Explaining the International Relations
of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability
Versus Ethnic Ties
Stephen M. Saideman
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, many observers expected that intemational conflict
would be less likely to occur and easier to manage. Given the successful resolution of
the Gulf War and the European Community's (EC) efforts to develop a common
foreign policy, observers expected intemational cooperation to manage the few conflicts
that might break out. Instead, the disintegration of Yugoslavia contradicted
these expectations. Rather than developing a common foreign policy, European states
were divided over how to deal with Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Germany pushed for
relatively quick recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, whereas other members of the
EC wanted to go slower. Some observers expected Russia to fall in line with the West
because of its need for investment and trade, but instead it supported Serbia. It is
puzzling that Europe failed to cooperate regardless of whether greater intemational
cooperation could have managed this conflict. How can we make sense of the international
relations of Yugoslavia's demise? Since secession is not a new phenomenon,
we should study previous secessionist conflicts to determine if they share certain
dynamics, and we should consider applying to Yugoslavia the arguments developed
to understand such conflicts.
When studying secessionist conflicts, analysts have frequently argued that states
vulnerable to secession do not support separatist movements in other states. This
argument serves as the foundation for many analyses of the intemational relations of
ethnic conflict. If this were tme, the last few years would have been much more
peaceful. Separatist tendencies in Kosovo and the Sandzak region, for example, should
have constrained Serbia. Similarly, the secessionist efforts of Croatia's Serbian miI
would like to thank the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of Califomia, San
Diego, for generously funding much of the research from which this article is drawn. Miles Kahler, Peter
Cowhey, Arend Lijphart, Deborah Avant, John Barkdull, Brian Sala, David Lake, Peter Gourevitch, and,
especially. Lisa Martin have provided insightful criticisms and helpful suggestions. All errors are my sole
responsibility.
Intemational Organization 51,4, Autumn 1997, pp. 721—53
© 1997 by The 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
722 Intemational Organization
nority should have inhibited Croatia's ambitions in Bosnia. Furthermore, the significant
threat of disintegration should have deterred Russia from assisting secessionists
in the rest of the former Soviet Union.' In sum, the vulnerability argument fails to
account for recent events.
The vulnerability argument does not even adequately explain the intemational
relations of Africa—the region for which the argument was developed. Using differing
logics, analysts argue that vulnerability to separatism constrains the foreign policies
of African states and causes them to cooperate with each other in support of
states resisting secessionism.^ These arguments posit the common interest and then use
systemic-level approaches to explain the high degree of intemational cooperation. The
problem is that in each African secessionist crisis most of the secessionists' important
supporters were facing their own ongoing or potential separatist movements.
This article presents an altemative explanation: ethnic divisions within countries
both constrain and compel leaders as they develop policy toward secessionist crises
in other states. Although the vulnerability argument considers the weak positions of
leaders, it does not take domestic politics seriously. The counterargument, the ethnicties
approach, asserts that domestic politics is the most important influence on foreign
policies toward secessionist conflicts. Specifically, politicians have to pay attention
to their supporters' preferences, because they might otherwise give their support
to someone else. Ethnic identity shapes what supporters prefer in both domestic and
foreign policy. Individuals prefer that their states support those with whom they
share ethnic ties. Since almost all secessionist crises are ethnic conflicts, potential
and existing supporters frequently have ethnic ties to one side of a secessionist crisis.
Politicians respond to their supporters' desires and support the side with which their
constituents share ethnic ties. Therefore, the ethnic ties (or enmities) between a politician's
supporters and the combatants in ethnic conflicts in other states help to explain
the policies of states toward secessionist crises.
Systemic accounts fail because vulnerability does not determine the foreign policies
of states. Instead, ethnic politics within states significantly conditions their policies
toward ethnic conflicts in other states, as indicated by case studies of the Congo
Crisis, the Nigerian Civil War, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This implies that
we need to examine the domestic sources of cooperation more seriously, that fears of
contagion or setting unfortunate precedents do not inhibit states as much as we might
think, and that conflict management of secessionist crises may fail because outside
actors may not agree on the preferred outcome.
Conventional Wisdom: Vulnerability Deters
Support for Secession
"The greatest deterrent to territorial revisionism has been the fear of opening a Pandora's
box. If any one boundary is seriously questioned, why not all the boundaries in
1, See Treisman 1997; and Hill and Jewett 1994,
2, "Host state" refers to the state resisting a secessionist movement.
Secessionist Conflicts 723
Westem Africa?"^ This is the heart of conventional understandings of Africa's boundary
politics and beyond. Vulnerability inhibits policymakers from supporting secessionism
in other states. It also causes them to strengthen the norm of territorial integrity
by building an intemational institution—such as the Organization of African
Unity (OAU),'' Separatism is a serious threat because most African states face serious
racial, religious, tribal, and linguistic divisions. Leaders fear that once some group
successfully questions one tenuous, artificial African boundary, all the boundaries
will be subject to challenges,^
Saadia Touval stresses the vulnerability of African states to separatism to explain
why they have not supported secessionist movements or engaged in irredentism,^
"Since most states are vulnerable to extemal incitement to secession, it was obvious
to the majority of states that reciprocal respect for boundaries, and mutual abstinence
from irredentism, would be to their advantage."'' Touval goes on to argue that Somalia
was the exception that proved the rule. Somalia's relative invulnerability to ethnic
conflict, due to its homogeneity, explains its exceptional irredentism.^ Although the
rise of clan conflict in the early 1990s and the de facto secession of Somaliland
(northem Somalia) demonstrate that Somalia is currently vulnerable to ethnic conflict,
an examination of its history indicates that secessionism and ethnic conflict
have plagued Somalia since it became independent in 1960, thus challenging Touval's
assertion.^
Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg argue that the norms of intemational society
preserve African states lacking the empirical requisites of statehood,'" Jackson
and Rosberg incisively apply Grotian theory to the practices of states and the influence
of the intemational community." Their discussion contains keen insights
into the nature of sovereignty, but one of their central points is problematic. They
assert that "there is a common interest in the support of intemational rules and institutions
and state jurisdictions in the African region that derives from the common
vulnerability of states and the insecurity of statesmen."'^ Thus they make
one very important but very questionable assertion: that vulnerability to ethnic conflict
and separatism presents African leaders with similar opportunities and con-
straints.
3, Zartman 1966, 109,
4, For example, see Buchheit 1978; Foltz 1991; Herbst 1989; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Jackson
1990; Neuberger 1986; and Touval 1972,
5, Some analysts, such as Neuberger, have even argued that no rational basis needs to exist for such
fears of dangerous precedents; Neuberger 1986, 97, For an excellent discussion of precedent setting and
violating, see Kier and Mercer 1996,
6, I do not deal explicitly with irredentism here, though the argument can be applied to it; see Saideman
1996,
7, Touval 1972,33, For critiques of this argument, see Suhrke and Noble 1977; and Kamanu 1974,
8, Touval 1972, 34,
9, See Lewis 1965; and Laitin and Samatar 1987,
10, See Jackson and Rosberg 1982; and Jackson 1990,
11, For the Grotian approach, see Bull 1977,
12, Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 18 (emphasis added).
724 Intemational Organization
Similarly, Jeffrey Herbst applies Robert Keohane's neoiiberal approach to explain
why African states have been able to maintain their boundaries.'^ Herbst admits that
for boundary stability to exist, states must solve a collective action problem. "However,
in the case of the state system that protects African boundaries, the large number
of states is not a problem, because each state still feels at risk from secession,
conquest, or some other boundary change."''' Although elites face many threats, for
Herbst, vulnerability to secession overrides the collective action problem. "Since all
countries are at risk from disgruntled minority groups, there is a general sense that all
states gain crucial protection from the current system." '^
Herbst's approach does not adequately solve the problem that he seeks to address:
Why do states still cooperate despite the temptation to free ride? Given the logic of
collective action, vulnerability does not sufficiently explain cooperation; nor does the
existence of common interest sufficiently explain cooperation—the temptation to
free ride continues to exist.'* Herbst and others suggest that there is no free riding
because a single violation of the boundary regime may undermine the entire system.
"Precisely because all parties know that once African boundaries begin to change
there would be an indefinite period of chaos.... the grave danger of not cooperating
is clear to all."'' Thus since any boundary change, such as a successful secession,
would reverberate throughout Africa, no country would have any interest in supporting
such behavior. Herbst's emphasis on intemational norms and organizations, like
that of Jackson and Rosberg, suggests that the greater the involvement of intemational
organizations and the clearer the intemational norms, the less support secessionist
movements will receive.
In these arguments, analysts treat vulnerability to ethnic conflict in general and
secessionism specifically as a sufficient condition for explaining why a state would
not support a separatist movement. Yet vulnerability fails to explain why a state
would want to support a secessionist movement, suggesting only that a state that was
invulnerable to secessionism could do so if it desired. Because states do help secessionists,
the vulnerability argument only accounts for one value of the dependent
variable. Furthermore, mutual vulnerability does not necessarily mean that states will
pursue identical solutions to shared problems, because vulnerability may present
different politicians with varying interests. Vulnerability by itself says very little
about how leaders choose to deal with their fragile positions and divided states.
Leaders may opt for extemal aggression to unify a divided society, or they may opt to
acquiesce, depending on the nature of the intemal conflict they face and their political
interests.'* Another major problem with vulnerability arguments is that states
under attack by secessionist movements have supported similar groups in other states.
