GEORGIA:
AVOIDING WAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA
26 November 2004
Europe Report N°159
Tbilisi/Brussels
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
II. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT........................................................ 2
A. HISTORICAL CAUSES.............................................................................................................2
1. Competing narratives of South Ossetia's past............................................................2
2. The 1990-1992 conflict and its aftermath..................................................................3
3. The peace agreement and peace implementation mechanisms..................................4
B. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT ..........................................5
1. Ossetian and Georgian population settlement and displacement...............................5
2. War-time atrocities ....................................................................................................7
C. POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT...................................................................................7
D. GEOPOLITICAL CAUSES.........................................................................................................8
E. POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CONFLICT .......................................................................9
III. UNFREEZING THE CONFLICT .............................................................................. 11
A. FOCUSING ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CONFLICT.........................................11
1. Attacking greed........................................................................................................11
2. Addressing grievance...............................................................................................12
3. The South Ossetian reaction ....................................................................................12
B. THE START OF VIOLENT CONFLICT .....................................................................................14
C. THE UNEASY TRUCE...........................................................................................................15
IV. INTER OR INTRA-STATE CONFLICT? ................................................................ 16
A. GEORGIAN ALLEGATIONS ON RUSSIA'S ROLE .....................................................................16
B. THE VIEW FROM RUSSIA.....................................................................................................17
C. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT ..........................................................................................18
D. THE OSCE..........................................................................................................................19
E. THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................................................................................................19
F. THE WAR NOBODY WANTED..............................................................................................20
V. OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT ALLEVIATION AND PREVENTION.................... 22
A. STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ..................................................22
1. Law enforcement and peacekeeping........................................................................23
2. Addressing the civilian dimension of security.........................................................23
B. ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION AND COOPERATION .................................24
C. PROMOTING REFUGEE AND IDP RETURN ............................................................................25
D. ADDRESSING POLITICAL STATUS ........................................................................................27
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 29
APPENDICES
A. MAP OF GEORGIA ...............................................................................................................30
B. MAP OF THE SOUTH OSSETIAN REGION...............................................................................31
C. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................32
D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP.......................................................................33
E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE.........................................................................34
F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................36
ICG Europe Report N°159 26 November 2004
GEORGIA: AVOIDING WAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
A precarious peace is back in place between Georgia
and South Ossetia after the long-frozen conflict nearly
became a hot war again and drew in Russia when
dozens were killed in August 2004 fighting. President
Saakashvili tried to break a twelve-year deadlock and
take another step to restore Georgia's territorial
integrity by undermining the regime in Tskhinvali,
but seriously miscalculated. A more comprehensive
approach is needed to resolve this conflict peacefully.
The onus is on Georgia, with help from its
international partners, to increase the security and
confidence of people living in the zone of conflict,
promote economic rehabilitation and development,
ensure the right of Ossetians to return to South
Ossetia and Georgia proper, and create arrangements
guaranteeing South Ossetia effective autonomy.
South Ossetia must enter a real dialogue with Georgia
on its status and not use the winter to force Georgian
villagers still in South Ossetia to leave their homes.
After peacefully resolving its decade-old conflict with
Ajara earlier this year, the Georgian decision-makers
turned their attention to South Ossetia. In May 2004
they believed their Ajarian success could easily be
repeated. They considered that South Ossetia's de
facto president, Eduard Kokoity, had little democratic
legitimacy or popular support and that, as in Ajara,
the people would rapidly switch loyalty from
Tskhinvali to Tbilisi.
The initial strategy aimed to address the politicaleconomic
causes of the conflict through an antismuggling
operation, aimed primarily at closing the
sprawling Ergneti market on the outskirts of
Tskhinvali, in the Georgian-South Ossetia zone of
conflict. The theory was that Kokoity and a small
circle of officials around him were maintaining
control over South Ossetia through their involvement
in black market trade. In parallel, the Georgian side
organised a humanitarian "offensive" to provide
people in the region with the benefits of economic
and cultural projects.
The strategy backfired. Rather then capitalising on real
popular discontent, it caused many average citizens
who depended on illegal trade for their economic
survival to regroup around Kokoity. Ossetian de facto
authorities successfully portrayed Georgian moves as
aggressive first steps towards a remilitarisation of the
conflict that had enjoyed a ceasefire since 1992.
Kokoity's popular support rose as he described himself
as the only leader capable of guaranteeing Ossetians'
security, as well as their political, economic and
cultural interests. Assistance sent by Tbilisi was
portrayed as a cheap attempt to buy support.
The Georgian approach failed in large part because it
was based on a limited analysis of the causes of the
conflict. Since 1992 little progress has been made to
bring Ossetians and Georgians closer together. Many
of the grievances and ambitions developed during the
war that broke out as the Soviet Union was dying
remain tough obstacles to peace. Unless they are
addressed, efforts to re-integrate South Ossetia into
Georgia are almost certain to lead again to violence.
In the past few months Georgia has shifted gears
and begun to emphasise the geopolitical nature of
the conflict, terming it "a problem between Georgia
and Russia". Russia does play a special role. But it
is unlikely that Georgia can successfully persuade
the U.S. or European Union to duel with Moscow
over South Ossetia.
A new ceasefire holds since 19 August 2004. At a
high level meeting between Georgian Prime
Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian leader
Eduard Kokoity on 5 November in Sochi, an
agreement on demilitarisation of the zone of conflict
was signed. Some exchange of fire continues in the
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page ii
zone of conflict, apparently primarily initiated by the
Ossetian side, but there is still cause for optimism
that the conflict will be resolved non-violently since
all sides seem to be reconsidering their policies.
Georgia's legitimate insistence on the preservation of
its territorial integrity needs to be balanced with the
Ossetians' concerns for the protection of their
national minority rights.
For the negotiations that are needed with Russia, South
and North Ossetia to succeed, Georgia must show it is
putting in place political, economic, legal, and social
conditions to guarantee Ossetians equal rights in a
multi-national and democratic state. The greatest lesson
from the May-August period is that attempts to
resolve the conflict swiftly will lead to war. President
Saakashvili seemed to recognise this when, at the UN
General Assembly, he pledged to engage in a "stageby-stage
settlement plan". To avoid further
casualties and displacement, Georgia, together with
its international partners, must implement a
comprehensive strategy to resolve the root causes of
the conflict and make non-violent re-integration
possible.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Georgia and the de facto
Government of South Ossetia:
1. Stop all armed hostilities and implement stepby-step
demilitarisation of South Ossetia with
respect to all troops not part of the Joint
Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) or local police,
starting in the zone of conflict.
2. Implement all previously agreed upon JCC
decisions and bilateral Georgian-Russian
agreements regarding the conflict.
3. Engage citizens and civil society in conflict
resolution efforts.
To the Government of Georgia:
4. Fund in the 2005 budget the costs of social
services and economic development in and
around the zone of conflict, confidence building
measures, rehabilitation of communities in
Georgia proper to which Ossetian refugees may
return, and a new Russian-Georgian inter-state
body to facilitate return and economic
rehabilitation in the zone of conflict.
5. Adopt a law providing restitution of property
and compensation to all affected by the 1990-
1992 conflict that takes into consideration the
comments of the Venice Commission and other
international experts, and discuss with the JCC
creation of a property claims commission.
6. Adopt legislation permitting those affected by
the conflict to hold dual citizenship.
7. Agree with Russia, and in particular North
Ossetia, on measures to boost economic
cooperation, coordinate custom policies and
facilitate the free movement of goods and
persons along the Transcaucasian highway and
Russian military highway.
8. Deal with the legacy of the 1990-1992 conflict
by investigating war crimes, prosecuting those
responsible, and adopting legislation to amnesty
those who participated in the conflict but
committed no war crimes.
9. Open discussion on the status of South Ossetia
with local and international experts, including
experts from the parties to the conflict, with a
view to developing a comprehensive concept
within the framework of an overall administrativeterritorial
reform of Georgia.
To the de facto Government of South Ossetia:
10. Guarantee full freedom of movement on the
territory of South Ossetia and do not obstruct
implementation of economic rehabilitation,
refugee return, or confidence-building measures
agreed upon at the JCC and within GeorgianRussian
bilateral talks.
11. Participate in a dialogue with the Georgian side
on means to reach a final resolution to the
conflict, including determination of the future
administrative-territorial status of South Ossetia
and the work of a property claims commission.
To the Government of Russia:
12. Prevent any armed formations or weapons not
approved within the JCC framework from
crossing into South Ossetia from Russia.
13. Create with Georgia an inter-state body on
return and economic rehabilitation in the zone
of conflict and work with Georgia to devise and
fund from 2005 budgets programs to facilitate
return and economic rehabilitation in South
Ossetia.
14. Together with Georgia agree on measures to
boost economic cooperation, coordinate customs
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page iii
policies, and facilitate the free movement of
goods and persons along the Transcaucasian and
Russian military highways.
15. Support the increase of OSCE staff in
Tskhinvali and the implementation of its
mandate to work throughout South Ossetia.
To the Joint Control Commission (JCC):
16. Meet at least monthly and agree to hold biannual
meetings between the de facto president
of South Ossetia and the prime minister of
Georgia.
17. Establish a technical working group, including
international experts and ethnic Georgians
living in South Ossetia, to define the territorialadministrative
status of South Ossetia.
18. Establish a property claims commission with
participation of Georgian, Ossetian and
international experts, create a working group to
investigate any claims of human rights abuse in
the zone of conflict, and reinvigorate the work of
the Special Coordination Centre (SCC) to
facilitate law enforcement cooperation.
To the OSCE and its Member States:
19. Be more pro-active in the search for a political
settlement to the conflict, increase the number of
OSCE monitors and officers in South Ossetia,
and add civilian police, democratisation/human
rights, and political officers to the Tskhinvali
Field Office.
To the European Union:
20. Play a more active role as mediator through
the EU Special Representative to the South
Caucasus in the effort to develop a consensus
between Georgia and Russia on the final status
of South Ossetia.
21. Consider re-allocating some funds of the third
rehabilitation program for rebuilding houses and
infrastructure in Georgia proper for returning
Ossetian refugees, approve funding for a fourth
rehabilitation program, and encourage the design
of joint Georgian-Ossetian economic and
community development projects.
To the United States Government:
22. Secure commitments when donating military
equipment or ammunition to the Georgian
military that these will not be used for offensive
actions in the South Ossetian or Abkhaz disputes
and extend USAID programs and funding to
support confidence-building measures between
Ossetians and Georgians.
To the Wider International Community:
23. Support existing agreements with additional
financial assistance, especially in the field of
economic development, refugee return and
confidence building.
Tbilisi/Brussels, 26 November 2004
ICG Europe Report N°159 26 November 2004
GEORGIA: AVOIDING WAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA
I. INTRODUCTION
In July and August 2004 the Georgian-South Ossetian
conflict became, among all frozen conflicts in the
South Caucasus, the most likely to spill over into fullscale
war. Since the signature of the "Agreement on
the Principles of the Settlement of the GeorgianOssetian
Conflict between Georgia and Russia" in
1992, no military confrontations had occurred. As the
years passed, contacts and trade revived between
Ossetians and Georgians living in and around the zone
of conflict. A slow but progressive negotiation process
brought Georgia, Russia, South and North Ossetia
together, leading to agreements on the maintenance of
peace and security, economic rehabilitation and
development, and refugee return. Georgia and Russia
had made commitments -- many not yet implemented --
to political steps and budgetary expenditures to
improve Georgian-Ossetian relations. The final status
of South Ossetia remains unresolved as the key
obstacle to conflict settlement.
After becoming president of Georgia in January 2004,
Mikheil Saakashvili made restoration of territorial
integrity a main goal. In December 2003, he ruled out
force and stated, "I am sure, that if the Abkhaz and
South Ossetian sides see that the economy is growing
in Georgia they will come to us. We should attract
them with economic opportunities".1
At the same time
Saakashvili was clear that the reintegration process
should be completed rapidly -- during his term in office
-- and in progressively difficult stages, with Ajara first,
South Ossetia second and Abkhazia third. Efforts to
engage Abkhazia would not be restarted until
presidential elections had been held there in October
2004.2
Thus initial thinking was that South Ossetia
1
Civil Georgia, 10 January 2004.
2
Interview with Georgian MP, Giga Bokaria, Civil Georgia,
26 July 2004. Interview with Georgian State Minister, Goga
Khaindrava, Civil Georgia, 28 July 2004.
should be solved in the intermediary months between
the resolution of the Ajara crisis in May and October.
Events during the summer, however, showed that a
peaceful resolution of the conflict will take years. It
remains unclear whether decision-makers in Georgia
are ready to commit the time, funds, and political
effort needed for a peaceful outcome. In August an
influential MP said, "We don't have three years to
solve South Ossetia".3
As recently as 14 October,
President Saakashvili insisted on short-term
resolution, reportedly stating that "South Ossetia is a
very small region, so I think that a breakthrough in
reunification would take a matter of months. The
main problem related to South Ossetia is contraband,
but we have resolved that problem".4
Contraband is indeed one of the causes of the
conflict, but there are many other factors. The
Georgian government's limited interpretation led to a
serious escalation of tensions in South Ossetia in
mid-2004 and undermined what feelings of trust had
been restored. Addressing the full range of causes
and restoring territorial integrity peacefully requires
sustained effort by the Georgian government with
international support.
3
Crisis Group interview with Georgian MP, August 2004.
4
"South Ossetia Will be Georgian in Several Months",
Caucasus Press, 14 October 2004, and Interfax Presidential
Bulletin Report for same day, at http://worldnews.xignite.com/
xWorldNews.aspx?articleid=CEP20041014000320.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 2
II. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE
CONFLICT
In taking its first action, Saakashvili's government
was driven by conviction the conflict could be
resolved rapidly and through the application of
strategies similar to those employed in Ajara.5
As in
Ajara, Georgian authorities sought to unseat South
Ossetia's political leadership in order to re-establish
control.6
They utilised a two-pronged approach:
launching a large scale anti-smuggling campaign to
block local authorities' ability to gain from illegal
trade, and implementing a "humanitarian aid"
offensive to win the hearts and minds of inhabitants.
The strategy was based on the expectation that when
local authorities could no longer deliver basic
services, citizens would turn against their leadership.
Animosities against Tbilisi would be tempered by
aid. As will be described in more detail below, this
strategy had the opposite effect, as Ossetians rallied
around their de facto president.
Tbilisi's erroneous strategy was largely based on a
limited and selective interpretation of the roots of the
conflict. Policy makers focused on political-economic
causes, largely ignoring others. However, the conflict's
origins include, but are not limited to, different
understandings of history; grievances from the 1990-
1992 conflict especially with regard to displacement
and human rights violations; institutional arrangements
and political influences; geopolitical interests; and
political-economic realities.
A. HISTORICAL CAUSES
1. Competing narratives of South Ossetia's
past
South Ossetia is located along Georgia's northern
frontier in the southern foothills of the Caucasus
Mountains, bordering the North Ossetian
Autonomous Republic of the Russian Federation. The
5
As a local conflict resolution expert explained with regards
to South Ossetia, "there are two trends in the Georgian
government....People who know what happened thirteen years
ago, who have experience, who understand that the issue is
complex...and a younger generation, let's say hard-liners, who
thought that this issue could be revolved like Ajara". Crisis
Group interview, September 2004.
6
For background on the Ajara case, see ICG Europe
Briefing, Saakashvili's Ajara Success: Repeatable Elsewhere
in Georgia?, 18 August 2004.
region is surrounded on the south, east and west by
Georgia proper. South Ossetia was granted the status
of an autonomous region (oblast) in the Georgian
Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923.7
The Ossetian
people claim to be descendants of the Alanian and
Scythian tribes that migrated from Persia to the
Caucasus at least five millennia ago.8
The Ossetian
language belongs to the Indo-European group and is
related to Pushto and (more distantly) Farsi, but uses
the Cyrillic alphabet.9
When and how Ossetians
migrated to the southern Caucasus is much disputed.10
Georgian sources mostly claim that mass movement
to Georgia took place in seventeenth to nineteenth
centuries11
But Ossetians claim they have been living
much longer on both sides of the Caucasus, and their
presence in the region is at least as ancient as the
Georgians'.12
They argue that Ossetians in the North
and South in 1774 chose to join the Russian Empire.13
This different understanding of the duration of
Ossetian presence causes deep divisions, providing
fodder for Georgians to claim they are "guests" in the
South, while Ossetians argue that they populate their
historical homeland on both sides of the Caucasus.
7
Oblasts had the least autonomy, mostly cultural, within the
Soviet system. North Ossetia was given the status of
autonomous republic in the Russian SSR.
8
P. Kozaev, Alans-Aryans (Vladikavkaz, 1998).
9
Nikola Svetkovsky, "The Georgian-South Ossetia Conflict",
Danish Association for Research on the Caucasus, at
http://www.caucasus.dk/publication5.htm.
10
The rivalry is visible in the different titles of the region.
South Ossetia is often referred to as "Samachablo", "Shida
Kartli", or "the Tskhinvali Region" by Georgians. Georgian
hard-line nationalists call it "Samachablo" -- the land of the
aristocratic Georgian Machabeli family. This term is offensive
to Ossetians and reminiscent of former President
Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic rhetoric; they prefer "South
Ossetia", emphasizing the ethno-cultural affinity with North
Ossetia. This report uses South Ossetia, as it is the most
frequently used in official documents and diplomatic discourse.
11
G. Zhorzholiani, S. Lekishvili, L. Mataradze, L. Toidze, and
E. Khoshtaria, The Historical, Political and Legal Aspects of
The Georgian-Ossetian Conflict (Tbilisi, 1992), pp. 3-4; See
also, A. Surguladze and P. Surguladze, A History of Georgia
(Tbilisi, 1992); N. Lomouri, A History of Georgia (Tbilisi,
1993).
