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Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany since Unification

Various phenomena may be analyzed in order to ascertain the extent and significance of antisemitism in society: public opinion; the attitude of the intellectual elite; treatment by the media; antiminority activities; government treatment of Jews and antisemites in politics, the courts, and education; the ideology and activities of right-wing organizations, and the like. The results vary according to the chosen subject of the analysis. I shall concentrate on public attitudes toward Jews and foreigners on the one hand and on open, sometimes violent acts of antisemitism and xenophobia on the other; I shall also examine the connections between the two. Antisemitism and xenophobia will be treated separately. Although they correlate highly with each other, I believe they vary in terms of motives, prevalence, and public acceptance.

I. Motives: Rejection of Jews in Germany today must be viewed within the context of attitudes toward National Socialism and German history. Guilt, responsibility, and reparations are the major issues involved, in contrast to questions of entitlement to civil rights and welfare services or feelings of cultural isolation, which influence attitudes toward migrant laborers in Germany. Right-wing extremism always couples antisemitism with xenophobia, though each serves a different function: Jews are challenged as a politically influential group that is suspected of being behind state and media attacks on the right-wing. Foreigners (*Ausländer*), on the other hand, are considered competitors, providing a present and concrete embodiment of the "enemy." The prejudices against middle-class, socially integrated Jews as a group tend to involve accusations that they have too much influence and financial strength. Migrant laborers and asylum seekers—who occupy the lowest rung on the labor market ladder—are subjected to the same prejudices

2. Prevalence: Antisemitism and xenophobia are not equally prevalent in society. Although it is true that most antisemites are xenophobic, forming an ideologically right-wing hard core, opposition to certain immigrant groups or immigration in general often does not include rejection of Jews, especially among younger generations (see Bergmann 1992).¹ Group resentment based on actual or feared social competition and conflict is less relevant when it comes to attitudes toward Jews and Blacks. Prejudice against these traditional scapegoats is based rather on ethnocultural distance, traditional prejudice, and racism; but resentment is less prevalent among the public than is xenophobic hostility toward Turks and Arabs. The relatively low level of social distance from Jews can be explained by the lack of social conflicts with this relatively small and invisible group. But more important is the impact of decades of an emerging public taboo against antisemitism, postwar education about the history of antisemitism, and empathy with the fate of persecuted Jews. Such a public awareness does not exist for other minority groups. Thus, Jews have lost their traditional scapegoat role, whereas resentment of other groups is more tolerated today. This analysis raises the question, Are xenophobic persons not necessarily antisemitic? However, both strong antisemites and extremists (i.e., persons with deep ideologically rooted prejudices) tend to score high in their rejection of foreigners and non-Germans, regardless of ethnic, cultural, or other differences.

Among East Germans in particular, there is a considerable discrepancy between attitudes toward Jews and those toward foreign nationals. East Germans are clearly less antisemitic than West Germans, but more xenophobic.

3. Acceptance: Tolerance of antisemitic or xenophobic opinions and incidents varies considerably in politics, the media, and public opinion. Whereas antisemitic statements are considered taboo and quickly lead to public censure, this is not equally true with respect to xenophobia.

Antisemitism in Public Opinion

West Germany

The relationship between Germans and Jews, which received little attention in the 1970s, returned to the public eye in the form of various scandals in the mid-80s. The Bitburg affair, the Fassbinder and Jenninger scandals, insults leveled at Jews by Christian Democratic Party (Christlich-Demokratische Union [CDU]) officials, and the historians' debate (*Historikerstreit*) about the uniqueness of the Holocaust in history led to heated public debates. For the first time since the early 1970s, surveys on antisemitism in the population were carried out in 1986, 1987, and 1989 (Institut für Demoskopie 1986, 1987, Bergmann and Erb 1991a, Emmid-Institut 1989), and they yielded the same results: about 15% of the West German population was strongly antisemitic, with great discrepancies between generations, reflecting their different political socialization. This is confirmed by three important surveys in the late 1980s (Institut für Demoskopie 1986, 1987, Emmid-Institut 1989), despite their use of different questions, rating methods, and category hierarchies.²

In comparison to research findings from the 1950s, one could speak of a slow but steady decline in anti-Jewish attitudes in West Germany. A second important factor was education level; whereas 20% of those with less schooling were antisemitic, the figure was only 5% for those with a college education. As the number of those old enough to have been actively involved in the Nazi period continues to decrease, the attitudes of subsequent generations are also becoming more and more similar, so that the dominant influence of age is disappearing. In particular, differences between the 18 to 29-year-old group and the 30 to 50-year-old group are negligible (see table 2.1).

The GDR and the East German States

No studies on antisemitism exist for East Germany prior to 1990, so we do not know which periods brought a decline in antisemitic prejudice or the factors that influenced the changes. Some empirical findings from the time before the Berlin Wall fell, however, verify the existence of right-wing extremism among adolescents in the socialist GDR (German Democratic Republic). In 1988, the Central Institute for Research on Youth in Leipzig found that about 10–15% of all young people sympathized with Nazi ideology (H. Müller 1991, Friedrich and Schubarth 1991). In 1988 and 1989, there were approximately thirty cases annually, involving sixty offenders, in which charges were pressed for neo-Nazi activities.

Two surveys were conducted at the end of 1990, both of which confirmed that East Germans were less antisemitic in all areas of prejudice than West Germans (Wittenberg, Prosch, and Abraham 1991, Jodice 1991). A comparative study conducted in late 1991 determined a West-East ratio of 16% versus 4% of Germans with antisemitic attitudes (*Der Spiegel* 1992: 70 f.).³ Additional studies from 1994 have confirmed these findings. The data also show that these differences generally apply to attitudes toward World War II, Nazism, and the Holocaust (Forsa 1994, Golub 1994). Since 1945 such viewpoints have been closely tied in both parts of Germany to the attitudes toward Jews (see also chapter 3). Respondents in East Germany generally demonstrated more specific knowledge of National Socialism, rejecting it more decisively and tending less toward rationalization. These data are confirmed by election results that show only minimal support for ultraright-wing parties in the new federal states (the best election result for the "Republikaner" Party in 1994 was 1.4% in the state assembly elections of Saxony-Anhalt). The

TABLE 2.1. Antisemitic Attitudes by Age Group, 1949–1991

Age Group	1949	1991	
		West Germany	East Germany
18–30	26%	16–24	6%
30–50	23%	25–35	3%
50–65	25%	36–49	4%
		50–64	3%
65+	17%	65+	6%
N	2,000	N	1,875

only attitudinal dimension in which East Germans showed a negative deviation from West Germans was in their attitudes toward Israelis and Zionism, thus showing the negative impact of decades of anti-Israeli propaganda and policies by the GDR leadership. Although Germans in the East rejected Jews less often than those in the West did (8% vs. 13%), they more often "did not want to have much to do with Israelis" (16% vs. 11%). In 1990, young people in the eastern German city of Jena clearly showed even stronger rejection (26%) than the adults did (Wittenberg, Prosch, and Abraham 1995).⁴ This result, of course, begs the question why antisemitic attitudes have declined more sharply in the former GDR than in the Federal Republic of Germany, where, after all, the goal of postwar re-education was actively pursued. There are three possible explanations for this.⁵

1. The presence of a dogmatic ideology centered around antifascism was able to eradicate dissenting prejudices and worldviews more thoroughly than the open, wide range of ideologies that coexist in a pluralistic society, even if that society generally rejects and opposes extreme right-wing ideas. In the GDR, fundamental reference points were antifascism, resistance, and the idea of socialism. The Jews and the Holocaust do not—and never did—play anything similar to the role they did in the FRG. The generation that built up East Germany in the 1950s and 1960s at least could be expected to faithfully support a humanist-oriented form of antifascism and thus reject antisemitism.

2. State doctrine in the GDR treated antisemitism and neofascism as the problems of capitalist countries, thus exonerating its population of any historical responsibility for Nazi fascism. East Germans accepted this; in the words of writer Stephan Hermlin, they lived in the belief that "half the German population were antifascists during the Nazi period." This freedom from guilt appears to explain why East Germans are less antisemitic and show less rejection of memories of the Holocaust. They feel free of the need to deal with questions concerning their share of guilt and responsibility, issues which, I believe, represent an essential motive for post-Holocaust antisemitism among West Germans today.⁵

3. It is possible that the psychoanalytic model, which theorizes that something can be overcome by being worked through, does not apply to societies as a whole. Antifascism as proclaimed by the East German state made it impossible to constantly reiterate antisemitic ideas. Consequently, the handing down of anti-Jewish stereotypes was effectively blocked. In West Germany, on the other hand, the very intense preoccupation with Nazism in schools and public life meant that, like it or not, prejudices about Jews were also communicated. This is particularly apparent with regard to religious anti-Judaism, which virtually disappeared in the atheistic GDR.

As in the case of West Germany, the main factors that influenced the different manifestations of antisemitism in the GDR are level of education and generational cohort (i.e., age group). Because of the very different educational systems and occupational structures in the Federal Republic and East Germany, it is difficult to compare the effects of education and employment history on the adoption of antisemitic attitudes. Individuals in the GDR were not as clearly separated by education, income, employment, and status differences as were individuals in the FRG, so that it might be expected that attitude differences among East Germans would

be less clearly related to level of education or employment. The empirical findings confirm this assumption. As in western Germany, formal schooling in eastern Germany has a positive effect, that is, those with a college education very rarely express negative attitudes toward Jews, whereas the corresponding figure for those having completed only the regular 10 years of schooling (polytechnic high school) is above the population average. However, the distinctions between different education and employment groups are less than in western Germany.

Political orientation, measured according to plans to vote for a particular party or a self-evaluation on a 10-point Left-Right scale, showed a significant correlation to attitudes toward Jews. As expected, antisemitism is widespread among those with extreme right-wing views, though left-wing extremists, in keeping with their anti-Zionism and critical attitudes on religion, also rejected Jews more often than those located at the center of the political spectrum. The same pattern applies for both eastern and western Germany. An evaluation of voter intentions showed that right-wing extremists consider the "Republikaner" to be "their" party; two-fifths of the voters in both East and West Germany are antisemitic (see table 2.2). More than half of all eastern "Republikaner" voters are under 35 years of age, whereas three-quarters of western "Republikaner" Party voters are over 35 years of age. Otherwise, the distribution of antisemitism among voters of other parties corresponds to the expected Right-Left pattern in both East and West.

The age distribution of antisemitism in 1991 in East Germany was different from that in West Germany (see table 2.1); as in the latter, the older age groups were more antisemitic than the middle cohorts of 35- to 64-year-olds. In the youngest age group—socialized and educated primarily in the 1980s, a time when young people showed growing skepticism toward and rejection of the official myths and propaganda of the GDR (Friedrich and Griese 1991)—an increase in antisemitic prejudice can be observed between 1990 and 1992.

Differences in political attitudes between age cohorts have also been observed in West Germany. In the 1960s, surveys already showed that generations socialized after 1945 display less antisemitism. Accordingly, significant differences in the early 1990s were found to exist only between respondents above and below age 50. Differences within the 16-49 age group are negligible. Also, with time proceed-

TABLE 2.2. Antisemitic Respondents within the Electorate in East and West Germany in 1991 according to Party Preference (N = 2,822)

Party Preference	West Germany		East Germany	
	Antisemitism	Nonantisemitism	Antisemitism	Nonantisemitism
REP	38%	62%	40%	60%
CDU/CSU	19	81	5	95
FDP	18	82	4	96
SPD	13	87	3	97
B90/Green	10	90	0	100
PDS	5	95	0	100

Source: Spiegel 1992.

ing, the cohort differences by and large become smaller and insignificant. For example, in the 1991 Emnid-Institut survey (1992), antisemitic attitudes by age were distributed as follows: ages 16–24 (12%), 25–35 (13%), 36–49 (14%), 50–64 (22%), and 65 and over (23%).

Compared with West Germany, age effects in East Germany—though existing—are almost ignorable (Bergmann and Erb, 1995). In 1991, antisemitism was exhibited among the 16–24 age group by 6% of all respondents, among the 25–64 age groups by 3%, and among respondents older than age 65 by 6%. East-West differences have to be explained by political socialization. In the GDR, subtle or open antisemitism and Nazi propaganda were publicly banned from speeches, newspapers, books, brochures, movies, songs, and so on and were replaced by socialist anti-fascist campaigns. In contrast, postwar education in the FRG was based on a somewhat ambiguous anti-Communist and antitotalitarian consensus that allowed for the continuing existence of prewar ideology and resentment.

As our data show—confirmed by the first public opinion survey about prejudice in East Germany in 1990—young adults and adolescents in East Germany proved more susceptible to xenophobic and antisemitic slogans (Wittenberg, Prosch, and Abraham 1991) than the middle-aged cohorts. Studies of youths 14 years of age and older show strong political polarization into right- and left-wing camps in the new states, whereas political ties to the democratic center parties are weak. Antisemitic statements meet with approval from 12% among 14- to 25-year-olds in Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt but were more often rejected (71%) than other xenophobic items (29% approval; 45% rejection). A negative trend is evident between different age groups, however, as the 14- to 18-year-olds displayed the greatest degree of antisemitism: 14% agree with the old anti-Jewish slogan, "The Jews are Germany's misfortune" ("Die Juden sind Deutschlands Unglück"), which is far more than among those in the 20 to 25 age group (1%). Youth researchers in Leipzig, who conducted a study on young people in 1990, repeated their study in 1992 and determined that right-wing extremist orientations, xenophobia, and the inclination toward violence had increased among German adolescents in the East during those two years (Förster et al. 1993).⁶ In a youth survey conducted in 1993 in Brandenburg, as many as 25% of the students at comprehensive high schools agreed strongly or somewhat with the above-mentioned anti-Jewish slogan (see Sturzebecher, Dietrich, and Kohlstruck 1994). This Brandenburg youth study also used the statement, from the 1991 Spiegel-sponsored Emnid-Institut survey, "Jews are partly to blame for the persecution and hate against them" ("Die Juden sind mitschuldig, wenn sie gehaßt und verfolgt werden"). In Brandenburg 25% of 17- to 18-year-old respondents and 32% aged 15 to 16 agreed with this statement, whereas in the representative Emnid poll on a 6-point Likert scale only 10% of East German respondents aged 18 to 24 expressed strong or some support for that opinion (Emnid-Institut 1992; table 2.5).

Gender and education shape this anti-Jewish potential: of male apprentices (persons enrolled in a training or apprenticeship program for a blue-collar occupation), 33% reject Jews (female apprentices: 10%), compared to 16% of male high school students (4% of the girls) in the eleventh and twelfth grades. The rejection of foreigners by German youth in the former GDR also increased sharply (by about

10%) between 1990 and 1992. Young people in eastern Germany also lead the statistics in Europe with regard to xenophobia.

The situation is different in western Germany. In a survey conducted in December 1992, the Infas-Institut (Institut für angewandte Sozialforschung) presented young people in Schleswig-Holstein with a similar statement, "The Jews are a people who bring nothing but disaster" ("Die Juden sind ein Volk, von dem nur Unheil ausgeht"). Compared to eastern German youth, in the west only 5.1% of respondents aged 14 to 18 and 4.2% aged 19 to 24 expressed support for this statement.

Public Opinion Trends since Unification

The 1990 public opinion surveys contradicted the pessimism of an assertive united Germany moving "back to the future" (Mearsheimer 1990) or the phantom of a "Fourth Reich" promoting noisy nationalism, antisemitism, and racism. But optimism was soon questioned by the wave of xenophobic violence, neo-Nazi demonstrations, and antisemitic attacks that happened in particular between 1991 and 1993. However, the often repeated speculation that the escalating wave of violence corresponded with a dramatic increase of resentment in public opinion cannot be corroborated. First, sociopsychological findings about the relationship between attitudes and actions confirm that manifest behavior is greatly dependent on situational circumstances (see Willems et al. 1993). Second, violent actions of the extremist fringe did not reflect attitudes of the majority. Rather, arson and brutal assaults led to an isolation of the violent activists and their propaganda of hate and contempt.

A series of public opinion surveys validated that attitudes in Germany remained stable. The German public has shown increasing concern about the growth of antisemitism since 1990. Jodice found that in 1990 14% of all Germans perceived antisemitism a "very serious problem" (Jodice 1991: table 10a). This percentage grew to 26% in 1994 (Golub 1994: table 5). Both surveys also revealed stability or a slight decline in antisemitism, according to the responses to several questions that are believed to be indicative of antisemitism (see tables 2.3–2.5).

According to findings of these youth studies and public surveys, antisemitism has not gained significance in the population at large but has, indeed, become more widespread and radicalized within a particular subpopulation: ultraright-wing

TABLE 2.3. "Now, as in the past, Jews exert too much influence on world events"

Sample	Year	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	Don't Know
West Germany	1990	12%	32%	27%	11%	18%
	1994	11	23	32	14	19
East Germany	1990	3	17	38	19	24
	1994	3	16	33	19	29

Source: Jodice 1991, Golub 1994.

TABLE 2.4. "Jews are exploiting the National Socialist Holocaust for their own purposes"

Sample	Year	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	Don't Know
West Germany	1990	13%	32%	25%	11%	19%
	1994	18	26	25	13	18
East Germany	1990	4	16	34	21	25
	1994	4	15	36	20	24

Sources: Jodice 1991, Golub 1994.

adolescents—particularly less educated, right-wing-oriented male manual laborers. This finding is corroborated by media reports of antisemitic actions, as well as criminological evaluations of offenses. The particular susceptibility of youth in eastern Germany is rooted above all in the far-reaching and crisis-ridden transformation processes going on in the new states, which required radical reorientation (see chapter 6). In addition, the antisemitic wave can be explained by dramatic societal transformations at a time when public debate on issues of political asylum and immigration emerged, thus offering easy scapegoats.