13. Keohane 1986.
14. Herbst 1989,690.
15. Ibid.
16. Olson 1965.
17. Herbst 1989, 689.
18. For recent discussions of diversionary theories of war, see Morgan and Bickers 1992; and Miller
1995.
Secessionist Conflicts 725
Despite the vulnerability argument's weaknesses, it remains popular today, and
analysts apply it beyond the African context. Radmila Nakarada refers to Pandora's
box when he argues that "if the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia is compromised in
the name of self-determination, then the ensuing secessions .., will have an extemal
domino effect. The Yugoslav precedent will reach other dissatisfied minorities (Basque,
Corsica, Sardinia, Northem Ireland, Southem Tyrol, etc) whose aspirations for independence
will be encouraged. The supreme danger is that once a precedent is set, no
European borders can escape re-examination."" Indeed, Susan Woodward argues
that initially Westem countries sought to preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity
because they feared setting a precedent for the Soviet Union,^''
Should the vulnerability argument apply beyond the African context? Herbst, Jackson
and Rosberg, and many others focus strictly on the single continent, so perhaps
we cannot apply their arguments beyond Africa. Given the relatively recent decolonization
of Africa, the artificiality of its boundaries, and the political, economic, and
social weakness of African states, it might make sense not to generalize beyond it.
Nonetheless, much of the vulnerability argument's logic should apply to any state
suffering from separatism. If African states do not support secession due to fears of a
backlash or reluctance to set nasty precedents, such concems should constrain states
in similar positions. Since vulnerability assertion is part of the larger systemic approaches
Grotian theory and neoliberalism, contextual variables should not significantly
limit the reach of such arguments. Of course, the vulnerability logic should
apply most strongly to those regions closely resembling Africa, A similar region
would be characterized by receding colonial or imperial domination, boundaries created
by outsiders and not reflective of the distribution of ethnic groups, and states
suffering from economic dismptions and political instability. The vulnerability argument,
therefore, should apply to Eastem Europe and the former Soviet Union, given
the significant similarities of that region today to Africa of thirty years ago.
In sum, the vulnerability argument predicts that states vulnerable to secessionism
will support host states and oppose secessionists. Table 1 summarizes the key prediction
of the argument. The argument by itself makes no predictions about the behavior
of invulnerable states. The larger arguments associated with the vulnerability assumption,
however, suggest that intemational norms and intemational organizations may
constrain even invulnerable states. Before going on to the cases, I delineate the alternative
argument: how ethnic politics within states influences their policies toward
secessionist conflicts elsewhere.
Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy
Ethnic politics does not always inhibit foreign policy but serves as a critical dynamic
compelling some politicians to support secession elsewhere while constraining oth-
19, Nakarada 1991, See also Lukic and Lynch 1996, chap, 13; and Steinberg 1993, 34, 61,
20, Woodward 1995, 164,
726 Intemational Organization
TABLE 1. Tlie vulnerability argument's predictions
State is vulnerable to secessionism
Predicted policy Yes No
State supports secessionists No Indeterminate
State supports host state Yes Indeterminate
ers. Rather than always preventing politicians from supporting secession, the demands
of ethnopolitical competition will cause politicians to assist secessionists in
other states under certain conditions and limit them from doing so under other conditions.
The ethnic-ties argument builds on a few basic assumptions and deductions
about the motivations of politicians, the interests of their supporters, and their influence
on foreign policy.
The first assumption of the ethnic-ties argument is that politicians care primarily
about gaining and maintaining office, the prerequisite for most other goals attainable
through politics.^' Second, each politician requires the support of others to gain and
maintain political offices—the supporters forming the politician's constituency. How
the constituency supports a decision maker varies, depending on the regime type and
on existing political institutions. In a democracy, the constituency's support comes
primarily through voting, though campaign contributions also matter. In an authoritarian
regime, the leaders' constituencies generally consist of those who control the
means of repression, such as the officer corps of the military as well as the security
apparatus. Regardless of the particular support mechanisms, incumbent politicians
care most about preventing these supporters from leaving their coalition, that is,
exiting.^^ Who is exiting determines how politicians respond.
Third, ethnic identities influence the preferences of potential and existing constituents
and, therefore, who might wish to exit and why.^^ Ethnic groups are "collective
groups whose membership is largely determined by real or putative ancestral inherited
ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate
in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society."^" These
ancestral ties are through race, kinship (tribe or clan), religion, and language. A
long-running debate concems whether ethnic identity is a given in society (primordial)
or created by politicians as they see fit. I follow the moderate position: multiple
21. For the classic discussion of this assumption applied to democracies, see Mayhew 1974. It is
assumed here that elites in nondemocracies will behave similarly, since the costs of losing one's office are
probably greater in authoritarian regimes; Ames 1987.
22. Hirschman 1970.
23. For a rational-choice theoretic explanation of why followers care about ethnic identities, see Hardin
1995.
24. Rothschild 1981.2.
Secessionist Conflicts 727
ethnic identities frequently coexist, and the political context determines the salience
of particular identities.^^
From these assumptions, we can deduce that the ethnic ties of potential and existing
constituents to extemal actors influence their preferences. If ethnic identity influences
individuals' preferences toward domestic policies, these same identities should
influence preferences toward foreign policies for at least two reasons. First, ethnic
identity, by its nature, creates loyalty, interest, and fear of extinction.^^ Intemational
boundaries do not cause members of ethnic groups to ignore the condition of those
who are similar to themselves—their ethnic kin.^^ Constituents will care most about
those with whom they share ethnic ties or those with whom a history of ethnic enmity
exists. Ethnic enmity matters almost as much as ethnic ties, because ethnicity is
partially an attempt to deflne who one is by who one is not.^* Second, ethnic ties
influence foreign policymaking, because support for ethnic kin abroad can be a litmus
test for a politician's sincerity on ethnic issues at home. Politicians lack credibility
if they take symbolic stands on ethnic issues but do not follow up when an ethnically
charged foreign event develops.
Politicians care about the ethnic composition of their supporters, because this may
determine who might exit and over which issues. Thus politicians avoid certain issues
and embrace others to prevent their supporters from exiting and to attract the
constituents of their competitors. If a politician needs Muslims for political support,
for instance, the role of religion in the state will be a prominent area of interest for
both the politician and his or her supporters. If a politician's supporters are predominantly
African American, the constituency of that politician will prefer policies benefiting
African Americans. The ethnic identities of potential exiters not only restrain
politicians, they can also provide opportunities. Politicians can use the circumstances
of ethnic kin to emphasize certain ethnic identities at the expense of other identities
and other issues. When constituents become focused on economic problems or on a
particularly problematic ethnic identity, a politician can use a foreign event to increase
the salience of a specific ethnic identity domestically, creating unity at least
for the short term.^' Consequently, if ethnic ties determine the foreign policy preferences
of constituents, such ties also influence the politician's foreign policy choices—
both as constraint and opportunity. If the politician can influence foreign policy, the
existence of ethnic ties and antagonisms between the politician's supporters and extemal
actors will shape the state's foreign policy.^"
Table 2 presents the predictions of the ethnic-ties argument. Specifically, states
will assist the side with which the ruling politicians' constituency shares ethnic ties.
25, For examples ofthe primordial approach and its opposing argument (politicians creating ethnicity),
see, respectively, Geertz 1963; and Brass 1991, For more moderate approaches that inspire the view of
ethnicity presented here, see Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1986; and Rothschild 1981,
26, Horowitz 1985, especially chap, 4,
27, For a discussion of ethnic ties in U,S, foreign policy, see DeConde 1992,
28, Young 1976,
29, For a discussion of Slobodan Milosevic's efforts to use events in Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia
to redefine the political context away from economic and other problems, see Gagnon 1994-95,
30, Davis and Moore 1997,
728 Intemational Organization
TABLE 2. Ethnic ties and expectedforeign policies
Predicted policy
State supports secessionists
State supports host state
Ruling politician's constituency has ethnic ties with
Secessionists
Yes
No
Both
Yes/No"
Yes/No"
Host state
No
Yes
''If constituency has ties to both sides of an ethnic confiict, the state is likely to support either both
sides (ambivalence) or neither (neutrality).
Because constituents care about those with whom they share ethnic ties, they prefer
their state to take sides in ethnic conflicts elsewhere, supporting the side with which
they have ethnic ties. Politicians, because they need support and fear its loss, take the
preferences of their supporters seriously and push for policies assisting the ethnic kin
of their constituents. Ethnic enmity will work in ethnic politics like realism does in
intemational relations: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. In other words, a politician's
constituents want to support their ethnic kin and oppose those with whom they
share a history of ethnic enmity. Ethnic enmities cause politicians to oppose those
actors with whom ethnic enmity exists and to support ethnic groups fighting the
ethnic adversary of their constituents.
Of course, politicians' constituencies are not always homogeneous. A constituency
may consist of multiple ethnic groups, each having ties to different sides of ethnic
conflicts in other countries; for example, a constituency might consist of both Muslims
and Jews. When dealing with conflicts between these two religious groups in
other states, a politician would have a difficult time choosing which side to support.
If the politician were to avoid taking a position on the conflict, the result would be
neutrality. If the politician preferred to satisfy both groups by supporting both sides
of the conflict, the result would be ambivalence. Thus the ethnic-ties argument produces
the following testable hypotheses:
States will support those actors internationally that share ethnic ties with decision-makers
' supporters.
States will oppose those actors that share a history of ethnic enmity with the
decision-makers' supporters.
States will be neutral or ambivalent toward those conflicts where decisionmakers
' supporters have ties to both sides.
