

Ethnicity as cognition

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Abstract. This article identifies an incipient and largely implicit cognitive turn in the study of ethnicity, and argues that it can be consolidated and extended by drawing on cognitive research in social psychology and anthropology. Cognitive perspectives provide resources for conceptualizing ethnicity, race, and nation as perspectives on the world rather than entities in the world, for treating ethnicity, race, and nationalism together rather than as separate subfields, and for re-specifying the old debate between primordialist and circumstantialist approaches.

In recent years, categorization has emerged as a major focus of research in the study of ethnicity as in many other domains. As long as ethnic groups were conceived as substantial, objectively definable entities, there was no reason to focus on categorization or classification. As constructivist stances have gained ground in the last quarter century, however, objectivist understandings of ethnicity (a term we use broadly here to include race and nationhood as well¹) have been displaced by subjectivist approaches. The latter define ethnicity not in terms of objective commonalities but in terms of participants' beliefs, perceptions, understandings, and identifications. One consequence of this shift has been an increasing concern with categorization and classification.

We see the emergent concern with categorization as an incipient, and still implicit, cognitive turn in the study of ethnicity.² We argue that the understanding of ethnicity can be enriched by making explicit this heretofore implicit cognitive reorientation, and by engaging research in cognitive psychology and cognitive anthropology.³ Doing so, we suggest, has far-reaching implications for how ethnicity should be conceived as both object and field of study. Cognitive perspectives provide resources for avoiding analytical "groupism" – the tendency to treat ethnic groups as substantial entities to which interests and agency

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can be attributed – while helping to explain the tenacious hold of groupism in practice.⁴ They suggest strong reasons for treating race, ethnicity, and nationalism together rather than as separate subfields. And they afford new purchase on the old debate between primordialist and circumstantialist approaches to ethnicity.

We begin by reviewing historical, political, institutional, ethnographic, and micro-interactional work on classification and categorization in the study of ethnicity, and by suggesting why cognitive perspectives have remained implicit in such work. We next consider expressly cognitive work on stereotypes, social categorization, and schemas, and we suggest ways in which the latter concept, in particular – designating more complex knowledge structures than categories – might be used in research on ethnicity. Finally, we consider the broader implications of cognitive perspectives, which suggest that ethnicity is fundamentally not a thing *in* the world, but a perspective *on* the world. Our aim in this article is not to advance specific hypotheses, but to sensitize students of ethnicity to largely unacknowledged cognitive dimensions of the phenomenon, and to point to ways in which attention to these dimensions can fruitfully inform research in the field.

Categories and categorization: An incipient cognitive turn

Anthropology has a long-standing interest in classification and categorization,⁵ so it is not surprising that anthropologists took the lead in highlighting the centrality of classification and categorization to ethnicity. The key work here is that of Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth.⁶ Ethnicity, Barth argued, is not a matter of shared traits or cultural commonalities but rather of practices of classification and categorization, including both self-classification and the classification of (and by) others. Richard Jenkins and others have developed the basic Barthian position further, emphasizing the interplay between self-identification and external categorization, and drawing attention to the various levels (individual, interactional, and institutional) and contexts (informal and formal) in which categorization processes occur.⁷

Although Barth formulated his argument with respect to ethnicity, it applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to race and nation as well. As its biological underpinning came to seem increasingly dubious, race came to be reconceptualized as “a manner of dividing and ranking human beings

by reference to selected embodied properties (real or imputed) so as to subordinate, exclude and exploit them...”⁸ The first sentence of the introduction to a recent anthology on *Race and Racism* begins as follows: “Racial classification today is commonplace; people routinely catalogue each other as members of this or that race, and seem to assume that everyone can be thus classified.”⁹ The American Anthropological Association has issued an official “Statement on ‘Race’” that refers to race as “a mode of classification,” a “worldview,” and an “ideology” that employs socially exclusive categories to naturalize status differences.¹⁰ In sociology, too, the ascendancy of social constructivist perspectives led analysts to emphasize “the absence of any essential racial characteristics” and “the historical flexibility of racial meanings and categories.”¹¹

A general retreat from objectivism has been apparent in the study of nationhood as well: a shift from definitions of nationhood in terms of common language, culture, territory, history, economic life, political arrangements, and so on to definitions that emphasize the subjective sense of or claim to nationhood, as in Hugh Seton-Watson’s interestingly circular suggestion that “a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one.”¹² Like ethnicity and race, nation too has been expressly conceptualized as “a basic operator in a widespread system of social classification”¹³ and as a “practical category.”¹⁴

Empirical work influenced by this new understanding of the centrality – indeed the constitutive significance – of categorization and classification for ethnicity, race, and nation clusters in two broad areas.¹⁵ One cluster comprises historical, political, and institutional studies of official, codified, formalized categorization practices employed by powerful and authoritative institutions – above all, the state. Foucault’s notion of governmentality has been an important point of reference here,¹⁶ as has Bourdieu’s account of the state’s symbolic power as the power to state what is what and who is who, and thereby to impose legitimate principles of vision and division of the social world.¹⁷ The second, smaller, cluster comprises ethnographic and micro-interactionist studies of the unofficial, informal, “everyday” classification and categorization practices employed by ordinary people.

Research on official practices of ethnic, racial, and national categorization began with studies of colonial and post-colonial societies. Without dwelling on categorization per se, several now classic works

pointed out how colonial rule transformed antecedent patterns of social identification and shaped patterns of ethnic mobilization through the identification, labeling, and differential treatment of ethnic groups.¹⁸ More recent studies, giving more sustained attention to systems of classification and practices of categorization themselves, have shown how rulers' practices of naming, counting, and classifying affected the self-understandings, social organization, and political claims of indigenous populations.¹⁹

A growing literature addresses official categorization practices in non-colonial settings as well. Much of this literature has focused on censuses. Drawing inspiration from Bourdieu's work on the symbolic power of modern states, recent works have examined how censuses inculcate the idea that national societies are bounded wholes, composed of discrete, mutually exclusive ethnic, racial, or cultural groups.²⁰ Even when census categories are initially remote from prevailing self-understandings, they may be taken up by cultural and political entrepreneurs and eventually reshape lines of identification.²¹ Especially when they are linked through public policy to tangible benefits, official census categories can have the effect of "making up people"²² or "nominating into existence,"²³ creating new kinds of persons for individuals to be. Such categories, Goldberg argues from a Foucauldian perspective, are central to the state's exercise of "racial governmentality": censuses have constituted a "formative governmental technology in the service of the state to fashion racialized knowledge – to articulate categories, to gather data, and to put them to work."²⁴

Censuses classify people anonymously and fleetingly; they do not permanently assign individuals to categories, or attach enduring, legally consequential identities to specific persons. Other forms of state categorization, however, do just this, imposing ethnic or racial categories on persons, inscribing them in documents, and attaching consequences – sometimes fateful ones – to these official identities.²⁵ The most notorious cases are the official schemes of racial classification and identification employed by Nazi Germany²⁶ and South Africa.²⁷ More recently, attention has been called to the uses made of official ethnic identities, specified in formal identity documents, in the Rwandan genocide.²⁸ In the Soviet Union, too, ethnic nationality was not only a statistical category, a fundamental unit of social counting and accounting, but a legal category that was inscribed in personal documents, transmitted by descent, recorded in bureaucratic encoun-

ters and official transactions, and used in certain contexts to govern admission to higher education and access to certain types of jobs.²⁹

Studies of official categorization practices generally argue or imply that the ways in which states and other organizations count, classify, and identify their subjects, citizens, and clients have profound consequences for the self-understandings of the classified. This is no doubt often the case, but the connection between official categories and popular self-understandings is seldom demonstrated in detail. And the literature on classification and categorization in everyday life shows that the categories used by ordinary people in everyday interaction often differ substantially from official categories. The categorized are themselves chronic categorizers; the categories they deploy to make sense of themselves and others need not match those employed by states, no matter how powerful.

