Study Group Information
Ernst M. Felberbauer
Frederic Labarre (Eds.)
De-conflicting Protracted Conflicts
in the South Caucasus:
The Role of the EU and NATO
6th
Workshop of the Study Group
“Regional Stability in the South Caucasus”
Vienna, January 2013
Impressum:
Study Group Information
Publishers:
© National Defence Academy and
Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence
in co-operation with
PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and
Security Studies Institutes
Editors:
Ernst M. Felberbauer
Frederic Labarre
Facilitating Editor:
Judith Ivancsits
Layout and Graphics:
Multimedia Office of the National Defence Academy, Vienna
Printing and Finishing:
HDruckZ
1070 Vienna, Stiftgasse 2a
ISBN: 978-3-902670-97-7
3
Table of Contents
Foreword 7
Ernst M. Felberbauer and Frederic Labarre
Reconnecting with the South Caucasus
Heidemaria Gürer 15
EU and NATO Relations with the South Caucasus:
Toward a Decade of Pragmatic Realignments?
Annie Jafalian 17
PART 1:
PERSPECTIVES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS FROM
THE REGION: WHAT ROLE, WHAT CRITICAL
CHALLENGES FOR THE EU AND NATO? 29
Reassessing EU and NATO Engagement:
Lost Opportunities and Ways Forward
Leila Alieva 31
On the Role of the EU and NATO in the South Caucasus:
The View from Georgia
Ghia Nodia 43
A “Commission on Difficult Issues” to Improve
Russian-Georgian Relations
Boris Kuznetsov 49
4
PART 2:
PERSPECTIVES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS FROM
THE OUTSIDE: WHAT STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS
FOR WHAT DRIVERS OF INSTABILITY? 53
The Role of Uti Possidetis in Determining Boundaries:
Lessons for the South Caucasus
Suzanne Lalonde 55
Learning from the Others: Patterns of Secessionism
Before and After Partition
Pierre Jolicoeur 63
Energy Competition in the South Caucasus: Driver of
Stability or Instability?
Régis Genté 71
The South Caucasus: Russia’s Perspective
Nikolay Petrov 77
Structural Solutions for Drivers of Instability:
Perspectives from Turkey
Burcu Gültekin Punsmann 83
PART 3:
BUILDING UNDERSTANDING AND BUILDING STABILITY:
IDENTIFYING EXTERNAL PRESSURES 87
The Internal Threats to the South Caucasus Region
Alexander Iskandaryan 89
Managing External Pressures to Stability:
Some Brief Observations
Rashad Shirinov 95
5
PART 4:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 99
Policy Recommendations 101
Concluding Remarks
Johann Pucher 107
List of Authors and Editors 111
6
7
Foreword
After a hiatus of several years, the Study Group Regional Stability in the
South Caucasus was re-launched by the PfP Consortium and the Austrian
Ministry of Defence and Sports in June 2011. Building on previous
iterations of the RSSC Study Group, it held its 6th workshop at Reichenau,
Austria, on November 8-11 2012. The format of the workshop was
based on the successful Study Group Regional Stability in South East
Europe (RSSEE), and its thematic concept aims at gradually bringing
parties from the region to discuss and form policy recommendations on
security issues and conflict resolution ideas starting from a high-level
strategic outlook towards resolving particular issues of tension.
To this end, the Study Groups in the PfP Consortium provide an apolitical
forum in which to discuss the most sensitive matters in a free and
informed manner. The objective is to build mutual trust in small groups
of people of different backgrounds. The objective of the RSSC Study
Group is to help the academic and policy-making elite of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia to build mutual trust among themselves and
with other regional stakeholders, such as with participants from Russia
and Turkey. The task of the Study Group is to have its members, led by
the co-chairman, to identify areas of common interest pertaining to the
security of the whole region and lead the workshop participants to develop
pertinent and actionable security policy recommendations. One of
the medium-term objectives is to lead academics and policy makers to
treat the region as a single strategic entity.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia each have their integration agendas,
but the RSSC Study Group seeks to promote the value of regional integration
as well. This process helps to achieve the critical long-term goal
of altering conflict narratives in the region towards more constructive
exchanges.
8
In the workshop, panellists from all three South Caucasus countries were
invited to present their thoughts on five key questions:
1) How can the EU (and/or NATO) engage the region without triggering
a pushback from Russia?
2) What are the possible consequences if the EU and NATO decrease
their engagement in the South Caucasus?
3) What are the objective factors impeding social, political and economic
development in the South Caucasus? What are the consequences
for stability and security in the region?
4) Based on 3) above, is there a need for an “energy security convention”
or a renewed commitment to regional disarmament along the
lines of the CFE Treaty, or in a more general way: should there be
more room for regional cooperation?
5) What conditions of external pressures (push) and internal lure
(pull) can incentivize or deter constructive change in the South
Caucasus?
These five questions were examined through a three-panel structure
which allowed for greater precision when developing policy recommendations.
Breaking a cycle of conflict and mistrust two decades in the
making will not be easy, but we have been fortunate to receive expression
of interest from all three South Caucasus countries, along with Russia
and Turkey. This settles a key quantitative measure of success.
What follows are the speaking notes of the panellists who were invited
to present in Reichenau, followed by Policy Recommendations. They
represent the qualitative measure of success of our 6th
RSSC SG workshop.
The Policy Recommendations that follow have been taken on to
conceive future workshops. This was made possible as much by the participants
themselves as the organizers, sponsors and co-chair, and we are
grateful for their contribution, and our gratefulness is expressed through
this Study Group Information.
9
Some of the preceding texts argue that nothing much can be done about
the conflicts in the region. This opinion is mostly directed at the seemingly
intractable conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno
Karabakh. There two things to be said about the status quo in that conflict,
in relation to the EU and NATO, and, in general, to the international
community.
First, the status quo should be seen as intolerable to both organizations
and more should be done to develop incentives to resolve tensions there.
These incentives should motivate belligerents by proposing material
rewards for cooperation. At present, such rewards cannot be obtained
from within the region.
The status quo is intolerable because as long as the conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan endures and remains frozen, the more the
“idea” of a de facto independent Nagorno Karabakh becomes attractive
in law. To the EU and NATO, which do not cease to repeat that territorial
integrity should be respected in the spirit and letter of the 1975 Helsinki
Final Act, this cancels the premise that the case of the independence
of Kosovo should be seen sui generis, not to be applied to other
contexts.
Suzanne Lalonde shows that the principle buttressing post-Cold War
independence claims has been found in the principle of uti possidetis, a
principle with a life of its own. Although it is legally inapplicable to the
South Caucasus conflicts, international law breeds by precedent, and no
matter what the international community says, the tendency is for
Karabakh Armenians (and why not Abkhaz and Ossetians in the case of
Georgia) to say “why not us?” And so the international community has
an interest in preventing further fragmentation internationally and regionally.
The reason is simple, and has been provided by Pierre
Jolicoeur; if secession is to be defined as successful because it brings
post-separation stability, then it is a solution which has a very poor track
record, unless both parties agree mutually to a separation. So far, this has
taken place in a very few cases, and the most celebrated has been that of
Czechoslovakia in 1992.
10
At the very least, the objective of the EU and NATO should be to promote
the conditions for this mutuality. So far, however, the actions of
the international community have only achieved such a result as to promote
the status quo in the region. Armenia has an interest in keeping the
conflict frozen because it increases the chances of an independent
Karabakh. At the same time, a frozen conflict gives time to Azerbaijan
to generate the armed forces that can buttress its negotiating position visà-vis
Armenia.
Having sensed this, Armenia tries to keep up with Azerbaijani defence
spending at great cost to the ordinary Armenian’s welfare and social
development. The asymmetry between the two contenders is balanced by
Russia’s presence on Armenia’s side, and this represents an additional
burden for her.
The second thing that can be said about the status quo is that it is in fact
an expression of the Armenian and Azerbaijani public’s fatigue with the
conflict. In other words, neither the governments of Armenia or Azerbaijan
are willing to visit additional hardships on their population by unthawing
the conflict and resort to a shooting war. Lately, the skirmishing
that has taken place along the Nagorno Karabakh trench lines has increased,
but has not negatively un frozen the conflict. That is the good
news.
This means that the efforts at confidence-building could be more propitious
if applied at the grass-roots level as opposed to official levels, even
if the existing channels through the Minsk Group should remain open,
despite their lack of results. Indeed, participants were keen to promote
Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts at the level of constituents and civil society,
but also within each society (Armenian-to-Armenian and Azerbaijani-to-Azerbaijani).
The objective would be to bring greater awareness
and understanding of the other’s conditions, and the real causes of con-
flict.
If one were to promote Boris Kuznetsov’s idea of a “Commission on
Difficult Issues” towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, improving the mutual
perception of each belligerent would have to be a key objective. In this
11
last sense, the preservation of the status quo provides room for dialogue.
But dialogue can only take place if there is a perception of equality
which is not merely military in nature. There needs to be the assurance
that on the other side of the table, there is an individual of equal rights
and who has legitimate interests, feelings and hope for a better tomor-
row.
For the whole region, conflicts seem to be driven by two key intangibles;
an idea of sovereignty made antiquated by new conditions of integration,
and leaders’ personalities. First, the idea of sovereignty, which has been
too long associated with control over territory, finds little meaning if the
political ambitions of countries is to access the EU or NATO, or any
other multilateral body where legal norms define state behaviour. This
“modernist” notion of sovereignty (to take Robert Cooper’s definition in
his Breaking of Nations book) continues to inform policy and to guide
action in the South Caucasus. The attachment to sovereignty should be
less strong if a country is to submit to the legal constraints of a multilateral
regime. One of the solutions should be to bring greater emphasis to
the fact that obtaining membership to multilateral institutions brings less
national freedom, and therefore, it matters little whether a particular
piece of territory is effectively controlled or not, since it will end up in a
wider geo- and economic-political framework eventually.
Second, the endurance of this antiquated vision of sovereignty is also
driven by the egos of the political elite. This socio-psychological complex
must be surpassed, and the only way to surpass it is to help each
leader develop greater returns from resolving the conflict than for continuing
it. Furthermore, the leaders must be seen to be the owners of the
solution.
However, international life is not lived in isolation, and because ego
trumps material gains, the idea of a “win-win” result, where zero-sum
outcomes are substituted by solutions that improve the greater regional
good, is premature. This observation may be less true in the case of
Georgia vis-à-vis Russia, where the new government has recently greater
openness than that of Mr. Saakashvili. However, we do not know yet
whether this openness will be replicated in the case of the two break-
12
away regions of Georgia, and will be answered positively by the authorities
in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.
Indeed, leaders will need to show that they will have prevailed over the
“adversary.” This factor is so evident as to make any attempt at resolution
apparently fruitless. The international community must therefore
provide the material incentives to resolve the conflict, and help the sides
articulate the outcome in positive sum gains towards their respective
constituents (and diasporas). Breaking out of two decades of bitter conflict
will depend on the leaders’ ability to demonstrate tangible improvements
in the public good, and initially, at least, this improvement
can only be provided by the international community, and more specifically
by the EU.
The case of Georgia vis-à-vis Russia, as we have seen, seems more
promising. We must lament the occurrence of the a 20th
century conflict
in the 21st
century, but we must realise that it has been decisive in bringing
the two sides at the negotiating table, under the auspices of a process
led by major “Western” powers. As Boris Kuznetsov has said, both Russia
and Georgia are to blame for the eruption of the first conventional
war in the 21st
century. But other participants were adamant that other
actors also had a share of (indirect) blame, namely NATO and the EU,
by sending conflicting messages.
International diplomacy must only promise what it can deliver if it is to
remain credible. The current malaise affecting the UN and the OSCE,
for example, can be traced back to their inability to make effective
commitments. On the other hand, the perception of their good intention
borne by the erstwhile recipients of the international organizations’ favours
can also be blamed.
It is Georgia that has convinced itself that it would become a NATO
member in short order. Alliance members have made no concrete promise
of the sort. The assurance that Georgia would “one day be a member”
was tempered by the fact that there was no definition of the quality of
that membership, and by the statement that only NATO members will
decide who gets to join. A realistic outlook would have helped Georgian
13
decision makers that this last statement was directed at Georgia as much
as at Russia. Such are the hazards of Alliance politics. In a sense, the
2008 August War serves as a stark reminder to NATO that clarity of
expression brings greater credibility, and that ambiguity brings distrust,
and, ultimately, fragmentation of effort, if not of commitment. The same
critique can be applied to the EU, whose Eastern Partnership Initiative
has been seen as lacklustre in the region.
The process of conflict resolution in the South Caucasus cannot avoid
identifying Russia and Turkey as critical partners of the EU and NATO.
The South Caucasus countries would rather not have to deal with such
great powers in their regional disputes, but the wider framework of regional
security actually demands their inclusion.
Russia is a prime mover of energy resources towards the EU, and a
country with which NATO is actively seeking better relations. Its interests
must be factored in. Turkey, for its part, has been NATO’s most
important ally and an important EU partner – despite its EU membership
snub – because of its geostrategic location. Turkey has front row seats to
all the major conflicts of the last decade; whether it be the war on terror,
the 2003 Iraq war, the Syrian civil war, and Iran, not to mention its own
troubles with separatist Kurds.
As we have seen lately, Turkey will remain an essential interlocutor with
regards to the Arab Spring developments, now in their second successive
summers, falls, and now winters, as well as with the looming confrontation
with Iran over her nuclear ambitions and intractable leadership.
NATO and EU members will only show resolve in these crises with the
benefit of international consensus, which will not obtain without Turkish
and Russian assent.
Without suggesting that a “deal” might be struck between these two
countries and the international community at the detriment of the South
Caucasus countries, it bears reminding that realism, as an operating disposition
of international affairs, is a matter of great powers, not medium
or soft powers.
14
This adds greater credence to the need for Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia to find the common ground to pool their political resources and
impose themselves collectively as an international actor to be reckoned
with. Although we have seen that energy extraction and transport was
not a driver of instability, it remains nonetheless a source of interest for
the region. The same can be said for the region’s position relative to the
conflict with Iran, and perhaps Syria, especially now that Russia has
acknowledged the moral and political bankruptcy of the latter’s regime,
and is now siding with major Western actors on the issue of intervention.
We conclude that the South Caucasus must harmonize its relations with
the international community if it is to break out of the cycle of conflict,
but it must before normalize relations within the region.
The solutions proposed in this workshop have focused on soft-security
measures; on building better relations from the ground up (as opposed
from the top down, i.e. relying on political elites), by putting emphasis
on cultural, educational and commercial exchanges. It will be the task of
future workshops to explore this avenue further. For now, the RSSC SG
has been blessed by the profound thought from participants representing
every South Caucasus country, plus a generous participation from Russian
and Turkish panellists.
Ernst M. Felberbauer
Frederic Labarre
15
Reconnecting with the South Caucasus
Heidemaria Gürer
You have been convened here because of your expertise on the South
Caucasus, and on the themes related to the grave challenges that this
region faces. I rejoice at seeing that all the countries of the region are
represented here today, and I thank every one of you for taking the time
off your busy schedule to come here. The objective of the Regional Stability
in the South Caucasus Study Group is to develop and establish a
critical mass of experts and policy-makers, as well as future policymakers,
whose deep knowledge of the region’s challenges will help the
Austrian Ministry of European and International Affairs, as well as the
Ministry of Defence and Sports formulate policy towards the region.
Thanks to Austria’s extensive political networks and membership in the
EU and PfP, the conclusions of this workshop have a strong likelihood
of finding resonance in higher spheres of international relations.
By definition, the process whereby we reach our conclusions this weekend
is iterative and inclusive. It is iterative because we come here with
no pre-conceived ideas, no ready-made solutions to impose. It is inclusive
because to reach balanced solutions, we need balanced representation,
and discussions that take place in a spirit of constructive creativity
and openness.
I know that two decades of conflict have created tensions, and that in
some cases, tensions are being keenly felt. To rise above these tensions
requires courage, of which we are all endowed here. So let me say that
the fortitude that is demonstrated by your presence is a step in the right
direction, and I am thankful for it. To continue on this path, I believe
that it is vital that we consider the value of each other’s positions based
on its own merits. No one person here is responsible in whole or in part
16
to the problems of the South Caucasus, but all of us here are responsible
in providing at least part of the solution.
Our deliberations must be aimed at discovering the solutions when possible,
or creating them anew when necessary.
Let me refer to the main questions that should frame our panels:
• How can the EU or NATO engage in the region without affecting
relations with Russia?
• What consequences for EU or NATO disengagement in the South
Caucasus?
• What are the objective factors impeding social, political and economic
development?
• Can a regional trade regime bring forth greater stability, especially
in the energy domain?
• What are the incentives and deterrents to regional stability?
We will be looking for your input and feedback whether it comes from
within the region, or from without.
The ultimate goal is building stability through a common understanding
of the challenges of the South Caucasus, and ideas on confidencebuilding
measures. I truly hope that we will be able to take significant
steps in that direction at least among ourselves.
