OSKAR VERKAAIK
University of Amsterdam
The cachet dilemma:
Ritual and agency in new Dutch nationalism
A B S T R A C T
In 2006, the Dutch government introduced a
naturalization ceremony for foreigners wishing to
become Dutch citizens. Local bureaucrats who
organize the ceremony initially disapproved of the
measure as symbolic of the neonationalist approach
to migration. I analyze how their criticism is
undermined in the process of designing the ritual,
the form of which continues to express a culturalist
message of citizenship, despite organizers’ explicit
criticism or ridicule. Using the concept of “cultural
intimacy,” I show how nationalism builds on a
shared embarrassment among local bureaucrats,
from which the new citizens are excluded by way of
the ceremony. [neonationalism, migration,
naturalization, Europe, ritual, agency, bureaucracy]
I
n 2006, as part of its new approach to migration and integration politics,
the right-wing Dutch government introduced a naturalization
ceremony for foreigners wishing to become Dutch citizens. This new
policy entails what is often called the “culturalization” of citizenship,
meaning that full Dutch citizenship is not merely a legal status
and does not merely enable political and economic participation but also
comes with a certain acceptance of “Dutch norms and values” and a certain
level of integration into “Dutch culture.” Whereas former integration
courses were primarily meant to teach migrants the Dutch language and
prepare them for the labor market, the restyled courses also include lessons
on “knowledge of Dutch society” (kennis van de Nederlandse samenleving),
which contain information on constitutional rights, the rules of democratic
government, Dutch national history, dominant key values such as
gender equality and sexual freedom, and perceived national customs and
traditions. At the time of its introduction, the naturalization ceremony was
presented as the pinnacle of a successfully realized process of integration
(bekroning van een succesvol integratieproces). In an August 15, 2006, letter
sent to the municipalities responsible for organizing the ceremonies, the
then minister of integration affairs, Rita Verdonk, wrote, “Dutch citizenship
is something special, more than just an adaptation in the register of
population. Therefore we must mark and adorn this occasion. Moreover, it
is an appropriate moment to tell people again what they may expect from
our society and what is expected from them” (Directie Co¨ordinatie Integratiebeleid
Minderheden 2005).
As I write, two and a half years after its introduction, it is becoming clear
that the naturalization ceremony has had an effect quite distinct from the
one it was intended and expected to have. From the instructions given to
the municipal bureaucracies, the ceremony was clearly meant as a kind
of disciplinary initiation ritual. New citizens were to be welcomed as part
of Dutch society but at the same time reminded of certain “norms and
values” (normen en waarden), “manners” (omgangsvormen), and “duties”
(plichten) that apparently were not taken to be self-evident, or were even
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 69–82, ISSN 0094-0496, online
ISSN 1548-1425. C 2010 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1425.2009.01242.x
American Ethnologist Volume 37 Number 1 February 2010
thought to be foreign, to them. However, the new citizens
do not seem to be affected much by the welcoming gesture
or the patronizing words, let alone the combination of
the two. The “new tradition” (Verdonk 2006) is better understood
as a state ritual that is part of a larger effort to redefine
Dutch national culture in terms of autochthony and belonging
(e.g., Geschiere 2009). Amidst other state-led projects,
such as the creation of a Dutch historical “canon” and a new
national history museum, that reformulate Dutch identity
largely in high-cultural terms, the naturalization ceremony,
as most commonly performed, expresses a popular, often
folkloristic, version of new Dutch nationalism. One of the
more interesting aspects of the ceremony is, indeed, how local
civil servants have gone about presenting local forms of
“Dutchness” to an audience of new citizens. Consistent with
this local focus, ample evidence indicates that in various
municipalities the ceremonies have become part of publicrelations
campaigns, tourist information efforts, and other
activities meant to promote those municipalities and attract
investors, residents, and tourists. Yet, since the general
public hardly knows about the existence of naturalization
ceremonies and certainly does not take part in them, their
effect as state ritual or local self-promotion event is not very
significant. That, however, does not mean that the naturalization
ceremony has no impact at all. It does have a significant
effect, but not on the new citizens or on the general
public. The new ritual primarily has a profound impact on
the local civil servants who organize and perform it.
A significant number of the local bureaucrats working
in the field of migration, naturalization, and integration
can be characterized as having moderate left-wing views
and multicultural sympathies. Many of them, especially in
smaller municipalities, like working with migrants and foreigners
and empathize with them. Yet, at the same time,
they are expected to implement the new right-wing nationalist
integration policy. For them, the naturalization ceremony
initially was symbolic of a particular way of thinking
about integration and cultural differences, one that they
did not agree with. But now, more than two years after its
adoption, many of them have accepted the ceremony and
given it their own twist. Although the naturalization ceremony
is but a small event in the whole process of integration,
I think that the way local bureaucrats have come to accept
it is indicative of the way many of them have accepted,
learned to live with, or even appropriated the new nationalist
discourse. Surprisingly, then, the new ceremony reveals
something about the much larger question of how new discourses
on nationalism and culture become matters of social
convention, or even common sense, in settings and situations
in which political discourse is put into practice.
It is on this point that an ethnography of naturalization
ceremonies has a contribution to make to the anthropology
of new nationalism in post-1989—and especially post–
September 11—Europe. Although many anthropologists
working on this complex issue are concerned with political
culture and nationalist discourse, anthropology’s unique
selling points are often said to lie elsewhere, in its emphasis
on symbolic behavior and its attention to agency (e.g.,
Gingrich and Banks 2006). Indeed, some of the best work in
this field—Gerd Baumann’s Contesting Culture (1996) and
Katherine Pratt Ewing’s Stolen Honor (2008), to name but
two—offer subtle analyses of how people negotiate, appropriate,
contest, or try to transform the various identities ascribed
to them. However, such a structure–agency approach
is mostly employed to understand how groups and individuals
with a minority status deal with dominant discourses
about them. How subjects with a majority status, working
in the state apparatus, deal with such issues is not really
known. The naturalization ceremony may be an appropriate
“microscopic” setting (Geertz 1973:21) in which to begin
looking for answers to this question because it foregrounds
the importance of ritual and agency. In what follows, I argue
that ritual is important because it provides people with
a practice that they can much more easily identify with than
they can with mere discourse. That local bureaucrats are
expected to organize the ritual has given them a sense of
agency. By modifying the substance of the ritual, they have
come to accept its form, which is not of their own making
and which continues to enact a culturalized notion of
citizenship. The local bureaucrats remake the ritual, but
the ritual also transforms them. To the extent that the new
ritual counteracts local objections to new nationalist policies,
neutralization ceremony would be a more appropriate
name for the event.
This article, then, can be read as a case study of a major
discursive change that took many people by surprise: the
sudden outburst of nationalism, including the definition
of an “autochthonous culture” and a fear of “foreign” cultures
and religions (especially Islam), in a society known—
to outsiders and to itself—as tolerant and multicultural.1
Although new nationalist policies on integration are designed
to enhance the cultural capital of migrants, the public
debate on national culture and integration, in which so
many people have passionately engaged since the turn of
the millennium, has had its greatest impact on how the
ethnic Dutch perceive of their national culture and cultural
differences. That is to say, the lack of social cohesion
between various ethnic and religious groups in the
Netherlands is, indeed, to a considerable extent a cultural
problem. The main problem, however, is not the perceived
foreignness of migrant cultures and religions but the increasingly
exclusivist character of new dominant discourses
of “autochthonous cultures” and “European civilization.”
This framing of the issue, however, raises the question of
how, and to what extent, the ideology of tolerance that formerly
characterized Dutch society has been replaced by a
new nationalist discourse. In this article, I seek to give an
ethnographic answer to that question.