Obviously, an approach based on ethnic ties cannot explain the policies of countries
lacking ethnic ties or enmities between their own constituencies and the combatants.
Other factors would play a greater role in these cases.
Secessionist Conflicts 729
Evaluating the Competing Arguments
The essential prediction derived from the vulnerability argument is that vulnerability
inhibits support for secession. The conventional approach to the intemational relations
of secessionism also predicts that when and where norms supporting territorial
integrity and opposing secessionism are clear and where intemational organizations
are involved, foreign support for secessionist movements will be less likely. The
testable hypothesis of the ethnic-ties argument is that states will support the side of
an ethnic conflict that shares ethnic ties with the leaders' constituents. Given these
hypotheses, how do we evaluate them?
Since I am challenging the conventional wisdom, it makes sense to examine it on
its home turf—Africa—where the vulnerability argument most likely applies.^' If the
vulnerability argument fails to explain the intemational politics of African secessionist
crises, we must seriously question the veracity of its claims. Rather than choosing
randomly among all secessionist conflicts, I chose to study two African secessionist
crises: the Congo Crisis of 1960-63 and the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70.^2 g^^h
crisis should provide strong support for the conventional wisdom and has been cited
as doing so.^^
During the Congo Crisis, African states should have behaved as the vulnerability
argument predicts. First, they were most vulnerable to separatism shortly after decolonization.
There was still some question as to whether the boundaries created by the
colonial powers would be respected, and this was not resolved until 1964 with the
declaration of the OAU recognizing the colonial boundaries as legitimate. Further,
since many African states became independent shortly before or during the Congo
Crisis, they had not really consolidated their regimes. Given the uncertainty about
boundaries and the basic weakness of African regimes, if vulnerability inhibits states
from supporting separatism, African states should not have supported Katanga.
Second, the Congo Crisis is a most-likely case for the vulnerability argument, and
a relatively least-likely case for the ethnic-ties argument, because the intervention of
the United Nations (UN) should have deterred states from supporting Katanga. The
conventional wisdom asserts that intemational organizations help to define intemational
norms and inhibit states from supporting secession.^" The UN intervened more
directly and more forcefully in the Congo Crisis than in any other secessionist crisis
to date. Therefore, arguments focusing on the role of intemational organizations
should do well here, and those that deemphasize intemational organizations, like the
ethnic-ties argument, should not provide as accurate predictions or as good explana-
tions.
Likewise, the Nigerian Civil War is also a most-likely case for the vulnerability
argument. African states were still as vulnerable to separatism as they were a few
31. For using most-likely cases to evaluate theory, see Eckstein 1975.
32. In qualitative analyses, random selection may be problematic, as argued in King, Keohane and
Verba 1994, 124-28.
33. See Jackson 1992, 7; and Herbst 1992, 20.
34. See Herbst 1989; and Jackson and Rosberg 1982.
730 Intemational Organization
years earlier. The OAU was strongly involved, trying to deter others from intervening
in the eonflict. Most importantly, the war took plaee only three years after African
states approved a resolution that affirmed the legitimacy of the colonial boundaries
and the norm of territorial integrity. If the vulnerability arguments are correct, African
states should not have supported the Biafran separatists. I also chose the Nigerian
Civil War because this case facilitates a most-similar comparison. The secessionists
and the host states of each conflict share many attributes, which helps to isolate the
variations that might cause interesting behavior. Both Katanga and Biafra were mineralrich
regions, so the economic values of the seceding regions were similar.^' Both the
Congo and Nigeria, at the time of the conflicts, were the most potentially powerful
states in the region. The Cold War continued through both conflicts, so we can control
for ideological competition and great power interest in Africa, which could potentially
influence the superpowers' allies. What varies between the two cases are the
ethnic identities at stake. For the Congo Crisis, tribal and racial identities are relevant,
whereas during the Nigerian Civil War, tribal and religious identities were at
stake, so the case selection assures variance in the key independent variable of ethnic
ties.
Why then study the intemational politics of Yugoslavia's disintegration? Studying
this conflict helps to disarm two potential criticisms: that the ethnic-ties argument
applies only to the third world or to a particular period. Some non-African states
played important roles in the African secessionist crises, and ethnic ties influenced
their policies. Still, analyzing the Yugoslav conflict should provide stronger evidence
as to whether the dynamics predicted by the ethnic-ties argument are relevant in the
1990s and whether they apply to institutionalized democracies and to regimes making
the transition to democracy. The Yugoslav conflict should be a hard test for the
ethnic-ties argument because European states had many other interests at stake. Among
them are building a common European foreign policy, reforming the economies of
the former Soviet empire, developing institutions to govern European security, and
setting precedents in the post-Cold War era. Finally, the Yugoslav conflict is an
interesting anomaly. Given the web of economic and security institutions in Europe,
many observers expected a greater degree of cooperation than actually occurred.
Studying these three secessionist crises allows us to analyze more than three observations,
because each case breaks down into a number of observations: each country
making policy toward the conflict.^^ Thus the number of observations grows to between
thirteen and eighteen per crisis, totaling forty-six observations. The important
methodological question then becomes by what criteria did I choose the observations?
To make sure the dependent variable did vary, I chose, from the possible
universe of observations, the major actors in each conflict: those strongly supporting
35. The promise of economic resources might attract foreign support rather than ethnic ties, so the
selection of cases might introduce some bias. Specifically, secessionists who do not have economic resources
do not receive foreign support. Because this study focuses on the vulnerability argument, I am
biasing the cases in favor of that approach (most-likely cases), rather than in favor of other theoretical
arguments.
36. See Lijphart 1975; and King, Keohane. and Verba 1994, 117.
Secessionist Conflicts 731
the secessionist movement and those strongly supporting the host state. To exhaust
the possible range of observations, I also chose contiguous states that were neutral or
supported both sides during the conflicts.^^ By contrast, previous efforts focused only
on one value of the dependent variable, support for the host state, and downplayed or
overlooked cases where states assisted secessionists. Although I did study countries having
no ethnic ties to the combatants, I do not discuss them here, because the ethnic-ties argument
says nothing about states that have no ethnic ties.^* Such states may support
host states or separatists, but ethnic ties will not explain or predict their behavior.
I determine whether ethnic ties exist by considering the existing literature on the
domestic politics of each country to establish the essential constituencies for the
reigning politicians and to determine the constituency's ethnic composition. If the
constituency is homogeneous, coding is simple—do the members ofthe constituency
share the same race, religion, language, or kinship (tribe or clan) as the secessionist
movement or the host state? Since the secessionist movement and the host state may
each have multiple ethnic identities, and since ethnic identity is partly perceptual in
nature, perceptions of the conflict will influence the perception of ethnic ties.^' If the
constituency is not homogeneous, the focus is then on the ethnic ties of each ethnic
group in the constituency. Ethnic ties will exist if any group of constituents has the
same ethnic identity as one of the combatants in the secessionist conflict.
A state is vulnerable to secessionism if (1) a secessionist movement actually tried
to secede in recent history (the previous ten years), (2) members of a group have
organized with the goal of independence, or (3) area studies experts view particular
regions to be potentially secessionist. The last distinction should not be problematic
because the vulnerability approach focuses on fears of separatism, rather than on
ongoing or past secessionist wars.
Finally, I code the dependent variable as support for a particular side if a state
gives either material assistance in the form of arms, equipment, or money, or diplomatic
assistance in the form of recognition, votes in favor of that side in intemational
organizations, or interceding with other states on the behalf of that side."*"
The Congo Crisis
On 30 June 1960 the Congo became an independent state, even though the Belgians
had scarcely begun the task of preparing the state for its new status.'" Although the
37. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 130, 141.
38. For example, ethnic ties cannot account for France's involvement in the Congo Crisis and the
Soviet Union's involvement during the Nigerian Civil War.
39. For a discussion of factors shaping perceptions of secessionist conflicts, see Saideman 1997.
40. Although one could argue that military assistance is a stronger form of support than diplomatic
recognition, one could also argue that diplomatic assistance is a much more assertive step because it more
clearly violates existing norms. Since secessionists are so eager to get recognition, and host states so
desperate to avoid any semblance of recognition, its importance should not be underestimated. Therefore,
I do not make distinctions between them.
41. The Congo changed its name to Zaire in 1971 and has only changed back with the successful
rebellion in May 1997.
732 Intemational Organization
Belgians had not intended to free the Congo so quickly, France's painful experience
with decolonization intimidated Belgian decision makers."^ As a result, they shortened
a four-year plan for independence to six months.**' Fears of instahility were
quickly realized when the Congo's armed forces hegan to mutiny on 5 July. Events
quickly escalated, despite the efforts of President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister
Patrice Lumumba to settle the crisis, culminating in the declaration of Katangan
independence by the province's president, Moise Tshombe, on 11 July.
Early in the conflict, events indicated the extent to which white settlers had influenced
Katanga and the govemment of Belgium. White European settlers and former
Belgian colonial officials held many important administrative positions. Belgian behavior
differed in Katanga from elsewhere in the Congo, making it clear that Belgium
was supporting Katanga's secessionist movement.''^ Because of the close ties
between the separatists and the white settlers in Katanga, many states perceived
Katanga to be a supporter of white interests. Extemal actors, including the UN, paid
little attention to the tribal conflicts between the Lunda and the Baluba. Instead, most
states quickly perceived the secessionist crisis to be part of a larger racial conflict
between, on the one side, the former colonial powers and the white minority regimes
of southem Africa and, on the other side, the black nationalist states of Africa.