I am certain that the accommodation and facilities put at your disposal
by the PfP Consortium and the Austrian government will help us in our
task.
I would now like to yield to Professor Annie Jafalian, of the Université
Jean-Moulin in Lyon, France, where she is a member of the Law Faculty,
in charge of lecturing and research. She specialises in conflict studies
in the South Caucasus, and on energy security. The latest book that
she has edited “Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus” has been
published at Ashgate in 2011.
17
EU and NATO Relations with the South Caucasus:
Toward a Decade of Pragmatic Realignments?
Annie Jafalian
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, EU and NATO relations with the
South Caucasus have gone through different periods, which could be
divided into three main stages. After a period of gradual opening up to
the world, the South Caucasus has gained substantial visibility in the
eyes of EU and NATO decision-makers. This was particularly exemplified
by the creation, in the 2000s, of “special representatives” for the
region in both organizations, thereby expressing readiness for growing
relations with the three regional states, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia. But twenty years after the establishment of first cooperation
frameworks, relations on both sides have also reached a certain degree of
maturity. There are currently some signs that partners are entering into
an era of pragmatic realignments, clarifying their positions and commitments
as a consequence of the latest regional developments.
The 1990s: The Decade of Mutual Discovery
Starting from the early 1990s, the first period could be called the decade
of mutual discovery, when broad cooperation frameworks were established
to promote economic, political and military reforms in the South
Caucasus. In December 1991, the EU started providing Technical Assistance
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) in order to
support the transition to democracy and market economy. A few years
later, in 1996, it strengthened its involvement in favour of stability and
prosperity in the region through the conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements (PCA) that entered into force in 1999 for a ten-year
18
period.1
As for NATO, it launched in 1994 its Partnership for Peace
(PfP) program, aimed at increasing stability and security through cooperation
in the defence sector between the Allied members and the former
members of the Warsaw Pact.
However, European and Euro-Atlantic institutions were rather reluctant
to deeply engage in the South Caucasus, and even less in the settlement
of regional conflicts. The area was then clearly perceived as a conflictridden
but also small and remote zone, which hardly aroused the interests
of Western countries and was regarded by Russia as its traditional
sphere of influence. Even in the context of military conflicts and political
instability in the South Caucasus, the EU and NATO were more concerned
about and committed in the Balkans at the time. So they kept,
during the 1990s, quite a low profile in the region.2
The 2000s: The Decade of Growing Institutional Involvement
The second stage, covering the years 2000s, could be qualified as the
decade of intensified institutional engagement of the EU and NATO in
the South Caucasus. Over this period, the area has officially turned into a
region of strategic importance, especially after September 11th
and the
international fight against terrorism. For the EU, this rapprochement has
also been fostered by the 2004-2007 enlargements eastwards, which
brought the Caucasus much closer to Europe, and even created a common
border with the region through the Black Sea. It has been boosted
by “the Georgian factor” too, i.e. Georgia’s official priority objective,
1
From 1991 to 2005, EC assistance to Armenia thus amounted to €380 million;
assistance to Azerbaijan equaled €400 million while the one provided to Georgia
reached €500 million, cf. ENPI, Armenia/Azerbaijan/Georgia, Country Strategy
Papers 2007-2013.
2
In others words, the regional context “served to temper the Alliance’s willingness
to quickly get engaged in the region and pursue closer relations”, cf. Regional
Security in the South Caucasus: the Role of NATO, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute, Washington, 2004, p. 66. For some comments on EU hesitations at the
time, see Uwe Halbach, “The European Union in the South Caucasus: Story of a
Hesitant Approximation”, in The South Caucasus, 20 Years of Independence,
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011, 301-302.
19
under President Mikhail Saakashvili, to become a full member of the EU
and NATO. During his visit to Tbilisi in September 2012, NATO Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen indeed made a point of presenting
Georgia as “a special partner”3
, partly because of its membership aspira-
tions.
Interests in Energy Security and Regional Stability
The EU and NATO’s enhanced institutional involvement was based on
the definition of specific interests in the South Caucasus. It was mainly
driven by two core interests that may be connected with each other: access
to the Caspian Sea energy resources on the one hand; security and
stability in the neighbouring areas on the other hand.
Starting from the early 2000s, the EU has expressed growing interest in
the Caspian Sea oil and gas resources, considered as a source of diversification
of energy supplies and of valuable contribution to EU energy
security. In its November 2000 Green Paper, the European Commission
first identified the “considerable potential for oil and gas production in
the countries of the Caspian sea basin”4
, which was then presented as a
“source of non-OPEC production, extremely important” for the Union.5
After the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in winter 2005-2006 (and again
in 2009), the Green Paper that followed rather referred, indirectly, to the
need to reduce EU energy dependence on Russia and thus called for the
construction of “independent gas pipeline supplies from the Caspian
region.”6
As for NATO, it did not pay a special attention to energy security
at the time. However, the April 1999 Strategic Concept touched
upon the issue when it mentioned that “the disruption of the flow of vital
3
“NATO Secretary General praises Georgia's progress toward NATO in visit to
Tbilisi”, NATO News, 6 September 2012.
4
Toward an European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, European
Commission, 29 November 2000, COM(2000) 769 Final, p. 24.
5
Ibid., p. 38.
6
A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, European
Commission, 8 March 2006, COM(206) 105 Final, p. 15.
20
resources” could possibly affect the security interests of Allied mem-
bers.7
In addition to energy security, stability and peace were also at stake in
the EU and NATO further commitment in the South Caucasus. In its
December 2003 Security Strategy, the EU listed the “violent or frozen
conflicts, which also persist on our borders, [and] threaten regional stability”
among the key threats, more diverse and less predictable, that
Europe was mainly concerned about.8
And it stated, as a strategic objective,
the need to take “a stronger and more active interest in the problems
of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring
region.”9
At approximately the same time, NATO also expressed, in
its communiqué following the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, its willingness
“to further strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, in particular
through a special focus on … the strategically important regions of the
Caucasus and Central Asia.”10
New Cooperation Policy and Tools
These interests were then translated into new cooperation policy and
tools. The creation of new positions in the EU and NATO dedicated to
the South Caucasus was instrumental in the development of closer ties.
In July 2003, the EU appointed a Special Representative for the South
Caucasus. Its mandate has consisted in implementing EU policy, including
the objective, “in accordance with existing mechanisms, to prevent
conflicts in the region, to assist in the resolution of conflicts and to pre-
7
See point 24 of the Alliance Strategic Concept, issued in April 1999.
8
A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, European
Commission, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 4.
9
Ibid., 8.
10
“Istanbul Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, NATO Press Release,
28 June 2004 (Point 3).
21
pare the return of peace.”11
A similar position was created by NATO in
September 2004. A Secretary General’s Special Representative for the
Caucasus and Central Asia was appointed to establish high-level working
contacts with regional leaders and thereby support NATO’s goals in
the area.12
Beyond the creation of these positions that enhanced EU and NATO
visibility in the region, action plans were adopted to reinforce relations
between each side. In November 2002, NATO launched Individual Partnership
Action Plans (IPAPs), open to countries that have the political
will and ability to deepen their relationship with NATO. In October
2004, Georgia became the first country to agree an IPAP with NATO,
followed by Azerbaijan in May 2005 and Armenia in the following December.
Considering Georgia’s specific aspiration to full membership,
NATO offered an intensified dialogue to this country in September
2006.
At the Bucharest Summit of April 2008, it has also agreed that Georgia
will become a member. As for the EU, it included the South Caucasus in
its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in June 2004. Within this
framework, the European Union signed bilateral Action Plans (AP) with
the regional states in 2006 to strengthen cooperation and reforms. Each
action plan included a commitment to the peaceful solution of regional
conflicts, described as a key priority.13
This was reaffirmed in the Coun-
11
See article 2(b) of Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 7 July 2003. This
position was successively held by Heikki Talvitie (2003-2006), Peter Semneby
(2006-2011), and lastly Philippe Lefort (since 2011).
12
Since December 2011, this post has been held by James Appathurai, who replaced
Robert Simmons – the first NATO Special Representative for Central Asia and the
Caucasus.
13
But the ranking of this objective in the list of priorities differed from one plan to
another. The peaceful settlement of conflict was described as priority 1 out of 10 in
the AP for Azerbaijan, priority 6 out of 8 in the AP with Georgia, and priority 7
out of 8 in the AP with Armenia. For an in-depth study on this period, see Laure
Delcour, Hubert Duhot, Bringing South Caucasus Closer to Europe: Achievements
and Challenges in ENP Implementation, Natolin Research Papers, Warsaw, March
2011, 65.
22
try Strategy Papers covering the 2007-2013 period as well as in the National
Indicative Programs.
As far as energy security is concerned, the European Commission presented
the Caspian area, including Azerbaijan, as a source of “spectacular
progression” of supply potential to Europe.14
As a consequence, the
area was called to form an energy corridor – the fourth one – to be reinforced
with a view to further diversify and secure EU oil and gas im-
ports.15
So the European Commission has welcomed the construction of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil (BTC) and gas (SCP) pipelines linking
Azerbaijan to Turkey through Georgia. Azerbaijan has then turned into a
new oil supplier to the EU, accounting in 2011 for 4.4% of the EU’s
global oil imports.16
The BTC and SCP have thus become the pillars of a broader strategy
aimed at the creation of a Southern gas corridor, potentially transforming
Azerbaijan into a transit country between European gas markets and
Central Asian exporting countries. In that regard, the Commission has
supported new infrastructure projects – the Nabucco, ITGI and TAP –
involving different European countries and companies. These developments
were a particular source of tension with Russia, as Russian gas
company Gazprom itself suggested to transport Central Asian gas
through its own infrastructure project, namely the South Stream gas
pipeline.
14
Energy Corridors, European Union and Neighboring Countries, European
Commission: Brussels, 2007, p. 7.
15
The other three corridors being formed by EU traditional partners: Norway,
Russia, and Algeria, cf. ibid, p. 23.
16
Cf. European Commission, DG Energy, Market Observatory for Energy, Period 1-
12 2011. Azerbaijan share in EU global oil imports is relatively small compared to
Russia’s one - 28% - but it is still seen as a valuable source of diversification.
23
Table 1: Southern Gas Corridor – Pipeline Projects17
17
Source: Edison, BP, Gazprom, Nabucco Pipeline, TransAdriatic Pipeline
Consortium
members
Transit
countries
Length(
km)
Capacity
(bcm per
year)
Cost
(billion
€)
Opera-
tional
Nabucco BEH,
BOTAS,
FGSZ, OMV,
RWE, Trans-
gas
Turkey, Bulgaria,
Rumania,
Hungary,
Austria
3 893 8-31 7.9-14 2018
ITGI Edison,
DEPA, BEH
Turkey,
Greece
Italy
800 10-20 1.5-2 2017
TAP Axpo, Statoil,
E.ON-
Ruhrgas
Turkey,
Greece, Albania,
Italy
792 10-20 not
available
2017
South
Stream
Gazprom,
ENI, Wintershall,
EDF,
DESFA,
MVM, OMV,
BEH, Plino-
vodi
Russia, Rumania,
Bulgaria,
Serbia,
Hungary,
Slovenia,
Austria,
Croatia,
Greece, Italy
3 346 15-63 15.5 2015
24
The 2010s: Entering into a Decade of Adjustments?
Since the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the EU and NATO seem
to have entered into a decade of adjustments, based on a more realistic
assessment of developments in and around the South Caucasus, and of
their own related objectives and capacities. At a broader level, regional
powers have returned back to the region. Russia has for instance reasserted
its influence in the South Caucasus. From a military point of view,
it has increased the number of its troops in Georgia’s breakaway re-
gions18
and maintained its position in Armenia.19
Whereas the future of
its military presence in Azerbaijan is not clear yet20
, Russia has played a
new role there in the energy sector. In 2010, for the first time in its history,
it became an importer of Azerbaijani gas, albeit in small but growing
volumes.21
In addition to a revived Russian Federation, the EU and
NATO have had to cope with a more independent Turkish partner in
terms of strategic thinking and foreign policy, and a less isolated Republic
of Iran.22
18
In February 2010, Russia signed a treaty with Abkhazia on a joint military base
(the 7th
military base), and a similar one with South Ossetia in April 2010 (the 4th
military base), both for an initial 49-year period. Around 7000 troops would be
deployed in the two break-away republics. These treaties were ratified in October
2011; cf. “Russian Military to Stay in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 49 More Years”,
Eurasianet.org, 10 October 2011.
19
In August 2010, Russia signed a protocol with Armenia extending the lease of its
120th
military base in Gumri until 2044, i.e. 24 years more than what was initially
agreed upon. The first lease agreement dated 1995 was indeed signed for a 25-year
period, up to 2020, cf. “Russian-Armenian Talks”, Kremlin.ru, 20 August 2012.
20
Russia has been long discussing with Azerbaijan the terms of a lease agreement on
the Gabala radar station, but no agreement has been reached so far.
21
In 2010, Russia started importing 500 million cubic meters gas from Azerbaijan.
These volumes have been regularly increased to reach three billion cubic meters in
2012, cf. “Russia to Double Azerbaijan Gas Imports”, United Press International,
25 January 2012.
22
As pointed out by some observers, Iran is perhaps “out of the game” in the
regional political arena, but it is “still in the background”. It indeed serves as an
available partnership option which is used by the regional states whenever tensions
arouse in their cooperation with other powers.
25
At the local level, the South Caucasian states have also developed more
self-confident domestic and foreign policies. This was particularly
shown by Azerbaijan’s decision in May 2011 to join the Non-Aligned
Movement.23
In other words, the South Caucasus has appeared as a more
complicated area, where more players need be taken into account as
soon as it comes to consider any involvement in the region.
In this context, there have been – over the last years – some signs of realignment
from NATO and the EU toward the states of the South Caucasus.
While NATO has reaffirmed its strategic objectives in the area, it
has also refrained from making any further commitment. This was especially
true for the issue of Georgia’s membership. The Alliance has kept
its door open to Georgia but it has not provided any clear agenda toward
that end. In its November 2010 Strategic Concept, the Allied members
only declared “taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration”
of Georgia.24
As far as energy issues are concerned, the Alliance admittedly reached a
new step as it committed, in the same document, “to develop the capacity
to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical infrastructure
and transit areas and lines.”25
It has reiterated the “critical importance”
of stable and reliable energy supplies in its May 2012 Chicago
Summit declaration, while adding at the same time that these issues were
“primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international
organizations”. As a consequence, NATO will just “closely follow”
relevant developments in the field of energy security.26
Finally,
conflicts in the South Caucasus have been explicitly considered as “a
matter of great concern for the Alliance.”27
Nevertheless, NATO has
clearly stated that it “does not seek a direct role in the resolution of these
23
“Azerbaijan Joins Non-Aligned Group”, Azernews, 26 May 2011.
24
See point 35 of NATO Strategic Concept dated November 2010.
25
See point 19 of NATO Strategic Concept dated November 2010.
26
See point 52 of the May 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration of NATO Heads of
States.
27
See point 47 of the May 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration of NATO Heads of
States.
26
conflicts but supports the efforts of other international organizations,
which have specific mandates for their mediation roles.”28
Even though the EU has taken a higher profile in the South Caucasus, it
is still divided on which strategy it should follow. In terms of gas projects,
the Council approved in September 2011 the opening of talks with
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline aimed at
transporting Central Asian gas to the Nabucco, the ITGI and the TAP.
However, other European operators have kept promoting competing
projects such as the Russian-backed South Stream pipeline. Like NATO,
the EU has also acknowledged the European aspiration of Georgia without
offering Tbilisi concrete perspectives in that regard. Instead, it has
rather focused on its traditional know-how in dealing with neighbouring
countries, i.e. on negotiations on Association Agreements, as well as on
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA).29
Last but not least, while fully committed to the peaceful settlement of
regional conflicts, especially in Georgia where it has deployed a mission
monitoring the August 2008 cease-fire agreement, the EU has repeatedly
expressed support to existing mediation frameworks, namely those provided
by the Geneva international discussions and the OSCE Minsk
Group. In this regard, if it has voiced some concerns about Russia’s fulfillment
of its obligations in Georgia, it has also acknowledged “the efforts
of Russia” in achieving progress in the talks about Nagorno-
Karabakh.30
28
“NATO’s Partners in the South Caucasus”, NATO News, 10 September 2012.
29
Negotiations on Association Agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
were launched in July 2010. As for talks on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Agreements, they started with Armenia and Georgia in early 2012.
30
Council of the EU, Council conclusions on the South Caucasus, 3149th Foreign
Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 27 February 2012, points 18 and 24.
27
Conclusion
Under these circumstances, the EU and NATO seem to be searching for
a more balanced approach, based on a continued involvement coupled
with a more cautious line, sometimes with some degree of reservations
or reluctance to intervene. How are these developments perceived in the
South Caucasus?
1. Is the EU and NATO willingness to accommodate Russia and
move away from a zero-sum game considered as an opportunity to
play a more constructive role in the region? Or is it rather viewed
as a concession made at the expense of regional states’ interests,
thereby changing their perceptions of the EU and NATO?