Xenophobia in Public Opinion

Since the early 1980s, West German governments have hovered uneasily between limitation and integration—between rejecting asylum seekers and immigrants on the one hand and granting "foreigners" equal treatment in society on the other hand. West German policies changed dramatically from 1978 to 1982. This was accompanied by a polarization in public opinion that resulted in what could be referred to as "a shift from a receptive society to a rejectionist one" (Bade 1992); thus it became a society that started to articulate the presence of "foreigners" as a "problem." In 1980, the number of asylum seekers (107,818) rose for the first time. Although this number sank by more than half in the following year, it was sufficient to unleash a debate on asylum rights in 1980–81, which took on distorted proportions through gross exaggeration of the figures. The subject of asylum was then thrown into the same pot as the problems of labor migrants living in Germany, and the resulting soup was stirred (Thranhardt 1993). Starting in 1986,

TABLE 2.5. "Recently someone said: 'Today in the aftermath of German unification, we should not talk so much about the Holocaust, but should rather draw a line through the past'"

Sample	Year	Correct	Incorrect	Don't Know/No Answer
West Germany	1990	65%	27%	8%
	1994	56	29	15
East Germany	1990	44	47	9
	1994	36	54	10

Sources: Jodice 1991, Golub 1994.

the asylum and foreigner debates surged once again, in the face of the increasing number of asylum seekers—rising to over 100,000—and also through the "Republikaner" Party's antireporter election campaigns. It is important to recognize that this debate was structured and dramatized by distinctions made between those who were considered "genuine" political refugees, which supposedly represented a small minority of the total applicants for asylum, and the masses of "pseudo" asylum seekers. Parallel to these developments, right-wing parties ("Republikaner," Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands [NPD], and Deutsche Volksunion [DVU]) gained popularity.

The socialist GDR officially welcomed foreigners and claimed that the population expressed no hostilities toward foreign nationals;⁷ in fact, the status of resident aliens was less than equal. Conflicts with Polish visitors, resentment of preferential treatment of de facto guest workers from "brotherly" socialist countries, and the findings of surveys conducted immediately after the Wall came down indicate the existence of a pronounced ethnocentrism in the East German population before 1990.

The Asylum Debate and Immigration

Because of the economic and psychological problems that developed in its wake, German unification did not give rise to national euphoria, as had been feared, but led instead to a depression that exposed the limits of political effectiveness. The virulent asylum debate in 1989 in West Germany and the related rise in right-wing extremism were placed on the back burner during the process of unification, and the ultraright parties achieved disappointing 1990 election returns, above all in the former GDR. The situation changed in 1991, however, when the political parties continued their perennial conflict by placing the issue of the asylum article 16 of the Federal Basic Law (the West German constitution) back on the agenda. The legal right to asylum (by far the most generous in the Western hemisphere) and right-wing extremism were issues of greatest concern to the population in October 1992: 50% of the respondents to an IfD Survey mentioned the asylum issue and 44% the issue of right-wing extremism (IfD 1992a). At the same time the political disputes gave voters—a majority of whom were also in favor of restrictive legislation⁸—the impression that politicians were incapable of resolving the issue. Almost two-thirds of the population in 1991–92 felt that "politicians were not seriously attempting to solve the problem" (IfD 1992a). This debate gave violent extremists the impression that expressing hate and contempt through action had some legitimization and support among the public. The combination of perceived pressure of an unprecedented immigration situation, the seemingly incapability of traditional political parties to resolve the issue at hand, and an assumed xenophobic public consensus certainly contributed to the poisoned atmosphere in Germany in the summer and fall of 1992.⁹ Political incompetence—not a general political shift to the Right—was primarily responsible for the rise of hostility toward asylum seekers, Turks, and other immigrants (Leenen 1992).

Surveys yielded mixed findings with respect to the distribution of xenophobic attitudes (table 2.6). Surprisingly, some opinion polls on the attitudes of West Ger-

TABLE 2.6. Disapproving Attitudes toward "Guest Workers" in West Germany, 1980-1990

	Should Try to Adapt Better	Should Be Sent Back	Should Be Prohibited from Political Activity	Should Abide Endogamy
1980	66%			
1984	61	52%	51%	44%
1988	57	42	47	34
1990	51	36	38	33
		31	36	34

Source: ALLBUS Survey 1980, 1984, 1988, 1990.

Note: The following questions were asked:

"Guest workers should try to adapt their lifestyle a little better to that of the Germans."

"If jobs get short, the guest workers should be sent back to their native countries."

"Guest workers should be prohibited from any political activity at all in Germany."

"Guest workers should marry people from their own countries."

mans toward foreigners suggest that antipathy receded between 1980 and 1990 (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage [ALLBUS] 1980-90, IPOS [Institut für praxisorientierte Sozialforschung] 1987-91).

From 1990 on, the debate about asylum and immigration came to a halt and deepened public discontent and polarization (Kurthen 1995). On the one hand the proportion of western Germans willing to halt the immigration of asylum seekers altogether declined from 30% in 1990 to 23% in 1992, but fewer respondents supported unrestricted entry (1990, 19%; 1992, 13%). A considerable majority (65%) preferred a policy that limited entry of so-called economic refugees, as was discussed in the public arena at that time. Eastern Germans were less supportive of such a limitation than their western counterparts. About 5% fewer eastern Germans supported a complete halt of asylum seekers who wished to enter the country.¹⁰ This figure represents the only deviation from opinions of western Germans; eastern Germans advocated stronger and broader restrictions on other groups of immigrants from the European Community (EC) and from non-EC countries.¹¹ Foreign nationals in the new federal states in the East were seen as unwanted competitors in a situation of economic turmoil.¹²

Other surveys, such as the Eurobarometer survey, differ somewhat from the findings mentioned earlier. For both, eastern and western Germany, the Eurobarometer data show an increase in the number of those in favor of reducing the rights of non-EC foreigners in Germany from 1990 to 1992. In the West, the number increased from 21% in 1990 to 44% in 1992; in the east, the increase was smaller: from 22% to 37%. This suggests a drastic increase in xenophobia in both parts of Germany.

Using the Eurobarometer data from 1988 and 1992, Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller (1993) ascertain a strong increase in negative evaluations of non-EC foreigners for all West European countries. They also refer to a significant correlation among rejection of foreigners, group size, and cultural distance, as well as a correlation between the sending and the host countries. Their findings support the assumption that xenophobia is likely to exist in Germany and Western Europe for some time,

nurtured by the presence of large immigrant minorities, social competition, and lingering racist and nationalist attitudes.

But some contradictions of these survey findings remain and are difficult to explain (Hill 1993: 45). On methodological grounds, Hill favors the findings from ALLBUS and IPOS surveys that do not suggest a dramatic change in attitudes toward foreigners. This interpretation is supported by two Emnid-Institut surveys (Emnid-Institut 1989, 1992). The 1992 survey (using the same like-dislike scales as in March 1989) was conducted at the end of 1991—at the height of the so-called asylum debate—and surprisingly shows a significant decrease in antipathy toward asylum seekers and Turks.¹³ Since it seems unlikely that attitudes would shift so drastically for the better, we assume that one has to take into account a context bias. Further investigation is needed to test the hypothesis that respondents used opinion polls to air their current anger or hope. The more positive findings of the Emnid surveys may indicate a desire for a political solution or opposition and distancing from the vigilante justice of the violent fringe rather than a significant change in negative attitudes or stereotypes toward foreigners in general. Or did the violence, indeed, galvanize the public and create a stable attitude shift toward more awareness and tolerance?

Another field of contention is the role of authoritarianism. Recent studies did not find any differences between young people from East and West Berlin (aged 16-21) with respect to the extent of right-wing and authoritarian attitudes. They did, however, find differences in attitudes toward foreign nationals. In a study of Berlin youth in 1991, those from the eastern part of the city revealed slightly more negative attitudes than those from the western sector (31% compared to 24% of young people from West Berlin agreed with the statement, "Foreigners should leave Germany as quickly as possible" (Oesterreich 1993). This manifestation of right-wing extremism and xenophobia among eastern German youth could be seen as a reaction to radical political changes and not as an expression of a "deformed GDR personality."¹⁴

This hypothesis was corroborated in 1993 when the 1991 Oesterreich study (1993) was repeated. The increasing effects of the unification crisis led to an 11% rise in xenophobia among young people in East Berlin, as compared to 1991. There was a slight decrease during this same period among young people in West Berlin (Oesterreich 1994). As in findings on antisemitism, East German youth were found to be especially xenophobic, so that the age distribution in East and West varied significantly. Another survey found that in East Berlin, the cohorts under 34 years of age were more ethnocentric than those aged 35-64, whereas in West Berlin the age groups under 50 were the least ethnocentric (Stöss 1993a). In other words, right-wing attitudes tend to increase with age in West Germany, whereas in East Germany young people (in addition to those over 65) can be called xenophobic.¹⁵

These studies suggest that the succession of political generations in the former GDR is different from the western part of Germany. The oldest generation (over 65) in both parts of Germany was raised during the Nazi period and most frequently displays right-wing and xenophobic attitudes. The antifascist socialization in the GDR seems to have had its greatest impact on the middle generation.

(ages 35–64), who, in the period of reconstruction, more strongly identified with the “antifascist state” than the younger cohorts, who showed a more tenuous commitment to their state, as evidenced by the development of a right-wing youth culture in the 1980s. In West Germany, on the other hand, the most definitive difference in terms of attitudes is between those below age 50 and those over 50.

Aside from age, education has an influence on xenophobic attitudes. The less educated tend to be more ethnocentric. Political identification is another important factor. People who identify with the political Right are more often ethnocentric than those on the Left. This holds true for the old and the new federal states alike. For the new states only, the place of residence has a significant influence on ethnocentrism: respondents living in smaller and more rural communities are more often in favor of putting a stop to immigration. Unemployment only moderately influences the degree of xenophobia in the new states, whereas in western Germany, unemployment does not appear to have any impact at all on xenophobia, calling into question narrow socioeconomic theories that explain xenophobia simply with labor market deprivation and competition.

Violence against Jews and Foreigners

Of course, the relative stability in attitudes seems to contradict the violence that has been directed at foreigners and Jews in Germany in the last five years. An attitudinal analysis can only partly explain this phenomenon. Drawing conclusions about behavior on the basis of the existence of a particular attitude is only possible to a limited extent. Xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes are far more widespread than an inclination toward violence, which in turn is more widespread than actual violent attacks.

The discrepancy between attitudes and behavior becomes especially visible when the age distribution of right-wing extremist attitudes is analyzed relative to participation in xenophobic or antisemitic activities. Whereas ultraright-wing and anti-Jewish attitudes are most prevalent among older Germans of both genders, virtually all those responsible for violent crimes are young men. According to an analysis of 758 convictions of participants in right-wing extremist acts of violence since 1991, 78% of the offenders were between 14 and 20 years old, only 3% were over 30, and only 1% were female. Of these offenders, 9% were either members of an ultraright-wing party or organization or had contact with one, and 30% belonged to the skinhead scene (Bundesministerium des Innern 1995, Willems et al. 1993). In an evaluation of the education and career level of offenders, most were found to have had little education, that is, 78% attended *Hauptschule* (equivalent to junior high school); 10% attended *Realschule* (basic high school), and half of them were still in school or job training; approximately 29% had not completed any vocational training whatsoever or had quit such a program at least once. In other words, this is a problem concerning less-educated young men, basically a peripheral group in danger of marginalization.

Studies on participation in different types of political protest revealed a definitive increase of inclination toward and tolerance of violence in the early 1990s in

Germany. Tolerance of violence among adolescents in the new eastern states is higher and more often accompanied by a right-wing political orientation than it is in western Germany (see Hoffmann-Lange 1995a: 73). This stronger ideological foundation in the former GDR is less a result of insecurity in coping with new postunification demands than it is the result of an attitudinal pattern that combines nationalism, xenophobia, and a pseudo-Darwinist ideology of violence and struggle with anomie and a delegitimation of the state monopoly of power. In contrast, in western Germany the propensity toward violence in 1992 was still more strongly associated with left-wing supporters (70% on the Left vs. 52% on the Right had thought about violent means in achieving their political aims). But in eastern Germany, the inclination to participate in illegal activity was greater among right-wing (84%) than among left-wing respondents (71%) (Hoffmann-Lange 1995a; see also Willems et al. 1993). In the early 1990s, within the context of immigration and xenophobia, a new violent potential developed that was directed against weaker social groups, above all immigrants. Thus there was not only a rise in tolerance toward using violence in achieving political aims but also a new, right-wing violent fringe was formed, made up in part of young people who combined violent youth crime with a right-wing political orientation. Neo-Nazi organizations attempted to recruit members from this potentially violent youth scene, especially in eastern Germany, and to integrate these cliques of adolescents into right-wing networks (Bergmann and Erb 1994c, Bergmann 1994c).

The fact that sensational actions directed against homes of asylum seekers (Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Quedlinburg) were even possible in 1991–92 in the new federal states (sometimes lasting for days) and that most xenophobic activity took place in the states of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg–West Pomerania (also in the East), can be attributed to the favorable opportunity structure. Owing to the extensive breakdown of police authority, especially in rural areas, and the reorganization of the judicial system, conditions served to encourage violent, right-wing criminals because the risk of getting apprehended and convicted was relatively low. In addition, setting up accommodations for asylum seekers in overwhelmed eastern German communities led to local conflicts that seemed to legitimize the violent actions of young people against these homes. However, this opportunity structure had changed by late 1992. Since then the overwhelming majority of Germans and the public have expressed clear opposition to violence against foreigners or their homes.¹⁶ Bans on organizations, coordinated investigations, searches and seizures, countless criminal proceedings, and high sentences for xenophobic crimes have had a perceptible impact on the right-wing scene. The number of serious acts of violence and other forms of extremist right-wing violations of law thus decreased in 1993–94.¹⁷

The number of illegal actions motivated by right-wing sentiments fluctuated in the years 1980 to 1990—between 1,300 and 1,900—most of them so-called propaganda offenses (i.e., the use of swastikas, and the Nazi salute, dissemination of neo-Nazi literature, etc.). No increase after this period could be observed, except that violent crimes increased slightly starting in 1989 (1988, 193; 1989, 253; 1990, 309) before “mushrooming” in 1991 (1,492), peaking in 1992 (2,639), and declining ever since (1993, 2,232; 1994, 1,480; 1995, 837), though they remained well

above the level in the 1980s. About one-third of these crimes were committed in eastern Germany and two-thirds in western Germany; that is, relative to population, an above-average number of crimes took place in the GDR.

In 1991, among violent thugs, foreigners were considered public enemy number one; more recently, there has been a shift to more diffuse targets of attack. From 1993 to 1994, the number of violent crimes motivated by xenophobia declined by 50% (1,609 to 860); right-wing extremist acts that victimized other groups (disabled, homosexuals, homeless) rose from 394 to 493; and violent antisemitic incidents fell from 1993 (72) to 1994 (41) and again to 1995 (27). Typical offenses in 1991-93, such as killings, arson, and disturbing the peace, went down considerably in 1994; the decline in property damage and assault cases, however, was not as great. When analyzing violations of the law other than violent crimes, above all in the area of public incitement to racial hatred and propaganda offenses, one can see that these infractions have decreased to a lesser extent than violent crimes. This can be traced to the fact that because of increased police and judicial activity, offenders have taken to lesser crimes, refraining from the more serious ones. These developments indicate that collective acts of violence, (e.g., the attacks on homes for asylum seekers) that were common in the 1991-92 wave of violence, have become rarer and have given way to a more diffuse form of everyday violence in small groups.

Anti-Jewish incidents have increased sharply since the second half of 1992 (1991, 367; 1992, 627; 1993, 656; 1994, 1,366; 1995, 1,155). This increase in the number of general antisemitic offenses can be partly attributed to the greater awareness of the public, who are now reporting offenses of this nature more often, and to the improved categorizing of these incidents by the police authorities.¹⁸

Thus one could say that antisemitism clearly follows on the heels of xenophobic attitudes; on the contrary, Jews and Jewish institutions, as well as other groups, are becoming targets in the course of a wave of violence that is primarily xenophobic in nature. The time lag in the rise of antisemitic hate propaganda and public incitement offenses indicates different sources and groups of perpetrators. Antiforeigner violence was started and carried out mostly by youngsters. But those responsible for anonymous and slanderous pamphlets, letters, phone calls, and so on are more likely to be extremist, antisemitic fanatics, some even older people who have been activated by the wave of violence and hatred.

A minority of youths have combined xenophobia and antisemitism into a complex of hatred of everything appearing "foreign." The mobilization of right-wing extremism, which can also be observed in other European countries, has thus led to a wavelike increase in manifestations of antisemitism since 1991.

Most of the incidents included in the figures mentioned herein are propaganda offenses (graffiti and poster hanging), followed by slander, libel, and threats of violence. Physical attacks on Jews have been rare. In the seven cases of bodily injury reported in 1993, most of the victims were non-Jewish Germans who were either mistaken for Jews or were attacked after expressing positive attitudes toward Jews. Incidents of arson or firebombing, as well as other forms of damage to property, have been almost exclusively directed toward monuments, memorials,

or Jewish cemeteries. They are therefore intended as an iconoclastic redefinition of these artworks or institutions more than attacks against existing Jewish communities. This is in contrast to the attacks on homes for asylum seekers, which are obviously directed against the residents living there.¹⁹ However, Jewish communities have been subjected to telephone threats and defamatory letters. These appear to be exceptional incidents, according to a nonrepresentative study conducted by Alphons Silbermann and Herbert A. Sallen in 1990. A large percentage of Jews questioned, considered many Germans to be antisemitic, but hardly any of them had personally experienced discrimination at work or in their communities (Silbermann and Sallen 1992, 47).

In assessing the development of violence, it is important to take into account the escalation process and the fact that such incidents often occur in waves. The monthly statistics on desecration of Jewish buildings and cemeteries for the period from January 1992 to February 1993 clearly reflect that anti-Jewish actions followed phases of xenophobic mobilization; for example, the highest figures for violence occurred from October to December 1992 after the anti-foreigner violence in Rostock. Such short-term swings do not provide conclusive information as far as longer-term, stable levels of antisemitic violence are concerned. It is more significant that there has been an annual average of slightly over 30 desecrations in the Federal Republic since 1986, compared to only 15 to 20 in the preceding years. The escalation to 40 incidents in 1990-91, 62 in 1992, 68 in 1993, 68 in 1994, and 40 in 1995 started from an already existing level. (The number of criminal acts in 1985 was as high as it would again become in 1991.) Half of the cemetery desecrations each year have had a right-wing extremist background. Most of the remaining desecrations are probably acts of right-wing sympathizers or imitations by apolitical lunatics. Similar waves of antisemitism have often emerged in the FRG and other countries (see Epstein 1993), without reversing or even interrupting the long-term trend toward a decline in antisemitism.