70
Ritual and agency in new Dutch nationalism American Ethnologist
New nationalism
In 1995, the Court of Justice in The Hague found Hans
Janmaat, the leader of a small extreme right-wing party
known as the Centrum Democraten, guilty of discrimination
for publicly expressing his wish to abolish “multicultural
society.” Shortly before his death in 2002, he took his
case to the European Court of Justice, claiming that more
charismatic politicians like Pim Fortuyn had escaped prosecution
even though they had repeatedly made similar, or
even more outspoken, remarks. Janmaat died before the
case was heard, but the man who had been treated by the
media as a political outcast did have a point. Several other
remarks for which he was prosecuted and convicted in the
1990s sound moderate in today’s political debate in the
Netherlands.
Dutch discourse on migration and integration has
rapidly changed since 2000, when a national discussion was
opened on what was dubbed “the multicultural drama.”
September 11 as well as the murders of Pim Fortuyn in
2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004 turned the debate into
the most urgent national concern (Sunier and van Ginkel
2006). Only more recently have intellectuals—themselves
often involved in the heated debate—taken a step back
to highlight some of the continuities that remained invisible
during the hectic shift in the political paradigm. The
fear of Islam, for instance, is at least as old as the Salman
Rushdie affair in 1989; migration and integration laws had
been tightening from the mid-1990s onward; and new populist
political parties contested the political establishment
in local elections long before Pim Fortuyn did so in 2002.
Besides, the self-image of the Dutch as a tolerant and multicultural
nation was not only based on an essentialist notion
of culture (e.g., Grillo 2003) but also concealed the structural
neglect of migrant communities in urban neighborhoods
during a time of unprecedented economic boom.
It is also clear that politicians like Fortuyn exploited the
notion of a discursive shift, presenting themselves as the
heroes of a new era. There is, however, no denying that no
one had foreseen the right-wing radicalism of politicians
like Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Minister Rita Verdonk, and—
more recently—Geert Wilders, all of whom were ready to
supply the media with provocative one-liners. In their slipstream,
many public and academic intellectuals also reinvented
themselves along new nationalist lines.2
Nationalism is, of course, not new in the Netherlands,
but what I call “new nationalism” differs from earlier forms
in that it is primarily directed against internal migrant Others,
especially Muslims (cf. Hardt and Negri 2000:161–204).
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, freedom in Dutch nationalist
terms meant freedom from Germany or France.
Nationalism also had a colonial genealogy connected to
the so-called civilizing mission of the Dutch in Indonesia
and other colonies. After World War II, a sense of national
identity was paradoxically built on the notion of the Dutch
as modernists and internationalists (Ginkel 1999; Swaan
1991). Today’s revival of nationalism, however, defines its
key values, such as gender equality, sexual emancipation,
and freedom of speech, in opposition to a perception of
Islam as essentially unfriendly to women, homosexuals,
and heretics. At the same time, new nationalism is attractive
to many people. It thrives in middle-class suburbia as well
as impoverished inner-city neighborhoods. It is embraced
by progressive writers and artists fearing to lose secular
liberties, by professional historians applying for research
money in the field of national history, and by the youth
in rural areas competing with migrant teenagers for jobs
and girlfriends. On the one hand, new nationalism is discursively
thin and one-dimensional, based on a simplified
orientalism in which secular freedom stands in opposition
to religious doctrine. On the other hand, its social elasticity
makes it serve many projects and desires.
Precisely because of this flexibility, new nationalism is
difficult to explain in terms of one master narrative. According
to a particularly popular explanation, new nationalism
in Europe is a defensive reaction against globalization.
Douglas Holmes (2000), a proponent of this idea, builds
on Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000) critical remarks about the
“light capitalism” that breaks up communities and leaves
many people out in the cold. In this view, nationalism is
a response to a postmodern condition brought about by
economic globalization. This may explain the formation of
some of the nationalist parties that Holmes takes as his object,
but many others who fear the influence of Islam cannot
possibly be called the victims of globalization. In fact,
the culturalization of citizenship often goes well with neoliberal
economic policies (e.g., Schinkel 2007). This is, of
course, not to deny that the revival of nationalism in Europe
is related to the increasing flows of people, money, products,
images, and ideas across national boundaries or to the
growing influence of the European Union.
To avoid simplifications of any kind, I see a need for
the type of work anthropologists tend to be good at: ethnographic
investigation, in this case of the nitty-gritty of nationalist
practice. This type of work does not limit itself to
a search for social causes or structural explanations but,
rather, explores nationalism as an interactional process
shaped by agency and performance. Agency can be seen as
a discursive intervention that is always “citational” (Derrida
1988:18) or “internally dialogized” (Bakhtin 1981:279)—that
is, the intervention always builds on previous interventions
that resonate with the new one. Whether the intervention is
a powerful one depends on this resonance. Successful innovation,
transformation, and resistance all depend on a
deeply developed ear or intuition for the range of possible
meanings that reverberate with the discursive intervention.
As I understand it, then, agency is another word for intuitive
cultural competence that has to be developed by repetitive
71
American Ethnologist Volume 37 Number 1 February 2010
performance. Analogous to Susan Harding’s (2000) understanding
of conversion as the process of learning to speak
a religious discourse by prolonged exposure to and interaction
with it, agency in the context of nationalism entails
learning to speak nationalist language and to use it creatively
in what Michael Billig (1995) calls the “banality” of
everyday practice. Whereas Billig is primarily interested in
how the state, through recurrent ritual practices in everyday
life, makes nationalism self-evident as second nature, I ask
how similar practices take shape at the local level of state
bureaucracy. My question is, to what extent can the naturalization
ceremony be seen as an opportunity for local bureaucrats
to develop the cultural competence necessary to
apply the nationalist vocabulary in a creative and meaningful
way?
Local bureaucrats
Who, then, are these local public servants and what are their
views on integration? I got a powerful answer to that question
in October 2007 during a conference meant to bring
together the two organizations responsible for immigration
and naturalization matters: the national Immigration and
Naturalization Department (IND) and the association of local
registry office workers (NVVB). The conference is held
every year, but this was the first time after Rita Verdonk had
been dismissed as minister of justice. The event, held in the
rather nondescript Amsterdam Rai Exhibition and Convention
Center, developed into a bureaucratic catharsis. Only a
year earlier, the NVVB had decided to boycott the meeting
out of sheer frustration with Verdonk’s policy and its implementation
by the IND. For many local civil servants, the IND
was not only a bureaucratic Moloch—hardly accessible, notoriously
slow and arrogant, often showing contempt for its
own rules and regulations—but it was also associated with a
governmental change of policy informed by the wish to reduce
immigration and tighten integration laws. On a local
level, where bureaucrats dealt with people instead of files,
the new measures and the accompanying harsh language
about migrants’ perceived refusal to adjust were seen as an
annoyance. On top of that, municipal bureaucrats thought
the new integration laws were extremely complex and impossible
to work with. The boycott of the annual meeting
with the IND was a strong political statement by the NVVB,
but a year later, in 2007, the association took a more favorable
view of the integration process. The new justice minister,
Nebahat Albayrak, who belonged to the labor party,
had indicated her intention to reform the IND to make it
more efficient and transparent; the stigmatizing statements
about migrants by members of government had come to
an end; and, symbolically important, Albayrak herself had
a Turkish family background.
At the 2007 conference, various speeches had already
evoked an atmosphere of victory on the side of municipal
civil servants when a group of stand-up comedians
took the stage to present a sketch involving Dr. Phil. Within
the sketch, Dr. Phil, the counselor known, of course, from
the Oprah Winfrey Show, was hired to rescue the troubled
marriage between the NVVB–wife and her IND–husband.
A little hysterical and conveying an air of moral superiority,
the wife accused the stiff, cynical husband of trying to
turn their house into a barricaded castle. No longer was the
house a meeting place full of guests and strangers; under
the husband’s new rule, the place had become dull and desolate.
The husband, clearly irritated by his wife’s emotional
outbursts, matter-of-factly stated that they could simply
no longer afford to open their doors to everyone. “It’s all
Aunt Rita’s fault,” the wife cried, “I don’t want her in this
house anymore.” “You say that because she is my family, not
yours,” the husband rebuked her. At that point, Dr. Phil intervened,
suggesting that, on behalf of the husband, all the
IND–employers say “I am sorry” to their colleagues from the
municipalities, to which the latter were to respond with a
unanimous “you are welcome.” Amidst general hilarity, the
two groups celebrated their reunion.