2. In the field of energy security, how do South Caucasian states
view the impact of liquefied national gas (LNG) and shale gas on
EU interests in Caspian Sea energy? How could this alter the geopolitical
picture of the Caspian Sea?
3. What are, from a South Caucasian point of view, the advantages,
the limits, and the added-value of EU’s involvement in conflict
mediation compared to existing mechanisms of negotiation? In a
context of potential renewed conflicts, how can the EU change relation
to war and peace in the South Caucasus?
Those are questions that the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus
Study Group will need to address in its future workshops.
29
PART 1:
PERSPECTIVES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
FROM THE REGION: WHAT ROLE, WHAT
CRITICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE EU AND
NATO?
31
Reassessing EU and NATO Engagement:
Lost Opportunities and Ways Forward
Leila Alieva
Current Security Situation due to Unresolved Conflicts in the South
Caucasus
Conflicts in the South Caucasus are not dormant – they are active; the
daily violation of ceasefire in Karabakh and the war in Georgia is the
most outstanding evidence. While in the early stages of the ceasefire the
risks were associated with accidental violations, the new trend – made
possible by the greater consolidation of power in both states – makes the
threats and risks of skirmishes are more subject to manipulations for
political purposes; to advance external actor’s objectives in the region,
to put pressure on the other side during another round of negotiations, or
to promote one’s domestic agenda and to draw legitimacy from nationalistic
sentiments.
The entrenched institutions of the cease fire situation, which has lasted
for almost two decades makes any change from the status quo in a positive
direction unlikely. The negotiations on Karabakh have stalled because
the Minsk Process seemingly has exhausted its highest potential to
mediate and lead to a breakthrough in conflict resolution. In fact, the
status quo has proved to be less risky than its possible change. Indeed,
the status quo of the unresolved conflict provides a sufficient level of
stability to allow Russia to maintain its traditional lever of influence
over Armenia and Azerbaijan and consequently over the whole region.
For Western powers tensions did not prevent major oil and transportation
companies from contracting and implementing the “Deal of the
Century.” Thus no incentive has been created, as in case of Yugoslavia
or more recently the Arab states for more decisive and concerted intervention,
or to actually implement UN resolutions pertinent to the South
32
Caucasus. However, in spite of stagnation in political affairs, there is
obviously dynamism in others – such as the military.
A few factors led to militarization in the region. One of them is the failure
of the Caspian states to come to agreement on the security and legal
status of the sea. Now every state tries to build its own naval forces, observing
Russia’s or Iran’s unwillingness to reconcile with the new geopolitical
realities. The inability to suggest an effective international
framework for resolution of the South Caucasus conflicts – such as consensus-based
decision mechanisms, the normative uncertainty of the
OSCE framework, the unbalanced composition of the OSCE cochairmanship
(France, the US and Russia), the insufficient pressure on
the sides which violate international law – are the other reasons.
Neither Azerbaijan and Turkey’s economic embargo of Armenia resulting
from the conflict (mainly due to the regional trade with Russia and
Iran and extensive aid from the West) led to greater awareness in the
region that colonial times are over and that if a state wants to enjoy a
safe and prosperous future it should respect for the international norms
of behaviour with its neighbours. The absence of economic relations
between the parties in conflict was also part of non-military signals to
Armenia, which violated the borders of its neighbour. This led to the fact
that Azerbaijan’s significant oil revenues (roughly 50 million dollars per
day) have been spent on militarization of the country. On the other hand,
the unresolved conflict also led to the plans for the restoration of the
Medzamor atomic station in Armenia, which poses serious security challenges
in an earthquake-prone area such as Caucasus. Much has been
said also about the danger that uncontrolled territories pose for regional
and international security in terms of trafficking and militarization due to
the inaccessibility of the region to international inspectors.
Geopolitically, unresolved conflicts make regional stability vulnerable to
Russia’s manipulation and the region is still a hostage to her interests.
Although Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s united efforts in the 1990s promoted
NATO and EU presence in the region, Russia still retains the leverage
over conflicts due to the security deficit and domestic political
stagnation in the countries in conflict.
33
The Democracy Deficit of States in Conflict – Transformation of
Threats
The effects of the “frozen” conflicts go far beyond tensions and security
risks related to the region. The case of Georgia – democracy in one separate
country – is almost a success. However, with lack of resources and
resulting dependence on authoritarian Azerbaijan and Russia, Georgia
has limited capacity to play an important role in promotion of reforms in
the region and even to sustain its own democratic achievements. Two
states in conflict – Armenia and Azerbaijan – have poor record of human
rights, basic freedoms, division of power and are at the end of the rating
list based on the recently developed EU Integration Index. According to
Freedom House Armenia is ‘partly free”, while Azerbaijan is a “not
free” country. Both states are ruled by similar elite, which has entrenched
interests in the domestic political status quo and extensively
takes advantage of the “no peace – no war” situation. This includes playing
the nationalistic card by the incumbents, corruption in state institutions
related to the military industrial complex and security apparatus,
lagging reforms in the government, and significant spending on the mili-
tary.
The lack of democracy often is reinforced by outside actors, who compromise
their assessment of democracy progress in the countries for the
sake of “stability”, or any other interfering foreign policy agenda, both
in Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, democracy building is an important
factor in resolving major security issues in the region, as “democracies
do not fight each other.”
The role of the EU and NATO in this regard could have been unique, as
institution building in the states in transition was notably influenced by
the interaction with external actors – through the mode and nature of aid
policy, bilateral relations, trade, etc. At the same time, the nature of
threats in the region has changed – those, caused by “weak states” were
replaced by those caused by strong but repressive states. This increased
the threat of radicalism, abrupt domestic instability due to the failure of
evolutionary development and uncertain fate of the post-revolutionary
regimes.
34
For instance, the threat of disintegration of Georgia and Azerbaijan in
the early 1990s affected stability in the region, but on the other hand the
weakness of Russia allowed leaders of the same South Caucasus states
to promote consolidation of their national independence and pronounce
boldly the strategic course of integration in European and Euro-Atlantic
structures. At the same time, while the direction of post-Soviet integration
in the 1990s was mainly affected by hard security threats, this factor
was complemented by institution building and the resulting political
identity of the authoritarian states in the 2000s.
In the case of Azerbaijan, the gradual cooling of integration aspirations
was primarily caused by the inability of NATO of prioritizing its relations
with Azerbaijan, as compared with Armenia, in recognition of its
significant contribution to NATO-South Caucasus cooperation and of
the Western states presence in the region. On the other hand the problems
with Azerbaijan’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP),
which implementation dragged on indefinitely proved the reform process
to be a major stumbling block on the way to integration. Thus, the
emerging political identity of the state, along with hard security threats,
such as the Karabakh conflict, weakened the integration momentum, and
justified Azerbaijan’s joining the Non-Aligned movement.
NATO keeps the South Caucasus at a Distance
NATO’s policies in the South Caucasus were characterized by inconsistency.
South Caucasus security policies were divided by the Karabakh
conflict and relations with Russia. While Georgia and Azerbaijan expressed
their intention to integrate in European and Euro-Atlantic structures,
Armenia did not. Moreover, while Azerbaijani leaders – Aliyev
and before him Elchibey – in a move of outstanding political courage
adopted EU, US and NATO interests (through withdrawal of all former
Soviet bases from its territory and granting only 10% to Russia in the
major oil contract), Armenia strengthened its cooperation with Russia
and continued to serve as a stronghold for Russia’s interests in the region.
However, neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan received preferential
treatment in their relations with NATO. Azerbaijan was not “rewarded”
35
by NATO even by political statements asserting an importance of internationally
recognized borders and condemnation of their violation by
Armenia.
The other example was NATO’s hesitation on the issue of membership
for Georgia and Ukraine. NATO allies were reportedly divided on the
issue of offering them the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the 2008
Summit. Besides the factor of Russia, the slow pace of reforms of the
military and in general in the country contributed to the hesitation in
keeping promises regarding Ukraine and Georgia’s membership.
In sum, the lack of support in solving security concerns of the country
like Azerbaijan, which has taken significant risks by creating conditions
for the Western states to realize their interests in the region, the hesitant
position of NATO regarding membership perspectives for Georgia and
Ukraine and the slow pace of reforms limited NATO’s influence in security
of the region.
The EU’s Delayed and Inconsistent Policies
The EU arrival to the South Caucasus as compared to the USA or individual
states was late and her policies, much like NATO’s, were inconsistent.
The EU was too pre-occupied by issues of enlargement and the
necessity to accommodate Russia. Thus it focused mainly on emergency
situations and energy access and transportation issues. There were a few
problems related to EU policy in the region. First there was an underestimation
of the reform potential of the South Caucasus states, especially
Azerbaijan, and their European identity which resulted in delayed support
for institution building through EU programmes. The other problem
was that policies were lagging behind stated strategic objectives. For
instance, while pronouncing energy as a main interest in the Caspian
region, the EU’s diplomatic efforts were much weaker than those of
Russia. The third set of problems has been inconsistency in stated objectives
and the actual policy in promotion of democracy in the oil rich
states, like Azerbaijan. There was permanent criticism from the side of
the experts and domestic actors that the EU applied softer standards to
36
democracy building and does not apply its mechanisms, such as conditionality,
to this country, as compared to others. Last but not least is that
the EU has been promoting multilateral (or trilateral) cooperation in the
region – between all three states Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia— but
remained passive and in a subordinate role in the resolution of the major
conflict in the area. The EU stated that it supported the Minsk Process of
the OSCE, which so far has not achieved any significant results.
The EU’s incapacity to suggest a mechanism and an effective institution
for resolution of the conflict is one of the reasons of the limited role the
EU can play in the security of the region.
However, the EU does not utilize its major advantage – the extremely
attractive nature of the EU “club” for the South Caucasus states – in the
form of openness to membership perspectives.
Resulting Patterns of Regional Integration
The post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus witnessed the process of
consolidation of independence of two states – Azerbaijan and Georgia –
vis-à-vis Russia as a high risk enterprise. The leaders of both states respectively
Aliyev and Shevardnadze have undertaken bold measures and
policies to provide for the interests of the EU and NATO in the region.
Both experienced permanent pressure in a form of attempts at coups
d’états, assassinations, manipulation by secessionist groups and issues of
border security. However, neither of them has ever enjoyed full-fledged
military cooperation or support which would allow them to counterbalance
Russia’s pressure.
Noticing the absence of counterbalancing support in the region and insufficient
interest to regional organizations like GUAM (Georgia, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan and Moldova) the states opted for individual strategies
to deal with the regional security challenges.
Azerbaijan has joined organizations where the power balance allowed
recognizing the violation of international norms by Armenia – such as
37
the OIC, Non –Aligned Movement and even got an observer status in
African Union in 2011. The same year Azerbaijan was invited to a nonpermanent
seat at the UN Security Council. Armenia continues its intense
trade with Iran and Russia, with which it is closely allied militarily,
and is part of the CSTO. She also depends for her survival on the transportation
routes through Georgia. Georgia has chosen the way of integration
to EU and NATO, and cooperates in most of the energy projects
with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Thus, “frozen conflicts” continue to divide the South Caucasus, block
democratic reforms, economic prosperity (first of all in Armenia), trilateral
regional cooperation and integration of the region into the EU and
NATO. The vicious circle of conflicts feeding the deficit of democracy
and vice-versa has led to a dangerous divide in the region, pushing states
in opposing directions and promoting militarization of the conflicting
parties.
A Way Forward: Promoting a Sense of Interdependency…
Not all states of the South Caucasus accepted the international norms of
the external relations in practice. One of the obstacles was inertia of patron-dependent
behaviour of the small and poor states left since the
times when Russia was determining the flow of resources between republics
of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, poor resources countries,
such as Armenia, were enjoying support from other resource rich
republics, such as Azerbaijan.
This however did not lead to the sense of interdependency which usually
regulates relations between independent states, as these trade and supply
relations were realized through Moscow and by the decision of Gosplan.
The disruption of these ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a result
of the conflict, and afterwards joined by Turkey’s embargo, was supposed
to be a reminder of the regulating nature of economic relations
between the independent subjects of international relations.
38
Logically Armenia should have restrained its military involvement in
Azerbaijan, which is rich and can be a beneficial provider of resources to
the landlocked state. But support from Russia, and aid from Europe and
the USA undermined the economic opportunities, resulting in military
conflict, where Armenia openly violated internationally-recognized borders
of the neighbour.
Thus the perspectives of enjoying full-fledged cooperation and prosperity
in Armenia only under conditions of responsible behaviour with regards
to its neighbours should be promoted by the EU and NATO. This
behaviour might be modelled after that of Austria during the conflict
with Italy over the Tyrol area. In fact, non-interference and discouragement
of the minority from secession on the neighbour’s territory could
be considered an internationally responsible behaviour, which would be
“rewarded” by constructive cooperation between the states. Instead,
NATO and the EU promote trilateral relations including economic cooperation
between the states regardless of the state of affairs between them.
This continues the Soviet dependence type of behaviour rather than
promoting a new basis for relations between the parties as independent
subjects of international relations. Any attempt to unconditional force
the parties to cooperate will not lead to positive results, especially since
economic cooperation is part of the bargaining tools in the Minsk Process
of the OSCE.
…and Responsibility
The South Caucasus is an area where none of the laws and norms of international
behaviour are applied in practice. There is no a regional organization
which could create a normative framework to address the
violations of international law having taken place during the disputes.
The problem is that those who led ethnic cleansing and mass elimination
of civilians are now in power and are not brought to justice, simply because
they participate in the official negotiation process. The “soft” reaction
of the international community to violation and occupation by Armenia
of a significant (16%-20%) part of the lands in Azerbaijan has
39
created a sense of impunity and a precedent, which was obviously taken
into account by Russia in August 2008.
The only normative organization demanding unconditional withdrawal
of troops from Azerbaijan territories has been the UN, but none of the
five resolutions calling for withdrawal were implemented.
In contrast, the OSCE Minsk group shows complete normative uncertainty
allowing countries to appeal to and manipulate two principles –
territorial integrity and self-determination – and encouraging countries to
find a compromise between the two principles. The justification of the
mediators in this case is to call the lands (officially belonging to Azerbaijan)
“disputed” (which is not the case for Georgia). There are however
two clearly distinguishable elements in the conflict which are clear
violation of the norms of international relations. First in the case of Russia
it is the violation of Georgia’s borders, and second is the case of Armenia,
regarding Azerbaijan’s borders.
Once military gains become bargaining tools in negotiations, relations in
the region lose any normative basis. The EU and NATO should direct
their efforts to clearly support rules which they observe in Europe and
between each other – those of inviolability of borders, protection of
rights of minorities and right of displaced people to return, discourage
external actors from interference and involvement in the issues of minorities
in the neighbour states and discourage minorities from secessionist
claims. The international community should also identify and
address all cases of crimes against humanity and other violations of law.
Elevating to the next Level: Making Borders less Significant
Taking into account the current power balance which does not allow
bringing parties to compromise there are few possible ways out of the
situation, the main principle of which is to take the solution of the conflict
to the next level, which is to neutralize the major obstacles on the
way to solution.
40
As the conflicts are in essence territorial, a common perspective which
would be equally attractive for all parties to the conflict and would make
borders less significant could be encouraged. There have been attempts
to create an open market, or trilateral “Caucasus common House”, or the
parliamentary cooperation, but two issues are preventing it from the success
– all of the three states (or at least their populations) have a desire to
integrate in a better world, rather than any uncertain Caucasus com-
monwealth.
They prefer attachment to already successful models, which are the EU
and NATO. Only by having a real perspective of such integration will
the Caucasus countries be willing to delegate part of their sovereignty to
a Union ruled by law and decision making based on democratic principles.
This will be equally attractive to minorities, as they will be protected
not only by local laws, but also have supranational guarantees of
security and prosperity.
Development of Liberal Values and Keeping up with Global Trends
While democracy is the most reliable way to resolution of conflicts, this
is not a sufficient factor yet for peaceful resolution of conflict. In fact,
according to Jack Snyder, democratizing societies are often torn by violent
conflicts. Besides, the opponents of viewing a democracy as a factor
of peaceful solution to conflicts usually refer to the possibility of election
of extreme or radical leaders.
Democracy however is a necessary step on the way, as it generates legitimate
leadership, where power is supported by popular votes and what
in turn allows the leader to compromise. On the other hand, democracy
develops institutions of checks and balances and agencies which would
develop alternative approaches to the resolution of conflicts. And lastly,
it is democracy and freedoms that create conditions for the development
of liberal values. There are some concepts and traits of liberal mindset,
which are relevant for conflict resolution – tolerance, inclusiveness and
equality.
41
Transforming mindsets shaped by authoritarianism can be realized by
encouraging their involvement in a greater space – integrating in European
Union, globalizing through the internet or free market.