Research on the production and reproduction of racial, ethnic, and national distinctions and boundaries in everyday life demonstrates great complexity, and great variability, in the categories actually used. An extreme example is the very large number of race and color categories used in Brazil,³⁰ but complex and variable categorization practices have been documented in many other settings.³¹ A common thread in studies of everyday classification is the recognition that ordinary actors usually have considerable room for maneuver in the ways in which they use even highly institutionalized and powerfully sanctioned categories.³² They are often able to deploy such categories strategically, bending them to their own purposes; or they may adhere nominally to official classificatory schemes while infusing official categories with alternative, unofficial meanings.³³

Although most work on everyday categorization is ethnographic, a few works derive inspiration from ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, and notably from the pioneering work of Harvey Sacks.³⁴ These works treat ethnicity as a skilled practical accomplishment, as something that “happens” when ethnic categories are made relevant to participants in the course of a particular interactional trajectory.³⁵ Such research sees ethnic and other category memberships as “ascribed (and rejected), avowed (and disavowed), displayed (and ignored) in local places and at certain times ... as part of the interactional work that constitutes people’s lives.”³⁶

In its concern with the social organization and interactional deployment of knowledge, the literature on official and everyday categorization represents an incipient cognitive turn in the study of ethnicity. The scope of this cognitive turn, however, has been limited by the lack of engagement with expressly cognitive research in psychology and cognitive anthropology. Indeed most discussions of categorization and classification proceed without any explicit reference to cognition.³⁷

Two reasons for the reluctance to engage expressly cognitive research can be identified. First, to extend a point DiMaggio made about the sociology of culture,³⁸ the humanistic, interpretive, holistic, and anti-reductionist commitments that inform most sociological, anthropological, and historical work on ethnicity clash with the positivistic, experimentalist, individualist, and reductionist commitments of cognitive science. Yet as DiMaggio goes on to argue, there has been a certain rapprochement in recent years. On the one hand, holistic understandings of culture – and, one might add, of ethnicity – have come to seem increasingly problematic; on the other, cognitive research has paid increasing attention to more complex and culturally and historically specific mental structures and processes – to the “socio-mental” domain, as Zerubavel calls it.³⁹

Second, advocates of ethnographic and especially interactionally oriented research have drawn a sharp distinction between cognitive and discursive approaches. The cognitive approach takes “discourse as a realization of ... underlying processes and structures of knowledge,” and “culture itself ... as a kind of socially shared cognitive organization.”⁴⁰ The discursive approach, in contrast,

treats talk and texts ... as forms of social action. Categorization is *something we do*, in talk, in order to accomplish social actions (persuasion, blaming, denials, reputations, accusations, etc.). From this perspective, we would expect language’s “resources” not to come ready-made from a process in which people are trying their best to understand the world [as in the cognitive approach] ... but rather, or at least additionally, to be shaped for their functions in talk, for the business of doing situated social actions.⁴¹

This is a valid – and important – critique of some strands of cognitive research. Yet it overstates the opposition by relying on a narrow understanding of cognitive research as premised on an “individualistic, mentalistic, computational, and culture-minimal” notion of mind and as seeking to reduce “all of psychological life, including discourse and social interaction, to the workings of cognitive, or even computational,

mental processes.”⁴² As DiMaggio has pointed out, and as Edwards and Potter themselves acknowledge, there is much recent cognitive research that cannot be characterized in this way.⁴³

The incipient cognitive turn in the study of ethnicity could be extended in fruitful ways by drawing on the empirical findings and analytical tools of cognitive research. Strong cognitive assumptions – though generally unacknowledged and therefore unanalyzed ones – inform almost all accounts of the way race, ethnicity, and nation “work” in practice. When we characterize an act of violence as racial, ethnic, or nationalist; when we analyze the workings of racially, ethnically, or nationally charged symbols; when we characterize police practices as involving “racial profiling”; when we explain voting patterns in terms of racial or ethnic loyalties; when we impute identities or interests to racial, ethnic, or national groups; when we analyze nationalist collective action; when we characterize an action as meaningfully oriented to the race or ethnicity or nationality of another person; when we identify an expression as an ethnic slur – in these and innumerable other situations we make cognitive assumptions about the way in which people parse, frame, and interpret their experience. At a minimum, we assume that they are identifying persons, actions, threats, problems, opportunities, obligations, loyalties, interests and so on in racial, ethnic, or national terms rather than in terms of some other interpretive scheme. Engaging cognitive anthropology and cognitive psychology would help specify – rather than simply presuppose – the cognitive mechanisms and processes involved in the workings of ethnicity, and would strengthen the micro-foundations of macroanalytic work in the field. Towards this end, the next section reviews cognitive work on stereotyping, social categorization, and schemas that holds particular promise for the study of ethnicity.

Cognitive perspectives: From categories to schemas

We have considered categorization as a political project and as an everyday social practice. But categorization is also a fundamental and ubiquitous mental process. As George Lakoff put it, “There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech.” We employ categories whenever we “see something as a *kind* of thing ... [or] reason about *kinds* of things”; we do so equally, it should be emphasized, whenever we – persons, organizations, or states – *talk* about kinds of things, or *treat* something as a kind of

thing (or as a kind of person, a kind of action, a kind of situation, and so on). Categories are utterly central to seeing and thinking, but they are equally central to talking and acting. “Without the ability to categorize, we could not function at all, either in the physical world or in our social and intellectual lives.”⁴⁴

Categories structure and order the world for us. We use categories to parse the flow of experience into discriminable and interpretable objects, attributes, and events. Categories permit – indeed entail – massive cognitive, social, and political simplification. Following a principle of “cognitive economy,” they “provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort.”⁴⁵ They allow us to see different things – and treat different cases – as the same. They focus our attention and channel our limited energies, leaving us – individuals and organizations alike – free to disattend to “irrelevant” stimuli. They thereby make the natural and social worlds intelligible, interpretable, communicable, and transformable. Without categories, the world would be a “blooming, buzzing confusion”; experience and action as we know them would be impossible. Thus categories underlie not only seeing and thinking but the most basic forms of doing as well, including both everyday action and more complex, institutionalized forms of “doing.”

When we make sense of our experience by seeing objects, persons, actions, or situations as instances of categories, this always involves more than mere sorting. It always carries with it expectations and “knowledge” – sometimes rather elaborate knowledge – about how members of that category characteristically behave.⁴⁶ Such beliefs and expectations are embodied in persons, encoded in myths, memories, narratives, and discourses, and embedded in institutions and organizational routines. Even when we are not consciously aware of them, they can subtly (or not so subtly) influence our judgments, and even our very perceptions, of objects or persons so categorized, and thereby the way we behave toward them. This holds true not only in laboratory settings, but also in everyday interactional contexts and in the workings of organizations and institutions.

Stereotypes

Recent work on stereotypes emphasizes the continuities between stereotypical thinking and categorical thinking in general.⁴⁷ Stereotypes are

no longer defined in terms of cognitive deficiencies – in terms of false or exaggerated or unwarranted belief – but more neutrally as cognitive structures that contain knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about social groups.⁴⁸ Nor are stereotypes seen as the distinctive and pathological propensity of particular kinds of personalities (the “authoritarian personality” or “high-prejudice” individual, for example), but rather as rooted in normal and ubiquitous cognitive processes. There is no need to postulate special “needs” – for example the alleged need to feel superior to others – to explain stereotypes; they are more parsimoniously explained as an outgrowth of ordinary cognitive processes.

On this understanding, which has antecedents in the work of Gordon Allport, stereotypes are simply categories of social groups, and their structure and workings mirror those of categories in general.⁴⁹ Like other categories, stereotypes are represented in the mind through some combination of prototypical features, concrete exemplars, expectations, and theory-like causal knowledge. Like other categories, stereotypes obey the principle of cognitive economy, generating inferences and expectations that go “beyond the information given” with minimal cognitive processing.⁵⁰ Like other categories, stereotypes work largely automatically. They can be primed or cued subliminally, and can influence subjects’ judgments without their awareness. This does not mean that stereotypes are wholly beyond conscious control, but it does mean that stereotyping is deeply rooted in ordinary cognitive processes and that countering or correcting stereotypes is effortful and costly.⁵¹

The content of stereotypes – and therefore their substantive social significance and in particular their perniciousness – is of course highly variable across cultural settings, over time, and across target groups. Clearly, cognitive research cannot explain such variations in content. What cognitive research can help explain are the universality of stereotyping, based as it is in categorical thinking in general; the resistance of stereotypes to disconfirming information; the dynamics of activation of stereotypes; the ways in which stereotypes, once activated, can subtly influence subsequent perception and judgment without any awareness on the part of the perceiver; and the extent to which and manner in which deliberate and controlled processes may be able to override the automatic and largely unconscious processes through which stereotypes are activated.

Because they are not the products of individual pathology but of cognitive regularities and shared culture, stereotypes – like social

categories more generally – are not individual attitudinal predilections, but deeply embedded, shared mental representations of social objects. As a consequence, macro and meso-level research cannot dismiss research on stereotypes as “individualistic” or “psychologically reductionist.” Research on stereotypes clarifies the relationship between the individual and the social in the production and operation of standardized templates for making sense of social objects. Among these templates are those that frame social objects and social experience in racial, ethnic, or national terms and are activated by particular, culturally specific cues. Cognitive research on stereotypes can thus illuminate the sociocognitive underpinnings of the variable resonance and salience of racial, ethnic, and national ways of seeing, interpreting and reacting to social experience.