Such waves of violence have almost always been triggered by isolated antisemitic attacks and are seldom the result of more general political events. By publicly opposing such actions, politics and the media have served to inhibit these waves. A different situation prevails with regard to xenophobia. Here, clear relationships can be observed with economic conditions (or at least the subjective perception of them), the number of immigrants, and above all discourse in politics and the media. In contrast to antisemitism, the issue of "foreigners" is a less tabooed subject in political and social debate, for it allows the public expression of negative opinions about "the foreigners." Such statements by media or politicians would never be tolerated if made about Jews; in that case, anyone making such statements would suffer a withdrawal of public respect.

NOTES

Translated from German by Allison Brown.

1. The following are the responses of Germans who were asked questions about contact with different groups:

"Do not want too much to do with Turks" (34%, N = 721)

with asylum seekers	66%
with Arabs	64%
with Blacks	50%
with Jews	25%

"Do not want too much to do with asylum seekers" (33%, N = 700)

with Arabs	67%
with Blacks	50%
with Turks	32%
with Jews	25%

"Do not want too much to do with Jews" (13%, N = 273)

with Turks	88%
with Arabs	84%
with Blacks	80%
with asylum seekers	80%

"Do not want too much to do with Blacks" (21%, N = 443)

with Turks	85%
with Arabs	76%
with asylum seekers	75%
with Jews	38%

Bergmann and Erb 1991a, data from Institut für Demoskopie 1987.

2. Cluster analysis of a 19-item scale with two points per item in the 1986 Institut für Demoskopie (IfD) poll (N = 2,254) revealed the following respondent distribution of the extent of anti-Jewish sentiment:

29-33 points	Strong positive attitudes	42.1%
27 points	Somewhat positive attitudes	13.1%
21-22 points	Somewhat negative attitudes	29.5%
11 points	Strong antisemitic attitudes	15.3%

The 1987 IfD follow-up study (N = 2,102) resulted in similar respondent patterns, although respondents who agreed with at least half of the 19 antisemitic statements were defined as strongly antisemitic.

The 1989 Emnid-Institut survey (N = 2,272) with seven anti-Jewish questions and a 27-point scale obtained results comparable to those of the IfD survey about the distribution of attitudes toward Jews:

0-5 points	Not antisemitic	46%
6-13 points	Somewhat antisemitic	40%
14-19 points	Strongly antisemitic	10%
20-27 points	Extremely antisemitic	4%

3. Respondents with 6 or more critical or anti-Jewish answers out of a total of 16 questions were labeled antisemitic (Emnid-Institut 1992).

4. A survey of eastern and western college students in the summer of 1992 showed that both groups rated Jews with the same level of antipathy (East, 5.5%; West, 5.2%). However, their opinions toward Israelis differed greatly: 18.5% of western German students did not like Israelis, whereas 30.1% of eastern students did not (see Brusten 1995).

5. The fact that eastern Germans more often than western Germans hold anti-Jewish

persons guilty of the persecution of Jews who were active participants in the Holocaust and who personally knew what happened provides evidence of this assumption. Eastern Germans also interpret the degree of awareness about the Holocaust in a stricter fashion. A portion of western Germans, on the other hand, tends to blame the Holocaust on the entire population of Germany at the time (during the Third Reich), or Germans in general (*Spiegel* 1992).

6. A survey in December 1991 of ninth- to twelfth-grade high school students in Jena also found that young people, more often than the total population, expressed the opinion that they "would not like to have too much to do with Jews" (13% vs. 8% among the total population) and that they "would not like to have too much to do with Israelis" (26% vs. 16% among the total population) (see Wittenberg, Prosch, and Abraham 1995).

7. Starting in the 1960s, the GDR employed a relatively small number of foreign workers (1989, 95,000) on the basis of bilateral government agreements. Legally, their social status was equal to that of GDR citizens, but outside the workplace they had almost no contact with Germans. Despite the propagation of international friendship, GDR policy toward foreign workers was highly restrictive; there was no right to asylum and the GDR had not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. At the same time, however, all xenophobic or antisemitic activities were suppressed and severely punished.

8. As early as 1990, a majority in both western and eastern Germany supported restrictive legislation with respect to asylum (60% in the West and 53% in the East). The respective figures for 1991 were 69% (West) and 64% (East). By the end of 1992, figures for the West and East were almost equal: 72% (West) and 70% (East) (see IfD 1992a).

9. Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke of a "national state of emergency," expressing a feeling that was widespread at the time, though his remarks also served to intensify the situation even further.

10. The different age distribution in eastern and western Germany is conspicuous. The General Population Survey (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage [Allbus]) of June 1992 found that rejection of asylum seekers in the West was most pronounced among the older generations; in the East, on the other hand, it was greatest among the younger generations.

11. Paul B. Hill assumes that this disparity is due to the political experiences of East German citizens. They had lived in a totalitarian regime, and their only opportunity to leave their country was as refugees—a situation similar to that of the asylum seekers (Hill 1993: 42).

12. In 1992, in the new eastern states, 24% were opposed to any further immigration of foreigners from EC countries (in the western states, 9%). Thirty-six% in the East were against non-EC guest workers (in the western states, 28%). In 1991, opposition to immigration was slightly greater (see Hill 1993: 40 ff).

13. Expression of "dislike" for particular immigrant groups, as reported in the Emnid-Institut surveys of 1989 and 1991:

	1989	1991	Difference
Turks	30%	19%	11%
Asylum Seekers from Eastern Europe	40%	31%	9%
Asylum Seekers from Africa	49%	38%	11%
Ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe	27%	21%	6%
N	2,272	1,875	

14. Based on interviews in May 1990 with eastern German youth aged 15-18, Lederer and others (1991) also came to the conclusion that eastern respondents were slightly more authoritarian than their western German counterparts but that the differences were surpris-

ingly small when one takes into account the extremely different educational and ideological systems to which the respondents were exposed. The only major difference was found in levels of xenophobia and ethnocentrism. Many more eastern German young people supported ethnocentrist statements such as, "Germans as a whole are better than Turks, Poles, Israelis, or Congolese." Sixty-five percent of East German respondents agreed that "Germans are better than . . . Turks" (West, 22%); "better than . . . Poles" (East, 67%; West, 19%); "better than . . . Israelis" (East, 65%; West, 14%); "better than . . . Congolese" (East, 55%; West, 17%); "better than . . . French" (East, 8%; West, 9%). (See Lederer et al. 1991: 591, 593).

15. Frequencies in the different age groups are as follows: age below 25 (East, 12%; West, 8%); age 25-34 (East, 16%; West, 2%); age 35-49 (East, 9%; West, 6%); age 50-64 (East, 8%; West, 11%); above age 65 (East, 16%; West, 20%). (See Stöss 1993a: table 15.)

16. Today 90% of the public supports prosecution of antisemitic offenses and only 6% are opposed. Opposition to violence against foreigners is significantly lower: in December 1991, 27% of western Germans and 13% of eastern Germans expressed understanding for right-wing extremist actions; these figures dropped to 16% in eastern and western Germany in the aftermath of the pogrom in Rostock (*Spiegel* 1992, *IfD* 1992a). A large majority of German respondents (80%) also supported the banning of antisemitic groups in 1990; only 12% were opposed to such a ban. The opposition was even lower among 18- to 29-year-olds (7%). (See Jodice 1991: table 6b.)

17. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) distinguishes among violations of law with proven or suspected extremist right-wing background between violent acts (manslaughter, bomb and arson attack, breach of the public peace, bodily harm, considerable damage to property) and other offenses (threatening/coercion, hate propaganda, public incitement, slander, etc.). In addition, extremist violations of law are divided into xenophobic, antisemitic, and political violations, among others. With the exception of antisemitic hate propaganda and public incitement, the number of offenses has continuously decreased from its peak in 1993. Violent acts have already started to decrease since 1993 after their apex in 1992, whereas lesser offenses have declined since 1994 (Bundesministerium des Innern 1993, 1994).

18. According to the Verfassungsschutz, the strong increase in the category of "other offenses" can be explained by "the disproportional 130 percent increase of hate propaganda and public incitement to racial hatred." In contrast to 1993, in 1994 many hate pamphlets have been mailed out several times. For example, 35 pamphlets under the pseudonym "Hutgenberg" and 15 under "Hermann-Wahfried Eichmann" were discovered. Some of them were addressed to police headquarters and the public prosecutor's office. The statistic contains about 190 cases where preliminary proceedings were instituted based on multiple charges of the same offense. Also, slander and property damage without considerable violence were on the rise (9.5 times increase) (Bundesministerium des Innern 1995: 88).

19. In case of the Lübeck synagogue arson attack in March 25, 1994, the young attackers believed the synagogue was not occupied. Nevertheless, they accepted the possibility that the life of Jewish residents might also be threatened.

Antisemitism and Xenophobia in United Germany

How the Burden of the Past Affects the Present

When in the early 1990s ugly pictures of xenophobic violence, swastika graffiti, and vandalism replaced the joyful and peaceful pictures of German unification, some observers speculated that the horrific past of Germany would surface again (Sana 1990, Mead 1990). The fear that again an army of industrious and obedient *Volksgeossen* (members of the German national collective) would mobilize and overrun Europe was not stifled by reports of millions of marchers who protested the violence by candlelight. Continued antisemitic and xenophobic resentment in a nation that was responsible for the Holocaust has been viewed as an indication that postwar Germany's policy of dealing with the past has failed.¹ Events such as the so-called historians' debate about the uniqueness of the Holocaust in the mid-1980s were seen as an attempt to whitewash German responsibility for the Holocaust. Some were equally worried by the "tendency to pass over the terror and misery of the Third Reich and to focus instead on the normality and continuity of everyday life before, during, and after the Hitler years" (Kushner 1991: 23). Similarly, it was feared that once the iron curtain was removed a formidable antisemitism would reappear in the former socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) nurtured by decades of anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli propaganda. Such fears and reservations led observers to ask whether postwar Germans in the East and West had drawn sufficient lessons from the failures of their past. It raised other questions such as: What do postwar Germans in the East and West know about the Holocaust and Nazism? What impact had socialist anti-Zionism on East German attitudes toward Jews and Israel? Was suppression of Holocaust remembrance a central cleavage for the political culture and self-perception of postwar Germany (see Bergmann and Erb 1991a)? Was antisemitism only disguised under a thin layer of philosemitic official statements (see Safran 1986: 278, Weil 1990:

against immigrants (Eric Hobsbawm, cited in Fein 1987: 365)? Before I shed some light on these questions by comparing poll data from German and international surveys, I shall first describe the context in which one should consider anti-semitism and anti-Israel resentment, xenophobia, and Holocaust knowledge—that is, Germany's relationship with its Nazi past.

Remembrance in Germany: The Context

The question of how to deal appropriately with the past has plagued the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) since its foundation 50 years ago. Politicians, academics, teachers, journalists, and ordinary citizens have developed different arguments and strategies for remembrance and coming to terms with the past. The political culture, intellectual debate, and public discourse in Germany have never been able to escape the memories of the past because—in comparison with other countries—Germany's recent history invites many uneasy questions. In fact, such events as commemorations, war crime trials, political scandals, incidents of anti-foreigner violence, and debates in postwar and post-Wall Germany indicate the sensitive nature of issues pertaining to how Germany should deal with its past. Since the foundation of the FRG, Germans have walked a fine line between suppression and remembrance, between the desire to distance themselves from deeds of the past and acceptance of collective guilt, shame, and responsibility. For some the awkward past has been a reason for defiant ignorance, revisionism, and amnesia. For others it is a source of constant embarrassment and moral conflict, leading to a serious examination of conscience.

The retention of memories of the Holocaust and World War II has been termed coming to terms with the past (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) or better, confrontation of the past (*Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung*).² This term describes different pedagogic, political, and cultural strategies that have been employed to describe, explain, interpret, reshape, and give meaning to events that led to Nazism, the Holocaust, and their aftermath in Germany and Austria. One can distinguish between a more legalistic way of coping with the past in Austria, a political approach in the former GDR, and a moral-political-pedagogic strategy in West Germany. Rainer Lepsius has developed a handy formula to characterize major differences in these three countries. Austria, he claimed, externalized the past as a German problem; Communist East Germany universalized Nazi fascism as part of a global class struggle; and West Germany normatively internalized, (i.e., officially accepted) moral and material liability for Nazi crimes (Lepsius 1989: 250 ff.; see for empirical substantiation, Bergmann, Erb and Lichtblau 1995).

The historical rupture of unification, the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent removal of communication taboos have invited attempts to historicize West Germany's dealings with the past. Roughly three phases have been distinguished: (1) a phase of suppression during the first years after World War II (1945–58), (2) a period of transition and growing awareness (1959–78), and (3) a period of prominent consideration of the past with attempts to normalize and put the past into perspective (1970 to the present). Werner Bergmann in his analysis of the framing

of the past subdivides these phases further, distinguishing diachronic and synchronic events (Bergmann 1994a; see appendix, table 3.1). Others like Jeffrey K. Olick—using the concept of collective memory (Halbwachs 1992)—divide the postwar formation of West German society into periods according to how the West Germans dealt culturally, psychologically, and politically with the past (Olick 1994).

In contrast, a history of East Germany's ways of coping with the past has yet to be written. East Germans paid huge reparations to the Soviet Union until the end of the 1950s. However, East Germans did not make large reparations for the sufferings of Jews, and it was not until the 1980s that a debate started in some circles about Jewish life before and after World War II. Synagogues were repaired, books and movies were made public, and cautious political steps were undertaken toward a rapprochement with world Jewry and Israel. But the East German response to the Jewish Holocaust never had West German dimensions. Nevertheless, postunification surveys found common ground among East and West Germans in their assessment of the tragedy of the Holocaust, the rejection of National Socialism, dictatorship, militarism, and war, though for current West Germans coming to terms with the past has had a stronger impact on their postwar identity and political culture (see Lutz 1993: 158 ff.).

Academic literature in Germany normally identifies four methods of coping with the past: (1) legal proceedings against former Nazis, (2) financial restitution to victims of the Holocaust and World War II, (3) postwar political and constitutional conclusions and actions, and (4) the moral, psychological, pedagogical, and historical ways to deal with the legacy of the Holocaust and its impact on the national and cultural West German identity. Whereas the first three dimensions are less controversial, the fourth dimension is more disputed and contested, as suggested by academic and popular literature on the subject (Dudek 1992).

The question of success or failure of remembrance is of importance because it is perceived as a cornerstone of West Germany's reintegration into the West after the war. If confrontation of the past had little or no effect on German attitudes and political culture, a repetition of past mistakes seems more likely. From that perspective, unification and any strengthening of Germany economically, politically, or militarily could bear the potential of future disaster.

Two schools of thought about Germany's coping with the past can be distinguished depending on (1) standards of judgment used for making historical comparisons; (2) defining moral principles of responsibility, guilt, and punishment; and (3) assessing the virulence of antisemitism, the interpretation of antisemitic incidents, and the reaction of the political establishment. Optimists claim remembrance was a success because its intentions have been largely fulfilled (Meier 1990, Groll 1990, Jesse 1991, Wolffsohn 1993, R. M. Müller 1994). Pessimists criticize the foundation of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in West Germany and its intentions and practice, pointing, for example, to present levels of antisemitism and xenophobia as proof of its failure (Henningson 1989, Zipes 1991, Giordano 1992, Buruma 1994). I shall outline some of the arguments on both sides of the academic and public debate.

Pessimists accuse the majority of Germans of having ignored the crimes of

Nazism and of failing to seriously acknowledge their guilt and responsibility. The terms *second guilt* (Giordano 1987) and *third guilt* (Hennig 1988: 26 ff.) have been coined to characterize silencing, relativization, minimization, and historical revisionism supposedly transferred from the war to postwar generations. Hans Magnus Enzensberger charged those Germans who claimed they could not feel remorse for crimes they did not commit personally of a lie of life (*Lebenslüge*). Such judgments rest on the assumption of collective responsibility or guilt, a failure to choose resistance during the war, and on the existence of collective methods to confess crimes and deal with the burden of the past. In fact, the nature and size of Nazi crimes makes it difficult to distinguish individual crimes from the collective political, cultural, and social context in which they were committed. It poses questions that have not yet been sufficiently resolved. Where did guilt start and where does it end? Was a bystander, a voter, or a member of the NSDAP (National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei) as guilty as a camp guard or person directly involved in killings? How many Germans had knowledge of and willingly supported the Holocaust? How much were the Nazis able to hide their genocidal policy? Have those Germans who paid for their belonging to the National Socialist collective with life, health, property, loss of homeland, and family members been punished sufficiently? How should the postwar generations who can experience the past only in the abstract, intellectually and historically (Martin Broszat, in Baldwin 1990: 105), deal with the legacies of the past? How far-reaching is their moral, material, and political responsibility toward the victims and their descendants (Trautmann 1991: 9, citing Meier 1990)?

Other pessimists acknowledge that Germans have developed a sense of shame and guilt but are incapable of truly mourning. Their continuing struggle with contradictory feelings of secret guilt and resentment makes acceptance of the past and healing impossible (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975). Applying the Freudian concept of individually displaced aggression, anger, and guilt to group consciousness, this view maintains that the psychic dispositions of many Germans have not changed because the past has been collectively suppressed and silenced. If prejudice and ideological debris of the past is still embedded in personalities, emotions, and attitudes of contemporaries, is it not likely that history will repeat itself, they ask. Why do antisemitic attitudes exist in a country with only a tiny minority of Jews, even now, 50 years after the Holocaust?³ Is the attempt to reevaluate Hitler's dictatorship by putting it into a comparative historical context, that is, the historians' debate (*Historikerstreit*) an example of hidden revisionist trends in West German society (Eckhard Jesse, in Gaulty 1988: 37)? To what extent does the official—often declamatory and ritualized—atonement of German leaders represent the feelings and attitudes of the population? How deeply has the past been engraved in the Germans' collective memory?