With borders being increasingly challenged by information technologies,
global markets and freedoms, the communities that are keeping up with
the current or emerging trends will be the ones to most probably survive
in this speedy transformation of the world by getting out of the provincial
and modernist level and moving on to the post-modern and global
world with provisional physical borders.
This is the other area, where EU or NATO can help both the South Caucasus
and Russia to get to the level which would allow them to escape
controversies and barriers erected by modernist (or in this case Stalinist)
thinking.
43
On the Role of the EU and NATO in the South
Caucasus: The View from Georgia
Ghia Nodia
It is easy to be sceptical about the ability of NATO and the EU (that is,
the West) to contribute to greater stability and development of the South
Caucasus. This scepticism is often a reaction to exaggerated expectations.
So, we should probably start by getting the expectations right.
NATO and the EU cannot do wonders in the region. By ‘wonders’ I
mean three things: they (1) they cannot ‘de-conflict’ the conflicts, that is,
they cannot bring solutions to the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’; (2) they
cannot turn political regimes (that are different in each country but neither
of them can be described as a full democracy) into stable democracies;
(3) they cannot turn poor countries into rich ones.
Why is this so? The main problems are of course inherent to the countries
themselves: they have the level of development, the political culture
and historical legacies they have; solving a post-violent conflict by
peaceful means is difficult for any country. But apart from that, this is a
contested area in terms of international influence. Ambassador Philippe
Lefort said that the South Caucasus is between EU and Russia; I would
rather say it is between the West and Russia (US has also been active
and influential here), and these two players have conflicting aims with
regards to the region.
The disagreement between Russia and the West over the 2008 war and
the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the most conspicuous – but
by all means not the only – expression of this difference. One should
also not forget that there are disagreements and differences within the
European Union with regards to policies towards the region: some countries
want the EU and NATO to be more active over Russia’s objections;
others prefer to keep it at arm’s length. If we use the Balkans – another
conflict-ridden region – as a point of comparison, the commitment of
44
NATO and the EU, as well as their influence and capacity to bring
change in the South Caucasus, are much more modest.
Having said all that, I would still contend that the West is indispensable
to the South Caucasus. Namely, I see an important role for NATO and
the EU in three areas: (1) not allowing the conflicts to re-escalate; (2) to
increase the chances for the political regimes to become more democratic
than they are, and (3) increase chances for their economic devel-
opment.
Taking into account the lack of commitment within NATO and the EU
to be strongly engaged in the region, made worse by deep internal difficulties
the Union is going through, it may be proper to play devils’ advocate
and ask: why not to leave the region to Russia? Arguably, this
might remove a bone of contention between the West and Russia. This is
not a language used in official discourse in the West but we can be certain
that such an idea crosses the minds of quite a few Western politicians.
One strong argument against such an idea is that Russia has no
resources to be a real hegemon in the region anyway: this implies both
economic resources, and hard power. Russia suffers from imperial overstretch.
We can see that Russia has a difficulty to take care of its own
problems, and the region where this is most obvious is North Caucasus.
Russia has only enough resources to play the game of a spoiler, but it
has no ability to play a leading role. No less importantly, Russia also has
few resources of soft power because it is not a desirable model of development.
Yes, the EU is undergoing grave problems, but for peoples of
the South Caucasus Europe continues to be a much more attractive
model than Russia.
Now I will focus on Georgia. With regards to conflicts, at this point
there is no grave imminent danger for Georgia’s security from its own
conflicts. Under Georgia’s ‘own’ conflicts I mean the triangle constituted
by (1) Tbilisi, (2) Moscow, and (3) de facto governments in Sukhumi
and Tskhinvali. Within it, the situation appears to be deeply frozen
for the immediate future, which means that it is unlikely that things will
get much better or much worse. Probably, the recent change of power in
45
Tbilisi will not affect the situation much – but I will come back to this in
a moment.
In this sense, the August 2008 war, a tragic event as it was, may have
proven to have been a stabilizing event in the long run. Georgia put this
war behind her and survived, so it was an important test of statehood to
be passed. It also brought greater clarity: Russia is now openly a patroncountry
of Georgia’s separatist regions. For obvious reasons, Georgia
has no other option but to accept the status quo for the time being, but
Russia has less leverage against Georgia than it used to have before the
war. Theoretically, one cannot rule out Russia’s military invasion – but
short of that, its ability to seriously influence the situation in Georgia is
rather limited.
For Georgia, the greatest threats of destabilization come from its immediate
neighbourhood. Namely, there are three potential conflict escalation
scenarios that may have a spill over effect in Georgia: 1) resumption
of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh;
2) possible military strikes against Iran by Israel and the
USA; and 3) deterioration of security situation in North Caucasus.
There is no space here to discuss each of these three scenarios in detail
and in terms of their possible spill over effects for Georgia. But there is
some level of consensus within Georgia’s security community that there
will be some in each case. Large-scale military escalation concerning
Karabakh is obviously the worst nightmare, but the other two prospects
are bad enough. Georgia has no capacity to influence the situation in
either of those cases in order to prevent worse-case scenarios. The capacity
of the West to influence the situation in the North Caucasus is
very limited, but with regards to Iran and Nagorno-Karabakh it can do
much more. Of course the nature of threats in these regions is very well
understood and nobody needs to be reminded by the Georgians. But this
demonstrates once more how important NATO and the EU are for stability
in the region.
In the last part of my paper, I will focus on what the recent political
change in Georgia may bring to this country and the region. I will men-
46
tion implications of this change for regional conflicts and for democratic
development. This is a very recent development, so my remarks can only
be tentative and preliminary. Moreover, the Georgian Dream coalition
that came to power as a result of the October 1 parliamentary elections is
a very diverse coalition that is only united by its opposition to the previous
government, and by the personality and money of Bidzina Ivanishvili,
a billionaire-turned-politician. But in his own turn, Mr Ivanishvili,
who recently became Georgia’s prime minister, is an untested politician
and a somewhat enigmatic person, so this is an additional reason to be
cautious when predicting the effect of his coming to power.
But still, what happened might prove a positive development for the future
of Georgia. This was a first precedent in Georgia, but also in the
region at large, that power changed hands peacefully and constitutionally
from the government to the opposition. Not only the result of the elections
was somewhat unexpected, but also its aftermath. Most people anticipated
the government party to win and the opposition not to accept
defeat. Another narrative saw Saakashvili losing but also not accepting
defeat. In either case, this would have implied post-election turmoil and
a crisis of legitimacy of power. Therefore, there were ambivalent attitudes:
the elections were seen as constituting an opening for democracy
but also an opening for destabilization. So far it did only prove the for-
mer.
Paradoxically, the elections had their good side for Mikheil Saakashvili
and his team as well: he was vindicated in the eyes of history. Despite
criticism for autocratic transgressions (some of it just and some greatly
exaggerated), in the critical moment he proved himself to be a mature
statesman and a democratic rather than autocratic leader. This also allowed
his party to keep afloat as a democratic opposition in a new par-
liament.
Having said all that, there is no guarantee that overall, Georgia will now
progress towards a consolidated democracy. It is a widely shared concern
that after the elections Georgia may follow the pattern of Ukraine:
there too, the Orange coalition lost elections in peaceful and democratic
elections, but under the incoming government of President Victor
47
Yanukovich the country backtracked and became more autocratic than it
used to be.
There are quite a few things about Mr Ivanishvili showing that his instincts
are far from democratic: he has already displayed a wish for monopolizing
power as well as the spirit of retribution and witch-hunting.
There are also structural challenges: it will be very difficult to balance
power which is underpinned not only by administrative resources but
also by Mr. Ivanishvili’s immense personal fortune (roughly equal to
half of the country’s GDP).
This does not mean, though, that Georgia is doomed to repeat the
Ukrainian scenario. And here the western factor may play an important
role. Why? In general, Georgia lacks many important structural preconditions
for democracy. I do not only mean general socio-economic indicators:
the country is quite poor, the middle class is relatively small, and
about half of the people live in the countryside. There is also weak civil
society development, the system of political parties hardly exists, and the
dominant Church is rather influential but often takes illiberal stands.
The influence of the West somewhat compensates for the lack of internal
system of checks on central power. In critical moments of Georgia’s
political development, the West has played the role of effective (though
not formal) mediator and arbiter in internal fights. It is a major moderating
influence on Georgia’s extremely confrontational political culture.
Arguably, the influence of the West has been rather important also for
making possible the peaceful transfer of power from the government to
the opposition.
Why is this so? The most obvious answer is: because of Georgia’s commitment
to join NATO and the EU, and because of the country’s general
western vocation that makes the majority of Georgia’s people see its
future as a European nation.
This makes it the decisive point; will the new government keep that vocation
up? Before the elections, this was major question. Saakashvili’s
team described Bidzina Ivanishvili as a Russian stooge. This was not just
48
pre-election rhetoric aimed at discrediting the opponent; taking into account
Ivanishvili’s biography and his enigmatic nature, as well as the
fact that there were quite a few openly anti-western groups in his coalition,
one could have some doubts about his intended direction.
However, there were no direct proofs for these allegations; therefore the
government was justly criticized for this rhetoric. What can we say now?
The first signs after the elections are somewhat promising. Mr. Ivanishvili
and his lieutenants have made clear statements that they will continue
the pro-western foreign policy of the previous government. His
appointments to foreign and defence ministries, as well as the president
of parliament are consistent with this. There are also signs that he actually
listens to suggestions from the West.
Moreover, the peaceful transfer of power created a new momentum in
Georgia’s relations with NATO and Europe. It is widely recognized that
in October, Georgia passed a critical test of democracy so at least some
objections to Georgia’s further integration into the West should be lifted.
It is important that there is close interaction between Georgia on the one
hand and the EU and NATO on the other. This will maintain western
leverage on Georgia’s continuing democratic development.
In contrast to that, the Georgian Dream’s pre-election promises of improving
relations with Russia look somewhat empty now. Russia’s first
reactions make it certain that it is not interested in improving relations
with Georgia unless the latter makes very important strategic concessions,
which means making steps towards recognizing the independence
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and away from western integration.
These are all very preliminary remarks. The coming year will be very
important because it will show, which way Georgia really goes. Western
players can influence that.
49
A “Commission on Difficult Issues” to Improve
Russian-Georgian Relations1
Boris Kuznetsov
This amazing place2
leads us to be tolerant, patient and peaceful. I am
not prepared to defend Russia’s policies towards the South Caucasus,
especially towards Georgia. I am convinced both States have made lots
of mistakes, and much is to be learned from those mistakes, and how to
develop our relationships. I would like to bring some examples on how
we can improve our relations, and especially how we can affect ordinary
people.
We are faced with a phenomenon, after the August 2008 war; Russia has
a big Georgian community concentrated mainly in Moscow and SaintPetersburg.
I noted that the number of restaurants of Georgian cuisine
has rapidly increased after the August war. I counted in my district, in
Saint-Petersburg, where I live, seven restaurants. Before, we had only
two restaurants of Georgian cuisine. All of these restaurants are run by
native Georgians, who have relatives and friends back in Georgia. And I
asked them, “What do you think about our relations between our coun-
tries?”
Because most of them suffered from the August 2008 consequences,
they told me they would really like our relations to improve because they
really need direct flights to Tbilisi from Saint-Petersburg to see their
friends and relatives. They would like their friends to visit SaintPetersburg
also. They would like to develop our trade, to bring more and
more Georgian goods to Russia.
1
This is a verbatim transcript from Mr. Kuznetsov’s presentation, prepared and
edited by Frederic Labarre, co-chair of the Study Group Regional Stability in the
South Caucasus.
2
Château Rothschild in Reichenau, where the 6th
Conference of the Study Group
Regional Stability in the South Caucasus took place.
50
In this case, we have a clear message from ordinary people. The message
means that we should change the policy of confrontation to a policy of
gradual cooperation, step by step. I suppose that the new Georgian government
understands this clearly, as it would like to develop economic
contacts between our countries that would affect further relationships.
I can also trace the similarities between the Russian-Georgian relations
with the relations with Russia’s closest, nearest neighbour – Estonia.
Since the Bronze Soldier3
event, we have no high level political contacts
between Estonia and Russia. Moreover, Russian authorities conceive of
Estonia as an unfriendly country. Nevertheless, we see the growing tourist
flow between our countries, year by year, despite the official propaganda.
People ignore this propaganda and visit Estonia as a tourist destination.
We face the fact that on holidays, all the Estonian hotels are
over-booked with Russian travellers. This is soft power – Estonian soft
power – because Estonians give us their traditions and their culture, and
people visiting their country see what is happening in reality. It contributes
to our relationship, but we have no political contact at high level.
Another example of what I would like to bring to your attention is the
relationship between Russia and Poland. You know that we have had
very difficult times between our countries, especially when the President
of Poland was Lech Kaczynski.4
But the situation has changed since
3
What Mr. Kuznetsov refers to here is the removal of a Soviet-era statue in
downtown Tallinn, which was the focal point of many Russian-Estonians and
Estonians of Russian extraction, who commemorate the Soviet losses of the
Second World War every year. The removal of the monument, on 26 April 2007,
triggered massive riots in the Estonian capital, causing millions of Euros in
damages, killing one, injuring several dozens, and resulting in the arrest of several
hundreds. The statue was transported to the site of a military cemetery in the
suburbs of Tallinn. Estonia was then subjected to a concerted cyber-attack, the first
of its kind, and it is widely thought that it originated from Russia, or with the
Russian government’s approval and as retaliation for the removal of the statue
(Note of the editor).
4
Mr. Kaczynski died along with several other Polish officials and members of the
high-ranking military staff when the plane they were travelling in crashed in heavy
fog at Smolensk airport, in April 2010. Mr. Kaczynski and his delegation were
supposed to attend a memorial to commemorate the 70th
anniversary of the Katyn
51
2009 when then Prime Minister Putin visited Gdansk to commemorate
the 70th
anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War. There,
he (Mr. Putin) admitted that Russia – at that time the Soviet Union – had
done a lot of bad things against Poland during the Stalin regime and extended
his condolences to the Polish people.
There was a bilateral commission established – a “Commission on Difficult
Issues” – between Russia and Poland. This Commission is composed
of policy makers and experts from both sides, and has two meetings
per year; one in Warsaw and one in Moscow or Saint-Petersburg.
Policy makers and experts discuss all the difficult issues between our
countries, and try to find solutions. After that, all recommendations and
considerations are submitted to Russian and Polish authorities.
I am a member of this Commission and I see how we are really improving
relations between Russia and Poland. For example, we also established
in 2011 and 2012 a Russian-Polish Centre for Dialogue and Understanding,
and its partner, the Polish-Russian Centre for Dialogue and
Understanding, under the auspices of the Minister of Culture.
Both Centres have their own budget, estimated at some 1 million Euros.
It is not much money, but it is enough to start work, and mostly they
would like to use this money to develop contacts between youth, journalists,
experts, and organize events between the two countries that should
improve the image of Russia in Poland, and the image of Poland in Rus-
sia.
And I also hope that we will find the same solution between Russia and
Georgia. As a first step we should think about establishing such a
“Commission on Difficult Issues” to bring independent experts and to
begin this hard work together.
Forest massacre, where Soviet NKVD troops, under Josef Stalin’s orders, shot
more than 25000 Polish armed forces officers in the Spring of 1940 (Note of the
editor).
53
PART 2:
PERSPECTIVES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
FROM THE OUTSIDE: WHAT STRUCTURAL
SOLUTIONS FOR WHAT DRIVERS OF
INSTABILITY?
55
The Role of Uti Possidetis in Determining
Boundaries: Lessons for the South Caucasus
Suzanne Lalonde
The second panel of the workshop has been asked to try and identify
what structural solutions might be out there to deal with particular drivers
of instability in the South Caucasus region. I believe international
law can be a stabilizing force and that it has an important role to play in
shaping solutions. I’ve been asked to discuss, briefly, one particular international
legal principle and to evaluate its potential impact on the conflicts
plaguing the region: the uti possidetis principle.
Uti possidetis is a principle bequeathed to international law by the Roman
Empire. As originally defined under Roman law, uti possidetis constituted
a provisional remedy between two individuals based on possession
and until a final judicial determination as to ownership could be
made: uti possidetis, ita possideatis (as you possess, so may you continue
to possess). In the decolonization period of Latin America in the
19th
century, the principle resurfaced as a tool for determining the
boundaries between the newly independent Republics.
This rather obscure and neglected ‘Latin American principle’ was recently
catapulted into the limelight by the Yugoslavia Arbritration
Commission [Badinter Commission]. In its 3rd
Advisory Opinion delivered
in January 1992, the Badinter Commission recommended that the
internal boundaries which had divided the former Yugoslav Republics
should automatically become the international boundaries of the new
independent States. And the Commission declared that this conclusion
followed from the principle of uti possidetis.
Only a few short months later, in May 1992, the sovereigntist Parti Québécois
under Jacques Parizeau commissioned five renowned international
legal experts ((Franck, Higgins, Pellet, Shaw, Tomuschat)) to ad-
56
vise the Quebec government on the question of Quebec’s territorial integrity
in the event of secession [Quebec Report]. Relying heavily on the
Badinter Commission’s novel interpretation of the colonial uti possidetis
principle, the Five Experts assured the Parizeau government that in the
event of secession, Quebec could assume legal entitlement under international
law to its existing boundaries.