Social categorization

Stereotyping is, of course, one key aspect of social categorization, but it is by no means the only one. Other aspects have been explored by the largely European tradition of research known as “social identity theory” (or in some later variants as “self-categorization theory”) that grew out of the work of social psychologist Henri Tajfel. Arguing against the paradigm of “realistic group conflict theory,” according to which intergroup conflicts are grounded in accurate perceptions of underlying conflicts of interest, Tajfel demonstrated the autonomous significance of categorization. His “minimal group” experiments revealed a robust tendency toward in-group bias – the tendency to favor members of one’s own category – even in the absence of any intergroup conflict or hostility, indeed even when the “groups” or categories were constructed along purely arbitrary lines (for example, through random experimental assignment of subjects to artificial categories of “reds” or “blues”). In other words, “the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups – that is, social categorization per se – is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group.”⁵²

A second aspect of social categorization (indeed of categorization in general) documented by Tajfel and associates is the tendency of categorization to produce “accentuation effects.” People tend to exaggerate both the similarity of objects within a category and the differences between objects in different categories.⁵³ When the categories at hand are categories of “human kinds,” the overestimation of intercategory differences and of intracategory (especially out-group) homoge-

neity⁵⁴ facilitates the reification of groups. Ethnic classification depersonalizes individuals by transforming them “from unique persons to exemplars of named groups.”⁵⁵ Together with more recent research on the causes and consequences of perceptions of the “entitativity” – i.e. unity and coherence – of social categories or groups,⁵⁶ these findings can help explain the resilience of “groupist” representations of the social world.

Schemas

Schemas (and related concepts such as scripts and cultural models) became a central focus of research in cognitive psychology and cognitive anthropology in the 1970s as researchers developed more complex models of cognition than had characterized earlier phases of cognitive research.⁵⁷ Recent sociological theory has also invoked the notion of schema,⁵⁸ while the related concept of frame, originally given sociological formulation by Goffman, has been adapted by the cognitively oriented literature on social movements.⁵⁹

Schemas are mental structures in which knowledge is represented. They range from the universal to the idiosyncratic.⁶⁰ Most sociologically interesting schemas, however, are neither universal nor idiosyncratic but “culturally [more or less widely] shared mental constructs.”⁶¹ As mental structures, schemas are of course not directly observable. Rather, they are posited to account for evidence – experimental, observational, and historical – about how people perceive and interpret the world and about how knowledge is acquired, stored, recalled, activated, and extended to new domains.

Not simply representations of information, schemas are also, simultaneously, “processors” of information.⁶² They guide perception and recall, interpret experience, generate inferences and expectations, and organize action. In this way they function as “a kind of mental recognition ‘device’ which creates a complex interpretation from minimal inputs; [they are] not just a ‘picture’ in the mind.”⁶³ In contrast to piecemeal processing, which “relies only on the information given and combines the available features without reference to an overall organizing structure,” schematic processing treats each “new person, event, or issue as an instance of an already familiar category or schema.”⁶⁴ As processors, schemas function automatically, outside of conscious awareness. They process knowledge in an “implicit, un verbalized,

rapid, and automatic” manner, unlike modes of controlled cognition, which process knowledge in an “explicit, verbalized, slow, and deliberate” manner.⁶⁵ In this respect, they are congruent with, and indeed the means of specifying further, sociological constructs such as Bourdieu’s notion of *sens pratique*, the “regulated improvisation” of practical action governed by the habitus.⁶⁶

Schemas are organized hierarchically. The top levels, representing core, invariant aspects of concepts, are fixed, but lower levels have “slots” that need to be filled in by contextual cues, by information revealed in the course of interaction, or by “default values.”⁶⁷ In this respect the concept resonates with the core ethnomethodological idea that all mundane interaction requires participants to “fill in” unspecified information continuously from their stocks of tacit background knowledge.

Schemas must be activated by some stimulus or cue. Activation depends on proximate, situationally specific cues and triggers, not directly on large-scale structural or cultural contexts, though structural and cultural changes can affect the distribution of such proximate cues and thereby the probabilities of activation of schemas. An important limitation of existing research is that activation of schemas, as of stereotypes, has been studied chiefly in artificial experimental settings that cannot come close to capturing the enormous complexity of actual interactional contexts in which schemas are activated. As DiMaggio points out, a central challenge for cognitively minded sociologists is to understand the interaction between the distribution of schemas across persons and the distribution of the “external cultural primers” that evoke them.⁶⁸ To the extent that progress is made in this respect, the schema concept has the potential to bridge private and public, mental and social, the individual mind and the supra-individual world of public representations.

Surprisingly, given its application in many other social and cultural domains,⁶⁹ the schema concept has not been used systematically in the study of ethnicity. There has of course been a great deal of work on ethnic and racial (and to a lesser extent national) *categories*. And there is certainly some overlap between the notion of categories and that of schemas. Both concern the organization and representation of knowledge and the ways in which knowledge structures permit us to go beyond immediately given information, make inferences, interpret the world, and so on. Yet the schema concept allows consideration of more

complex knowledge structures. The recent literature on categories, to be sure, stresses the complexity of category-based knowledge. It suggests, for example, that categories are “theory-like,” in that causal knowledge – not simply prototypical attributes or characteristic exemplars – is built into categories themselves.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, the issue of categories and categorization has been interpreted relatively narrowly in studies of ethnicity.

When we think of categorization in connection with ethnicity, we tend to think of categories of people. We don’t think of categories of situations, events, actions, stories, theories, and so on. Yet as Lakoff observes, most categories “are not categories of things; they are categories of abstract entities. We categorize events, actions, emotions, spatial relationships, social relationships, and abstract entities of an enormous range.”⁷¹

A cognitive perspective focuses our analytical lens on how people see the world, parse their experience, and interpret events. This raises a different and broader set of questions about racial, ethnic, and national categorization. The relevant questions are not only about how people get classified, but about how gestures, utterances, situations, events, states of affairs, actions, and sequences of actions get classified (and thereby interpreted and experienced). The questions, in short, are about seeing the social world and interpreting social experience, not simply about classifying social actors, in ethnic terms. The schema concept can help elucidate and concretize this notion of ethnic “ways of seeing.”

Consider, for example, schemas for events and for standardized sequences of events. In the cognitive literature, these are sometimes called scripts.⁷² A standard example is the “restaurant” schema or script for the stereotypical sequence of events involved in ordering, being served, eating, and paying for food at a restaurant. Much knowledge (in the broadest sense) that is relevant to – indeed partly constitutive of – race, ethnicity, and nationhood is embedded in such event schemas. For example, a significant part of the knowledge that many African Americans have about race may be contained in schemas for recurrent events or stereotypical sequences of events. These might include the “being stopped by the police for DWB [‘driving while black’]” schema or the “being-watched-in-the-store-as-if-one-were-considered-a-potential-shoplifter” schema. Like all schemas, event schemas such as these can be activated and generate interpretations

with minimal or ambiguous inputs. There is no doubt – there is indeed abundant evidence – that conscious and unconscious “racial profiling” exists; but it may also be that event schemas such as these can generate the interpretation and experience of racial profiling even in marginal or ambiguous situations, thereby further “racializing” social experience.

Or consider social interpretation schemas – a loose and heterogeneous class of schemas that includes all kinds of templates for making sense of the social world. Ethnicity can be slotted into many of these schemas so as to generate ethnic variants or subtypes of the schemas. Consider for example a generic social competition schema, an abstract representation of two or more parties competing over some scarce good or resource. In the generic schema, there is no restriction on the object of competition (which might be money, prestige, love, market share, power, etc.) or on the parties (which might be persons, families, cliques, factions, teams, coalitions, firms, occupational groups, organizations, states, and so on). In addition to this generic social competition schema, however, there may be a variety of more specific social competition schemas, defined by specific sorts of objects or by specific sorts of parties. One of these might be an ethnic competition schema, perhaps informed by a strong normative “sense of group position,”⁷³ in which the parties would be ethnic (or racial or national) groups. If this ethnic competition schema is easily activated, people may be more prone to see and experience competition in ethnic rather than other terms. This is part of what is meant by ethnicization. Given the pervasive ambiguity of the social world, there is always a great deal of room for interpretation, and schemas are the mechanisms through which interpretation is constructed. One key aspect of processes of ethnicization is that ethnic schemas become hyper-accessible and in effect crowd out other interpretive schemas.

Broader implications

Apart from their direct applications to the study of ethnicity, the cognitive perspectives we have reviewed challenge us to revisit foundational issues and recast certain fundamental debates in the field. In this final section, we consider the implications of cognitive perspectives for (1) the conceptualization of the domain of study; (2) the question whether race, ethnicity, and nation require separate or integrated analytical treatment; and (3) the perennial debate between “primordialist” and “circumstantialist” approaches.