Researchers like Bergmann and Erb have tried to give some answers to these questions and coined the term *communication latency* (Bergmann and Erb 1986; 1991a: 276). It describes an environment where antisemitism is a public taboo and socially undesirable but nevertheless coexists in private communications. Other approaches go further and refer to the notion of *dormancy* (Chanes 1994: 36) or claim a hidden refinement of antisemitism disguised as philosemitism.⁴ Such

assumptions, however, raise new questions. Can large groups of people hide their true opinions from the public? Under what circumstances is such hidden resentment transformed into open prejudice and active participation in violent acts? How does one distinguish honest positive feelings toward Jews and Israel from excessive admiration and uncritical sentiments based on compulsory needs to reconcile feelings of shame, anger, and guilt? Because notions of dormancy, hidden hate, and philosemitism are hard to prove, some have recommended abandoning such terminology because it demonstrates a lack of knowledge or investigation (Smith 1991).

Optimists reject the harsh judgments and assumptions of pessimists about an alleged German failure to deal with the Nazi past. This school of thought does not share the postulate of resilient and strong antisemitism in Germany, the notion of collective guilt, or the speculations about hidden hate and anti-Jewish philosemitism. Authors such as Kielmannsegg (1989), Grosser (1990), J. Herz (1990: 23), Dudek (1992: 49), Kittel (1993), Merkl (1994), and R. M. Müller (1994) point out that criticism is often based on unrealistic expectations of how most people react to their own guilt feelings. Germans should not be judged by rules of conduct from which other peoples are exempted. They argue that in this century no other nation has instigated, with similar intensity over a time span of almost 50 years, the prosecution of crimes that have been committed by their own people on orders of their own government. Few countries with totalitarian periods in their history—it is argued—have ever been as persistent in their efforts to deal with their past, to compensate victims, to overcome and eradicate prejudice, and to establish a firm democratic order in such a short historical time.

Optimists argue further that comparatively low levels of anti-Jewish prejudice are proof that postwar reeducation, denazification, and restitution (*Wiedergutmachung*) have been successful. Germany, they argue, did not have a very strong liberal democratic political tradition before 1945, and the rabid antisemitic ideology of the Nazis ended less than two generations ago. For decades, East Germans were confronted with socialist anti-Zionist, pro-Arab, and anti-Israel propaganda. But the FRG officially accepted material and moral responsibility for the acts of the Nazi Reich. West Germany continuously undertook symbolic acts of collective penitence, publicly apologized to persecuted Jews, and actively supported the state of Israel financially and politically since its foundation. And Germany has refrained from any acts that could be seen as a repetition of the past, that is, power politics, (nuclear) military armament, and imperialist conquest for a "place in the sun."

Against the accusation of a lenient coping of the past in the 1950s and 1960s, optimists argue that only a "silent mastery of the past" (Rabinbach 1990: 45 ff.) or "latency" (Lübbe 1983: 334) avoided a cultural and social "civil war" in postwar Germany. It is argued that the integration of former supporters and bystanders (*Mitläufer*) of the regime combined with an official discrediting of Nazism and its ideology provided the groundwork for the creation of a stable democracy, itself a precondition to overcoming the evils of the past. According to optimists, the political conditions under which the FRG started to cope with Germany's past were much less ideal than they now appear. Many Germans had suffered heavy personal

losses, were preoccupied with survival and reconstruction, and were still dealing with the shock of defeat, destruction, expulsion, loss of national sovereignty, and military rule of Allied occupation forces until 1950. Then the Cold War took over and building a reliable bulwark against communism took precedence over thorough democratization, denazification, and settling accounts of the past. For the ordinary German the outcome of the war resulted in self-pity and the perception that they were more like victims than perpetrators. (Lüdtke 1993: 548 f, 561f).

Besides questioning the simplistic categorizing of the average German as a murderous Nazi perpetrator and willing executioner, optimists also criticize rigid standards of "correct" remembrance and the degree of personal and collective guilt and moral responsibility. Should survivors who lived through that time be held collectively guilty, even if some either "opposed the Nazi government, have been painfully denazified, or have seriously repented their loyalty to an infamous regime" (Merkel 1989: 12)? Optimists also ask if guilt can be inherited or morally transferred to later generations (see Pauley 1992: 331).⁵ What kind of remembrance and what institutions and norms of conduct may allow postwar-born Jews and Germans to overcome the past that stands between them?

The fact is that contemporary Jews and Germans and their respective intellectual and political establishments concentrate on different aspects of German-Jewish relations and have developed distinct narratives (Watson 1992). Although dialectically intertwined, they draw moral, historical, and political lessons from the Holocaust that are not identical in every aspect (Wolffsohn 1993). According to Charles S. Maier, the Holocaust and its remembrance is central for the legitimization of Israeli nationhood and the *Aliyah* (the return to Israel for religious Jews, see Maier 1988: 163 ff.).⁶ In contrast, Germans have a tendency to avoid identifying their national history only with the Holocaust guilt.⁷ According to human capability and collective interests of remembrance and mourning, both countries and peoples put, and use, the Holocaust in a different historical, political, and moral context.

Many Germans—deluged by a flood of books, newspaper stories, and TV programs on the Hitler era and the Holocaust—want to dispense with or distance themselves from that dark part of their history because it impedes the individual and collective self-image and pride of a people who believe they belong to Western civilization and culture. Some are tempted to offset Nazi crimes by comparing them with genocidal policies of other times and others nations (*Aufrechnung*); some criticize sterile ritualized remembrance and official politics of history (*Geschichtspolitik*; see Wolffsohn 1993) or the notion of collective responsibility, the continuation of reparation demands, and alleged widespread self-hatred (Mohler 1980, Zitelmann 1993b). Bergmann and Erb use the term *secondary resentment* to describe the mind-set of persons who—as a result of the burden of guilt—resent the continuation of remembrance, moral responsibility, and material reparation (Bergmann and Erb 1990: 121 f. and 1991a: 231 ff.). Several hypotheses have been brought forward to explain the dynamics of dealing with the past. Some observers see the emergence of a new, "modernized" antisemitism (Abella 1994: 54) replacing the stereotype of the "coward Jew" with the "unforgiving," "revengeful," and "oversensitive Jew" (Kushner 1991: 26 ff.). Jews are resented not despite but because of *Anechitz* (Kushner 1991: 26 ff.).

exploitation of Israel's unpopular policy toward the Palestinians, particularly in East Germany, where pro-Arab and anti-Israel propaganda became "a mask for antisemitism, or an extension or sublimated version of it" (Brown 1994: 8). Pessimists speculated that such resentment—linked with xenophobia—had become the foundation of a popular right-wing movement of organized political antisemitism in united Germany.

Based on recent international and German opinion polls, I shall—from a sociological point of view—try to shed more light on Germany's coping with its past. I shall concentrate on what some (Frank Stern 1994, Chanes 1994: 34 f.) have called an attitude syndrome toward foreigners and Jews (including the Holocaust, its remembrance, and Israel). I hypothesize that opinion polls comparing these issues over time are expressions of identity formation and reflect political cultures and attitudinal dispositions. They are more than just situational reflections of current events (Trautmann 1991: 14). I agree with Gavin Langmuir that survey analysis over time allows us to make inferences about prevailing cultural (conformist) norms in the expression of attitudes (Langmuir 1990: 323). They also give us hints about processes of collective learning and collective memory configurations.

In the following discussion, the strength and distribution of attitudes in Germany in comparison with other countries will be analyzed. What are the Germans' attitudes toward remembrance? Are large numbers of East and West Germans denying the past and the truth of the Holocaust? How much do they know about the Holocaust? Is antisemitism linked with other forms of resentment, such as xenophobia? And had anti-Zionist education in the former GDR a measurable effect?

The Data

International and German representative opinion polls conducted after 1989–90 were evaluated by descriptive methods common in social science research. Most of the polls analyzed were sponsored by the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Of the three German polls, two were arranged by the AJC: one was undertaken in October 1990 with 995 West and 826 East Germans (Jodice 1991) and one in January 1994 with 992 West Germans and 442 East Germans (Golub 1994).⁸ The third German poll was financed by the German weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* (1992) and undertaken between November 30 and December 17, 1991, with 1,875 West German and 947 East German respondents.⁹ In addition, published findings from other polls sponsored by the AJC after 1989–90 in Western and Eastern Europe, Russia, the United States, and Argentina were used for comparative purposes (see appendix: table 3.2).

Empirical Findings: East and West Germany in International Comparison

In a descriptive analysis, questions from three postunification German surveys were compared with findings from ten international polls undertaken after 1980.

High ratios indicated little anti-Jewish prejudice, little social distance from Jews, much Holocaust knowledge, and much concern about antisemitism.

To put the findings in a nutshell: the international comparison indicates that absolute or relative majorities of respondents in Western and Eastern Europe, Russia, the United States, and Argentina are more sympathetic than hostile toward Jews. They show social acceptance of Jews, display Holocaust knowledge, reject Holocaust denial, support remembrance, but do not perceive antisemitism as a serious problem now or in the future (see appendix, table 3.3).

Contrary to often-repeated rumors, attitudes toward Jews in the former Soviet Union and former socialist Eastern European countries do not indicate the existence of widespread and strong antisemitic resentment or a significant impact of pro-Arab, anti-Israel and anti-Zionist propaganda of the past.¹⁰ Support for the equation of "Zionism is racism" was only somewhat stronger in East European countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) than in East and West Germany (1990), and Austria (1991). Gudkov and Levinson found for the former Soviet Union, after its breakup called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Cohen and Golub found for Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSR), that anti-Zionist attitudes were concomitant with positive attitudes toward Israel (Gudkov and Levinson 1994, Cohen and Golub 1991: 1 f., 6). In other words, the impact of Cold War division, isolation, and socialist anti-Zionism seems to have left only a limited mark in Eastern Europe and Russia. Variations in attitudes toward Jews do not reflect significant geographic patterns that resemble a West-East tilt of antisemitism or anti-Jewish social distance. Rather, differences in outcomes have to be explained by specific national conditions and cohort effects, as earlier European and North American studies indicate (Bergmann and Erb 1991a, Smith 1991, 1994). But further research and more in-depth analysis is needed to confirm the trend of changes in social distance, emotional rejection, and discrimination against Jews in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.¹¹

For Western democracies, including Germany, the international comparison reveals that the Holocaust has been accepted as a central event in modern history that should not be forgotten. In Germany, the United States, France, and Britain more than half of all respondents believe the Holocaust is relevant today, "although it happened almost 50 years ago." Majorities also believe it is important "to know about and understand the Holocaust." The number of those responding "not important" was below 7% in all countries. The international survey comparison also contradicts the earlier-mentioned pessimistic notion of a strong suppression of the past, rampant ignorance, revisionism, and denial of facts in Germany. Attitudes in West and East Germany do not differ from general trends in Western Europe and the United States. Rather, the findings indicate a relative success of West German postwar reeducation and reform of its political culture. West Germans and particularly East Germans have a good knowledge of the Holocaust unmatched by British, American, or French respondents. The revisionist (but, in its double negative wording, confusing) question about the possibility "that the Holocaust never happened" has no mass support.¹² The German response ratios indicate comparatively little antisemitic prejudice or social distance toward Jews

but strong concern and awareness about antisemitism.¹³ The results suggest that pessimism and international concern about widespread and rising antisemitism in postunification Germany are not justified. Rather, such concerns seem to reflect prevailing memories and historical narratives of Germany's Nazi past (see similar results in Bergmann 1990a: 151; see also appendix, table 3.5).

In the case of East Germany, Western observers feared the impact of the indoctrination of the population with pro-Arab and anti-Israel propaganda; which depicted Zionism as a dangerous nationalist ideology that threatened stability in the Near East. Observers also expected the isolation of East Germans from the Western discourse about the past would be reflected in widespread and strong antidemocratic, racist, and antisemitic attitudes (see, for example, Andrei S. Markovits, cited in Merkl 1994: 292). Until 1989 the official state ideology of the socialist rulers proclaimed East Germany an inheritor of German antifascism which represented a clear break with the past of National Socialism (F. P. Lutz 1993: 160). The government provided the population with a consistent interpretation of the past, but prevented an unrestricted debate about Germany's guilt and responsibility. With Soviet support the socialist GDR also refused to pay reparations to Israel or world Jewry, and it failed to recognize Israel as a legitimate state.¹⁴

Surprisingly, postunification surveys discredit fears of strong anti-Jewish resentment in East Germany. On the contrary, on almost all items East Germans reveal less antisemitic resentment, less social distance, and a greater knowledge of the Holocaust than West Germans, Austrians, Americans, French, British, or East European respondents (see appendix, table 3.3, questions 1-5, 8-12, and table 3.5). Poll figures regarding the equation of Zionism with racism are similar for East and West Germany. In other words, stringent antifascist education seems to have had rather a suppressing effect on anti-Jewish resentment in East Germany (similarly P. P. Lutz 1991: 354).¹⁵

Although East and West Germans have in international comparison a relatively good ranking on most items, particularly West Germans deviate on two issues (see appendix, table 3.5). They resent Jewish influence in society more frequently and they display comparatively low levels of support for remembrance of the Nazi past, although they have good knowledge about the Holocaust and do not support revisionist claims. A correlation analysis reveals that opposition to remembrance and antisemitic (and xenophobic) attitudes increase with little knowledge and low education. But among a sizable group of German respondents, rejection of remembrance also accompanies good Holocaust knowledge. In a 1994 poll (Golub 1994), 27% of those with very good knowledge of the Holocaust in the East and 53% in the West also believed at the same time in the decreasing importance of the Holocaust for the present.

It remains unclear why Holocaust knowledge is unrelated to support for continuing strong remembrance and commemoration of Nazi crimes among a considerable group of Germans. Is this a sign of hidden anti-Jewish resentment as the pessimistic view suggests? Or has the taboo against antisemitism—popularized in the German media and in political education—and the official rhetoric in favor of remembrance pushed resentment into the niches of private communication (communicative latency), possibly giving rise to a new secondary resentment (Berg-

or economic antisemitism has neither an ideological basis nor institutional, official, or popular support in East or West Germany. And the existing levels of resentment are in no way comparable to the organized political antisemitism of the first part of the century or found during the regime of National Socialism.

Not only antisemitic attitudes but also antisemitic actions are unpopular. In an 1987 poll, 82% of all West German respondents favored punishment for any anti-Jewish activities, 89% favored punishment for the desecration of cemeteries, and 71% rejected anti-Jewish proclamations by politicians (Bergmann 1990b: 116). In the 1990 Jodice poll, four out of five respondents in the East and a relative majority in the West were in favor of continuing the prosecution of Nazi war criminals after unification. About 85% in the East and 70% in the West thought the German government should continue, "after the unification of the two German states, [to] teach about the Nazi period in history lessons in the schools." Almost four out of five respondents in the East and West agreed that the German government should continue to ban antisemitic groups. Majorities in the East (75%) and West (59%) also considered a Jewish candidate for president of united Germany acceptable (Golub 1994).

On the other hand only about 30% in the West and 40% in the East agreed with the statement, "Because of the events during the Third Reich, we have a special obligation toward Jews and also toward Israel. We cannot treat Israel like any other country on earth." But more than two out of five respondents in the West and one out of five in the East in 1990 and 1994 agreed somewhat or strongly with the statement, "Jews are exploiting the National Socialist Holocaust for their own purposes" (Jodice 1991, Golub 1994).¹⁷ In the 1991 poll undertaken by *Der Spiegel* (1992), 75% in the West and 57% in the East rejected Jewish and Israeli demands for reparation payments to compensate in the aftermath for the lack of reparation payments by the former socialist East Germany.¹⁸ And in the 1994 Golub survey, 56% in the West and 36% in the East agreed somewhat or strongly with the statement, "Today, in the aftermath of German unification, we should not talk so much about the Holocaust, but should rather draw a line under the past" (Golub 1994, table 20).¹⁹

Could the dynamics of suppression, anger, shame, guilt, responsibility, and reparation become the source of a new secondary antisemitism as the pessimists have suggested? How can it be explained that respondents who do not deny the Holocaust, who have good knowledge about the past, who are concerned about antisemitism, and who support the continuation of Nazi prosecution at the same time wish to "draw a line," and reject additional reparation payments to Jews and Israel by a united Germany—in lieu of the former East Germany's refusal to do so?

An explanation for this ambivalent attitude, particularly in West Germany, points at the increasing historical distance between the events of the Nazi era and the present. Postwar generations, now representing more than four out of five Germans, have no personal experience and only a second hand knowledge of the past. To be held collectively responsible for the sins of prior generations seems to most an abstract and purely moral concept (Jarausch 1988: 286). Some may fear that keeping alive negative war memories artificially reopens old wounds and even hatreds that besmirch "their" postwar democratic and economic miracle and efforts

mann and Erb 1991a)? To answer these and related questions, German poll data have been subjected to bivariate, factor, and regression analyses, using attitude scales and response typologies. Although such an empirical approach is not free from limitations and cannot, for example, answer questions about the transformation of attitudes into behavior or the impact of single historical events on mass attitudes, the analysis sheds some verifiable light on the relationship between antisemitism, xenophobia, and remembrance.¹⁶

Antisemitism and Remembrance in Germany

When discussing the issue of antisemitism and xenophobia, it is necessary to keep in mind the broader cultural and social framework, as well as historical developments. Hatred and hostility against Jews has been a constant of Western civilization for more than 2,000 years. This animosity does not mean that attitudes and behavior have not changed over time. In fact, "modern" anti-Jewish stereotypes are an amalgam of Christian religious "beliefs" and nineteenth-century philosophical and ideological ideas that later were embellished and transformed into various subdiscourses that molded political resentment with biological or anthropological racism, anticommunism, antikapitalism, and anti-Zionism (Bauer 1994). Researchers, therefore, have distinguished premodern, mostly religious and mythological antisemitism from modern, mostly politically, ideologically, and racially motivated antisemitism. In addition, anti-Jewish resentment also may be related to guilt feelings and national pride, group conflict, competition about scarce resources, and ethnocultural distance (Weil 1990: 131, Langmuir 1990).