In the decades since Opinion No. 3 and the Quebec Report, there have
been a number of calls to extend the uti possidetis principle to other noncolonial
situations, particularly in the context of secessionist claims.
However, I believe that the idea that the uti possidetis principle can provide
a one-size-fits-all, legally incontestable solution to all territorial
disputes is an illusion. There is much to say but I will try to summarize
my two main arguments.
First, there is the very fundamental question of the legal status of the
principle. In the Canada/Quebec context, Quebec separatists argue that
in the event of a unilateral secession, the uti possidetis principle would
guarantee Quebec its current provincial territory. Indeed, uti possidetis
would eliminate the specter of partition, a key issue for undecided Qué-
bécois.
Experts in the rest of Canada are not all in agreement: On what basis
could the officials of a newly declared independent Quebec impose this
particular version of the uti possidetis principle? It would certainly not
be binding on the rest of Canada by virtue of an international treaty. In
fact, the only way it would have this binding effect on Canadian federal
authorities is if the uti possidetis principle is considered to be a customary
rule of international law. That is to say, that the practice of adhering
to the uti possidetis principle in the context of unilateral secessions is
supported by a general and consistent State practice and moreover, that
such practice is followed out of a sense of legal obligation.
In preparing for this talk, I came across at least four articles that described
the uti possidetis principle as a customary rule of international
law and those four articles referred to its general application in the context
of the decolonization of Latin America in the 19th
century in support
57
of this conclusion. I disagree with this assessment for various reasons
but in light of time constraints, I will limit my comments to a few key
points.
During the course of my doctoral studies on uti possidetis, I consulted
many of the official Latin American instruments of the independence
period and there are actually few instances where the new Republics
explicitly referred to the uti possidetis principle. It is just simply not the
case that it was “generally applied” by the former Iberian colonies; there
is in fact no generalized practice to be discovered in the official documents.
Worse, there were competing versions of the principle among the
newly independent Republics; uti possedetis juris, uti possidetis de
facto, uti possidetis of 1821, uti possidetis before independence, etc.
States relied on one particular version of the principle in negotiations
with one neighbour and then in light of political calculations, abandoned
it for another version in their dealings with a second neighbour. Thus,
not only is there no generalized practice, there is also no consistent prac-
tice.
Also, in 19th
century Latin America, the colonial administrators knew
very little about the vast Spanish and Portuguese territories under their
authority. As a consequence, even when two or three newly independent
States could agree on a particular version of the uti possidetis principle
and accepted that the determination of their boundaries should be resolved
on the basis of that principle, more often than not it proved impossible
to establish where the Spanish or Portuguese line had actually
been drawn; the official colonial maps and documents proved to be
hopelessly flawed. Thus, even in those few arbitrations where the Parties
did try to apply the uti possidetis principle, the disputes ultimately had to
be resolved on the basis of other principles: equity or effective occupation
or natural, geographical features. The final point about the Latin
American experience with the uti possidetis principle is that the consent
of all the parties involved was essential; it was never imposed on an unwilling
party.
The decolonization process of the African continent adds very little relevant
State practice in terms of the customary nature of the uti possidetis
58
principle. It must also be strongly emphasized that the practice considered
to this point has all been colonial State practice. There is in fact, no
trace of the uti possidetis principle in any of the official speeches, pronouncement
or documents of the African independence period: not in the
1963 OAU Charter or the 1964 Cairo Resolution.
There was no need for the African leaders to rely on the uncertain and
impractical Latin American principle of uti possidetis. The combination
of two classic, fundamental international legal rights – the right of selfdetermination,
which was territorially defined and was granted to each
colonial people as a whole, together with the right to territorial integrity
– guaranteed the territorial status quo in Africa.
However, in their 1992 Quebec Report the Five Experts argued that recent
post-colonial State practice had revealed the existence of a generalized
opinio juris in favour of the uti possidetis principle. And in support
of this extension of the principle, they referred to the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Yet, it must be emphasized that in
both of those cases, the dissolution of the parent State resulted from
agreement and thus created no precedent for cases of contested seces-
sion.
The 1991 Minsk Agreement, a key document for the transition to independence
of the former USSR Republics, refers to the territorial integrity
and the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth and
these principles are then reiterated in the Alma Ata Declaration. How
can these clear and unambiguous references to such fundamental legal
principles as territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers be
treated as the application of the uti possidetis principle? To make such a
claim, I feel, is to mistakenly believe that uti possidetis has become the
incarnation of all the various rules and principles which contribute to the
resolution of boundary issues. In addition, it also disregards fundamental
rules on treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.
As for the case of Yugoslavia, as long as the Slovenian and Croatian
declarations of independence were characterized as secession attempts,
59
the international community reiterated its commitment to the territorial
integrity of the Yugoslav Federation. It was only after the Badinter
Commission’s critical and controversial finding that the process unfolding
in Yugoslavia was one of dissolution and not secession that recognition
was entertained and the issue of boundaries raised. Furthermore, an
analysis of official pronouncements during the critical period reveals
that political rather than legal considerations accounted for the ultimate
solution adopted in resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Certainly there seems
to be no evidence of a belief that international law dictated a particular
outcome.
It is therefore highly disputable whether these three post-colonial precedents
meet the definition of custom.
My second main argument is that even if it is accepted that the uti possidetis
principle cannot be imposed on unwilling parties but rather that
its application must be based on the consent or mutual agreement of all
the parties involved, there is still a huge problem in terms of the outcome.
As interpreted by the Badinter Commission and the Five Experts,
the colonial uti possidetis has undergone a fundamental and unjustifiable
transformation.
In Latin America, the declared principle was respect for the colonial
administrative divisions existing at the time of independence. However
this commitment concerned lines dividing units which the struggle for
independence had already placed under the control of new international
actors. In some cases, a new State might embrace several audiencias (a
Spanish administrative unit) as in the case of Colombia prior to 1830, of
Mexico or of Peru. In other cases, States were formed on the basis of
smaller administrative units within an audiencia as in the case of Paraguay
and Uruguay. In other cases, the new State was founded on a larger
unit – a vice-royalty – as in the case of Argentina. In the African context,
devolution is a legal act with territorial implications.
The critical point is that both in Latin America and Africa, two separate
and distinct processes were at work: first, the identification of the presumptive
units of statehood, whether by virtue of the principle of effec-
60
tiveness or force of arms in the case of Latin America or the right of
self-determination of colonial peoples in the case of Africa; and then, in
a second phase, the determination of the boundaries of those entities
through the application of various principles, including uti possidetis.
As Angelet has so aptly commented, the principle of uti possidetis can
only fulfil its stabilizing role on condition that the beneficiary of the
principle is designated beforehand. For in the absence of such a designation,
the uti possidetis principle can generate a multitude of solutions
depending on whether independence is proclaimed at one or the other
level of organization of the Predecessor State.
Yet outside the colonial context, international law does not designate
such beneficiaries. The uti possidetis principle as defined in 19th
century
Latin America cannot account for the Badinter Commission’s preindependence
selection of the Yugoslav Republican borders and only the
Republican borders as the new international boundaries. Why choose
administrative boundaries between constituent republics but not administrative
boundaries between autonomous provinces? No longer an afterthe-fact
presumption as to the location of boundaries between States who
have achieved independence, the principle is now deemed to apply in
advance of formal independence and is used to determine the units entitled
to achieve statehood. Why Slovenia but not Kosovo? Why the province
of Quebec but not the northern lands of the Cree Indian nation?
Such a discriminatory treatment of the aspirations of peoples can only
have troubling consequences, as the eventual conflict in Kosovo eloquently
confirmed.
My conclusion is simple but I think important to ongoing negotiating
processes in the South Caucasus: there is no automatic solution to the
territorial question. The principle of uti possidetis is not a panacea and
should not be seen as a cure-all. Indeed, Latin America and Africa bear
witness to the fact that in the process of formation of new States, unchangeable
administrative borders will not always maximize stability
and public order. This is true also of the South Caucasus.
61
What is perhaps needed is a return to the Roman law origins of the principle.
Uti possidetis, as a provisional solution, would operate so as to
preserve the status quo but only until the parties involved could resolve
their competing claims. Withholding recognition until boundary issues
had been peacefully resolved would constitute a powerful incentive for
the arbitration of boundary disputes. A provisional status quo would
help avoid conflict by providing a clear solution during the critical period.
Existing boundaries would necessarily deserve consideration and
some deference, but decision-makers would have the opportunity to consider
whether a significantly better line could be drawn.
Existing lines could be evaluated as to their suitability as international
boundaries in terms of the age of the line, the process by which the line
was drawn and the viability of the entities on either side of the line. Furthermore,
a flexible uti possidetis principle would allow a consideration
of alternatives to take into account minorities trapped within the new
States and the respect of human rights.
Condemnation of the use of force to change the status quo - clearly warranted
in the context of Yugoslavia - need not necessarily coincide with
the legal transformation of the status quo into a permanent solution by
default. If the international community decides to intervene and to guarantee
the boundaries of internal units in the context of the break-up of a
State, then that decision - if agreed to or enforced - may have operative
effect. This was essentially the outcome in Yugoslavia, where a decision
initially taken only at the European level, was subsequently adopted and
applied by the UN and endorsed in the Dayton Peace Accords. The crux
of the matter is not to confuse this political process with pre-existing
requirements of international law with regard to internal boundaries.
63
Learning from the Others: Patterns of
Secessionism Before and After Partition
Pierre Jolicoeur
In this presentation, I will discuss some rarely studied aspects of secessionism
and partitions, namely 1) the extent to which external support
contributes to the success or failure of a secessionist movement; 2) secessionism
as a response to the way a State manages its ethnic diversity;
and 3) whether a post-partition society would be more stable than the
pre-partition order.
External Support – a Key Factor for Successful Secession?
Outside support has always been seen as critical to the chances that a
secessionist movement will fail or succeed (Horowitz 1985).
In particular supply in armaments, funding and bases are generally seen
as decisive assets for secessionist groups in their endeavour to become
independent. However, overcoming the old order is not sufficient as a
definition of secessionist success. There has to be a moment that “makes
authority”, which is legitimate, and which legitimizes at the same time in
the eyes of the separatist sympathisers, their supporters, as well as their
opponents, not to mention the uncommitted members of the international
community. This “moment of authority” is generated by the recognition
of the new order. Obtaining international recognition is just as important,
if not even more crucial for the success of secessionist movements.
In addition to the psychological motivation of seeking recognition, there
are practical implications as well. For instance, international recognition
allows secessionist groups to join international organisations, to have
access to funding from international institutions, and to participate in the
club of countries in dealing with international relations. Those advan-
64
tages are critical to future stability (both intra-national and regional) because
they offer platforms for dialogue, which, in addition to consolidating
the legitimacy of the new order, remove the incentive to use violence
for the separatists to have their voices heard.
Furthermore, the success of secession depends on the ability of the new
order to shape the economic future of its constituents. In today’s regimented
international economic relations, access to World Bank funds or
International Monetary Fund programmes, not to mention participation
in the World Trade Organization are essential for prosperity, and prosperity
is the best guarantor of continued stability.
A contrario, secessionist groups without international recognition dwell
in ambiguous situations, a sort of political purgatory where economic
exchanges and international relations remain at an informal unofficial
level. Often, these economic exchanges will take place in black market
conditions, where smuggling can become a security risk for other international
actors, prompting their intervention. Again, there is a clear line
of consequence between unfulfilled national aspirations and unresolved
disputes about sovereignty. These consequences affect everyone in a
region, and sometimes beyond. This is why support and recognition is
believed to be important in determining success of secessionist movements,
insofar as success also means the future stability of the new order.
In most cases, international support and recognition will explain the
success or failure of secessionist enterprises.
However why do some secessionist groups obtain international support
and recognition while others don’t? As we have seen from Suzanne
Lalonde’s contribution, international law is of some – but only limited help.
Of course there are fundamental principles of international law. It
seems though that these principles are applied only as long as the states
deem to do it. As much as certain countries – especially the weaker ones
– and separatist groups would like it, the “rule of international law” is
capricious.
In most cases, geopolitics – i.e. Realism – is way more successful in
explaining why a state accepts to recognise a newly created one. For
65
instance, an interesting theory explaining the behaviour of states is the
“vulnerability of the state”. Vulnerability is here defined as exposure to
outside pressure, to challenges to the independence of the existing order.
The presence of potentially secessionist groups within a country, the
weakness of a government’s authority, the exposure to foreign pressures
is important parts of the explanation.
Because international law is of limited help and much depends on the
power relations of states, there is absolutely no guarantee that a secessionist
movement will obtain one day international recognition. The existence
of de facto states over several decades is a perfect illustration of
that phenomenon, even though the number of such de facto states is extremely
limited. Most cases (Biafra, Katanga, Somaliland, Cyprus,
Transdnistria… and of course some Caucasian polities) have to be considered
as secessionist failures because features of international or internal
relations remain unresolved.
Since the end of the Second World War, Bangladesh is the only real case
of successful secession, and potentially Kosovo can be considered as the
most recent example of a successful secession. But again, insofar as stability
is concerned, we have to factor in their ability to integrate the
global economy. Lately, Kosovo and Serbia appear to have made a
breakthrough in stabilising their relations by jointly monitoring their
common borders.
Secessionism and Management of Ethnic Diversity
The discussion of patterns of secessionist movements would be incomplete
if it focussed solely on a state’s international behaviour. The internal
behaviour of a state (i.e. how it deals with minority groups) is just as
important. The rationale is that the absence of legitimate political space
for minorities to air their grievances will be substituted by covert action,
taking the form of political subversion or violence.
Different experiences in this respect can teach us some important lessons
useful to establish better practices in managing ethnic diversity. This
66
leads me to introduce what certain authors refer to as the discrimination/accommodation
debate (McGarry, O’Reilly, 1993).
Of course, States can be repressive and use violence in order to extinguish
any secessionist movement or attempt of mobilization of internal
ethnic communities. But not only is this method reprehensible, this kind
of behaviour is generally not a success. It may temporarily succeed in
eradicating the mobilization, but at the expense of human rights. It may
attract the negative attention of great powers and international institu-
tions.
However, most of the time, this kind of behaviour triggers renewed attempts
at mobilization and often produces more violence from the ethnic
minorities’ side. Repressive tools are commonly used especially by authoritarian
States, but are the least successful in terms of managing diversity.
Even though great powers do not always an interest in the stakes
in play, this is definitely not a path that the international community
wants to encourage.
Instead of discriminating against their minorities, states can also use
different forms of accommodation. There is a lively debate about which
institutions work best to accommodate ethnic minorities, what incentives
they create, and what influence they have on the propensity of ethnic
groups to mobilize and seek secession.
Federal institutions and decentralization (political autonomy) are sometimes
thought to be slippery slopes leading to secession (Roeder 1991,
Bunce 1999, Cornell 2002). Others contend, however, that such institutions
actually calm down, rather than nurture, separatist tendencies (Stepan
1999, Bermeo 2002). In other words, making space for a minority
should not be seen as legitimation of its grievances, or right to separate.
Scholars have made progress in understanding this “paradox” (Anderson)
by analysing the conditions under which responsive policies of decentralisation
have one effect rather than the other.
There still is no consensus on this question. Nevertheless, a trend seems
to emerge from the following analysts; Hechter (2000) argues that
67
“…decentralization may provide cultural minorities with greater resources
to engage in collective action… at the same time, it may also
erode the demand for sovereignty”. Kholi (1997) makes a related argument
about “accommodation from a strong state increasing instability in
the short term, but decreasing instability in the long term”, whereas Lustic
(2004) concluded that “increasing representativeness in fact decreased
secessionist activity… representative institutions, even if not
fully autonomous, thus seem to inhibit secessionism”. At the same time,
he also says that “rigorous repression can prevent mobilization, but only
in the short term… at a great cost and without eliminating the threat of
secessionism”.
Power sharing can be seen as more effective in the long term, yet it also
tends to encourage larger minorities to develop “identity movements”.
Northern Ireland, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea are often cited as powersharing
successes because they reduced the use of violence by secessionist
groups by integrating and including these groups in decision-making.
However, Nigeria, Lebanon, Cyprus, by contrast, are reminders that
even carefully designed power-sharing institutions are far from being a
panacea, and can sometimes exacerbate problems in divided societies. If
we were to extend these models to the South Caucasus, we would still
have no guarantee for the ultimate outcome on stability.
Bakke and Wibbels (2006) argue that fiscal decentralisation increases
the likelihood of ethnic rebellion when there are important income disparities
across regions. In addition, they found that when a strong national
party excludes ethnic regions from national governance, ethnic
conflict is more likely to occur. Essentially, they showed that the effect
of federalism is contingent on underlying social features, especially ethnic
group concentration and regional economic inequality.
