as campaign workers or lobbyists, others as elected or appointed officials.
In 1973, such condderations drew me to become a candidate.-for the Detroit City Council and to make familv_vÍQlenr.gjmgof . several huraar^gj^.ce^pgb^ campaign issues?At
the time, there was some publicTecognition of family violence as a
problem, and demands were mounting that the Detroit Police Department find a solution. By focusing attention on the public .gafgtjr aspect nfjfamj^rir effort to
deal with the problem, and by drawing a large vote as a candidate for the city council, I hoped to show that a solution involving the pravjsjonof ^additional jJohce^d^ju^JH^ crisis hadTroaH^^bTIcstipnort
This article describes my efforts, as a social worker, to create such services, through .direct inxplvjs^aJt^^ InTenSe^to provide a model for incrernental change through, political action, the article highlights the importance of understanding power.jr^ bringing.. about_ change—^P^rt^power, referent power, cnarismatic power, and the power of numbers. it"also"*aSnon-' sfrates the need for resourcefulness" and ffed^dty^rt^e^rniig objectives and revising, strategies and.tactic|.
Emergence of a Political Issue
In 1973, Detroit was caught in a political cross fire. The black mayoral candidate—with my support and that of the black community and progressive whites—had fought for and won changes in the city charter to create a_civjharL police .commission, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, charged with making policy for and controlling the police department. The other candidate for mayor was the white police chief. Hysteria was rising in the community as the media focused on crime, muggings, and property damage. One headline screamed "Detroit Is Murder City." The media portrayed the problem as one Df strangers^Jdjling strangers, creating fear among city residents. In the suburbs, hos-tiuTy~\vas' rising toward the;rity_as Detroit's black population. crepXtowarj^aJjl percent majority. Some people were calling for more police and for "untying their hands." Others were camgaign.-ingjjgainst the poli^_aridJfcir_black.-contr.ql^of the city. The black community viewed the police as a white occupying force, and verbal attacks by blacks had many police paranoid. In this climate, a political strategy of open confrontation would have been inflammatory and counterproductive.
As a candidate for city council, I_J,efin^_as,,.pubBc,safety issues the need to free, ppjk^officersjfir cnrn^^ nBrTj'obswith civilians. and_ the. need to reduce
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deaths among policy and citizens by training poucejjgi dgal_with domestic "viblg^^ajid„3Qci£d corrjucts. I knew the deaths were mostly results of arguments among acquaintances. My objective
Detroit and Wayn^_C^un^arid^.b^^
deruslfmcmehts of domesticjaQlence,^d to provide social, services totjSdisri^^^',' The project t proposed wauid(i) train the police 1 in crisis intervention to defuse domestic violence, (2) involve social ) porkers in providing this training for the police, (3) jiave_j§2|nal ', worker^^pn^gall'jn pVecihct stations, and (4) ha^ejthe poHce_malce .'reterralsj^spi^ of the project depended on
•' its acceptance by the decision makers in city government who ,had responslfiifffylor the police depart-
ment and by the leadersrupiri^'e^arn^ a^ency*and^in the"private saciaTservice systejnT ***=  " ~
My position' was strengthened by the large vote I received in November 1973. From a field of eighteen candidates, Ijvas elected to the nine-member city_ council with_the fifth highest vote. Soon after the new "dry "council was sworn in, we marched", with the new black mayor, in a funeral for a police officer killed in the line of duty during a social conflict situation. The emotional impact on the council members was forceful—the dirge, the lines of silent officers, the crowds along the parade route, the rifle salute, and the solidarity of officers and families as they rallied around the widow, who was herself in police training. In June 1974, the coun-riljtdopted my resolution estabUshjng a tasFforce" to investigate theJssuii^ among fainuieBr"rriendsv.^d'"^fluain-
.tances, jagb^j^^jS^ues^on of dornestic_vm^
Tlie resolution mstructed the Social Conflict Task Force to report to the city council and the'mayor'witnin three months with recommendations for referral mechanisms to handle situations involving social' conflict and witfi propjjsals_for training Detroit police officers to deal with;_such sitjiatipns. The task force, by resolution, was to be composed of representatives from a number of organizations and agencies, mcluding Family Service, the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), the Association of Black Social Workers, community counseling and mental health coordinating agencies, the Detroit Police Department, and the department's corps of chaplains. The task force was also to include three people named by the mayor and the Detroit Board of
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Police Commissioners. .By asking the mayor and the board of commissioners to name three people, I hoped to avoid turf problems, lend credibility to the task force, ensure that the new mayor would feel involved, and avoid giving the community the impression that the council and the mayor were at odds.