Conceptualizing the domain: From things in the world to ways of seeing

Despite the constructivist stance that has come to prevail in sophisticated studies of ethnicity, everyday talk, policy analysis, media reporting, and even much ostensibly constructivist academic writing about ethnicity remain informed by “groupism”: by the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous, and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis.⁷⁴ Ethnic groups, races, and nations continue to be treated as things-in-the-world, as real, substantial entities with their own cultures, their own identities, and their own interests. In accordance with what David Hollinger has called pluralist rather than cosmopolitan understandings of diversity and multiculturalism, the social and cultural world is represented in groupist terms as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome racial, ethnic, or cultural blocs.⁷⁵

Cognitively oriented work offers resources for avoiding such groupism, while at the same time helping account for its tenacious hold on our social imagination. Cognitive perspectives suggest treating racial, ethnic, and national groups not as substantial entities but as collective cultural representations, as widely shared ways of seeing, thinking, parsing social experience, and interpreting the social world. Instead of conceptualizing the social world in substantialist terms as a composite of racial, ethnic, and national groups – instead, that is, of uncritically adopting the folk sociological ontology that is central to racial, ethnic, and national movements – cognitive perspectives address the social and mental processes that sustain the vision and division of the social world in racial, ethnic, or national terms. Rather than take “groups” as basic units of analysis, cognitive perspectives shift analytical attention to “group-making” and “grouping” activities such as classification, categorization, and identification. By their very nature, classification, categorization, and identification create “groups” and assign members to them; but the groups thus created do not exist independently of the myriad acts of classification, categorization, and identification, public and private, through which they are sustained from day to day. Race, ethnicity, and nationality exist only in and through our perceptions, interpretations, representations, classifications, categorizations, and identifications. They are not things *in* the world, but perspectives *on* the world – not ontological but epistemological realities.⁷⁶

To say this is not to espouse a radical subjectivism or psychologism.⁷⁷ It is not to privilege what goes on in people's heads over what goes on in public. The promise of cognitive approaches is precisely that they may help connect our analyses of what goes on in people's heads with our analyses of what goes on in public. Dan Sperber, for example, has proposed an "epidemiological" perspective on the distribution and diffusion of representations within a population.⁷⁸ Representations, according to Sperber, are of two kinds: public representations⁷⁹ (embodied in texts, talk, monuments, etc.) and mental representations. Representations of either kind may be idiosyncratic, or they may be more or less widely shared. Some representations are "easier to think" than others. Lawrence Hirschfeld and Francisco Gil-White have argued that representations of the social world in terms of putative intrinsic kinds (including ethnic "kinds") may be easy to think because of our cognitive architecture.⁸⁰ Representations that are easy to think will be more easily communicated, transmitted, and remembered, and as a result more widely shared, than others. When more or less similar versions of a representation are widely (but not universally) shared, we may speak of a cultural (rather than an idiosyncratic personal) representation. If Hirschfeld, Gil-White, and others are right about racial, ethnic, and national categories being easy to think – easier to think than, say, class – this would help explain in part why they tend to be widely shared and powerfully entrenched cultural representations.⁸¹

If racial, ethnic, and national categories are easy to think, this does not, of course, mean that they, or the various schemas in which such categories may be embedded, are universally active or salient. Indeed a concern with the diffusion, distribution, accessibility, and salience of schemas can help avoid the pronounced tendency, in the literature, to take the centrality and salience of race, ethnicity, and nation for granted. Instead of speaking routinely of racial, ethnic, or national "groups," for example, which carries with it the usual implications of boundedness and homogeneity and biases the discussion by *presuming* the relevance of a racial, ethnic, or national frame or self-understanding, a cognitive perspective suggests speaking of *groupness* as a variable. Here cognitive perspectives complement other attempts to think relationally rather than substantially and to problematize groupness rather than taking it for granted.⁸² In its cognitive dimensions, groupness can be understood as depending not simply on the *content* of representations (i.e., on the extent to which the representations highlight the "entitativity," the internal homogeneity and external boundedness of the "group"⁸³) but on the *distribution* of such representations

within a population,⁸⁴ on their accessibility or ease of activation, on their relative salience once activated, and – not least – on the relative ease with which they “slot” into or “interlock” with other key cultural representations. This last might be understood as the cognitive counterpart to the notion of “resonance,” which assumed a key place in the social movement literature on framing and frame alignment. Changes in groupness – short-term fluctuations as well as long-term developments – are cognitively mediated, depending on changes in the distribution or propagation of groupist representations, or on changes in their accessibility, activation, salience, or resonance. Clearly, social structural, cultural, and situational factors will be key determinants of such changes; but we will understand them better when we understand the cognitive micromechanisms through which such macro-level determinants are mediated.⁸⁵

What cognitive perspectives suggest, in short, is that race, ethnicity, and nation are not things in the world but ways of seeing the world. They are ways of understanding and identifying oneself, making sense of one’s problems and predicaments, identifying one’s interests, and orienting one’s action. They are ways of recognizing, identifying, and classifying other people, of construing sameness and difference, and of “coding” and making sense of their actions. They are templates for representing and organizing social knowledge, frames for articulating social comparisons and explanations, and filters that shape what is noticed or unnoticed, relevant or irrelevant, remembered or forgotten.

One domain or several?

Race, ethnicity, and nationalism were long considered separate analytical domains, with largely non-overlapping literatures. In the last two decades, as the literature has become more comparative and less parochial, the boundaries have blurred.⁸⁶ The wider spectrum of cases has undermined neat distinctions that might have worked in some limited settings – for example, in the United States, between “race” (conceptualized in strictly black-white terms mirroring the one-drop rule), ethnicity (seen as generated by immigration), and nationalism (understood as something that happens elsewhere, and as definitionally linked to state formation).

Still, much ink continues to be spilled in an effort to draw analytical distinctions among race, ethnicity, and nation. In our view, this

conceptual casuistry – sometimes informed by political concerns – is misplaced. It is not that we wish to treat race, ethnicity, and nation as one undifferentiated domain. Clearly, the domain is highly differentiated. But it does not parse into three clearly bounded subdomains. Rather, there are many dimensions of differentiation, none of them coinciding precisely with conventional definitions of domain. An abbreviated list of these would include:

- Criteria and indicia of membership
- Transmission: manner in which membership is acquired
- Fixedness versus fluidity of membership
- Degree and form of naturalization, i.e. degree and form of appeal to natural grounding for community
- Degree and form of embodiment; importance attributed to phenotypic and other visible markers
- Importance attributed to distinctive language, religion, customs, and other elements of culture
- Degree and nature of territorialization; importance of territorial organization and symbolism
- Nature of claims, if any, to autonomy and self-sufficiency

These multiple dimensions of differentiation do not map neatly onto any conventional distinctions among race, ethnicity, and nation.

Cognitive perspectives suggest further reasons for treating race, ethnicity, and nation together, as one integrated domain rather than several distinct domains of study. As we suggested above, race, ethnicity, and nation are fundamentally ways of seeing. The cognitive processes and mechanisms underlying these ways of seeing are identical throughout the larger domain. If nation, for example, is famously treated as an “imagined community” or a “conceived order,”⁸⁷ this is no less true of ethnicity or race. If race, according to Hirschfeld, involves folk sociologies that divide people into intrinsic, putatively natural human kinds, this is no less true for ethnicity and nation. If ethnic boundaries, as Barth says, are sustained by processes of categorical self- and other-description, then this is no less true for racial and national boundaries. The processes of classification and categorization, formal and informal, that divide “us” from “them”; the forms of social closure that depend on categorizing and excluding certain potential competitors as “outsiders”; the categories and frames in terms of which social comparison and social explanation are organized; the schemas, scripts, and cultural models that allow one to

perceive, experience, or interpret situations and sequences of action in standardized racial, ethnic, or national terms; the cognitive biases in the retrieval and processing of information that lead us to evaluate evidence in selective ways that tend to confirm prior expectations and strengthen stereotypes – all of these and many more cognitive and socio-cognitive mechanisms and processes are involved in essentially similar forms in phenomena conventionally coded as belonging to distinct domains of race, ethnicity, and nationalism. Of course there are great variations in the content of patterns of classification and closure, social comparison and explanation, schemas and cultural models, but these cut across conventional distinctions of domain.