The stand-up comedians brilliantly illustrated the rift
between local bureaucrats and national politicians concerning
migration and integration matters. What has been
called “new realism” (Prins 2004) in Dutch political discourse
combines a deep aversion to Islam (and religion in
general) with antiestablishment rhetoric, a call for zero tolerance
on crime, and a demand for a more decentralized
and community-based form of politics. It evokes concepts
like “Dutch national identity,” “Dutch norms and values,”
and “European civilization,” all perceived to be threatened
by supposedly non-European cultures and religions. Many
local bureaucrats working in the field of migration and integration,
however, are critical of this rhetoric. Minister Rita
Verdonk, in particular, was highly unpopular among them,
partly for her authoritarian and intimidating way of negotiating
with the municipalities and partly for her new nationalist
views. There are, to be sure, exceptions to this pattern.
In the city of Rotterdam, for instance, where the political
heirs of Pim Fortuyn have been in a powerful position, local
policies on integration are considerably more “revanchist”
(Uitermark and Duyvendak 2005) than in other cities. Elsewhere,
however, many local bureaucrats tend to be critical
of new nationalism.
There are several reasons for this criticism. Many bureaucrats
made the choice to work on migration and integration
matters in the 1990s or earlier because they liked
working with foreigners and wanted to help them find their
way in Dutch society. Although integration courses were not
voluntary, even in the 1990s, the local bureaucracy tended
to see migrants as clients. Even today, many local bureaucrats
build up personal relationships of sorts with their
clients, unlike their colleagues in the IND, where measures
are taken to avoid such relationships. Most of all, however,
72
Ritual and agency in new Dutch nationalism American Ethnologist
local bureaucrats tend to identify with their clients out of a
sense of professional ethics. It is the task of local civil servants
to assist the migrant during the course of integration
and to help him or her get the application for Dutch citizenship
ready. It is the job of the IND to evaluate the application
and decide whether to approve it. A successful application
proves the competence of the local bureaucrat,
whereas a rejection confirms the authority of the IND. The
new integration and naturalization policy made it considerably
harder for the local bureaucracy to book results.
It is against this background that the initial lack of support
for the naturalization ceremony has to be understood.
In the municipalities, the ceremony was not seen as a necessarily
onerous part of the new integration and naturalization
policy. The obligation to follow costly integration
courses, concluded by a long series of exams, was much
more of a burden for migrants. But the naturalization ceremony
was seen as symbolic of the new regime, and for many
local bureaucrats, it was redundant and patronizing. “Before
they can successfully apply for Dutch citizenship,” one
official said, “people already have to do so many things: integration
courses, several exams—by the time they get their
citizenship they know more about the Netherlands than
many of us.” Many took the ceremony as just another obligation
migrants had to perform to be accepted as full citizens.
And precisely these skeptical local bureaucrats were
given the task of organizing the new ritual.
The political debate
Before exploring what the local bureaucracy made of the
ceremony, however, it is useful to have a brief look at the
political debate that preceded its introduction. To some extent,
the introduction of the ceremony is a good example
of the polysemic nature of ritual. That is to say, virtually
all political parties in parliament were in favor of a ceremony
but often for quite different reasons. In addition, the
dominant motivation for the introduction of the ceremony
changed during the process of decision making. In fact,
the idea came up for the first time before the moral panic
about Islam and the loss of national identity broke loose. In
2000, the then minister of urban affairs, Roger van Boxtel,
first proposed the introduction of a ceremony as part of
his effort to develop a more open immigration policy. Despite
the continuing influx of migrants to the Netherlands
from the 1960s onward, policy makers had always refused
to declare the Netherlands a country of immigration. Various
flows of migration, such as the labor migration starting
in the 1960s and the arrival of Surinamese after the independence
of Suriname in 1975, had always been treated
as isolated phenomena, not as sequences in a continuing
trend. Van Boxtel, member of a small liberal party established
in the 1960s (Democraten 66, or D66), wanted to promote
an open economy that would benefit from the influx
of skilled professionals from abroad. Like other countries
of immigration, such as Canada and the United States, the
Netherlands, he felt, should encourage migrants to become
Dutch citizens, welcoming them by way of a formal naturalization
ceremony. The parliament, however, did not support
the proposal, and the idea was dropped.
Two years later, however, multiculturalism had become
the main political issue of contention. In the city of
Rotterdam, the party founded by Pim Fortuyn won the local
elections and, having formed a right-wing coalition, started
a new local integration procedure that included courses
on Dutch norms, values, and manners and concluded
with a so-called integration ceremony (inburgeringsceremonie)
that marked a change of status from “nonintegrated
alien” (niet-ingeburgerde vreemdeling) to “Rotterdammer.”
Clearly, this was not the welcoming ceremony for skilled
migrants beneficial to the Dutch economy that Van Boxtel
had had in mind, but primarily the ritual confirmation of a
cultural norm (the identity of “Rotterdammer” and, more
broadly, “Dutch norms and values”) that the participants
had supposedly learned to accept. When, in 2004, the national
parliament critically discussed the integration policies
of former governments, the idea of a national naturalization
ceremony came up again, this time proposed by a
member of the Christian-Democratic party, Mirjam Sterk,
who had been the personal assistant of the alderman responsible
for the new integration policy in Rotterdam.
This time, the idea was widely supported, although
there was some discussion about the format and the meaning
of the ceremony. Some left-wing parties continued to
view the ceremony as a welcoming gesture to migrants with
hyphenated identities. The vast majority, however, wanted
a ceremony that expressed both the Dutch norm and the
migrant’s loyalty to it. There was some discussion about
the form this expression of loyalty should take. Some demanded
a pledge of loyalty, which met with opposition from
the liberal parties.3
Even Minister Verdonk said that such a
pledge reminded her too much of the Second World War.
Others objected that a formal oath did not necessarily reflect
a true change of identity. Ironically, the liberal parties
wanted an obligatory ceremony that would confirm a sense
of loyalty without any sign of compulsion.4
If the parliament took some time to discuss the format
of the expression of loyalty, it said very little about the formulation
of the Dutch norm that the ceremony was supposed
to convey. In the August 15, 2006, letter to mayors,
Minister Verdonk did give some instructions about the substance
of the ritual. First, she wrote, the ceremony should
make clear “who we are” [wie we zijn]; it should provide information
about “our history that has formed our identity”
[onze geschiedenis die onze identiteit gevormd heeft] and especially
about the constitution and some of the “fundamental
constitutional rights” such as the antidiscrimination law,
gender equality, and the freedom of speech and religion.
73
American Ethnologist Volume 37 Number 1 February 2010
Second, the ceremony should convey a message of good citizenship,
especially “the balance between rights and duties”
[de balans tussen rechten en plichten]. Finally, the ceremony
should promote social manners (omgangsvormen) and underscore
that “we should treat each other with respect, and
if we disagree, we should do so in a civilized manner” [we
moeten elkaar met respect behandelen, en als we van mening
verschillen hier op een beschaafde manier mee omgaan].
Apart from these instructions, the minister suggested that
the ceremony should be a happy occasion, a party celebrated
with “cachet” (the French cachet has been adopted
into Dutch vernacular usage), a moment that should be
both joyous and ceremonial. Other than these instructions,
however, the municipalities were free to organize the ceremony
as they saw fit.
Irony and embarrassment
In a study of the making of state rituals in the Soviet Union,
Christel Lane (1981:28) has argued that ritual and cultural
management become important when ideology and reality
are far apart. Ritual is supposed to cover up this discrepancy
by structuring citizens’ perception of reality. Nevertheless,
ritual “can only succeed if it responds to some degree to
the emotional requirements of those who are meant to perform
it”—emotions, Lane (1981:33–34) continues, that can
be evoked by color, beauty, significance, and dignity. Making
new state rituals, in other words, is not an easy matter,
as it requires finding a balance between past and future. It
cannot but relate to an existing symbolic repertoire but at
the same time is intended to restructure the symbolic order.