The idea of a task force was new for the Detroit City Council. Although the council met every day of the year in committee of the whole, subcommittees were prohibited by the charter from 1918 to 1974. Sorne^ members of_ the council were reluctant to establish committeesor task forces^ for theyJfelHt would then be impossible tolaipw evjiryth^ Others thought
establishing such bodies would reduce the power of _the_c_ity council president, a position many_members.wanted.. It seemed wise, therefore, to make this a task force with a time limit and, because it was a first, to have someone other Jhan^cojnic^jr^em^ber chair it. A priestwho was_a_trajped"ccj]^ was asked
rto head the task force in the hope that this wouldf"reduce "turf-related problems. He would also do better, I believed, with the police department because his gender and priestly identification would help in dealings with the police chief.
It was also essential to_uivolve a diverse group ofhuman service professkm,als to avoid ieavTng_the_pi|oimt to pQE^ae-" partment traditionalists or to professionals advocating one particular method, such as~peer group counseling, whicbTis based pn_ the idea that one doe_s not need professional.Jr.aining to deal with prjblems_jrn[plying. human^relationsffips,_biri: needs only, tojse _a_ p_eerjwith a loving, caring heart. (In Detroit in 1973, untrained women were running rape counseling services without professional consultation; by 1975, such services throughout the country were applying for money to hire professionals because the problems to be dealt with called for more skills and training than the volunteers had.)
A central objective of my resolution was to address thejack \ of understanding betweenJ:he_sqcial workprof^ssignaj.and trig..-__jDofice;I was convinced ,„tha.t'. if social jvprk.professipnals_were involved, in the project from the begmnjng^sgmeof the_artificial barriers. betw.een. the two professions would be eliminated, and the services developed 'w6ulH''be~better for it. "However, some social workersJiagLserioua doubts about the project. They quesr! tioned whether a change from "traditional social agency practices.! ^SHMJsHfK^^^MtP^PJ? whetiier_^soc^
Creating a New Service
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; IsaUJieuUslSsa^ They also
; wgrj4gr,ed whatjhejihysical dangers would be. Manysocial work-
■ =§£j&ngs.. Neither psychiatrists nor socTaTworkers have tradition-1 ally worked with the police, although, as will be discussed later, ' some psychologists have begun to develop cnsjsjn^eryention pro-
police traditional^ view their work as the pursuit of criminals and the performance of patrol duties. Intervening in social conflicts is often seen_as social work and^ as a Jess^ desirable assignment .for the r^iice..p|ficer. IfoweveV many police, like the public, are intrigued by the police activities portrayed in such television shows as "Baretta" and "Starsky and Hutch," although police admit that a show like "Barney Miller" is closer to reality. Police officer,s_usually want to get the family trouble runs off their
thgyrictHns, told-that the problem is a civil matter: "Sorrv ladv there s nothing we can do. "
"As the task force began its work, it became known that a command' officer in the_Detroit^Pgj.ice Department,_had researched domestic.Yiol^j^jSLRrfiliaring a dqctp£^aisserTalion on the police emergency phone system.'His findings tagfilighted th^lacjc^_crisis_Jn^v^end for "the' police ogeratqrs
and the low pnorityL.polfce^gaye to domestic jnplenpe. Although this officer was regarded by police officers, both black and white, as fair, tough, and a true police professional, the chief refused to appoint him to the Social Conflict_.Task_F_Qrce."instead, the chiefintimated that the officer was being investigated by the FBI because of criminal contacts. This new, white chief was intent on proving his ability to rule the department. Therefore, the police officers appointed to the task- force included one assigned to the Criminal Justice Institute (the local police academy) and an officer in headquarters command who was held in low esteem by the chief. The officers in charge of the institute were from outside the city and had little credibility in some levels of the police department. These appointments reflected \ th^Joj^priority_the mayor assigned to the EasTTForce. The only 'hope was to usejfieTaskTorce to develop a"base and a de^eToT' un^Vslandingof family vioIe^icelFrnTiMlice department" social a£encjess.jmdjh^^^ to develop a model for later
pjrogranjLjl^^ '
Work of the Task Force
The task force studied crisis intervention programs conducted by police departments and other law enforcement agencies, examining them for their training^techniojJes^their referral mechanisms, and their effectiveness^!)! 1974, most of the published work in this field had been done by psychologists, with the two major training packages having been developed by Bard from the Psychology Department of City College of New York and by Schwartz and Liebman, psychologists based in San Francisco. The Bard model emphasized teaching officers techniques for defusing conflict and for referring people to agencies.1' This package was designed for special units in police departments, but, unfortunately, such units tend to be elitist and to arrive at the scene after other officers have already performed the difficult and sensitive parts of the assignment. Moreover, when problems with funding arise, special units are the most likely to be eliminated.