12
I.BB Sanakoev, Origins and Factors of Georgian-South
Ossetian Conflict (1989-1992) (Vladikavkaz, 2004), p. 44. For
a wider coverage of the historical background, see
Svetkovsky, op. cit.; also, Julian Birch, "The Georgian/South
Ossetian Territorial and Boundary Dispute", in Wright,
Goldenberg, and Schofield, (eds.), Transcaucasian
Boundaries, the SOAS/GRC Geopolitical Series (London,
1996), pp. 202-210.
13
Crisis Group interviews, political analysts, Tskhinvali,
October 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 3
Ethnic tensions became visible during the first
Georgian Republic, 1918-1921. The Georgian
Menshevik government accused Ossetians of
cooperating with Russian Bolsheviks.14
A series of
Ossetian rebellions took place between 1918 and
1920 during which claims were made to an
independent territory. Violence broke out in 1920
when Georgian Mensheviks sent National Guards
and regular army units to Tskhinvali to crush the
uprisings.15
Ossetian sources claim that about 5,000
Ossetians were killed and more than 13,000
subsequently died from hunger and epidemics.16
After the Red Army invaded Georgia in 1921, the
South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (SOAO) was
created within Georgia.
During the Soviet period, Georgians generally
considered South Ossetia an artificial entity, and
rivalries remained latent. Many Georgians perceived
that Ossetians living in South Ossetia had benefits not
granted to them. According to a source originally
from Tskhinvali, "the first in charge was always
Ossetian, in all possible positions".17
On the other
hand, Ossetians in the South felt politically
disadvantaged compared to their kin in the North and
to the Abkhaz, as both had Autonomous Republics (in
the Russian Federation and Georgia respectively).
2. The 1990-1992 conflict and its aftermath
The Ossetians renewed efforts to upgrade their status
in 1988, when Ademon Nykhaz (the South Ossetian
Popular Front) was created.18
On 10 November
1989, the SOAO regional council sent a plea to the
Georgian Supreme Soviet for the region to be made
an Autonomous Republic, infuriating Georgian
authorities. The language issue also increased
14
Zhorzholiani, et. al., The Historical, Political and Legal
Aspects of The Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, op. cit., p. 6.
15
Vakhtang Guruli (ed.), History of Georgia - XX Century
(Tbilisi, 2003), p. 69.
16
Svetkovsky, op. cit. Chapter 4.2.
17
Crisis Group interview with Gori Region government
official, September 2004.
18
During the late 1980s, Popular Front movements were
created throughout the USSR but generally on a republic
rather then an oblast basis. They tended to advocate protection
and promotion of national rights in opposition to Soviet or
Russian policies. Ademon Nykhaz was particularly criticised
in Tbilisi when in Spring 1989 its head, Alan Chochiev, wrote
an open letter to the Abkhaz people supporting their
independence claim. Human Rights Watch, "Bloodshed in the
Caucasus: Violation of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
in the Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict", 1998, p. 6.
tensions.19
Some attempts appear to have been made
to defuse the crisis through organising public forums
attended by both Georgians and Ossetians.20
But the
last such meeting ended violently when, on 23
November 1989, 15,000 Georgians marched on
Tskhinvali. The caravan of buses and cars was met
by a mob of Ossetians, militia and soldiers from the
8th
regiment of the Soviet Army, who prevented
them from entering the city.21
The clash caused the
first casualties.22
The situation worsened in summer 1990, prior to
parliamentary elections in Georgia, when the
Georgian Supreme Soviet adopted an election law
barring regional parties. This was interpreted by
Ossetians as a way to cut Ademon Nykhaz out and
led to Ossetians proclaiming full sovereignty within
the USSR on 20 September 1990. Ossetians then
boycotted elections the next month that brought Zviad
Gamsakhurdia's "Round Table" coalition to power in
Georgia and held their own parliamentary contest in
December.23
Gamsakhurdia's government frantically
reacted, cancelling the election results and abolishing
the autonomous oblast status of South Ossetia on 11
December 1990. Tbilisi announced a state of
emergency in the region and appointed the
commander of Georgian Interior Troops as
Tskhinvali's mayor. Authorities in that city organised
a referendum in January 1992, which overwhelmingly
supported secession and integration with Russia. On
19 November 1992, the South Ossetian Supreme
Council voted for the same actions.24
Direct military confrontation started in January 1991
when several thousand Georgian troops entered
Tskhinvali, leading to a year of chaos and urban
19
In 1989 the Georgian Supreme Soviet promoted its
language program, establishing Georgian as the principle
language countrywide. Ossetians reacted by passing a
resolution on Ossetian as an official language in the
autonomous areas. Svetkovsky, op. cit., Chapter 4.3.
Ossetians living in Tskhinvali claim that in 1989 they were
instructed to use Georgian in all state work rather than
Russian. Crisis Group interview with former public officials,
South Ossetia, October 2004.
20
Human Rights Watch, "Bloodshed in the Caucasus", op.
cit., p. 7.
21
Ibid, p.7.
22
At least six people were killed, 27 sustained gunshot
injuries, and 140 were hospitalised. Komsomolskaya Pravda,
26 December 1990, p. 1, cited in Human Rights Watch report,
op. cit. p.7.
23
Svetkovsky, op. cit. Chapter 4.3.
24
Julian Birch, "Ossetiya -- land of uncertain frontiers and
manipulative elites", Central Asia Survey, 18 (4), 1999, p. 505.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 4
warfare. In spring 1992, fighting escalated with
sporadic Russian involvement.25
On 24 June 1992, in
the Russian city of Sochi, the then Russian and
Georgian leaders, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard
Shevardnadze, signed an agreement that brought
about a ceasefire, but the war's consequences were
devastating: some 1,000 dead, 100 missing, extensive
destruction of homes and infrastructure, and many
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).26
3. The peace agreement and peace
implementation mechanisms
A series of protocols to the Sochi Agreement were
signed soon thereafter including Protocol no. 3, which
defined the zone of conflict -- a circle of 15 km.
radius from the centre of Tskhinvali -- and a security
corridor -- a 14 km, band divided evenly on both sides
of the administrative border of the former South
Ossetia Autonomous Oblast.27
On the ground, the
authorities of the former oblast maintained control
over the districts of Tskhinvali, Java, Znauri, and
parts of Akhalgori. The Tbilisi central government
controlled the rest of Akhalgori and several ethnic
Georgian villages in the Tskhinvali district.
The Sochi Agreement also set up the Joint Control
Commission (JCC),28
a quadrilateral body with
Georgian, Russian, North and South Ossetian
representatives,29
plus participation from the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).30
The JCC was created to supervise the
observance of the agreement, draft and implement
conflict settlement measures, promote dialogue and
political settlement, devise and carry out measures to
facilitate refugee and IDP return, solve problems
25
Svetkovsky, op. cit. Chapter 4.3.
26
According to the "Intergovernmental Agreement Between
Russia and Georgia on Economic Rehabilitation in the
Georgian-Ossetian Zone of Conflict" (14 September 1993),
war damages totalled 34.2 billion Russian rubles based on 15
July 1992 prices ($260 million). The ceasefire entered fully
into force on 28 June 1992. Figures denoted in dollars ($)
refer to U.S. dollars in this report unless otherwise noted.
27
Protocol no. Three, 12 July 2004, signed in Vladikavkaz
by the JCC.
28
"Sochi Agreement on Resolving the Georgian-Ossetian
Conflict", Article 3, 24 June 1992; its functions were defined
in a 4 July 1993 protocol signed in Vladikavkaz.
29
Terms of Reference for the JCC, 26 July 1994, signed by
the Russian and Georgian representatives.
30
At that time, the OSCE was the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was agreed that the CSCE
would participate in the work of the JCC within the Terms of
Reference for the JCC, 26 July 1994.
related to economic reconstruction in the zone of
conflict, and monitor human rights. It is also within
JCC competence to coordinate activities of the Joint
Peacekeeping Forces.31
In practice, the JCC's work
has tended to focus on three main issues, each with a
working group: military and security matters,
economic rehabilitation of the zone of conflict, and
establishing conditions for the return of refugees and
IDPs. In addition, ad hoc committees, expert groups,
plenipotentiary delegations and other formations have
met at various levels.32
The June 1992 agreement also created trilateral Joint
Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), with Georgian, Russian
and Ossetian units.33
The JPKF was mandated to
restore peace and maintain law and order in the zone
of conflict and security corridor, as well as in districts
and villages not in the zone of conflict.34
It was
additionally tasked to monitor provisions of the
ceasefire agreement and take decisive measures,
including the use of arms, in case of violations of JCC
decisions by any uncontrolled armed formations of a
party.35
The Protocol gave the military command the
right "to use all measures to localise military clashes
and destroy armed formations in districts and villages
of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast that
were not included in the security zone or corridor".36
However, it is specifically in the zone of conflict (on
South Ossetian territory) that the JPKF has the right to
deploy and to establish checkpoints.37
Since 1992 the
JPKF has deployed and set up checkpoints in the zone
of conflict and security corridor (on the South
Ossetian side) but has rarely extended its activities
outside the corridor to districts and villages not in the
zone of conflict. Each party was to provide a
31
Terms of Reference for the JCC, 26 July 1994, op. cit.
32
The European Commission of the European Union is
present in the working group on economic issues and the
UNHCR in the working group on refugees and IDPs.
33
A common misperception is that the JPKF is quadrilateral,
including South and North Ossetian forces. Rather, the
Ossetian unit has over time come to be staffed mainly by
soldiers from South Ossetia under the command of a North
Ossetian officer.
34
In 1992 what is now called the JPKF was termed the Joint
Peacekeeping and Law Enforcement Forces (JPKLEF). The
mandate was changed in 1997 to exclude law enforcement.
Protocol no. Seven of the JCC Meeting, Annex 1, 13 February
1997, in Vladikavkaz.
35
Protocol no. Three, Annex 1, Article 1, 12 July 2004,
signed in Vladikavkaz by the JCC.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid, Article 4.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 5
maximum of 500 troops to the JPKF,38
who served
under Russian command.39
In 1996 the parties signed
a Memorandum to Enhance Security and Confidence
Building Measures and agreed to step-by-step
demilitarisation of the zone of conflict and reduction
of the number of JPKF frontier posts and guards.40
The peacekeeping and conflict settlement process
evolved over the past ten years, as various agreements
were made, especially at the JCC level.41
The
negotiation process was slow, with lengthy periods of
inactivity.42
The parties made various commitments,
especially relating to economic rehabilitation and
refugee return (detailed below). Nevertheless
negotiations on full-scale resolution of the conflict
posed significant obstacles. The May 1996
"Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and
Reinforce Mutual Confidence between the Parties to
the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict" called on them to
"continue their negotiations with a view to achieving
a full-scale political settlement".43
However, attempts
to start negotiations on the political settlement did not
begin until February 1999 and have only reached an
intermediary stage with the signature of the Baden
Agreement (Declaration) in 2000.44
Before November 2004, the leaders of Georgia and
South Ossetia had not met since June 1998 when
Shevardnadze and Chibirov came together in the
Georgian town of Borjomi.45
The most recent
38
Decision no. 1 of the JCC, 4 July 1992, signed in
Vladikavkaz. The commander of the JPKF is named by the
JCC on the proposal of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian
Federation.
39
JCC Decree, December 1994, signed in Moscow.
40
"Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and
Reinforce Mutual Confidence Between the Parties to the
Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", Moscow, 16 May 1996. This
reduction was to occur "as progress is made towards a fullscale
settlement...."
41
Between December 1994 and April 2004, the JCC met 30
times.
42
For example, between August 1992-December 1994,
September 1997-March 1999, and July 1999-April 2001, no
JCC sessions were held.
43
"Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and
Reinforce Mutual Confidence Between the Parties to the
Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", Moscow, 16 May 1996.
44
The last time the authorised delegations met to discuss a
political settlement, on 14 to 17 October 2003 in The Hague,
the experts meeting facilitated by the OSCE ended without a
concluding document. It was a follow-up to meetings in
Vienna/Baden (2000), Bucharest (2001) and Castelo Branco
(2002).
45
Two previous meetings between Shevardnadze and
Chibirov took place in Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia) on 27
bilateral agreement was on 23 December 2000.46
As
will be described below, it stipulated that Georgia
and Russia should, with the North and South
Ossetian sides, devise two crucial programs: one on
economic rehabilitation of the zone of conflict, the
other on return, settlement, and re-integration of
refugees, forcibly displaced and other persons
affected by the conflict, including measures for
restoration of the economy in places of return.
B. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
POPULATION DISPLACEMENT
1. Ossetian and Georgian population
settlement and displacement
Populations were closely inter-mixed before the 1990-
1992 conflict. According to the last pre-war census in
1989, Ossetians living in South Ossetia numbered
65,000, with 98,000 in the rest of Georgia.47
The
overall population of South Ossetia was
approximately 99,700, including some 26,000 ethnic
Georgians.48
The war brought massive displacement,
which shattered much of this coexistence and brought
South Ossetians much closer to their ethnic kin in
North Ossetia (Russian Federation).
The displacements have yet to be reversed. Their
brunt was shouldered by North Ossetia. While precise
figures are difficult to find, accounts claim that
between 40,000 and 100,000 Ossetians from South
Ossetia and Georgia proper fled there during the
conflict.49
Additionally, some 10,000 Georgians and
August 1996, and in Java (South Ossetia) on 14 November
1997. See below for the November 2004 meeting between
Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian
leader Eduard Kokoity.
46
"Agreement Between the Government of the Russian
Federation and the Government of Georgia on Economic
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the Zone of GeorgianOssetian
Conflict and on Refugee Return", Tbilisi, 23
December 2000.
47
Birch, "Ossetiya", op. cit., p. 505.
48
Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian official,
Tskhinvali, August 2004.
49
The lower figure is based on data from UNHCR
(estimations as of 1998). According to UNHCR Tbilisi,
30,000 Ossetians from Georgia proper registered in North
Ossetia as refugees, while 10,000 from South Ossetia became
"de facto refugees" in North Ossetia. Crisis Group interview,
August 2004. Officials of UNHCR Vladikavkaz consider that
in 1995 there were some 55,000 persons in North Ossetia
displaced by the Georgian--South Ossetian conflict. Crisis
Group interview, October 2004. The 100,000 figure is used by
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 6
persons of mixed ethnicity were displaced from South
Ossetia to Georgia proper, and 5,000 internally
displaced in South Ossetia.50
The 1992 ceasefire was
not followed by large-scale returns. In 2004 the UN
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian
Assistance (OCHA) found that "an overwhelming
number of IDPs and returnees remain
displaced...many if not most...reluctant to return to
their places of origin".51
As of September 2004 the
office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) had facilitated return of no more than
1,734 persons (513 families) from North Ossetia to
South Ossetia and Georgia proper.52
The returns that did occur after 1992 tended to
strengthen the dominance of majority populations
rather then promote multi-ethnic co-existence. Few
minorities chose to regain pre-war residences. UNHCR
assisted return of 278 ethnic Georgian families to
South Ossetia and 86 Ossetian families to Georgia.53
A
Georgian engineer who worked on the reconstruction
of homes for returnees told Crisis Group (ICG)
these figures were exaggerated because very few
families came back permanently -- the majority sold
their rebuilt property. "We did not achieve the
expected results", he claimed.54
Allegedly South
Ossetian authorities encouraged Ossetian refugees
to settle in South Ossetia rather then in Georgia
proper. In turn, Georgian local authorities did little
to assist returning Ossetians regain possession of their
property.55
From 2000 to 2004 return on all sides
virtually came to a halt.56
Thus much of the inter-ethnic mixing that existed
before 1990 has been lost. Before the war, Georgia
North Ossetia officials (Crisis Group interview, October 2004)
and is also quoted in Birch, "Ossetiya", op. cit., p. 505.
50
UNHCR, "Population Movements as a Consequence of
the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict", updated 1 September
2004.
51
UN OCHA Georgia, "South Ossetia Briefing Note",
January 2004.
52
UNHCR, "Population Movements", op. cit.
53
Ibid.
54
Crisis Group interview with Gori Region government
official, September 2004.
55
U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2000 Country Report,
Georgia country study, at http://www.refugees.org/
world/countryrpt/europe/2000/georgia.htm. In the Gori region
a regional official claimed that court decisions in 70 cases had
enabled pre-war Ossetian inhabitants to regain legal
possession of their property. Crisis Group interview,
September 2004.
56
UNCHR, "Global Shelter Assistance in South Ossetia/
Georgia Proper", 1997-2004.
had a population of some 164,000 ethnic Ossetians.
Approximately 38,000 remain.57
A handful of
ethnically mixed villages survive in South
Ossetia.58
While Ossetian authorities claim that up
to 2,000 ethnic Georgian still live in Tskhinvali,59
Georgian officials in Gori say only a few dozen
do.60
In parts of South Ossetia under Georgian
government control, there are some 20,000 persons,
mainly ethnic Georgians, in four districts.61
Wartime displacement also significantly reduced
South Ossetia's population, which has yet to reach
1990 numbers. Authorities there claim some 80,000
persons live in the region.62
However the real number
of full time residents is likely around 65,000.63
No
more than 36,600 are reported to have voted in the
2004 South Ossetian parliamentary elections.64
Many Ossetians from South Ossetia and Georgia
proper have regulated their status in North Ossetia
and Russia. The number of refugees from Georgia
registered in North Ossetia has dropped to 19,496.65
57
Found at http://www.statistics.ge/main/census/cen_inf/
Tavi%203.htm. The 1989 figure is based on the 1989
countrywide census and thus includes South Ossetia. The 2002
figure does not include South Ossetia, only Georgia proper.
According to the same source, 33,138 Ossetians lived in Tbilisi
in 1989 but only 10,266 in 2002.