Earlier research about the transformation of antisemitic prejudice in postwar West Germany suggests that antisemitism motivated by religion, nationalism, race, and economics is on the retreat. Social distance, emotional rejection, and the readiness to discriminate against Jews have changed significantly (Weil 1987: 175 ff., 1990: 137 f., Bergmann and Erb 1991a, Silbermann and Sallen 1992, Merritt 1993, Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1993). In a comprehensive overview about empirical research in Germany between 1946 and 1989, Bergmann and Erb (1991a) have used various survey instruments (e.g., antisemitism indexes, sympathy, and trait scales) to measure prejudice. They found that between 10% and 15% of German respondents have antisemitic attitudes, among them about 5% exhibit very strong prejudice in contrast to about 20% who are apparently unprejudiced respondents. Bergmann reported that a 1974 study found "racial antisemitism" among 8% of the population, "political antisemitism" among 5%, and "economic antisemitism" among 13% (Bergmann 1990b: 119). "Religious antisemitism," focusing on the alleged "Jewish deicide" of Jesus, was found to exist only in small pockets among older, poorly educated respondents in rural and Catholic regions.

Evaluation of three postunification German polls confirm these findings. For example, in the 1991 poll by *Der Spiegel* (1992), about 1.9% of all German respondents in the East and 4.5% in the West supported the statement that "Jews have some responsibility for the death of Jesus, as the Bible says." These and other responses suggest that at present, consistent and strong religious, political,

to overcome shadows of the past by normalizing neighborly relations. Polls and observers agree that throughout the life of the Bonn Republic, West Germans displayed comparatively low levels of national chauvinism and pride. With memories and witnesses of the past slowly fading away, postwar Germans are in search of a positive social identity that restores feelings of pride and integrity, an identity that is less stained with the human horrors, painful events, and moral descent of the Holocaust, as well as the events of World War II with the resulting total defeat, mass expulsion from Germany's former eastern provinces and areas of settlement in Eastern Europe, and Cold War division?

Some evidence exists that many of the war generation reacted to information about the Holocaust with guilt, shame, anger, fear, confessions, and prayers for forgiveness, whereas others responded with silence, defiance, and comparison of Nazi crimes with other genocidal acts in world history. Germans born after the war may be tempted to defend their personal distance from the past and their newly won identification with and pride in the national collective. Among both war and postwar generations, some may find comfort in the simple but ignorant formula of "drawing a line" or of considering the past closed (*einen Schlußstrich ziehen*). In fact, Bergmann found that support for such an attitude fluctuated (following public and media events) but rose in the West from 34% in 1958 to 67% in 1969, 62% in 1978, 67% in 1987, and 56% in 1994 (Bergmann 1990b: 122 f.). An analysis of the 1994 Golub poll indicates that younger West Germans tend to be more open toward remembrance. In the East, however, the findings were not so definite and the factors that influenced respondents' answers have to be more thoroughly investigated in the future.

But are the wish to avoid a confrontation with the past and the fact that many respondents do not exhibit an overwhelming rejection of single statements such as "Jewish World influence" or "Jews are exploiting the . . . Holocaust" (see also chapter 2, tables 2.3-2.5) proof of strong antisemitism, as pessimists suggest (e.g., Jodice 1991: 10)? According to attitudinal research such a conclusion is only validated if support for such statements is embedded in a coherent and rigid ideological framework. An antisemitic syndrome may exist if support for the "exploitation" question is linked with other traditional stereotypes about the "powerful" and "revengeful" Jew (Kushner 1991), who supposedly stirs up old memories of hatred instead of facilitating reconciliation and peace. In fact, far-right extremists try to instrumentalize and manipulate Holocaust shame, fear, and guilt, using the "Jewish exploitation" cliché. As Anson Rabinbach has observed, they claim to be victims of a presumptuous "Jewish monopoly on the moral capital of suffering which holds the present hostage to the past" (Rabinbach 1990: 60). Hard-core antisemites also look for opportunities to defend their attitudes by legitimating negative views about Jews. Many are eager to document evidence of Jewish or Israeli wrongdoing, whether accurate or not. Those who set off German misdeeds with Jewish ones or use the "exploitation" phrase tend to overlook that they themselves manipulate and exploit history and remembrance by defensively projecting their own national guilt on others. The existence of such right-wing thought patterns, however, does not necessarily imply that large segments of the population share them.

One method to avoid an overgeneralization of single statements and to measure the distribution of rigid and coherent attitudes is the use of scales.²⁰

Scales Measuring Antisemitism, Remembrance, Xenophobia, and Holocaust Knowledge Based on Three German Attitude Polls

Three German postunification surveys (Jodice 1991, Spiegel 1992, and Golub 1994) were used to investigate the distribution of coherent attitudinal patterns on antisemitism, remembrance, xenophobia, and Holocaust knowledge. To measure antisemitic resentment, the author recoded and dichotomized poll questions concerning "too much Jewish power," the view that Jews "provoke hostilities," or the belief that "Jews are responsible for the hate against them." Responses to these statements with strong commonalities within similar topic groups were selected with principal-component factor analysis (orthogonal varimax rotation). This resulted in scales containing between 3 and 6 questions to measure antisemitism, remembrance, Holocaust knowledge, xenophobia, foreigner resentment, and foreigner antipathy. Scales are not identical for all three opinion polls because of differences in questions used for scale construction (see appendix, table 3.6). Differences in response patterns are most likely explained by differences in wording, questionnaire construction, sample size, and other contextual effects.²¹

Response Types in East and West Germany

To more closely investigate prejudiced and nonprejudiced respondents and their characteristics, a response typology was developed based on the combination of scales (see appendix, tables 3.8-3.10). Because the used scales differ for each of the three German polls and because of the different timing of the surveys, the percentages vary. Nevertheless, a scale comparison supports the notion of attitudinal coherence and confirms significant differences in attitudes between East and West Germans (see appendix, table 3.11). A correlation analysis also informs about the strength of links between scale items, although the data do not allow for inferences about causality and directions of relationships (see appendix, table 3.12). One important finding is a strong positive relationship between xenophobia, anti-foreigner resentment, and antisemitism. The pessimistic assumption that xenophobia also can be explained by an assumed failure of remembrance (i.e., "a culture of suppression") or that lower levels of foreigner hostility and social distance in the East (see appendix, table 3.6) are only a result of the quarantine of East Germany from Western influences cannot be empirically confirmed by the data.²² Rather, xenophobia and hostility toward foreigners can be explained as a function of ethnocultural intergroup conflict and economic competition (Kuechler 1994, Saalfeld 1994, Kurthen and Minkenberg 1995). Given the much higher number of foreigners in the West (7 million) compared with the East (250,000 in 1994), lower levels of anti-foreigner hostility in the East are not surprising.²³ Xenophobia rose in the East after 1989 and led in some communities to an outburst of hostility

only after the post-Wall influx of asylum seekers and undocumented illegal workers, the unexpected economic strains of unification, the insensitive political instrumentalization of the migration and asylum issue, and irresponsible media attention (see Kurthen 1995).

A somewhat unexpected finding is the different strength of relationships of Holocaust knowledge in the East and West (see appendix, table 3.12).²⁴ Although data are only available from the *Spiegel* (1992) survey, the assumption that little Holocaust knowledge is strongly related to antisemitism, xenophobia, and opposition to remembrance is not confirmed for West Germany, but it is for East Germany. In other words, Holocaust knowledge in the West is not a very reliable variable to predict attitudes toward Jews, xenophobia, or disagreement with remembrance. Knowledge of the Holocaust may exist parallel with anti-Jewish resentment and vice versa. This finding confirms the more complex and ambivalent attitude of many West Germans toward the past. It also illustrates differences between West and East Germany as reported earlier in the international comparison.

The comparison of poll findings from 1990, 1991, and 1994 (see appendix, table 3.11) reveals a continuing postunification trend toward more tolerance of and less prejudice against Jews and a greater willingness to come to terms with the past (remembrance). This finding contradicts the pessimistic expectations and alarm signals of observers in and outside Germany. But significant differences exist between West and East Germany. Unprejudiced responses (scale type 4) are found significantly more frequently in East Germany (between 50% in 1991 and 70% in 1994 of all responses) than in West Germany (30% in 1990/91 to 48% in 1994). Respondents agreeing with stereotypes about Jews and opposing remembrance (scale type 1) represent about 20% in 1994 to 32% in 1990 of all answers in West Germany and 6% in 1994 to 9% in 1991 in East Germany. Between one and two out of five respondents in the East and West oppose remembrance although they show no visible evidence of antisemitic prejudice (scale type 3). Prejudiced respondents in favor of Holocaust remembrance (scale type 2) are only a small and almost negligible group in East and West Germany. In other words, there is a significant group of ambivalent respondents in both parts of Germany. Second, East Germans, in contradiction to popular narratives, are surprisingly less prejudiced and more open confronting the past than many in the West—blinded by anticommunism—have predicted or have been willing to concede. These findings have to be interpreted in light of the differing histories of confrontation of the past in East and West Germany.

As Rainer Lepsius stated, the more coherent and ideologically loaded socialist antifascism helped East Germans abandon antisemitic ideological debris and develop a distant, selective view of German national history (Lepsius 1989: 247 ff.). The East German regime suppressed Nazi antisemitism and substituted it relatively successfully with an amalgam of officially decreed antifascist internationalism and elements of *obrigkeitstaatlich* (authoritarian) traditions. What was left of antisemitic and racist attitudes after the war was contained by the regime and slowly fell into oblivion. In contrast, West Germans have much stronger opinions about Germany's moral, legal, and financial responsibilities for the Nazi past. In the

West, remembrance was more controversial, less ideologically coherent, and more ambivalent. It underwent various cycles and periods (as mentioned earlier). Opposition to remembrance in the West is more a function of the interpretation of the recent past and the wish to identify with an untainted national history and collective identity. The official public taboo against antisemitism helped to silence and contain the revival of antisemitism in the Konrad Adenauer era until a democratic political culture had developed. According to the pessimistic view, antisemitic prejudice was never wholly overcome; instead, it underwent changes and became latent (Bergmann and Erb 1990). Can this explain why ambivalent attitudes toward remembrance are more widespread in the West? Cross-tabulation (not shown) confirms for the *Spiegel* (1992) survey that support for latency questions²⁵ was moderately (but not significantly) correlated with ambivalent responses (see appendix, table 3.9, scale type 3aS and 3bS, and table 3.10, scale type 3aG). Can we conclude that all nonantisemitic respondents who—at the same time—oppose remembrance, are hiding their true opinions about Jews out of sheer opportunism? Such an answer ignores that ambivalence toward remembrance and continuing reparations hides a variety of motives not evaluated by preset poll questions. Some respondents may not want to cope with unrelenting guilt, shame, and feelings of anger. Others may feel their patriotic sentiments threatened, and still others may have seriously contemplated the past and may want to bring such considerations to a conclusion. Perhaps some think that Germany has paid for its crimes. Postwar-born respondents may also believe that they should not be held responsible any longer because the Nazi crimes were an event of the past (for a range of motives, see Curtis 1986: 10, Safran 1986: 277 f., Wodak et al. 1990: 29, 147 ff., 216 f., 352 ff., Sniderman and Piazza 1993: 168).

Is it possible that some respondents hide the full extent of their prejudices by refusing to answer sensitive questions? Latency correlates in the *Spiegel* (1992) survey with a high nonresponse ratio among antisemitic persons, but only in the case of East Germany (see appendix, table 3.9, scale type 1bS). As for ambivalent responses, however, refusal to answer or undecided answers may not only indicate evasion—as Selznick and Steinberg explain in their antisemitism study (1969: 31 f.). They are often indicative of misunderstanding or unfamiliarity with questionnaires, the aggressive wording of a question, lack of knowledge, distrust in the confidentiality of the interviewer, time constraints, and other factors (Smith 1993: 384). Karmasin (1992: 40), for example, asked nonrespondents about their reasons for refusing to answer a question about Austria's Nazi involvement. Forty-three percent said they declined to answer because they found *both* assumptions of the original question true, and 35% felt incompetent or had never thought about the question (the latter group were typically elderly respondents with lower education). Twenty-three percent refused to answer (42% of this group had a university education). Some of the well-informed and well-educated respondents seemed to have declined answers because they disagreed with stereotypical questions that trapped desired answers as proof of the poll sponsor's or researchers' stereotypical attitudes about respondents' prejudices.²⁶ Further investigations into the dynamics of latency and ambivalence toward remembrance and reparations should take a

closer look at the methodological limitations of standardized questionnaires (e.g., multiple meaning of wording) and evaluate more thoroughly response motives and the desirability effects of answers, that is, the adaptation of the expression of attitudes to cultural norms (Langmuir 1990: 323).

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

With scales we are able to assess not only the distribution of certain response sets but also the demographic and individual characteristics of respondent types. Who are those who resent Jews and remembrance (scale type 1) in comparison to those who express resentment but support Holocaust remembrance (scale type 2)? How do nonantisemitic respondents in support of "drawing a line" (scale type 3) differ from those who support remembrance of the Holocaust (scale type 4)? Do those with antisemitic opinions have characteristics in common with a person described as having an "authoritarian personality" (see Adorno et al. 1973)? What relationship exists between certain attitudes and demographic characteristics such as education, age, religion, place of residence, political identification, and personality traits?²⁷

Using standard evaluation techniques and independent variables common in attitudinal research, a demographic analysis of response types and attitude scales was undertaken. Logistic regression with weighted variables is a tool to control independent variables against each other in case the dependent variable is skewed and dichotomous. Log-likelihood ratios and levels of correct model predictions give a clue about how much each independent variable contributes to a dependent variable's variance. Significance levels show if a variable is important for explaining a given attitude syndrome measured by a response type or attitude scale.

The finding can be best illustrated using the *Spiegel* (1992) survey. This poll has the advantage of having a comparatively large (and reliable) sample size and a particularly sophisticated questionnaire. In a nutshell, logistic regression confirms (1) East-West German differences and commonalities and (2) a significant impact of variables such as social class (education/occupation/income), political orientation, authoritarian disposition, age, and residence on attitudes about Jews, foreigners, and remembrance.

A brief description of significant outcomes follows (see appendix, table 3.13). Persons who score above average on antisemitism, foreigner resentment, and anti-remembrance share three characteristics in both the East and the West: low education/blue-collar occupation, intention to vote for the populist right-wing "Republikaner" Party,²⁸ and support for the authoritarian question of disciplining youth. Besides these commonalities, differences also exist. Persons in the East with strong resentment against foreigners and opposing remembrance more likely live in rural areas and cities with populations of fewer than 50,000. In West Germany, antisemitic and antiforeigner respondents are more likely to live in areas with a higher degree of urbanization. Also, the age factor is more explicit in the West, that is, older persons tend to be more resentful toward Jews and foreigners or tend to oppose remembrance. In the East, the age factor is only significant for persons resentful of foreigners. Gender, religious affiliation, north-south region, and economic situation

(with the exception of antiforeigner hostility) are variables that are not very strongly affiliated with the antisemitism, antiforeigner, and remembrance scales.

Respondents with high scores on the antiforeigner scale are unsatisfied with their economic situation in both the East and the West. This finding seems to confirm the assumption that suspiciousness of and distance from foreigners is partially a function of ethnocultural intergroup conflict and economic competition among lower-class members who are threatened by economic and social changes. In the West such persons also express little interest in political affairs, intend to abstain from voting or support the far right-wing "Republikaner" Party, and attend churches infrequently. In other words, they may have few social and community ties and show signs of status deprivation and political disillusion, blaming others for personal and societal shortcomings. Persons in the West who oppose continuing remembrance of Nazi crimes have similar characteristics as those who are hostile and suspicious toward foreigners.

An analysis of respondent types (prejudiced and antiremembrance, nonprejudiced and proremembrance, and nonprejudiced and antiremembrance) confirms characteristic differences between respondent types.²⁹ In East and West Germany, prejudiced respondents differ significantly from nonprejudiced along lines of social class, Left-Right party alignment, and support for discipline. In the West, additionally, age, gender, political participation (party vote), economic satisfaction, and political interest are attributes where scale type 1 and 4 respondents differ.³⁰ In East Germany, characteristics like urbanization, region, and gender are of importance.

The differences between scale type 1 and 4 respondents in the West very much reflect what has been called the conflict between the old and the new political agenda that emerged during the transformation processes of postindustrial societies (Inglehart and Rabier 1986). The New Politics cleavage is characterized by a polarization between low-prejudiced, postmaterialist, younger and better educated voters with sympathies for the Green Party or the Social Democrats on the Left versus materialistic and less-educated voters with working- and middle-class backgrounds with traditionally CDU/CSU (Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union) and SPD (Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschlands) sympathies on the Right. At the extreme end are populist New Right parties (e.g., the "Republikaner Party" that capitalize on those parts of the old middle and working classes who perceive their status as particularly threatened by the ongoing social and cultural change, and who feel not sufficiently represented by the traditional majority parties.³¹ In the last decade such contested issues were the protection of the environment, immigration and its consequences (multiculturalism, ethnic diversity), and identity questions (national pride, rejection of supranational institutions such as the European Union [EU], the United Nations [UN], and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), and coping with the past.

How do ambivalent nonantisemitic but remembrance-critical and foreigner-hostile respondents fit into that picture? According to the data they have some commonalities with prejudiced respondents, such as low education, prodisciplinary-authoritarianism, and (blue-collar) lower-class affiliation. The similarity of ambivalent with prejudiced respondents suggests that many respondents conform to

opinion trends in society and their reference group. Some may even hide their hostile opinions toward Jews and could be counted under the latency category.

In contrast, respondents of the nonantisemitic and nonantiforeigner type who oppose Holocaust remembrance are characteristically authoritarian males who do not belong to the blue-collar group (East) or have a significantly higher education (West). These respondents are not in favor of voting for either the "Republikaner" Party, Green Party, or the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS) in either the East or (less clear) the West. It is not unrealistic to suppose that an unknown percentage of these respondents (well-educated, feeling not threatened by foreigners, and aware of the current taboo against antisemitism) use the less stigmatizing remembrance issue to express their desire to move beyond the past and develop a new sense of national pride. Ambivalent respondents obviously represent a heterogeneous group of people whose response motives and attitudes need to be investigated further with more sophisticated methods (see also Bergmann and Erb 1991a: 240).

It is of interest that many of the properties of prejudiced respondents fall under the label of "working-class authoritarianism" (Lipset 1960). Their characteristics also resemble the conception of the inflexible or rigid, prejudiced personality as developed in *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al. 1973) and related studies about the psychopathology of prejudice.³² Recently Sniderman and Piazza (1993: 87) have reported similar relationships between racial stereotyping and support for authoritarian values in the United States. A survey in the Netherlands (Scheepers, Felling, and Peters 1990) suggests that authoritarianism is an overlooked predictor of ethnocentrism and prejudice that is itself related to education, age, social class, church involvement, and status anxiety.