The Schwartz-Liebman model used in San Francisco's Bay Area also emphasized defusing conflict.5 Although this approach involved the training of all police officers, the relationship between police and social service agencies was limited to the making of referrals and the developing of pocket-size referral books for officers. The police also tested whether the agency was receptive to police referrals and whether people were taken care of. Such referral mechanisms seemed to be afterthoughts. Both models had sexist overtones in how they viewed women victims of violence, and they built on the machismo emphasis of police training.
I joined a task force team that included representatives from the Detroit Police Department and the Criminal Justice Institute in conducting on-site research in California with police departments using the Schwartz model. The visit won support among some of the police officers for such a program and gave me additional information regarding links to community agencies and the experience of community agencies in social conflict interventions. For example, the experience of the program in Oakland, California, indicated that the peaks for conflict occurred on weekends and paydays and that once a situation was defused, 75 percent of the people being dealt with could wait until Monday morning for further intervention. Most families successfully referred needed from one to three interviews, and only 5 percent became long-term clients.8 The task force also consulted extensively with the Police
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Foundation in Washington, D.C., and one member of the task force attended an FBI seminar on social conflict in Virginia. Others attended a regional Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) conference in Chicago.
The task force also examined the policies and practices of the Detroit Police Department in handling family violence. In 1974 the department gave a low priority to "domestic calls" on 911, the emergency line. People soon caught on that calls describing family problems brought a slow response, and callers began claiming there was "a man with a gun," which made the call a high priority and prompted a quick police response.
The General Orders of the Detroit Police Department in 1974 described social conflict situations as civil matters and not as a police responsibility. Several reasons were given for this point of view: (1) the large volume of other service demands for emergencies involving immediate physical danger and crimes in progress, (2) the lack of specific training for police mediating social conflicts, and (3) the service award system that emphasized arrests and convictions. Police recruits in Detroit received a total of seven hours of lecture-type training in topics related to social conflicts, a three-hour lecture on domestic complaints, and four hours of lecture on handling abnormal individuals, all of which constituted a tiny portion of the recruits' six-month training. Nevertheless, an estimated 25 to 30 percent of the calls to the 911 number in Detroit each week related to social conflicts.
Recommendations
In October of 1974, the_SocialXonfhc^Task Foxcjire^ftedjto the Detroit City Council and the mayor, pointing ouT^rootems in many areas. The task force cited liiejackofajegal way, in situations of marital, conflict, .to force a separation or to "evict a violent person from "the situation. It also criticized the failure of the police to treat ~with the same seriousness.as_i^mies..pccurring between stranger^jdomestic conflict or social conflict situations that in-volyed-peopJewho I5iew~eacffQther; this problem was^parBcularly noteworthy in instances of .violence between, husbands, and wives. The lack of understanding anll.cooperatiqn^etweejusQciaJ_^gen-cies .and the police department was another problem discussed in the task force's repoft7Spciil"agencies offered services during cer-
tain^vmiingjipurs^a^nd. ran somejňmte^sj^ers for people who needed a place to spend the night. This was not enough, however, and what was available_waa oft en_nqt_ made ,lmown__to_poXicejoffi-cers. In Detroit, as in many communities, there are twenty-four-hour mental health clinics, but these are intended to deal with -psychiatric emergencies, not problems in relationships, such "as faxnily~čonfIicts. In addition, most of Detroit's social agencies did not.setaside blocks of time duringjyhich chents..caughtjn^čón-flict situation could walk in and receive services; with "few exceptions, agencies_had waiting_lj^sjgr_5eryices. Two friends threatening to shoot each other do not need to be told to get at the end of the waiting list.