58
According to an OSCE official, these include Ksuisi and
Arstsevi (Tskhinvali region) Akhalsheni, Tigva and Shindara
(Znauri region) and several villages in the
Leningori/Akhalgori region.
59
Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of
South Ossetia, August 2004.
60
Crisis Group interview with Gori Region government
official, September 2004. According to OSCE estimates a few
hundred Georgian families may live in Tskhinvali. Crisis
Group interview with OSCE officers, September 2004.
61
The calculation is based on figures from the 2002 census
carried out by the Georgian Department of Statistics and
covering the districts of Eredvi, Kurta, Avnevi and Akhalgori.
It does not include villages not under control of the Georgian
authorities. Georgian State Department of Statistics, Main
Results of National Census 2002, vol. 2 (Tbilisi, 2003), pp.
117, 226-227, 233.
62
Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of
South Ossetia, August 2004.
63
Crisis Group interview with UNHCR Georgia staff,
August 2004.
64
Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of
South Ossetia, August 2004. It is highly likely this number
was inflated for political reasons.
65
Crisis Group interview with official of the department on
migration issues, ministry of internal affairs, North Ossetia,
October 2004. This figure can be further broken down to
include 19,007 persons from Georgia proper, 134 from
Abkhazia and 355 from South Ossetia. UNHCR Vladikavkaz
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 7
This suggests that many displaced from South
Ossetia have found alternative means to define their
status -- often taking Russian citizenship, registering
as residents of North Ossetia, and moving on to
other parts of Russia or further afield. In addition,
the de facto foreign minister of South Ossetia claims
that close to 90 per cent of all Ossetians in South
Ossetia have become Russian citizens.66
Informally
South Ossetians note that every family has at least
one member in North Ossetia.67
Lack of employment
and education opportunities, as well as the generally
pessimistic political-economic outlook in South
Ossetia, pushes many to migrate.
2. War-time atrocities
The conflict in the beginning of the 1990s was sporadic
and anarchic.68
Neither Georgians nor Ossetians
possessed a disciplined army, and fighting generally
took place between small groups and paramilitaries,
facilitated by the easy availability of arms. Half a dozen
Georgian paramilitary formations, from 50 to 200 men
each, participated.69
There was lack of coordination
between the groups, and they had different allegiances:
some were loyal to Gamsakhurdia, others to his
opposition, and a third group was made up of common
criminals.70
The South Ossetians consisted mainly of
a 2,400-man National Guard formed in November
1991.71
Locals also engaged in street clashes,
particularly in Tskhinvali.72
Both sides committed brutal atrocities, including
decapitation of infants, executions in front of
family members, and rape.73
According to a Human
Rights Watch report:
has a slightly higher figure, 22,631. Of these, 10,527 have
become full Russian citizens while 11,150 have forced
migrant status. Crisis Group interview with UNHCR
Vladikavkaz staff, October 2004.
66
Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of
South Ossetia, August 2004.
67
Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, August-September
2004.
68
Svetkovsky, op. cit., Chapter 4.4.
69
These included the White Eagles, White Georgia, White
Falcons, Black Panthers, the Kutaisi National Guard, and the
Merab Kostava Society. Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 14.
70
Ibid, p. 14.
71
Ibid, p. 13.
72
During the conflict, Tskhinvali was divided into Georgian
and Ossetian-controlled zones and for months was under
shell fire, without electricity supply or communications.
73
Svetkovsky, op. cit., Chapter 4.4.
Georgian paramilitary groups committed acts
of violence against Ossetian civilians within
South Ossetia that were motivated both by the
desire to expel Ossetians and reclaim villages
for Georgia, and by sheer revenge against the
Ossetian people. As a consequence of this
violence, between 60 and 100 villages in South
Ossetia are reported to have been burned
down, destroyed or otherwise abandoned.74
The same report documents how Georgians in Ossetian
villages became easy targets for Ossetian paramilitaries.
Both parties perpetrated hostage taking, indiscriminate
shelling and summary executions.75
Neither Georgian
nor Ossetian authorities have investigated these actions.
The number killed remains controversial. No amnesties
have been declared, and no individuals have been
sentenced for crimes against civilians. The lack of
accountability is a grievance raised by the South
Ossetians. In June 2004, de facto President Kokoity
stated that the Georgian Parliament should conduct a
political assessment of the 1990-1992 conflict and
the Georgian government should acknowledge that
genocide was carried out against South Ossetians.76
C. POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT
Politically Georgians and South Ossetians are divided
by the former's claims to state territorial integrity and
the latter's aspirations for national self-determination.
President Saakashvili has made restoration of Georgia's
territorial integrity his top priority. Following his highly
symbolic inauguration oath at the grave of David IV77
in January 2004, he stated, "Georgia's territorial
integrity is the goal of my life". He promised that
South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be restored to
Georgia before the presidential elections scheduled
for 2009. Finding a solution to the South Ossetian issue
is key for his credibility. Public opinion is unprepared
to accept any solution that does not involve full reintegration
of South Ossetia, and Saakashvili has done
little to pave the way for any compromise.
The South Ossetians have a radically different vision.
Since 1989 they have promoted two options: full
74
Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 17.
75
Ibid.
76
"Kokoity puts everything at stake", Svobodnaya Gruziya,
15 June 2004.
77
King David IV, born in 1073, ruled Georgia from 1089 to
his death in 1125 and is considered the first unifier of the
country.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 8
independence and international recognition, or
integration into the Russian Federation. The former
head of the region, Lyudvig Chibirov, tended toward
a more conciliatory stance and was considered to
have a stabilising influence on relations. In 2000 it
seemed that Chibirov and Shevardnadze might
ultimately agree on re-integration.78
However Eduard
Kokoity's victory in the December 2001 elections
changed this.79
Kokoity has refused to discuss a
political settlement, especially on the issue of South
Ossetia's future status in Georgia.
In 2004 the Kokoity government repeatedly called for
integration of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation.
On 5 June, the Ossetian legislature appealed to the State
Duma to incorporate the territory.80
On 15 September, in
Moscow, Kokoity stated, "It is high time to stop
dividing Ossetia into North and South. There is one big
and unified Ossetia...reintegration into Georgia is out of
the question".81
Authorities in South and North Ossetia justify their
demands as national self-determination.82
They
argue that during the Soviet period the Ossetian
nation was wrongly divided between the Russian
SSR and the Georgian SSR. As all lived within the
Soviet Union and nothing impeded freedom of
movement, it was not until the break-up of the
USSR that the real consequences of this division
were felt. Today members of the Ossetian elite ask:
"why don't we as a people [narod] have the right to
re-unite? Like the Germans, the Koreans, and now
maybe the Albanians?"83
They also point out that
78
President Shevardnadze and de facto President Chibirov
met three times, in 1996, 1997 and 1998, and both publicly
expressed commitment to peaceful settlement of the conflict.
79
Kokoity was elected with over 55 per cent of the vote in the
second round on 6 December 2001, defeating the chairperson
of the de facto Parliament and Communist Party regional
leader Stanislav Kochiyev. Turnout was estimated at 63 per
cent. In the first round Kokoity received 47 per cent, Kochiyev
24 per cent and Chibirov 21 per cent. "Georgia Conflict
Assessment", prepared for the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), 23 January 2002, p. 36. The election
was not recognised internationally.
80
"Parliament of South Ossetia Appeals to the Duma of
Russian Federation to Incorporate the Republic into Russia",
NEWSru.com, at http://newsru.com/arch/world/07jun2004/
ho4etsya.html.
81
"Kokoev calls for 'United Ossetia', Rules out Integration
into Georgia", Civil Georgia, 15 September 2004.
82
Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, August 2004 and
Vladikavkaz, October 2004.
83
Crisis Group interviews, Vladikavkaz, October 2004.
since 1992, ties between North and South Ossetia
have strengthened in all fields.84
Ossetians argue that their rights would be better
protected within the Russian Federation than Georgia.
Crisis Group was told repeatedly by officials in North
and South Ossetia that since the end of the conflict,
they have received direct financial assistance from
Russia, but nothing from Georgia.85
Chibirov said that
"during my years as president, I have never received a
cent from the Georgian government".86
Russia has
assisted with reconstruction of roads and other
infrastructure in South Ossetia and provided
humanitarian aid there, while covering
accommodation and social care costs of most
refugees in North Ossetia.87
Georgians oppose South Ossetia's independence
because it would undermine the their state's territorial
integrity. In addition, they say independence is
unrealistic because the region is not economically
viable, is populated by Georgian citizens, and has
only one main road link to Russia through the Roki
tunnel,88
while the Caucasus Mountains provide a
"natural barrier" to North/South Ossetia reunification.89
D. GEOPOLITICAL CAUSES
South Ossetia's strategic location on the border
between Russia and Georgia has contributed to
tensions. The region is a mere 3,900 sq. kms. and
has only two large towns: Tskhinvali and Java. The
remainder of the territory is made up of villages
84
In order to promote cooperation between North and South
Ossetia, a "Republic of South Ossetia Department for
Relations with the Republic of North Ossetia" was opened in
2002. Its aim is to "promote integration of South Ossetia into
North Ossetia" by strengthening ties between nongovernmental
structures such as local firms and farms and also
building links between schools and other institutions. Crisis
Group interview with department head, Vladikavkaz, October
2004.
85
Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, August 2004 and
Vladikavkaz, October 2004.
86
Crisis Group interview, Vladikavkaz, October 2004.
87
Most recently refugees living in collective centres in North
Ossetia have started to receive cash compensation from the
Russian Federal Government, 110,000 RR ($3,800) to vacate
their temporary premises. Crisis Group interview with ICRC
staff, Vladikavkaz, October 2004.
88
Crisis Group interview with Georgian conflict resolution
expert, September 2004.
89
Crisis Group interview with former UNHCR subcontractor,
September 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 9
dispersed among small mountain valleys. The Roki
tunnel, 2,995 metres above sea level, provides the
only paved road link between the two Ossetias.
For Russia, South Ossetia is of strategic importance
because it is on the border of its volatile Northern
Caucasus region. A senior Russian diplomat in
Georgia told Crisis Group, "North Ossetia was an
island of stability. It was important for us to keep it
that way....Events in South Ossetia destabilised
this, and this is why we reacted so strongly".90
As
the only Christian people in the North Caucasus,
Russia has traditionally relied on the Ossetians as
trustworthy allies.91
Outside analysts have pointed
out that the Georgian-South Ossetian war helped
precipitate the 1992 outbreak of fighting between
Ossetians and Ingush in the Russian Federation.92
During the first part of 2004, there were expectations
Russia and Georgia would informally agree on
managing their common security problems. Relations
between Presidents Putin and Saakashvili were
reportedly improving in spring 2004, as both expressed
an interest in fighting international terrorism. During
his first official visit to Moscow, in February,
Saakashvili agreed to joint patrols of Georgia's
northern border to contain possible terrorist incursions.
The two presidents discussed creation of a joint antiterrorist
centre in Tbilisi. They also appeared close to
overcoming differences over Russian military bases in
Georgia.93
At the start of his presidency, Saakashvili
was adamant that the two remaining bases be closed by
2006. However, he did not publicly bring up the issue
at the Istanbul NATO Summit. During talks in
Moscow on 10-11 August, the two defence ministers
agreed to extend the bases for seven or eight years.
Perhaps most importantly, Saakashvili and Putin
90
Crisis Group interview with Russian diplomat in Georgia,
September 2004.
91
Evidence of the Russian-Ossetian military alliance date at
least back to the nineteenth century, when Ossetia assisted
Russia against Chechens and Daghestanis. Birch, "Ossetiya",
op. cit., p. 525.
92
Ibid, pp. 512-528.
93
At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999, Russia
undertook to reduce its military strength in Georgia by the
end of 2000 to comply with the Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe Treaty. Georgia and Russia also agreed to
complete negotiations in 2000 on the duration and modalities
of the bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Russia has so far
closed its bases in Vaziani (Tbilisi) and Gudauta (Abkhazia)
but maintains those in Batumi and Akhalkalaki, though
negotiations on closure continue.
appeared on the verge of signing a long-awaited
framework treaty on cooperation and security issues.94
Other developments, however, strained bilateral
relations. The Ajara crisis provided a second
opportunity after the "Rose Revolution"95
for Igor
Ivanov, the head of the Russian National Security
Council, to show Russia's ability to contribute to
solution of Georgian problems, when he facilitated
Abashidze's exile to Moscow. Russia had expected
some political gratitude for its assistance, so President
Putin was allegedly infuriated when the day after
Abashidze's exit, Georgian Foreign Minister
Zurabashvili repeated demands for the removal of
Russian bases.96
However, informed sources agree that
the South Ossetia crisis, not Ajara, was the major
reason for deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations
in mid-2004.97
E. POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CAUSES OF
CONFLICT
The frozen nature of the conflict had provided a
fertile ground for development of illegal business --
smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnapping and arms
trading. The Transcaucasian highway connecting
Georgia to Russia goes through South Ossetia and
allegedly serves as a key smuggling route.98
Due to
the unresolved status of South Ossetia, neither
Georgia nor South Ossetia could agree on the
establishment of a system of customs control on
94
The signing of the framework agreement is now on hold.
A senior source within the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi
informed Crisis Group that most points have been agreed.
The main remaining issue concerns the Russian military
bases, whose closure may be linked to a Georgian pledge not
to accept other foreign bases. Crisis Group interview with
Russian diplomat in Georgia, September 2004.
95
The term refers to the uprising against President
Shevardnadze and the rigged 2003 parliamentary elections
that led to Saakashvili's ascent to power.
96
Putin's reaction was described by a Russian political analyst,
in a Crisis Group interview, Moscow, October 2004.
Zurabashvili's statement was reported at
http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/ print.html?mid=4573756.
97
Crisis Group interview, senior Russian diplomat,
September 2004.
98
The road is one of three linking Georgia with Russia. By
default it is also an important link to Russia for Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Roman Gotsiridze, "Economic and
Social Consequences of Internal Conflict in Georgia", Report
for the Parliament Budget Office of Georgia, 2003, pp. 5-6.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 10
transiting goods.99
South Ossetians refuse to allow
Georgian customs officials on their territory, in
particular on their side of the Roki pass, claiming
that an independent state has the right to its own
customs administration. Georgian officials are less
than keen on setting up customs points on their side
of the divide, considering this would amount to defacto
recognition of South Ossetian independence.
Up to the end of 2003, a number of law enforcement
officials from South Ossetia and Georgia proper were
believed to be participating in criminal economic
activities.100
It was alleged that authorities on both sides
co-operated to profit from illegal trade, as did Russian
customs and peacekeeping troops.101
Three Georgian
MPs and the deputy governor of the Shida Kartli
region were considered to control parts of the market
on the Georgian side, and the son of former South
Ossetian leader Chibirov was seen as playing a key
role on the Ossetian side.102
Thus many officials were
believed to have little incentive to stop smuggling, let
alone to resolve the conflict. The lawless economy
helped sustain the post war status quo.
The Ergneti market on a track of land between South
Ossetia and Georgia proper, a part of the
Transcaucasian highway linking Gori and Tskhinvali,
started to develop in the mid-1990s as an informal
trading post mainly for Georgians and South
Ossetians. Most frequently Georgian individuals and
companies bought goods to be re-sold in the country's
internal market without proper customs clearance and
legalisation. The most lucrative trade was allegedly
wheat flour.103
An estimated 450,000 tons worth,
some $130 million a year, transited the market. Dairy
99
In November 2002, South Ossetia and Georgia agreed to
participate in an EU Customs Control project, which included
a joint taxation scheme on cargo traffic transiting South
Ossetia. The revenue collected was to be allocated to projects
in the zone of conflict. Ultimately the South Ossetians pulled
out, claiming the project threatened their sovereignty. UN
OCHA Georgia, "South Ossetia Briefing Note", January 2004.
100
David Darchiashvili and Gigi Tevzadze, "Ethnic Conflicts
and Breakaway Regions in Georgia", Building Democracy in
Georgia, Discussion Paper no. 9, May 2003, pp. 12-13.
101
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Aleko Kupatadze, and Roman
Gotsiridze, "Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
Region/South Ossetia", research report for the American
University's Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre,
2003, pp. 8, 27, 38.
102
Mamuka Areshidze, "Current Economic Causes of Conflict
in Georgia", unpublished report for UK Department for
International Development (DFID), 2002.
103
Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze, op. cit., pp. 28-
29.
products ($60.5 million), cigarettes ($60 million),
petrol ($23.2 million) and kerosene ($12 million) also
were smuggled yearly.104
The market also facilitated the trade in stolen and illegal
goods. Cars stolen in Georgia proper were frequently
taken there. Heroin and opium were also said to be
traded.105
Georgia was particularly concerned that fake
alcoholic goods, especially wine allegedly produced in
Georgia, were being sold, tarnishing the trademark. In
the general atmosphere of lawlessness, kidnappings,
assault and murder were carried out with impunity.
Georgia lost significant customs revenue due to
smuggling; some calculated as much as 80 per
cent.106
Estimates of the value vary widely from 5 to
20 million lari ($2.5 to $10 million) monthly.107
While some analysts consider that "the greatest part
of the smuggled goods entering Georgia came from
South Ossetia,108
others argue, "the scale of
smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
small in comparison with the volume of illegal trade
through other (non-conflict) parts of the country".109
When the market was closed in June 2004, Georgian
customs claimed a four-fold increase in revenue
collected at the northern customs point with
Russia.110
The Ergneti market generally had a negative effect
on Georgia's legal, political and economic
environment, but it provided at least three benefits.
Although much of the proceeds apparently went to
elites among the local authorities, law enforcement,
and "business community", average citizens also
gained livelihoods from the trade in a context of
overall high South Ossetian unemployment and poor
economic development. Prices on basic goods such
as bread were artificially low because there was no
tax. Most importantly, perhaps, the market was a
means for average Georgians and Ossetians to meet,
104
Ibid, p. 51. Areshidze, op. cit.