To some extent, this was precisely the predicament of
local bureaucrats who were put to the task of designing a
new naturalization ceremony.
Most of them found Verdonk’s letter of instruction of
little use. For many, the most problematic concept in that
letter was that of “cachet.” That term, they felt, asked for
something out of the ordinary to express the core of the nation.
One public servant said, “The minister wants cachet
because she sees the outside. We are trying to see what is inside.
That is not so easy.” Many others observed that Dutch
nationalism lacks a key symbol that expresses the national
core, is ceremonial, and has enough cachet. The constitution,
for instance, is not as symbolically loaded as in the
United States; neither is the flag nor the national anthem.
Natural symbols like the tulip were felt to be so commercialized
as to no longer have any cachet. Dutch nationalism,
many local bureaucrats felt, was a matter of freedom, tolerance,
and modernity, but how does one symbolize such
concepts? Even the royal family and the color orange did
not evoke such concepts very well. In the absence of the obvious,
then, the first task was to invent key symbols for the
elusive concept of “Dutchness.”
Given the initial tepid reaction, it is remarkable how
much creativity was unleashed once bureaucrats started
to organize ceremonies. In various places, new citizens
were treated to licorice—not always a big success—or sandwiches
made with peanut butter. One municipality served
brussels sprouts and boerenkool—a peasant’s dish made
of kale and potatoes. Another took three new citizens—
members of a family from Afghanistan—to a dairy farm;
elsewhere there was a visit to a windmill. In various municipalities,
organizing committees wanted to do excursions,
outings, or multicultural dinners but were confronted with
tight budgets. There were speeches in various places about
the feeling of solidarity fostered by the collective fear of the
sea. In one place, a box of varied flowers was brought in,
and all guests were invited to pick a flower to his or her liking,
a gesture symbolizing the multifaceted nature of Dutch
national identity. Elsewhere one could have one’s picture
taken standing next to a life-size image of soccer hero
Johan Cruyff. In most places, the ceremony started with coffee
and ended with cheese, and almost everywhere it had
a very strong local character. Various places offered local
pastries, brochures from the local tourist office, information
on scenic bicycle routes in the nearby countryside, and poems
written by local poets. The Amsterdam ceremony was
probably the most local of all, reducing Dutch history to
Amsterdam’s once central position in the global economy.
In sum, whereas Dutch intellectuals were busy defining
Dutch culture in terms of European civilization, the naturalization
ceremony linked it to nationalist history and local
folklore.5
On my visits throughout the country, two different reactions
among bureaucrats struck me most forcefully. One
was a sense of insecurity or even embarrassment about
one’s own ceremony, strengthened by the fact that the organizers
looked at me, an anthropologist, as an expert on
culture and ritual. My visit was a moment for them to look
at their own work from a distance, like the anthropologist
they imagined me to be, and to realize that their display of
folklore had little to do with the realities of social life. In
other cases, however, it soon turned out that the expressions
of local culture were self-consciously ironic. Sometimes
the irony could not be missed. In a town in the southern
province of Brabant, the mayor asserted, “A Dutchman
is always on time, eats his potatoes at six in the evening, and
never comes unannounced. . . . A Dutchman eats cheese,
puts tulips in a vase, wears wooden shoes and spends the
day admiring the windmills.”6
In other cases, the irony was
subtler, and sometimes it was difficult to draw the line between
irony and embarrassment at all.
Irony and embarrassment also ruled the workshop organized
by the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG)
in October 2007. Ceremony organizers from various municipalities,
big and small, had gathered to learn from each
other’s experiences. Since I think the workshop illustrates
74
Ritual and agency in new Dutch nationalism American Ethnologist
quite accurately the local anxieties about the ceremony, I
offer a lengthy excerpt from the discussion that occurred
there. It starts with an introduction by an official from a
town in the southern province of Limburg, which I call R,
followed by comments from representatives of various municipalities,
also indicated by their initials.
R: I was skeptical at first. I did not like the idea at all.
But I am from Limburg, I like to celebrate.7
I am also a
loyal servant who does his job. And it needs to be said:
the people are happy. They do not have to deal with the
IND any longer. They are safe—important for refugees.
But do they also belong? That remains unclear. Does
the ceremony add something? I do not have an answer.
I am on the other side. Do we manage to get the message
of welcome across? I don’t know.
We welcome everybody in the city hall. The flag has
been struck. We serve coffee with vlaai [a local cake] in
the council chamber. That is also where wedding ceremonies
take place. A combo is playing music. Then
the mayor makes a speech, he always does that very
well. He says: “Now you are part of us. You are allowed
to support the Dutch football team.” He asks: “Who
will you support now, the Dutch or the Turkish team?”
He talks with the people. We do not sing the national
anthem.
On the National Naturalization Day we went on a tour
through the city.8
We introduced them to the local
archive which has a former dungeon. There we keep
the sword with which we used to behead the prisoners.
So people, we said, be careful. We also informed them
that the Dutch have always been a free and civilized
nation. Then the city poet recited a poem he himself
had written. It was such a beautiful poem that many
were deeply moved. Some even walked out of the room,
which of course was not the intention.
The last time we did a ceremony was during Ramadan.
So the reception was a failure. The people said to the
mayor: “Please eat. Don’t mind us.” But the mayor answered:
“I am with you.” The whole day he didn’t eat.
Well done.
We often think about doing the ceremony differently.
But it is also a matter of economy. How much can we
afford? And what is it actually that we want to accomplish?
Being a Limburger I am a member of the brass
band. We play at carnival. But no new Dutch citizen has
ever joined the brass band. It is not that they are not
welcome. They must also like music, they may even be
better at playing music than we are . . .
N: Maybe they play a different kind of music.
R: That is possible. But nonetheless, they don’t come.
So I ask myself: do people want to listen to a combo?
That is the kind of question you start to ask yourself. To
my mind, the ceremony is the most unattractive way to
invite people to participate.
After this introduction, the chairman, an official from the
ministry, opened the floor for further discussion.
H: We do it every six weeks. The reactions are mixed.
Sometimes the people are really apathetic. How do you
deal with that? Now we invite an expert, a former migrant
from Indonesia. People from Indonesia are usually
well-integrated.
M: We ask three people to tell something about their
life.
D: In our city there are always a number of people who
want to leave early. In other cities they put someone
at the door to prevent that. We don’t do that. But it
poses the question: does this result in active citizenship?
Frankly I don’t care about cachet. I want to meet
new Dutch citizens.
E: We want to organize a party, but the mayor refuses
to cooperate. He says: this is forced upon me.
A: In our village the mayor visits the people at their
home. People appreciate that because they see the
mayor as the municipality. They feel welcomed. We always
have a conversation.
Z: Not everyone appreciates the ceremony. We always
take a picture of the whole group at the end of the ceremony.
Some weeks ago we had someone from Germany
who refused to pose with Africans and Arabs. He said: I
don’t belong to these people. (General hilarity.)
B: We had a discussion on whether or not to serve alcohol.
On the one hand you want to be tolerant and hospitable.
So we said no. (Again general laughter.) On the
other hand, this is Holland. So yes, now we serve alcohol.
But only beer and wine and we also serve orange
juice and mineral water. (More giggling.)
V: We decided to organize the ceremony in the daytime.
That means people need to take a day off so they
have to explain to their boss and colleagues what they
are going to do. That way you create a conversation
with the autochthonous.
This discussion aptly shows the concerns of local bureaucrats
as well as the tone in which they were discussed. Bureaucrats’
main worry was to solve all sorts of practical
problems they encountered while designing a completely
new kind of ritual. They had no obvious models to follow
or experts to consult, and they were very eager to learn
from each other. On the level of practicalities, then, the discussion
was quite serious. But there remained an undertone
of skepticism in the way they discussed these everyday
concerns, which revealed their discomfort with the idea
of the naturalization ceremony itself. Although they did not
describe their own reactions as a combination of embarrassment
and irony, the less-than-serious tone and discomfited
giggling can be understood as a defense mechanism
that enabled the local bureaucrats to do their job without
75
American Ethnologist Volume 37 Number 1 February 2010
personally subscribing to the nationalist ideology that produced
the ceremony.