More investigation of the socioeconomic conditions, political demands, and cultural values that accompany ongoing social change and the reorganization of the political system in Germany may help to uncover some of the questions about future trends in antisemitism, xenophobia, and remembrance, including the growth of postmaterialist and postnational pacifist Western and authoritarian materialistic political cultures, particularly in the East. Thus future studies should concentrate in particular on (1) how distinct political cultures and personality "types" react to socioeconomic changes that trigger ethnocultural pluralism via immigration (which covers issues such as xenophobia and antiforeigner attitudes), and (2) how these cultures and personalities respond to the search for a revived or new understanding of the national collective via a redefinition of national identity and history (the latter is clearly related to Holocaust and war remembrance). My research indicates that antisemitism is related to both dimensions: xenophobia and national identity. Its dynamism might result from its bridging function. An increase in xenophobia will affect antisemitic resentment just as the frustrated search for a usable and untainted national past may lead to an increase in secondary anti-Jewish resentment.

German Attitudes toward Israel

Some observers have speculated that antisemitic attitudes, distance from ethnic and cultural groups, and opposition to remembrance are linked to negative atti-

tudes toward Israel. The analysis of the *Spiegel* (1992) poll confirms for West German respondents a relationship between antisemitism, ascription of "typical" negative Jewish traits (from a trait scale with 22 characteristics), and a relatively strong sympathy with the Arab cause. Other opinions about the peace process between Israel and its neighbors are only moderately correlated with antisemitism, a finding that is supported by prior surveys (Bergmann and Erb 1991a).³³ In fact, Lily G. Feldman and Michael Wolffsohn attest for Germany and Smith for the United States that the opinion about Israel is shaped by the political context of Middle East politics, independent of the ratings of Jews (Feldman 1984, Wolffsohn 1993: 108 ff., 99 f., Smith 1991: 16).³⁴ Until 1967 the German public expressed more sympathy for Israel than its Arab neighbors. Since then the percentage of those preferring neither Israel nor the Arabs has increased, similar to U.S. and West European opinions. In the *Spiegel* poll, undertaken in December 1991, shortly before the American-led UN attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait, unprejudiced German respondents were more pessimistic about a continuing peace in the Middle East. They displayed distance toward both conflicting parties and expected the Israeli government to take the first steps toward peace. Indicative of this shift is that persons rating low on antisemitism (i.e., younger, more educated and Left respondents) were, in contrast to prior decades, also more critical toward Israel's policy in the Middle East. The sufferings of Holocaust victims and World War II generations are no longer seen as excuses for a harsh Israeli policy toward the Palestinians and Arabs. In other words, a skeptical view prevails that should not be confounded with ideological anti-Zionism or antisemitism. The majority of German respondents did not support the equation that "Zionism is racism." In fact, Left or Right anti-Zionism never attracted a measurable population segment nor was it influential in West German intellectual circles.³⁵

Low-level resentment against Jews and Israel in East Germany fit into the hypothesis of the role of socialist antifascism described earlier. Nevertheless, this finding is somewhat surprising if one considers decades of East German pro-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) propaganda and anti-Israel politics. Also remarkable is the fact that in comparison with the West the average East German is more optimistic about the peace process and does not prefer Arabs over Israelis. Overall Germans in the East and West have a comparatively positive image of Israelis. On a sympathy scale of -5 to +5, 34% of all Germans—regardless of age—perceive Israeli Jews very sympathetically, 12% view them sympathetically, 38% were neutral, 10% view them unsympathetically, and 2% view them very unsympathetically. East Germans (mean: +1.14) had a somewhat more positive attitude than West Germans (mean 0.95). Compared with other nations and ethnic groups, Germans rank the Israelis close to Austrians, French, and Americans and ahead of, for example, Turks, Gypsies, or Palestinians. The latter are perceived by German respondents as culturally more distant.

Although most respondents in the East and West want to treat the State of Israel like any other state, a majority of respondents in the *Spiegel* (1992) poll realizes that the Holocaust still puts a heavy strain on Israelis' opinions about Germany. They also correctly assume that a large group of Israeli Jews is not yet open for reconciliation. A parallel survey in Israel sponsored by *Der Spiegel* in December

1991 confirms that the positive feelings of Germans toward Israeli Jews are not reciprocated.³⁶ For example, in 1991, a majority of Israeli respondents strongly identified united Germany and the Germans with their Nazi past.³⁷ Israelis expressed pessimistic and negative attitudes about German unification and the strength of democratic traditions in Germany. They also were concerned about German xenophobia and antisemitism (Wolffsohn 1991). For most Israelis the Nazi and Holocaust image of Germany still is an obstacle to more friendly relations in the present and future. Many Israelis also include postwar-born Germans in their anti-German resentments.³⁸

Summary

Many arguments may be brought forward about how East and West Germans come to terms with the Nazi and Holocaust legacy. The gloomy portrait drawn by pessimists that West Germans have clearly failed to heed the lesson of the past, the alarmist cries of a rising tide of neo-Nazi antisemitism,³⁹ and the notion that anti-Zionism in East Germany masked popular anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish resentment are not supported by the findings of public opinion polls undertaken after unification (see also Marrus 1986: 177). In international comparison, Germany has a rather positive record regarding Holocaust knowledge, antisemitism, social distance, and concern about Jewish prejudice. In addition, many indicators—not only surveys—testify that the public in Germany in the last pre-Wall decades and after unification has rather intensified its efforts to cope with the past. From that viewpoint, it seems paradoxical that allegations of a failure to seriously confront the past have continued (see C. Hoffmann 1990).

From the end of World War II to 1995, a period that spans at least three generations, the Holocaust and World War II had an impact on the identity formation of Germans. Although confronted with, exposed to, and to some extent socialized by this past, generations of Germans born after the war (representing now over 85% of the German population) are rarely involved in personal interactions with Jews. But fictional and nonfictional books, movies, schooling, media reports, Nazi trials, public scandals, political speeches, memorials, and exhibitions have educated the Germans to such an extent that cognitively the memory of Nazism, the war, and the Holocaust cannot be easily suppressed. Shame, anger, and guilt are deeply felt in a large segment of the German population. Among the better educated postwar generations, the Holocaust has become a central focus of the recollection of the recent past (Weil 1990: 140, 157).⁴⁰ For the majority of contemporary Germans, the past is present; knowledge about the Holocaust exists and is available—often unavoidable—and they are not inclined to deny the truth of the Holocaust. Even those who want to overcome the guilt burden, those who are tired of self-incrimination or who consider themselves not personally responsible, are not necessarily identical with small groups of deniers and revisionists. Not everyone who supports the notion of “drawing a line,” naively trying to remove the “Nazi stain” (Jarausch 1988), is a staunch antisemite with a coherent ideological view about National Socialism, Jews, and Israel. Many, tired of the guilt burden, have a rather

conservative and patriotic worldview but support democracy (see F. P. Lutz 1993: 164 ff.).

Based on the *Spiegel* (1992) survey and using conservative estimates, three groups of people with different attitudes toward Jews, foreigners, and remembrance were found in East and West Germany, varying according to occupation, education, political affiliation, age, residence, and political interests: (1) an unprejudiced group of urban, younger, and better educated respondents who are willing to confront the past (West, 18%; East, 30%); (2) an ambivalent and less clearly definable response group who want to consider the Nazi past closed but are not (openly and expressively) prejudiced against Jews, although they are often resentful of foreigners (West, 30%; East, 28%); and (3) those who do not feel responsibility for the past, identify Jews in a negative way with remembrance, and have resentment against foreigners (West, 19%; East, 7%). The latter group represent attitudes that could be exploited by far right-wing ideologues and organizations. However, it is important to acknowledge that persons who share attitudes of the third group are *not* identical with a few hard-core old and neo-Nazis. Besides, transforming the third group's resentment into political action is not easy to accomplish if all other conditions are hostile. These findings are similar to other poll evaluations (see chapter 2). Particularly in the western part of Germany, the characteristics of type (1) and (3) respondents fit into the anti-authoritarian post-materialist-authoritarian materialist pattern, which is related to what has been defined as the New and Old Politics dimension that cuts across the older Left and Right cleavages based on social class, education, party alignment, urbanization, and political participation (see Kurthen and Minkenberg 1995).

In comparison with the more pervasive xenophobia against East European and non-European immigrants and asylum seekers, anti-Jewish feelings are not predominant in German society, and Jews are not the main targets of hostility and bigotry. If one considers opinions toward Israel, the Holocaust, and Jews as proof of antisemitism, German respondents display comparatively little prejudice. Although there might be a small but noisy extreme Right, the poll data indicate that there is a large group of Germans in the East and the West who reject antisemitism, accept the Jewish community, sympathize with Israel, and are opposed to attempts of the right-wing extremists to stir up anti-Jewish resentment and reject Holocaust remembrance. Some evidence exists that the nature and level of “traditional” antisemitism have changed into what has been called secondary resentment (Bergmann and Erb 1991a), but it is also true that anti-Jewish attitudes have continuously decreased over the last 40 years. Given generational changes and a stable liberal and democratic political culture it will most likely continue to decline further.

Distrust and antipathy toward foreigners is more widespread and differs significantly from anti-Jewish resentment. Whereas the latter contains elements of traditional political envy and conspiracy combined with resentment resulting from guilt, national pride, and reparation, attitudes toward foreigners differ by ethnocultural distance, skin color, and immigration type. They contain strong elements of social competition, welfare chauvinism, and scapegoating of immigrant minorities. In 1991 45% of the population in the West and 40% in the East disliked

foreigners. In 1994 this hostility seemed to be somewhat lessened, with 23% of the respondents perceiving foreigners as hostile in the West and 17% in the East (see appendix, table 3.6).

My analysis also confirms a relationship between anti-foreigner resentment and antisemitism. In particular, in West Germany a correlation exists between foreigner scapegoating and resentment against Jews, though somewhat different scales were used. In 1994 the relationship between projected hostility of foreigners and antisemitism had become stronger in the East (see appendix, table 3.12). This may indicate an attitudinal right-wing hardening among prejudiced respondents in the East. In fact, respondents with a consistent antisemitic view are also most likely to be hostile toward foreigners, oppose remembrance, have authoritarian tendencies, and support antidemocratic attitudes.⁴¹

What conclusions can be drawn from these findings?

1. Xenophobia and antisemitism have to be seen in both historical and international comparative perspective, otherwise there is a danger of either exaggerating or downplaying their significance. Antisemitic attitudes and behavior, more than hostility against foreigners, are officially a public taboo and institutionally illegal in Germany. Public awareness about antisemitism is high, and anti-Jewish resentment is neither politically nor intellectually respectable, nor is it officially embedded in the political culture. In comparison with xenophobia there are no social forces or influential political advocates that could lead to a significant growth of antisemitism at the present. And there is no indication that after unification antisemitic incidents have significantly increased as the result of a popular, elite-supported political movement similar to that during the last years of the Weimar Republic. Comparatively small and fragmented fringe groups that promote prejudice and hatred against immigrant minorities and Jews are lacking support, leadership, an attractive ideology, and other means to sustain a political movement. Even within right-wing subcultures rabid antisemites are isolated (Bergmann 1990a: 152), whereas ambivalent feelings toward foreigners are more widespread.

2. These facts do not mean, however, that xenophobia, nationalist arrogance, and hatred of all sorts, including antisemitism, are unimportant, do not contain dangerous political potential, could not be revived, or may experience only a short-lived upsurge. In the case of anti-Jewish resentment, new sources and expressions have to be recognized, resulting from the burden of the past (collective guilt, remembrance, and reparation) and the unrealizable search for an untainted national identity. Xenophobia is fed by the failure to recognize that Germany has become an immigrant country and by the inexperience of the country with ethnocultural diversity. But on the whole the conditions for a simple renewal or repetition of the Nazi past in united Germany are unfavorable, and it would take a cataclysmic event such as a supranational upheaval and unprecedented domestic and international changes for such a change to occur (Feingold 1985: 323).

3. Remembrance of the past and historical consciousness about Nazi crimes should not be relativized, apologetically whitewashed, or offset against genocidal acts committed by other nations. Nor should the historically unique course of responsibility and restitution taken by the German government be cast into the marketplace of moral, political, and financial claims and counterclaims as if these

voluntary obligations were—in the words of Jürgen Habermas—some sort of natural and granted insurance for damages (*Schadensabwicklung*) (see Merkl 1989: 495). Awareness of the sufferings of other groups and nations allows the German people also to recognize their betrayal by a Nazi leadership, who led them mercifully “into the slaughter of the Second World War” (Wolffsohn 1993: 208), ending with division, expulsion, and loss of homelands in the East. Recollection of the past sharpens the conscience against all sorts of present-day racism and xenophobia, demagoguery, and political adventurism.

4. Unfortunately, even with the best pedagogical intentions, increasing chronological distance makes it harder and harder to revive or even to imagine the sufferings of millions. But coping with the past should not become a compulsive, routinely performed national act of self-accusation that is not free from self-righteousness. Any attempt to moralize and ritualize remembrance or to condemn those who do not respond politically correctly will probably not result in the desired outcome.⁴² Compulsory exercises in philosemitism, ritualistic breast-beating, or alarmist anti-antisemitism will not be of much help either (Jesse 1990: 560). One cannot transfer guilt feelings or impose collective or individual mourning, sensitivity, compassion, and responsibility. The “first step of moral development” (Wisse 1994: 27) could be the growth of a feeling of responsibility for one’s individual acts without blaming others or using other means of self-exculpation. Such an honest learning process could result in a nonhypocritical, moral sensibility toward the multifaceted side of national histories, pride in the overcoming of narrow nationalism and ethnocentrism, and a critical attitude toward collective ideologies and generalizations.

TABLE 3.1. History of Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung in West Germany, 1945–1995

Frame	Central events	Official explanations of Nazism and its victims	Public memory of Holocaust	Official framing of antisemitism	Official treatment of former Nazis	Public attitudes toward Jews/German Jews toward Israel/Israeli Jews	Degree of antisemitism according to polls	Public reaction to antisemitism	Institutions fighting antisemitism	Public memory of 1933–1945	Factors determining adult cohort views on the past	Right-wing parties and membership	Political reaction to right-wing extremism
1945–1952	Nuremberg trials, "deviance" of Jewish displaced persons, scandals, antisemitic compensation, and German Jewish-Israeli reparations agreement	Dictatorship, National Socialism as "catastrophe," Germans as victims too, National Mourning Day (Volksstrauertag)	Suppressed or offset by postwar expulsions and war crimes against Germans	Unacceptable and extremist, punishable by law	1945–1949: Denazification, reeducation; since 1950: reintegration of bystanders into society, war crime trials	Indifference	Strong and rising antisemitism, often under mask of philosemitism	Public reaction to antisemitism	Media, democratic parties, churches, constitution	Prewar years: more positive; war years: more negative	Personal experience	Increasing membership after foundation of FRG in 1949	Marginalization, ban of extremist parties
1953–1958	Diary of Anne Frank, second German compensation law, establishment of German-Israeli diplomatic relations	Moral dramatization of guilt and reparation, Jews victims of racial oppression	Slow change	Distancing through taboos and rituals	Early retirement schemes, expulsion from public service of activists	Rising acceptance	Slow decrease	Rising opposition and public protests	Media, democratic parties, churches, historical research	Prewar years: more positive; war years: more negative	Reports from (grand-) parents, teachers, media, schools, media	Decreasing membership after ban and during "economic miracle"	Marginalization
1959–1966	Antisemitic scandals, graffiti and cemetery desecrations, movies, plays, Eichmann and Auschwitz trials, compensation payments by businesses		Constant public information	Refinement of taboos and rituals	Diverse individual and camp trials	Rising acceptance	Reduction	Public protests	Schools, media, parties, churches, literary, historical research, cultural institutions, universities, Bundes- und Landeszentralen für politische Bildung	Slow change	Reports from (grand-) parents, teachers, media, schools, media, and personal reports	National Democratic Party	Ban of Deutsche Reichs Partei
1967–1978	Debate about juridical limitation (<i>Verjährungsdebatte</i>), "68" generation revolt against fathers, Fassbinder affair		Constant public information	Refinement of taboos and rituals	Diverse individual and camp trials	Rising acceptance	Slow reduction	Latent pressure to assimilate to norms	Schools, media, parties, churches, literary, historical research, cultural institutions, universities, Bundes- und Landeszentralen für politische Bildung	Slow change	Reports from (grand-) parents, teachers, media, schools, media, and personal reports	National Democratic Party	Ban of Deutsche Reichs Partei
1979–1989	Holocaust TV series, Nachmann scandal, Bitburg, historians' debate, Weizsäcker and Jeminger speeches, no legal limitations of Nazi genocide, compensation scandal, funds for enforced laborers (Poland, Russia)	Focal point on Holocaust and Jews but other victim groups are also remembered, Germany accepts moral responsibility and lessons (vigilance, awareness), ambivalence in remembering 1945: defeat versus liberation narrative	Constant public information	Refinement of taboos and rituals	Diverse individual and camp trials	Rising acceptance	Slow reduction	Latent pressure to assimilate to norms	Schools, media, parties, churches, literary, historical research, cultural institutions, universities, Bundes- und Landeszentralen für politische Bildung	Slow change	Reports from (grand-) parents, teachers, media, schools, media, and personal reports	National Democratic Party	Ban of Deutsche Reichs Partei
1990–1995	German unification, Gulf War, Germ military aid for Israel, German payments to compensate for East Germany, Rostock council scandal, postunification xenophobia, arson of Lubbeck synagogue and Sachsenhausen camp barracks, <i>Schindler's List</i> , 50th anniversary allied WWII victory	Focal point on Holocaust and Jews but other victim groups are also remembered, Germany accepts moral responsibility and lessons (vigilance, awareness), ambivalence in remembering 1945: defeat versus liberation narrative	Constant public information	Refinement of taboos and rituals	Diverse individual and camp trials	Rising acceptance	Slow reduction	Latent pressure to assimilate to norms	Schools, media, parties, churches, literary, historical research, cultural institutions, universities, Bundes- und Landeszentralen für politische Bildung	Slow change	Reports from (grand-) parents, teachers, media, schools, media, and personal reports	National Democratic Party	Ban of Deutsche Reichs Partei