105
Areshidze, op. cit.
106
Ibid.
107
The lower figure is in ibid. The higher one was from
Georgi Godabrekidze, chairman of the customs department,
Georgian finance ministry, quoted in Caucasus Press, 9
January 2004.
108
Levan Chrdileli, deputy minister of finance, quoted in
Areshidze, op. cit.
109
Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze, op. cit., p. 26.
110
In August 2004, the "Northern" regional customs point
collected GEL 4,650,000 ($2,560,000). In August 2003 it
collected GEL 1,200,000 ($660,000). Godabrekidze, op. cit.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 11
build contacts, and identify common interests after
the war years.111
It has been argued that South Ossetia's economy
became criminalised because the region had few
opportunities to participate in legal activity since it
was not a recognised entity. With regards to the
Ergneti market, South Ossetian authorities claim the
trade was legal because they imposed custom duties
on the goods from Russia. "A large part of our
budget" was financed by these duties, one stated.112
During the first half of 2004, South Ossetia's revenue
collection was cut in half. Georgian analysts say this
was a direct consequence of the closure of the market,
while South Ossetian authorities claim it was due to
the generally difficult situation in the region.113
The
rest of the region's revenue came from the few
remaining local businesses. South Ossetian GDP is
estimated at $15 million, $250 per capita.114
Ossetians argue that since 1992 South Ossetia has
suffered from a de facto Georgian embargo.115
Few
economic ties link Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, and there is
little legal trade. Thus South Ossetia has increasingly
integrated into the North Ossetian economic space
and separated itself from Georgia's.
111
Similarly, in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, along a main
road linking Croat, Bosniak and Serb settlements, the Arizona
Market has served since 1996 as a unique meeting place
facilitating reconciliation. There was no tax system to regulate
its trade until 2000.
112
Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of
South Ossetia, August 2004.
113
"Budget of the de facto Republic of South Ossetia was
fulfilled by less then 50 per cent in the first half of 2004",
Black Sea Press, 30 August 2004.
114
Areshidze, op. cit.
115
In direct contravention to the Sochi Agreement, which
states that "the parties shall deem unacceptable the imposition
of economic sanctions and blockades". "Sochi Agreement on
Resolving the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", Article 4, 24 June
1992. The pledge not to exert political or economic pressure
was again made in the "Memorandum on the Measures
Providing Security and Strengthening Mutual Confidence
Between the Sides of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", 1996.
III. UNFREEZING THE CONFLICT
A. FOCUSING ON THE POLITICAL
ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CONFLICT
Policy makers in Tbilisi considered that the main
impediment to any solution to the conflict was
smuggling. They reasoned that it was sustained
because South Ossetian authorities had significant
gains from illegal trade, which gave them the means
to maintain control and satisfy their desire for money
and power. In parallel, part of the profits was used to
offer basic goods and services to South Ossetia's
inhabitants, in essence to secure their loyalty to the
Tskhinvali regime.
1. Attacking greed
Georgia initiated a major anti-smuggling operation
in and around South Ossetia in December 2003,
which was reinforced in May 2004. Before then, its
police had often been accused of collusion with
smugglers.116
In December, the Ministry of Interior
(MIA) dispatched Special Forces to villages outside
Tskhinvali to seize smuggled goods.117
This was
followed by an operation organised by the new
governor of the Shida Kartli region, Irakli
Okruashvili,118
to blow up roads used for goods
smuggled through South Ossetia and the Ergneti
market.119
By June the market was closed and
Georgian police were regularly checking vehicles for
contraband.
During the spring months, Georgian MIA troop
presence in the zone of conflict grew as a result of
the anti-smuggling campaign.120
In some instances
police were returned to areas where they had not
been since the war.121
By the end of May 2004, MIA
troops had checkpoints in Tkviavi, Pkvenisi, Nikozi
and Eredvi, all ethnic Georgian populated villages
116
Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze, "Smuggling", op.
cit.
117
Civil Georgia, 11 December 2003.
118
On 14 January 2004, Okruashvili became Georgia's
prosecutor general, on 10 June the interior minister.
119
Civil Georgia, 28 December 2003.
120
Georgia appears to have acted unilaterally, without first
informing the South Ossetian side through the JCC.
121
For example, in the Proni Gorge. Nineteen police were
placed in Proni in May 2004. Theresa Freese, "Security,
Governance and Economic Reform in Shida Kartli", Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 May 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 12
near Tskhinvali. On 31 May, a 300-strong, heavily
armed unit was dispatched by helicopter to reinforce
a checkpoint in Tkviavi but was withdrawn a few
hours later. Saakashvili claimed it was sent after
General Svyatoslav Nabdzorov, commander of the
JPKF, declared the roadblocks to be unauthorised
and threatened to remove them by force.122
While Georgia justified the significant increase of
MIA troops in the zone of conflict as necessary for
the anti-smuggling campaign and later to protect
Georgian-populated villages,123
the Ossetians
perceived this as preparation for military action
against Tskhinvali. On 2 June the JCC determined
the introduction of the additional police units and
new checkpoints in the zone to be in contravention
of agreements and concluded that Georgia should
dismantle the extra checkpoints and refrain from
establishing any not first agreed to by the JCC. The
Georgian side agreed to withdraw immediately any
new armed units from the zone of conflict. This
withdrawal, however, did not begin for two and a
half months. In the interval, tensions between South
Ossetian and Georgian armed groups grew until
they reached a crisis point in August, when the first
civilian deaths were recorded.
2. Addressing grievance
In parallel, Tbilisi's approach aimed to address the
South Ossetian population's feelings of grievance
against their local authorities. Georgia embarked on a
"humanitarian offensive" to assist ethnic Ossetians and
Georgians. It realised that the Ergneti market's closure
would affect not only corrupt officials but also the
livelihoods of common people who depended on petty
trafficking for survival. It bet that resentment would
turn against Tskhinvali124
and it could capitalise on
growing dissatisfaction with the Kokoity regime. Just
as they had in Ajara, in order to facilitate popular
mobilisation, Saakashvili's associates called on Tbilisi-
122
Civil Georgia, 1 June 2004; Institute for War and Peace
Reporting (IWPR), 3 June 2004.
123
Crisis Group interview, Georgian ministry of security
official, September 2004.
124
Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze stated,
"Particular groups, which have definite interests in smuggling,
have lost a significant source of income. This in itself is reason
for such a severe reaction to the Georgian authorities'
activities". She added that "in the near future we will manage
to restore friendly relations with the Ossetian people". Civil
Georgia, 2 June 2004.
based national NGOs such as Kmara to strengthen
South Ossetia-based groups organising for change.125
Tbilisi offered unilateral social, economic and cultural
projects to benefit South Ossetians, including an
Ossetian language TV station, pensions, the re-start of
the Tskhinvali railway,126
free fertiliser and
humanitarian aid. On 26 May 2004, in a speech
marking Georgian Independence Day, Saakashvili
addressed the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
in their native languages, urged their separatist leaders
to launch peace talks on the breakaway regions' status
and invited Ossetians to reintegrate into Georgian
society. In early June, various Georgian authorities
travelled to South Ossetia to begin implementing the
pledges. They concentrated on the zone of conflict
and ultimately mainly in Georgian-populated villages.
Their efforts were unilateral, not co-ordinated with de
facto local authorities or the JCC.
As the security situation worsened in the zone of conflict
during the summer, Tbilisi also offered shelter refuge to
women and children from the affected area, who were
relocated to various regions, including Borjomi, Imereti,
Kakheti, and Ajara. Both ethnic Ossetians and
Georgians were provided for according to Georgian
officials. Few central government funds were allocated
to support this, however, so district governments and
Georgian firms covered many of the costs.127
3. The South Ossetian reaction
Elites as well as common citizens reacted negatively
to Tbilisi's anti-smuggling drive and humanitarian
overtures. Kokoity's response was to take a more
hard-line position. On 11 June he said, "South Ossetia
is cutting off all relations with Tbilisi"128
and would
communicate with Georgia only within the JCC.
125
Civil Georgia, 24 May 2004; RFE/RL Newsline, 21 May
2004. Theresa Freese, "Yet Another Rose Revolution?
Georgia's 'Two Brothers' Campaign in South Ossetia", Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2 June 2004.
126
Within the context of the Second Rehabilitation Program
for South Ossetia, the European Commission financed the
reconstruction of the railway and the restoration of Tskhinvali
train station.
127
Crisis Group interview, Georgian minister for refugees and
internally displaced persons, August 2004. "UNHCR/WFP
Joint Assessment Mission in Relation to the Relocation of
Women and Children from South Ossetia", UNHCR Georgia,
20 August 2004.
128
Interfax, 11 June 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 13
Georgia had expected the Tskhinvali regime to weaken
quickly after smuggling was curbed. In fact, Kokoity
appeared to grow stronger between May and August.
On 23 May 2004, parliamentary elections were
organised in South Ossetia, and Unity, the propresidential
party, won two thirds of the seats.129
This
at least temporarily ended divisions between the
presidency and Parliament, which at times had been
intense under Chibirov (especially in 1996 and 1999).
Georgian analysts nevertheless predicted that Kokoity
could not remain in office for more than three to
six months, and that no more than 2 per cent of the
population supported him.130
Some NGO
representatives in Tskhinvali agree that before May
only a minority of some 20 per cent was firmly
committed to independence and behind Kokoity.131
However, Georgia's sudden active engagement had a
boomerang effect. South Ossetians were won over
neither by the reduction of smuggling nor by the
humanitarian efforts. Closing the Ergneti market hit at
a main economic lifeline, and rather than blame
Tskhinvali, many accused Tbilisi. The South Ossetian
authorities portrayed the operation as a direct attack
on independence and security. By July a local poll
found that 95 per cent of the population opposed
reestablishment of Georgian sovereignty, 96 per cent
supported Kokoity, and 78 per cent would personally
fight if needed.132
129
The main opposition to Unity was the Communist Party,
which until the 2004 elections had a majority of seats and
whose leader, Stanislav Kochiyev, was the Parliament
speaker. The parties shared the aim of bringing South Ossetia
closer to North Ossetia and Russia. Kosta Dzugayev, "South
Ossetia: President Builds Power Base", IWPR, 19 May 2004.
The elections were not internationally recognised. Turnout
was 22,407 of whom 24.7 per cent voted for the Communist
Party (four proportional seats), 54.6 per cent for Unity (nine
proportional seats) and 11.4 per cent for the National Youth
Party (two proportional seats). Unity also won all fifteen
contested single mandate seats. Four single mandate
constituencies reserved for the region's Georgian population
were not filled. See "Summary of the Results of the
Parliamentary Elections in South Ossetia", Regnum News
Agency, 28 June 2004, at http://regnum.ru/news/269013.html.
130
Crisis Group interview, analyst, Georgian national
security council, August 2004.
131
Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, August and
September 2004.
132
The poll was conducted amongst 800 respondents
between 21 and 26 July 2004 by the North Ossetian Centre
for Social Research and was published in Severnaya Ossetia,
7 August 2004.
Humanitarian aid from Tbilisi was received with deep
suspicion. EU Special Envoy Heikki Talvitie noted
"they [authorities in South Ossetia] are very much
afraid. They do not have much trust towards the
Georgian aid".133
Residents felt Tbilisi was trying to
buy them cheaply.134
Georgians involved in the
process considered that the Ossetians "politicised the
delivery of humanitarian aid" and described how local
police openly threatened any who accepted it.135
An
ethnic Ossetian in Tskhinvali was arrested -- and
remains in detention -- for helping organise groups of
youth to take part in sponsored summer trips to the
Georgian seaside.136
By mid-June relations between ethnic Georgians
and Ossetians living in villages on the outskirts
of Tskhinvali had reached a low point. The antismuggling
operation had a direct effect on the security
environment, as the Georgian checkpoints and
increasing numbers of armed men in the zone shattered
the peaceful environment and co-existence. Both sides
felt insecure. Georgian villagers who previously sold
their produce at the Tskhinvali market feared to travel
to the city.137
Tbilisi attempted to strengthen their
security by opening a new road to the Georgianpopulated
Didi Liakhvi Gorge (from the Patara
Liakhvi Gorge), bypassing Tskhinvali. While
providing a new lifeline for civilians, this road also
had strategic value.
Georgian villagers north of Tskhinvali, surrounded by
Ossetians, were in a particularly precarious position.
On 22 June, as South Ossetian militia trained, a bullet
allegedly fired from a training ground slightly
wounded a 70-year-old ethnic Georgian woman.138
By
early July the security situation had deteriorated
significantly, with gunfire exchanges in and around
the villages of Nikozi, Prisi, Argvitsi and Tamarsheni.
133
Civil Georgia, 6 July 2004.
134
Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of
South Ossetia, August 2004.
135
Crisis Group interview with former UNHCR subcontractor,
September 2004.
136
Caucasus Press reported on 19 August 2004 that Ossetians
charged Alik Kozaev, 22, with high treason.
137
Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of
South Ossetia, August 2004. Also in Theresa Freese, "With
All Roads to Tskhinvali Closed, Zone of conflict Residents
Pray for Saakashvili and Peace", Central Asia-Caucasus
Analyst, 30 June 2004.
138
Civil Georgia, 25 June 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 14
B. THE START OF VIOLENT CONFLICT
In June and July 2004, Tbilisi accused Russia of
supplying weapons to the South Ossetians. On 11
June, State Minister for Conflict Resolution Goga
Khaindrava said 160-170 trucks loaded with weapons
entered the territory via North Ossetia.139
In a surprise
move on 7 July, Georgian interior ministry forces
seized two trucks belonging to Russian peacekeepers
loaded with 300 unguided missiles for helicopters.140
The Russian foreign and defence ministries
condemned this, stating that a 2 June JCC Agreement
authorised the resupply shipment,141
and the next day
South Ossetian authorities appeared to retaliate, for
the first time openly taking offensive action against
Tbilisi forces by detaining some 50 troops in police
uniforms in the Georgian-populated village of Vanati
inside the South Ossetian zone of conflict.142
Most
were released the following day, but only after having
been filmed kneeling at gunpoint in a Tskhinvali
square.143
On 20 July tensions flared again as Georgia
accused Russia of bringing non-approved hardware
into South Ossetia.
The conflict had in effect reverted to a state of war,
with exchanges of gun and mortar fire between
villages in the zone of conflict. Such exchanges were
reported between Tamarasheni and Tskhinvali on 28,
29 and 30 July, and 1 August.144
On 4 August the
chairman of the Russian Duma's Committee for the
Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), Andrei Kokoshin, escaped uninjured from a
crossfire. On 10 August, gunfire was reported
between Eredvi, Prisi, Sarabuk, Dmenis and the
northern outskirts of Tskhinvali. As usual, each side
accused the other of starting the violence.
The first civilians were killed during the night of 11-
12 August. Georgian governmental sources reported
three dead, to which South Ossetian spokespersons
added 28 wounded and hundreds of houses
destroyed.145
The incidents happened soon after the
139
OSCE monitored the situation and found no evidence of
additional arms in the region, Civil Georgia, 15 June 2004.
140
"Georgia Seizes Russian Arms Convoy in South Ossetia",
Civil Georgia, 7 July 2004.
141
This seizure also led to a war of words between the
Georgian interior ministry and the Georgian state minister
for conflicts resolution issues, Goga Khaindrava.
142
The U.S. and the OSCE condemned the detentions.
143
The images were widely broadcast and were seen in
Georgia as a direct affront to national pride and honour.
144
Civil Georgia, 28 July 2004.
145
Caucasus Press, 12 August 2004.
Georgian Defence Minister Giorgi Baramidze and the
chief of the Russian General Staff, Yuri Baluyevskiy,
reached an accord in Moscow on withdrawing from
the zone of conflict all armed groups except for
peacekeepers. A ceasefire between the Georgian and
Ossetian sides on 13 August was quickly violated by
a new exchange of gun and mortar fire. A second
agreement, signed on 18 August by the JCC co-chairs
and Georgian Prime Minister Zhvania, took hold only
after several peacekeepers were killed on 18-19
August and Georgian troops took three strategic
heights over a road linking the Georgian villages of
Patara and Didi Liakhvi Gorges during the early
hours of 19 August.146
The death toll in July-August
was seventeen Georgians,147
five Ossetians.148
After the 19 August operation, Georgia returned
control of the hills to the JPKF and started pulling
back, eventually removing ministry of interior troops
from South Ossetia and filling its peacekeeper quota
from the ministry of defence.149
Several members of
Georgia's security and defence community admitted
the withdrawal was because, "at this stage it is
impossible for Georgia to restore its territorial
integrity militarily".150
It lacked the resources to
engage in months of combat. While Tskhinvali
could have been seized in a two or three-day
operation, to secure the northern Java district would
have taken months. Ultimately, even if Georgian
forces had been successful, the country risked years
of guerrilla warfare and losing much international
support and credibility.151
The remilitarisation of the zone of conflict reversed a
decade of progress. A Georgian analyst estimated
there were 1,650 to 2,000 South Ossetian troops in
and around the zone of conflict from the ministries of
defence and security and police special forces
(OMON), and up to a further 1,000 Russian
mercenaries who began entering the region in midJune.
By the end of August the number of
146
Seven Georgian peacekeepers were killed and seven
wounded during the night of 18-19 August. Caucasus Press,
19 August 2004.
147
Crisis Group interview, governor of Shida Kartli,
September 2004.
148
Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of
South Ossetia, August 2004.
149
Including military trained under the U.S. Train and Equip
Program (GTEP) for Georgia, see below.
150
Crisis Group interviews with senior analysts, Georgian
defence and security ministries, August 2004.
