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September 23, 2008 17:10 MAC/SGLS Page-209 9780230_574052_12_cha11
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11
Cosmopolitanism and
Nationalism1
Craig Calhoun
Introduction
Cosmopolitanism has become an enormously popular rhetorical vehicle
for claiming at once to be already global and to have the highest
ethical aspirations for what globalization can offer. It names a virtue of
considerable importance. But, and these are my themes, it is not at all
clear (a) that cosmopolitanism is quite so different from nationalism as
sometimes supposed, (b) whether cosmopolitanism is really supplanting
nationalism in global politics, and (c) whether cosmopolitanism is an
ethical complement to politics, or in some usages a substitution of ethics
for politics. In many ways the enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism extends
decades of attacks on the state. These have come from both the libertarian
right and the anti-authoritarian left. They have been marked by both
a capitalist celebration of free markets and a romantic, sometimes anarchist
notion of self-organizing civil society. A key result is that there are
fewer defenders of the importance of government than there might be.
This makes it hard to articulate the value of stronger public institutions.
And it makes it easier to imagine that there are approaches that might
bring global order more by bypassing states than improving them, more
by direct exercise of individual ethics than by large-scale politics. This
raises a variety of issues from problems with privatization as a solution
to weak public institutions to approaches to making states stronger without
stiﬂing freedom to efforts to build effective mechanisms of interstate
governance. The present chapter takes up one speciﬁc dimension of
this larger whole, the question of whether the always imperfect link
between nations and states is now so deeply ruptured by migration and
multiculturalism that it makes little sense to talk of ‘belonging’ to particular
nations or more generally to emphasize solidarities at a level well
209
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210 Globalization and the State
below that of the world as a whole. The primacy of belonging simply
to the human race is basic to most versions of cosmopolitanism. It is
a valuable ethical norm, but I ask whether the contemporary vogue for
cosmopolitanism may both state it too categorically, neglecting the need
to complement it with attention to more local belonging and state institutions,
and distort it by allowing a fashion for universalism to mislead
us about the inequalities built into ostensibly universalist projects.
Cosmopolitanism in the modern social imaginary
Salman Rushdie writes that ‘among the great struggles of man –
good/evil, reason/unreason, etc. – there is also this mighty conﬂict
between the fantasy of Home and the fantasy of Away, the dream of
roots and the mirage of the journey’ (Rushdie, 2000). Cosmopolitanism
is a central way in which the modern era has organized ‘the fantasy
of Away’. The term is operative in culture and commerce, ethics and
politics. Whether as the fashionable man of the world or the responsible
(and gender neutral) citizen of the world, the cosmopolitan inhabits
the world. The modern era has also reorganized ‘the fantasy of Home’.
The more local world of face-to-face relations still matters of course,
but so do nations. The old contrasts of country village and capital city,
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, are reworked in the era of globalization.
To have a merely national outlook seems altogether parochial (even
though nations may be large and historically built by integrating very
diverse groups). Human nature is indeed contradictory. We seek excitement
and security, difference and familiarity, and, as Salman Rushdie
suggests, the pleasures of being both home and away. This is not like
the contradiction between seeking good and doing evil anyway. In this
case, moral virtues are claimed for each side. Great explorers and patriot
heroes are both praised in schoolbooks. Loyalty to one’s own is reinforced
not only by myths and moral tales but by ‘one’s own’ themselves.
Yet as the parable of the Good Samaritan reminds us, a more expansive
view of moral obligation has also long been taught.
At the moment, away is more in fashion among intellectuals and
especially political theorists. But home has a strong popular following.
Debates over cosmopolitanism are largely about this tension. Cosmopolitanism
means focusing on the world as a whole rather than on
a particular locality or group within it. It also means being at home
with diversity. Its main meanings refer in this sense to an orientation
or capacity of individuals. But the noun ‘cosmopolitan’ is also used
to describe the actual diversity of speciﬁc countries or cities. Paris is
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Craig Calhoun 211
more cosmopolitan than Lille, one might argue, and New York more
cosmopolitan than Cleveland (and neither Lille nor Cleveland is at
the opposite end of the spectrum). The meaning is primarily that the
city’s diversity reﬂects that of the world – without denying that many
inhabitants of Paris and New York are in fact quite parochial in their
perspectives. At the same time, cosmopolitan may describe the growing
interconnection of the whole world across national and other boundaries.
Paris and New York have cosmopolitan connections – to Shanghai,
Delhi and Cairo. And the world itself is more cosmopolitan the more
such connections exist.
Sometimes cosmopolitan is used loosely simply to mean transnational.
Often it denotes a more rigorous stress on the truly universal.
This is crucial to most systematic use of the term in ethics and political
philosophy. But though the later usage is more linguistically precise –
cosmos refers to the whole – it raises the theoretical question of just what
makes the world – or the cosmos – whole. Is it nature? Or divine creation?
Or human history? Most ethical thinking approaches the whole,
the universal, as a complete set of all human individuals (usually those
alive at one time, though occasionally ancestors and more often those
yet to be born are also given consideration). Each of us, we might say,
has a duty to consider the implications of our actions for everyone.
But thinking in terms of a set or category of human individuals misses
part of what makes cosmopolitanism a compelling concern today: the
extraordinary growth of connections among human beings and variously
organized social groups, relationships mediated by markets and
media, migrations and infectious diseases. Precisely because the world is
so intensively connected today, cosmopolitanism has become an important
theme in politics and social science, not only ethics. It ﬁgures in
practical affairs and public debates as well as intellectual explorations.
Interest in cosmopolitanism has also been fuelled by anxieties over identity
politics and multiculturalism. Many commentators are worried that
efforts to support different ways of life undermine the common culture
required by democracy. They think that too much respect for ethnic
and cultural differences among nations undermines attempts to enforce
universal human rights.
There are, however, three potential lines of confusion built into the
idea of cosmopolitanism. We have noted two already. First, does it
refer to what is common to the whole world and unites humanity? Or
does it refer to appreciation of the differences among different groups
and places? And second, does it refer to an individual attitude or ethical
orientation, or does it refer to a condition of collective life? But
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212 Globalization and the State
confusion of the third sort is at least as common: cosmopolitanism is
both description and normative programme and the distinction is often
unclear. Indeed, part of the attraction of the idea of cosmopolitanism is
that it seems to refer at once to a fact about the world – particularly in
this era of globalization – and to a desirable response to that fact. Ulrich
Beck suggests that we should think of two linked processes. The growing
interconnection of the world he calls ‘cosmopolitanization’. He uses
‘cosmopolitanism’ for the attitude that treats these as a source of moral
responsibility for everyone.2
But the very overlap in terminology suggests
(despite occasional disclaimers) that one is automatically linked
to the other. And this is not just an issue in Beck’s writing but a wider
feature of discourse about cosmopolitanism.
Clearly, neither the interconnectedness nor the diversity of the world
brings pleasure to everyone. Growing global connections can become a
source of fear and defensiveness rather than appreciation for diversity
or sense of ethical responsibility for distant strangers. Globalization can
lead to renewed nationalism or strengthening of borders – as has often
been the case since the 2001 terrorist attacks. But like many others Beck
hopes that instead a cosmopolitan attitude will spread. He emphasizes
that risks such as environmental degradation turn the whole world into
a ‘community of fate’ (cf. Beck, 2006). Cosmopolitanism is, for him,
the perspective on what humanity shares that will help us deal with
this. Cosmopolitanism offers an ethics for globalization. Globalization
requires an ethics not only because ordinary people ﬁnd themselves
interacting more often with people from other countries, cultures and
religions but because they are implicated in relationships with others
around the world whom they will never meet. Through trade and foreign
aid and wars and diplomacy and the tourist industry and the global
organization of religion people on every continent are joined to others
through indirect relationships. These are mediated by information technology,
business corporations, governments and NGOs. But they remain
human relationships and therefore demand ethical evaluation. What are
we doing (or failing to do) for those dying in Darfur? What responsibility
do we share for the intellectual property regime that – depending on
how you evaluate it – ensures the production of new drugs to treat diseases
around the world or makes those drugs harder to buy for anyone
who is not rich. And how should we think about the very fact that some
are rich and some are poor for reasons having more to do with the countries
into which they are born than the efforts or intelligence they have
put into their careers. But as even these examples should make clear,
globalization demands more than ethics. Precisely because so many of
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Craig Calhoun 213
the crucial relationships that drive and shape it are indirect, they do not
resolve easily into interpersonal norms. They require action aimed at
states, corporations, markets and media – systems and technologies in
short. They require politics. And politics is required in another sense as
well, the sense of political speech that constitutes social organization,
not only interpersonal relationships.