Primordialism and circumstantialism

Cognitive research also invites us to revisit and reframe the classic, though too often hackneyed, debate between primordialist and circumstantialist or instrumentalist approaches.⁸⁸ This debate pits an understanding of ethnicity as rooted in deep-seated or “primordial” attachments and sentiments⁸⁹ against an understanding of it as an instrumental adaptation to shifting economic and political circumstances. Cognitive perspectives allow us to recast both positions and to see them as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

With the ascent of the social constructionist paradigm, serious engagement of primordialist positions has given way to dismissive references to “naturalizing” and “essentializing” perspectives. But primordialism is more subtle and interesting than this. In the oft-cited but seldom closely analyzed formulation of Clifford Geertz, primordial attachments stem “from the ‘givens’ – or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ – of social existence,” including blood-ties, religion, shared language, and customs.⁹⁰ In most discussions, this crucial distinction between *perceived* “givens” and *actual* “givens” is lost. Primordialists are depicted as “analytical naturalizers” rather than “analysts of naturalizers.”⁹¹ In fact, on the primordialist account, it is participants, not the analysts, who are the real primordialists, treating ethnicity as naturally given and immutable.

Thus clarified, the primordialist position cannot be so easily dismissed. And cognitive research can give it a stronger empirical foundation, by specifying the natural foundations of the often-observed

tendency to naturalize ethnicity. Research on “psychological essentialism” suggests that “people act as if things ... have essences or underlying natures that make them the things they are,” and that even if this is “bad metaphysics” it may in many circumstances serve as “good epistemology.”⁹² Even young children, traditionally understood to attend primarily to external, visible features of things, in fact have a firm grasp of notions of “insides” and essences.⁹³ Social categories, in particular, are often (incorrectly) perceived as if they were natural kinds; as a result, people often infer “deep essential qualities on the basis of surface appearance” and “imbue even arbitrary categorizations with deep meaning.”⁹⁴

Hirschfeld and Gil-White extend this line of analysis to race and ethnicity, positing a deep-seated cognitive disposition to perceive human beings as members of “natural kinds” with inherited and immutable “essences.” Drawing on experiments with three- and four-year olds, Hirschfeld argues that humans have a special-purpose cognitive device⁹⁵ for partitioning the social world into what he calls “intrinsic kinds” based on “shared essences.”⁹⁶ This provides the cognitive foundations for what Hirschfeld calls “folk sociology,” by which he means the “commonsense partitive logic or social ontology that picks out the ‘natural’ kinds of people that exist in the world.”⁹⁷ Hirschfeld emphasizes the presence worldwide of a similar deep classificatory logic – one that naturalizes social difference by dividing the social world into putatively deeply constituted groups seen as based on some shared intrinsic essence – underlying what seem at first glance to be strikingly different systems of racial, ethnic, and national classification. Gil-White argues that essentialist reasoning about ethnicity is derived by analogical transfer from reasoning about biological species. He speculates that this occurs through the adaptation of an existing special-purpose cognitive module – a “living-kinds” module evolutionarily tailored to perception of and reasoning about species – to perception of and reasoning about ethnic groups.⁹⁸

Although Hirschfeld and Gil-White disagree about the particular nature of the cognitive mechanism at work, both suggest that the extremely widespread tendency to “naturalize” and “essentialize” racial, ethnic, and national categories may be grounded in the human cognitive apparatus. Cognitive perspectives enable us to analyze “participants’ primordialism”⁹⁹ without endorsing analytical primordialism. And rather than attribute the naturalization of social differences to vaguely conceived emotional commitments,¹⁰⁰ to an irreducible

sense of “identity,”¹⁰¹ or to “a certain ineffable significance ... attributed to the tie of blood,”¹⁰² cognitive perspectives provide potentially powerful explanations for this tendency.

Cognitive perspectives can help respecify and strengthen the circumstantialist position as well.¹⁰³ Circumstantialists have characterized ethnicity as situationally malleable and context-dependent. But how does this work? Accounts have been implicitly cognitive. Okamura, for example, has suggested that ethnic identities are activated depending on “the actor’s subjective perception of the situation in which he finds himself” and “the salience he attributes to ethnicity as a relevant factor in that situation.”¹⁰⁴ But what governs the perception of the situation and the perceived salience of ethnicity? Most accounts are rather narrowly instrumentalist at this point, suggesting that individuals strategically manipulate, deploy, mobilize, or downplay ethnicity to suit their interests. Such deliberate and calculated manipulation of ethnicity certainly occurs, but circumstantialist perspectives would be strengthened by a less restrictive account of the micro-mechanisms that enable and prompt situational shifts in identification.

As we observed above, cognitive research indicates that much cognition (and schema-governed cognition in particular) is unselfconscious and quasi-automatic rather than deliberate and controlled. This suggests that the explicit, deliberate, and calculated deployment of an ethnic frame of reference in pursuit of instrumental advantage may be less important, in explaining the situational variability of ethnicity, than the ways in which ethnic – and non-ethnic – ways of seeing, interpreting, and experiencing social relations are unselfconsciously “triggered” or activated by proximate situational cues.¹⁰⁵ Attention to framing processes, too, can help explain the variable salience of ethnicity and variable resonance of ethnicized discourse.¹⁰⁶ By illuminating the cognitive processes that underlie ethnic ways of seeing and talking, cognitive perspectives can provide a firmer microfoundation for accounts of “situational ethnicity.”

Once each position is respecified in cognitive terms, it becomes apparent that primordialist and circumstantialist accounts need not be mutually exclusive. The former can help explain the seemingly universal tendency to naturalize and essentialize real or imputed human differences, while the latter can help explain how ethnicity becomes relevant or salient in particular contexts. Rather than contradicting one another, they can be seen as directed largely to different questions:

on the one hand, how groups are conceived, and folk sociologies constructed and sustained; on the other hand, how ethnicity works in interactional practice.

Conclusion

Cognitive perspectives, we have been arguing, suggest new ways of conceptualizing ethnicity as a domain of study. By treating ethnicity as a way of understanding, interpreting, and framing experience, these perspectives provide an alternative to substantialist or groupist ontologies. They afford strong reasons for treating ethnicity, race, and nationalism as one domain rather than several. And they suggest a fresh and fruitful way of recasting the perennial debate between primordialist and circumstantialist accounts of ethnicity. In addition, the empirical findings and conceptual tools of cognitive research can help illuminate the mechanisms that link the microdynamics of race, ethnicity and nationalism to macro-level structures and processes.

The skeptic may counter that attending seriously to cognitive research risks abandoning the social constructionist agenda for a psychological and individualistic approach. We thus conclude with a reminder that there is nothing intrinsically individualistic about the study of cognition. The domain of the “mental” is not identical with the domain of the individual. Indeed, the kind of knowledge in which we are interested – the schemes of perception and interpretation through which the social world is experienced in racial, ethnic, or national terms – is social in a double sense: it is *socially shared knowledge of social objects*. A cognitive approach to the study of ethnicity directs our attention not to individual psychology but to “sociomental”¹⁰⁷ phenomena that link culture and cognition, macro- and micro-level concerns.¹⁰⁸ Cognitive construction, in short, *is* social construction. It is only in and through cognitive processes and mechanisms that the social construction of race, ethnicity, and nation can plausibly be understood to occur.

Cognitive perspectives can also advance the constructivist agenda by correcting for the elite bias of much constructivist research. By this we mean the tendency to focus on conspicuously visible constructions, such as those of political entrepreneurs, high-level state bureaucrats, or public intellectuals, to the neglect of the less visible (but no less “constructive”) activities of common people in their everyday lives. In his “insider’s critique” of the framing perspective in social movement

literature, Benford¹⁰⁹ points to the need for studies of “rank-and-file” framing. Similarly, social constructivism needs studies of the “rank-and-file” construction of racial, ethnic, and national “realities.” Cognitive research provides the conceptual vocabulary and analytical tools for such an enterprise.

Finally, cognitive perspectives can help realize the constructivist aspiration to capture the relational and dynamic nature of race, ethnicity, and nation as fluid and contingent products of reiterative and cumulative processes of categorizing, coding, framing, and interpreting. Instead of asking “what is race?”, “what is an ethnic group?”, “what is a nation?”, a cognitive approach encourages us to ask how, when, and why people interpret social experience in racial, ethnic, or national terms.

The phenomena we call race, ethnicity, and nation surely count among the most significant social and cultural structures – and among the most significant social and political movements – of modern times. Yet they continue to exist only by virtue of being reproduced daily in and through the quotidian ways of thinking, talking, and acting of countless anonymous individuals. Although this is widely recognized in principle, the mechanisms of this daily reproduction remain little known. The promise of a cognitive perspective is that it can help us understand the ways in which these great principles of vision and division of the social world work in the world at large by specifying the way they work in ordinary minds and seemingly insignificant everyday practices.