All of these studies contribute to explain the incidence of secessionist
movements. Institutional arguments, exploring the role of federalism,
also try to answer a number of important questions including:
68
1. Why, despite decades of federal arrangements, secession happens
at certain junctures, but not at others?
2. How secession can occur in the absence of federal arrangements?
3. Why secession happened in pre-federal times, say from the Habsburg
and Ottoman empires, where none possessed federal institutions
and very few possessed autonomous any form of autonomy?
In general we can say that secessionists react to the state’s actions, both
present and past, and not only to the state’s inaction, weakness, and/or
institutions. Whether state policies tend toward inclusion, status quo or
exclusion is likely to influence the minority leaders’ reaction ranging
from secession to a less radical pursuit of autonomy.
After Secession Scenarios: Will They Bring Stability?
Talking about secession cannot be limited to examining the struggle for
separation (vs. territorial integrity), but has also to consider scenarios of
what will happen after the event of secession. In the end, that is the real
definition of success.
Secession, much like partition after civil war, does not resolve ethnic
conflicts, but merely reorders them and may potentially create new
forms of violence.
One reason is that the successful independence creates incentives for
new groups within the newly created state to gather and to mobilize.
Another reason is that individuals often possess more than one ethnic
identity from which to choose, which is likely to be influenced by the
new institution setting, and the aggregation of these choices may make a
country look quite different than it did before independence. Chechnya
is a good example of that phenomenon, and so is the former Yugoslavia,
with the region of Sandžak in Serbia, or in Macedonia, with the Presevo
Valley. Because international law on recognition is thought to have a life
of its own, separatist groups think they can bank on it to legitimise secession,
and so the apparent ease of the process encourages further
69
fragmentation based on ethnic identity, and not on how this ethnic group
has been treated within a greater polity.
This said, the problem of accommodating ethnic groups, whether long
established or newly constructed, is not to be taken for granted in new
states. “Nationalizing states”, as R. Brubaker calls them (1995), can
make life for new minorities so unbearable that the risky struggle to fight
their own way out through secession becomes relatively attractive.
Of course, this debate would be moot if states could more or less peacefully
agree to part ways, as did Norway-Sweden or Slovakia-Czech Republic
or Iceland-Denmark. This is, in fact, in law, and in practice the
only way to secure future stability in secessionist contests. But states
willing to part peacefully with a portion of their territory are extremely
rare.
Bibliography
Bakke, K., and E. Wibbels (2006), “Diversity, Disparity and Civil Conflict
in Federal States”, World Politics, No. 59, pp. 1-50.
Bermeo, N. (2002), The Import of Institutions”, Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 13, No 2, pp. 96-110.
Brubaker, R., (1995), “National Minorities, Nationalizing States and
External National Homelands in the New Europe”, Deadalus,
Vol. 124, No. 2, pp. 107-132.
Bunce, V. (1999), Subversive Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Cornell, S. E. (2002), “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian
Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective”, World Politics, Vol. 54,
No. 2, pp. 245-276.
70
Erk, J., and L. M. Anderson (2010), The Paradox of Federalism; Does
Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?, London:
Routledge.
Hechter, M. (2000), Containing Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Kholi, A. (1997), “The Bell Curve of Ethnic Politics: The Rise and Decline
of Self-Determination Movements in India”, in W.
Danspeckgruber (Ed.), Self-Determination and Self Administration:
A Sourcebook, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 309-336.
Lustic, I. (2004), “Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Power
Sharing Prevent or Encourage it?”, American Political Science
Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, pp. 209-229.
McGarry, J., and B. O’Reilly (1993), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict
Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London:
Routledge.
Roeder, P. (1991), “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization”, World
Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 202-222.
Stepan, A. (1999), “Federalism and Democracy”, Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 19-34.
71
Energy Competition in the South Caucasus: Driver
of Stability or Instability?
Régis Genté
I will speak about energy as a driver of instability in the South Caucasus.
That’s not an easy topic as thousands of articles were written on the subject
in the last 20 years. We know that wars can happen indeed because
of the energy search, the will to control export routes, etc. Could it also
be the case in the South Caucasus? I will answer as a journalist, basing
my opinion on some things I have observed for the last ten years in the
region and pointing out some details we don’t pay enough attention to,
in my opinion.
When I came to work in the region, ten years ago, I had the following
questions in mind: why is the South Caucasus so unstable? Is it because
of its hydrocarbons reserves, and the ones of the Caspian region that are
or could be evacuated through the Caucasus? Would this region be so
instable if it wouldn’t have 3-4% of the world hydrocarbons reserves in
its subsoil? Sometimes, reading the press and academic analysis, I feel
that there is a prejudice to say that this instability is nurtured by the thirst
for oil and gas.
If we take quick look into the South Caucasus history, in the 20th
century,
we see that there were three major periods of instabilities and war.
Let’s see if energy appetites were the cause of them:
• At the end of the First World War: Even if Baku was already seen
as attractive because of its oil deposits, the instability wasn’t due
to energy. The then instability was almost only a political and geopolitical
fight, between big regional and world players. The new
Bolshevik regime was trying to keep the borders it “inherited”
from the Tsarist regime. The Turkish republic, after the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire, was trying to establish its national territory
72
and to create a kind of Turkish sphere of influence. The Western
powers, such as the UK or France, wanted to contain these two
new regimes. In some extent indeed, there were also looking at the
oil deposits but it was obviously not their main goal.
• During the Second World War: if war came to Caucasus, it was in
this case indeed because of the oil thirst. The Wehrmacht tried to
pass the Caucasian mountains because it needed badly to get Baku
oil.
• At the end of the Cold War: The situation then is more complex,
so to speak. The three Caucasian separatist conflicts were not
about oil and gas. We may think that Russia was manipulating the
conflict in order to keep control over the South Caucasus and the
Caspian region’s hydrocarbons wealth. But that’s difficult to assert,
because Russia at that time was then very weak, chaotic and
divided on the policy to follow in the South Caucasus. Army intelligence
was not thinking like the Foreign Ministry; the Foreign
Ministry was not thinking like the security services’ successors…
which were not thinking like the Ministry of Defence, etc. But after
some years, Russia having recovered, the tensions in the region
became more and more about oil and gas. The West fuelled these
tensions by showing a big interest for the Caspian deposits. We
remember how Western experts, oil firms, or diplomats exaggerated
the potential volume of reserves in the Caspian basin, speaking
about 200 billion barrels while it is in reality 6 times less at
least.
It is in this context that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was
built, while investors were not sure that the project would be economically
sustainable. It was a political project. But again, nobody can say
that this rivalry between the West and Russia was only about oil and gas,
but it seems that hydrocarbons were a pretext for a geopolitical fight as a
kind of prolongation of the Cold war.
73
If now, I’m coming to what I could observe this last decade, let me
speak about two events or rather series of events:
The 2008 Georgian-Russian war
It wasn’t first of all about oil and gas. I remember how during the conflict
the Russian leadership was constantly reminding the Western countries
of the Kosovo recognition, the NATO bombing of Belgrade, and of
the Iraq invasion. Their message was that the West should not anymore
weaken Moscow in the international arena. This war was for Russia
about regaining its place as a power we have to take into consideration
in big decisions to be taken about the world, or at least in the wider re-
gion.
The Kremlin’s martial rhetoric about the South Caucasus is often motivated
by the Moscow claim to get the place Russia believes it deserves
in the world community. It was indeed again the case a year ago; when
Moscow felt that it could lose its influence in the Middle East (Israel
was speaking more about strikes on Iran while the West was asking Assad
to step down in Syria).
Two events, during the 2008 war, were directly connected to oil and gas.
The first one is the launch of a few bombs close to the BTC, in the South
of Tbilisi. Georgian authorities interpreted this bombing, which was not
aiming at damaging the oil pipeline, as the sending of a message: “We
can destroy your oil pipes if we want.” Certainly, Russia could, but it
didn’t want to go into a direct confrontation with the West. That’s an
illustration of how the Caucasus is at the moment a place where proxy
wars can happen.
The second event is the train carrying oil wagons which exploded at the
end of August 2008, after it ran on a mine put on the railway around
Gori city. Again, it seems to have been the sending of the same clear
message.
74
It seems that 2008 war was about big politics. As Tolstoï says, in War
and Peace, wars happen because of plenty of causes, and no one is the
only reason of it. But obviously energy thirst can contribute heavily to
fuel the flames. That’s probably why in 1994, the Azeri President Heydar
Aliyev did his best to include Russia in the “deal of the century”,
giving finally to Lukoil 10% of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field. This
man, who knew as nobody the Kremlin’s inner logic, thought giving a
share to Russia in the project was the best way not to anger Moscow and
eventually push it to destabilize the South Caucasus.
The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Issue
Let me first remind you two figures, which are strangely always underestimated.
These last few years, Gazprom’s volume of exports to Europe
was around 30% of its production. This little one third represented about
two thirds of Gazprom’s income. It means that Kremlin’s political ambitions
are for a huge part coming from the Gazprom’s sales to Europe.
That’s why, in my understanding, Moscow was so tough on the Nabucco
issue, and consequently with the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.
I never heard any Russian official, whether politicians or energy specialists,
saying a single word against the Chinese gas pipelines projects in
Turkmenistan even if exports reach about 40 billion cubic meters (bcm)
or more per year. For me, it is clear that Moscow is glad to see these
huge amounts of gas going to East… and not to the market Gazprom
wants to keep as much as possible for itself, Europe. The pipeline war,
between the Nabucco/EU project and the Moscow/South Stream competitor
project, is rooted in this will to keep for Russia the European
market. And all the controversies, for example on the real amount of gas
reserves in Turkmenistan, on the Trans-Caspian pipeline are also coming
from the same reason.
In 2011, there was even some threatening Russian rhetoric towards Ashgabat.
It was not formulated by Russian officials, but by experts reportedly
quite close to the Kremlin and Gazprom. Somebody like the Turkmen
President, Gourbanguly Berdymukhamedov, probably didn’t fear a
75
Russian military invasion. But he knows how the Kremlin can play a big
role to overthrow a post-Soviet president. He knows how Moscow heavily
contributed to kick out the Kyrgyz President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in
April 2010.
Europe didn’t understand, or didn’t want to understand, what Turkmenistan
has been saying since 2007, that it really wants to diversify its clientele;
“everyone is welcome to take our gas at our border.” When Mr.
Barroso went to Baku and Ashgabat in early 2012, he encouraged the
Turkmen leader to be more courageous. But what Turkmens are saying
is that it is to the EU to be more courageous. Taking Turkmen gas to
Turkmenistan’s borders means taking it on the Eastern shores of the
Caspian Sea. It means that it is Brussels who has to deal with Moscow to
get an agreement to allow building a gas pipe under the Caspian Sea.
Ashgabat thinks, and it is probably true, that it is too weak to challenge
Moscow on such an issue.
Conclusion
To conclude, let me remark three things:
1) Indeed energy has rarely been the main driver of instability in the
South Caucasus, but it can become so potentially.
2) If Europe wants to get Turkmen gas, it needs to engage Russia in a
big bargain to be “allowed” to lay a gas pipeline under the Caspian
Sea. For example, it supposes giving Russia the possibility to
benefit from Western technology to modernize its energy industry
and improve its terribly low energy efficiency. But the EU, which
is divided, seems far from ready for such a discussion.
3) What I say might change slightly with the shale gas revolution.
Nobody knows at the moment what will be the impact of that revolution.
But as America won’t import gas anymore, who knows if
they will keep a very strong position in the Caucasus to defend the
“Western” pipelines projects. Who knows if Europe, which will
76
buy more liquid natural gas (LNG) from Qatar for example, will
really fight to get Turkmen gas in the future? More importantly,
who knows what will Russia’s strategy be to counter the shale gas
revolution?
77
The South Caucasus: Russia’s Perspective
Nikolay Petrov
Russia: Outsider and Insider to the Region
What makes Russia an insider? It is geography, first of all, with the Russian
North Caucasus ‘internal abroad’ as it is called by some experts,
which is an organic part of the region, inseparable from its southern
counterpart beyond the Caucasian range. There is an extremely complicated
ethnic mix there with close relatives from both sides of Caucasian
mountains. There are also ‘divided nations’ – Lezgins in southern Daghestan
and northern Azerbaijan and Ossetians both in Russia (North Ossetia)
and Georgia (South Ossetia).
Second, there are big ethnic Caucasian diasporas not only in North Caucasus
(Armenian, first of all), but everywhere in Russia including in
Moscow, where number of ethnic Azeri, Georgian and Armenian nationals
in total is equal or even exceeds the population of individual
South Caucasian states.
Finally, there are very intensive business connections, which have direct
political implications. One can recall the Russian-Georgian tycoon
Bedzina Ivanishvili, who became the prime minister of Georgia in October
2012, and the recent case of well-known Azeri moguls and public
figures in late September 2012 establishing the Union of Azeri organiza-
tions.
Russia’s Problems with North Caucasus
The North Caucasus is the remains of the former Soviet empire and
many of its current problems originated in the USSR. Being an ‘internal
78
abroad’ as some experts put it, it creates the biggest challenge for Russia
now.
There are both specific regional problems and all-Russian problems like
weak institutions, huge corruption etc., which reach extreme expression
in the region. Proper Caucasian problems are connected not so much
with poverty, but with huge inequality, lack of social development and
archaic clan social organization.
The scale of problems there which have been accumulating since before
the Soviet era, even in czarist time and has huge meaning. Among other
things, problems can’t be fixed without implementing a long-term and
painful strategy which carries risks of instability. The problem is that the
Russian government, being overwhelmed by short-term tactical consideration,
is hardly in a position to work out and to implement such a strat-
egy.
It started in 2003, when on the eve of forthcoming presidential elections
Vladimir Putin, in order to demonstrate the glorious character of his war
in Chechnya, decided to install one of the Chechnya’s warlords Ahmed
Kadyrov. In exchange for his personal loyalty, he helped him against
other warlords, which created a vision that the war is over and the situation
is under control. Since that time Putin is hostage to a choice he
made in 2003.
Instead of trying to deal with the essence of Caucasian problems Moscow
is saturating them by money, trying to buy loyalty from local elites.
Not only is it ineffective, but it is counter-productive because it maintains
or even increases social inequality.
Public Opinion and Ethnic Tensions
The Russian perspective about the Caucasus and the wider security problems
of that region are provided by the Levada Centre’s 2011 Annual
Report. The figures that follow come from that report, and indicate the
79
tendency of public opinion, also as it relates to the Federal authorities
handling of tensions in the region.1
When answering the question whether some ethnic groups should be
limited to live in Russia, respondents put ‘Caucasians’ in first place
(39% in 2011), ahead of Chinese (30%) and those who originate from
Central Asia (26%). The phobia against ‘Caucasians’ replaced anti-
Semitism.
42 per cent think that Russian authorities will never manage to provide
order and peaceful life in the Caucasus, and another 38 per cent think
that it is possible but in many years, while 13 per cent think that Chechnya
and maybe other North Caucasian republics will secede from Russia.
When answering the question whether Russian authorities can control
the situation at the Caucasus the share of those answering in the affirmative
(49%) almost doesn’t differ from the share of those answering
in the negative (40%). This is nevertheless a great amelioration as some
years ago the latter dominated in a 2:1 proportion.
However only 5 per cent think that Federal authorities now control the
situation in the Caucasus entirely, another 29 per cent more think that
the Federal level controls the situation most of all, while 43 per cent
think that they control the situation to a lesser extent, and 10 per cent
think that authorities don’t control the situation at all. Almost two thirds
(62%) think that the war in the Caucasus will continue decreasing in
intensity, but that this will be a long-term process. Evidence for this tendency
is provided in Table 1.
As a mean to fix problems of North Caucasus tougher control over North
Caucasians coming into Russia is at first place (36%), 26 per cent would
use all the Russian Army might to mercilessly crush secessionist movements
forever, 18 per cent got both peaceful solution including negotiations
with separatists and militants, from one side, and breaking North
1
Levada-Center Annual Report ‘Public Opinion-2011’,
http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/levada_2011_0.pdf
80
Caucasus away from Russia while maintaining open the possibility for
those who want to resettle in Central Russia.
With regard to Chechnya 11 per cent consider that its secession has already
taken place, 23 per cent would be glad if it did take place, while
28 per cent would not worry if so, with only 12 per cent being against
such an opportunity and 13 per cent more being ready to oppose such a
development by all means including military.
When answering the question whether life in Russia will become more
or less calm and peaceful in case the North Caucasian republics secede,
respondents are split half and half.
With regard to the slogan ‘Let’s stop feeding the Caucasus’ 28 per cent
definitely support it with another 34 per cent rather supporting it. Another
18 per cent don’t support it and only 6 per cent definitely don’t
support it.
Public Attitude toward Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
The knowledge concerning Russia’s relations with the South Caucasus
states is not that big with Armenia and Azerbaijan being in the second
echelon of countries to be known as Confederation of Independent States
(CIS) members (27 and 22 per cent respectfully). 12 per cent of respondents
were mistaken in thinking that Georgia is a CIS member as well
along with Abkhazia (12%) and South Ossetia (9%). The balance of
positive and negative attitude toward Georgia which has been oscillating
over the last decade from +10% to -20% has reached -60% in late 2008,
and now moves to 0.