Mixing fashion, commerce, ethics, and politics
Always in vogue for elites, though sometimes suspect to others, cosmopolitanism
has lately become even more fashionable. The trend
started in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War amid intensifying
globalization. ‘Cosmopolitan’ is now a compliment for the suave in a
way it has not been since the 1920s or at least the 1960s (when in
Cold War spirit spies epitomized the cosmopolitan). The Cosmopolitan
is a popular drink, a ‘sophisticated vodka based cocktail, ﬂavored
with orange and cranberry’, made famous as the favourite drink of
the girls on TV’s Sex and the City.3
Those self-styled girls did not show
much interest in the political philosophy of globalization or Kantian
ethics. But they were surely cultural descendants of Helen Gurley Brown,
who reinvented Cosmopolitan magazine in the 1960s. Now, as then, cosmopolitanism
lives a double life as a pop cultural evocation of openness
to a larger world and a sometimes more systematic and academic claim
about the moral signiﬁcance of transcending the local, even achieving
the universal. Both have ﬂourished especially in good times and
amid optimism about globalization. Cosmo (as the magazine came to
be called) was founded in 1886, riding the wave of a stock market
boom not unlike those of the 1920s and the 1990s. The Gilded Age (as
Mark Twain’s novel named it) ground to a halt with the stock market
crash of 1893. The Roaring Twenties took a dive, along with ﬂappers
and Fitzgeraldian cosmopolitanism, in 1929. Their 1990s successor was
wounded deeply by the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center (among
the headquarters of corporate cosmopolitanism) and deﬂated in 2002
after overheating. But though 2002 marked a ‘severe correction’ it was
not a bust of 1893 let alone 1929 proportions. Cosmopolitans with
lifestyles linked to the market were chastened. But like the Dow Jones
Industrial Average, they caught their breath and came back. The Dow
has set a new record (though volatility is growing as I write) and enthusiasm
for cosmopolitanism is similarly buoyant. It is of course not merely
a matter of drinks but of hopes for human rights. Cosmopolitanism is
what we praise in those who read novelists from every continent, or
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214 Globalization and the State
in the audiences and performers of world music. It is the aspiration of
advocates for global justice, and the claim of managers of multinational
businesses. Campaigners on behalf of migrants urge ‘cosmopolitan’ legal
reforms out of both concern for immigrants and belief that openness to
people from other cultures enriches their countries. ‘Cosmopolitan’ is
the ﬁrst category in the advertisements posted by would-be husbands
seeking brides (and vice versa) in the Sunday Times of India.4
The many different usages reinforce the fashion for the concept but
they muddy its meaning. ‘Cosmopolitan’ is claimed sometimes for a
political project: building participatory institutions adequate to contemporary
global integration, especially outside the nation-state framework.
It is claimed sometimes for an ethical orientation of individuals: the
suggestion that each should think and act with strong concern for all
humanity. It is claimed sometimes for a stylistic capacity to incorporate
diverse inﬂuences and sometimes for a psychological capacity to
feel at ease amid difference and appreciate diversity. It is used sometimes
for all projects that reach beyond the local (with some slippage
depending on whether the ‘local’ is the village or the nation state). It is
used other times for strongly holistic visions of global totality, like the
notion of a community of risk imposed by potential for nuclear or environmental
disaster. It is used still other times to describe not individuals
but cities, as for example New York or London, contemporary Delhi or
historical Alexandria gain their vitality and character not from the similarities
of their residents but from the concrete ways in which they have
learned to interact across lines of ethnic, religious, national, linguistic
and other identities. Of course citizens of these cities interact largely in
trade and there is an easy extension of usage from the cosmopolitanism
encouraged by interaction in physically located markets or along longdistance
trading networks to the idea that a global market is intrinsically
cosmopolitan because not contained by nation states.
Britain was a centre of the 1990s boom in talk of cosmopolitanism.
Reference to ‘cosmopolitan Britain’ became standard speech. As in: ‘cosmopolitan
Britain has emerged as one of the word’s most diverse and
innovative food and drink markets’.5
It evoked sophisticated, metropolitan
culture vs the non-cosmopolitan hinterlands; this was a period of
renewal in the cultural and ﬁnancial life of British cities with yuppies,
art galleries, and startling improvement in restaurants. It evoked multicultural
Britain vs monocultural English, Scottish or Welsh national
identity; this was not only a matter of revaluing the different historically
British cultures but of incorporating immigrants from former colonies,
Eastern Europe and elsewhere (with the accent on black and brown faces
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Craig Calhoun 215
at Cambridge and Oxford, in Parliament and reading the TV news – only
somewhat undercut by more concentrated and less happy black and
brown faces in Brixton, Bradford and other less thriving locales). Perhaps
most of all, cosmopolitanism evoked a positive orientation towards
European integration and engagement with the rest of the world. The
LSE was academic headquarters for this, with a range of intellectual
exchanges and conferences, new master’s programmes focusing on ﬁelds
like human rights and NGO management, a clutch of international
celebrity professors, and (not coincidentally fee-paying) students from
all over the world. The LSE became in a sense the ﬁrst really European
university (as the European University Institute outside Florence was a
more rariﬁed centre for advanced study only). Britain was especially well
placed to embrace this cosmopolitanism because English was increasingly
the world language, because it had joined the EU without losing
its special relationship with the US, because it was a major ﬁnancial centre,
and because its former empire gave it unusually strong connections
around the world. Britain remains a centre of cosmopolitan discourse,
and also offers a good example of the way in which cosmopolitan style
can ﬂourish as part of economic and statist projects. Consider British
Airways’ rebranding as ‘a global, caring company, more modern, more
open, more cosmopolitan, but proud to be based in Britain’:
What is vital to this new identity is its international feel. This is
indicative of BA’s desire to be a global player. Also, according to BA, it
shows Britain’s own multicultural mix. However, the emphasis is on
presenting the positive aspects of different cultures and how British
Airways truly supports its operations, including its many joint ventures,
in different countries. All this leads to a positive image for the
60 per cent of BA customers who are not British. (Ayling, 1997)
But the message is not just for foreigners. As British Airway’s branding
consultants point out: ‘the United Kingdom is not keen on being seen
as the country of outmoded traditions and old castles. The new surface
shows a youthful, cosmopolitan Britain, conﬁdently looking to the
future.’6
Indeed, this example of commercial cosmopolitanism comes
on the heels of the late 1990s rebranding of Britain itself as ‘Cool Britannia’.
‘New Labour’ was in the leadership but hints of the Mod Sixties
and the once mighty empire were not accidental. Advertising campaigns
designed to brand nations have become common, in fact, situating
countries in global communications and global markets. Nearly every
nation claims to be cosmopolitan but with distinctive arts and culture
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216 Globalization and the State
and delightful local scenery (see Aronczyk, 2007). With their logos and
slogans, nations are marketing themselves not just to tourists but to
investors and sometimes to their own citizens. The nation-branding
around the Olympics – whether in China, Greece or Spain – always
includes a reminder to citizens to feel good about themselves, and their
government.
In both popular culture and political science, cosmopolitanism often
ﬁgures as an attitude, a style, a personal commitment. This is not necessarily
political or even ethical. The contrasting signiﬁcance of the
phrases ‘citizen of the world’ and ‘man of the world’ suggests the
difference. The latter is as likely to be about expanded tolerance for
ethical lapses, or simply about more fashionable clothes. Cosmopolitanism
signals a direct connection between the individual and world as
a whole.7
But if this is sometimes given ethical emphasis, equally often
the world appears simply as an object of consumption, there for individuals’
pleasure: ‘The goal of cosmopolitanism is self-expression and
self-realization’, writes Kimberly Yuracko. ‘Cosmopolitanism presents
individuals with a wide range of options; they choose the one that
will bring them the most pleasure and gratiﬁcation’ (Yuracko, 2003:
91). More commonly, being cosmopolitan is glossed as being a ‘citizen
of the world’. Even if this suggests more ethical obligations than mere
self-gratiﬁcation, contemporary usage gives this almost unambiguously
positive valence – who would not want to be a citizen of the world?
But of course the idea can be terrifying if what world citizenship means
is exclusion from citizenship and rights in particular states. Past demonizations
of ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ should not be forgotten. And the
two often coexist. There is no upper class in the world more dedicated
to cosmopolitan shopping than that of Russia. But it is not just ignorant
rural Russian masses with minimal access to the new megamalls that
participate in xenophobic nationalism. State elites and well-connected
millionaires press anti-cosmopolitan policies. Even oligarchs who drive
Bentleys and have homes in the South of France are complicit – though
they may also become objects of nationalist attack. The issue is not just
consumerism vs ethics, or the coexistence of stylistic cosmopolitanism
with political nationalism. It is the tendency to substitute ethics or style
for deeper senses of politics. Cosmopolitan typically suggests an attitude
or virtue that can be assumed without change in basic political or
economic structures – which are external to the individual. Much of its
appeal comes from the notion that cosmopolitanism (a version of ethical
goodness) can be achieved without such deeper change. But therein
lies a key problem in an otherwise attractive concept. Cosmopolitanism
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Craig Calhoun 217
is not simply a free-ﬂoating cultural taste, personal attitude or political
choice, however; it is a matter of institutions. What seems like free individual
choice is often made possible by capital – social and cultural as
well as economic. Take the slogan in Sony’s recent computer advertisements:
‘C is for Choice, Color, and Cosmopolitanism.’ Surely C is also
for capital.8
Or again, after Singapore’s president spoke of the island’s ‘cosmopolitans’
and ‘heartlanders’, a local blogger posted mock advice on how to
be a cosmopolitan: ‘Many Heartlanders think that to become a Cosmo,
you need a lot of money. Nothing could be further from the truth. Being
a Cosmo is essentially a state of mind, and has nothing to do with that
overdraft that keeps you awake at night.’9
He continues with advice
on wine and watches, cars and condos. But, as he says, ‘Travel is the
true measure of a Cosmo. “Been there, done that” is their motto.’ Sadly,
his readership is ‘those of us who haven’t been, primarily because we
haven’t a bean’. The markets, the migrations and the media that encourage
and shape cosmopolitanism are not simply responses to individual
taste or morality but creatures of capitalism. This does not determine
every detail of their operation nor does it make them necessarily bad.