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Notes

1. This is in part simply an effort to avoid the cumbersome repetition of “ethnicity, race, and nationhood.” But it also reflects our belief that ethnicity, race, and nation are best treated together as one rather than three distinct domains. We return to this issue in the final section of the article.

2. The “cognitive turn” was one of the most significant intellectual developments of the last third of the twentieth century, and one that has transformed diverse areas of the human sciences, revolutionizing psychology, recasting debates in linguistics, creating a new subdiscipline in anthropology, and founding entirely new fields such as artificial intelligence and cognitive science. In sociology and related disciplines, the cognitive turn has opened up new domains of study and new lines of analysis, and has informed work, *inter alia*, on organizations, boundaries, risk, the sociology of knowledge, and social movements. In the study of ethnicity, however, for reasons we discuss in the text, the cognitive turn has remained incipient and largely implicit. For a broad overview of the cognitive turn, see Howard Gardner, *The Mind's New Science* (New York: Basic Books, 1987). For psychology, see B. J. Baars, *The Cognitive Revolution in Psychology* (New York: Guilford, 1986); for linguistics, Noam Chomsky, “A Review of B. F. Skinner’s *Verbal Behavior*,” in Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz, editors, *The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964 [1959]), 547–578; for philosophy, Jerry A. Fodor, *The Modularity of Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983); for anthropology, Roy G. D’Andrade, *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the cognitive turn in sociology, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “Introduction,” in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), esp. 14–27; Paul DiMaggio, “Culture and Cognition,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 23 (1997): 263–287; Eviatar Zerubavel, *The Fine Line: Making Distinctions in Everyday Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Eviatar Zerubavel, *Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Karen A. Cerulo, editor, *Culture In Mind: Toward a Sociology of Culture and Cognition* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Michèle Lamont and Virág Molnár, “The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 167–195; Carol A. Heimer, “Social Structure, Psychology and the Estimation of Risk,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 14 (1988): 491–519; Ann Swidler and Jorge Ardití, “The New Sociology of Knowledge,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 20 (1994): 305–329. Via Goffman’s work on framing, the cognitive turn has also informed work on social movements. See Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (San Francisco: Harper Colophon Books, 1974); David A. Snow, E. B. Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 464–481; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 197–217; William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach,” *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (1989): 1–37; William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Hank Johnston, “A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata” in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, editors, *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 217–246. For political science, see Richard Herrmann, “The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Inferences About Perceptions,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1988): 175–203; for economics, Herbert Simon et al., *Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution*, Massimo Egidi and Robin Marris, editors (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1992); for the

- history of science, Nancy J. Nersessian, "Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Science and History of Science," *Osiris* 10 (1995): 194–211; for history, Kenneth Gouwens, "Perceiving the Past: Renaissance Humanism After the 'Cognitive Turn,'" *American Historical Review* 103 (1998): 55–82.
3. In this respect we follow the lead of DiMaggio's "Culture and Cognition," which specifies lessons of cognitive research for the study of culture; see also Paul J. DiMaggio, "Why Cognitive (and Cultural) Sociology Needs Cognitive Psychology" in Cerulo, editor, *Culture In Mind*, 274–281.
 4. See Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity Without Groups," *Archives européennes de sociologie* XLIII/2 (2002): 163–189.
 5. Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, *Primitive Classification* (London: Cohen & West, 1963 [1903]); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); Rodney Needham, *Symbolic Classification* (Santa Monica, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1979).
 6. Fredrik Barth, "Introduction" in Fredrik Barth, editor, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), 9–38.
 7. See Richard Jenkins, *Rethinking Ethnicity* (London: SAGE, 1997). Classification and categorization figure centrally in several recent overviews of the field: Marcus Banks, *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions* (London: Routledge, 1996); Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World* Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1998; Thomas H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 1993); Steve Fenton, *Ethnicity: Racism, Class and Culture* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). See also Scott Leon Washington, "Social Classification: An Integrative Approach," manuscript under review (2002), which treats race, ethnicity, and nationality (along with gender, age, class, caste, and sexuality) as "elementary forms of social classification."
 8. Loïc Wacquant, "For an Analytic of Racial Domination," *Political Power and Social Theory* 11 (1997): 221–234, 229.
 9. Bernard Boxill, "Introduction" in Bernard Boxill, editor, *Race and Racism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1.
 10. See <http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm>.
 11. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 1994), 4. In much work on race, to be sure – and in some work on ethnic, national and other identities – constructivist language masks essentialist or at least substantialist assumptions (Mara Loveman, "Is 'Race' Essential?" *American Sociological Review* 64 (1999): 891–898; Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" *Theory and Society* 29/1 (2000): 1–47).
 12. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977), 5.
 13. Katherine Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?" *Daedalus* 122 (1993): 37.
 14. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 1.
 15. This shift in focus towards boundaries, categories, and classification is also evident in recent works whose central focus is not ethnicity per se, but broader, more general social processes such as social exclusion and inequality (which, of course, are centrally relevant to race, ethnicity, and nationhood). See, for example, Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), which

- makes “categorical inequality” central to a theoretical argument about the structure and dynamics of “durable inequality.”
16. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, editors, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
 17. Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” *Sociological Theory* 12/1 (1994): 1–18.
 18. See, for example, Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution” in Clifford Geertz, editor, *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press, 1963), 105–157; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
 19. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991 [1983]), chapter 10; Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Nicholas B. Dirks, “Castes of Mind: the Original Caste,” *Representations* 37 (1992): 56–78; Charles Hirschman, “The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology,” *Sociological Forum* 1 (1986): 330–361; Robert H. Jackson, *Race, Caste, and Status: Indians in Colonial Spanish America* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999); Robert H. Jackson and Gregory Maddox, “The Creation of Identity: Colonial Society in Bolivia and Tanzania,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993): 263–284.
 20. Silvana Patriarca, *Numbers and Nationhood: Writing Statistics in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5–6; Melissa Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Mara Loveman, “Nation-State Building, ‘Race,’ and the Production of Official Statistics: Brazil in Comparative Perspective,” Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California, Los Angeles, 2001).
 21. Paul Starr, “The Sociology of Official Statistics,” in William Alonso and Paul Starr, editors, *The Politics of Numbers* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), 7–57; Joan Nagel, “American Indian Ethnic Revival: Politics and the Resurgence of Identity” *American Sociological Review* 60 (1995): 947–965; William Petersen, “Politics and the Measurement of Ethnicity,” in Alonso and Starr, editors, *The Politics of Numbers*; William Petersen, *Ethnicity Counts* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997).
 22. Ian Hacking, “Making Up People” in Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery, editors, *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 222–236.
 23. David T. Goldberg, “Taking Stock: Counting by Race” in Goldberg, *Racial Subjects: Writing on Race in America* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 29–30.
 24. Goldberg, “Taking Stock,” 30.
 25. Jenkins, *Rethinking Ethnicity*, 69.
 26. Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
 27. Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan L. Star, *Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), chapter 6.

28. Timothy Longman, "Identity Cards, Ethnic Self-Perception, and Genocide in Rwanda" in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, editors, *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 345–357; James Fussell, "Group Classification on National ID Cards as a Factor in Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing," presented on November 15, 2001 to the Seminar Series of the Yale University Genocide Studies Program <http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/removing-facilitating-factors/IDcards/>. For country-by-country reports, see <http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/removing-facilitating-factors/IDcards/survey/index.htm>.
29. Veljko Vujacic and Victor Zaslavsky, "The Causes of Disintegration in the USSR and Yugoslavia," *Telos* 88 (1991): 120–140; Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," *World Politics* 43 (1991): 196–232; Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR As a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53 (1994): 414–452; Rogers Brubaker, "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia," *Theory and Society* 23 (1994): 47–78; Terry D. Martin, *An Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
30. Marvin Harris, "Referential Ambiguity in the Calculus of Brazilian Racial Identity," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 26 (1970): 1–14; Roger Sanjek, "Brazilian Racial Terms: Some Aspects of Meaning and Learning," *American Anthropologist* 73 (1971): 1126–1143.
31. See, for example, Roger Sanjek, "Cognitive Maps of the Ethnic Domain in Urban Ghana: Reflections on Variability and Change" in Ronald W. Casson, editor, *Language, Culture, and Cognition* (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 305–328; Edmund Ronald Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Peter Kunstadter, "Ethnic Group, Category and Identity: Karen in Northern Thailand" in Charles F. Keyes, editor, *Ethnic Adaptation and Identity: The Karen on the Thai Frontier With Burma* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979), 119–163; Michael Moerman, "Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization: Who Are the Lue?" *American Anthropologist* 67/1 (1965): 1215–1230.
32. Gerd Baumann, *Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jack Alexander, "The Culture of Race in Middle-Class Kingston, Jamaica," *American Ethnologist* 4 (1977): 413–435; Nancy E. Levine, "Caste, State, and Ethnic Boundaries in Nepal," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46/1 (1987): 71–88; Gerald D. Berreman, "Social Categories and Social Interaction in Urban India," *American Anthropologist* 74 (1972): 567–586; Virginia R. Dominguez, *White by Definition* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986); Paul Kay, "Tahitian Words for Race and Class," *Journal de la Société des Océanistes* 39 (1978): 81–93; Sanjek, "Cognitive Maps of the Ethnic Domain in Urban Ghana: Reflections on Variability and Change"; Paul D. Starr, "Ethnic Categories and Identification in Lebanon," *Urban Life* 7 (1978): 111–142.
33. The variability and context dependency of practical categorization is not limited to the domain of ethnicity. In modern societies, officially sanctioned classificatory schemes are available for numerous organizational fields. Yet practitioners within these fields develop their own practical, "folk" taxonomies that guide them in performing their everyday tasks, as in the case of emergency physicians (Robert Dingwall, "Categorization in Accident Departments: 'Good' Patients, 'Bad' Patients, and 'Children,'" *Sociology of Health and Illness* 5 (1983): 127–148) or U.S.