Although no state formally recognized Katanga, some states supported the secessionists,
assisting Tshombe's regime to persist for three years. Belgium (the former
colonial power), the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (the neighboring whiteminority
regime), and Congo-Brazzaville gave critical support. They gave Katanga
money and arms, facilitated the recmitment of mercenaries, and provided advisors.
Although few states assisted Katanga directly, many supported the Congo's territorial
integrity. States helped in three ways: by providing financial assistance to the
UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), contributing soldiers to ONUC, and engaging
in diplomatic efforts to end Katanga's secession. These efforts were pivotal because
the UN force intervened with a vague mandate that evolved into a mission to end
Katanga's secession.
Although many states took a strong stand on either side of the conflict, some
countries were less certain in their support and either followed ambivalent policies or
tried to stay neutral. The United States at first supported UN efforts in the Congo
while giving some assistance to the Katangans as well. After John Kennedy took
office as president, the United States stood more decisively against Katanga, first
permitting and later pushing for more assertive ONUC efforts.
The conventional wisdom expects very few states to support Katanga due to the
strong UN role and widespread vulnerability to secessionism. Those states supporting
Katanga would be relatively less vulnerable to secessionism. The vulnerability
argument may account partially for the popularity of the Congo's cause, since most
states supported the Congo, and many of these states were vulnerable to secession.
42. Spaak 1971,358.
43. For a discussion of the conflict's outbreak, see Hoskyns 1965.
44. Gerard-Libois 1966.
Secessionist Conflicts 733
Katanga's most energetic allies, however, were also vulnerable to secession. If vulnerability
to separatism inhibited states, these states would not have assisted Katanga.
The ethnic-ties argument expects that leaders depending on ethnic groups with ties
to Katanga or enmity toward the Congo would support Katanga, and those relying on
constituents with ties with the Congo or enmity toward Katanga would support the
Congo. Because most perceived the crisis as a racial conflict, leaders depending on
black supporters or on those hostile to whites would support the Congo, and leaders
depending on white supporters would assist the Katangans. Politicians depending on
support from both blacks and whites would be ambivalent or neutral during this
crisis.
Table 3 shows the major actors in the Congo Crisis, with whom the leaders' constituents
had ethnic ties, whether the state was vulnerable to secessionism, the resulting
predictions of the two approaches, and the state's actual policies.''^ As Table 3
indicates, the ethnic-ties argument provides relatively accurate predictions. For ten
of the predominant actors in the Congo Crisis, it predicts their behavior toward the
conflict; it fails to predict the behavior of three of the actors. States where leaders
depended on supporters with racial ties to the Congo almost always supported the
Congo, whereas those states with leaders relying on constituents with ties to the
secessionists tended to support Katanga. The vulnerability hypothesis correctly predicts
the policies of six states, but does not predict all four of Katanga's most enthusiastic
supporters, which is even more surprising given the strong involvement of the
UN. Moreover, the vulnerability argument could not make any predictions for three
states. The ethnic-ties argument incorrectly predicts the policy changes of Belgium
and the United States and fails to predict Congo-Brazzaville's support for Katanga.
In the first two cases, the behavior of states at the outset of the crisis conforms to the
argument's predictions. Over time, however, each state changed its policies: Belgium
decreased its support of Katanga, and the United States became less ambivalent in its
support ofthe Congo. Two observations are worth noting: the policy changes by both
states coincide with changes in govemments, and the policy changes met with much
resistance from precisely those groups having ties with Katanga and/or enmities with
the Congo."^ Although the specific predictions of the ethnic-ties argument do not
bear out in those two cases, its logic still helps to explain Belgian and American
foreign policy during the Congo Crisis.
When the crisis began, a weak coalition of the Christian Democratic party and the
Liberal party governed Belgium.''' The main party in opposition was the Socialist
party. Although the Socialists declared that Belgium should neither send troops to the
Congo nor recognize Katanga, the Liberals pushed for recognition. The Christian
Democrats sought to compromise between the two positions by giving arms, equip-
45. One neutral country, the Central African Republic, was included due to its proximity to the Congo
and its similarities to Congo-Brazzaville in this case and to Nigeria's neighbors in the following case.
46. The focus here is on what states did, but the policies promoted by the decision makers' competitors
are additional observable implications of the ethnic-ties argument.
47. The Liberal party's name is deceptive, since it was a conservative party with much right-wing
support; Fitzmaurice 1983, 162-68.
734 Intemational Organization
TABLE 3. Racial politics and the Congo crisis
Country
Belgium
Federation of
Nyasaland
South Africa
United States
Central African
Republic
Ghana
Guinea
Ethiopia
Morocco
Tunisia
India
Nigeria
Congo-Brazzaville
Racial
ties to
Katanga'
Katanga
Katanga
Both
Both
Congo
Congo
Congo
Congo''
Congo''
Congo''
Congo
Congo
Vulnerability
High
High
High
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
Low
High
High
High
Vulnerability
predictions
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
No prediction
No prediction
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
No prediction
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Ethnic-ties
predictions
Support for Katanga
Support for Katanga
Support for Katanga
Ambivalence or
neutrality
Ambivalence or
neutrality
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Support for Congo
Actual policy
Initially supported Katanga,
weakened over time'
Supported Katanga
Supported Katanga
Ambivalent, shifting to
supported Congo'
Neutral
Supported Congo
Supported Congo
Supported Congo
Supported Congo
Supported Congo
Supported Congo
Supported Congo
Supported Katanga'
"The Belgian case is primarily about its enmity toward Che Congo and is not ethnically oriented,
'These cases focus more on ethnic enmity toward the Katangans, which produces the same foreign policies as ethnic
ties with the Congo,
'Incorrect prediction for the ethnic-ties argument.
ment, and other forms of support to Katanga but refusing to give diplomatic recognition.
An election produced a new govemment in 1961, creating a coalition between
the Socialists and the Christian Democrats,''*
Why should a new coalition develop a different foreign policy? Rising linguistic
conflict was the key constraint for all Belgian politicians during the Congo Crisis,
Linguistic conflict challenged all three major parties because each contained Flemish
and Walloon (French-speaking) wings,'*' All three tried to avoid linguistic divisions
and preferred policies that stressed some common bond among their constituents,
such as attachment to the Belgian state. If politicians could overcome linguistic divides
by mobilizing their followers through Belgian nationalism, they might prevent,
or at least delay, the breakup of their supporting coalitions. The Liberal party, due to
its conservative background, and the Christian Democratic party, due to its ties to the
monarchy, relied on Belgian nationalism. The Socialist party, due to its class and
ideological appeals, relied on Belgian nationalism the least.
The Congo's Independence Day triggered Belgian patriotism when Lumumba responded
to King Baudouin's paternalistic speech with a tirade against Belgian colonial
policies.'" The Belgian press and people reacted very strongly against Lu-
48, See Gerard-LiboLs 1966, 197; and Helmreich 1976,397,
49, Fitztnaurice 1983,
50, Hoskyns 1965,85,
Secessionist Conflicts 735
mumba, leading to a rise in Belgian nationalism.^' Because this patriotic sentiment
was directed against Lumumba, it favored Tshombe.^^ By supporting Tshombe, Belgian
politicians rode the wave of Belgian popular opinion as they defended Belgium
from the attacks of radical black nationalists like Lumumba. Although Belgium's
support was splitting along linguistic cleavages, Flemings and Walloons could agree
on supporting Katanga, because the conflict in the Congo was one of race, not lan-
guage.
Despite a new govemment in 1961, foreign policy did not change immediately.
Although Belgian nationalism constrained the Socialists less, they still could not
afford to offend Belgian nationalists or their coalition partners. When Belgian decision
makers did meet UN demands, opposition was fierce. As the conflict continued,
Belgian nationalism lessened as politicians and voters refocused on economic issues
and linguistic problems.
Despite increasing separatism at home, Belgian politicians could support Katanga
because the conflict was of a different ethnic tie—race—than the one polarizing
Belgian society—language. Although the ethnic-ties argument does not predict Belgium's
policies correctly, ethnic politics provides a better explanation of Belgian
foreign policy than does its vulnerability to secession.
Although Cold War politics mostly explains American interest in the region and
some of its policies, ethnic politics also mattered. Under President Dwight Eisenhower,
U.S. policy fixated on getting rid of Lumumba, who had asked for Soviet
help, and the United States was less resolute when dealing with Tshombe, who strategically
painted himself as staunchly anticommunist.'-' Although anticommunism
also motivated Kennedy's policies, his views were more nuanced, due to his previous
experiences and his successful campaign strategies. As a senator, Kennedy made a
series of statements on Africa, the product both of his opinions and of his political
agenda. Within the Democratic party, Kennedy's left flank was his weakest, and he
realized that he needed the support of liberals to be nominated for president. He was
reluctant, however, to push for civil rights in the United States, fearing that it might
alienate southem democrats. To get more liberal and black votes without losing southem
whites, Kennedy used African issues to his advantage, making 479 references to
Africa in a three-month campaign. "Kennedy's handling of the Africa issue in the
I960 campaign ... was a minor classic in political exploitation offoreign policy."^*
Domestic opposition still constrained Kennedy. Most of the groups supporting
Katanga and opposing Kennedy's policy in the Congo were anticommunist, anti-UN,
and right wing, including the John Birch Society and the Young Americans for Freedom."