But it does mean that cosmopolitanism is not free-ﬂoating, not equally
available to everyone, not equally empowering for everyone. The material
globalization on which cosmopolitanism rests is strikingly unequal
as well as uprooting. This is one of the reasons why the cosmopolitanism
of some sparks the resentments of others. But it would be a
mistake to identify anxieties about cosmopolitanism simply with resentment
or indeed with ethnic prejudice or benighted localism. In the ﬁrst
place localism is not always benighted. More basically, belonging to
speciﬁc social groups is an important source of collective strength for
many; the solidarity of these groups is a basis for action to redress many
ills and sometimes even to mitigate inequality; communities, nations
and religions motivate many in ways that abstract membership of the
human race does not. We need not simply oppose cosmopolitanism and
belonging, as universalism and particularism are opposed in logic and in
Parsonsian theory.10
They can be complements to each other.
The melting pot
The cosmopolitan critique of particularistic belonging is a sort of global
revision of the older idea of a melting pot. This was proposed most
famously as a description of the United States in the early twentieth
century. An era of high immigration had brought together speakers
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218 Globalization and the State
of different languages, followers of different religions, people raised in
different cultures. A prominent rabbi used the image of a melting pot
in a Passover sermon, simultaneously praising American openness and
warning his congregation against excessive assimilation. Israel Zangwill,
a London-born playwright of Russian Jewish ancestry, took up
the phrase as the title of a 1908 play in which he suggested that in
America all would be remade in a new common culture. Each would be
free to pursue a new individual destiny.11
Theodore Roosevelt attended
and applauded. The phrase stuck. But the phrase had much older roots.
Emerson, for example, referred in 1845 to racial and cultural mixture
through the metaphor of ‘the smelting pot’; there were still earlier anticipations
in Crevecoeur and other colonial commentators. The ‘melting’
metaphor was used to discuss the question of how autonomous and
distinct the separate American states should be, as in Winterbotham’s
(1795) observation that: ‘some from jealousy of liberty were afraid of
giving too much power to their rulers; others, from an honest ambition
to aggrandize their country, were for paving the way to national
greatness by melting down the separate states into a national mass’
(quoted in Kohn, 1944: 288). The passage reminds us helpfully of the
parallel between debates over the integration of immigrants and those
over the incorporation of disparate regions, provinces and states into a
larger common nation state. By the 1970s, some worried patriots were
writing of ‘the rise of the unmeltable ethnics’ (Novak, 1973). And some
happier patriots were celebrating the salad bowl or the mosaic instead
of the melting pot, mixture without loss of distinction. In other words,
America remained diverse and maintaining cultural distinctions and
ethnic solidarities – rather than melting them away in the assimilationist
pot – became a positive goal. Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggested
claiming both sides of this debate, arguing that especially in cities there
was simultaneously assimilation and reproduction of ethnic identity
and that both things could be good (Glaser and Moynihan, 1970).
Richard Sennett (1970) argued for the ‘uses of disorder’ that made cities
vital, even when it spilled over into conﬂict, and that made the lives of
individuals richer.
A new wave of immigration in the 1990s put the issue back on the
front burner. It came, moreover, after 20 years in which the idea of
multicultural coexistence and a politics of recognition had been in
the ascendancy. An increasing number of authors called for stronger
assimilationism, for a deeper sense of political commonality, for resistance
to ‘identity politics’. Then the terrorist attacks of 2001 made the
issue feel newly acute. Samuel Huntington, as often, caught an aspect
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Craig Calhoun 219
of the national mood and framed an issue on the minds of many
who hesitated to name it so bluntly. His recent book, Who Are We?,
is shaped by a deep anxiety that Hispanic immigrants do not want to
become Americans in the same sense as his WASP (white Anglo-Saxon
Protestant) ancestors (it is perhaps no accident that he traces descent to
immigrants who came on the Mayﬂower and is a descendant of several
generations of Harvard men) (Huntington, 2004). Indeed, Huntington
suspects, Latin American immigrants not only do not want to assimilate,
they cannot. It is not clear to what extent Huntington thinks that
the problem is the strength of Hispanic–Catholic identity and to what
extent the unanticipated weakness of American nationalism as a culture
of assimilation. Either way, he articulates a sense of threat among many
in the US analogous to that which many Europeans feel over Islamic
immigrants.
Yet this new anxiety over unmeltable immigrants has risen at the same
time as a widespread celebration of the melting pot ideal in the form of
mixed race identities. In the US this is symbolized by the golfer Tiger
Woods – who describes himself as ‘Cablinasian’: simultaneously Caucasian,
black, Indian and Asian.12
It is given a reiﬁed form by genetic
testing which gives sharp percentages and geographies to ancestry. People
who thought themselves simply black – like the jazz musician
Quincy Jones – may be told their genes are only 66 per cent African. The
prominent African American literary critic Henry Louis Gates learned
that his traceable ancestry is half-European and joked that perhaps
he wasn’t black enough to head African American Studies at Harvard
(Gates, 2007).13
But just as the extension of this into a popular expression
like ‘his blood is half white’ represents a slippage from genes to
one of their physical manifestations, so the reimagining of sociocultural
categories as biological represents a slippage. Ironically, while the dominant
response to genetic accounts of ancestry is to see race as biological,
it makes as much sense to say that the demonstrated genetic diversity
within populations like ‘African Americans’ reveals the extent to which
these were social and cultural constructions (though not the less real
for that). On the one hand, mixed race identities are important and
should not be dismissed in favour of ethnic essentialism. On the other
hand, it is a worrying illusion to think that problems of race will simply
fade away because of intermarriage or genetically demonstrated ancestral
mixtures. It is also an illusory solution to problems of migration and
citizenship simply to say – though it can be true – that many migrants
have rights in multiple nation states and understand their belonging in
complexly overlapping ways.14
Take Palestinians in Israel. Multiple and
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220 Globalization and the State
overlapping identities are real, but not without problems. Jewish Israelis
are frightened by a demographic peril: a growing population of Muslim
Arabs inside the Jewish state. Arab Israelis beneﬁt from citizenship
but also chafe at its limitations, injustices and initial premises. And if
nationalism is problematic, it is far from obvious that there is a ‘postnational’
resolution available for the problems of Palestine. With their
own history of minority life, Jews involved in the founding of Israel
were of course worried about creating new minorities. For a (perhaps
ironic) example, return to Israel Zangwill, the playwright who popularized
the idea of the melting pot. Zangwill (1917) was a prominent
cultural Zionist and the author of books like The Principle of Nationalities.
As an advocate of Jewish ethnic nationalism, he argued that Jews
needed to face up to the necessity of forcing Arabs out of Palestine (see
Simons, 2007). The new Jewish state, Zangwill argued, needed a clear
Jewish majority. He thought constitutional government and especially
democracy required this. In a 1916 conversation with Vladimir Jabotinsky,
for example, Zangwill asked what Jabotinsky would do with the
Arabs if the Jews got a Charter for Palestine. Jabotinsky replied with the
classic answer that there was enough room in Palestine on both sides
of the Jordan for 6 or 8 million people and the Arabs only numbered
half a million. ‘All this is just idle chatter’, replied Zangwill, adding that
people, such as Jabotinsky, from Eastern Europe
considered it quite normal for more than ten minority groups to be
found living together in a small area. However, peoples from Western
democracies would see this as a disease for which there could be no
cure. To allow such a situation in our Jewish State would be like gorging
out our eyes with our hands. If we receive Palestine, the Arabs
will have to ‘trek’.
The last reference is, of course, to the Boer trek to escape English domination
in South Africa. Zangwill’s name became associated with the
description of Palestine as a ‘land without people for a people without
land’. In fact, he did not offer this as a mere description. Rather, responding
to Lord Shaftesbury’s suggestion (originally with reference to Syria)
that Britain might give ‘a country without a nation to a nation without a
country’, Zangwill was clear that there were Arabs who would have to be
moved in order to achieve the desired goal (see Garﬁnkle, 1991). ‘A land
without people for a people without land’ became a slogan justifying
Jewish appropriation of Palestine to create Israel and not surprisingly
provoked a nationalist response.