- immigration inspectors (Janet A. Gilboy, "Deciding Who Gets In: Decisionmaking by Immigration Inspectors," *Law & Society Review* 25/3 [1991]: 571–599). Similarly, although modern states have highly developed and codified schemes for the classification of occupations and social classes (S. R. S. Szreter, "The Official Representation of Social Classes in Britain, the United States, and France: the Professional Model and 'Les Cadres'," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993): 285–317), everyday occupational and class categorizations are variable and context-dependent (Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, "Finding One's Way in Social Space: A Study Based on Games," *Social Science Information* 22 (1983): 631–680).
34. For Sacks on categories, see Harvey Sacks, *Lectures on Conversation*, edited by Gail Jefferson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), I, 40–48, 333–340, 396–403, 578–596; II, 184–187.
 35. See Michael Moerman, "Accomplishing Ethnicity," in Roy Turner, editor, *Ethnomethodology: Selected Readings* (Baltimore: Penguin Education, 1974), 54–68; Dennis Day, "Being Ascribed, and Resisting, Membership of an Ethnic Group," in Charles Antaki and Sue Widdicombe, editors, *Identities in Talk* (London: Sage, 1998), 151–170; Emanuel A. Schegloff, "Conversation Analysis, Then and Now," paper prepared for American Sociological Association Annual Meetings (2002); Rogers Brubaker, Jon Fox, Liana Grancea, and Margit Feischmidt, *Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, book manuscript (2004).
 36. Charles Antaki and Sue Widdicombe, editors, *Identities in Talk* (London: Sage, 1998), 2.
 37. A notable exception is Horowitz's classic *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, which draws on accounts of assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment theory to help explain shifts in the scale of ethnic identities as polities expand and contract. More recent exceptions include Hal B. Levine, "Reconstructing Ethnicity," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (New Series)* 5 (1999): 165–180 and Francisco Gil-White, "Are Ethnic Groups Biological 'Species' to the Human Brain? Essentialism in Our Cognition of Some Social Categories," *Current Anthropology* 42 (2001): 515–554.
 38. DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," 264–266.
 39. Zerubavel, *Social Mindscapes*, 5.
 40. Derek Edwards, "Categories Are for Talking: On the Cognitive and Discursive Bases of Categorization," *Theory and Psychology* 1 (1991): 517.
 41. Ibid. For the discursive critique of cognitivism, see also Michael Billig, "Prejudice, Categorization and Particularization: From a Perceptual to a Rhetorical Approach," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 15 (1985): 79–103; Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, *Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour* (London: Sage, 1987); Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter, *Discursive Psychology* (London: Sage, 1992); and Derek Edwards, *Discourse and Cognition* (London: Sage, 1997).
 42. Edwards, *Discourse and Cognition*, 32, 19.
 43. DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition"; Edwards and Potter, *Discursive Psychology*, 14–15, 21, 23.
 44. George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 5–6.
 45. Eleanor Rosch, "Principles of Categorization" in Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd, editors, *Cognition and Categorization* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1978), 28.

46. Douglas L. Medin, "Concepts and Conceptual Structure," *The American Psychologist* 44 (1989): 1469–1481.
47. For an overview of the large social psychological literature on stereotypes, see David L. Hamilton and Jeffrey W. Sherman, "Stereotypes" in Robert S. Wyer and Thomas K. Srull, editors, *Handbook of Social Cognition*, 2nd edition (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1994), 1–68.
48. Hamilton and Sherman, "Stereotypes," 2–3.
49. Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954).
50. Jerome S. Bruner, "Going Beyond the Information Given" in Bruner, *Beyond the Information Given: Studies in the Psychology of Knowing*, edited by Jeremy M. Anglin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973 [1957]), 218–238.
51. Patricia G. Devine, "Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 56 (1989): 5–18.
52. Henri Tajfel and John Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior" in Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin, editors, *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1986), 13. Studies using a modified research design have subsequently shown that something more than "mere categorization" is likely to be at work in the production of in-group bias. The combination of a "group schema" with additional information regarding the appropriateness of competition appears to be the cognitive mechanism that produces in-group bias (Chester A. Insko and John Schopler, "Categorization, Competition, and Collectivity," in Clyde Hendrick, editor, *Group Processes* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987), 213–251).
53. Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (London: Routledge, 1988), 19.
54. For a review of studies showing that people judge out-groups to be more homogeneous than in-groups, see David M. Messick and Diane M. Mackie, "Intergroup Relations," *Annual Review of Psychology* 40 (1989): 55–59.
55. Levine, "Reconstructing Ethnicity," 169.
56. Donald T. Campbell, "Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons As Social Entities," *Behavioral Science* 3 (1958): 14–25; David L. Hamilton and Steven J. Sherman, "Perceiving Persons and Groups," *Psychological Review* 103 (1996): 336–355; David L. Hamilton, Steven J. Sherman, and Brian Lickel, "Perceiving Social Groups: The Importance of the Entitativity Continuum" in Constantine Sedikides, John Schopler, and Chester A. Insko, editors, *Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 47–74; Steven J. Sherman, David L. Hamilton, and Amy C. Lewis, "Perceived Entitativity and the Social Identity Value of Group Memberships" in Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, editors, *Social Identity and Social Cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 80–110.
57. For overviews see David E. Rumelhart, "Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition" in Rand J. Spiro, Bertram C. Bruce, and William F. Brewer, editors, *Theoretical Issues in Reading Comprehension: Perspectives From Cognitive Psychology, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, and Education* (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1980), 33–58; Ronald W. Casson, "Schemata in Cognitive Anthropology," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 12 (1983): 429–462; Hazel Markus and R. B. Zajonc, "The Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology" in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, editors, *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3rd edition (New York: Random House, 1985), 137–230; D'Andrade, *The Development*

- of *Cognitive Anthropology*, chapter 6; Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn, *A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 3.
58. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); synthesizing them, William H. Sewell Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (1992): 1–29; DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition."
 59. Goffman, *Frame Analysis*; Gamson, *Talking Politics*; Johnston, "A Methodology for Frame Analysis."
 60. Casson, "Schemata in Cognitive Anthropology," 440.
 61. D'Andrade, *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*, 132; cf. Roy G. D'Andrade, "The Cultural Part of Cognition," *Cognitive Science* 5 (1981): 179–195; Zerubavel, *Social Mindscapes*.
 62. Rumelhart, "Schemata," 39; Casson. "Schemata in Cognitive Anthropology," 438; D'Andrade, *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*, 122, 136.
 63. D'Andrade, *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*, 136.
 64. Susan T. Fiske, "Schema-Based Versus Piecemeal Politics: A Patchwork Quilt, but Not a Blanket of Evidence" in Richard R. Lau and David O. Sears, editors, *Political Cognition: The 19th Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cognition* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986), 41–53.
 65. D'Andrade, *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*, 180.
 66. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*; Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990a); Andreas Wimmer, "Variationen über ein Schema. Zur Infrapolitik des Denkens am Beispiel eines Mythos der Mixe," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 120 (1995): 51–71, 62ff; Strauss and Quinn, *A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning*, 44–47. The schema concept also resonates strongly with the metaphor of culture as a "toolkit," and is a way of specifying how cultural "tools" are actually used (Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 273–286; cf. DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition"; DiMaggio, "Why Cognitive (and Cultural) Sociology Needs Cognitive Psychology"). While influential ways of analyzing culture in recent years have privileged semantic relations between symbols (for an analysis and critique, see Richard Biernacki, "Method and Metaphor After the New Cultural History" in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, editors, *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999], 62–92), the schema concept directs our attention to the pragmatics of symbols, to the ways in which symbols and ideas are represented, recalled, transmitted, diffused, activated, overridden, or ignored.
 67. Casson, "Schemata in Cognitive Anthropology," 431–432; D'Andrade, *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*, 123, 136, 139f.
 68. DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," 274. Schemas differ in their availability and in their salience. Schemas that are chronically available or easily and frequently activated, as well as those that are highly salient once activated, will be more important in organizing experience and structuring the interpretation of the world than will schemas that are only rarely activated or non-salient. Even when activated and salient, however, specific schemas do not ordinarily directly govern specific overt behavior (Markus and Zajonc, "The Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology," 162–163). Rather, schemas shape behavior in more indirect and interactive ways, in part by activating goals (Roy G. D'Andrade, "Some Proposi-