The task force also faulted the 911 priority list, which placed property crimes and crimes involving a weapon higher than family calls. An example of the 911 calls to which the operator could not send a car in 1974 was as follows: AJ5-yjeju^oIdjrirI called, screaming that her mother was hitting her and beating her up. She cried thatsJTe_w^_Jrig.hi;eried^that_her motber_-would_ldlL-herJ...The operator sajd_tha^this_waa.not.a police matter .and_hung_up. In turnTthe p^lTce complained that.when the^aUs_cain^ night on Friday oTat: 2:00 A.M. on .Sunday. from_ajainjlyjnyjoived jn phygK:al_violence,„.np AQStaLwgjkgr, or,spcial.work agency was available;.
* The task force's report made five major fr^^lffiénHaHonsí (1) that all officers be exposed to_a forty-hour crisis intervention training programj^ther^tfian just members oř^special, units, (2) fEáTa^Dmmunity resource! řefeiraX sj&jem be established, (3) that social agencies set aside blocks of time and have extended hours to asiisFlhose calling thejjpjice, department, (4) that changes_be_ rňáffin^thejiptí allocation o? person-
nel, giving a higher priority to family calls and tramingjirijjjiera-tors injfesjclntii^ and (5)
that a service awardjsvsftm^bej^t^
their abilities liolíěTuse volatile situations without injury to themselves or others.
When the report of the Social Conflict Task Force was completed in November 1974, Ijjsed my elected position to obtain media coverage for the report's .findings". T'aTso"presented .the. report to the JJetroit_^ai^oLPj3Ík.e Commissioners at a public meeting. Several members of the board believed in what we were trying to do; others thought it a minor matter. However, the police
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\ -
cJiigfsmd that the recommend^tionsjpll^ could not beV
acted^n.iWu.s.Qcjal;,;wonc agencies^ere aydlab^Tw^b^^Tf h^QHj»^d^„.sey5njd^_aj^^~ile was unwilling to consider employing, social workers'Jn the police department unless, they-were uniformed ..officers; if Jhej" were uniforro^oM^rsrbeltfa'a not wjlljng to give them the assignmenfof working_with_dpmesBc violence.- - "      ~~    " -
Other obstacles included the mayor's continuing to view the project as a low priority. It seemed obvious that the recommendations of the task force were not going to get far without better , cooperation from the top of the police department. Therefore, the • j strategy.,became one_of_keeping theJ|^e^iy^h^rQugh meeting a j wl£llJ.^^E2ii£5_?ji^e^ andTrle'n^yor^ and .thi2u.ghj2X^^^^^ir
' representatives of the task force"met with the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, additional members of the Social Conflict Task Force and others were rounded up to be present as a show of support. The head of the task force organized an NASW cojgimit-tee on^aciaLcDnfHct, aild Dot;h of us continued tojalk to the police,, the policj^unjons^ann^ We also con-
tinued to work on the issue of 911 priorities, to talk with professionals and agenciesjjibgi:i,t.the.necessi.ty:-QL.P*gser work between social_agentiesjind_dTe police..department, and to work with the NiHonaroVganization for Women (NOW) and other community groups to keep the pressure on.
The Criminal Justice Institute had the officers most interested in the project. They even invited Schwartz and Liebman to conduct a week-long demonstration course on handling social conflicts. Not long afterwards, however, the institute was closed as a result of police department politics and Detroit's 1975-76 depres sion, during which every department of city government, including the police, took a 20-percent budget cut. The projection was that there would be no police to train for at least six months. It appeared the project was dead.
Breakthrough
Events quite apart from any efforts in behalf of the task force recommendations offered an opportunity for some progress. The police chief overreached himself in a departmental dispute and_
y/as fired. A new police chief was appointed. Also, the officer who ■^a^Hecome the expert within the department on the issue of social conflict calls became deputy executive chief for several months.