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Imagining a world without nations, a world in which ethnicity is
simply a consumer taste, a world in which each individual simply and
directly inhabits the whole, is like imagining the melting pot in which
all ethnicities vanish into the formation of a new kind of individual.
In each case this produces an ideology especially attractive to some.
It neglects the reasons why many others need and reproduce ethnic
or national distinctions. And perhaps most importantly it obscures the
issues of inequality that make ethnically unmarked national identities
accessible mainly to elites, and make an easy sense of being a citizen
of the world contingent on having the right passports, credit cards
and cultural credentials. American debates over immigration and assimilation
predate independence, often as debates about the peopling of
speciﬁc colonies, and shape both images of America and practical policies
through the history of the United States. The dominant American
ideology – common among scholars as well as the broader population –
suggested that the ‘ﬁrst new nation’ was precisely not an ethnic nation.
Tom Paine famously held that ‘Europe, not England is the parent country
of America’ – though one might suggest that ‘European’ is itself an
ethnic category of sorts, at least by comparison to, say, Asian or Latin
American. In any event, British – and indeed, speciﬁcally English – history
loomed large in US school curricula. But both ‘consensus’ historians
(e.g. Higham, 1955) and later social scientists (e.g. Greenﬁeld, 1992;
Lipset, 1996) have commonly seen nativist movements as aberrations,
recurrently overcome, and the main pattern as an idealized mixture that
transcends ethnicity. This view perhaps grasps an element of truth in its
contrasts to Europe, but it has been very uncritically held. From the
beginning it failed to confront both the fundamental challenge of racial
domination and the continuing hegemony of an elite constituted in
part through ethnicity. Long described as WASP, this has broadened,
but not entirely disappeared, and continues to be reproduced in common
experiences of education, religion and culture as well as networks
of social relations.15
Recurrently, the notion of the ideal post-ethnic
nation has also confronted waves of less elite nativist sentiment and
political agitation. And ﬁnally, the assertion of ethnic identities and
the positive valuing of difference also have a long tradition, and one
that has long made uncomfortable those who would see the struggle as
only between assimilationists or cosmopolitans and nativists or racists.
W.E.B. DuBois wrote famously of the double-consciousness of those for
whom an ascriptive racial identitiy must always compete with an inclusive
national identity. Yet, in The Souls of Black Folk he advocated no
simple choice. ‘One ever feels his two-ness, – an American, a Negro; two
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222 Globalization and the State
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in
one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn
asunder’ (DuBois, 1994: 2). The American Negro may long ‘to merge his
double-self into a better and truer self.’ But
in this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He
would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach
the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a ﬂood
of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message
for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be
both a Negro and an American ... (DuBois, 1994: 3)
Various sorts of ‘both/and’ identities are pervasive in the modern
world. They are brought to the fore by international migration, by
European integration, and by the claims of multiple states on common
cultural traditions and identities, like China and Taiwan and for that
matter Singapore. Islam and Christianity are each religions that produce
common identities crossing national divisions. Gender, race and even
engagement in social movements can produce ‘both/and’ identities (see
Anzaldúa, 1987; Collins, 1990). Neither universalism nor essentialist
nativism or nationalism deals well with these multiplicities and overlaps,
and indeed it is common for universalists to imagine all claims to
group solidarity on the model of nativist closure – and for nativists and
nationalists to imagine all suggestions that multiple identities matter
as ‘rootless cosmopolitan’ challenges to the integral whole. Celebration
of multiple identities has recently come into vogue – for example as
multiculturalism – and has produced both universalist and particularist
responses.16
Salman Rushdie says he writes love songs ‘to our mongrel
selves’; he refuses to be simply Indian, lives in England, and travels
enough to show those who would stop him in the name of religious
purity that they have failed (Rushdie, 2000: 394). Indeed, one might
think it is hard for anyone to be ‘simply Indian’, so deeply plural and
cross-cutting are the identities of the subcontinent. Yet there are other
Indians living in England whose very sense of being is bound up with
being Indian. And as Tariq Modood notes, many immigrants from India
in the era of partition became Pakistanis without ever living in that
country, and then in the dominant British politics of identity became
‘Asian’ and then more commonly ‘Muslim’ (Modood et al., 2004).
‘Indian’ now distinguishes mainly Hindu Britons (ironically echoing
the assertions of religious purity of some Hindu fundamentalists back on
the subcontinent). There are also angry Englishmen determined to make
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Craig Calhoun 223
sure that neither Indians nor Muslims ever feel they belong unequivocally
to England’s green and pleasant land. Of course there are also
Indians in India for whom England is only ancient history and India
itself somewhat abstract but for whom village or caste are central locations.
There are at least as many for whom a militantly Hindu account of
being Indian is fundamentally compelling. And there are still other Indians
for whom the Communist Party (or rather, one of them) is still vital
and transcends ethnicity and nationality and others who love mathematics
partly because it seems a universal language as well as a good
source of that other universal, money. In England, when asked their
national identity, those of Indian descent face the same puzzle as others:
is the right answer English, British or just possibly European?17
This sort of ﬁeld of multiple and heterogeneously structured identities
has become increasingly common in the contemporary world but it
should not be thought that identities were ever quite so clear or singular
in the past as ideology sometimes suggested. Colonialism produced
plenty of examples and independence did not neatly straighten them
out. Think of Léopold Senghor, ﬁrst President of Senegal but before that
a member of the French National Assembly and all the while a panAfricanist,
one of the founders of the idea and movement of negritude.
Earlier empires produced their own such complexities, but even villages
were not quite the homogenous communities of myth and nostalgia.
From the 1960s to the 1990s multiculturalism was in vogue. The wave
seems since to have crested. By 2007 a New York Times art critic could
draw a contrast between Manhattan’s somewhat more central art world
and its Brooklyn cousin by saying ‘Multiculturalist terms like identity,
hybridity and diversity may sound like words from a dead language in
Chelsea, but they are the lingua franca of the Brooklyn show’ (Carter,
2007).18
It’s not only in the Chelsea galleries that ‘identity’ sounds passé;
it seems so 1990s to a range of social theoretical hipsters. They want to
give identity and especially identity politics a rest and be cosmopolitan.
But cosmopolitanism is claimed by multiculturalists as well as those who
think multiculturalism has got out of hand and needs to be tamed by
emphasis on universal humanity (and those who think multiculturalism
is simply no longer trendy). Indeed the very idea of multiculturalism was
also something of a theoretical muddle. On the one hand it suggested
the essential malleability of identity and on the other the essential priority
of identity (though both sides tended to condemn essentialism). The
same went for the ‘politics of identity’. This meant most coherently that
identity was always subject to politics – to struggles within groups over
what they stood for, to struggles between those with different agendas
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224 Globalization and the State
over which identity would be primary. But to many it also meant simply
that different groups struggled politically to get due recognition for
their identities or over issues in which the stakes were deﬁned by group
identity (see Calhoun, 1994).
Cosmopolitanism is most often invoked by those who see identity
politics as a sort of mistake – like lingering ethnonationalism, rather
than citizenship of the world. But the issues have not gone away. European
politics is rife with struggles over whether national identities or the
common claim of ‘European’ should be primary. There are few African
countries where claims for religious, or ethnic, or regional or ‘tribal’
identities are not sometimes as powerful as projects of national integration.
Latin American countries ﬁnd themselves common identity in
the struggle against US domination, but internally are split by movements
deriving signiﬁcant force from indigenous resentment against
elites deﬁned in part by European ancestry (as well as cosmopolitan
property). The economic rise of China both masks identity struggles
within the People’s Republic and intensiﬁes others around Asia. And
from the Middle East through South and South East Asia (and indeed in
Europe, Africa and the US) Islamic renewal generates both struggles over
identity and struggles deﬁned by religious identities that modernization
theorists had pronounced permanently fading.
European integration and the politics of fear (and hope)
In 2005, just before the ﬁrst series of referenda on the proposed European
constitution, observers noted a perplexing trend: European Jews
voting for far-right wing political parties. In Antwerp, for example, at
least 65 per cent of those registered as Jews during the Second World
War died during the Holocaust yet at least 5 per cent of the Jewish population
today has voted for Vlaams Belang, the xenophobic far-right
party that focuses on Muslims but was founded by Nazi collaborators
(Smith, 2005). Most of Antwerp’s Jews are probably outraged by Vlaams
Belang. There may be a long-term drift of Jewish voting from more Leftist
to Rightist parties, but that is not really the issue. The issue has
nothing to do with generalizing about Jews, nor simply with Left or
Right. It has to do with fear making for strange alliances, since after all
the party the surprising 5 per cent of Antwerp Jews have voted for is not
simply Rightist, it is extreme Dutch nationalist. It is, in an ironic way,
a party of unity – for some – a party that says one particular common
bond should trump certain internal differences and at the same time
create a wall against ‘foreign’ incursions.
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Craig Calhoun 225
It is no accident that such nationalism could play on anxieties raised
simultaneously by Muslim immigration and European integration. But
this is not just a Dutch or a European phenomenon. Versions of the
same thing are happening in many places in the world. People are seeking
protective solidarities against a variety of real or perceived threats.