TABLE 3.2. Overview of German and International Attitude Survey Data

Survey	Number of Respondents	Sample	Date	Pollster	Sponsor
What Do Americans Think about Jews? (Smith 1991)	995	West Germans, 826 East Germans	1990 (Oct. 1-15)	Emnid-Institut	Various U.S. public opinion polls
United Germany and Jewish Concerns: Attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and the Holocaust (Jodice 1991)	995	West Germans, 826 East Germans	1990 (Oct. 1-15)	Emnid-Institut	Various U.S. public opinion polls
Attitudes toward Jews in the Soviet Union: Public Opinion in Ten Republics (Gudkov and Levinson 1992)	4,206	1,200 Poles, 1,132 Czechoslovaks, 1,201 Hungarians, 180 non-Jewish Israelis	1991 (Jan. 7-21)	Penn + Schoen Assoc., Demoskop Res. Agency (Poland), Median (Hungary), and Assoc. f. Indep. Social Analysis (Czechoslovakia)	Soviet Center for Public Opinion and Market Research
Attitudes toward Jews in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia: A Comparative Survey (Cohen and Golub 1991)	1,200	1,200 Poles, 1,132 Czechoslovaks, 1,201 Hungarians, 180 non-Jewish Israelis	1991 (Jan. 7-21)	Penn + Schoen Assoc., Demoskop Res. Agency (Poland), Median (Hungary), and Assoc. f. Indep. Social Analysis (Czechoslovakia)	Soviet Center for Public Opinion and Market Research
Austrian Attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and the Holocaust (Karmasin 1992)	2,000	1,875 West Germans, 947 East Germans	1991 (June 24-Aug. 21)	Gallup Austria	Gallup Austria
Juden und Deutsche (Spiegel 1992)	1,875	West Germans, 947 East Germans	1991 (Nov. 30-Dec. 17)	Emnid-Institut	Spiegel Verlag
Juden und Deutsche (Spiegel 1992)	820	Israeli Jews, 180 non-Jewish Israelis	1991 (Dec.)	Gallup Israel	Spiegel Verlag
Attitudes toward Jews in the Americas Know about the Holocaust? (Golub and Cohen 1993)	506	10th-12th grade students	1992 (Oct. 19-30)	Roper	Roper
What Do the Americans Know about the Holocaust? (Golub and Cohen 1993)	992	age 18+	1992 (Nov. 14-21)	Roper	Roper
What Do the British Know about the Holocaust? (Golub and Cohen 1993)	1,025	age 16+	1993 (May 5-10)	Gallup Great Britain	Gallup Great Britain
British Attitudes toward Jews and Other Minorities (Golub 1993)	959	age 16+	1993 (Sept. 2-7)	Gallup Great Britain	Gallup Great Britain
What Do the French Know about the Holocaust? (Golub and Cohen 1994)	1,046	age 15+	1993 (Oct. 8, 9, 11)	Louis Harris France	Louis Harris France
Current German Attitudes toward Jews and Other Minorities (Golub 1994)	992	West Germans, 442 East Germans	1994 (Jan. 12-31)	Emnid-Institut	Emnid-Institut
Holocaust Denial: What the Survey Data Reveal (Smith 1995)	991	age 18+	1994 (April)	Roper USA	Roper USA
Attitudes toward Jews in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Gudkov and Levinson 1994)	3,965	Representative	1991 (Mar. 4-Apr. 26)	Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research	Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research

TABLE 3-3. International Country Comparison of Dichotomized Questions and Response Ratios

Question	Germany				U.S.A.	
	West Leaders 1990	East Leaders 1990	West 1994	East 1994	Adults 1989/90	Adults 1992
1 Zionism is racism: Disagree somewhat or strongly/agree	62%/30%	55%/37%	41%/33%	38%/33%		
2 Jewish president: Wouldn't matter or like to have/prefer not	2.1	1.5	1.2	1.2	75/21	91/5
3 Jews provoke hostility: No/yes			3.3	3.6	75/6	18
4 Jewish societal influence: Right amount or too little/too much			8.6	13	36/8	68/21
5 Jews as neighbors: Approve or makes no difference/disapprove			1.7	4.5	75/20	87/11
5 Antisemitism: Very serious or somewhat a problem/ not at all	46/52	93/6	60/26	83/7	72/19	77/14
5 Response ratio (question 4)			2	3.8	7.9	
6 Future of antisemitism: Will increase somewhat or greatly/ decrease or remain the same	0.9	16	2.3	3.8	5.5	55/37
7 Response ratio (question 6)	22/72	38/59	32/53	58/28	45/40	
7 Holocaust definition: Extremation, murder, persecution of Jews, etc./other responses or DK/NA	0.3	0.6	0.6	2.1	1.1	91/9
8 Response ratio (question 7)					73/27	61/38
8 Response ratio (question 8)					2.7	1.6

TABLE 3-3. (continued)

Question	Argentina 1992	UK 1993	France 1993	Austria 1991	Hungary 1991	Czech Rep. 1991	Slovakia 1991	Poland 1991	Lithuania 1992
1 Disagree somewhat or strongly/agree				35%/25%	21%/25%	17%/52%	21%/42%	19%/39%	
2 Jewish president: Wouldn't matter or like to have/prefer not	91/8	85/12	61/31	81/17	71/20	57/32	54/40	51/40	
3 Jews provoke hostility: No/yes	11	7.1	2	4.8	3.6	1.8	1.4	1.3	
4 Jewish societal influence: Right amount or too little/too much	5.1	49/8	3.3	15	35	3.6	3.4	47/11	
4 Response ratio (question 2)	52/41	49/8	55/8	64/17	51/5	41/25	32/26	29/70	
5 Jews as neighbors: Approve or makes no difference/ disapprove			2	3.8	10	1.6	1.2	4.3	
5 Antisemitism: Very serious or somewhat a problem/ not at all	1.3	38/48	45/30	51/34	28/72	34/66	39/44	0.4	
6 Future of antisemitism: Will increase somewhat or greatly/ decrease or remain the same	0.8	1.5	1.5	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.3	17/51	
7 Response ratio (question 6)	25/56	24/45	25/53	13/58	26/44	0.5	0.9		
8 Extremation, murder, persecution of Jews, etc./other responses or DK/NA	56/44	68/32	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.3		
8 Response ratio (question 8)	1.3	1.3							

TABLE 3.3. (continued)

Question	Latvia 1992	Estonia 1992	Belarus 1992	Moldavia 1992	Ukraine 1992	Russia 1992	Azerbaijan 1992	Kazakhstan 1992	Uzbekistan 1992
1 Zionism is racism: Disagree somewhat or strongly/agree	53/28	62/22	64/20	79/5	65/23	61/24	64/16	70/21	38/39
2 Jewish president: Wouldn't matter or like to have/prefer not	1.9	2.8	3.2	1.6	2.8	2.5	4	3.3	1
3 Jews provoke hostility: No/yes	18/8	30/2	55/15	27/1	49/9	33/11	32/11	55/13	40/5
4 Jewish societal influence: Right amount or too little/too much	2.3	1.5	3.7	2.7	5.4	3	2.9	4.2	8
5 Jews as neighbors: Approve or makes no difference/disapprove	37/63	39/61	33/67	53/47	48/53	42/57	24/77	31/70	24/76
6 Antisemitism: Very serious or somewhat a problem/ not at all	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.3
7 Future of antisemitism: Will increase somewhat or greatly/ decrease or remain the same									
8 Holocaust definition: Extremation, murder, persecution of Jews, etc./other responses or DK/NA									

TABLE 3.3. (continued)

Question	West 1994	East 1994	Adults 1989/90	Adults 1992	Students 1992	Adults 1994	U.K. 1993	France 1993
9 Recognition of Nazi label for Jews: Yellow star, Star of David/other responses or DK/NA	91/9	98/2	42/58	42/58	42/58	42/58	47/53	88/12
10 Camp recognition: Concentration camps/other or DK/NA	10	49	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	7.3
11 Estimate of killed Jews: 6 mil./other number or DK/NA	10	19	1.6	35/65	28/72	41/59	3.2	9
12 Knowledge of other persecuted groups: Sum of correct answers/incorrect or DK/NA	0.6	0.6	0.5	102/42	71/55	100/45	0.7	0.8
13 No relevance of Holocaust today: Strongly or mostly disagree/agree	9.6	15	2.4	63/21	54/26	65/21	2.2	6.2
14 Know and understand Holocaust now: Essential or very important/somewhat or not important	2.2	3.1	3	72/15	64/21	76/14	4.1	4
15 Revisionist claim: Heard this claim/not heard	2.4	3.8	4.8	38/54	21/66	49/47	3	7.3
16 Holocaust never happened: It seems impossible/possible	2.1	1.7	0.7	65/22	0.3	1.0	1.1	2
Response ratio (question 15)	11	8.2	3	3.2	12	19		

Note: High response ratios indicate little antisemitic resentment, little social distance, strong concern about antisemitism, good Holocaust knowledge, support for Holocaust remembrance, and rejection of revisionism. Response ratios represent the division of positive by negative item responses.

TABLE 3.4. International and German Poll Questions

1:	Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia:	"The view that 'Zionism is racism' has gained currency on the contemporary scene. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?"
2:	Germany:	"Several years ago, the United Nations passed a resolution saying that Zionism is racism. Do you agree or disagree with this resolution?"
		"If a party nominated a Jew as its candidate for president of [nation], would you approve, disapprove, or would the candidate's Jewishness make no difference to you?"
	U.S.A.:	"If a party nominated a Jew as its candidate for president of Germany, would you approve, disapprove, or would the candidate's Jewishness make no difference to you?" (in percents).
	Argentina:	"I'm going to read a few attributes that might be found in a candidate for president. Tell me if each would make you more likely to vote for that candidate for president, or less likely to vote for that candidate, or if it wouldn't matter."
	CIS:	"Would you or would you not vote for a presidential candidate who was Jewish?"
		"What would be your attitude if a Jew became president of your republic?: I have nothing against it, I wouldn't like it, can't say definitely."
3:		"Do any of the following groups [group] behave in a manner which provokes hostility toward them in our country?" (only answers listed for Jews).
4:		"Do you feel that the following groups [group] have too much influence, too little influence, or the right amount of influence in our society?" (only answers listed for Jews).
	CIS:	"How much influence do the following groups [Jews] have in our society: too much, too little, a reasonable amount?"
	Argentina:	"Do any of the following groups [Jews] have too much power and influence in Argentina?"
5:		"How do you feel about having [group] in your neighborhood? Would you like to have some [group] neighbors, wouldn't it make any difference to you, or would you prefer not to have any [group] neighbors?" (only answers listed for Jews).
	Argentina:	"How would you feel about having members of the following group [Jews] as neighbors? Would you like it, would you be indifferent, or would you dislike it?"
	CIS:	"How would you feel if your neighbors belonged to the following ethnic groups? I would like to have them as neighbors, it does not matter to me, I would rather not have them as neighbors?"
6:		"Do you think antisemitism in our country is a very serious problem, somewhat of a problem, or not a problem at all?"
7:		"Looking ahead over the next several years, do you think that antisemitism in [country] will increase greatly, increase somewhat, remain the same, decrease somewhat, or decrease greatly?"
8:		"As far as you know, what does the term 'the Holocaust' refer to?"

TABLE 3.4. (continued)

9:		"Many Jews in Europe were forced to wear a symbol on their clothes during the Second World War. What was it?" (open-ended).
10:		"From what you know or have heard, what were Auschwitz, Dachau, and Treblinka?" (open-ended).
11:		"Approximately how many Jews were killed in the Holocaust?" (open-ended with codes).
12:		"In addition to the Jews, which of the following groups, if any, were persecuted by the Nazis?"
13:		"Please tell me whether you strongly agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or strongly disagree: 'The Holocaust is not relevant today because it happened almost 50 years ago.'"
14:		"In your view, how important is it for [nationality] to know about and understand the Holocaust: is it essential, very important, only somewhat important, or not important?"
15:		"Some people claim that the Nazi extermination of the Jews never happened. Have you ever heard this claim, or not?"
16:		"Does it seem possible or does it seem impossible to you that the Nazi extermination of the Jews never happened?"

TABLE 3.5. Ranking of East and West Germany's Response Ratios in International Comparison

Topic	Question #	Attitude Question	Ranking in Comparison with Other Countries Polled	
			West Germany	East Germany
Resentment	1	Zionism is racism (disagree)	2 of 7	2 of 7
	2	Jewish president (approve)	9 of 20	7 of 20
	3	Jews provoke hostility (no)	6 of 10	4 of 10
	4	Jewish influence society (no)	17 of 19	7 of 19
	5	Jews in neighborhood (approve)	3 of 14	2 of 14
Social distance Concern	6	Antisemitism is a problem in society (yes)	4 of 10	1 of 10
	7	Future of antisemitism in society (increase)	4 of 10	1 of 10
Knowledge	8	Knowledge of term "Holocaust" (yes)	1 of 6	2 of 6
	9	Recognition of yellow star/Siar of David (yes)	2 of 7	1 of 7
	10	Recognition of concentration camp names (yes)	2 of 7	1 of 7
Remembrance	11	Knowledge of estimate of killed Jews in Holocaust (yes)	3 of 7	3 of 7
	12	Knowledge of persecuted victim groups (yes)	3 of 7	1 of 7
	13	Relevance of Holocaust today (agree)	7 of 7	3 of 7
	14	Need to understand and know Holocaust (yes)	7 of 7	4 of 7
	15	Heard claim that Holocaust never happened (yes)	1 of 7	3 of 7
Revisionism	16	Possible that extermination never happened (no)	3 of 6	4 of 6

Note: Response ratios represent dichotomized answer patterns to the same or similar question in comparison with other Western and European countries (see appendix, tables 3.3 and 3.4). For example, the West Germans' ranking position of 1 indicates that they display the best knowledge in understanding the meaning of the term "Holocaust" in comparison with six other countries polled. Elite opinion leaders' responses in East and West Germany are not included.

TABLE 3-7. German Attitudinal Survey Questions

Golub Poll 1994

- F110__8: "How do you feel about having Jews in your neighborhood?" Answer: "Would you like to have some Jewish neighbors?" (1), "Wouldn't it make any difference to you?" (2), "Would you prefer not to have any Jewish neighbors?" (3).
- F111__2: "Do Gypsies behave in a manner which provokes hostility toward them in our country?" Answer: "Yes" (1), "No" (0).
- F111__3: "Do Arabs behave in a manner which provokes hostility toward them in our country?" Answer: "Yes" (1), "No" (0).
- F111__4: "Do Vietnamese behave in a manner which provokes hostility toward them in our country?" Answer: "Yes" (1), "No" (0).
- F111__5: "Do Turks behave in a manner which provokes hostility toward them in our country?" Answer: "Yes" (1), "No" (0).
- F111__6: "Do Poles behave in a manner which provokes hostility toward them in our country?" Answer: "Yes" (1), "No" (0).
- F111__7: "Do Africans behave in a manner which provokes hostility toward them in our country?" Answer: "Yes" (1), "No" (0).
- F111__8: "Do Jews behave in a manner which provokes hostility toward them in our country?" Answer: "Yes" (1), "No" (0).
- F113__8: "Have Jews too much influence in our society?" Answer: "Too much" (1), "Too little" (2), "The right amount" (3).
- F116: "If a party nominated a Jew as its candidate for president of Germany, would you approve (1), disapprove (2), or would the candidate's Jewishness⁸ make no difference to you?" (3).
- F117: "Now, as in the past, Jews exert too much influence on world events." Answer: "Agree strongly" (1), "Agree somewhat" (2), "Disagree somewhat" (3), "Disagree strongly" (4).
- F118: "As far as you know, what does the term 'the Holocaust' refer to?" Answer open-ended with codes: "Extermination etc. of Jews by Hitler/Nazis/Germans" (1), "Extermination etc. of Jews" (2), "Other relevant responses" (3), "Others" (4).
- F119: "From what you know or have heard, what were Auschwitz, Dachau, and Treblinka?" Answer open-ended: "Concentration camps" (1), "Other responses" (2).
- F124: "Many Jews in Europe were forced to wear a symbol on their clothes during the Second World War. What was it?" Answer open-ended: "Yellow star/Jewish star/Star of David" (1), "Other responses" (2).
- F125: "The Holocaust is not relevant today because it happened almost 50 years ago." Answer: "Agree strongly" (1), "Agree somewhat" (2), "Disagree somewhat" (3), "Disagree strongly" (4).
- F127: "In your view, how important is it for Germans to know about and understand the Holocaust?" Answer: "Essential" (1), "Very important" (2), "Only somewhat important" (3), "Not important" (4).
- F128: "Jews are exploiting the National Socialist Holocaust for their own purposes." Answer: "Agree strongly" (1), "Agree somewhat" (2), "Disagree somewhat" (3), "Disagree strongly" (4).