In November 1976, in an effort to break through the stalemate, I heldj^egtjxjgjn my office to discuss social conflict calls. I invited the deputy executive chief of the police department", a representative of United Community Services, the priest who had headed the task force, the two area directors of Family Service of Detroit and Wayne County, and a representative of the Detroit unit of NASW's Michigan Chapter. Discussion at this meeting identifiejy^
to house and protect children Jn danger as a reiuTTCpLfamily Jrou-ble, and.prgfjssjona^ responded_with_a
gropojyOP4^^ °f Detroit and Wayne County, which eventually became known as the Family Trouble Clinic. The agency's willingness to engage in this project was partly a result of community pressure and NASW invoh^ment A speech~"by*"fhe deputy executive police chief at a local NASW meeting on the issue of family violence and the police had interested many social workers in the problem.
The project was conceived as aj^ree-month pilot effort. Family Service was to provide the finances for„^jggiaTwo^^|q be*pTesefit"in trie precinct station and offexJrnjnaikt£lae^ice-.to clients during the peak Deriods for incidents of dome^jj^jQfllencg,-which^we?e~Fnday and^SaJturda^ P.M. jjntil
miHmgrlOn addition, one or two. vjsalsJiyj_siK3aJ_Hori^ precin^during the week were planned to facilitate, coordinate, and direct referrals to Family Service. Objectives of the project were to demons tracejthat_referrals are^expediteaHiiy prerinct:based activities, make social services, better known..to more ppjkje._g.ffi-cers, increase professional staff's appreciation of_ the, problems police officers" hHve~in~domestic relations cai|s.K..and..give, police officers a betteTlTiiderstanding of tKe' slices .offered. It was also hoped that the results of tFis police~referral project would lend support to the task f^ce_recgmmendation of.establishmgjijght serviceJgr.familyj:ounseling.
No movement toolTpface regarding the proposal for several months. Finally, IjfocoyexBd_£h^ had not_seen theprpposal, so I forwarded another copy to him. I then called him several times, and he finally agreed it was worth pur-
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suing. At a brief meeting in March 1977, the acceptancei of_the project ..was confirmed .^ancMts location established for the Sixteenth Police "Precinct, whose commander had volunteered to house the project. The precinct was the largest in the city, its population presented a racial and economic cross section, and the precinct station was close to an office of Family Service. As responsbility for the development arid"implementation of the project shifted from one step to the next, it was repeatedly necessary, to confront obstacles, defuse emotions, and solve problems to keep the..project. moving toward the finalgoal. Social work skills and Ehe modest power of my elected office were valuable assets during this stage.
Although an early problem arose when the precinct commander publicly supported a mayoral candidate in opposition to the incumbent mayor in the 1977 election, tjiejft^e^wjjricuig with the project were■ conyjncedjof its value, and the two social workers assigned tqJhe_project_by Fam_ilyJS^^e_wer^nleased wjtlijheirwork. Everyone involved became supportive of the project, and both .the police and the human service. professionals_said they had begun to a^redat^eacji otbjacj" lobbied the mayor and his staff in support of the project and, in my reelection campaign, described it as a success, thus building public acceptance and support. In the end, the project survived both the internal politics of the police department and electoral politics.
An ad hoc committee of Family Service studied the experiences of the police-referral project and compiled useful information:
• Social workers and the police were received differently by families in crisis.
• All direct referrals resulted in clients' receiving crisis counseling services within three hours of the complaint.
• Follow-up counseling occurred in 89 percent of all situations in which families received crisis counseling from the social worker.
e In all situations of family conflict, at least one member of the family received some form of direct service from a social worker.
e The number of referrals the project generated in the test precinct would have doubled Family Service's total annual intake if the rate of referral were projected to all the city's police precincts.
• Nme^nine percent of the people referred _hadjnpj_.vjsited_a human service ageney'befofe.
• Police officers were concerned about domestic violence, but most felt helpless and powerless in confronting the problem. Perceived as the authority in the community, police can force cessation of a violent situation, but they cannot keep people apart. In some situations, for a variety of reasons, the next day the wife would say that she wanted her abuser home. Social workers know and deal with the dynamics of relation- ^ ships, the police officer with cessation qf_ the_immediate i trouble. With the inception of the pilot project tHejolice qfficerTiadlsomething to say, to recommend, after stopping jhe''h"o"stjle actions. ""
• Most disputants lacked communication slcills and were not usea^oj^lkmg about feelings. There are also problems when only one of two marital partners is verbal.
