Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict

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Definition

- Political conflict covers the political aspect of the state, it involves the concern about who should govern the state.
- Leadership conflict refers to a power struggle between different parties about the leadership of the state. This is especially true in case of weak states, when regional leaders and warlords gain in power and start a struggle for privileged position, autonomy, or even separation and independence.

• Violence in civil wars may be affected by factors that include the specific profile of political actors and their political ideology, their organizational structure, underlying social basis and military culture, their resources, their national and local leadership and strategies, the type of challenges they face and the assistance they receive from third parties, the prevailing international norms, the level of available military technology and factors such as geography and climate.

• According to **traditionalists** civil wars are the ultimate manifestations of the collective grievance of a people and are caused by inequality, political oppression and competition over scare resources. According to grievance theory the outbreak of civil war is linked to the deprivation of a particular group by another group and those underprivileged and deprived groups strife to attain relative equality.

 According to greed theory more important are those factors which determine the financial and military viability of rebellion. In other words this theory was built around economic model of rebellion. The biggest proponents of greed theory were Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler.

- Which theory can best explain the causes of ethnic conflict?
- Grievance theory was criticized from various scholars, who stressed that "grievance" was crucial, people did not simply jump into revolutionary fervor because they were discontent. They argued, that the act of rebellion requires effective mobilization strategies and the ability to mobilize resources that determines the extent of the conflict. On the other hand, greed theory is criticized for overemphasizing the idea of a conflict economy. It is argued that personal economic gains are not the only motivating factors for the outbreak of ethnic conflict.

• It can be said that neither "grievance" nor "greed" are the sole motivational factors influencing the dynamics of civil war. The opposite is true; combination of the two is often the norm in various conflicts. It should be underlined, that while both greed and grievance motivate belligerents, there are many other complex and deep-rooted factors that contribute the outbreak of ethnic conflict.

Weinstein

 Groups that are organized on economic endowments are populated by opportunists, lack mechanisms for discipline behavior and tend to commit widespread abuses against civilians. Contrary to that rebellions organized around social endowments establish structures that facilitate cooperation and discipline and employ violence selectively.

- There are two dominant models that explain the behavior of rebel groups: one approach treats rebel organizations as **social movements** and the other as if they were **states**.
- 1. rapid structural changes in a society.
- 2. rebellion is the result of security dilemma.

Weinstein

- Weinstein the initial endowments to which rebel leaders have access shape the organizations that emerge and the way in which different rebel group ultimately use violence.
- Rebel group that emerge in environments rich in natural resources or with the external support of an outside patron tend to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence, contrary to that, rebel movements that arise in resource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and employ violence selectively and strategically.

Weinstein

• We have to distinguish between **activist** rebellions and opportunistic rebellions. Activist rebellions are high-commitment individuals, willing to make risky and costly investments today for the promise of rewards in the future. Contrary to that opportunistic rebellions expect to be rewarded immediately for their involvement, seeking short-term gains. Weinstein argues that the membership profile of a rebellion is an important aspect we should pay our attention, as it affects its internal organization and the strategies it pursues in war.

Democratization in the new world order

- Since the time of Woodrow Wilson, President Bill Clinton – central theme of his foreign policy – global transformation in which peace and democracy are mutually reinforcing.
- Conventional wisdom spread of democracy promoting peace and security in the world.

Democratization in the new world order

- Francis Fukuyama "end of history" peaceful, liberal democracy in all the most significant countries. This vision was tarnishes by bloody nationalist conflicts in former communist states and in Central Africa.
- Huntington: "clash of civilizations" better captured the mounting anxiety. Fixed civilizations locked in struggle did not adequately describe a rapidly changing world in which many of the worst conflicts were within, rather than between civilizations.

Democratization in the new world order

 Thomas Friedman's "The Lexus and the Olive Tree" – better described the dual trends in 1990s (globalization and parochial backlash) – conclusions exaggerated the chances of economic success in the developing worlds and underestimated the degree to which political rivalries could overshadow potential gains from economic liberalization.

- Zakaria "illiberal democracies" failed to deliver freedom and prosperity to their population.
 Democracy often gave vent to "hypernationalism" and ethnic conflict.
- It is confirmed empirically that incidents of violent conflict is much higher in democratizing or semi-democratic states than in either autocracies or consolidates democracies.

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- What is the causal connection between regime type and the causes of ethnic conflict?
- Democracy war?