151
Ibid.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 15
mercenaries had decreased significantly.152
The South
Ossetians considered that the Georgians had up to
3,000 men within or in close proximity to the zone of
conflict.153
C. THE UNEASY TRUCE
As the situation on the ground worsened during the
May-July 2004 period, the conflict prevention
mechanisms including the JCC and the JPKF broke
down. June JCC meetings were repeatedly
postponed when first the South Ossetians, then the
Georgians boycotted. Dialogue between them did
not resume within the JCC until a meeting in
Moscow on 14 July. Tbilisi requested the right to set
up a checkpoint at the Roki Pass linking South
Ossetia with Russia and the withdrawal of militia
from the Java district. The Russians and South
Ossetians insisted that Georgia withdraw what they
said were 3,000 extra troops from the zone of
conflict and dismantle the sixteen checkpoints it had
established since June.154
In July and August the
JPKF was unable to carry out its peacekeeping
mandate. According to an OSCE official, the three
battalions were no longer operating jointly, "the
JPKF was totally not functioning … we had cases of
one battalion firing at another".155
However in the crucial mid-August week the JCC
played an essential role, bringing the sides together
and facilitating the ceasefire agreement. Between 12
and 18 August the JCC was "in near permanent
session."156
The four participants agreed on the need
to demilitarise the zone of conflict and were
represented at a high enough level to ensure
implementation.
Since then the situation on the ground has remained
tense. After the withdrawal of Georgian troops from
152
Crisis Group interview with senior analyst, Georgian
defence ministry, September 2004. In North Ossetia,
government sources admitted that armed persons travelled
from there to the South but said they never entered the zone
of conflict and were successfully pressured to leave. Crisis
Group interview with North Ossetian governmental official,
October 2004.
153
Crisis Group interview with official of de facto
government of South Ossetia,, Tskhinvali, August 2004.
154
"Russia Calls on Georgia to Pullout Extra Troops from
South Ossetia", Civil Georgia, 13 July 2004.
155
Crisis Group interview with OSCE official, Tbilisi,
August 2004.
156
Ibid.
the zone of conflict, there were night-time shootings
and mutual accusations by Tbilisi and Tskhinvali
about who shot first but no further casualties.
Georgian officials and some international observers
have alleged that Georgian villages are being
targeted,157
potentially with the aim of forcing their
inhabitants to leave, thus ethically cleansing villages
along the Transcaucasian highway.158
In October,
residents of the Georgian villages twice blocked that
highway in protest of the shootings. Recent
developments are following a pattern similar to the
summer events, and several observers predict that the
sporadic night-time exchanges will soon trigger larger
clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian
forces.159
As winter approaches, the economic situation in and
around South Ossetia is deteriorating. Popular
discontent among those in South Ossetia, both
Georgians and Ossetians, is increasing. In mid
October, an "Appeal of the population of the
Tskhinvali region to the Georgian authorities" was
published in the Georgian press, with over 70
signatories complaining about the Ergneti market
closure: "we understand that the Ergneti market's
closure was a serious and essential step to combat
smuggling, but we consider that you should have
thought of those who knew nothing of smuggling
and remain unemployed now".160
Some observers
claim that although Ergneti is closed, smuggling
continues in smaller quantities and along different
routes.161
Other reports suggest that the Georgian and
Ossetian populations of the Tskhinvali region
suffered equally from the market closure, and
Georgians in South Ossetia feel forgotten by
Tbilisi.162
The bypass road -- a lifeline for Georgians
157
Georgian Defence Minister Giorgi Baramidze quoted in
Liz Fuler, "Renewed Shooting in South Ossetia", RFE/RL,
27 October 2004. Also information from international
organisation representative, October 2004.
158
The displacements are most likely to have a strategic aim
and to target Georgian villages along the Transcaucasian
highway (Tamarasheni, Kurta, Kekhvi) linking Tskhinvali to
Java.
159
Giorgi Sepashvili, "Fears Increase Over Fresh Fighting in
South Ossetia", Civil Georgia, 26 October 2004. Also
information from international organisation representative,
October 2004, and international political analyst, October
2004.
160
"Appeal of the Tskhinvali Region to the Authorities of
Georgia", The Georgian Times, 14-21 October 2004, p. 4.
161
David Devidze, "Ergneti Market Died … Smuggling?!",
Kviris Palitra, 25-31 October 2004, pp. 5-6.
162
Levan Javakhishvili, "Population Threaten to Leave
Samachablo", Alia, 2-4 October 2004, p. 2.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 16
unable to drive through Tskhinvali -- may soon be
closed by weather. South Ossetians say their salaries
have not been paid for two or three months. Harvests
have been poor, and field commanders, unsatisfied
with Kokoity's approach, are beginning to think of
taking more radical anti-Georgian measures.163
163
Crisis Group interview with international organisation
representative, October 2004.
IV. INTER OR INTRA-STATE
CONFLICT?
The conflict was initially portrayed as an internal affair
by Georgian officials, as Tbilisi increased its armed
presence and overall engagement in South Ossetia to
carry out the anti-smuggling operation that closed the
Ergneti Market. However, by mid-summer 2004, the
Saakashvili administration began to emphasise wider
causes. The president elevated the dispute to an interstate
level, depicting it as one between Georgia and
Russia. At an 11 July rally he said, "crisis in South
Ossetia is not a problem between Georgians and
Ossetians. This is a problem between Georgia and
Russia."164
Once the conflict was perceived as
international, Tbilisi turned to its external partners in the
hope they would put pressure on Russia. In particular,
efforts were made to increase the role and presence of
the OSCE inside the zone of conflict and beyond.
A. GEORGIAN ALLEGATIONS ON RUSSIA'S
ROLE
The Georgian government considers Russia an active
participant in the conflict. More specifically it
accused Russia of providing armoured personnel
carriers, tanks, other military equipment, fuel, and
training by Russian army officers. Most of the
equipment was allegedly brought through the Roki
tunnel linking North and South Ossetia. Georgia also
accuses Russia of allowing up to 1,000 Russian
mercenaries -- many of them Cossacks -- to fight on
the South Ossetian side.165
General Svyatoslav
Nabdzorov, a former JPKF commander, was accused
of personally siding with the South Ossetians and
saying he could not see a Russian-Georgian border in
South Ossetia. A source within the ministry of
security told Crisis Group the Ossetian battalion of
the JPKF had given weapons to the South Ossetian
OMON forces and also fired at Georgian positions.166
Georgia often accuses Russia of double standards on
secessionist regions. Shortly after the September
2004 Beslan massacre, Russia closed the border with
164
"Saakashvili: Russia to Blame for South Ossetia Crisis",
Eurasia Insight, 12 July 2004.
165
Crisis Group interview, senior analyst, Georgian defence
ministry, September 2004.
166
Crisis Group interview with official, Georgian security
ministry September 2004
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 17
Georgia at the Larsi checkpoint167
as an anti-terrorist
measure but kept the Roki tunnel open, implying it
did not consider the tunnel crossing an international
border. The Larsi closure increased traffic of goods
and people via South Ossetia and put pressure on
Georgia to let them through.168
While Russia has a
visa regime with Georgia, South Ossetians have a
considerably simplified entry procedure.
Georgian authorities are particularly critical that
several senior South Ossetian officials are Russian
citizens with close ties to Moscow. Kokoity, though
originally from South Ossetia, is a Russian citizen and
lived there from 1997 to 2000.169
At the end of May
2004 South Ossetia appointed as its new de facto
minister of security Majorbek Bishikuyev, who
previously was deputy head of security in North
Ossetia. Anatoli Barankevich, though born in
Tskhinvali, was a colonel in the Russian army when
Kokoity appointed him de facto defence minister on 20
September 2004. These officials are considered to have
regular and close contacts inside the Russian
government. Kokoity himself has travelled to Moscow
for consultations at least monthly since May 2004.
Though Russia has supported South Ossetia, it has
not met its main demand: integration into the
Russian Federation. Senior Russian diplomats in
Tbilisi told Crisis Group this was unlikely to
happen.170
In June 2004 Russia's Constitutional
Court responded to an inquiry about the legality of
such a move by stating that discussions on South
Ossetia, a region belonging to a foreign state, must
be held with Georgia and at Georgia's initiative.171
167
Larsi, the land checkpoint with Russia controlled by the
Georgian authorities, is on the Russian military highway.
168
Civil Georgia, 21 September 2004. According to Georgian
customs information, the country lost 3 to 4 million GEL
($1.57 to $2.10 million) for twenty days when the border was
closed. Khutsidze Nino, "Georgia's Visa, Border Burden with
Russia", Civil Georgia, 23 September 2004.
169
Eduard Djabeevich Kokoity was born on 31 October
1964 in Tskhinvali, where he graduated from the Pedagogic
Institute in 1987. During the Georgian-Ossetian conflict he is
alleged to have established and led an armed detachment and
to have created a charity sports fund, "Yunost". He was
elected to the South Ossetian Parliament in 1993 and
appointed trade representative of South Ossetia to Russia in
1997. He worked in that capacity until 2000.
170
Crisis Group interview with Russian diplomatic source,
September 2004.
171
"S. Ossetia's joining to Russia Impossible -- Russian
Constitutional Court", Caucasus Press, 8 June 2004.
B. THE VIEW FROM RUSSIA
Russia is a co-signatory to the Sochi Agreement of
1992, which established a ceasefire, and has played
an active role in the JCC and JPKF. It considers itself
a guarantor of stability in the zone of conflict and that
it has helped mediate between Georgian and South
Ossetia. It has shouldered the costs of caring for
Ossetian refugees displaced from Georgia to Russia.
Within South Ossetia itself, it has provided financial
and humanitarian assistance. According to a Russian
diplomatic source, this aid fit within a 2000 bilateral
agreement with Georgia on "Economic rehabilitation
and Refugee Return in the Georgian-Ossetian Zone of
conflict". Russia accuses Georgia of never having
fulfilled its part of the agreement to contribute funds
to South Ossetia's economic development.172
Over the summer the Russians called on the
Georgian government to act "with prudence" and
commit to confidence building -- withdrawing illegal
armed groups, promoting economic development,
engaging in humanitarian and cultural activities --
before seeking a final political settlement.173
According to opinion polls, approximately 50 per
cent of Russians believe Russia should remain
neutral in the conflict, 14 per cent argue it should
take South Ossetia's side and 5 per cent want it to aid
Georgia regain its territorial integrity.174
In mid-2004
Russia began to emphasise a new reason for concern
over developments in the zone of conflict, namely an
obligation to protect the large number of Ossetians
who had become Russian citizens. In July the
foreign ministry stated, "Russia is concerned over
the fate of the Russian citizens who comprise the
overwhelming majority of the South Ossetian
population".175
On 8 August 425 members of the
Duma harshly criticised Georgia and said that due to
the presence of Russian citizens in South Ossetia,
"there appear to be circumstances that infringe upon
Russian sovereignty."176
172
Crisis Group interview with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi,
September 2004.
173
Crisis Group interview with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi,
September 2004.
174
"Poll Says Russians Advocate Neutrality in Conflict Over
South Ossetia", RFE/RL, 30 July 2004.
175
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, 30 July 2004; Speech of the Russian representative
to the OSCE Permanent Council, 30 July 2004.
176
"Russian Parliamentarians Adopt Statement on South
Ossetia," Caucasus Press, 8 May 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 18
Russia reinforced its links with South Ossetians by
giving financial aid and developing economic ties.
Russia pays pensions to South Ossetians with Russian
citizenship, at least 660 Russian roubles per month
(some $23).177
Substantial humanitarian aid was sent
to South Ossetia in 2004. In early October, for
example, the Moscow Municipality reportedly
delivered 700 tons of aid in 22 train carriages.178
Ties
are further strengthened by South Ossetia's use of
roubles, car licence plates resembling Russian ones,
and harmonisation of legislation.179
Russian
companies, such as Megaphone (mobile telephones)
are active in the region.
During Summer 2004, the standing of President
Saakashvili and his administration reached a low point
in Russia. The popular feeling was that he was quick
to criticise others -- especially Russia -- but slow to
define a long term strategy for resolving Georgia's
internal problems.180
A North Ossetian official
expressed a popular feeling when he asked, "will
Georgia always have a revolutionary government? We
need a stable and normal government that follows
through on its commitments".181
A Russian diplomat
argued that the statements by Georgian politicians
blaming Russia for supporting separatists in South
Ossetia "were political games for domestic
consumption … because the domestic situation is
terrible from a political and economic point of
view".182
Russia considered Georgia wanted to worsen
matters to increase international awareness and show
that Russian peacekeepers could not carry out their
mandate so that Western governments would
intervene on Georgia's side, at least to support changes
in JPKF command and composition.183
177
Crisis Group interview with official of de facto
government of South Ossetia, August 2004. Other sources
suggest that the real figure is higher, $100-$400. Crisis
Group interview with former official of de facto government
of South Ossetia, May 2004.
178
"Moscow Transfers 700 Tons of Humanitarian Aid to
South Ossetia", Regnum News Agency, 18:37 1 October
2004, at http://www.regnum.ru/allnews/334753. html.
179
Crisis Group interview with official of de facto
government of South Ossetia, August 2004.
180
Crisis Group interviews with Russian political analysts,
Moscow, 2004.
181
Crisis Group interview with North Ossetian governmental
official, October 2004.
182
Crisis Group interview with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi ,
September 2004.
183
Ibid.
C. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT
As Georgia increasingly began to perceive the
conflict as a confrontation with Moscow, President
Saakashvili turned to the U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell and National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice for support.184
Powell responded
positively and spoke twice during the second week
of July 2004 with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov about South Ossetia.185
On 4-5 August
Saakashvili went to Washington to meet with senior
Bush administration officials, including Powell,
Rice, and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to
gain further help. His goal was clearly to put South
Ossetia on the U.S.-Russia agenda and possibly to
pull the U.S. into the negotiation process. However,
Powell reportedly strongly warned Saakashvili
against further escalation and said if Georgia fought
with Russia, it would be on its own.186
Washington has played no direct role in the conflict,
though Georgia has sent troops trained and equipped
by the U.S. into the zone of conflict.187
Through the
Georgian Train and Equip Program (GTEP), the U.S.
has trained some 2,000 troops in counterinsurgency
and counter terrorism in 2003-2004.188
The Georgian
army also received equipment including uniforms,
small arms and ammunition, communications gear,
medical aid, fuel, and training and construction
materials through the program.189
Russian observers have expressed concern that troops
who benefited from GTEP are now actively engaged
184
"Powell, Saakashvili Discussed South Ossetia", Civil
Georgia, 10 July 2004.
185
"Powell, Lavrov Discuss South Ossetia Again", Civil
Georgia, 11 July 2004.
186
Crisis Group e-mail correspondence, Washington D.C.based
political analyst, September 2004.
187
According to the Georgian defence ministry, GTEPtrained
units sent to South Ossetia include the 11th
Mechanised Brigade (light infantry battalion "Commando").
188
This includes four light infantry battalions and one
mechanised army company, georgia.usembassy.gov/releases/
release 20040424.genwald.html. The program cost $64 million
and lasted 21 months.
189
www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/index.htm?http://
www.eucom.mil/directorates/ecpa/operations/gtep/englishpr
oducts/fact_ sheet6.htm&2. The GTEP was completed in
April 2004, and there are no plans for a follow on. In January
2004, however, the U.S. provided some $3 million to pay the
salaries of staff trained under the GTEP for five and a half
months. Crisis Group interview, U.S. embassy in Georgia,
2004. See also, georgia.usembassy.gov/releases/release
20040112.html.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 19
in the conflict. According to russian Embassy staff in
Georgia, the U.S. pledged that GTEP troops would
not be used to resolve conflicts in South Ossetia or
Abkhazia.190
U.S. Embassy personnel deny this,
saying that there was only an oral agreement under
Shevardnadze that troops would not be sent to
Abkhazia. They suggested GTEP-trained forces were
in South Ossetia because they are "Georgia's very best
trained troops".191
Some U.S. political analysts also
say the Georgian government made commitments not
to use GTEP-trained forces in domestic political
disputes, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia.192
Nevertheless, by September 2004 the U.S. position
appeared largely to coincide with statements
coming from Moscow and other European capitals.
According to a U.S. diplomat, "we are advising
caution and restraint on both sides, to the Georgians
and -- we are not speaking to the South Ossetians --
to the Russians".193
However, U.S. embassy staff
say, "Russia is not playing as big a role as Georgia
would like to think".194
The U.S. supports a "step by
step" approach to resolve the conflict, including an
increase of OSCE staff in South Ossetia, but
considers international or Georgian monitoring at
the Roki tunnel unlikely in the near future.195
D. THE OSCE
The OSCE has been involved in the conflict since
1992 when it set up a mission to encourage dialogue
and identify and eliminate sources of tension. In
March 1994, this mandate was extended to
monitoring the JPKF. The mandate now includes
facilitating creation of a broad political framework for
a lasting political resolution; encourage active
dialogue through roundtable discussions; and playing
an active role in the JCC.196
While generally low
profile over the past decade, the mission also has
facilitated implementation of confidence building
measures and programs, including small projects with
NGO leaders, youth, women, and journalists.
190
Crisis Group interviews with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi,
August and September 2004.
191
Crisis Group interview with U.S. diplomat, Tbilisi,
August 2004.
192
Crisis Group e-mail correspondence, Washington D.C.based
political analyst, September 2004.
193
Crisis Group interview with U.S. diplomat, Tbilisi,
September 2004.
194
Ibid.
195
Ibid.
196
OSCE Mission to Georgia, information booklet, 2003.