Focus on Publicity
Once this information had been compiled, my office announced on a Friday that there would be a report to the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners. A newspaper reporter called me on Sunday afternoon, desperately looking for a story, and, as a result, the police referral-^ffiO-ject received a front-page headline Monday^jaiorn-ing. Fortunately, the writer of the newspaper irIfcle spoke with a police sergeant who had worked with Family Service on the pilot project. The sergeant was pleased with the project and praised it, and the article had the effect of broadening, public support. As planned, the report was presented to the board with t^^ressfe-tions: (1) that the board approach the local United Foundation and its planning agency for the mdnexJP^a.^ Proigpt Permanent andj^expanfLit to another precinct and (2) that the police department be instructed.to work with.Faiiuly Service tpprepar^^^ aU the precincts.
Time, place, and situation all influence process and strategy. As a result of Family Service's report and of the media coverage received by a national conference on domestic violence held in Detroit by NOW, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, on my recommendation, set up a task force on social conflict. A
206 MAHAFFEY . Creating a New Service 207
woman commissioner was to chair the task force, and I was to be vice-chair. We thus developed a publicly mandated support network as well as an entrée to the board of commissioners,.the policymaking body for the police department.
Part of my. function wasjojnaiirdan^^ in th^aqliic.ejgfm^l3«M^^an<UQ save the, pqHce^&OTn'having^lo^ inta^aLo&,bat|^s wjth^U
might want.tojat.ch„on to ajnot topic. Forexample, after tne task force was formed by the board of commissioners, two local feminists wrote a proposal for crisis intervention training for the police. One of them, a person with experience in sociological research, was to spend two months supervising a police sergeant in the development of a program to train police officers in defusion techniques. The researcher jalanned to^ devejpp, a referral manual. TheJocus-• was- on. the victim without: real consideration "of"TfKe protófa5%jpfj^.pplic£^^cetj^o mention was iňadVof the train; ing the„Dolice were alreadyreceiving or oif any'čóop|iafjoS^mw» ^^^^M^SJDTQ^Tt^^iie sociological researcher and the other feminist, a planner in trie city's planning department, did their political homework, and by maneuvering and taking advantage of internecine rivalry in the police department, they managed to obtain an LEAA grant despite the objections of several top officials in the police department and of the board of commissioner's task force. The grant was subse^^ police.officHF^con^erm^
J UtEér^groupš^also went to the board of commissioners to demand changes in. police procedures. Some representatives of these groups were made members of the board's task force.
In 1977,1 built my successful reelection campaign presentation on the theme "promises made and promises kept." One of the promises made in 1973 had been to do something about domestic violence. The promise had been kept: the police referral project had demonstrated that help could be given to families and to police officers and had resulted in some lessening of domestic violence. ThjrejMa^ejqdjejiceJJ^^ lower among casesjh-
verte^JCLFEumhy^Servke.
The piloLQmJect demonstrated theneed to spread the,police refer^^priigEarQJhroughmLt-the_city. In November of 1977, the Iocal_UmtedJEoinTd^tjojL6 money to continue
lihe^rojn^jnJnJhe-SM
the Tenth Precinct. When the Criminal Justice Institute resumed
training in 1977, it incorporated into its curriculum for all officers some Of the material that was prepared as a result of the studies by the Social Conflict Task Force. As a whole, the project documented the overwhelming need for money to involve additional social workers in social conflict work.
Principles of Political Practice .
It would have been impossible to establish the police referral sys-      .J , tern had there not been support inside the police department, as ^ 'J ' well as considerable support on the outside. Confrontation was { frJL?* avoided. TJfte chan^n^cli^a^ejn^ relation tajramg". contributed, immensely to this. Despite the mayor's placing low priority on Tiuniarf services, his recogmfon_of the general support,_thejssue attracted, of my expertise in this area,"and'of rhy"support for his administration kept the task force and the police referral project from being seen as too great a threat. In addition, success was ensured by using existing structures and by keeping small the amount of money initially requested, ^purees of fundin^outside ,city,,gpvemment were relied on hea^y^unt^ffl^,. acceptance of the idea for a different kind of traimng..haii,.been..establis^ed. It was" alsoi" important to the success of the program that thejjojice d£parim£DiJbja£^
its eagerness to find solutions^ to help people. ' "Given'the dynamics involved in working with the Detroit Police Department, the mayor, and various elements of city government, a strategy that included picket lines and mass demonstrations would have been counterproductive. However, the strategy used did include a great deal of individual assessment, persuasion, expert information and documentation, lobbying, and the implied pressure of budget power, particularly the power to hold up contracts. It further required the ability to create publicity. The value of coordinating various forces was also demonstrated, because the Detroit Police Department has expert politicians in its ranks. Injiddition,.poUcejd^^
a member of the city council, I had.,thg_poj.yer to call .them, tq a pITffiu^discugsion otr Hearing. Like most bureaucrats, they dreaded the posslbllTty^^dverse publicity. Apparent throughout the long campaign for the referral system was the importance of timing and of keeping the issue alive during the many periods of waiting
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Creating a New Service
209
for favorable conditions and opportunities for progress.