They seek different kinds of solidarities: ethnic, nationalist, religious,
regional, corporate and others. In general, none feels adequate and fears
remain powerful – which may help turn any of the defensive solidarities
into something offensive. The strange juxtaposition of Jews voting
for the descendants of Nazis because they fear Muslims is not merely an
ironic reﬂection of how difﬁcult it is to make sense of the multiple identities
by which each of us is located in the modern world. It is a challenge
to the notion that ‘thin’ identities, those grounded in the common
procedures of a constitution or an entirely civic nationalism, are ascendant
in Europe. The very language of civic nationalism is ironically
deployed in articulating what amounts to an ethnic identity. A group
of immigrants is described as undesirable because of the ‘thickness’
of its cultural traditions, which resist assimilation, and the undesirable
character of some of its alleged cultural practices. The charges are
framed in the language of civic nationalism and Enlightenment. That
a not insigniﬁcant number of Dutch Jews join in reﬂects not only how
widespread the phenomenon is, but also the power of this rhetorical
formation.
This involves a peculiar form of ‘culturalism’ which is widespread
in European debates about immigration (Schinkel, 2007). Informed,
ironically, by modern anthropological relativism, it suggests that the
immigrants need to return to their ‘own cultures’ which must follow
their own paths of development. Indeed, many in the Netherlands
implicitly, if paradoxically, claim the heritage of the Enlightenment as
a sort of ethnic attribute. Their main insistence is not on race but culture,
on having absorbed the Enlightenment into their culture in a way
that Muslim immigrants could not or would not. This sort of view is
widespread not just in the Netherlands but in Sweden and other countries
where a liberal immigration policy has been juxtaposed to a strong
sense of national identity – with the result that the grandchildren of
immigrants, themselves citizens and often children of citizens, are not
recognized as nationals. And it is analogous to Samuel Huntington’s
arguments about the gulf between the democratic-capitalist culture of
the United States and the inescapable alienness of Hispanics.
Cosmopolitanism becomes, ironically, the language of rejection of
immigrants who are inadequately cosmopolitan. The immigrants are
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226 Globalization and the State
accused of not respecting human rights or other universal values, thus,
as well as of not learning the local language. European struggles over
the relationship of cosmopolitanism to belonging reﬂect a particular history
of nationalism and a particular project of transnational integration.
They have inﬂuenced the development of cosmopolitanism as a core
theme in both political theory and global politics. This has sometimes
brought problematic assumptions. For example, the 300 years after the
Peace of Westphalia are sometimes treated as an era of global order based
on national states. The nation-state project was indeed one powerful
force between 1648 and the current period. But to call this an era of
global order requires some sense of irony, since nation states engineered
such massive violence. It was in the context of these wars, indeed, that
the very cosmopolitan idea of humanitarian actions to reduce the suffering
wars entailed took root, with the founding of the International
Committee for the Red Cross in 1863 and the Geneva Conventions
of 1864 as its symbols. But the fact of these wars, and the fact that
refugees were hardly greeted with open arms in all instances, remind
us that Kant’s effort to renew commitments to the ancient idea of
political asylum were efforts in theory that did not immediately deﬁne
practice. Likewise, the Peace of Westphalia ended Europe’s main religious
wars, but ushered in an era of new struggles to deﬁne, unify
and strengthen national states, not simply an era when the nationstate
form was dominant. It was not simply an era of actual nation
states, and therefore the present era is hardly simply the end of the
era of nation states. It was an era in which national projects – and
states – confronted different challenges. European nationalism, moreover,
was almost always intimately connected to European imperialism.
At its most Republican, revolutionary France never ceased being actively
imperial – not when the Revolutionary Assembly confronted the Haitian
revolution and not when the Third Republic faced the Algerian drive for
independence.
Over decades, the project of European integration has itself become
a response to the fact that no European country is a superpower.
This encourages cooperation as much as does the threat of war any
one of them might pose the others. Europe needs to unite, Europeans
are told, in order to compete effectively in global markets. This is made
possible, Europeans are told, by a common European civilization. And
moreover, Europeans still have a mission civilisatrice to the rest of the
world. Not least of all, as Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003)
argued in their joint letter after the US invasion of Iraq, Europeans
have an opportunity and a responsibility to ‘balance out the hegemonic
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Craig Calhoun 227
unilateralism of the United States’. Europe’s solidarity is not simply
intra-European, but also counterposed to the US and the non-West. And
here again, the assertion of cosmopolitanism ﬁgures as among other
things an answer to perceived excesses of nationalism. Global projections
of US state power are at the same time imperialist, nationalist
and neo-liberal. They combine attempts to reshape semi-autonomous
nation states, to derive national advantages for the US, and to promote
global capitalism. Some US leaders express ambitions to spread
democracy, and it is important not merely to dismiss or debunk these
but to demand demonstrations of honest commitment. When hegemonic
powers use the language of democracy and popular will it is easy
to be cynical but more productive to try to seize what openings this
provides. At the same time, it is important to recognize that a new assertion
of imperial power is not simply a return to some ‘pre-Westphalian’
order, as though for 350 years the world has been neatly and peacefully
ordered by nation states. Nationalism and imperialism have been
more mutually connected and interdependent than that. And ﬁnally,
it is important to recognize that cosmopolitanism can be as much the
project of neo-liberalism as of cultural creativity or human rights, that
global citizenship is extremely inegalitarian, and that national and local
structures of belonging still matter a great deal. We need not embrace
nationalism uncritically to see that nation states still provide the contexts
of everyday solidarities and most people’s life projects; they still
are the primary arenas for democratic public life; and they are focal
points for resistance to imperialism. Cosmopolitan democracy seemed
not only an attractive possibility but the clear direction of progress,
borne ineluctably on the tide of globalization. But of course tides
have a way of turning, and globalization brought resistances as well
as embraces. Theories that made cosmopolitanism seem too easy left
many cosmopolitan liberals unprepared for new challenges symbolized
by September 11th and more generally for a world in which suspicions
and cultural divisions were powerful, in which a struggle over solidarities
and identities was by no means consistently ‘liberal’, and in which a
hegemonic global superpower claimed to be cosmopolitan and advance
democracy – though hardly without dissent. Even in Europe, the politics
of fear ﬂourished. The proposed ‘constitution’ of 2005 seemed to
embody the cosmopolitan ideals of European integration. It fared no
better than the dream of a common foreign policy faced with US-led
war and struggles against terrorist tactics. Indeed, the so-called constitution
illustrated not only a weak point of the European Union but
also the weakness of approaches to transnational unity grounded only
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228 Globalization and the State
in formal legal arrangements, not social solidarity. It was a document
only technocrats could love, and which some technocrats loved partly
because it was designed to empower them at the expense of democratic
public participation. It was too long to be read, let alone memorized;
too complicated to be incorporated in a meaningful way into the collective
consciousness of Europeans. It was a manifestation of a process that
thought of a constitution as simply a basic law and not as a process
of constituting political relations among citizens. That the writing was
overseen by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a quintessential ‘Énarch’ (graduate
of France’s super-elite national school of administration), was apt
and that he showed no comprehension of the depth of doubt and distrust
his document inspired was telling. Ironically, the debate over the
constitution may have been the most meaningful demonstration of a
European public sphere yet seen. But the opposition was as strong as it
was (and still is) partly because the process of ‘constituting’ Europe had
not included the nurturing of a strong pan-European public sphere. This
contributed to suspicions of the technocratic constitution and indeed
fear of the European project itself, at least as currently led.
Moreover, just as the domination of national states and large-scale
markets over local communities and other groupings like craft unions
or provincial cultures was hardly a one-sided blessing, so too would it
be a mistake to think transcending the national is only and entirely a
path of progress. Who wins and who loses is in every historical recurrence
an open question, decided in signiﬁcant part by how the process
plays out – and by struggles over its terms. In such struggles, power is
typically lopsided. As Pierre Bourdieu (2002) has suggested, uniﬁcation
usually beneﬁts the dominant. This was true in the forging of national
states, but the process nonetheless created openings for new groups and
occasions for struggle to increase democracy and public services. There
are similar opportunities in European and indeed global integration. But
the advance of democracy is far from a simple or guaranteed by-product
of such integration. It still takes a struggle fought with very unequal
resources. In such struggles, seemingly anti-cosmopolitan resistance is
often a weapon of those in danger of intensiﬁed exploitation by dominant
interests; it may shape a better international order and eventually
better terms for cosmopolitan transcendence of parts of the nation-state
system. But equally, extensions of transnational power and capitalist
markets can also inform fears that fuel populist reactions against immigrants.
These are fears not merely from the ethnically prejudiced –
though they may also be that – but fears as well from citizens who feel
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Craig Calhoun 229
that their citizenship buys them less and less protection from global
threats and less and less participatory democracy.
European integration and non-Western immigration put enormous
pressures on the solidarity and self-understanding of European societies.