The Katanga lobby "also attracted certain Southem whites who seem to have
regarded Moise Tshombe as the African incamation of Uncle Tom."^^ It is not surpris-
51. Helmreich 1976,395.
52. Hoskyns 1965,140-41.
53. Weissman 1974, 63, 74-75.
54. Mahoney 1983, 30 (emphasis added).
55. Mahoney 1983, 150-53.
56. Gibbs 1991, 122.
736 Intemational Organization
ing that Kennedy considered the most assertive attempts to end the secession after
the Cuban Missile Crisis ended, when his right flank was more secure.^''
Although ethnic politics may not provide the best explanation of U.S. foreign
policy at this time, it does explain some of Kennedy's choices. The Congo Crisis
provided American presidents with more than one option, Anticommunism could
mean either supporting Katanga, which espoused anticommunism, or defeating
Katanga, since it was a source of regional instability. Kennedy's appeals to liberal
and black voters influenced his policy choices as president.
The foreign policy of Congo-Brazzaville is very anomalous.'* "Congo-Brazzaville
was virtually the only one [black African-ruled country] that faithfully defended
to the very end the secessionist policy of Moise Tshombe,"^' The ethnic-ties argument
does not predict this policy, since President Abbe Fulbert Youlou of CongoBrazzaville
and President Joseph Kasavubu of the Congo shared the same tribal
background, the Bakongo, a large kinship group whose territory crossed the boundaries
ofthe two states. With these kinship ties, in addition to the racial ties, one would
expect that Congo-Brazzaville would oppose Katanga. Rather than manipulating ethnicity
through foreign policy, Youlou instead tried to decrease ethnic opposition
through two methods: by building a dam that would ensure employment for all and
bribing ethnic groups with funds solicited from abroad, "All the country's hopes for
improving the economic situation had centered on construction of the Kouilou dam
and on the industrialization of Pointe Noire, Youlou, for his part, had staked his
whole political future on carrying out this project."*" By employing his country's
youth, Youlou hoped to limit the influence of radical movements, Youlou also solicited
foreign sources of money to pay off all groups, especially govemment workers
and the urban population,^' He traded his foreign policies for the funds necessary to
pay off his constituents, "Aid from Katanga and elsewhere was sufficient to provide
the necessary subsidies" to all tribes in Congo-Brazzaville.^^ Although CongoBrazzaville
contradicts the ethnic-ties argument, its behavior still indicates that ethnic
politics motivates politicians when making foreign policy decisions. The argument
failed to predict Youlou's policies because it fails to take into account an
altemative method of dealing with ethnic conflict—buying it off.
The Nigerian Civil War
Although ethnic conflict existed in Nigeria before the coup d'etat on 15 January
1966 that ended the First Republic, strife between tribal groups increased because of
the military takeover. The coup resulted in the deaths of the prime minister as well as
57, Weissman 1974, 171,
58, Because France supported Katanga, one could argue that Congo-Brazzaville did the same due to
French influence. Most francophone African states, however, opposed Katanga, so French influence by
itself does not sufficiently explain Congo-Brazzaville's policies,
59, Gauze 1973, 126,
60, Ibid,, 89,
61, Ibid,, 141,
62, Ballard 1966, 249, 295,
Secessionist Conflicts 737
the govemors of the northern and westem states. Only the eastem govemor, an Ibo,
survived. The leader of the military regime. Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi,
also an Ibo, proclaimed Nigeria to be a unitary state, abolishing federal institutions
established before decolonization. This led to anti-Ibo riots in the northem region as
fears of Ibo domination grew. A second coup occurred on 29 July 1966, resulting in
the death of Ironsi; Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a member of a smaller tribe, replaced
him. Rioting and massacres of Ibos in the northem regions occurred, leading to large
flows of Ibos retuming to the eastem region. General C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, who
was made the military govemor of the eastem region after the first coup, was reluctant
to submit to the new federal military govemment. After failed negotiations,
Ojukwu declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra, which comprised the
territory ofthe eastem region, on 30 May 1967. Fighting broke out in July 1967, and
the conflict ended two-and-a-half-years later in January 1970, after a series of offensives
by the Nigerian armed forces.
Despite the tribal roots of the conflict, Biafran efforts caused outside actors to
perceive this conflict as a religious dispute. By stressing religious ties, the Ibos were
seeking support from non-Ibo Christians in the region, and by emphasizing the history
of enslavement by Muslims, the Ibos were also trying to appeal to the animists,^^
By deflning the conflict as one between Biafra and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani, rather
than the whole of Nigeria, the Biafrans emphasized religious ties and enmities. The
Biafrans also aimed their emphasis on religious persecution at the intemational audience.
They compared themselves to the Jews during the holocaust and to Israel surrounded
by hostile Arab neighbors.^ Religious appeals and assertions of genocide
aimed against Christians by Muslims influenced the positions of many states toward
Biafra and Nigeria. This strategy was a double-edged sword, however, because it
encouraged some states to support Biafra and alienated many others, pushing them
into Nigeria's camp.
Strangely, the vulnerability theorists use this conflict to support their arguments.
Of the four African states to recognize Biafra—Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Tanzania,
and Zambia—three faced ongoing or potential secessionist conflicts, and the fourth,
Tanzania, encountered the difficult problem of integrating a noncontiguous, ethnically
distinct territory: Zanzibar. According to the vulnerability argument, these states
should be the last, not the first, to support a secessionist movement. Other supporters
of Biafra, including Israel, Rhodesia, and South Africa, also faced high levels of
ethnic conflict, contradicting the expectations of the vulnerability argument. Furthermore,
one would expect less support for Biafra than for Katanga, since the formation
of the OAU in 1963 and its subsequent declaration on the territorial integrity of
African states clarified the norms goveming African boundaries. Nevertheless, more
African states govemed by blacks—precisely those supposedly bound by intema-
63, Emphasizing religion was also a strategy to divide the religiously heterogeneous Yorubas, the
second largest tribe in Nigeria, For more on ethnic politics within the Yoruba, see Laitin 1986,
64, "Biafra Sees Itself as David," African Monthly Review, September 1967, cited in Kirk-Greene
1971, 172,
738 Intemational Organization
tional norms—supported Biafra than Katanga and did so far more openly and aggres-
sively.
Most African states took Nigeria's side in the conflict, supporting the efforts of the
OAU to limit extemal intervention in the war and defining the problem as Nigeria's
to solve. Their efforts lend some support to the vulnerability hypothesis.
Because the Biafrans defined this as a conflict between different religious groups,
the ethnic-ties argument makes several predictions. Leaders relying on constituents
with religious ties to the Biafrans would support Biafra. Decision makers relying on
supporters with religious ties to Nigeria's Muslim majority would support Nigeria.
Those politicians depending on constituents with ties to both would be either neutral
or ambivalent. Suggestively, not a single country ruled by politicians relying on
Muslims recognized or gave material assistance to Biafra.
Table 4 shows the religious ties of decision-makers' constituents to the combatants,
the vulnerability of their states to secessionism, the expectations of the two
arguments, and what the states actually did during the conflict. As Table 4 indicates,
the vulnerability argument could make predictions for only thirteen observations,
and of those it correctly predicted only four: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.
Seven states that were vulnerable to secessionism and ethnic conflict supported
Biafra, and two other vulnerable states were either neutral or ambivalent. In contrast,
the ethnic-ties argument correctly predicted fifteen states examined, whereas only
three contradicted the expectations of the argument: Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Senegal.
The Ethiopian case is the one observation that the vulnerability argument predicts
correctly but the ethnic-ties argument does not. Ethiopia's emperor, Haile Selassie I,
strongly supported Nigeria's territorial integrity despite relying on a multireligious
constituency. Selassie, though predominantly relying on Christian support at the time,
was trying to improve his relationship with Ethiopia's Muslim population. He called
for religious tolerance, met with Muslim leaders, and finally included one in his
cabinet in 1966.^' Supporting Nigeria would assist these efforts to gain the support of
the Muslim populace of Ethiopia. Moreover, the emperor's strategy for handling
ethnic conflict involved developing an altemative nationalism. "Within the boundaries
of this religiously pluralistic, ethnically and linguistically diverse political entity
that is called Ethiopia, the government has been deliberately pursuing a policy of
creating an Ethiopian national identification, a higher loyalty than that to religion or
group."^ Asserting Ethiopian leadership in Africa served as part of creating such a
national identity. Supporting Nigeria against Christian Biafra would demonstrate
clearly his commitment to a nationalist and African foreign policy rather than to a
communal one. Although ethnic politics can explain the emperor's decisions to an
extent, the Ethiopian case provides stronger evidence for the vulnerability argument
than for the ethnic-ties argument. This situation, however, is quite rare—it is only
one of four observations the vulnerability argument predicts correctly and one of
three the ethnic-ties argument does not predict.
65. Clapham 1969, 85.
66. Hess 1966, 522 (emphasis added).
Secessionist Conflicts 739
TABLE 4. Religious politics and the Nigerian Civil War
Country
Tanzania
Zambia
Ivory Coast
Gabon
Portugal
Israel
Rhodesia
South Africa
Sierra Leone
Uganda
Senegal
Ethiopia
Cameroon
Niger
Egypt
Sudan
Somalia
Tunisia
Religious
ties to
Both
Biafra
Biafra
Biafra
Biafra
Biafra"
Biafra
Biafra
Both
Both
Nigeria
Both
Nigeria''
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Vulnerability
High
High
High
High
Low
High
High
High
High
High
Low
High
High
Low
Low
High
High
Low
Vulnerability
predictions
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
No prediction
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
No prediction
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
No prediction
No prediction
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
No prediction
Ethnic politics
predictions
Neutrality or ambivalence
Support for Biafra
Support for Biafra
Support for Biafra
Support for Biafra
Support for Biafra
Support for Biafra
Support for Biafra
Ambivalence or neutrality
Ambivalence or neutrality
Support for Nigeria
Ambivalence or neutrality
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Support for Nigeria
Actual policy
Supported Biafra"
Supported Biafra
Supported Biafra
Supported Biafra
Supported Biafra
Supported Biafra
Supported Biafra
Supported Biafra
Ambivalent
Neutral
Ambivalent,' changing
to supported
Nigeria
Supported Nigeria'
Supported Nigeria
Supported Nigeria
Supported Nigeria
Supported Nigeria
Supported Nigeria
Supported Nigeria
"Israel had enmity toward Nigeria, producing the same preferences as its ethnic ties with Biafra.