The usual speculations about Armenia being brother in faith and a Russian
bastion in the Caucasus endure. It’s not so evident in public opinion
where Armenia goes eighth (11%) in the list of friends and allies, with
Azerbaijan being tenth (9%) and Georgia 36th
(2%) just near South Korea
(2%) and Iran (1%). Georgia leads in the list of Russia’s enemies
81
(50%) being far ahead of everybody else, with Azerbaijan (5%) and Armenia
being neighbours once again in 14th
and 16th
position.
Table 1: Terrorist attacks in North Caucasus, 2010-2012 2
2
Source: Kavkazsky Uzel site
83
Structural Solutions for Drivers of Instability:
Perspectives from Turkey
Burcu Gültekin Punsmann
The evolution of the security situation in the Caucasus region at the end
of the Cold War has had a direct impact on Turkey’s security. The days
of Turkey sharing a land border with the USSR ended and Turkey rediscovered
her new neighbours. This evolution is first considered as a main
strategic gain: for the first time in several centuries (with the exception
of 1918-1920) Turkey and Russia have no land border. Turkey recognized
the newly independent post-Soviet Republics before the United
States and other Western powers in 1991.
However the instability which arisen from the power vacuum in the region
became a source of concern for Turkey. Turkey which has traditionally
avoided being involved in regional politics has been drawn into
volatile new conflicts in the Caucasus. Celebrations of the fall of the
Soviet Union have been short-lived. The newly rediscovered Caucasian
borderlands transformed the Turkish-Soviet border in an area of instability
and brought the risk of a direct confrontation with Russia, reminding
of the recurrent Turkish-Russian wars of the past century.
The conflicts are spilling over into Turkey. Turkey discovered her own
Caucasian identity and became an insider to regional dynamics. The
Chechen, the Georgian-Abkhazian and the Nagorno-Karabakh wars have
become part of the domestic Turkish agenda with large parts of the
population showing sympathy for one or another of the conflicting sides.
According to some unofficial data – censuses in Turkey don’t collect
any data on the ethnic descents of the population – the total number of
Chechens and Abkhazians in Turkey can outweigh the populations of
Chechnya and Abkhazia proper. The Diasporas can therefore emerge as
powerful and unsettling lobbies within Turkey.
84
Generally speaking, Turkey’s policy towards the South Caucasian Republics
aims at the strengthening of political institutions, the fostering of
economic viability and military reforms. In this respect Turkey’s approach
to the region precedes the launch of the Euro-Atlantic integration
processes. The independence, sovereignty and stability of the region are
considered as important for Turkey’s own security and regional ambitions.
In the second half of the years 2000, economic growth and internal
political stability allowed Turkey to increase considerably its external
action capacities in its neighbourhood.
The need to project stability beyond its borders is more than mere rhetoric
in the case of Turkey. It defines a real strategic objective. Turkey’s
neighbourhood policy as formulated by the Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Davutoglu, aims at helping to secure and nurture a peaceful,
prosperous, stable and cooperative environment conducive to human
development at home and its neighbourhood. This proves to be a difficult
challenge in the complex and conflicting environment where Turkey
is located.
More specifically, five different range of factors are underlying Turkey’s
approach to South Caucasus: 1) Balancing of its NATO commitments;
2) The development of good neighbourly relations with Russia have indeed
become the major strategic gain at the end of the Cold War; 3) the
shared interest with Georgia in positioning itself as a transit hub for hydrocarbons.
Furthermore Georgia has become Turkey’s gateway to the
rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia after the closure of its border with
Armenia; 4) the sense of solidarity with Azerbaijan claimed to be based
on ethnic kinship, which is conditioned domestically to a large extent by
a nationalistic discourse; 5) and finally, the historically fraught relationship
with Armenia and current impossibility to normalize intergovernmental
relations between Ankara and Yerevan.
Has Turkey been able to develop leverages powerful enough to impact
positively on the regional and domestic dynamics in South Caucasus?
Turkey’s role in South Caucasus cannot be analyzed separately from its
broader relationship with Russia. Throughout the last decade, Turkey
has grown more deferential towards Russia’s regional strategic interests.
85
Turkey tries to work with rather than against Russia. Paradoxically this
deferential attitude doesn’t represent a limitation; it enlarges Turkey’s
room for manoeuvre and underlines Russia’s implicit acceptance of Turkey
in the post-Soviet geography.
Turkey is a factor that has to be dealt with in security equations. Turkey
and Azerbaijan signed a defence pact which includes a mutual assistance
clause. Its signature has been possible with Russia’s implicit understanding
of its more symbolical aspect; this explains the latter’s restrained
reaction. Turkey has been acting as a security provider for the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline and by extension to Georgia; although its
security-based relationship with Turkey has been overshadowed by
NATO and US involvement. One can argue that the Turkish factor
proved its efficiency during the 2008 war which opposed Georgia to
Russia by providing security to the port of Batumi and the airport of
Tbilisi. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas
pipeline became facts on the ground respectively in June 2006 and
March 2007. The region matters therefore for Turkey’s energy security.
Turkey’s actions in South Caucasus face serious limitations as long as it
can’t have a direct influence on the dynamics of conflict settlement. The
proximity to the region is both an aide and hindrance to diplomacy. Turkey
is too close to the theatre. Its capacity to use hard power is seriously
restricted not much because of its lack of freedom of action and independence
but because of the risks it involves. The decision to send
troops across borders can have far-reaching consequences.
Turkey’s main contribution can be in reshaping the geopolitical discourse
in the region away from a grand chessboard of great power confrontation.
The future of the region depends on its re-orientation away
from regional polarization. It is necessary to promote pragmaticallyoriented
approaches based on self-interest and business initiatives, and to
stress the importance of economic competition, rather than political confrontation
and domination.
86
The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform announced in the context
of the 2008 war could have been a significant step ahead in this respect.
It is unfortunate that it had remained short-lived. Regional momentum
triggered from inside can develop the much-needed sense of
accountability and ownership. Inclusiveness requires a healthy communication
with all without any discrimination. A pragmatic approach can
help to build trust and cooperation in the context of mistrust and mutually
perceived threats.
Turkey has the potential to support transformation and reform processes
within the societies of South Caucasus through soft power means. Turkey
is the only country that can compete with the soft power of Russia in
the region. Its force of attraction is based on economic growth and its
liberal visa regime. Turkey has become a major destination for tourism,
trade and work for people from the region. 3.5 million Russians, 1.1 million
Georgians, 500 000 Azerbaijanis and 72 000 Armenians visited
Turkey in 2011.
The nascent middle classes travelling to Turkey for work, trade or tourism
become lucid enough to acknowledge the need for social and political
change at home. Turkey’s new strength, its experience in building a
strong, modern economy and its ambition to trade and integrate with its
neighbours offer a chance to bring more stability and reduce conflicts.
Turkey’s approach can help shape a vision of a region in which security
and economic interests are pursued pragmatically by all states and citizens
and within a framework of cooperation aiming at a normalization of
relations.
However the current state of the relations with Armenia will keep on
seriously curtailing Turkey’s outreach in South Caucasus. Furthermore
the transformation of this soft power and force of attraction into a vector
of influence to be used in the field of preventive diplomacy and mitigation
of tensions requires enhanced political engagement and strategic
planning.
87
PART 3:
BUILDING UNDERSTANDING AND BUILDING
STABILITY: IDENTIFYING EXTERNAL
PRESSURES
89
The Internal Threats to the South Caucasus Region
Alexander Iskandaryan
The main threat to the South Caucasus region comes from inside not
from the outside. The region is broken into parts, some internationally
recognized and some not, and the various parts challenge one another.
Sometimes external actors also create challenges but Iran or Turkey,
Russia, CSTO or NATO are much less challenging to the nations of the
South Caucasus than Armenians are to Azerbaijanis, Azerbaijanis to
Armenians, Georgians to Abkhazians, and so on. External actors are
certainly aware of this fact. Everyone understands that conflicts are
holding back the region’s development. And therefore, Western and international
players have been trying to promote the resolution of these
conflicts ever since they began engaging with the region.
During twenty years, efforts to resolve ethno-political conflicts have
involved every kind of international body and actor in a wide variety of
formats, from official negotiations to Track Two diplomacy. However,
all these efforts and formats have always been inefficient.
The US, the EU, NATO and the UN have – to their great surprise –
found that the parties in conflict, instead of cooperating, are doing their
best to prevent a settlement, although it seems to be in their best interest
to cooperate. This resistance has made the regional engagement of external
actors very problematic. Pressure on the political leadership of the
parties in conflict –whether internationally recognized states or internationally
unrecognized de facto states – does not lead to any results, because
resistance to resolution efforts from inside the region remains
stronger than the pressure applied from outside.
Being smart and creative does not help either. The parties in conflict
reject all conflict resolution scenarios, however well elaborated. They
don’t reject particular scenarios – they reject them in principle, because
90
in the eyes of the parties in conflict, negotiations are either a continuation
of warfare using other methods, or a useless activity imposed by the
powerful external actors. Consequently, stakeholders only pretend to
engage in negotiations. The result is a sometimes rather realistic but always
hypocritical imitation of a peace process.
Worse still, since the external players who are applying the pressure are
different actors with different stakes and concerns, they always have
some disagreements on how things should be done in the region. The
parties in conflict soon learn to play on those disagreements in a way to
make the negotiation process meaningless and make sure it does not
affect the status quo in any significant way.
In my opinion, this means that we cannot resolve the conflicts by just
dealing with the conflicts. From numerous examples worldwide, we
know already that it is wrong to see the conflicts as isolated problems
that can be handled separately from other political or societal concerns.
This approach is a priori doomed to failure. The problems are not just
about the conflicts themselves but about the stakeholders – leaders,
states and societies included. Everywhere they happen, ethno-political
conflicts are deeply rooted in the political, cultural and social lives of the
region. They are not random unfortunate incidents, nor are they the result
of the evil will of individuals. Of course, for people involved in the
conflicts, it is comforting to think that they are the fault of ‘bad guys’;
Soviet politicians, local post-Soviet politicians, world powers, or international
cartels. This way, you don’t have to accept responsibility for the
conflicts, or for their resolution.
Apparently, a productive scenario for external engagement in the region
should involve putting the conflicts in perspective. In terms of political
science, there is a logical explanation for both the origins of the conflicts
and the parties’ unwillingness to resolve them or to accept responsibility
for them.
The explanation is that ethno-political conflicts are intrinsic to the historical
development stage at which the South Caucasus region now finds
itself. In terms of identities and visions, the region’s current develop-
91
ment stage is rather similar to the late 18th
– early 19th
century in Western
Europe, or the early 20th
century in Eastern Europe and Central
Europe. At that stage, empires fall apart into nation-states. In these
terms, contemporary post-Soviet society is Modernity that began here
two centuries later than in the West and almost a century later than in
Eastern Europe. The reason why it didn’t happen earlier is that the creation
of the USSR preserved – or re-created - imperialism in this part of
the world, and kept it going for an extra 70 years.
The emergence of nation-states never goes conflict-free. In the postSoviet
world, like in Central Europe a hundred years ago, the nationstates
were ethnicity-based projects. “Nations” were understood as ethnic
domains, which is always problematic because ethnic groups often
live on both sides of any administrative border. Besides, while changing
hands from empire to empire, the South Caucasus region grew a complicated
history of border-drawing and administrative divisions. As a result,
some of the nation-state projects overlapped in a really bad way, with
two (or more) ethnic nations claiming ‘ownership’ of the same territory.
This means that, on the level at which they originated, the conflicts cannot
be resolved. In a zero-sum game, whatever one party in conflict
gains, the other party loses, and its ethno-national identity is badly dam-
aged.
Within this paradigm, there is no such thing as a good scenario for conflict
resolution. The goal of a peacemaking initiative is to leave the paradigm
altogether. Ideally, one needs to teleport all stakeholders from the
18th
to the 21st
century, from zero-sum-games to problem solving. However,
this is a very complicated task, much more challenging than writing
up conflict resolution scenarios.
One could, however, say that the search for scenarios, and pressure on
the stakeholders to implement them, is not just useless. The risks here
are the wars that periodically break out. Although caused by very old
18th
century paradigms, the wars are fought with very modern 21st
century
weapons. Each new round may be fought at a higher technical level,
causing even more destruction than the wars that happened in the region
in the early 1990s.
92
When thinking of the alternatives, many peacemakers say that the region
needs more democracy. If we democratize the societies, the conflicts
will go away. However, in the societies of the South Caucasus, more
democracy will not necessarily mean less conflict and more integration.
In history, there have been situations when societies democratically
elected leaders with nationalist or even aggressive agendas. The societies
of the present-day South Caucasus may prove even more radical with
regard to the conflicts than their leaderships are.
This does not mean that we need to stop democratization in order to resolve
conflicts. It means that democratic institutions, however useful, are
not enough to prepare societies for resolution. Identity and culture are
vital. They will need to change quite a bit before the conflicts can go
away.
Cross-border efforts at ‘building trust’ are not working either. Crossborder
trade, civil society projects, educational exchange and joint activism,
in a variety of spheres from women’s rights to environment, all
seem to involve a small circle of the same people. Participants of these
projects form an international network of people who have learned to
cooperate across borders but remain marginalized in their own societies.
At best, these activists feel isolated from the societies; in the worst case
scenarios, they are hated or even oppressed. Again, the problem is not
about institutions or individuals. It’s about paradigms.
Changing paradigms does not require dealing with the conflicts; it requires
working with the societies. Ideally, the issue is not to draw the
‘right’ borders but to build new, dramatically different societies. Once
this happens, the developments will lie in a different paradigm, which
we cannot imagine now, just like people living in 18th
-century AlsaceLorraine
were unable to imagine the role that Strasbourg would one day
play in the European Union.
I am not trying to say that external actors in the South Caucasus must be
prepared to engage here for the next two hundred years. However, I believe
that they should also give up the idea of getting things done in a
year or two. In the contemporary South Caucasus, the frozen status of
93
the conflicts is not a bad result. The preservation of the status quo in the
medium or even long-term perspective is not a sign of failure. It is not a
setback, but a respite, a relatively peaceful environment in which some
very important things can be done to modernize societies, not just gov-
ernments.
The societal transformation required for changing the existing paradigms
can include activities in the sphere of discourse development, education
and media.
The current emotional discourses around the conflicts will need to be
replaced with rational ones. Very few rational thins are currently said or
written about the conflicts. This will require engaging scholars but also
working with the media and journalists’ education and training.
Cross-border projects are a good idea but they will need to change in
order to become effective. The participants of these projects usually give
feedback to their societies. However, most of the time they only talk to
people who already support the ideas of peace and cooperation. In order
for something to change, they will need to start talking to people who
don’t agree, such as ethnic nationalists or opponents of modernization.
So far, in our countries it is normal that people with contrasting views
hardly ever talk to each other. They have their own NGOs, blogs and
discussion clubs. For paradigms to change, we will need to build a culture
of rational informed debate between supporters of contrasting ideologies
and worldviews.
The societies will need to move towards a more modern and more European
model, based, first, on diversity (including diverse approaches to
conflict resolution) and second, on efficient mechanisms of inclusive
governance. In both, European actors can help a lot.
Another key step that external players can take is to put an end to the
international isolation of the de facto states, so as to ensure their modernization,
transformation and democratization.
94
Something that European actors can also help us to do is to shift conflict
perception into the human dimension. This way, conflicts will no longer
be perceived as territorial disputes, but as problems faced by people.
Overall, a good way to invest into the region is not resolving conflicts
but changing people in order to create a new environment in which the
conflicts can be resolved.
95
Managing External Pressures to Stability:
Some Brief Observations
Rashad Shirinov
The South Caucasus could be characterized as a producer of instability;
producer as well as consumer of security. These different roles have
made domestic and international politics complex and volatile.
The presence of big actors having interests in the region (Russia, US,
Turkey, Iran and EU) have contributed to local actors’ searching for safe
havens for security among these players. Armenia is oriented mostly
towards Russia and partly to Iran; Georgia – mostly towards Europe and
United States and Turkey; Azerbaijan has developed a special policy of
balancing among practically all regional players.
As professor Neil McFarlane mentioned earlier this year in Tbilisi during
the PfP Consortium Annual Conference, this diversity of approaches
inside and outside the region creates doubts whether the South Caucasus
can be termed a case of regional integration. Perhaps it could be considered
as a region (like the Balkans or Middle East), but the question remains;
can it be taken as granted when it comes to regional integration?
The lack of a more or less clear idea of “belonging” to a region from the
countries has also created various tendencies with the process of democratization:
Georgia (adhering to Western principles of liberal democracy)
shows more interest in transforming its state and civil institutions according
to a liberal democratic state model. Armenia has been caught
between authoritarian and democratic tendencies (with manipulated
elections but relatively free assembly, media and freedom of association
practice). Azerbaijan has demonstrated an obvious retreat from democracy-building
after 2003 with nominal freedom of media, assembly and
association and constantly rigged elections.