There were, however, also municipalities where civil
servants enthusiastically put themselves to the task of designing
a colorful ceremony without being bothered by either
irony or embarrassment. In a regional town north of
Amsterdam, for instance, the ceremony took more than an
hour and was considerably more vibrant than elsewhere.
Here, too, people were received in the historical city hall and
welcomed by a formal speech from the mayor that was full
of references to history, in particular the town’s role in the
Dutch Protestants’ uprising against Spanish rule in the 16th
century. After this introduction, a professional actor walked
into the room dressed in a suit of steel armor and introduced
himself as Agito, a Spanish soldier of the occupying
force. He went on to say,
You may call me the original alien (oerallochtoon).
Therefore I am asked to give you a bit of advice on
this very day. I think you need some advice now that
you are really going to settle here. I am not the only
one in this room who has put on something special for
this occasion. That is nice. But it is important to realize
that clothes do matter. Suppose I would walk out into
the streets in this outfit [pointing at the armor], people
would treat me very differently from when I would wear
ordinary jeans and a jacket. So my first advice is, do not
dress differently. If you do, you show that you are different
and people will treat you accordingly.9
He offered a few other suggestions (“make sure you find a
job,” “mix with people”) before leaving the stage. Despite
the theatrical format, this monologue was not meant to be
ironic.
Irony was also absent in those municipalities that
openly rebelled against the government’s new nationalist
message. In a suburban town not far from the city of
Utrecht, for instance, six new citizens from Iraq, Croatia,
and Venezuela were welcomed by a short, straightforward
speech from the mayor:
At this moment our different lives and routes cross each
other. You have come a long way to be here. Today in
this country we have many opinions about foreigners.
But let me tell you: migrants like you are good for our
country and our economy. I welcome you. You enrich
us. Do not forget where you come from and be proud of
who you are. We are a free country with cultural and religious
freedom so never feel ashamed. The Dutch develop
too, we are also human beings, and you help us
in our development. Thank you for wanting to belong
to us.
In rare cases, bureaucrats flatly boycotted the ceremony. To
be able to legally do so, the city government of a large town
near the coast declared every day of the year to be a naturalization
day. This enabled the bureaucracy to invite a new
citizen to come to the registry as soon as he or she received
word of a positive decision, to collect his or her papers.
One of the staff members in charge of naturalization matters
explained, “Of course, if our new fellow-citizen insists
on singing the national anthem on the occasion, the official
on duty is instructed to sing along. But so far this has never
happened.” This comment added irony to subversion.
Today, after two and a half years of bureaucrats’ creative
experimenting, problem solving, and political statements,
the ceremony has gradually become standardized
in most places. Now that protocols have been written and
budgets established, the ceremony has become part of the
bureaucratic routine. In municipalities with relatively large
numbers of new citizens, ceremonies tend to be based on
the model of a graduation ceremony. After a formal speech
highlighting the change of status, people are invited to
come forward to collect their papers and a present, like
graduates finishing their education. In smaller municipalities,
the ritual tends to copy a wedding ceremony and includes
speeches highlighting personal backgrounds, flowers,
and a reception afterward. The search for key symbols
naturalizing the Dutch nation has largely been abandoned.
Time and routine have solved the cachet dilemma.
Ritual power
Saying that irony and embarrassment—and in some cases
enthusiasm and aversion—were the most common emotions
bureaucrats displayed also means that indifference
was not common. This deserves to be emphasized because
most studies of modern state power foreground indifference
as the main characteristic of bureaucracy, largely
caused by bureaucratic formalism. Following the views of
Karl Marx and Max Weber (and Franz Kafka) on the issue,
authors like Michael Crozier (1964), Claude Lefort (1971),
Mary Douglas (1986), Michael Herzfeld (1992), and James
Scott (1998) have all, in their own ways, focused on the interrelatedness
of formalism and indifference in modern bureaucracy,
even if some of them quite explicitly distance
themselves from the early sociology of bureaucracy. Crozier,
for instance, presents his study as a critique of Weber’s notion
of the “bureaucratization” of society. For Crozier, bureaucracy
is anything but a rationalist form of government.
The bureaucracy is, rather, divided into all sorts of groups
and subcultures engaged in power struggles, and its proverbial
rigidity is the result of bureaucratic self-interest that fuels
these conflicts. For Herzfeld, indifference is not so much
an inevitable by-product of the routinization of power as a
bureaucratic strategy that conceals active engagement. Although
there is disagreement over the nature of bureaucratic
indifference and inflexibility, these issues continue
to influence both academic and popular perceptions of the
bureaucracy.
76
Ritual and agency in new Dutch nationalism American Ethnologist
It is therefore somewhat surprising that the local officials
organizing the naturalization ceremony were anything
but indifferent to it. Bureaucratic indifference and inefficiency
are precisely what many local officials loath in the
IND, with which they have to work. It is something they
want to avoid at all costs in their own work. It is true that the
organization of the naturalization ceremony became subject
to routinization, but this did not generate indifference
or lack of interest. The repetitive nature of the ceremony
produced something quite different: a gradual suspension
of locals’ initial skepticism toward the ceremony and the nationalist
ideology that is built into its form.
In the vast literature on ritual, a lot of attention has
been paid to its repetitive nature. Although anthropologists
have disagreed on the function of ritual—whether it, for
instance, primarily reproduces power relations (e.g., Bloch
1974; Geertz 1983) or allows new worldviews to emerge (e.g.,
Bourdillon 1978; Handelman 1990)—there is a wide, albeit
sometimes implicit, understanding that the repetitive form
is crucial in bringing about a register of experience quite
distinct from the ordinary that can both sanctify the status
quo and open up new subject positions. Edmund Leach, for
instance, wondered why, in rituals, “everything in fact happened
just as predicted” (1972:334) without harming the
notion that something extraordinary was going on. Ritual’s
routine, in other words, creates something quite dissimilar
from indifference; it stimulates the experience of a reality
felt to be more authentic—in either a banal or cerebral
manner (Obeyesekere 1990)—than everyday life. Although
James Clifford (1988) has rightly pointed out that ritual and
everyday practice are much more conjunctural than much
of the related literature tries to demonstrate, his critique
does not undermine the observation that, in the experience
of the partakers, ritual often does stand out as starkly different
from the reality of daily life largely because of its repetitive
form. In Roy Rappaport’s (1999) view, this “liturgical
order,” as he calls it, does two things. First, it prescribes
the behavior of the participants. Once they enter the ritual,
they become subject to its form. It is not possible to avoid
the ritual’s structure and language without leaving the ritual
altogether. Second, through ritual structure and language,
the participants enter into a world of social convention. By
“social convention,” Rappaport means something very different
from both belief and behavior. Belief, he insists, is
personal and therefore not a subject of anthropological inquiry,
whereas behavior is not necessarily directed by social
convention alone. A wedding ceremony may point out
the virtues of marital faithfulness, but that does not mean
that adultery does not occur. Ritual’s “sequestered” nature
(Turner 1977:183), in other words, creates a fictional world
of social convention that remains relatively untouched by
everyday complexities as well as people’s personal convictions.
Ritual’s repetitiveness gives it a feel of tradition beyond
history.
Alexei Yurchak’s work on the former Soviet Union offers
a subtle understanding of the effects of state ritual and
its capacity to create social convention in the context of a
modern society. Yurchak (2006) argues that Soviet rituals,
ceremonies, and other social events enabled people to respond
to Soviet state propaganda in a way that was neither
supportive nor openly contesting. Evoking John Austin’s notion
of “performative utterances” that cannot be true or
false but only felicitous or infelicitous, Yurchak highlights
what he calls the “constitutive dimension” of conventional
forms. People perform state rituals not because they agree
with their ideological meaning but because the rituals create
possibilities: to belong to a group, to do a job, and so on.