A social worker entering politics cannot overlook the importance of conviction and assertiveness. In the DetroitLCity_Council, where the members are elected simultaneouslyand atlarge, there is a natural competition for constituencies and for votes. TJiergjs.. also, a JSSJtigrairoen^ issiLe-Qts^i^concCT^
not .serioualy. interfere with.his-pr hjier leader shie on ,thatjssu,e.
; sjdesJl'ms, of course, ^is both a gift and a. liability.,.ggcognltioj^ ; con^l^idesjcan lej^juhi^jsive^^
; toj^flfcigive, to "Be in command.ran'd to giye-short^uick ^answgrs.
! A^consequence of theMj^erenceyaJthatPoHce and social workers
;. ^l^^LH^sM^^^U^ttaUierj_WhatJaneeded.is.an.integration ofskills.
Social workers as a whole, and human service agencies as well, need to understand that if they have an idea for a solution to a problem and the professional expertise to carry it out, they must be prepared to fight to get the problem solved in a professional way. Social workers sometimes take the position that the best program will eventually win and so do not fight for proposals that would assure social work services. Too often, non-social workers become attracted by a social work idea and are allowed to take it over for personal gain as it becomes popular. It is important that social workers commit themselves to engage in action for the client's benefit and for equitable treatment to ensure the availability of social work services.
The solution to a problem on a limited scale creates new"demands. As the police referral service demonstrated that it worked, the police in Detroit's Sixteenth Police Precinct made more referrals, and satisfied clients and others called the Family Trouble Clinic instead of the police. Those_who returned seemed to want Jonger..terra, cpunseling1..£yentuaUyJ_the clinic-needed, increases in ^orkers_ andmgngy^Xhejy so overlp^djhey had
f ~H^?£j^lP]^IJiOIL.P^iJs--and resorted to conducBng~~most counseling via telephqne^JI^e-SQludon.iQjQjie_pxQ^em thus created new ones, which had to be addressed in new ways. Flexibility is an essential complement to stability of purpose. The scientific method of problem solving—assessing anddefining the problem, analyzing the forces involved, establishing goals and objectives, planning and implementing intervention strategies, and constantly
reevaluating process and substance to identify the need for any corrective action—provides a valid model for developing and delivering services to a needy population.
The steps outlined in this article can be translated for use by other social workers elected to office, by the many social workers who work with elected officials, and by community groups who have been successful in selling an issue to an elected official. The problem of domestic violence—its impact on the police as well as on families—was identified and then further defined through the use of a task force to gather information and bring various forces in the community together. At each step in the process, strategies were developed to continue the forward movement of the project. When some forces threatened to sidetrack the project, other routes were found and counterforces developed. Most important, throughout this long process, the goal was kept in focus and the pressure was continued. Perhaps the old maxim that change is slow should be extended to affirm that achieving the goal reached through long and persistent effort is even sweeter.
Notes and References
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
2. Interview with Patrick V. Murphy, executive director, Police Foundation, Washington, D.C., June 1974.
3. Interviews with United States Army social workers, Fifth Army, Frankfurt, Germany, June 1975.
4. See Morton Bard and Joseph Zaclcer, The Police and Fnlerj>ersonal Conflict: Third-Party Intervention Approaches (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1976).
5. Sea Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Donald A. Liebman, "Domestic Crisis Intervention" (Mountain View, Calif.: Law Enforcement Training and Research Association, Inc., 1971). (Photocopied.)
6. Interview with Betty Terrell, director of professional services, Family Service of the East Bay, Oakland, Calif., September 1974.
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