In July and August 2004, Georgia increasingly looked
to the OSCE as it sought an inter-governmental
platform from which to express its grievances. Foreign
Minister Zurabishvili made a special presentation to
the OSCE Permanent Council on 29 July, calling for a
greater monitoring presence, in particular at the Roki
tunnel and in the Java district. Georgia also requested
the OSCE to convene a conference, at presidential or
prime ministerial level, on settlement of the conflict.197
Russia termed the request for more OSCE observers
and their deployment on the border with Russia at the
Roki tunnel "deliberately unrealistic".198
Nonetheless,
the mission is mandated to operate on the whole
territory of South Ossetia.199
As the situation deteriorated on the ground, the OSCE
became increasingly engaged in attempts to reduce
tensions. The Bulgarian Chairmanship-in-Office
(CiO) sent former President Zhelyu Zhelev as a
Special Representative to Georgia on 27 July. On 30
July the CiO called for implementation of 2 June and
15 July JCC agreements, withdrawal of all
paramilitary and police personnel "not required", a
JCC meeting, and a technical expert group meeting in
Tskhinvali.200
On 6 August the OSCE Permanent
Council agreed to increase military observers in South
Ossetia from four to six. Twenty diplomats from
OSCE delegations in Vienna visited Georgia from 5
to 9 September. Zhelev reminded the parties that "the
OSCE has an important role to play both in restoring
confidence and increasing stability … as well as in
facilitating the political process aimed at a
comprehensive settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian
conflict".201
The CiO offered to organise high-level
political negotiations in Sofia in October.202
E. THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Commission (EC) of the European
Union (EU) has been engaged in the conflict since
197
"OSCE proposes to open 'field offices' in Zone of
conflicts", Caucasus Press, 30 July 2004.
198
"Moscow Dismisses Georgian Call for Bigger OSCE
Role in South Ossetia", Itar Tass, 31 July 2004. Also, Crisis
Group interview with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi, August
2004.
199
Crisis Group interview with OSCE official, October
2004.
200
OSCE Press Release, 30 July 2004.
201
OSCE Press Release, 24 September 2004.
202
OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office, Press Release, 13 August
2004, at http://www.osce.org/news/generate.pf.php3?news_
id=4284.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 20
1997 when it made a first grant of 3.5 million ECU203
to support rehabilitation in the zone of conflict.204
These funds were used to finance infrastructure and
economic rehabilitation, with special emphasis on
projects that bridged the two communities. Under a
second allocation of €1.5 million the EC proposed to
reactivate economic links between South Ossetia and
Georgia proper. The projects included rehabilitation
of the Gori-Tskhinvali railroad link, the Tskhinvali
railroad station, and the gas network in Tskhinvali. In
2003 a third €2.5 million rehabilitation program was
initiated. Originally the funds were earmarked for
starting a joint Georgian/South Ossetian customs
collection mechanism and rehabilitating the main
north-south road.205
When the two sides could not
agree on the location of the customs point, the
program was changed to provide more general shelter
and infrastructure rehabilitation support, especially
for the refugee return process in South Ossetia.206
The
latest rehabilitation program was signed in January
2004 but implementation has yet to begin.207
EU programs initially provided opportunities for
Ossetians and Georgians to work together on concrete
projects that created links between communities and
required the parties to devise common solutions.208
On
a local level there were examples of Georgian
contractors working in Tskhinvali and Ossetian
villages.209
Such community-level infrastructure
projects had the potential to build confidence and trust.
However, this contribution was lost once the projects
became politicised around the questions of how and
203
The ECU was the common unit of account that preceded
the EU's common currency, the Euro.
204
Since 2001 the EU has participated in all JCC plenary
sessions and has been present on the working group for
economic issues.
205
UN OCHA Briefing Note, "South Ossetia", December
2002.
206
"Protocol on the implementation of the third EC funded
rehabilitation program in the zone of Georgian-Ossetian
conflict". The program is divided into three parts. Part 1:
€800,000 for basic shelter assistance and repatriation kits for
refugees (UNHCR). Part 2: €1,300,000 euro for rehabilitation
of basic infrastructure in support of permanent residents
(UNDP). Part 3: €400,000 for rehabilitation of basic
infrastructure in places of refugee repatriation (UNDP).
207
In April 2004 it was agreed to create a Steering Committee
but due to the rapid decline in the security situation after May,
its first meeting was only on 25 October 2004. Crisis Group
interview, EC delegation to Georgia and Armenia, September
2004.
208
"Georgia Conflict Assessment", op. cit., p. 36.
209
Crisis Group interview with former UNHCR subcontractor,
September 2004.
where to set up instruments of customs collection and
control. As a state-level issue, a customs project could
not so easily bring communities together around
shared interests or mutually beneficial actions. The
decision to return to community rehabilitation projects
could be seen as a step backwards, but also one more
likely to promote confidence building if the projects
are selected with a view to creating infrastructure that
establishes new dependencies and links between
Ossetian and Georgian communities.210
The EU has also adopted a Joint Action under its
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a grant
of €210,000 to the OSCE Mission to finance the JCC
-- in particular its office and travel costs.211
Furthermore in 2002 the EU also supported the
special centre, which seeks to coordinate Georgian
and South Ossetian law enforcement in the zone of
conflict.212
The EU Special Representative for the
South Caucasus, Heikki Talvitie, travelled to Georgia
and South Ossetia in August 2004 at the height of the
recent troubles and repeatedly thereafter.213
The
European Parliament has not been very active but
passed a resolution on 14 October 2004 "deploring
the recent outbreaks of violence in the region of South
Ossetia …[and] express[ing] its full support for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia".214
F. THE WAR NOBODY WANTED
By portraying the conflict as international,
Saakashvili upped the stakes. He bet he would find a
sympathetic ear in the EU and U.S., which would
recognise the alleged contradiction between Russia's
policies in the North Caucasus, where it resists real
autonomy for Chechnya, and the South Caucasus,
where it supports secession in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.215
According to this analysis, Russia's
main interest in the latter is to maintain low-level
210
The decision to implement projects aimed at assisting
returning refugees was also somewhat unusual considering the
drastic reduction of numbers of refugees returning to South
Ossetia after 2000.
211
CFSP Action Profile, "South Ossetia, Georgia -- Conflict
Settlement Process (JCC) 2003", Joint Action 2001/759/CFSP
[OJ L 286 of 30.10.2001, p.4] at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/cfsp/fin/actions/geocsp.htm.
212
See below.
213
His most recent visit was on 16-17 November 2004.
214
European Parliament Resolution on Georgia, 14 October
2004, at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8089.
215
Crisis Group interview, official, office of the prime
minister of Georgia, September 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 21
conflict and perpetual instability so as to justify a
continued military presence and undermine Western
attempts to gain a stronger foothold.216
Saakashvili's argument was well received among
many Western analysts and policy circles. Editorials
warned of Russia's "post-imperial determination to
dominate the small nations to its south, notably
Georgia", and its "creeping annexation" of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia,217
and described a South
Ossetia "under the control of Russian security
services [sic] in a familiar symbiosis with organised
crime networks".218
They urged international
organisations and Western states to play a more
active role, to openly criticise Russian intervention
and encourage President Putin to stop supporting
separatist regimes.219
Ultimately however, U.S. and EU decision-makers
were reluctant to become engaged in a conflict
whose outcome they were unsure of, and which
would put them at odds with Russia. Neither
Washington nor Brussels openly chastised Moscow,
and by September a consensus seemed to have
formed with Moscow against use of force in South
Ossetia. It appears that rather than gaining Western
support, the opposite occurred, and Saakashvili was
warned not to enflame passions in the Caucasus.220
Had Saakashvili continued to define the South
Ossetia conflict as an internal affair, primarily an
anti-smuggling operation, he might in fact have
obtained greater international support. Brussels and
Washington could more easily have given full
backing to a Georgian administration intent on
establishing the rule of law, stamping out smuggling,
and promoting democratic change in South Ossetia
than to an effort to push Russia back from the South
216
S. Cornell, R. McDermott, W. O'Malley, V. Socor, S.F.
Starr, "Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of
NATO",. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, John Hopkins
University, 2004, at http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/
publications/2004/nato.pdf.
217
Lord Wallace, "A Contradictory Line on the Caucasus",
Financial Times, 6 September 2004.
218
Vladimir Socor, "On the Ground in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia", The Wall Street Journal Europe,3 September 2004.
219
See Wallace and Socor, op. cit. Also, "A Matter of
Russian Honour" and "The Hazards of a Long, hard Freeze",
The Economist, 21 August 2004.
220
A few weeks later, when EU Special Representative for
the South Caucasus Heikki Talvitie travelled to the region, a
similar message was conveyed. Crisis Group interview with
EU official, August 2004.
Caucasus. By portraying the conflict as they did,
however, Georgian policymakers limited the range
of their options. Within the Georgian government
the feeling persisted in late 2004 that there was little
it could do until and unless Russia was persuaded to
back off South Ossetia, a measure they continued to
believe a high-level international conference might
provide the forum for.221
Until that happens, Tbilisi
appears not to see much value in defining its own
approach to Tskhinvali.222
221
Crisis Group interview, analyst, Georgian national security
council, September 2004.
222
Crisis Group interview, official, office of the prime
minister of Georgia, September 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 22
V. OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT
ALLEVIATION AND PREVENTION
Georgia, South Ossetia and their international
partners are considering a range of policy and
program options to alleviate and eventually resolve
the conflict. None of these will succeed quickly but
they may eventually provide the foundation for
sustainable peace.
Georgian authorities have recently made statements
suggesting they understand the approach they
followed from May to August 2004 was dangerous.
In his speech to the UN General Assembly, President
Saakashvili called for implementation of a new "stage
by stage settlement plan". Returning to his December
2003 approach, he said, "I believe that the most
effective mechanism for establishing Georgia's long
term continuity and wholeness is the creation of a
strong economy … [in which] those who are not yet
sure if they want to remain outside Georgia will be
given real incentives and chances to benefit from a
prosperous, tolerant and successful Georgian state".223
In order to move the negotiation process forward,
all sides should build upon existing agreements
signed within the JCC framework. In addition,
Georgia could take unilateral steps to strengthen
Ossetian confidence and trust. Greater international
political and financial commitment to the process
will also be required if the peace is to hold and
negotiations move forward.
On 5 November 2004, a meeting between de facto
President Kokoity and Georgian Prime Minister
Zhvania occurred in Sochi, a significant step forward
in the negotiation process. They agreed to demilitarise
the zone of conflict by 20 November, a date that has,
however, slipped. The Georgian side proposed a
plan consisting of: ceasefire implementation, full
demilitarisation and increasing monitoring of the
Roki tunnel. Since exchanges of fire have continued,
with Georgian villages targeted, Tbilisi considers a
complete ceasefire a priority.224
Eventually it wants
full demilitarisation not only of the zone of conflict,
but also of all South Ossetia. At the Roki tunnel, there
should be "transparency", with JPKF, joint
223
"President Mikhail Saakashvili's Speech at the 59th
Session of the UN General Assembly, 21 September 2004",
Civil Georgia, 22 September 2004.
224
"Zhvania: Disarmament to Top High-Level South Ossetia
Talks", Civil Georgia, 21 October 2004.
Russian/Georgian custom officials, and/or
international monitors to ensure that smuggled goods
and weapons no longer transit. Tbilisi also seeks more
OSCE monitoring225
and to restart talks on the South
Ossetia's status as soon as possible.226
The Ossetians, on the other hand, are calling for
Georgia to fulfil commitments made at previous
JCC meetings, including removal of unauthorised
checkpoints and withdrawal of extra troops in the
zone of conflict. They accuse the Georgians of
retaining some 2,000 police and soldiers in the
Georgian-populated villages.227
Apparently against
the spirit of demilitarisation, on 9 November the
Georgian defence ministry set up a training ground
for reserve forces in the zone of conflict.228
A. STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
All sides in the conflict agree demilitarisation is
needed. However, the parties are in disagreement over
whether demilitarisation applies only to the zone of
conflict as defined in 1992, that is, the fifteen km.
radius around Tskhinvali, as the Ossetians prefer, or
the entire territory of South Ossetia, including the
Java district, as Georgia insists. Demilitarisation
should have occurred soon after the Sochi Agreement
was signed in 1992 but never did. Georgia argues
there should be no armed formations in South Ossetia,
other than JPKF troops and local police. State
Minister for Conflict Resolution Khaindrava insists
that "all the armament possessed by the South
Ossetian side should be stored in a single location at
the base of the Russian peacekeeping forces under
OSCE monitoring". The Georgian government claims
that, "the very existence of the so-called defence
ministry of South Ossetia completely contradicts all
the documents that have been signed".229
Ossetian officials consider they are entitled to defence
and security structures, as long as they are based
outside the original zone of conflict. A North Ossetian
225
Crisis Group interview, foreign minister of Georgia,
October 2004.
226
"Saakashvili: Talks on South Ossetia Cannot Drag on
Forever", Civil Georgia, 21 October 2004.
227
"Tskhinvali Protests Presence of Georgia's Extra Troops",
Civil Georgia, 10 November 2004.
228
"Tskhinvali Deploys Reserve Forces Battalion Near
Tskhinvali", Civil Georgia, 9 November 2004.
229
"Georgian PM Outlines Three-Point Plan for South
Ossetia", Imedi TV, BBC Monitoring, 5 August 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 23
official explained, "we cannot talk about the full
demilitarisation of South Ossetia. For Tskhinvali it is
impossible. The necessary trust between the two sides
does not exist for this to happen the near future. For
the authorities in South Ossetia this is a question of
their political survival".230
Even in 2000, when
progress on confidence building was being made, the
Ossetians demanded security guarantees before they
would consider full demilitarisation.231
Georgia argues that the JPKF should operate in all
districts to support demilitarisation, and the OSCE
should in turn be able to carry out its monitoring
mandate throughout South Ossetia. While Protocol
Three of the Sochi Agreement appears to give the
JPKF a mandate to work in all districts and villages
of South Ossetia, it has not done so for many years,
restricting its operations to a smaller territory.
1. Law enforcement and peacekeeping
Since 1992, when the JPKF was created with both law
enforcement and peacekeeping mandates, the parties
have recognised the importance of addressing crime in
the zone of conflict.232
At the 23 July 1999 meeting,
having noted that "crimes and incidents taking place
[there] did not have an ethnic character", the JCC
created a Special Coordination Centre (SCC).233
It was
to coordinate law enforcement efforts to prevent and
suppress illegal activity in the zone of conflict;
organise disarmament activities; and elaborate and
implement joint programs against organised crime,
including smuggling, drug dealing and car theft.234
The EU and the OSCE support the SCC, but they
could do more in this field. In February 2002 the EU
donated communication equipment and vehicles to the
230
Crisis Group interview, North Ossetian government
official, Vladikavkaz, October 2004.
231
"Agreement (Declaration) on Basic Principles of Political
and Legal Relations between the Sides in the GeorgianOssetian
Conflict" (Baden Document), draft, 13 July 2000.
232
In the "Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security
and Reinforce Mutual Confidence Between the Parties to the
Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", it was specifically stated that
"the parties note with satisfaction the valuable practice of
holding regular meetings of the representatives of the law
enforcement bodies and undertake to provide them with
every possible assistance in their task of improving the crime
situation in the zone of conflict", 16 May 1996, Moscow.
233
JCC decision, Annex no. 1, 23 July 1999.
234
JCC Decision, Annex no. 1, "Regulations On the Special
Coordination Centre under the JCC on the Interaction
Between the Law Enforcement Bodies in the Zone of the
Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", 21 April 2001.
SCC but it could also apply lessons it has learned from
its police operations in other countries, for example in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. To enhance SCC operational
effectiveness the OSCE has already facilitated
consultations between the Georgian and Ossetian
sides, the OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit
(SPMU) and the OSCE Kosovo Police Service
School.235
This complements the OSCE small arms
and ammunition collection program started in 2000.
However, as events in 2004 revealed, cooperation
between law enforcement personnel, including against
smuggling, is crucial to maintenance of the peace. The
conflict is as likely to involve opposing police forces
as armies. Thus, there is a need to synchronise South
Ossetian and Georgian law enforcement strategies and
modes of operation.
Georgian authorities have expressed deep dissatisfaction
with the JPKF and called for the "internationalisation
of the peacekeeping force". This could mean a new
peacekeeping operation entirely, or more modestly
the deployment of additional contingents from
different countries to work with the present three
JPKF battalions. While Georgia could envisage a
NATO, EU or OSCE operation,236
the three other
parties categorically reject this, and it has no backing
from NATO or EU member states. For the time being,
therefore, attempts to change the composition of the
JPKF are unlikely to succeed.
2. Addressing the civilian dimension of security
Summer 2004 developments undermined any fragile
feelings of trust and confidence that existed between
Georgians and South Ossetians. After 1992, face-toface
encounters were possible but they did not develop
a strong sense of common interests. South Ossetians in
particular cultivated a victim complex. Few Ossetian
youths had the chance to travel to Georgia, and they
were taught to consider Georgians as the enemy. For
Ossetians, and Georgians living in the zone of conflict,
to feel secure requires not only more robust law
enforcement and peacekeeping, but also steps to
address the civilian dimension of security.
Since the end of the 1990-1992 war, Georgia has
done little to address Ossetian grievances stemming
235
UN OCHA Georgia, "South Ossetia Briefing Note",
January 2004
236
"Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
at the Meeting of the OSCE Special Permanent Council", 18
August 2004 at http://69.93.247.156/news.php?newsid=
updates/EpAkAEKEFFgUDLyYvr.php.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 24
from wartime atrocities. In the 1996 "Memorandum
on Measures to Ensure Security and Reinforce
Mutual Confidence", the parties to the conflict agreed
to create the necessary conditions to investigate war
crimes and bring the guilty to justice.237
Georgia
should start this now, at least by apologising publicly
for violations of national minority rights during
President Gamsakhurdia's time in office.