Yurchak rejects the notion of an already existing self that responds
positively, negatively, or pragmatically to state rituals.
Rather, he sees ritual as enabling: By performing the
ritual in an ideologically neutral or indifferent manner, the
participants in Soviet rituals invented themselves and their
social environment. In doing so, however, they internalized
the Soviet Union—but not necessarily its ideology—as a
cultural form, to such an extent that Soviet society appeared
to them as traditional beyond history, almost eternal, as is
indicated by Yurchak’s wonderful title Everything Was Forever,
Until It Was No More (2006). When, in 1989, the Soviet
Union collapsed, together with its rituals and ceremonies, it
turned out that its ideology had already faded long before,
living on only as social conventions in seemingly everlasting
forms.
As I understand it, the naturalization ceremony in the
Netherlands works in a comparable way. When civil servants
gradually became less reflexive about its creation and
began to worry less about its ideological meaning as expressed
in the term cachet, the ceremony steadily began to
impose its implicit logic on them. The naturalization ceremony,
as a form, is not an ideologically neutral ritual. In
its form, it carries a particular meaning derived from the
dominant discourse on cultural citizenship that gave birth
to it. In speeches, one may criticize the nationalist ideology,
but the form of the ritual itself is more difficult to contest.
That form suggests that citizenship is to some extent cultural
and that a change of citizenship implies a change of
cultural identity. It also entails the notion that the nation—
that entity into which one is initiated—is itself already there,
truly existing and even welcoming, that is, unchanged by
the arrival of the new initiands. The ceremony hinges on
an implicit us–them dichotomy: “We” initiate and welcome
“them,” and “we” also exist without “them.” Most of all, the
ceremony suggests that citizenship is an accomplishment,
a conscious choice and desire, something to be proud of,
rather than simply an administrative change of status. It is
this implicit logic that the local bureaucracy, sometimes despite
itself, gradually learned to perform.
How did this happen? First of all, local civil servants began
to enjoy organizing the ceremony. The sheer pleasure
77
American Ethnologist Volume 37 Number 1 February 2010
of throwing a party for the foreigners they had helped get
their papers in order was the first element that undermined
bureaucrats’ initial critical stance. The sense of mild subversion
generated when the ceremony was used as an opportunity
to criticize the national government and its new integration
policy only enhanced that joy. More importantly,
however, the ceremony gradually became a ritual moment
during which it became possible to say or do things that
one would not normally say or do outside its formal limitations.
However profane the entry rites of the ceremony may
seem—usually a personal welcome by the civil servant on
duty, followed by a cup of coffee consumed while waiting
for the mayor or alderman to come in and give a speech—
they do create an ambience among the organizers that feels
distinct from everyday routine. As one official, who organizes
ceremonies approximately once a month, said, “We
have done many ceremonies by now. You enter your office
in the morning thinking it is just standard procedure,
but the moment the guests start to arrive you realize it is a
special occasion.” Although most of the organizers remain
backstage, leaving the official part of the ceremony to a representative
of the municipality, many of them describe the
mood as more formal than the everyday mood. Some notice
a difference in their bodily reactions. “It gives you a shot of
adrenaline,” one official said, “it feels like you have to perform.
I always put on lipstick before we start.” Within this
ceremonial atmosphere, then, statements that would otherwise
sound pretentious or imaginary sound appropriate. To
give one example, I quote from a speech given by the mayor
of a small rural municipality close to Rotterdam, followed by
the comments of the organizer of the ceremony. The mayor
noted that
the Dutch are frugal. We are also frugal when it comes
to hospitality. We say that in Holland there are as many
churches as there are pubs. And there are also many
associations. We call that the civil society (maatschappelijk
middenveld). In our municipality we have a
strong civil society. We have associations for many
things: for home watch, for care, for sports and arts.
We have many choirs. We also have many churches and
opinions. That makes us tolerant, especially to those
who participate.
Backstage, the public servant who organized the event reflected
on these comments:
When I put together the protocol for the ceremony, the
speech was sent to me by the public relations department.
Frankly when I read it I felt rather uncomfortable.
All these clich´es about the Dutch being frugal and
tolerant. . . . Perhaps that was true long ago, but I know
so many people who like spending money, even small
children have their own mobile phones—do you know
how much that costs! As to churches and pubs, yes,
the buildings are still there, but no one goes there anymore,
we spend our evenings in front of the TV, and on
Sunday mornings we stay in bed or go to the football
field. But I must admit that when the mayor gave the
speech, somehow it all sounded just right. It is because
of the occasion, I suppose. You cannot be too nuanced.
On a formal occasion like this, you cannot tell people
that the Dutch spend their evenings in front of the
television.
Others, too, noticed that irony did not work well in rituals.
“Standing in front of an audience, making fun of ourselves,
that makes an odd impression. A ceremony requires
a certain level of sincerity.” In short, despite the widespread
resistance at first, the naturalization ceremony gradually
became a ritually delineated moment for conveying essentialist
notions about Dutch national identity to an audience
of migrants, thanks to a form that does not allow irony or
ridicule to continue.
This does not mean, however, that local bureaucrats
also endorsed this essentialism outside the ritually defined
time of the ceremony. In fact, it was striking to see that
irony and embarrassment were often quick to return after
the ceremony had come to an end. During evaluations immediately
after the ceremony, bureaucrats often ridiculed
the clich´es about the Dutch that they had just ritually approved.
To some extent, this mockery marked the end of
the ritual for the organizers themselves. The ritual demarcation,
therefore, also worked to largely keep their multicultural
sympathies and aversion to right-wing nationalism
intact.
One could interpret the discrepancy between the ritual
message and postritual ridicule by reference to Herzfeld’s
notion of “cultural intimacy.” For Herzfeld (1997), cultural
intimacy is the shared embarrassment about the ethnic core
in the imagination of the modern nation. On the one hand,
nations want to be modern and civilized, but, on the other
hand, they trace their origin back to uncivilized ethnicity,
such that it is both at the heart and the margins of modern
nations. On a more abstract level, the concept of “cultural
intimacy” suggests the binding force of shared embarrassment
caused by the intimate knowledge that a shared identity
is deeply ambiguous, revolving around a vacuum. When
applied to the case at hand, it becomes clear how, precisely,
the naturalization ceremony functions as an instrument of
inclusion and exclusion. The point is not so much that the
ceremony conveys an essentialist notion of Dutchness into
which the new citizens are initiated as novices. Superficially,
at least, this is often the case. On a deeper level, however,
the ceremony has a segregating effect because cultural
intimacy—that shared and sacred knowledge that Dutchness
is without essence—is denied to the initiands. The
late Dutch historian Ernst Kossmann once compared national
identity to a jellyfish on the beach. “Walk around it,”
78
Ritual and agency in new Dutch nationalism American Ethnologist
he wrote, “explore it from all sides, but do not step into
it” (Oostindie 2008). What the new nationalists try to do
is make solid ground out of a notoriously slimy concept.
The naturalization ceremony is part of that project, and the
culturally intimate evaluations after the ritual are critical
comments that restore multicultural sympathies. Migrants,
however, are excluded from that part of the ritual. What is
presented to them is only the ceremonially established social
convention, not the travesty made of it at the end of the
ritual that enables the organizers to return to a more complex
social reality.
The excluded
A brief final word, then, about the people who are excluded
from the moment of cultural intimacy after the ceremony
and who are denied the bureaucratic knowledge that being
Dutch is much more complicated and diffuse than is
presented during the ceremony. How do they experience
the ritual? The first thing that catches the attention is that,
without bothering to talk to the people involved, politicians,
policy makers, and journalists take it for granted that
the naturalisandi consider their new citizenship a cultural
transformation and a change of cultural identity. The ideological
consensus on the culturalization of citizenship is
such that few people can imagine naturalization to be a
purely pragmatic change that does not affect a person’s
sense of being. A few well-known public intellectuals from
foreign backgrounds have fostered this notion by describing
their decision to naturalize as “the most important decision
of my life.”10
Their statements have led to the general conclusion
that all new citizens will appreciate the ceremony
as an occasion on which to share similar strong feelings
with others during a public celebration. However, people
conveniently forget that only a small percentage of the invitees
show up to attend those ceremonies that are not
obligatory.11
The ceremonies held prior to 2006 were not
compulsory, and they attracted, at best, 20 percent of the
target group. Local bureaucrats often have difficulties preventing
people from leaving ceremonies early. In some
cases, the ritual is disrupted by the defiant behavior of—
mostly young—new citizens.