- tions About the Relations Between Culture and Human Cognition” in James W. Stigler, Richard A. Shweder, and Gilbert H. Herdt, editors, *Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 115–118.
69. For reviews see Casson, “Schemata in Cognitive Anthropology”; D’Andrade, *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*; Naomi Quinn and Dorothy Holland, “Culture and Cognition” in Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, editors, *Cultural Models in Language and Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 3–40.
 70. Medin, “Concepts and Conceptual Structure.”
 71. Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 6.
 72. Roger Schank and Robert Abelson, *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding* (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977).
 73. Herbert Blumer, “Race Prejudice As a Sense of Group Position” *Pacific Sociological Review* 1/1 (1958): 3–7; Lawrence D. Bobo, “Prejudice As Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations,” *Journal of Social Issues* 55/3 (1999): 445–472.
 74. For an analysis and critique of “groupism,” see Brubaker, “Ethnicity Without Groups.”
 75. On pluralist and cosmopolitan understandings of diversity in the American context, see David A. Hollinger, *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1995). For a critique of the prevailing “ethnic reductionism” in British public discourse, likewise involving the reification of putatively bounded ethnoreligious and ethnocultural groups, see Baumann, *Contesting Culture*, especially chapters 1 and 2. Ironically, reified and groupist understandings of culture as a bounded and integral whole have been institutionalized in the ideology and practice of multiculturalism precisely as such notions of culture have been strongly criticized by recent anthropological and sociological theorizing about culture. See, for example, Steven Vertovec, “Multiculturalism, Culturalism and Public Incorporation,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19 (1996): 49–69; Lila Abu-Lughod, “Writing Against Culture” in Richard G. Fox, editor, *Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present* (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1991), 137–162; Straus and Quinn, *A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning*.
 76. As Emanuel Schegloff reminded us, this formulation is potentially misleading, since perspectives *on* the world – as every Sociology 1 student is taught – are themselves *in* the world, and every bit as “real” and consequential as other sorts of things. (But race, ethnicity, and nation are “in the world” as perspectives on the world, not as substantial entities.)
 77. Bourdieu’s critique of substantialist conceptions of groups and of the false opposition between objectivist and subjectivist understandings of groups and classes is pertinent here (see, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” *Theory and Society* 14/6 (1985): 723–744; Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power” in Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990b), 122–139). Although he did not write specifically on ethnicity, his essay on regionalism (Pierre Bourdieu, “Identity and Representation: Elements for a Critical Reflection on the Idea of Region” in Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 220–228) is richly suggestive for the study of ethnicity.

78. Dan Sperber, "Anthropology and Psychology: Towards an Epidemiology of Representations," *Man* 20 (1985): 73–89.
79. Note that, for Sperber, what makes a representation "public" is not the size or nature of its audience but its externality, its embodiment in a form that is, in principle, accessible to others.
80. Lawrence A. Hirschfeld, *Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture and the Child's Construction of Human Kinds* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Gil-White, "Are Ethnic Groups Biological 'Species' to the Human Brain?"
81. Without drawing on expressly cognitive research, Kanchan Chandra has argued that ethnicity, being readily and costlessly ascertainable in contexts of limited information, is in effect easy to see. This, in her view, helps explain the prevalence of a politics of ethnic favoritism in patronage democracies. See Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapters 2 and 3.
82. See, for example, Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), 62ff.
83. On entitativity, see the works cited in n. 56.
84. A concern with the distribution of representations, rather than simply with their content, can help correct for one very common bias in the study of race, ethnicity, and nation. This bias results from deriving characterizations of groups' interests, desires, beliefs, etc. from the content of the public representations of a few (often self-appointed) representatives of the group in question. The bias results not only from privileging public over mental representations, but from privileging, within the class of public representations, those that leave relatively accessible material traces in the form of texts, communiqués, press reports, interviews, and so on over the less easily accessible public representations produced in the course of ordinary interaction.
85. See DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," 280.
86. For works indicative of this broadening of horizons and blurring of boundaries, see Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981; Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*; Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Sociology* 19 (1993): 211–239; Banks, *Ethnicity*; Jenkins, *Rethinking Ethnicity*; Cornell and Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race*.
87. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; M. R. Lepsius, "The Nation and Nationalism in Germany," *Social Research* 52 (1985): 43–64.
88. For reviews of the debate, see James McKay, "An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 5/4 (1982): 395–420; George M. Scott Jr., "A Resynthesis of the Primordial and Circumstantial Approaches to Ethnic Group Solidarity: Towards an Explanatory Model," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13/2 (1990): 147–171; Jack D. Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, "The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16/2 (1993): 183–201; Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998); Francisco Gil-White, "How Thick Is Blood? The Plot Thickens...: If Ethnic Actors Are Primordialists, What Remains of the Circumstantialist/Primordialist Controversy?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (1999): 803.
89. As an analytic term, "primordial" was introduced – though not in connection with ethnicity – by Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *British*

- Journal of Sociology* 8 (1957): 130–145. It was extended to ethnicity by Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution.”
90. Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution,” 109.
 91. Gil-White, “How Thick Is Blood?,” 803.
 92. Medin, “Concepts and Conceptual Structure,” 1476–1477.
 93. Susan A. Gelman and Henry M. Wellman, “Insides and Essences: Early Understandings of the Non-Obvious,” *Cognition* 38 (1991): 213–244.
 94. Myron Rothbart and Marjorie Taylor, “Category Labels and Social Reality: Do We View Social Categories As Natural Kinds?” in Gün R. Semin and Klaus Fiedler, editors, *Language, Interaction and Social Cognition* (London: SAGE, 1992), 12.
 95. Hirschfeld belongs to a group of cognitive researchers who view the mind as a collection of dedicated, special-purpose devices rather than a single, general-purpose, cognitive instrument. On this view, which traces its antecedents to the Chomskian revolution in linguistics, there are distinct, dedicated, and evolutionarily adapted cognitive mechanisms and devices associated with language learning, color perception, edge detection, facial recognition, and many other domains of cognitive function (Lawrence A. Hirschfeld and Susan A. Gelman, “Toward a Topography of Mind: An Introduction to Domain Specificity” in Lawrence A. Hirschfeld and Susan A. Gelman, editors, *Mapping the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3–38; Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, “Origins of Domain Specificity: the Evolution of Functional Organization” in *ibid.*, 85–116).
 96. Hirschfeld, *Race in the Making*. Hirschfeld rejects the prevailing view that racial categories are first developed by children through naive, as it were “inductive” observation of conspicuous physical differences or simply through socialization into prevailing classificatory codes and practices. Neither conspicuous visual evidence nor cultural socialization, he argues, is crucial to young children’s attempts to make sense of human diversity. Rather than simply “seeing” or “learning about” race, he suggests, drawing on experimental evidence, children are cognitively equipped and disposed to construe the social world – largely independently of variations in what they see or what they are told – in terms of “race”-like intrinsic kinds.
 97. Hirschfeld, *Race in the Making*, 20.
 98. Gil-White, “Are Ethnic Groups Biological ‘Species’ to the Human Brain?”.
 99. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 158.
 100. Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16/3 (1993): 373–389.
 101. For a critical analysis of the concept of identity, see Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity.’”
 102. Shils, “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties,” 142.
 103. For an account that makes this point in different terms, see Gil-White, “How Thick Is Blood?,” 804ff.
 104. Jonathan Y. Okamura, “Situational Ethnicity,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4 (1981): 454.
 105. The distribution of such cues in the immediate situation, of course, will be shaped in varying ways by broader levels of context such as institutional setting, cultural or social milieu, and political moment.
 106. Here, circumstantialists might usefully draw on the social movement literature. For an initial attempt to link discussions of framing in the social movement literature to cognitive research, see Johnston (“A Methodology for Frame Analysis”).

107. Zerubavel, *Social Mindscapes*.
108. DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition"; Strauss and Quinn, *A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning*.
109. Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movements Framing Perspective," *Sociological Inquiry* 67 (1997): 409-430.