Little has been done to engage civil society. The focus
to date has been on increasing the availability of
unbiased information to the population affected by the
conflict.238
This should be extended and expanded, for
instance through the organisation of meetings,
humanitarian projects, and actions that satisfy the
common interests of average citizens. It will take time
for the benefits to be felt.239
Yet, some initiatives have
started and require strengthening. Experts and NGO
representatives met at the end of July 2004 to begin
developing an action program to improve intercommunity
relations. A result was the Kazbegi
Declaration appealing to NGOs, international
organisations and state actors to more effectively
coordinate conflict resolution efforts.240
Youth in particular should be targeted. Since the 1992
war new generations of Georgians and Ossetians have
grown up with little or no interaction. The biggest
impediment to their coming together is language: few
young Ossetians speak Georgian, and decreasing
numbers of Georgians speak Russian, let alone
Ossetian. Some efforts have been made to bring
youths to summer schools and camps. In the 2004
academic year, young people from the zone of
conflict who entered institutions of higher education
in Tbilisi were given small scholarships.241
More of
237
"Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and
Reinforce Mutual Confidence Between the Parties to the
Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", 16 May 1996, Moscow.
238
In the above cited Memorandum, it was specifically stated
that the parties express their willingness jointly to arrange
"meetings of representatives of Georgian and Ossetian
political and social organisations and scholars, … 'roundtables'
involving representatives of the creative intelligentsia, and also
meetings of journalists". At the 25 October 2001 JCC meeting,
it was decided to create an information bulletin on JCC
activities and a Georgian/ Ossetian press service.
239
David Darchiashvili and Gigi Tevzadze, "Ethnic Conflicts
and Breakaway Regions in Georgia", Building Democracy in
Georgia, Discussion Paper no. 9, May 2003, p. 14.
240
Kazbegi Declaration, 28 July 2004, signed in Kazbegi,
Georgia.
241
"Students of Tbilisi Institutions of Higher Education from
Tskhinvali will be presented solemnly student certificates",
Caucasus Press, 16 September 2004.
this is needed, notably more Russian language places
in Georgian universities.
Currently village and town authorities are not
officially engaged in attempts to find solutions to the
conflict, though Ossetians and Georgians are most
likely to be able to identify common interests and
actions precisely at the community level. Locals
understand each other, and as one told Crisis Group,
"we should be more involved in the process because
our hearts and soul are dedicated to it ... as people we
like and respect each other".242
B. ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION,
REHABILITATION AND COOPERATION
Since signature of the Sochi Agreement, the parties
have committed themselves to support the economic
recovery of the zone of conflict and to ensure that
conditions for humanitarian aid exist.243
In 1993 an
"Intergovernmental Agreement Between Russia and
Georgia on Economic Rehabilitation in the GeorgianOssetian
Zone of Conflict" was signed whereby
Georgia committed itself to cover two thirds of war
damage costs and Russia one third, in a program to be
completed by 1997. The deadline was not met, and
until 2000 Russia and Georgia discussed their
financial obligations, mechanisms to coordinate
economic efforts, and specific projects within the JCC
framework.244
The 23 December 2000 "GeorgianRussian
Economic Agreement on Rehabilitation in the
Zone of Conflict and on the Return and Integration of
Refugees" raised expectations, and the need for further
financing was recognised.245
The parties agreed on
priority areas, including transport links, energy,
communications, healthcare, civil engineering,
rehabilitation of houses, and agriculture.246
However,
no detailed program has been formulated. In May
2003 the JCC appealed to both governments to create
242
Crisis Group interview with Gori Region government
official, September 2004. A similar recommendation was
made in the above mentioned Kazbegi document.
243
"Sochi Agreement on Resolving the Georgian-Ossetian
Conflict", Article 4, 24 June 1992.
244
"Intergovernmental Agreement Between Russia and
Georgia on Economic Rehabilitation in the Georgian-Ossetian
Zone of Conflict", Article 2.
245
Ibid, Article 1.
246
JCC Protocol, 1 August 2001, Moscow.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 25
a bilateral body to devise and implement such a
program247
but the process has remained frozen.
Several large donors have provided economic
assistance to the zone of conflict but the gap between
needs and resources has not been met.248
From 1996
to 1999 the UN Development Program (UNDP) and
UNHCR played leading roles.249
Since then funding
has significantly decreased.250
The only major donor
is now the EU, whose projects have experienced
significant delays. While OSCE supports a range of
activities in South Ossetia, and UNHCR, the World
Food Program (WFP) and UNICEF have low-level
presences, only one international NGO is currently
fully operational in the area.251
Donors have tended
to focus on infrastructure and housing rehabilitation
but have been wary about development projects,
credit schemes, and social services.
Georgia has a role to play supporting reconstruction
in South Ossetia, as well as in providing public
services. At the 9 July 2002 JCC meeting it was
agreed that Georgia and Russia should include lines
for financing reconstruction in the zone of conflict in
their 2003 budget.252
Russia has done so but Georgia
did not follow through. Ultimately, if the region is to
reintegrate into Georgia, the government will need to
find money to pay for services, local administration
costs, pensions, and other regular expenditures. Even
if only for confidence building, the inclusion of South
Ossetia in the 2005 Georgian budget could have a
positive effect.
Developments in South Ossetia have had serious
economic repercussions on the movements of goods
and people between North Ossetia, South Ossetia and
247
JCC decision, Annex no. 1, 14-16 May 2003, JCC meeting
in Gori, Georgia. The body was to consist of representatives of
the ministries of economy, finance, energy, transport,
communications and information, agriculture and natural
resources, as well as of the foreign ministries of Georgia and
Russia (Article 1).
248
As recently as 2004, the UN OCHA considered that "much
need for rehabilitation and development work remains". UN
OCHA Georgia, "South Ossetia Briefing Note", January 2004.
249
UNDP carried out a $2 million rehabilitation program in
South Ossetia from 1996 to 1999. It set up a system of joint
technical groups with representatives from the Georgian and
Ossetian sides to identify and approve projects by consensus.
The UNHCR opened its office in Tskhinvali in 1997. Ibid.
250
From $8.14 million in 1997 to $3.38 million in 1998, for
example. Ibid.
251
Ibid. The one international NGO is the Adventist
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA).
252
JCC decision, 9 July 2002, signed in Moscow.
Georgia.253
No legal means exist for the import of
goods from Russia to Georgia through South Ossetia
and along the Transcaucasian highway. It is
impossible to travel legally to or through Georgia
along this route.254
Between South Ossetia and
Georgia, travel is impeded because Georgian license
plates cannot be used in Tskhinvali or South Ossetian
ones in Georgia.255
In June 2004 the heads of the
custom agencies of Russia and Georgia intended to
discuss how to increase control over goods on the
South Ossetian section of the Russian-Georgian
border256
but the meeting never took place. The
highway, however, could serve as a vital lifeline not
only for persons in South Ossetia but also inhabitants
of Georgia, Armenia, North Ossetia, and places
beyond in Russia.257
North Ossetia in particular has an
interest in keeping it open to trade with Georgia. It
also seeks greater economic cooperation with
Georgia, especially with the regions of Kazbegi,
Dusheti and Mtskheta along the Russian military
highway, the other main artery linking the two
countries, and access to Georgia's Black Sea ports.258
C. PROMOTING REFUGEE AND IDP RETURN
The two sides pledged in 1992 to create conditions for
return of refugees and displaced persons,259
yet it took
253
A handful of analysts warned that closing the Ergneti
market -- while justifiable economically and legally -- would
increase potential for renewed conflict between South Ossetia
and Georgia. One group of specialists recommended instead
coordination of customs and tax policies with neighbouring
countries, rationalisation of salaries, and improvement of the
Georgian tax code. Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze,
"Smuggling", op. cit., pp. 75-77.
254
From 10 September to 22 October 2004, the only other
major border crossing between Russia and Georgia, the Larsi
checkpoint, was closed. Georgian authorities blocked several
trucks and buses carrying Armenian citizens, claiming they
had illegally crossed into Georgia through the Roki tunnel.
255
From 20 to 27 October 2004, the police of Shida Kartli
region confiscated some 120 cars with Ossetian license plates.
Owners were told they could not repossess their vehicles until
they changed plates. Civil Georgia, 22 and 27 October 2004.
256
Russian MFA Information and Press Department,
"Commentary Regarding Questions from ITAR-TASS About
Georgian-Ossetian Problems", http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf
/0/01362f152922d2f2c3256ec40058b87d?OpenDocument.
257
It is one of the few North/South trade routes that bypass
Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia
258
Crisis Group interview, North Ossetian JCC co-chairman,
Vladikavkaz, October 2004.
259
"Sochi Agreement on Resolving the Georgian-Ossetian
Conflict", Article 4, 24 June 1992.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 26
over a decade to devise a detailed plan.260
In 1997 a
procedure "On the voluntary return of IDPs and
refugees resulting from the Georgian--Ossetian
conflict to their permanent place of residence" was
agreed by the JCC.261
The parties expressed readiness
to accept the right to "voluntary repatriation" and to
"choose their place of residence". They pledged to
protect returnees and guarantee them the property
they were deprived of, freedom of movement, civil,
cultural and social rights, and information on the
return process.262
Implementation was to be
coordinated by a permanent body of representatives
of the four JCC participants.263
Shevardnadze and
Chibirov declared 1998 the "Year of Return".
However, in 1999 the JCC said "insufficient work had
been carried out to address obstacles to return" and
recommended Georgia "speed up the consideration of
the Property Restitution of Refugees and IDPs".264
A
clear outline of the process came only with the 2000
Georgian-Russian economic document on the
rehabilitation of the conflict zone and a 2002 "Draft
Georgian-Russian Interstate Program"265
but nothing
was implemented, and Georgia's Parliament has yet to
pass a property restitution law.266
In a confidence building step in summer 2004,
however, Georgia unilaterally pledged to support the
260
"Draft Program on the Return, Settlement, Integration,
and Re-integration of Refugees, Forcibly Displaced and
Other Persons Affected by the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict
Comprising Measures for the Restoration of the Economy in
the Places of their Return", JCC decision, Annex no. 2, 9
July 2002, Moscow.
261
JCC decision, Annex no. 2, Article 1 (Procedure), 13
February 1997, signed in Vladikavkaz.
262
These rights were guaranteed whether the persons were
returning to their exact place of pre-war residence or
elsewhere in Georgia. Ibid.
263
The JCC agreed to create this body. Ibid. The JCC
subsequently decided to create an ad hoc committee to be
headed by the JCC co-chairs, rather then a permanent body.
JCC decision, Annex 2, 26 September 1997, signed in Java.
264
JCC decision, Annex no. 3, 23 July 1999.
265
The full title is the "Draft Program on the Return,
Settlement, Integration, and Re-integration of Refugees,
Forcibly Displaced and Other Persons Affected by the
Georgian-Ossetian Conflict Comprising Measures for the
Restoration of the Economy in the Places of their Return",
JCC decision, Annex no. 2, 9 July 2002, signed in Moscow.
266
Initial JCC agreements on return focused on measures to
support the return of Ossetians from internal districts of
Georgia. For example, the 6 December 1994 (Moscow), 8
June 1995 (Moscow), 19-20 July 1995 (Tbilisi/Tskhinvali)
JCC meetings. Subsequent documents prioritised those from
the zone of conflict. EU funding in support of the return
process has also focused on the zone of conflict.
return of ethnic Ossetians displaced during the 1990-
1992 conflict. In August President Saakashvili signed
a decree allocating 350,000 lari ($197,700) to assist 25
Ossetian families to return to pre-war homes. Returnee
residences were to be rehabilitated and furnished, and
seed money provided. Deputy State Minister for
Regional Issues Zenta Bestaeva, until recently an
Ossetian refugee herself, was made responsible. The
first five families returned in August 2004. The return
of the other twenty had been expected in September
but has been delayed. According to Bestaeva many
more Ossetians originally from Georgia and now
living in North Ossetia are interested in return.267
What
reluctance they feel is linked not to fear or ethnic
hatred but lack of housing and infrastructure. In many
rural areas the homes Ossetians left fourteen years ago
need rebuilding. Education facilities are derelict in
previously predominantly Ossetian ethnic
settlements.268
Parents are concerned there are no
schools, and no Russian language instruction would be
offered. Ossetians realise it would be difficult to find
jobs -- the firms they had worked in were closed.269
However, few legal mechanisms exist to facilitate
return. Obtaining Georgian citizenship is difficult for
those who left when the Soviet Union collapsed and
are not ethnic Georgians. According to the Georgian
Constitution (Article 12.2) dual citizenship is illegal
except as granted by the president in special cases. As
many Ossetian refugees have gained Russian
citizenship, this could pose an obstacle to return. For
several years the JCC has pressed Georgia for
property restitution legislation. Discussion on this
resumed in the justice ministry and parliamentary
Legal Committee in 2004.270
The Council of Europe's
267
She considered that up to 40 per cent of all persons
originally from Georgia now in North Ossetia are interested
in returning.
268
The South Caucasus Institute of Regional Security assessed
conditions in Ossetian villages in Georgia proper in spring
2004 and found that many buildings were unusable after years
of neglect -- especially schools and other public structures.
Crisis Group interview, August 2004.
269
Crisis Group interview with Georgian deputy state
minister for regional issues, September 2004. Through its
assistance program, the Georgian government provided
livestock and agriculture support to returnees.
270
In 2001 the OSCE and Council of Europe commented on
a draft law, which was expected to be adopted that year. A
draft of the new bill viewed by Crisis Group in 2004 would
guarantee refugees and IDPs the right to return to one's own
home, property lost during the conflict, compensation for
property that cannot be returned, and safety. A Housing and
Property Claims Commission would also be created. Draft
"Law of Georgia on Restoration and Protection of Housing
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 27
Venice Commission issued an opinion on the new
draft at its session on 8-9 October 2004.271
While in
the past returnees faced significant obstacles to
regaining pre-war residences,272
Georgian officials
claim return for owners of private property can be
easily legalised.273
However, resolving the claims of
those who lived in communal housing is more
difficult, especially if the buildings have been
privatised and sold.
Another large uncertainty is whether there will be
sufficient funding for infrastructure rehabilitation in
the Ossetian communities to sustain large scale return.
After years of virtually insignificant return, Ossetians
need to be convinced that this time the process is real,
not just another public relations exercise. New
legislation as well as inclusion of a return project in
the 2005 budget could contribute to this. JCC
agreements and EU funding on return should focus not
only on the zone of conflict but also Georgia proper.
D. ADDRESSING POLITICAL STATUS
The last time Georgians and South Ossetians
appeared close to settling their conflict settlement was
at an Experts Group Meeting held by the OSCE in
2000 in the Vienna suburb of Baden. Georgian
negotiators considered the intermediary document
discussed "a significant achievement."274
The
Ossetians recall it was never finalised and say it
demonstrated the incompatibility of final aims.275
The
document has been signed but remains in draft form,
with agreed parts in bold print, the remainder left "to
be negotiated". It envisaged recognition of the
territorial integrity of Georgia, the right to self
determination, South Ossetian autonomy, and security
guarantees for demilitarisation of the zone of conflict.
and Property Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons", copy obtained on 30 August 2004.
271
Council of Europe, Venice Commission, opinion on the
draft law on "on restitution of housing and property to the
victims of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict of the republic of
Georgia", adopted at Plenary on 8-9 October 2004 in Venice.
272
Crisis Group interview with UNHCR Protection staff,
September 2004.
273
Crisis Group interview with, Georgian minister of refugees
and displaced persons, September 2004. Crisis Group
interview with Georgian deputy state minister for regional
issues, September 2004.
274
Crisis Group interview, analyst, state ministry for conflict
resolution, August 2004.
275
Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian member of the
JCC, Tskhinvali, August 2004.
The divergence was over how to balance the
principles of territorial integrity and national selfdetermination;
how to define South Ossetia's legal
place within Georgia while maintaining links with
North Ossetia; and the attributes of its autonomy in
the context of a future federal Georgian state.276
The
document also reiterated mutual intention to assess
the origins and causes of the conflict, to transform the
zone of conflict into a demilitarised zone, to improve
law enforcement cooperation, to assist in voluntary
organised return, including through property
restitution and compensation, and to solve the
problems of economic rehabilitation, investment and
development.277
However, there was no timetable for
negotiations on the political settlement, and those
discussions have remained in abeyance since 2000.
On 29 July 2004 at the OSCE Permanent Council,
Georgia's foreign minister stated that his country was
ready to offer "South Ossetia broad autonomy within
the Georgian state federal structure" and to begin
discussions "on the basis of the Baden Document".278
This was rejected by the Ossetians. A South Ossetian
negotiator in the JCC insisted to Crisis Group there
had never been a Baden Document as such, that
nothing more substantial than a draft had been
discussed.279
A North Ossetian JCC member
explained that people were not psychologically
prepared to go back to the Baden text, and Georgia
should table a new proposal.280
Georgian officials and civil society experts have not
developed a comprehensive definition of South
Ossetia's status within the country's borders.
Government authorities say it is premature, because
while Kokoity is in power, the Ossetians have no
276
The two sides agreed that South Ossetia should have
judicial and executive bodies and symbols (coat of arms, flag
and anthem) but not whether or not it would have its own Basic
Law, representative bodies, security forces and the right
independently, with notification to the Georgian side, to
conclude international agreements on trade and economy,
science and technology, and culture. "Agreement (Declaration)
on Basic Principles of Political and Legal Relations between
the Sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", draft, 13 July
2000.
277
Ibid.
278
"Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
at the Meeting of the OSCE Special Permanent Council", 18
August 2004 at http://69.93.247.156/news.php?newsid=
updates/EpAkAEKEFFgUDLyYvr.php.
279
Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian member of the
JCC, Tskhinvali, August 2004.