Much cosmopolitanism speaks only poorly to this predicament.
By insisting on the language of liberal universalism as a basis for European
integration or global rights, by relying one-sidedly on notions like
constitutional patriotism, and by imagining that larger solidarities are
always produced by escape from narrower ones, rather than by transformations
of these, it loses purchase on reality. In particular, it loses
purchase on the possibility of actual historical production of larger and
better but still incomplete and imperfect projects of integration. The
defeat of Europe’s constitutional treaty was greeted with shock by many
European elites, even though the discontent behind the votes had been
brewing for years and been manifestly boiling for months. As the referenda
approached, opinion polls sounded the alarm for pro-European
intellectuals. Jürgen Habermas (2005) famously wrote to French voters
– and in general called on the European Left to vote in favour of
the constitution. ‘In my view’, he said, ‘a Left which aims to tame and
civilise capitalism with a “No” to the European constitution would be
deciding for the wrong side at the wrong time.’ Earlier, Habermas and
Derrida had jointly held that European opposition to America’s invasion
of Iraq had marked the beginning of a true popular public sphere in
Europe. They called for the development of a European capacity to balance
American power for the sake of the whole world. Backing Europe,
however, meant in this case backing the ‘basic law’, described widely
as a constitution. Habermas grasped that the document was ﬂawed and
that there was widespread impatience with the elites driving European
integration. He did not seem to grasp equally how elitist and offensive
the document itself was, how perfectly it symbolized the notion
that a cosmopolitan Europe would be democratic only in form, not
in egalitarian participation. Habermas hoped Europe would be enabled
to act with greater agency when bolstered by the legal unity of the
constitution. ‘We can only meet the challenges and risks of a world
in upheaval in an offensive way by strengthening Europe’, he wrote,
‘not by exploiting the understandable fears of the people in a populist
manner.’
A politics of fear was very prominent in the European constitutional
referenda. It seized in large part on immigrants and Europeans Muslims.
But it also reﬂected the notion that democratic participation in
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230 Globalization and the State
public affairs was to be diluted precisely at a time when powerful global
forces were undermining social beneﬁts which citizens of different countries
felt they had gained by centuries of struggle – and when their states
were engineering neo-liberal reforms rather than protecting important
institutions from the levelling effects of either global capitalism or the
power of an ‘American model’ and military. Immigrants became readily
available and relatively easy to name targets for fears aroused by
other sources. The results are sometimes saddening as well as perplexing
– as in the case of Antwerp Jews who voted for Vlaams Belang.
Fear – a widespread basic insecurity – is a central issue, and a challenge
to which global cosmopolitanism has not yet faced up. People
do not always name the sources of their fears very accurately. They
say they are afraid of immigrants when they are most afraid of losing
their jobs. They say they are afraid of European integration when they
are most afraid that their children will fail to ﬁnd careers and not be
there for them in their old age. Politicians may manipulate their fears
by playing on the most visible foci, those easiest for them to articulate.
But the pervasiveness of the fear and anxiety are clues that they transcend
these causes. They come from global neo-liberal capitalism and its
destruction of stable economic institutions. They come from new technologies
that change social relations, even inside families, and thereby
fundamental human relations to the world. They come from ageing –
both individually and in whole generations – with its attendant worries
over sickness and death and in the meantime where to ﬁnd care
and money and a safe place to live. They come from natural disasters
like tsunamis and from such not completely natural disasters as the
AIDS pandemic or avoidable famines and such humanly wrought disasters
as civil wars and genocides, terrorism and counter-terrorist projects
that seem only to breed more terrorism. And the fears and anxieties
are magniﬁed by the media because they produce audiences as well as
political extremists. There are many and realistic reasons for fear and
anxiety – indeed, there are enough that we should be impressed that
we are not afraid all the time. We take public transport despite terrorist
attacks. We approach most strangers with an optimism that we will
ﬁnd good ways to get along and maybe ﬁnd pleasure in our very differences.
We have children – despite the world they will face. But we are
able to do these things precisely because we do not face the frightening
and anxiety-provoking world alone. Ironically, the liberal individualist
underpinnings of much cosmopolitan thought suggest in essence that
we should. That is, they suggest that we start from individual moral subjects
abstracted out of particular social relations and cultural traditions
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Craig Calhoun 231
and ask what obligations they owe to each other. This is a mistake, for
the antidotes to insecurity and the capacity for democracy alike lie not
simply in individual reason but in social solidarity.
It is a mistake to treat nationalism and other forms of group solidarity
as a deviation from cosmopolitan neutrality. In the ﬁrst place,
cosmopolitanism is not neutral – though cosmopolitans can try to make
both global institutions and global discourse more open and more fair.
In the second place, national projects respond to global projects. They
are not mere inheritances from the past, but ways – certainly very often
problematic ways – of taking hold of current predicaments. The analogy
between nations faced with globalization and minorities within nation
states – both immigrants and so-called national minorities – is strong.
Nations have much the same relationship to pan-national or global governance
projects that localities and minorities had to the growth of
national states.19
And we can learn from Kymlicka’s injunction: ‘Fairness
therefore requires an ongoing, systematic exploration of our common
institutions to see whether their rules, structures and symbols disadvantage
immigrants.’20
Cosmopolitanism at its best is a ﬁght for just such
fairness in the continued development of global institutions. Moreover,
the building of nation states has typically involved efforts to rationalize
internal diversity – structuring the way it is represented in museums and
statistics, establishing symmetrical units of local government, and so
forth. And at least many cosmopolitanisms continue rather than breaking
with this dimension of nationalism. But the analogy is not perfect.
Not least, most immigrants (and national minorities) make only modest
claims to sovereignty. Strong Westphalian doctrines of sovereignty may
always have been problematic and may now be out of date. But just as
it would be hasty to imagine we are embarking on a postnational era –
when all the empirical indicators are that nationalism is resurgent precisely
because of asymmetrical globalization – so it would be hasty to
forget the strong claims to collective autonomy and self-determination
of those who have been denied both, and the need for solidarity
among those who are least empowered to realize their projects as individuals.
Solidarity need not always be national, and need not always
develop from traditional roots. But for many of those treated most
unfairly in the world, nations and traditions are potentially important
resources. Confronted with the exercise of global power by both multinational
corporations and the United States – whether one describes
this as empire or an extension of the US national project – resistance
and other responses necessarily start from local, national and regional
solidarities.
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232 Globalization and the State
Universalism as style
As a social condition, cosmopolitanism is not universalism; it is belonging
to a social class able to identify itself with the universal. Belonging
to the global cosmopolitan class is structured by social institutions just
as surely as belonging to a local caste in India or a Parisian quartier
anxious about Arab neighbours or European uniﬁcation. We should
be cautious accordingly about following earlier modernization theories
in identifying cosmopolitan unambiguously with progress or following
individualistic philosophical traditions that approach such cosmopolitanism
overwhelmingly as a matter of individual ethical judgement.
Some modernization accounts do help us, however, for cosmopolitanism
today shares much with the formation of national elites a
century or two ago. As Ernest Gellner (1983) described this process,
it always meant a triumph of high culture over culture embedded in
popular life and more local solidarities. And as Bourdieu (1958, 1990)
suggested, this always meant symbolic violence. In considering nationalism,
Gellner stressed the interests industrial production gave members
of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie in developing new lateral ties not
mediated by courts or old trading cities, and in extending the high
culture in which they participated into a (hierarchically organized) common
national culture open to the larger populations mobilized in their
enterprises and new cities. Deutsch (1966) and Anderson (1993) offer
different causal arguments but describe largely similar processes of communication
and the ﬂourishing of elite culture and its production of
much broader national culture. And cosmopolitan projects today largely
continue this pattern of simultaneous class formation and integration –
now transnational rather than only national. But the national solidarities
forged on earlier material bases are not simply old-fashioned
and sectional. What appeared often to modernization theory simply
as progress was a complex pattern of loss and gain. Villages overtaken
by industrialization were complexes of culture and social organization
not always easily or happily given up by even poor inhabitants. Provincial
cultures devalued in the course of national integration were often
intensely valued by those who spoke provincial dialects and languages.
But the high culture that supplanted provincial culture was the product
of cultural creativity, not simply power, and included works of
brilliance and enduring value far beyond their role in creating elitedominated
national cultures. And the connections forged by workers
in towns and cities enabled them to pursue democratic politics and
sometimes better material conditions of life than their village-bound
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Craig Calhoun 233
forebears. They experience the loss as wrenching, but they invested
themselves in struggles to make the new national cultures serve their
interests and understandings of the world as well as those of elites.
They achieved a level of collective voice in large-scale politics that
was unprecedented (if alas, not always adequate, sometimes subverted
and often squandered). In a mixture of victories and concessions they
secured national institutions that offered them notable protection and
support even if not as much equality or fairness as often promised.