The two different ethnic groups within the politicians' constituencies had different ties and enmities at stake. One
group shared religious and kinship ties with Nigeria, and the other had enmity toward the Ibos.
'Incorrect prediction for the ethnic-ties argument.
Neither argument could predict Tanzanian foreign policy. For the vulnerability
argument, Tanzania's support of Biafra is quite anomalous. Tanzania's leader, Julius
Nyerere, had played a major role in organizing the OAU and its resolution sanctifying
the existing boundaries, and he had made many statements before the crisis
affirming African states' territorial integrity and the nonintervention norm.^' For the
ethnic-ties argument, Nyerere's foreign policy is surprising. His constituency consisted
of both Muslims and Christians, leading to the expectation that the policy
toward Biafra would be ambivalent or neutral. Nevertheless, Tanzania strongly supported
Biafra by formally recognizing it and by shipping arms to it from China.**
Several factors may have lessened the ethnic constraints Nyerere faced. He did try
to redefine the conflict as a human rights problem, rather than as a religious conflict.*^
Furthermore, the institutions governing political competition in Tanzania gave Nyerere
some autonomy. Elites within Nyerere's party selected candidates for office.
67. See Chitne 1969, 76; and Nyerere 1967, 206.
68. Heraclides 1991,95.
69. Nyerere tried to define his support of Biafra as one favoritig minorities, thus appealitig to minorities
in Tanzania; Nyerere 1969, 11.
740 International Organization
and candidates were restricted from discussing ethnic identities or foreign policy
during their campaigns.^" The Zanzibaris, the most important Muslim group of Nyerere's
constituency, might have supported his policies because they might have
perceived the Nigerian Civil War as a racial conflict between Africans and Arabs,
rather than as a religious dispute between Christians and Muslims.'" Although the
ethnic-ties argument can make some sense of Tanzanian behavior, Tanzania is still a
troublesome case for both arguments.
Senegal's foreign policy at the outset of the Nigerian Civil War does not fit
the predictions of the ethnic-ties argument, but as the war continued, it changed
to the predicted support for Nigeria.'-^ Contradictions between the personal and
political interests of President Leopold Senghor produced inconsistent foreign policies.
His Catholic background and his support of Nigritude shaped his personal
interest in supporting Biafra. As a Catholic, Senghor had great sympathy for his
fellow Catholic, Ojukwu, and the mostly Christian Biafrans. Moreover, as the proponent
of an ideology stressing the dignity of the African man (Negritude) the war's
destruction disgusted Senghor.^^ Due to these interests, Senghor sought an immediate
cease-fire, which favored Biafra. Senghor's political interests, however, constrained
him from giving more support to Biafra. In his bid for high office in Senegal,
Senghor gained the support of Muslim religious leaders, who "represent the main
traditional force in Senegalese politics."^'' These Muslim elites became even more
important for Senghor during the Nigerian Civil War as crises developed within
Senegal.^^
Because Senghor needed the support of Muslim elites, he could not support the
Biafrans without alienating those who helped maintain his position. Senghor was
"under considerable domestic pressure from his large Moslem constituency," to support
Nigeria, not Biafra.'^ Thus the religious composition of Senghor's supporters
restrained him from following his personal preferences. The Senegal case supports
the ethnic-ties argument, since the imperatives of political survival overrode the
leader's initial personal preferences.
These three anomalies indicate that leaders must consider the dynamics of ethnic
politics within their country and develop suitable strategies. Nyerere's construction
of Tanzania's political system and Senghor's bowing to the preferences of his Muslim
supporters indicate that ethnic politics, rather than vulnerability to separatism,
strongly infiuences the foreign policy choices of politicians. Ethiopia is the only
observation where the vulnerability argument correctly predicts policies that were
counter to the expectations of the ethnic-ties argument.
70. See Young 1976, 262; and Nyerere 1967, 263.
71. Lofchie 1964, 488-89.
72. See Legum and Drysdale 1970, B588; and Corbett 1972, 71-72.
73. Ingham 1990, 119.
74. Foltz 1964,47.
75. Boubacar 1988,285.
76. Stremlau 1977, 140-41.
Secessionist Conflicts 741
The Complex Disintegration of Yugoslavia'^''
Studying African secessionist conflicts solely would limit our ability to generalize
thefindingsbeyond less-developed, weak institutionalized states. Expanding the cases
to include the intemational relations of Yugoslavia's demise gives us an opportunity
to examine how ethnic politics influences the foreign policies both of institutionalized
democracies and of states undergoing transitions from authoritarianism to democracy.
Moreover, there are multiple secessionist movements with differing ethnic
identities—such as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Serbian populations
of Croatia and Bosnia—that should also provide revealing comparisons.
Although the Yugoslav conflict has deep roots, it surfaced on European foreign
policy agendas in 1991. After the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and his use of ethnic
identities to gain and maintain his position, Slovenia and Croatia seceded in June
1991,^* Before this point and throughout the summer of 1991, the EC sought to keep
Yugoslavia together,^^ After Slovenia quickly won its independence, the focus of the
fighting shifted to Croatia, EC representatives brokered a series of cease-fires, which
eventually led to the introduction of UN peacekeepers separating Serb-held Croatian
territories from the rest of Croatia, Throughout the fall of 1991, EC members debated
whether to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, with Germany pushing for immediate
recognition,*" Resolving this debate, the EC agreed to a set of rules on 17 December
1991 that clarified the conditions for recognizing those seceding from Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union: respect for human rights, guarantees for ethnic groups in
accordance with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and respect
for all boundaries. To decide which Yugoslav republics met these criteria, the EC
appointed a commission, which found that Slovenia and Macedonia qualified. Before
the commission's decision, however, Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia, with
the rest of the EC following suit in January 1992, The EC withheld recognition of
Macedonia due to Greek opposition. After this debate, attention focused on Bosnia,
where conflict was emerging. War broke out in March 1992 and only stopped with
the Dayton Accords in late 1995,
How do the various hypotheses hold up in the Yugoslav case? If fears of vulnerability
motivate states, vulnerable states would have followed consistent policies. Such
states would have supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and then the integrity
of its constituent republics once Yugoslavia's disintegration was a fait accompli.
The United States, perhaps more than any other country, did take such a stand, supporting
Yugoslavia's unity until it was no longer possible and then supporting Bosnia's
77, This crisis is complex because of multiple secessionist movements, with several seeking to secede
from seceding territories. Despite Serbia's irredentism, the conflict is a secessionist conflict because Croatia
and Slovenia tried to and successfully did secede from Yugoslavia, Their recognition did not end the
secessionist crisis, since Bosnia and Macedonia then seceded, and groups within Croatia and Bosnia also
sought to secede,
78, For an explanation of Yugoslavia's disintegration consistent with the logic developed here, see
Saideman 1998,
79, The EC became the European Union when the Maastricht Treaty was ratifled in November 1993;
thus the EC was the relevant actor until 1993, when the European Union replaced it,
80, For one explanation of Germany's desire to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, see Crawford 1996,
742 Intemational Organization
territorial integrity for most of the conflict. Of course, the vulnerability argument
cannot account for this, since the United States faces no secessionist threats. Great
Britain and France, who have experienced some separatism, supported Yugoslavia's
integrity but quickly accepted various plans to partition Bosnia. Furthermore, once
Yugoslavia broke apart, Serbia should not have supported the separatist efforts of
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia because Serbia is quite vulnerable to secession. The
Albanian majority in Kosovo, the Hungarians in Vojvodina, and the Muslims in the
Sandzak region of Serbia are all potential separatist movements, with the Albanians
in Kosovo providing the most serious threat to secede. Likewise, Croatia's effort to
divide Bosnia is quite strange given Croatia's desire to maintain its territorial integrity.
Moreover, Russia has backed Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs despite its secessionist
conflict in Chechnya and potential ones elsewhere. Indeed, if vulnerability to
secession truly constrained states, the Yugoslav conflict would have been quite short,
because few actors would have supported the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and the
Croats in Bosnia.
The timing of the recognition policy of the EC, however, suggests one constraint
that the various actors felt: they did not want to set a precedent that might encourage
the disintegration of the Soviet Union.*' After the coup in August 1991, the Soviet
Union fell apart, and, consequently, fears of encouraging such an outcome no longer
restrained Germany nor the rest ofthe EC. Even so, this does not support the vulnerability
hypothesis, since it focuses on how the vulnerability of a state affects its
foreign policy, rather than on how another state's vulnerability inhibits the state's
foreign policy.