Let me first look at the roughly 20 percent of migrants
who do appreciate the ceremony. For them, naturalization
is, indeed, an emotional moment. Most of them are former
refugees who have gone through a very long process
of proving their bona fide status as refugees, following integration
courses, and applying for Dutch citizenship. It is
not unusual for such a process to last ten years or more, a
period mostly experienced as a time of utter uncertainty.
For some, naturalization means no longer being stateless.
Paradoxically, obtaining a Dutch passport enables them to
visit their home countries again, as is, for instance, the case
for Iraqi Kurds. People 40 years or older are primarily happy
for what their new citizenship will mean for their children,
who, they hope, will feel less out of place than they themselves
do. For them, the ceremony means the end of a long
time of waiting, a symbolic break with their place of birth,
and a moment of recognition in the new country.
The vast majority, however, consider the Dutch passport
a useful piece of paper, like a driver’s license or a
diploma. It will advance their position in the labor and
education markets, save them from tiresome visits to the
immigration office, and in general make their life in the
Netherlands easier. They look at Dutch peculiarities, like
celebrating Santa Claus, an obsession with sexuality, and
the habit of having long and formal meetings, with mild tolerance
but without feeling the urge to adopt such tendencies
themselves. They patiently sit through the naturalization
ceremony, which they consider—rightly in my view—
symbolic of the Dutch people’s preoccupation with their
own culture: not unpleasant but not very enticing either.
One civil servant said, “Most of them don’t mind the ceremony.
They simply want their passport.”
At the other end of the spectrum one finds the socalled
optanten. The naturalization process for this category,
consisting of adults born in the Netherlands who have
lived there all their lives, is considerably easier than for
those born outside the country. Most of them are children
of first-generation migrants from Morocco and Turkey who
opt for Dutch citizenship at the age of 18. They grew up in
the Netherlands, enrolled in Dutch schools, and speak the
Dutch language fluently but are also used to being seen and
treated and talked about as allochthones. They have quickly
built up a reputation for disrupting ceremonies with insubordinate
behavior, which irritates the organizing bureaucrats
enormously because it spoils the good, friendly, multicultural
atmosphere most of them want to create. On their
part, however, the young optanten consider the naturalization
ceremony another occasion that sets them apart from
their ethnic Dutch peers.
These three different positions also inform the various
ways in which people respond to their exclusion from the
cultural intimacy of being Dutch. The first group largely appreciates
the increasingly ceremonial character of the ritual
because it channels their emotions in a certain way. They
do not necessarily wish to be included in the cultural intimacy
of the organizers because that could belittle the significance
of their emotions. In fact, this group is usually
somewhat confused if the master of ceremonies openly criticizes
or ridicules the concept of Dutch culture. The second
group is not necessarily interested in the cultural intimacy
of the bureaucracy either. What one could call their “secular
opinion” of culture and religion as primarily private affairs
enables them to accept the public dominance of Dutch
culture as expressed in the ceremonies. Their mild tolerance
toward the dominant culture functions as a defense
against cultural interference by the state, just as secularism,
79
American Ethnologist Volume 37 Number 1 February 2010
in its original meaning, saved religion from the state. It is
primarily members of the third group, the optanten, who
experience the ceremony as offensive. For them, born and
bred in the Netherlands, the clich´es about Dutchness ring
as fictitious as they do to local bureaucrats, but their exclusion
from the bureaucracy’s cultural intimacy puts them in
a position in which they are supposed to accept the clich´es
as true. Their defiance can be seen as a contestation of
this position as well as an attempt to create a sense of cultural
intimacy among themselves. Their disregard ridicules
the Dutch clich´es as much as the local bureaucrats’ comments
backstage, but this skepticism about Dutchness takes
place in a different setting, creating different—and even
opposing—positions.
This is perhaps the most damaging effect of the naturalization
ceremony. Whereas many local bureaucrats
would normally empathize with the young optanten, the
different moments of cultural intimacy created by the ceremony
drive them apart. This may explain why some of the
local bureaucrats have developed rather negative views of
the optanten over the last few years. They appear to be frustrated
by their inability to successfully establish a sense of
solidarity with this group. One may wonder to what extent
the optanten can be blamed for this sense of frustration,
which is, in an important way, inherent in the form of the
naturalization ceremony and therefore beyond the responsibility
of both groups.
Conclusion
In this article, I have focused on the positions and practices
of local bureaucrats in relation to a new nationalist discourse
that has increasingly gained influence in Dutch politics
since the beginning of the 21st century. I have done so
not just because local bureaucrats are the ones who have to
translate the new nationalist discourse into local policies regarding
immigration and citizenship but also because their
gradually growing involvement in the naturalization ceremonies
says something about how new political discourses
become ingrained in practice-based social conventions. I
have argued that the naturalization ceremony has helped
them to accept and express new nationalism as a social convention
that may not be sustained by the experience of everyday
reality but that is expressed in a ritually demarcated
moment and nuanced in the cultural intimacy following
the ritual. The distinction between ritual and nonritual moments
makes Dutchness at once more real than and irrelevant
to bureaucratic practice. This split neutralizes bureaucrats’
initial opposition to the naturalization ceremony and
the culturalist ideology that created it. This process results
in a form of agency different from that of the reflexive self
found, for instance, in the work of James Scott (1985), but
also from that of the self that finds agency in willfully accepted
compliance (Mahmood 2005). The bureaucratic self
is an acting self, that is, a self that, in the daily practice of
meaningful work, develops cultural competence by learning
and internalizing its conventional forms to the point of
mastering them.
What this ethnographic account of new Dutch nationalist
practice suggests, then, is that the effect of nationalism
increases when it ceases to be mere discourse and becomes
embedded in the ritualized behavior of everyday life. In fact,
the naturalization ceremony is an example of how citizenship
in today’s Europe is being ritualized. The ceremony is,
in a way, an appropriate part of the restyled process of integration
that is obligatory for non-Western migrants, in the
sense that the courses, exams, and ritual passages can be
seen as a sequence of practices meant to teach migrants one
crucial, yet implicit, key value of new nationalism, namely,
that culture, in its essentialist form, matters. Like the integration
trajectory as a whole, the naturalization ceremony
emphasizes and fixes cultural differences. What I have argued
here is that the nationalist discourse on culture can be
contested, ridiculed, and undermined but that new nationalism,
as institutionalized in ritual form, is much more difficult
to resist. The form is subtler and more seductive precisely
because it allows for discursive ambiguity. Far from
neutral, however, it carries the dominant nationalist logic
with it in an implicit, self-perpetuating manner.
Notes
Acknowledgments. Parts of the empirical research for this article
were done by students of the University of Amsterdam. I especially
want to thank Corrie van Beitel, Janke de Boer, Sandra van Duuren,
Gijs Haanschoten, Lode Kulik, Dewi Lepelaar, Lisanne Oonk, Lotte
van Oudheusden, Arjanne Schaaf, Anna Tiggelaar, Esme Tromp,
and Jasper Velzeboer. I have also benefited enormously from comments
by Marieke Brand, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Thomas Blom
Hansen, Lotte Hoek, Peter Geschiere, Rob van Ginkel, Francio
Guadeloupe, Annelies Moors, Mattijs van de Port, Baukje Prins,
Vincent de Rooij, Willem Schinkel, Irene Stengs, Alex Strating, Thijl
Sunier, and Jojada Verrips. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers
for American Ethnologist for their useful comments as well as
Linda Forman for editing the text very carefully.