Even more than the villages lost in earlier political, economic and cultural
transformations, thus, nations are not merely objects of familiarity
and affection but achievements of struggle. Far from perfect, they still
should not be lightly denigrated, especially not in the name of a new
elite-dominated cosmopolitan culture (nor even a corporate-dominated
mass culture) that leaves underlying structures of social inequality
untouched or even is complicit in versions of globalization that, like
neo-liberalism, accentuate inequality. Contemporary cosmopolitanism
commonly reﬂects the experience and perspective of elites and obscures
the social foundations on which that experience and perspective rest.
Thinking about cosmopolitanism as ethical universalism reinforces the
lack of attention to the social foundations on which it rests – even when
ethical universalism might be a basis for egalitarian critique. Whether in
the Roman Empire for the Stoics, or the (temporary) post-Westphalian
paciﬁcation and growth of European states for Kant, or the great trading
and imperial cities of high modernity, or global capitalism today
cosmopolitanism always depends on social foundations. Transnational
institutions can be developed that offer ordinary people greater voice.
Emerging global elite culture and mass for-proﬁt consumer culture can
both be contested. International law and regulation can limit both
capitalist rapacity and state violence. But cosmopolitanism alone, commonly
focuses attention away from these political, economic and social
questions and towards apparently free-ﬂoating ethics and culture.
Thinking about cosmopolitanism as taste or even intellectual orientation
reinforces its association with elites and makes it harder to
understand the actually existing cosmopolitanism of multicultural cities
(which involves not only stylish consumption or the gaze of ﬂâneurs but
soccer matches, ethnic jokes and grudging accommodation of neighbours).
This connects to a tendency to imagine cosmopolitanism more
as escape from the constraints of cultural prejudice than the production
of cultural capacities for interaction and integration. If we look more at
the material and institutional underpinnings of actual cosmopolitanism
we will see less rational planning and more historical production of
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234 Globalization and the State
varied practical ways of organizing life across, not only in, communities.
Thinking about cosmopolitanism as a political idea demands attention
to whether it is a corrective and complement to national and other solidarities
or itself grounded in some other global solidarity. Cosmopolitan
style and taste and ethics and politics can reinforce each other but also
contend with each other. I want to raise questions about the tendency
for cosmopolitan ethics to substitute for transnational politics, about
the tendency for abstract thinking about the potential global whole to
undermine appreciation for actual if incomplete and imperfect integration
in cities, nations and religions. Integrating only part of humanity,
I will suggest, does not mean merely being particularistic or parochial.
Political, ethical and stylistic cosmopolitanism are all important, but it
is useful to distinguish them. The essays gathered here all emphasize
thinking about institutional underpinnings and contexts for cosmopolitanism,
and especially about the signiﬁcance of ‘belonging’ or social
solidarity. Cosmopolitanism is often conceived as the transcendence
of such belonging. Much cosmopolitan thinking participates in seeing
culture as identiﬁed with place, and travel as bringing escape from its
constraints. But as James Clifford (1992) has noted, cultures can travel
(compare Hannerz, 1992).21
Indeed diasporas can and often dramatically
do produce cultural conservatism among the relocated, although
they can also give rise to ‘vernacular’ or ‘demotic’ cosmopolitanism as
working-class migrants ﬁnd themselves opened to other cultural inﬂuences
(cf. Werbner, 2006). But note the implicit shift in reference. Does
saying that Pakistani migrants in Manchester or the Persian Gulf are
open to new cultural inﬂuences and changed thereby indicate that they
think of themselves as citizens of the world, bearing ethically equivalent
obligations to all others?
Some writers identify cosmopolitanism with a reﬂexive, open, inclusive
normative consciousness. Martha Nussbaum (1996), for example,
sees cosmopolitanism in terms of individual selves, located amid concentric
circles of potential connections – and sees cosmopolitanism as
the ethically superior identiﬁcation with, and sense of obligation to,
the widest, maximally universal circle of humans as a whole. Anthony
Appiah (2006) has argued for a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ in which local
ties still matter even amid far-ﬂung connections and with a global
ethical consciousness. If his is the perspective of postcolonial cultural
elites, and more generally those who came from somewhere but went to
Princeton (and Harvard and Oxford), others stress the extent to which
a range of different occupations, even warfare, may bring recognition
of the larger world beyond local (or national) cultural roots (Cheah and
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Craig Calhoun 235
Robbins, 1998). But in all these cases, cosmopolitanism is an ‘outlook’.
It is about either ethical obligations or cultural openness. Cosmopolitanism
may be a cultural orientation, but it is never the absence of
culture. It is produced and reinforced by belonging to transnational networks
and to a community of fellow cosmopolitans. There are different
such communities – academic and corporate and NGO, religious and
secular. One may participate in multiple such networks, but it is an illusion
– an ideological illusion – to imagine citizenship of the world as
simply freedom from belonging to more sectional groupings. There is,
thus, something misleading when Ulrich Beck writes: ‘To belong or not
to belong, that is the cosmopolitan question’ (Beck, 2003: 50). It is true
that some people are given the freedom and conﬁdence to experience
‘belonging’ as much more optional than others. But we should see in
such experience a systematic underestimation of the social foundations
of this freedom and conﬁdence – class position and privileged citizenship.
And we should see cosmopolitans as belonging to cosmopolitan
networks and culture, not just escaping locality or nation. Oddly, Beck
asks the question in a paper devoted to the analysis of global inequality.
His agenda is to focus our attention on the ‘big inequalities’ between
rich and poor nations. These, he suggests, dwarf inequalities within
nations. There is something to this, though it oversimpliﬁes empirical
patterns of inequality. Beck is certainly right that ‘it is surprising
how the big inequalities which are suffered by humanity can be continuously
legitimized through a silent complicity between the state
authority and the state-obsessed social sciences by means of a form
of organized non-perception’ (Beck, 2003: 50). But what he does not
consider is the extent to which participation in a multinational cosmopolitan
elite is basic to the reproduction of that non-perception.
The elites of ‘poor’ or postcolonial countries who participate in global
civil society, multilateral agencies and transnational business corporations
not only make money their compatriots can barely imagine but
make possible the cosmopolitan illusion of elites from rich countries.
This is the illusion that their relationships with fellow cosmopolitans
truly transcend nation and culture and place. Cosmopolitan elites too
often misrecognize transnational class formation as the escape from
belonging.
It is impossible not to belong to social groups, relations or culture.
The idea of individuals abstract enough to be able to choose all their
‘identiﬁcations’ is deeply misleading. Versions of this idea are, however,
widespread in liberal cosmopolitanism. They reﬂect the attractive
illusion of escaping from social determinations into a realm of greater
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236 Globalization and the State
freedom, and from cultural particularity into greater universalism. But
they are remarkably unrealistic, and so abstract as to provide little purchase
on what the next steps of actual social action might be for real
people who are necessarily situated in particular webs of belonging,
with access to particular others but not to humanity in general. Treating
ethnicity as essentially (rather than partially) a choice of identiﬁcations,
they neglect the omnipresence of ascription (and discrimination)
as determinations of social identities. They neglect the huge inequalities
in the supports available to individuals to enter cosmopolitan
intercourse as individuals (and also the ways in which certain socially
distributed supports like wealth, education and command of the English
language are understood as personal achievements or attributes). And
they neglect the extent to which people are implicated in social actions
which they are not entirely free to choose (as, for example, I remain an
American and share responsibility for the invasion of Iraq despite my
opposition to it and distaste for the US administration that launched it).
Whether blame or beneﬁt follow from such implications, they are not
altogether optional. Cosmopolitanism seems to signal both the identity
(and therefore unity) of all human beings despite their differences, and
appreciation for and ability to feel at home among the actual differences
among people and peoples. We focus sometimes on the essential similarity
of people and sometimes on their diversity. We should be careful
not to imagine that either sort of cosmopolitanism is an immediately
useful example for democracy. Modern democracy grew in close relationship
to nationalism, as the ideal of self-determination demanded a
strong notion of the collective self in question. Nationalism was also
(at least often) an attempt to reconcile liberty and ethical universalism
with felt community. This does not mean that we should not seek more
cosmopolitan values, cultural knowledge and styles of interpersonal
relations in modern national democracies. It certainly does not mean
that we should embrace reactionary versions of nationalism which have
often been antidemocratic as well as anticosmopolitan. But it does mean
that we need to ask some hard questions about how cosmopolitanism
relates to the construction of political and social solidarities. Does cosmopolitan
actually underpin effective political solidarity, or only offer
an attractive counterbalance to nationalism? How can the important
potential of multiple and hybrid cultural and social identities be reconciled
with political participation and rights? What is the relationship
between valuing difference and having a strong enough commitment
to speciﬁc others to sacriﬁce in collective struggle or accept democracy’s
difﬁcult challenge of living in a minority and attempting only
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Craig Calhoun 237
to persuade and not simply dominate others with whom one does not
agree? It will not do simply to substitute ethics for politics, no matter
how cosmopolitan and otherwise attractive the ethics. It will not do to
imagine democratic politics without paying serious attention to the production
of strong solidarity among the subjects of struggles for greater
self-determination.