Did the involvement of intemational organizations limit extemal support for the
various secessionists? Clearly, the UN arms embargo, enforced by NATO, decreased
the amount of arms reaching Bosnia and Croatia, though arms continued to flow. The
United States condoned arms transfers from Iran through Croatia to Bosnia despite
its membership in both NATO and the UN Security Council. The arms embargo,
however, impeded the United States, because domestic actors wanted to give more
assistance to the Bosnians. Significantly, intemational organizations themselves supported
certain separatists, enabling the separatists to continue their fight or maintain
their holdings. The introduction of UN peacekeepers into Croatia essentially ratified
the Serb conquest of one-third of Croatia, which Croatia altered forcefully in August
1995. The expanding UN role in Bosnia from providing food and medicine to guaranteeing
safe areas was significant in maintaining the Bosnian regime and its ability
to separate from Yugoslavia.*^ of course, one can interpret this as support for an
existing state as it fought off separatists (the Serbs).
Apart from providing direct assistance or blocking such support, intemational organizations
also served as fora for supporters of various separatists. Because of hard
81. Steinberg 1993. 34. Whether this is a reasonable fear is the subject of much debate, since the Soviet
Union's path toward disintegration was similar to that of Yugoslavia's: largely the product of domestic
political dynamics; see Saideman 1998.
82. The Bosnian Muslims used these safe areas as bases from which to attack the Bosnian Serbs- Boyd
1995.31.
Secessionist Conflicts 743
bargaining over the EC integration project, Germany could leverage the entire EC
into recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Without the EC and the coinciding Maastricht
negotiations, other members might not have recognized the seceding republics. The
EC also gave more influence to Greece (than it otherwise would have) as it sought to
prevent states from recognizing Macedonia. Therefore, this particular intemational
organization did not consistently support secessionists or the host states. At times the
UN enhanced Russia's ability to support the Bosnian Serbs by opposing expansion of
UN intervention. The United States and its allies were only able to use force extensively
once decision making was moved from the UN to NATO in the summer of
1995, cutting Russia out of the loop. No intemational organization could develop a
consistent policy during the crisis due in part to the complexity of the conflict (groups
seeking to secede from seceding republics), but also because bargaining among member
nations generated the policies of intemational organizations. Therefore, to explain
the behavior of these intemational organizations, we need to understand the
preferences and policies of their influential members.
The ethnic-ties argument predicts that domestic political imperatives motivate states,
and that states give support to the side with which important constituencies have
ethnic ties or against the side with which relevant supporters have ethnic enmities.
This conflict is complex, in part, because multiple ethnic identities—religious, racial,
and linguistic—are at work. The Slovenes and the Croats are primarily Catholic. The
Serbs are primarily Orthodox, though Serbia has significant Muslim populations in
Kosovo and the Sandzak. Bosnia is multiethnic, but the Muslim community has
dominated the govemment, so we can interpret support given to Bosnia as either
support for the Muslims or support for the state. Macedonia consists of both Muslim
Albanians and Orthodox Macedonians, but the latter largely govem Macedonia. Much
of the region's population is Slavic. In general, we expect states with Catholic constituencies
to support Slovenia and Croatia, states with Muslim constituencies to
support Bosnia, and states with Orthodox constituencies to support Serbia.
Table 5 depicts most of the key players in the Yugoslav conflict, the ethnic ties of
the leaders' constituents, the vulnerability of each state to separatism, the predictions
of each argument, and the policies pursued by each state. The vulnerability argument
is difficult to apply because of the complexity of the conflict. It is easiest to apply
before Yugoslavia's breakup and hardest to apply after EC recognition in January
1992. Vulnerable states giving support to any of the separatists before the conflict
began clearly to run counter to the expectations of the vulnerability argument. Of the
nine vulnerable states (excluding Serbia and Croatia), only France, Romania, and the
Soviet Union supported efforts to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.^^
Even this is complicated—since Serbs and the Serbian govemment wanted to preserve
Yugoslavia, we can also view support for Yugoslavia's integrity as supporting
Serbs. After EC recognition, it is difficult to code the vulnerability argument—what
83. For the purposes of this study, before June 1991 I treat Croatia and Serbia as part of Yugoslavia and
thus not independent actors with their own foreign policies. After the de facto disintegration, they can and
should be considered as important states in this conflict.
744 Intemational Organization
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Secessionist Conflicts 745
does supporting territorial integrity mean when groups are seceding from secessionist
states? Vulnerable states supporting partition of any of the former republics runs
counter to the expectations of the vulnerability argument. Furthermore, if motivated
by vulnerability, states should support all of the new states and oppose all of the
separatist movements in this second stage. Ofthe eleven vulnerable states considered
here, none consistently opposed separatism. Vulnerability theorists should be quite
surprised at this finding, since separatism threatened many of the states supporting
one or more secessionist movements.
The ethnic-ties argument performs much better than the vulnerability argument in
this case, predicting foreign policies toward the Yugoslav conflict in thirteen of fifteen
cases. Of the states examined, the theory failed to predict Romania's ambivalent
foreign policies and France's support of Serbia. Given Romania's ethnic ties to Serbia,
a focus on ethnic politics predicts support for Serbia. Romania assisted Serbia
through its violations of the economic sanctions, but Romania also recognized Slovenia
and Croatia, resulting in policies that supported both sides of the conflict. The
most likely explanation of Romania's ambivalence is that the imperatives of ethnic
politics conflicted with the need to engage in positive relations with the West.*''
The ethnic-ties argument failed to predict the behavior of France. As a predominantly
Catholic country. France should have supported Slovenia and Croatia. Instead,
France helped to lead EC efforts to maintain Yugoslavia's integrity.^' France
supported the introduction of peacekeepers into Croatia, allowing the Serbs to reinforce
their claims to the areas they had conquered. Furthermore. France was among
the first states to support plans for partitioning Bosnia, giving the Bosnian Serbs
much of what they wanted.
Why did France support the Serbs? A variety of factors might explain France's
deviant behavior, with some following the logic of the ethnic-ties argument and
others not. Franfois Mitterand was president of France until 1995 and as leader ofthe
Socialist party was less dependent on devout Catholics for political support. Furthermore,
rising enmities within France toward its Muslim population might help to
explain why France did not oppose Serb aggression toward Bosnia.*^ Nonethnic
explanations of France's behavior include rivalry with and fear of postreunification
Germany, historical ties with Serbia dating back to the first World War. and general
concems about European stability.*^ The vulnerability argument suggests that Corsican
separatism might have constrained France. Although this might partially explain
France's support of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, it cannot account for its willingness
to partition Bosnia. Furthermore. Corsican separatism has not inhibited French
support of other separatist movements, such as Katanga or Biafra. Regardless of the
reasons why France placed troops in the region, their presence almost certainly became
the most important influence on French foreign policy. Fears that French soldiers
would either become targets or hostages inhibited the French govemment from
84. Zametica 1992, 52.
85. Lukic and Lynch 1996, 259.
86. For an account focusing on anti-Muslim sentiment, see Sells 1996.
87. Lukic and Lynch 1996, 255.
746 Intemational Organization
supporting an end to the arms embargo or more decisive NATO action. The NATO
bombing campaign in the summer of 1995 became possible once France reinforced
its troops and moved them out of harm's way.^^ More definitive explanations of both
Romanian and French foreign policy toward Yugoslavia require further research.
The accuracy of ethnic ties in this case might be exaggerated somewhat because
some cases might fit into the coding scheme even though the dynamics may not have
been ethnically driven. In the U.S. case, for instance, leaders weakly depended on
voters who had ties to each side of the conflict, but such concerns drove neither
George Bush's nor Bill Clinton's policies. Clearly, other domestic and intemational
concems, such as preferring to avoid the use of American troops, fears of genocide,
anxiety about the future of NATO, and the preferences of American allies, influenced
foreign policy toward Yugoslavia more than what Serb Americans, Muslim Americans,
or Croatian Americans desired. Still, ethnic ties compelled European leaders
more than vulnerability to separatism, since many vulnerable states supported the
side with which the constituents of the leader shared ethnic ties.
Conclusion
How well do the competing arguments explain the intemational relations of secessionist
conflicts? Do they explain the level of intemational cooperation that the conventional
wisdom sought to address? In this section I consider these questions and develop
some theoretical and policy implications of this analysis.
Table 6 shows a cross-tabulation of vulnerability and the actual foreign policies of
the forty-six observations from the three case studies. A measure of the association
between vulnerability and the observed behavior, a Cramer's V of .297, indicates a
modest relationship, but of dubious significance (p > 0.1). The case studies and this
quantitative analysis indicate that vulnerability does not significantly deter states
from supporting separatist movements. Indeed, vulnerability serves as a poor predictor
of foreign policy: it correctly predicted the foreign policies of only twelve states
and incorrectly predicted twenty-two. Because each case study focused on only a
sample of countries, vulnerability may actually perform somewhat better than in this
study. Nevertheless, the findings are striking, because vulnerable states were consistently
among the most important supporters of separatists in each conflict.
Since vulnerability does not deter as strongly as previously believed, we need
other explanations for the intemational relations of separatist conflicts. The ethnicties
argument asserts that domestic politics motivates foreign policy. Since politicians
seek office and need the support of others to gain and maintain political positions,
they seek to attract supporters and avoid alienating constituents. Consequently,
they care about the preferences of constituents. These supporters frequently share
88. The British govemment and its troops faced the same problem. Great Britain is not included in this
study because British decision-makers' constituents did not have religious ties to any of the combatants.
Therefore, the ethnic-ties argument could not predict nor explain British policy toward Yugoslavia.