Democratization - war

- Link between democratization and nationalist war- "third wave" of democratization in 1980s and 1990s consolidated democratic regimes mainly in the richer countries of Eastern Europe, Latin America, Southern Africa and East Asia.
- Ted Gurr:societies in newly established states were especially war prone to ethnic violence. A forth wave – more challenging cases: countries that are poorer, more ethnically divided, ideologically more resistant to democracy, with more entrenched authoritarian elites, and with a much frailer base of governmental institutions and citizen-skills.

Democracy as a cause of war

- Chance of bellicose behavior arises in those transitional states:
- Lack of the strong political institutions: effective state, the rule of law, organized parties that compete in fair elections and professional news media.
- Nationalism ideology with tremendous appeal for elites whose positions are threatened.
- More important cleavages are those that divide nations, ethnic groups or races, than cleavages between the privileged and the masses.

Democracy as a cause of war

- Nationalism right to self-rule of the people, but not necessarily promise that the government will be accountable to the average voters through democratic process governed by the rule of law.
- Nationalist rhetoric "government for people", but not necessarily by the people.
- Nationalistic appeals are more likely when states attempt to transition to democracy lacks institutional and public accountability.

Democracy

- President Bush:
- "It is the practice of democracy that makes a nation ready for democracy".

- Ill prepared attempt to democratize weak statessuch as in the former Yugoslavia, Caucasus, Pakistan, Rwanda and Burundi – may lead to costly warfare.
- In the wake of Soviet collapse, popular sentiment expressed in the streets and at the ballot box fueled warfare between Armenia and Az. over the N-K.

- Violence insisw som unstable democratizing states also spilled across borders during the 1990s.
- Democratization played a catalytic role in the horrible slaughter in Africa.
- The 1993 elections in Burundi intensified ethnic polarization between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, relating in some 200 000 deaths.
- Democratic transformation coincided with renewed or intensified secessionist wars. Russia fought two wars against its breakaway province of Chechnya.

- Danwart Rustow addresses question of process and sequence.
- the stability of democratic consolidation depends on the sequence in which the requisites appear on the historical stage.
- "The ingredients (of democracy) must be assembled."
- Democratization causes war when it precedes the emergence of a consensus on national identity.

- Robert Dahl, Eric Nordlinger, Samuel Hungtington, Jack Snyder, Edward Mansfield
- democratic transition are most successful when strong political institutions are developed before popular political participation increased.

- Conflict is more likely under following conditions:
- a transition toward democracy that is incomplete;

- where institutions are too weak to manage the upsurge in the political power of newly enfranchised masses;

- where the elites use nationalist card in attempt to preserve in power.

- Regime types most likely to experience ethnic war in a mixed regime, one that is partly democratic and partly autocratic, with poorly developed state institutions – serious institutional deficit.
- Weak institutions per se do not increase the chance of the war; they do so only during the early phase of an incomplete democratic transition. In this case political leaders frequently turn to ideological or charismatic appeals to bolster the rule.

• The contest over national self-determination takes place as the fortunes of both elites and mass groups are shifting. Elites left over the old regime are seeking strategies that will prevent their fall, while rising elites are trying to muscle in, and both are scrambling for allies among the newly aroused masses.

• Elites are trying to solve political problems by invoking nationalism, the doctrine that a distinctive people deserve autonomy in a state that protects and advances their distinctive cultural or political interests. Nationalism helps to define the people who are exercising selfdetermination. Nationalism is attractive to rising groups, who use it as a populist club that can be wielded against elites who are insufficiently zealous on promoting the interests of "the nation "

 A common side effect of state weakness during early democratization is a poorly defined sense of the "nation." Democratization requires national self-determination, but people in weak states who are just emerging into political consciousness often lack a clear, agreed answer to the question: "who are we; what is our nation?"

 The probability of a political system development in a non-violent, nonauthoritarian, and eventually democratically viable manner are maximized when a national identity emerges first, followed by the institutionalization of the central government, and then the emergence of the mass parties and mass electorate."

Political transformation

- Although some democratic transition is risky, there is no alternative
- political change cannot be frozen.

• The fist step towards democratic selfdetermination must be to define the boundaries of the nation in a way that broad legitimacy. National legitimacy can only be achieved by constructing effective state institutions that begin to meet a people's needs for security – to strengthen the ability of the administrative apparatus of the state to act rationally, consistently, and impartially in implementing the policy of the regime.

- Why do citizen in well-established democratic systems vote for government that rarely wage upon each other, while electorates in transitional democracies so often support aggressively nationalist policies, even against democracies?
- Three main lines of explanation:
- 1. Institutions
- 2. Norms
- 3. Information.