Many forms and visions of belonging are also responses to globalization,
not merely inheritances from time immemorial. Nations and
national identities, for example, have been forged in international relations
from wars to trade, in international migrations and among those
who travelled as well as those who feared their arrival, and in pursuit
of popular sovereignty against traditional rulers. Nationalism has
often grown stronger when globalization has intensiﬁed. Islam, Christianity,
Buddhism and other religions arose in the contexts of empires
and conﬂicts but also have been remade as frames of identity crossing
nations and yet locating believers in a multireligious world. Religion has
shaped globalization not only as a source of conﬂict but of peacemaking.
The signiﬁcance of local community has repeatedly been changed
by incorporation into broader structures of trade and association. And
communal values have been articulated both to defend havens in a
seemingly heartless world and to set examples for global imitation.
While structures of belonging may be shaped by tradition, thus, we need
to understand them not merely as traditional alternatives to modernity
or cosmopolitanism but as important ways in which ordinary people
have tried to take hold of modernity and to locate themselves in a
globalizing world. In a broad, general sense cosmopolitanism is unexceptionable.
Who – at least what sophisticated intellectual – could argue
for parochialism over a broader perspective, for narrow sectarian loyalties
over recognition of global responsibilities? Who could be against
citizenship of the world? But the word ‘citizenship’ is a clue to the difﬁculty.
Cosmopolitanism means something very different as a political
project – or as the project of substituting universalistic ethics for politics
– from what it means as a general orientation to difference in the
world. And a central strand of political theory is now invested in hopes
for cosmopolitan democracy, democracy not limited by nation states.
In the spirit of Kant as well as Diogenes, many say, people should see
themselves as citizens of the world, not just of their countries. This
requires escape from the dominance of a nationalist social imaginary
(that is, a nationalist way of understanding what society is and constituting
new political communities). It is an escape that carries the risk
of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. We should I think join
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238 Globalization and the State
in recognizing the importance of transnational relations and therefore
transnational politics, movements and ethics. We should try to belong
to the world as a whole and help it thrive, and be more just and better
organized. But we should not imagine we can do so very well by ignoring
or wishing away national and local solidarities. We need to be global
in part through how we are national. And we need to recognize the ways
national – and ethnic and religious – solidarities work for others. If we
are among those privileged to transcend national identities and limits
in our travel and academic conferences and reading and friendships we
should nonetheless be attentive to the social conditions of our outlook
and the situations of those who do not share our privileges.
Notes
1. Part of this chapter was presented as the Ernest Gellner Memorial Lecture for
2007 and published in Nations and Nationalism.
2. Beck uses a similar play with the distinction between substance and process
to say that Europe does not exist, only Europeanization – ‘an institutionalized
process of permanent change’ which is producing ‘social and political
integration through cosmopolitanization’ (Beck and Grande, 2007: 5–6).
3. One of the several bartenders with claims to have invented the Cosmopolitan,
Toby Ceccini of the Odeon in New York’s Tribecca, entitled his
autobiography Cosmopolitan: a Bartender’s Story (and the pun is intentional).
Tribecca is of course the New York neighbourhood most identiﬁed with the
1990s boom, but then the boom was even more identiﬁed with Silicon Valley,
so it is apt that the blogging consensus gives San Francisco the strongest
claim on inventing the drink of the decade. But only in New York did the
relevant bartender write his autobiography. It was that sort of decade.
4. It should be noted that while ‘cosmopolitan’ is the ﬁrst category listed, the
ads go on for many pages organized also (for the less explicitly cosmopolitan)
by caste, community, language, religion, profession and previous marital status.
International educational credentials are noted throughout, but only in
the ‘cosmopolitan’ section are alliances invited speciﬁcally in terms like ‘Cultured,
Cosmopolitan, Westernized’ or ‘Smart, Westernized, Cosmopolitan
working for MNC’.
5. UK Ministry for Trade and Investment, online at http://www.investoverseas.
org/United_Kingdom/UK_Sectors/Food_and_Drink.htm. Examples can readily
be multiplied from almost any market imaginable. ‘With a more
cosmopolitan Britain driven by ‘lifestyle’ and ‘design’ home and garden television
programmes ... ’ (http://hiddenwires.co.uk/resourcesarticles2004/articles20040503-05.html).
In Britain as elsewhere, though, the years after 2001
marked a change. ‘Suddenly the celebration of postnational, cosmopolitan
Britain has been eclipsed by the return of “security and identity” issues, as
David Goodheart put it in 2006 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.
php?story_id=3445).
6. See http://www.jyanet.com/cap/0614fe1.htm. Accessed 15 January 2007.
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Craig Calhoun 239
7. In this as in other ways, it echoes rather than transcends nationalism; see
Calhoun (1997) on this presumption of ‘directness’ rather than mediation.
Of course there are exceptions to this general tendency in cosmopolitan
thought, efforts to understand cosmopolitanism from within various scales
of relationships across lines of difference rather than categorical similarity
on a global scale. For a noteworthy example, see Pollock (2000). Much more
abstractly, David Held (1995) has seen recognition of diversity as a hallmark
of what he calls ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ but seen the issue more as ﬁnding
appropriate representative mechanisms on a variety of scales than of shifting
the idea of cosmopolitanism away from global categorical similarity to the
multifarious and heterogeneous making of connections which is necessarily
at least partly local.
8. http://www.allbusiness.com/services/business-services/3915194-1.html (accessed
30 April 2007).
9. Mahesh Krishnaswamy, http://mahesh.sulekha.com/blog/post/2000/06/
how-to-be-cosmopolitan.htm
10. Talcott Parsons (see 1951) described societies as differing along several
‘pattern variables’. Universalism/particularism was one of these – and Parsons
associated modernization with movement towards the universal. This
notion of a linear variable diverted attention from the coexistence of the
two – whether in harmony, in tension or in dialectical relationship.
11. The play is not about overcoming national difference but about overcoming
a mixture of ethnic, religious and class difference. Updating the Romeo
and Juliet story, it centres on love between two Russians – a poor Jewish
man and a woman of noble Cossack descent who are able to ﬁnd love in
America.
12. Before Tiger Woods, an iconic representation of racial mixture as an attractive
vision of the future was a 1993 Time magazine cover in which several
pictures seeming to reveal different racial identities were morphed into each
other by computer imaging.
13. See also the PBS documentary to which it is an adjunct.
14. See Soysal (1994) for an early consideration of important ways in which
migrants may be legally recognized, afforded welfare rights and even given
political representation (though usually only at the local level) even without
becoming full-ﬂedged national citizens.
15. Not all WASPS are elite, however, and interaction between those at Harvard
and those in Appalachia is strained (when it takes place at all). But the connection
of the two in a common category also helps to produce the primacy
of ethnic over class consciousness.
16. See for example Habermas’s (1998: 203–38) response to Charles Taylor’s
(1994) ‘politics of recognition’ and Huntington’s (2004) polemic against
excessive Latin immigration to the US.
17. The real and growing numbers of people who have formal rights in multiple
polities shapes the issue but does not solve the problem. We see not so much
‘postnational citizenship’ as a new complexity in citizenship which is still
primarily organized in nation-state terms. Discussion in political theory has
often been informed too much by formal legal rights and an optimistic reading
of the European case. See Soysal (1994), and the more recent discussion
in Benhabib (2006).
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240 Globalization and the State
18. It is worth noting that Manhattanites’ belief in having advanced beyond
identity issues is exceedingly class structured. It is a post-multiculturalism
for those who can afford some of the most expensive real estate in the world
and pretty expensive art to go in it.
19. Scale is of course signiﬁcant as a continuous variable; to say something like
‘at the scale of the nation state’ accordingly masks enormous diversity in
the actual scale – territory, population, wealth, state capacity – of nation
states (never mind the contentious question of how states are related to
nations). Part of what is meant in such statements is not, I think, precisely
scale but corporate organization. And of course states are not the only such
corporations. It is also possible that what is meant by ‘scale’ is sovereignty,
though this is not precisely a scalar concept, though it is arguably much
more quantitatively variable than the usual accounts of its categorical perfection
suggest (indeed, Stephen Krasner (1999) suggests it is virtually a myth, if
a powerful one). Another categorical distinction is really a matter of scale: the
limits of the organization of social life through face-to-face arrangements.
These limits occasion the rise of forms of written, printed or electronic communication,
new forms of relationships among strangers, and non-linguistic
steering media.
20. Kymlicka (1998: 162).AQ1
21. Hannerz distinguishes different sorts of movement around the world from
foreign correspondents to labour migrants and tourists and notes that these
produce different challenges for, and orientations to, the production of
meaning. Among other things, for some involvement with other cultures
is in a sense a ‘cost’ while for others it is a beneﬁt.
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QUERIES TO BE ANSWERED BY AUTHOR (SEE MARGINAL MARKS)
IMPORTANT NOTE: Please mark your corrections and answer to these
queries directly onto the proof at the relevant place. Do NOT mark
your corrections on this query sheet.
Chapter 11
Query No. Page No. Query
AQ1 240 Note 20: Ok to expand to Krasner
(1999: 162)?