Secessionist Conflicts 747
TABLE 6. Vulnerability and actual policies
Actualforeign policy
Vulnerable to secessionism
Yes No Row total
Supported secessionists
Supported both/neither
(ambivalence/neutrality)
Supported host state
Column total
20 [11]"
3 (Sierra Leone, Uganda,
Romania) [If
II [10]
34 (73.9%)
3 [I] 23(50.0%)
2 (Central African Republic, 5 (10.9%)
U.S.—Yugoslavia) [1]
7 [6] 18(39.1%)
12(26.1%) 46(100%)
"Numbers within brackets exclude the Yugoslav case.
•"Incorrect prediction.
Chi-square = 4.06 degrees of freedom = 2; p > 0.13; Cramer's V = .297.
ethnic ties witli one side of a conflict in another state and will prefer that their state
supports that side of the dispute. Therefore, politicians will push for foreign policies
that assist the ethnic kin of their constituents. Consequently, the ethnic composition
of the constituencies of politicians becomes the essential variable in predicting and
explaining foreign policy toward secessionist conflicts.
Table 7 shows a cross-tabulation of ethnic ties and foreign policy. The ethnic-ties
argument accurately predicted foreign policies toward secessionist conflicts. Using
the same quantitative methods as before, the relationship between ethnic ties and
foreign policy proves to be much stronger and more significant: a Cramer's V of .748
{p< 0.001). Where the constituents of politicians had ethnic ties to the secessionists,
the state supported the secessionists. This was true for twenty-one countries as they
reacted to the various secessionist crises and false for only one such case—France
toward the Yugoslav conflict. In the fifteen states where the constituents of leaders
shared ethnic ties to the host state, the state supported the host state. Politicians with
constituents having ethnic ties to the host state did not support the host state in only
two countries. Not surprisingly, when constituents had ethnic ties to both sides of a
secessionist crisis, the ties were less determinate, accurately predicting the foreign
policies of only four countries and mistaking the policies of three. Admittedly, for
two observations the vulnerability argument could make more sense than ethnic ties:
Ethiopia during the Nigerian Civil War and perhaps France before the disintegration
of Yugoslavia. Three other observations proved to be quite puzzling for either approach:
Congo-Brazzaville during the Congo Crisis, Tanzania during Biafra's attempted
secession, and Romania during Yugoslavia's disintegration.
Another weakness in the ethnic-ties argument is that it does not account for those
observations where no ethnic ties exist. This may be as problematic as the failure of
the vulnerability argument to account for states that are not vulnerable to ethnic
conflict. It does not bias the results, but it may limit the generality of the argument.
Still, if ethnic ties and enmities include such widespread identities as race and reli-
748 Intemational Organization
TABLE 7. Ethnic ties andforeign policy
Actual foreign
policy
Supported
secessionists
Supported both/ neither
(ambivatence/
neutrality)
Supported host state
Column total
Secessionists
21
0
1 (France—•
Yugoslavia)"
22 (47.8%)
Ethnic ties with
Both
1 (Tanzania)"
4 (Central African Rep.,
Sierra Leone, Uganda,
U.S.—Yugoslavia)
2 (Ethiopia, U.S.—Congo)"
7(15.2%)
Host state
1 (Congo-Braz.)"
1 (Romania)"
15
17(37.0%)
Row total
23 (50.0%)
5 (10.9%)
18(39.1%)
46(100%)
"Incorrect prediction.
Chi-square = 51.46 degrees of freedom = 4; p < 0.001; Cramer's V = .748.
gion, for many secessionist crises numerous states will have ties to one or more ofthe
combatants.
Furthermore, selection bias could have produced the strength ofthe findings—that
is, something about these three crises, or the observations within them, produced
these results. I have tried to control for selection bias by studying a third case, Yugoslavia,
to ensure that there was not something unique about post-colonial African
politics that might bias the results. Within each case, I selected observations on the
dependent variable to ensure a full range of variance. Although it is possible that
some bias remains, the evidence still suggests that ethnic ties motivate foreign policy.
The relevance of ethnic ties might seem obvious, especially given how the Yugoslav
disintegration played out, but previous approaches to the intemational politics of
secessionist conflict overlooked this variable. Furthermore, when analysts have considered
this variable, they tend to focus on states acting according to affective, instead
of instrumental, motivations: emotion rather than rationality motivated policy.*'
The ethnic-ties argument asserts that politicians are acting instmmentally. Either they
use foreign policies toward ethnically defined conflicts abroad to mobilize particular
groups domestically, or they are compelled, because of the fear of losing office, to
support particular ethnic groups abroad who share ties with potential exiters.
The ethnic-ties argument explains the foreign policies of states, but the conventional
wisdom sought to account not only for the choices states made but for the
generally cooperative outcome produced by the interaction among states. Although
analysts may have overstated the degree of cooperation in Africa, it is still a puzzle
requiring explanation. Ethnic ties may provide a better explanation of African cooperation
for two reasons. It explains why cooperation in Africa varied significantly.
Furthermore, the ethnic-ties argument suggests the conditions under which politi-
89. Heraclides 1991.
Secessionist Conflicts 749
cians migtit have a personal stake in cooperating with other states beyond potential
threats of backlashes or dangerous precedents.
The ethnic-ties argument provides a better explanation of cooperation during African
secessionist crises for two reasons. First, rather than being exemplars of African
cooperation, the Congo Crisis and the Nigerian Civil War suggest that cooperation is
likely only when the perceptions of the ethnic identities at stake create overwhelming
coalitions against the separatists. If the Congo Crisis had remained a tribal dispute,
rather than a conflict between black-ruled African states and white minority regimes
and the remaining colonialists, probably less cooperation would have occurred among
African states. Likewise, because most African rulers relied on Muslim or nonChristian
constituents, most African states took Nigeria's side, with Biafra's few
African supporters largely relying on Christian and non-Muslim constituencies.*"
Focusing on ethnic ties, we would expect less regional cooperation when other kinds
of ethnic divides—such as between Arabs and blacks, among Muslims, or among
kinship groups—characterize the conflicts. For instance, the intemational relations
of Polisario's attempt to secede from Morocco have been less cooperative, since it is
a dispute among Arab Muslims dividing African states. In cases where each combatant
has ethnic ties to more than a few states, such as in Yugoslavia, cooperation can
be quite difficult, particularly when major powers have ethnic ties to opposing sides.
Although Samuel Huntington may overstate the "clash of civilizations," not surprisingly
states fail to cooperate when the combatants within the conflict have ties to
three major religions,^'
Second, constituents' immediate interests influence politicians more than potential
long-term threats. The threat of losing supporters is more likely to constrain politicians
than fears of dangerous precedents and the like. Politicians are more likely to
commit to cooperation if it benefits them directly. Most African leaders cooperated
during the Congo Crisis and the Nigerian Civil War because their domestic political
incentives and strategies, designed to deal with ruling ethnically divided societies,
required it. Vulnerability to secession did not compel such behavior, but efforts to
mobilize support or fears of losing constituents led to political strategies with foreign
policy implications. Developing Pan-African ideologies or relying on religious groups
for domestic rule implied certain foreign policies. Thus those who cooperated committed
more strongly than if they were responding to the vague threat of dangerous
precedents. Indeed, the two African secessionist crises may not have been collaboration
games at all, but situations of harmony. Many states followed their individual
interests toward a common policy without having to coordinate much with others.
Beyond explaining the foreign policies of states toward these crises and the pattems
of cooperative and conflict that developed, what are the broader implications of
this research? The first and probably most obvious implication for theoretical debates
is that we need to investigate the preferences of states before assuming they desire
90, Morrison et al, 1972, 20,
91, Huntington 1993, Unlike Huntington, the ethnic-ties argument can explain the intemational politics
of ethnic conflicts within civilizations as well as between them.
750 Intemational Organization
cooperation.^^ Although systemic theory often acquires much leverage while maintaining
parsimony by assuming the preferences of states, such approaches may miss
key sources of variation. Increasingly, scholars are looking to domestic politics to
understand the sources of cooperation.'^ This is the proper direction, especially when
states face similar intemational pressures but somehow process them differently and
develop varying foreign policies.
A second implication is that we need to reconsider arguments conceming fears of
possible demonstration effects. The conventional wisdom's foundation is the fear of
ethnic dominoes falling. Because such fears did not deter many vulnerable states, we
need to think more carefully about how domestic audiences perceive extemal events.
Under what conditions do demonstration effects matter? Do preexisting preferences
cause politicians and their constituents to draw varying lessons from extemal events?'"
A third implication is that we need to pay more attention to variations in our
dependent variable—support for separatism, that is, defection from cooperation. The
conventional wisdom glossed over important examples of states defecting from cooperation
and failed to consider why conflict developed over similar issues elsewhere,
such as in South Asia. These variations may tell us much about which conditions
cause cooperation or conflict.
A fourth implication is that intemational organizations may still have a role in
approaches centered on domestic politics because they may influence the domestic
politics of countries. If perceptions of the ethnic content of a crisis influence foreign
policy toward the conflict, intemational organizations can shape foreign policy by
influencing those perceptions.'^
Because ethnic ties influence foreign policy, we cannot be optimistic about the
intemational relations of future secessionist conflicts. States will probably find it
difficult to cooperate because their decision makers will face conflicting demands.
Their supporters will have ties to different sides of a conflict, and this will probably
compel them to disagree about how to properly manage a conflict. Although the
increased interest in conflict management techniques may lead to useful findings, we
cannot forget that domestic and ethnic politics drive policymakers as they develop
foreign policy. Consequently, we should expect that a mixture of collaboration and
conflict will characterize the intemational relations of future ethnic conflicts, and the
ethnic definition of each crisis will greatly influence this mixture.
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