96
Therefore the biggest question is whether values or interests should prevail
in the region, especially when it comes to Azerbaijan, which is the
dominant economic player due to the rich energy resources. It is a legitimate
question of Realpolitik versus Idealpolitik that, “will the West
lose its power and positions (to Russia or Iran) in the region if it sticks
only to its values and principles and forgets about its interests (economic
and security)?
Or can values and interests coexist and mutually reinforce each other?
Can we be convinced that value-based politics/policies would lead eventually
to basic interests being fulfilled?
The oil and gas resources of Azerbaijan can be a stabilizing factor for
the moment. However, in the long run, the region is yet to see the consequences
of flattening, decrease or eventually termination of energy resources.
The expectations that are raised due to the energy production
and the security it provides for the region might explode like a balloon
after the oil is over. I remember here a song by a prominent Russian dissident
group DDT “Kogda zakonchitsa neft” (When the oil runs out). It’s
a great optimistic song about Russia’s post-oil period, but I wouldn’t be
that positive; the prospects of the post-oil phase for Azerbaijan look
more volatile.
Democratic peace theory has for a long time been advocated by many in
academia and among politicians. The assumption (and empirical data
proves that) is that democracies do not fight each other. However, this
theory does not give an answer to following questions: a) does this
thinking help when we talk about non- or semi-democratic polities
(among which countries actually strive for democracy and some not necessarily).
It has been considered as a valid argument. Also, whether democratization
is going to contribute to more peace is not certain.
Russia’s role in the region after 1990s has been one of keeping ethnic
conflicts open and managed by the various leverages it possesses. I believe
starting from the 2000s Russia restarted to employ its “cultural
hegemony” (in Gramscian terms) at a moment when the Russian politi-
97
cal culture of the ruling elite was being launched anew. Especially, the
ruling elite in Azerbaijan have largely withdrawn from the track of de-
mocratization.
Moreover, the presence of ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan
and the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and neighbouring areas
have created not only an open-ended military-security and humanitarian
problem for the region, but it strengthened anti-democratic tendencies in
both countries. The conflict has given additional tools for ruling political
elites to manoeuvre so as to ensure the survival of ruling regimes. Thus,
every issue of domestic politics (including democratization) is deemed
to be viewed through the prism of this international conflict. This factor
(along with others) has reduced the space of democratization potential in
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
99
PART 4:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
101
Policy Recommendations
Study Group Regional Stability in the South Caucasus
Overview of Events in the South Caucasus
The current situation in the region has not improved since the wars of
the early 1990s came to a stalemate over Nagornyi-Karabakh between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the two countries engaged in an arms race
at least since 2006. There is evidence that the increased defence spending
on the Armenian side has the consequence of denying the government
the tools to address critical social issues in terms of health and nutrition.
At the same time, Azerbaijan, which has rebuilt its armed forces
thanks to revenues generated from its natural resources, could be in for a
shock when the oil and gas reserves start dwindling in 2014. There is
virtually no contact at all between the two countries besides meeting of
their presidents under Russian auspices or in the framework of different
conflict workshops that have however taken place years ago.
In Georgia, the relationship between the central powers in Tbilisi and the
breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has changed dramatically
since the Georgian-Russian war in 2008 with the following recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states by Russia
Previous contacts with the breakaway entities have stalled or are to-day
functioning differently in a decreased manner in comparison to what
they used to be. The 2008 war and its outcome meant for NATO and its
members a visible contradiction to its Kosovo policy, for Russia an additional
complicated surrounding taking into consideration her own policies
towards the Northern Caucasus. Channels of communications between
Moscow and Tbilisi have been opened in the wake of the French
mediation following the 2008 war and take place to-day in the framework
of the Geneva talks. The recent election of Mr. Ivanishvili as Prime
Minister of Georgia seems to have provided the grounds for maintaining
102
the goal of western integration in parallel with improved relations with
Russia.
The war of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the collapse
of the Soviet Union has produced thousands of refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs), in countries where traditional attachment
to the soil runs very deep. This suggests that easy solutions of “exchanges
of territories” or even compensations for abandoning an ancestral
home and moving away may not yield much in terms of sustainability.
This partly explains why insistence of parties on return of IDPs is so
crucial. IDP return would forestall further territorial disintegration in
case secessions are voted on by referendum, if it is perceived that IDPs
have run counter to a national destiny separate from central authorities
(e.g. the population of Abkhazia was composed of only 18% Abkhaz
(others predominantly Georgians) at the outbreak of the war.
Summary of Recommendations
Honouring Promises, Managing Expectations
The relationship between the South Caucasus and the EU and NATO,
seen from the region, has been marked by “broken promises”. This
should be characterised rather by an asymmetry between expectations
from the region, capability (or will) by the EU and NATO, and the belief
that security guarantees that these institutions could provide for the region
would in fact be provided. To-day governments in the region realize
that there are limits to the EU’s and NATO’s level of regional engagement.
NATO, in particular, was thought as “hesitant” and “indecisive.”
In fact, the dominant institutional actor in the region is the EU,
while NATO has not expressed deep-seated interest in the region, save
for secure access to energy resources
EU and NATO approaches to the region are also interlinked with their
relationship towards Russia. In fact, the EU-Russia dyad is an essential
component of any future resolution of protracted conflicts in the South
Caucasus. NATO, for its part, is torn between commitments it may seem
103
to make towards a region composed of non-members, and obedience to
the will of the various NATO member States which decide on its strategic
direction. In consequence, the Alliance members decide the Alliance’s
priorities.
One of the lessons of the Georgia-Russia war of 2008 is that perceptions
of security provisions and the actual delivery may differ widely. For
example, the 2008 NATO Summit declaration in Bucharest stated unequivocally
that “Georgia would one day be a member of NATO”. This
has the effect of an official promise by the organization. But this promise
is mitigated by the other statement that “decision on enlargement is
made by NATO members only, and not by third parties.” This statement
can be aimed at Russia, but it is also aimed at any candidate member,
from any part, and reiterates that it is not NATO as an organization that
makes such decisions, but as an Alliance (its member countries). Failure
to heed this nuance reveals the depth of misperception between regional
and outer regional (EU, NATO) approaches.
In consequence, a possible policy recommendation could be framed in
these terms:
1. Manage expectations rather than letting rhetoric build an alternative
reality. EU and NATO counterparts to the region should
reiterate that the level of engagement of their institutions is predicated
upon the political agreement within their respective structures.
This process should start with the sine qua non condition of
engagement, which is shared by both the EU and NATO, and, one
believes, by Russia as well, namely: no war.
2. Avoid rhetorical entrapment by instituting mild conditionality.
EU and NATO, having clarified their positions with regard to the
region and in consultation with Russia, could leverage their respective
engagement initiatives (Eastern Partnership, IMAP, IPAP,
etc.) to strengthen the commitment of the non-use of force in developing
solutions to regional security challenges – if these instruments
however are of interest for the parties (special case
Azerbaijan).
104
3. Clarify terminology. One of the Soviet Union’s legacies to the
post-Soviet republics is a penchant for ambiguity. Too much is
read between the lines, and not enough trust is put in the value of
what is actually expressed. Frankness has its value, and EU and
NATO officials should not fear for their institutions’ credibility by
speaking plainly, even in public formats. Trust must be built on
achieving what is promised based on what is achievable by all, not
on what is desirable by some.1
Relying on International Law and Recognition as Ways towards
Stability
Discussions on objective conflict resolution mechanisms have yielded
that international law and the practice of state recognition had not offset
the threat of instability. The international doctrine of uti possidetis,
which means that one uses what they possess, and vice-versa, has
evolved after the Balkan Wars of the 1990s to an ulterior meaning involving
the control by an ethnic group over a specific territory can often
yield to secession (external self-determination). Evidence has also been
presented to show that although certain political secessions can on the
surface be successful; the ensuing cascade of secessionist grievances
created by newly-former minorities (in the new independent state) will
perpetuate instability, and pose problems for other powers by the precedent
thereby created. A seemingly evident policy recommendation imposes
itself;
1. Insist on mutual consent of the parties, regardless of the decision.
If the internationalization (i.e. the involvement of large and
legitimate international bodies, like the UN, the International
Court of Justice, the OSCE or the EU) of the South Caucasus con-
1
This could be the basis for a renewed program of engagement by the EU and
NATO, but also of particular frameworks of youth interaction based on education
exchanges aimed at clarifying recent history, building understanding of
international actors’ interests and international law’s limits.
105
flicts is to meet with a happy end, the involvement of international
law and the practice of state recognition, if needed, should be directly
linked upon the mutuality of the decision by the parties in
conflict.
While this seems evident, large regional powers, namely Russia
and Turkey, will more easily accept an entity’s decision to separate
if that decision is somehow made with the consent of the (former)
central authority (i.e. Baku, Tbilisi or Yerevan). It has even been
suggested that “joint sovereignty” is a worthy subject to explore.
2. “Commissions on Difficult Issues”. Because reliance on international
law may not yield the stability hoped for, it may be necessary
for the parties to engage in constructive bilateral talks on their
own initiative. These initiatives should be formally rewarded by
the EU and NATO, and/or by great powers. The example provided
by the Russia-Polish Commission is worth following, and the beginning
of such contacts may be in the works between Tbilisi and
Moscow, which we all applaud.
Emphasizing Soft Security Measures
Participants insisted on the fact that the conflicts in the region were protracted
because of the absence of contact between parties. This is a characteristic
of the Armeno-Azerbaijani conflict mostly. The desire for stability
and a constructive resolution of the conflict has to come from
within.
This reality has helped shape the discussion as to what can be achieved,
and towards which audience initiatives should be aimed. In particular,
there was no consistent agreement that (mostly for Armenia and Azerbaijan),
appealing to the political regimes in the region as opposed to the
civil society would lead towards a relaxation of tensions.
106
The following recommendations have been brought out:
1. A Two-Track Approach Focusing on the Elite and Civil Society
in Parallel. The political sphere in the region is also hostage to
frozen conflicts. Though some political actors may depend on the
continuation of conflict as a backdrop to their political power, it
follows that only a change in public opinion about the conflicts can
lead the political elite to adopt a more conciliatory tone.
This is why the “Track 1” method of official diplomacy should be
maintained by keeping the Minsk Group channels open, or
strengthened by renewed engagement of other actors EU;
NATO?).
At the same time, efforts should be made to offer the respective
public/civil society within the region access to alternative points of
view on the conflicts without necessarily exposing the EU, NATO
or any other actor to the charge of intervening unduly in internal
affairs, which the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 prohibits.
2. Develop Incentives for the Political Sphere. Creativity should be
applied in finding ways to reward political elites for adopting less
confrontational policies or agreeing to confidence-building measures
to resolve their conflict. For the purpose of these policy recommendations,
the definition of political elites should include the
elites of the unrecognized regions, their IDPs as well as the different
lobbying factions..
3. Focus on Soft-Security Measures. Programmes should be developed
to offer the South Caucasus civil society with options for
economic and commercial cooperation, scientific cooperation, and
trust-building through regional intercultural cooperation. These
measures can take the form of educational exchange, women,
youth, journalists’ cooperation etc., and also involve intra-national
(Armenian-to-Armenian, Azerbaijani-to-Azerbaijani and Georgian-to-Georgian)
contacts aimed at redefining the conflicts that
affect their respective country.
107
Concluding Remarks
Johann Pucher
It is of strategic interest for Austria to contribute substantially to the
peace-building process and to support regional cooperation in the South
Caucasus, even if the two are not immediate neighbours. As LTG
Csitkovits said in his opening address, instability has the tendency to
spill-over into other regions, and take many unexpected forms.
This is why it is better to do the utmost to prevent conflict, as opposed to
react to it. This conference has enlightened us as to the value of the engagement
of the EU and NATO, international organizations and other
actors in stabilising the region.
Much more work remains to be done before we reach a common understanding
of the region’s challenges and possible solutions.
Still I am proud to say that this workshop has already made a substantial
contribution in increasing awareness of the region’s problems.
Building upon lessons identified and best practice established in the Regional
Stability in South East Europe Study Group, the Austrian MODS
through its Directorate General for Security Policy and its National Defence
Academy, and in cooperation with the Ministry of European and
International Affairs, has transferred this expertise into the establishment
of the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group.
It is in that context that we have hosted some the previous workshops of
the Regional Stability in South Caucasus Study Group. This is proof of
Austria’s ongoing engagement in the region. Furthermore it shows that
the Southern Caucasus is a region worthy of being supported on its way
to greater stability.
108
The Southern Caucasus has always been an area of concern for EuroAtlantic
security. During the last two decades, the region has not always
received the focus it deserved, mainly owing to other crises nearer
Europe’s borders. Nevertheless, the Southern Caucasus is of interest to
Europe mainly in terms of energy and human security.
Study Groups provide an opportunity for civil society actors and policy
makers of the region to introduce practical conflict resolution ideas to
each other and international actors alike. The regular gathering of experts
and interested parties from the region and beyond ensure an information
loop that leads to positive action.
The first step is to acknowledge the achievements of our conference. I
have noted three general areas of significance for the future:
• First and foremost, panelists from the region have given us an updated
appreciation of the challenges facing the South Caucasus, for
which we are grateful. In certain cases, the input of certain great
powers and organizations has not led to greater stability. The input
received this weekend will help us formulate policy to suggest
changes in approach that maintains the engagement, but brings
about more constructive solutions.
• Second, panelists dealing with international law and recognition
tell us that relying on international precedents and the practice of
recognizing new States is not always a guarantee of stability. The
panelists outlined that even if a region is independently viable, and
even if on the face of it, a region would “deserve” to be recognized,
we were informed during the conference that doing so perpetuates
a practice that has not proven successful in erasing regional
conflict. There is a need for the region, with the support of
other actors and nations, to look to additional solutions to bolster a
sustainable future.
109
• Third, we have heard of the objective factors that inhibit regional
cooperation. The discussions we have had this weekend on the impact
of energy security, on the plight of minorities, just to name a
few, will lead to proposals that will leverage these challenges to
bring forward regimes of trade cooperation and exchanges that are
the basis of regional prosperity, and from there, stability and
peace.
To have peace, the constituents of the region must live in conditions that
gives them something to cherish, something related to their human security
that they would fear losing if it ever came to be threatened. Currently,
the challenges remain too great to expect this outcome in the
short term, and for this we have to blame the global economic downturn,
and the consequences it has on the national budgets of the countries that
would like to see greater regional cooperation in the South Caucasus.
Over the past years Austria has contributed extensively to the PfP Consortium
mainly through the Study Group on Regional Stability in South
East Europe, but also in close cooperation with other study and working
groups through joint workshop and publications.
The South Caucasus cannot be neglected as a region any longer. The PfP
Consortium and the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports are committed
in pursuing the solutions that can be applied in real life, in a
transparent and inclusive manner. So far this conference has been run in
that spirit and I am very happy with the result.
The more security and stability develop in the Southern Caucasus, the
more countries of the region will look to be providers of security in their
own neighbourhood and beyond. Mutual engagement, with due respect
for regional sensitivities, is the key to decreasing tensions.
In addition, the Study Group on Regional Stability in the South Caucasus
will continue the tradition of taking the conclusion of its workshops
and digesting them into practical and applicable advice. This advice will
hopefully find echo in the region, attracting the attention of new actors
110
and future partners. Furthermore, the policy recommendations, fruit of
everyone’s participation here, will influence major actors in the area.
The Austrian MOD appreciates very much the opportunity to collaborate
within the framework of the PfP Consortium. The role of this association
as a unique vehicle of international scientific research cooperation becomes
evident with each workshop, through each publication.
111
List of Authors and Editors
ALIEVA Leila, Independent Center for National and International
Studies, Baku/ Azerbaijan
FELBERBAUER Ernst M., Research Management, National Defence
Academy, Vienna/Austria
GENTÉ Régis, Freelance Journalist, Correspondent Caucasus
GÜLTEKIN PUNSMANN Burcu, Economic Policy Research
Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara/ Turkey
GÜRER Heidemaria, Austrian Ministry for European and International
Affairs, Vienna/ Austria
ISKANDARYAN Alexander, Caucasus Institute, Yerevan/ Armenia
JAFALIAN Annie, Université de Lyon III/ Jean-Moulin, Lyon/ France
JOLICOEUR Pierre, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston/
Canada
KUZNETSOV Boris, Center for International and Regional Policy,
St. Petersburg/ Russia
LABARRE Frederic, RSSC Chair, Montréal/ Canada
LALONDE Suzanne, Université de Montréal, Montréal/ Canada
NODIA Ghia, Ilia State University, Tbilisi/ Georgia
PETROV Nikolay, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow/ Russia
112
PUCHER Johann, Directorate for Security Policy, Austrian Ministry of
Defence, Vienna/Austria
SHIRINOV Rashad, Independent Researcher, Baku/ Azerbaijan