280
Crisis Group interview, North Ossetian member of the
JCC, Tskhinvali, October 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 28
political will for a dialogue.281
However, the issue is
also stalled by unwillingness to determine Georgia's
own internal administrative-territorial structure.282
According to the constitution (Article 2.3), the state's
structure is to be determined "after the complete
restoration of the jurisdiction of Georgia over the
whole territory of the country". In July 2004, the
responsibilities and powers of an "autonomous
republic" were defined for the first time when
Parliament passed a law on Ajara's status. However,
that set a poor precedent. As Ajara's powers were
significantly curtailed, the value of a Georgian
"autonomy" offer was weakened for Tskhinvali. It
remains to be seen whether Ossetia's status can be
fully determined before Tbilisi decides if Georgia is
to be a federal state, and if so, what kind.283
In oral statements the Georgians have so far offered
"significant autonomy within the State of Georgia",
including "power-sharing at the central governmental
level", and "dual Russian-Georgian citizenship".284
Tbilisi has pledged that South Ossetia's status would
be better than North Ossetia's within the Russian
Federation, and Ossetians' rights would be better
protected in Georgia than they are in Russia.285
Sources within the security ministry claim that at talks
in May 2004 they offered the South Ossetians an
autonomous republic status that included all
competencies and rights except defence institutions.
The Ossetian side reportedly expressed no interest in
281
Crisis Group interview with Georgian MP, August 2004.
282
Conflict resolution experts point out in relation to Abkhazia:
"a widely held view (which is incorporated into the Georgian
Constitution of 1995) is that no model for the country's
administrative-territorial structure can be determined before
Georgia's conflicts, first and foremost that in Abkhazia, are
resolved. However, this position confuses cause and effect --
the conflicts cannot realistically be resolved before the
Georgian government articulates a clear vision for the structure
of the future Georgian state". "Concept on the Special Status of
Abkhazia in the Georgian State" (English version), prepared by
Konstantine Kublashvili, Archil Gegeshidze, Ivliane
Khaindrava and Paata Zakareishvili as informal document
made available to Crisis Group in Tbilisi, September 2004.
283
Civil society activists have also begun to consider South
Ossetia's status and with the assistance of the Open Society
Georgia Foundation hope to have a concept prepared by the
end of 2004. Crisis Group interview with executive director,
Open Society Georgia Foundation, August 2004.
284
"Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
at the Meeting of the OSCE Special Permanent Council", 18
August 2004 at http://69.93.247.156/news.php?newsid=
updates/EpAkAEKEFFgUDLyYvr.php.
285
Crisis Group interview with Georgian MP, August 2004.
discussing this proposal.286
The South Ossetians
continue to call for either independence or integration
into Russia. Neither is likely if Moscow maintains its
commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity. A fourth
option, described by analysts in North Ossetia, would
be based on a form of shared rule or sovereignty over
South Ossetia by Georgia and Russia.287
Agreement
on South Ossetia's final status thus remains the key
challenge of the conflict resolution process.
286
Crisis Group interview with official, Georgia security
ministry, September 2004.
287
Crisis Group interview with political analysts,
Vladikavkaz, October 2004.
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
ICG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 29
VI. CONCLUSION
The Georgian-South Ossetian dispute was frozen for
twelve years and largely ignored -- not only by the
international community but also by many
Georgians. President Saakashvili was intent on
changing this. He succeeded, but in doing so he also
rapidly raised tensions in the region. The new
fighting was on the verge of erupting into fullfledged
war until a ceasefire was agreed on 18
August. In November 2004, however, even though
the situation in the field remains tense and gunfire is
still exchanged, there is again a hope that the conflict
can be resolved peacefully, with demilitarisation and
a negotiated settlement.
The South Ossetians are unlikely at this stage to enter
talks willingly on a status within Georgia. At the least,
successful status negotiations will require an end to
the sporadic shooting and Georgia's implementation
of significant confidence building measures. Building
on past commitments within the JCC and in bilateral
agreements with Russia, Georgia must offer to increase
the security and confidence of people living in the
zone of conflict, promote economic rehabilitation and
development, ensure the right of Ossetians to
return to South Ossetia and Georgia proper, and
create administrative-territorial arrangements that
guarantee South Ossetia effective autonomous status.
To implement these measures, Georgia will require
greater political and financial assistance from its
international partners.
The alternative is bleak. Should one side use force to
seek its political goals, the other would respond in
kind, and massive displacement of the inhabitants of
South Ossetia would ensue. The war that would
engulf the region would destroy the Saakashvili
presidency and Georgia's hopes for a bright future,
while pulling Russia into another conflict in the
volatile Caucasus region.
Tbilisi/Brussels, 26 November 2004
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
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APPENDIX A
MAP OF GEORGIA
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
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APPENDIX B
MAP OF THE SOUTH OSSETIAN REGION
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
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APPENDIX C
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CiO Chairman in Office (OSCE)
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
EC European Commission
EU European Union
EUPM EU Police Mission
GDP Gross Domestic Product
Georgian SSR Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic
GTEP Georgian Train and Equip Program
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting
JCC Joint Control Commission
JPKF Joint Peacekeeping Forces
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIA Ministry of Interior
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OMON Ministry of Interior Special Forces (Otriad Militsii Ocobovo Naznacheniya)
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Russian SSR Russian Soviet Socialist Republic
SCC Special Coordination Centre
SOAO South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast
SPMU Strategic Police Matters Unit (OSCE)
UNOCHA UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNWFP UN World Food Program
UNICEF UN Children's Fund
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
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APPENDIX D
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent,
non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100
staff members on five continents, working through fieldbased
analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and
resolve deadly conflict.
ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of
political analysts are located within or close by countries
at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent
conflict. Based on information and assessments from the
field, it produces analytical reports containing practical
recommendations targeted at key international decisiontakers.
ICG also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page
monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on
the state of play in all the most significant situations of
conflict or potential conflict around the world.
ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely
by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries
and international organisations and made available
simultaneously on the website, www.icg.org. ICG works
closely with governments and those who influence them,
including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and
to generate support for its policy prescriptions.
The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from
the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media
– is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and
recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers
around the world. ICG is co-chaired by Leslie H. Gelb,
former President of the Council on Foreign Relations, and
Christopher Patten, former European Commissioner for
External Relations. President and Chief Executive since
January 2000 is former Australian Foreign Minister
Gareth Evans.
ICG’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with
advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, London
and Moscow. The organisation currently operates
nineteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá,
Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul,
Nairobi, Osh, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Pristina, Quito,
Sarajevo, Seoul, Skopje and Tbilisi), with analysts
working in over 50 crisis-affected countries and territories
across four continents. In Africa, this includes Angola,
Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia,
Afghanistan, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, North Korea,
Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe,
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro
and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from
North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia,
the Andean region and Haiti.
ICG raises funds from governments, charitable
foundations, companies and individual donors. The
following governmental departments and agencies
currently provide funding: Agence Intergouvernementale
de la francophonie, Australian Agency for International
Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Canadian International Development Agency, Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German
Foreign Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs,
Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Luxembourg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for
International Development, Republic of China (Taiwan)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for
International Development, U.S. Agency for International
Development.
Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic
Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford
Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William
& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation
Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John
Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open
Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing
Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Sarlo Foundation of
the Jewish Community Endowment Fund, United States
Institute of Peace and Fundação Oriente.
November 2004
Further information about ICG can be obtained from our website: www.icg.org
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
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APPENDIX E
ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE*
SINCE 2001
BALKANS∗
Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001
Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate the
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°106,
15 March 2001
Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans Report
N°107, 28 March 2001
The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, Balkans
Report N°109, 5 April 2001
Montenegro: Time to Decide, a Pre-Election Briefing,
Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001
After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans
Peace, Balkans Report N°108, 26 April 2001
No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,
Balkans Report N°110, 22 May 2001
Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans Report Nº111,
25 May 2001
A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability,
Balkans Report N°112, 15 June 2001
Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report
N°113, 20 June 2001
Milosevic in The Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and
the Region, Balkans Briefing, 6 July 2001
Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001
Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, Balkans
Report N°114, 1 August 2001
Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still Not Open for Business;
Balkans Report N°115, 7 August 2001
Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution? Balkans
Report N°116, 10 August 2001
Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001
Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, Balkans Briefing,
23 August 2001
Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing,
8 September 2001
Serbia’s Transition: Reforms Under Siege, Balkans Report
N°117, 21 September 2001 (also available in Serbian)
The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,
Balkans Report N°118, 8 October 2001 (also available in
Bosnian)
Facing Up to War Crimes, Balkans Briefing, 16 October 2001
Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism,
Balkans Report N°119, 9 November 2001
∗
Reports in the Europe Program were numbered as ICG
Balkans Reports until 12 August 2003 when the first Moldova
report was issued at which point series nomenclature but not
numbers was changed.
Kosovo: Landmark Election, Balkans Report N°120, 21
November 2001 (also available in Albanian and Serbian)
Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery, Balkans
Report N°121, 29 November 2001 (also available in Bosnian)
Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to
Resolve It, Balkans Report N°122, 10 December 2001 (also
available in Macedonian)
Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development, Balkans Report
N°123, 19 December 2001 (also available in Albanian)
A Kosovo Roadmap: I. Addressing Final Status, Balkans
Report N°124, 28 February 2002 (also available in Albanian and
Serbian)
A Kosovo Roadmap: II. Internal Benchmarks, Balkans Report
N°125, 1 March 2002 (also available in Albanian and Serbian)
Belgrade’s Lagging Reform: Cause for International Concern,
Balkans Report N°126, 7 March 2002 (also available in
Serbian)
Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°127, 26 March 2002 (also
available in Bosnian)
Serbia: Military Intervention Threatens Democratic Reform,
Balkans Briefing, 28 March 2002 (also available in Serbian)
Implementing Equality: The “Constituent Peoples” Decision
in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°128, 16 April
2002 (also available in Bosnian)
Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European
Union, Balkans Report N°129, 7 May 2002 (also available in
Serbian)
Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda,
Balkans Report N°130, 10 May 2002 (also available in Bosnian)
UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross: Tackling Division in Mitrovica,
Balkans Report N°131, 3 June 2002 (also available in Albanian
and Serbian)
Fighting to Control Yugoslavia’s Military, Balkans Briefing,
12 July 2002
Bosnia’s Alliance for (Smallish) Change, Balkans Report
N°132, 2 August 2002 (also available in Bosnian)
Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags the
Country Down, Balkans Report N°133, 14 August 2002 (also
available in Macedonian)
Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo, Balkans
Report N°134, 12 September 2002
Moving Macedonia Toward Self-Sufficiency: A New Security
Approach for NATO and the EU, Balkans Report N°135, 15
November 2002 (also available in Macedonian)
Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection, Balkans Report
N°136, 3 December 2002 (also available in Serbian)
The Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return in Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°137, 13 December 2002 (also
available in Bosnian)
A Half-Hearted Welcome: Refugee Return to Croatia, Balkans
Report N°138, 13 December 2002 (also available in Croatian)
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Return to Uncertainty: Kosovo’s Internally Displaced and the
Return Process, Balkans Report N°139, 13 December 2002 (also
available in Albanian and Serbian)
Albania: State of the Nation 2003, Balkans Report N°140, 11
March 2003
Serbia after Djindjic, Balkans Report N°141, 18 March 2003
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Montenegro 2003, Balkans
Report N°142, 16 April 2003
Kosovo’s Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for a Civic Contract,
Balkans Report N°143, 28 May 2003 (also available in Albanian
and Serbian)
Bosnia’s BRCKO: Getting In, Getting On and Getting Out,
Balkans Report N°144, 2 June 2003
Thessaloniki and After I: The EU’s Balkan Agenda, Europe
Briefing, 20 June 2003
Thessaloniki and After II: The EU and Bosnia, Europe Briefing,
20 June 2003
Thessaloniki and After III: The EU, Serbia, Montenegro
and Kosovo, Europe Briefing, 20 June 2003
Serbian Reform Stalls Again, Balkans Report N°145, 17 July
2003 (also available in Serbian).
Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the
Paradoxes of State Building, Balkans Report N°146, 22 July
2003
Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG, Europe
Report N°148, 3 September 2003 (also available in Serbian)
Macedonia: No Time for Complacency, Europe Report N°149,
23 October 2003 (also available in Macedonian)
Building Bridges in Mostar, Europe Report N°150, 20
November 2003 (also available in Bosnian)
Southern Serbia’s Fragile Peace, Europe Report N°I52, 9
December 2003
Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires: Lessons from
the Balkans, Europe Briefing, 23 January 2004
Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?,
Europe Report N°153, 25 February 2004 (also available in
Albanian and Serbian)
Serbia's U-Turn, Europe Report N°I54, 26 March 2004
Collapse in Kosovo, Europe Report N°155, 22 April 2004
(also available in Serbian and Albanian)
EUFOR: Changing Bosnia's Security Arrangements, Europe
Briefing, 29 June 2004 (also available in Bosnian)
Serbia's Changing Political Landscape, Europe Briefing, 22
July 2004
Macedonia: Make or Break, Europe Briefing, 3 August 2004
CAUCASUS
Georgia: What Now?, Europe Report N°I51, 3 December 2003
Azerbaijan: Turning Over A New Leaf?, Europe Report N°156,
13 May 2004
Saakashvili’s Ajara Success: Repeatable Elsewhere in
Georgia?, Europe Briefing, 18 August 2004
Armenia: Internal Instability Ahead, Europe Report N°158,
18 October 2004
MOLDOVA
Moldova: No Quick Fix, Europe Report N°147, 12 August 2003
Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria, Europe
Report Nº 157, 17 June 2004
OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS
For ICG reports and briefing papers on:
• Asia
• Africa
• Latin America
• Middle East and North Africa
• Thematic Issues
• CrisisWatch
please visit our website www.icg.org
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia
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APPENDIX F
ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Co-Chairs
Leslie H. Gelb
President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Christopher Patten
Former European Commissioner for External Relations, UK
President & CEO
Gareth Evans
Former Foreign Minister of Australia
Executive Committee
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey
Emma Bonino
Member of European Parliament; former European Commissioner
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK; former
Secretary General of the ANC
Maria Livanos Cattaui*
Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce
Yoichi Funabashi
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun,
Japan
William Shawcross
Journalist and author, UK
Stephen Solarz*
Former U.S. Congressman
George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute
William O. Taylor
Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe, U.S.
*Vice-Chair
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein;
former Jordan Permanent Representative to UN
Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Ersin Arioglu
Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi
Group
Diego Arria
Former Ambassador of Venezuela to the UN
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President
Victor Chu
Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Pat Cox
Former President of European Parliament
Ruth Dreifuss
Former President, Switzerland
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Stanley Fischer
Vice Chairman, Citigroup Inc.; former First Deputy Managing
Director of International Monetary Fund
Bronislaw Geremek
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
I.K.Gujral
Former Prime Minister of India
Carla Hills
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing; former U.S. Trade Representative
Lena Hjelm-Wallén
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Sweden
James C.F. Huang
Deputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan
Swanee Hunt
Founder and Chair of Women Waging Peace; former U.S.
Ambassador to Austria
Asma Jahangir
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions; former Chair Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Senior Advisor, Modern Africa Fund Managers; former Liberian
Minister of Finance and Director of UNDP Regional Bureau for
Africa
Shiv Vikram Khemka
Founder and Executive Director (Russia) of SUN Group, India
James V. Kimsey
Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL)
Bethuel Kiplagat
Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister, Netherlands
Trifun Kostovski
Member of Parliament, Macedonia; founder of Kometal Trade Gmbh
Elliott F. Kulick
Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S.
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Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Todung Mulya Lubis
Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia
Barbara McDougall
Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada
Ayo Obe
President, Civil Liberties Organisation, Nigeria
Christine Ockrent
Journalist and author, France
Friedbert Pflüger
Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group
in the German Bundestag
Victor M Pinchuk
Member of Parliament, Ukraine; founder of Interpipe Scientific and
Industrial Production Group
Surin Pitsuwan
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
Itamar Rabinovich
President of Tel Aviv University; former Israeli Ambassador to the
U.S. and Chief Negotiator with Syria
Fidel V. Ramos
Former President of the Philippines
George Robertson
Former Secretary General of NATO; former Defence Secretary, UK
Mohamed Sahnoun
Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Africa
Ghassan Salamé
Former Minister Lebanon, Professor of International Relations, Paris
Salim A. Salim
Former Prime Minister of Tanzania; former Secretary General of
the Organisation of African Unity
Douglas Schoen
Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S.
Pär Stenbäck
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway
Grigory Yavlinsky
Chairman of Yabloko Party and its Duma faction, Russia
Uta Zapf
Chairperson of the German Bundestag Subcommittee on
Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation
Ernesto Zedillo
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study
of Globalization
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD
ICG's International Advisory Board comprises major individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience
to ICG on a regular basis.
Rita E. Hauser (Chair)
Marc Abramowitz
Allen & Co.
Anglo American PLC
Michael J. Berland
John Chapman Chester
Peter Corcoran
John Ehara
Rita E. Hauser
JP Morgan Global Foreign
Exchange and Commodities
George Kellner
George Loening
Douglas Makepeace
Anna Luisa Ponti
Quantm
Michael L. Riordan
Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish
Community Endowment Fund
Tilleke & Gibbins
International LTD
Stanley Weiss
Westfield Group
Yasuyo Yamazaki
Sunny Yoon
SENIOR ADVISERS
ICG's Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding executive office) who maintain an association with ICG,
and whose advice and support are called on from time to time.
Oscar Arias
Zainab Bangura
Christoph Bertram
Jorge Castañeda
Eugene Chien
Gianfranco Dell'Alba
Alain Destexhe
Marika Fahlen
Malcolm Fraser
Marianne Heiberg
Max Jakobson
Mong Joon Chung
Allan J. MacEachen
Matt McHugh
George J. Mitchell
Mo Mowlam
Cyril Ramaphosa
Michel Rocard
Volker Ruehe
Simone Veil
Michael Sohlman
Leo Tindemans
Ed van Thijn
Shirley Williams
As at November 2004