1. Institutions

- Effective democratic institutions make the government accountable, through regular elections, to the average voter who bears the costs and risks of war. Democracies choose their wars more wisely;
- tend to win and suffer fewer causalities
- are less likely to initiate crises
- tend to prevail in the crises that they do initiate;
- rarely fight preventive wars;
- are more astute that their non-democratic counterparts.
- Mixed regimes have won only 58% of the wars they have started, as compared to 93% for democracies and 60% for dictatorship.

2. Norms and Identities

- Share democratic liberal identity and common norms that govern appropriate political behavior.
- Country should have deeply ingrained civic norms such as rule by consent the governed, free speech, due processes of law, fair electoral competition, and the settlement of political disputes by peaceful means.
- States in the midst of democratic transition are the most war-prone type of regime , more than authoritaritarian states, which should be even less constrained by norms.
- In a mature democracy, norms and institutions are mutually supportive. Fair elections, the rule of law, and other building blocks of democracy dependent both on institutions and on norms that is, standards for what behavior ought to be. People believe, moral obligation, democracy the only way to be effective.

3. Information and credibility in bargaining

- Greater transparency of democratic politics makes it less likely that democratic leaders will bluff or renege on agreements. With two parties transparency about the expected costs and benefits of fighting, there should be little guesswork about which side has the greater resolve, and a bargain can be struck that avoids the costs of fighting it out.
- Transparency and smart bargaining should lead to a peaceful settlement.

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- Do all regime transitions, whether democratizing or not, increase the risk of war?
- Why should transition toward democracy exert a stronger effect than other kinds of transitions?

- Instability of the political elite, which may be characteristic of various kinds of transitions, combines with the expansion of mass political participation in democratizing states in distinctively explosive ways.
- This situation creates strong incentives for elites to mobilize popular support through nationalist appeals, which tend to raise the risk of war.

- 1. Countries undergoing incomplete democratization with weak institutions are more likely than other states to become involved in war.
- 2. Countries undergoing incomplete democratization are more likely than other states to initiate war.
- 3. Incomplete democratization where institutions are weak is especially likely to lead to war when powerful elites feel threatened by the prospect of a democratic transitions.

- 4. Countries undergoing complete democratization have a higher risk of involvement in war shortly after the transition, but no elevated risk of involvement in war shortly after the transitions, but no elevated risk once democracy is consolidated.
- 5. The increased risk of war for countries undergoing complete democratization mainly applies to states already involved in enduring rivalries whose nationalist and militarist institutions and ideologies were forged in earlier phases of democratization.

• 6. Politics of democratizing states that initiate war are likely to exhibit some or all of the following characteristics: exclusionary nationalism, pressuregroup politics, logrolling among elite factors, weak brokerage of political bargains by the ruling elite, contradictory and unconvincing signaling in foreign affairs, the use of aggressive foreign policies by declining elites gambling for domestic political resurrection, the use of media dominance to promote nationalist ideology, and nationalist bidding wars between old elites and rising mass groups.

Political conflict

• The role of domestic élites has a big impact on evolution of intrastate conflict. Governmental politics has an impact on the pattern of intergroup relations. Different national governments utilize different instruments according to the nature of the political institutions of the state. Policy programs of educational, language and economic aspects have a significant impact on the status of particular groups inside the state. Success or failure of governmental policy determines the creation of tension and emergence of violent conflict.

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- Do increases in ethnic tensions coincide with democratization? Are the differences in ethnic unrest among democracies due to variations in political institutions?
- Are presidential systems more prone to ethnic conflict than parliamentary democracies? Does the electoral system matter? Does federalism cause more problems than it solves?

Political system

Nature of the executive, type of electoral system and distribution of power.

Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism

• Ethnic conflict is more likely in Parl. than in Pres. system

Electoral system

Plurality system causes ethnic conflict *Federalism*

Depends of the size of ethnic group

Political conflict

• Causal chain of political conflict is following: There must be one pre-condition present

- Political system of the state is going through a transformation state. Most dangerous time for bad government is during the period when it tries to transform itself.

Causal mechanism

- The conflict becomes violent through following mechanism:
- The lack of elite legitimacy results in discriminatory and weak political institution leading to instability.
- When authoritarianism collapses and is followed by ineffectual efforts to establish democracy, the interim period of relative anarchy is ripe leadership confrontation.
- Countries that have undergone a recent political transition are more likely to experience violent conflict.

Conclusion

- The huger is the decline of state power the more significant are the incentives of the elites to provoke ethnic conflict as a strategy to maintain in power.
- The more some groups are excluded from state power, the greater is the risk of ethnic tensions.
- The likelihood of ethnic war in semidemocracies remains higher than in other regime types, even after a regime change.