1. To a considerable extent, this article is a result of this stunning
change of discourse in Dutch politics and society. As a native
of the Netherlands, I have never felt an urge to do anthropology
“at home.” Being an anthropologist primarily enabled me to leave
the Netherlands and spend considerable time in Pakistan, where
I have worked for more than a decade. The neonationalist turn
in the Netherlands since the year 2000, however, caught my interest,
and I wondered how to explain this dramatic political change.
As was the case for other Dutch anthropologists, such as Peter
Geschiere (2009) and Oscar Salemink (2006), these events made me
redirect my professional attention to developments in my home
country.
2. Dutch anthropologists have played a minor role in this debate.
Until the early 1980s, some anthropologists were involved in
research that helped shape public policies related to the labor migration
that began in the 1960s. Since then, this role has largely
been taken over by sociologists. In this respect, the Netherlands
80
Ritual and agency in new Dutch nationalism American Ethnologist
differs significantly from, for instance, Norway, where anthropologists
have dominated the public debate on migration and integration.
Best known is Unni Wikan (2001), who has called for an assimilationist
approach to immigration.
3. I use the term liberal here in the European sense of the word,
meaning “right of center.”
4. The pledge of loyalty was initially not a part of the ceremony.
In 2008, however, a “declaration of solidarity” (verklaring
van verbondenheid) became obligatory. It reads, “I declare to respect
the Constitutional order of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
its freedoms and rights, and promise to faithfully fulfill the duties
of citizenship” [Ik verklaar dat ik de Grondwettelijke orde van het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, haar vrijheden en rechten respecteer
en beloof de plichten die het staatsburgerschap met zich meebrengt
getrouw te vervullen].
5. This turn from civilization to autochthonous culture and folklore
in the debate about Islam and national identity also takes place
elsewhere in Europe, for instance, in Germany in the discussion
about Leitkultur (Ewing 2008:214).
6. This example comes from Sandra van Duuren’s research on
naturalization ceremonies in the province of Noord-Brabant.
7. The inhabitants of the province of Limburg are predominantly
Catholic and are known in the Netherlands as relatively flamboyant
and fun loving.
8. There are, in fact, two kinds of naturalization ceremonies.
From 2006 to 2008, National Naturalization Day was celebrated on
August 24; since 2008, it has been observed on December 15. All
municipalities are required to organize a ceremony on that day.
Throughout the year, however, smaller ceremonies are held. Large
cities have a ceremony almost every week; small municipalities
have one at least every three months.
9. This quote comes from fieldwork conducted by Esme Tromp
and Jasper Velzeboer.
10. This is a quote from Afshin Ellian, a public intellectual of Iranian
origin. See Scheffer 2006.
11. One is required to attend the ceremony at which one receives
the royal grant of naturalization. However, attendance at the
bigger ceremony organized on National Naturalization Day is not
obligatory.
References cited
Bakhtin, Mikhail
1981 The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin.
Michael Holquist, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist,
trans. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Bauman, Zygmunt
2000 Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Baumann, Gerd
1996 Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic
London. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Billig, Michael
1995 Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.
Bloch, Maurice
1974 Symbols, Song, Dance and Features of Articulation.
Archives Europ´eeennes de Sociologie 15:55–81.
Bourdillon, M. F. C.
1978 Knowing the World or Hiding It: A Response to Maurice
Bloch. Man 13:591–599.
Clifford, James
1988 The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography,
Literature, and Art. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Crozier, Michel
1964 The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Derrida, Jacques
1988 Limited Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Directie Co¨ordinatie Integratiebeleid Minderheden
2006 Brief aan burgemeesters, 15 August 2006. http://www.
justitie.nl, accessed September 10, 2008.
Douglas, Mary
1986 How Institutions Think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press.
Ewing, Katherine Pratt
2008 Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Geertz, Clifford
1973 The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York:
Basic Books.
1983 Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics
of Power. In Local Knowledge: Further Essays in
Interpretative Anthropology. Pp. 121–146. New York: Basic
Books.
Geschiere, Peter
2009 The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion
in Africa and Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Gingrich, Andre, and Marcus Banks, eds.
2006 Neo-Nationalism in Europe and Beyond: Perspectives from
Social Anthropology. New York: Berghahn.
Ginkel, Rob van
1999 Op zoek naar eigenheid: Denkbeelden en discussies over
cultuur en identiteit in Nederland. The Hague: Sdu.
Grillo, R. D.
2003 Cultural Essentialism and Cultural Anxiety. Anthropological
Theory 3:157–173.
Handelman, Don
1990 Models and Mirrors: Towards an Anthropology of Public
Events. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harding, Susan
2000 The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and
Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri
2000 Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Herzfeld, Michael
1992 The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring
the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy. New York:
Berg.
1997 Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State. New
York: Routledge.
Holmes, Douglas
2000 Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, NeoFascism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lane, Christel
1981 The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society—the Soviet
Case. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leach, Edmund
1972 Ritualization in Man in Relation to Conceptual and Social
Development. In Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological
Approach. William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, eds. Pp.
333–337. New York: Harper and Row.
Lefort, Claude
1971 El´ements d’une critique de la bureaucratie. Geneva: Droz.
Mahmood, Saba
2005 Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
81
American Ethnologist Volume 37 Number 1 February 2010
Obeyesekere, Gananath
1990 The Work of Culture: Symbolic Transformation in Psychoanalysis
and Anthropology. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Oostindie, Gerd
2008 Kossmanns kwal: Identiteit, migratie en koloniale
geschiedenis zijn onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden.
De Academische Boekengids 68:15–20.
Prins, Baukje
2004 Voorbij de onschuld: Het debat over integratie in Nederland.
Amsterdam: Van Gennep.
Rappaport, Roy
1999 Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Salemink, Oscar
2006 New Rituals and the Nation: The Netherlands in the Mirror
of Vietnam. Amsterdam: Free University Press.
Scheffer, Paul
2006 Fijn, kan heel het land mee naturaliseren. NRC Handelsblad,
August 23. http://www.bkb.nl/llowgenda/home/parent-
page/lorem-page/fijn-kan-heel-het-land-mee-naturaliserendoor-paul-scheffer-nrc-next-van-24-08-2006/,
accessed August
12, 2008.
Schinkel, Willem
2007 Denken in een tijd van sociale hypochondrie: Aanzet tot een
theorie voorbij de maatschappij. Kampen, the Netherlands:
Klement.
Scott, James C.
1985 Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
1998 Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Sunier, Thijl, and Rob van Ginkel
2006 “At Your Service”: Reflections on the Rise of NeoNationalism
in the Netherlands. In Neo-Nationalism in Europe
and Beyond: Perspectives from Social Anthropology. Andre
Gingrich and Marcus Banks, eds. Pp. 107–124. New York:
Berghahn.
Swaan, Bram de
1991 Perron Nederland. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.
Turner, Victor
1977 Symbols in African Ritual. In Symbolic Anthropology: A
Reader in the Study of Symbols and Meanings. Janet L. Dolgin,
David S. Kemnizter, and David M. Schneider, eds. Pp. 183–194.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Uitermark, Justus, and Jan Willem Duyvendak
2005 Civilizing the City: Revanchist Urbanism in Rotterdam (the
Netherlands). ASSR Working Paper, 05/05. Amsterdam: Amsterdam
School for Social Science Research.
Verdonk, Rita
2006 Naturalisatieceremonie. http://www.justitie.nl/actueel/
toespraken/archief2006/, accessed April 4, 2008.
Wikan, Unni
2001 Generous Betrayal: Politics of Culture in the New Europe.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Yurchak, Alexei
2006 Everything Was Forever until It Was No More: The
Last Soviet Generation. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
accepted June 16, 2009
final version submitted June 22, 2009
Oskar Verkaaik
University of Amsterdam
Department of Anthropology
OZ Achterburgwal 185
Amsterdam 1012 DK
Netherlands
o.g.a.verkaaik@uva.nl
82