TABLE 3-7. (continued)

Jodice Poll 1990

- F129__ : "Recently someone said: 'Today, in the aftermath of German unification, we should not talk so much about the Holocaust, but should rather draw a line and consider the past closed [Schlußstrich ziehen]. Would you say this is correct (1) or incorrect?' (2).
- Q20: "With the opening of a new chapter in German history, 45 years after the end of the Second World War, it is time to put the memory of the Holocaust behind us?" Answer: "Agree strongly" (1), "Agree somewhat" (2), "Disagree somewhat" (3), "Disagree strongly" (4).
- Q21a: "Do you think that the German government should, after unification of the two German states, pay reparations to Jews?" Answer: "Agree strongly" (1), "Agree somewhat" (2), "Disagree somewhat" (3), "Disagree strongly" (4).
- Q22: "As far as our relationship to Israel is concerned, we should not let ourselves be burdened by the past and the events during the Third Reich. Israel is a state like any other" (1), "Because of the events during the Third Reich, we have a special obligation toward Jews and also toward Israel. We cannot treat Israel like any other country on earth" (2).
- Q26: "Jews are exploiting the National Socialist Holocaust for their own purposes." Answer: "Agree strongly" (1), "Agree somewhat" (2), "Disagree somewhat" (3), "Disagree strongly" (4).
- Q27: "Now as in the past, Jews exert too much influence on world events." Answer: "Agree strongly" (1), "Agree somewhat" (2), "Disagree somewhat" (3), "Disagree strongly" (4).
- Spiegel Poll 1992
- V21: "If somebody would tell you, 'Many Jews try to take advantage of the Third Reich and make the Germans pay for it,' how would you answer?" Answer: "That's correct" (1), "There's some truth" (2), "That's incorrect" (3), "It is impossible to answer" (4).
- V22: "I am ashamed that Germans have committed so many crimes against Jews." Answer: Scale of 6 possible answers ranging from "Strongly agree" (1) to "Strongly disagree" (6).
- V23: "Jews are partly to blame for the persecution and hate against them." Answer: Scale of 6 possible answers ranging from "Is entirely true" (1) to "Is entirely untrue" (6).
- V55: "Jews have too much influence in the world." Answer: "True" (1), "Not true" (2), "Undecided" (3).
- V92: "Foreigners coming now to Germany aggravate the unemployment of Germans." Answer: "Yes" (1), "Fairly certainly" (2), "Less certainly" (3), "No" (4).
- V93: "Foreigners coming now to Germany abuse the services of our welfare system." Answer: "Yes" (1), "Fairly certainly" (2), "Less certainly" (3), "No" (4).
- V95: "Most German politicians are too concerned about foreigners coming now to Germany and not concerned enough about Germans." Answer: "Yes" (1), "Fairly certainly" (2), "Less certainly" (3), "No" (4).
- V105: "We should draw a line and consider the past closed [Schlußstrich ziehen]. Other people have done just as bad things as we have." Answer: Scale of 6 possible answers ranging from "Disagree very strongly" (1) to "Agree very strongly" (6).

TABLE 3-7. (continued)

- V106: "The permanent talk about the guilt of the Germans in other countries often indicates envy about German efficiency and affluence." Answer: Scale of 6 possible answers ranging from "Disagree very strongly" (1) to "Agree very strongly" (6).
- V610: "Please judge some people according to your sympathy for them. How sympathetic are you to the Turks living in Germany?" Answer: Scale of 11 possible answers ranging from "Very unsympathetic" (-5) to "Very sympathetic" (+5).
- V630: "How sympathetic are you to the Jews living in Germany?" Answer: Scale of 11 possible answers ranging from "Very unsympathetic" (-5) to "Very sympathetic" (+5).
- V650: "How sympathetic are you to the Jews living in Israel?" Answer: Scale of 11 possible answers ranging from "Very unsympathetic" (-5) to "Very sympathetic" (+5).
- V690: "Please judge some people according to your sympathy for them. How sympathetic are you to the asylum seekers from Eastern Europe?" Answer: Scale of 11 possible answers ranging from "Very unsympathetic" (-5) to "Very sympathetic" (+5).
- V730: "Please judge some people according to your sympathy for them. How sympathetic are you to the asylum seekers from Africa?" Answer: Scale of 11 possible answers ranging from "Very unsympathetic" (-5) to "Very sympathetic" (+5).
- V810: "Please judge some people according to your sympathy for them. How sympathetic are you to the foreigners in Germany accepted as legal political refugees?" Answer: Scale of 11 possible answers ranging from "Very unsympathetic" (-5) to "Very sympathetic" (+5).

TABLE 3.8. Response Typology Based on Attitude Scales (Jodice Poll 1990)

Scale Type	Response Characteristics		West Germany 1990		East Germany 1990	
	Antisemitism	Remembrance	N = 940	N = 800	N = 800	N = 800
1J (N = 366)	Strong	Oppose	32.0%	8.1%		
2J (N = 68)	Strong	Support	3.3	4.6		
3J (N = 548)	Weak	Oppose	34.4	28.1		
4J (N = 758)	Weak	Support	30.3	59.1		

TABLE 3.9. Response Typology Based on Attitude Scales (Spiegel Poll 1992)

Scale Type	Response Characteristics			West Germany 1991		East Germany 1991	
	Antisemitism	Remembrance	Antiforeigner	N = 1,894	N = 980	N = 980	N = 980
1aS (N = 434)	Strong	Oppose	Strong	19.1%	7.3%		
1bS (N = 58)	Strong	Oppose	Weak	2.0	2.1		
2aS (N = 125)	Strong	Support	Strong	5.5	2.1		
2bS (N = 17)	Strong	Support	Weak	0.7	0.4		
3aS (N = 846)	Weak	Oppose	Strong	30	28.3		
3bS (N = 362)	Weak	Oppose	Weak	13.1	11.5		
4aS (N = 397)	Weak	Support	Strong	11.4	19.6		
4bS (N = 635)	Weak	Support	Weak	18.2	29.6		

TABLE 3.10. Response Typology Based on Attitude Scales (Golub Poll 1994)

Scale Type	Response Characteristics			West Germany 1994		East Germany 1994	
	Antisemitism	Remembrance	Holocaust Knowledge	N = 1,127	N = 291	N = 291	N = 291
1aG (N = 44)	Strong	Oppose	Little	3.5%	1.7%		
1bG (N = 198)	Strong	Oppose	Much	16.5	4.0		
2aG (N = 35)	Strong	Support	Little	2.1	3.9		
2bG (N = 78)	Strong	Support	Much	6.4	2.0		
3aG (N = 100)	Weak	Oppose	Little	6.1	10.8		
3bG (N = 219)	Weak	Oppose	Much	17.4	7.7		
4aG (N = 100)	Weak	Support	Little	5.4	13.4		
4bG (N = 644)	Weak	Support	Much	42.5	56.4		

TABLE 3.11. Distribution of Response Types Based on Dichotomized Attitude Scales from Three Consecutive German Polls in 1990, 1991, and 1994

Scale Type	Response Characteristics			West Germany			East Germany		
	Antisemitism	Remembrance		1990	1991	1994	1990	1991	1994
				N = 940	N = 1,894	N = 1,127	N = 800	N = 981	N = 291
1	Strong	Oppose	32.0%	21.1%	20.0%	8.1%	9.4%	5.7%	
2	Strong	Support	3.3	6.2	8.5	4.6	2.5	5.9	
3	Weak	Oppose	34.4	43.1	23.5	28.1	39.8	18.5	
4	Weak	Support	30.3	29.6	47.9	59.1	49.2	69.8	

Note: Typology percentages differ in each category because scales from the three surveys are based on different questions (see appendix, tables 3.6 and 3.7).

Correlations of West and East German Respondents Polled in Three Consecutive German Polls in 1990, 1991, and 1994 Based on Dichotomized Scales




TABLE 3-13. Summary of Logistic Regression Coefficients for Attitude Scales and Response Typologies in East and West Germany (Spiegel Poll 1991)

Dependent Variable	East	West	East	West
Antisemitism Scale 1991	.01*	.01***	.01*	.01***
Age (years)	-.00	.01***	.01*	.01***
Sex (male)	-.33	-.13	-.02	-.07
Education (high)	-1.37***	-.08	-.50*	-.85***
Occupation (non-blue collar)	-.03	-.32**	-.62***	-.33**
City size (over 50,000)	.41	.60***	.23	.16
North-South (South)	-.03	-.53***	-.86***	-.41**
Catholic (yes)	X	X	X	X
Protestant (yes)	-.04	.20	.12	.94***
Atheist (yes)	-.18	.11	.16	.73***
Church attendance (often)	.29	-.03	-.42	-.54***
Green-PDS voter (yes)	-1.38*	.11	-.46	-.26
CDU/CSU voter (yes)	-.13	.30**	.13	.31**
"Republican" voter (yes)	3.60***	1.35***	2.70*	2.31***
No vote (yes)	-.46	.14	-.35	.42*
Political interest (no)	.09	.16	-.05	.69***
Pro-youth discipline (yes)	-.92***	.49***	.60***	.72***
Economic situation (unsatisfactory)	-.20	.07	.41**	.36***
Constant	-1.87***	-2.49***	-.19	-1.11***
-2 Log Likelihood	593.8	2068.7	1134.6	2077.6
Degrees of freedom	16	17	16	17
Correctly placed	89%	72%	67%	72%

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. - = negative correlation. X = variables excluded from regression because cell contents are too small or data is missing.

TABLE 3.14. Variables Used for Logistic Regression of Attitude Scales (Spiegel Poll 1992)

Age of respondent (interval)
 Sex of respondent (0 = female/1 = male)
 Education (0 = primary-secondary/1 = secondary +)
 Occupation (0 = blue collar/1 = other than blue collar)
 Employment (0 = employed or in training/1 = not or not employed any more)
 Union membership (0 = no/1 = yes)
 Region (0 = North/1 = South)
 City size (0 = under 50,000/1 = over 50,000)
 Religious affiliation Catholic (1 = Catholic/0 = other)
 Religious affiliation Protestant (1 = Protestant/0 = other)
 Religious affiliation atheist (1 = atheist/0 = other)
 Respondent's church attendance (1 = often/0 = seldom)
 Sunday vote, i.e., respondent's vote if there would be a national election next Sunday (1 = Green Party-PDS/0 = Other)
 Sunday vote (1 = Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union/0 = other)
 Sunday vote (1 = "Republikaner" Party/0 = other)
 Sunday vote (1 = nonvoter/0 = other)
 Respondent's political interest (0 = yes/1 = no)
 "The youth should be much stronger disciplined" (Man sollte die Jugendlichen härter anfangen) (1 = agree/0 = disagree)
 Judgment of own economic (wirtschaftliche) situation (1 = unsatisfactory/0 = satisfactory)

NOTES

The author is grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts by Kay Losey, Konrad Jarausch, Siegfried Mews, Henry Landsberger, Stefan Immerfall, and Heike Trappe.

1. In this chapter the term *antisemitism* will be used "broadly to cover less favorable or lower ratings and evaluations of Jews" (Smith 1991: 1), thereby not limiting the term to extreme anti-Jewish hostility (Allport 1954: 9). Such a broad definition reflects the increasing difficulty to define and compare present-day antisemitism in Western countries in the terms of "classical" racial antisemitism during the first half of this century (Bauer 1994: 12). The term *xenophobia* signifies unduly fearful, hostile, or contemptuous attitudes toward strangers or foreigners, particularly in the cultural and political realm. The terms *remembrance* and *confrontation* of the past (*Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung*) will be used to depict an attitude that accepts Germany's shame or guilt, takes responsibility and makes reparations for the Nazi crimes, keeps uncomfortable memories alive, and agrees that knowledge and understanding of the Holocaust are important for future generations to avoid a repetition.

2. Because a past cannot be overcome nor undone, Andrei S. Markovits suggests the less euphoric terms *confrontation* and *coping with the past* (*Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung*), which I also prefer (Markovits 1990: 273).

3. Jews in united Germany (the huge majority living in the West) currently represent about 60,000 persons or 0.08 percent of the population. Their number has strongly risen since unification because of the influx of Jewish immigrants and refugees from the former Soviet Union.

4. Philosemitism became a "German therapy for German pain. The Jew became the enemy who now had to be loved" (Frank Stern 1994: 86).

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. - = negative correlation; X = variables excluded from regression because cell contents are too small or data is missing.

Dependent Variable	Age (years)	Sex (male)	Education (high)	Occupation (non-blue collar)	North-South (South)	City size (over 50,000)	Catholic (yes)	Protestant (yes)	Atheist (yes)	Church attendance (often)	Green-PDS voter (yes)	CDU/CSU voter (yes)	Republican voter (yes)	Political interest (no)	Pro-youth discipline (yes)	Economic situation (unsatisfactory)	Constant	N	-2 Log Likelihood	Degrees of freedom	Correctly placed
Scale Type 1a5 (1991): Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Antiremembrance	.00	.32	-1.85***	-.13	-.40***	.16	-.03	-.70*	.66*	.42	-.35*	-.07	-.27	2.70***	-.36	1.04***	-.15	943	433.6	16	93%
Scale Type 3a5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Antiremembrance	.01	.17	-.10	-.57**	-.72***	-.03	-.73***	.35	.44	.18	-.21	.07	-.38	.78***	-.21	1.04***	-.01	943	1,834	17	80%
Scale Type 3a5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Antiremembrance	.00	.00	-.14	-.95***	-.72***	-.03	-.16	.35	.44	.18	-.21	.07	-.38	.78***	-.21	1.04***	-.01	943	1,834	17	75%
Scale Type 3b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	-.01	.01	.56**	-.04	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
Scale Type 4b5 (1991): Weak Antisemitic/Antiforeigner/Neutral/Antiremembrance	.01	.29*	.01	.29*	.63***	.07	.27	.30	.09	.21	.22	-.03	.24	-.08	-.20	-.44	.74***	943	636.6	16	88%
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Scale Type 4b																					

5. Like Michael R. Marrus, they argue that "most people alive in North America and Europe were born considerably after World War II; for them, the notion of some sort of personal or inherited responsibility for what happened to Jews forty years ago seems inherently absurd. . . . For most the Holocaust occurred further back in their sense of time than war years, but their grandparents or even their great-grandparents" (Marrus 1986: 177).
6. "Jews are as bound to Germany as Germany is to Jews. . . . mainly latter-generation Germans, want to break out of these unavoidable links. The other, Jewish side cannot allow the Germans to escape this historical bind without endangering their own Jewish identity" (Wolffsohn 1993: 66 f.).
7. "It is a matter of human weakness for the memories of the relatives of those who harmed others to be less developed and long-term than the memories of those who were harmed. This also applies to the relations between peoples and countries" (Yitzhak Ben Ari, former Israeli ambassador to Germany, cited in Levkov 1987: 289).
8. The 1990 and 1994 AJC data were made available by David Jodice (D3 Systems) and the Zentralarchiv für Sozialforschung in Cologne, Germany. The author is indebted to Dr. David Singer, Research Director of the AJC in New York for support in data acquisition. The 1990 poll included interviews with 101 East and West German political and economic leaders, a majority of whom display significantly lower prejudice and resentment than the average German respondent. Elite responses are included in the sample and not separately evaluated.
9. The *Spiegel* data presented are based on a raw data evaluation of extracted item marginals with some cross-tabulation results the author received from the *Der Spiegel* magazine. Additional evaluations are based on data analyses undertaken at Technical University of Berlin, Center for Research on Antisemitism.
10. Nevertheless, the results have to be interpreted cautiously because the relatively high nonresponse ratio and the wording of the "Zionism" and other questions raise some doubt about the reliability to measure antisemitism and prejudice with the questionnaire used. See the critical discussion of poll instruments and methods to measure antisemitism by Feingold (1985: 320), Curtis (1986: 8), Glazer (1986: 155 ff.), Marrus (1986: 172 ff.), Raab (1986: 288 f.), Segre (1986: 145 ff.), Weil (1987: 183), (1990: 138), Smith (1991: 22 ff.), Bauer (1994: 20), Brown (1994: 8), and Smith (1994: 5 ff.).
11. Studies about antisemitism in Eastern Europe after 1990 have focused on the ultranationalist, xenophobic, and revisionist political fringe (e.g., Braham 1994). Few studies have attempted to assess the distribution of antisemitism in comparative perspective by using mass opinion poll data.
12. The appearance of the revisionist historian David Irving, for example, resulted in a public demonstration of 10,000 "anti-fascists" in Berlin in May 1992, a number hardly matched anywhere else (Merkel 1994: 447).
13. In comparison with the average respondents the economic and political leaders in East and West Germany polled in 1990 (Jodice 1991) display significantly lower anti-Jewish resentment, are more supportive of remembrance and reparations, and feel more content that antisemitism is not threatening German society. Only East German leaders displayed—shortly after unification—more insecurity about the extent and future of antisemitism.
14. According to Jack Zipes, the Communist Party rationalized its decision as follows: "After all, why should the victims of fascism, namely the communists, pay other victims for crimes that they, the communists, did not commit? Recognition of Israel was likened to recognition of guilt" (Zipes 1991: 12). In contrast, West Germany accepted responsibility, recognized Israel, returned property to Jewish exiles, and has paid since 1951 about \$57 billion to Jewish agencies, individuals, and the State of Israel. West Germany agreed to compensate Holocaust survivors for the rest of their lives. The last payments are estimated to last until 2025. The *Wiedergutmachung* is estimated at a total of at least about \$80 billion dollars (Herbst and Göschler 1989, German Information Center 1994).
15. Polls also indicate that liberal Western values and attitudes are relatively strongly embedded in East German mass opinion. The question remains, how could East Germans after 13 years of Nazism and 40 years of socialist indoctrination maintain, develop, or acquire this quickly a democratic political culture that resembles very much those in the West? See chapter 5.
16. The use of mathematical-statistical models and standardized poll answers necessarily implies a loss of information and generalizations. A particular disadvantage is the lack of knowledge about individual response motivations and legitimations that can be gained sufficiently only by qualitative in-depth studies.
17. Comparative data for this statement are only available for Austria. A 1991 poll found that 32% of polled Austrians agree strongly or somewhat with the "exploitation" question, 37% disagree strongly or somewhat, and 32% did not answer. Those who disagree are younger, better educated, less religious, more urban, Green party voters. In contrast, 50% of voters in the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) a populist right-wing party, agree with the statement. Also, weekly churchgoers and older men living in rural areas are more suspicious (Karmasin 1992). Resentment in Austria is lower than in West Germany because until the Walheim affair in 1986 neither domestic nor external moral and political pressures existed in Austria comparable to those in the FRG, nor has Austria paid reparations to the same degree as West Germany (Pauley 1992).
18. Though not very popular, united Germany paid several hundred million dollars to Jewish organizations inside and outside Germany in the wake of unification and ensured compensation of prewar and wartime-related Jewish property claims in East Germany. The \$880 million in German humanitarian aid and military assistance to Israel during the Gulf War also was related to Germany's special obligations toward Israel's security and well-being resulting from the past.
19. But 35% of this group supporting "drawing a line" also thought the Holocaust is still "relevant today," 57% believed it important "to know about and understand the Holocaust," and 75% were concerned about antisemitism in Germany. Similarly, among respondents of the 1990 Jodice survey who wanted to "put the memory of the Holocaust behind" them, 56% believed that prosecution of "Nazi war criminals" should continue, 81% agreed to "ban antisemitic groups," and 83% wanted the German government to continue to "teach about the Nazi period in history lessons in the schools. However, only 19% of respondents thought that Germany should, after unification, continue to "pay reparations to Jews."
20. The author is aware of the methodological problems of poll data evaluation, such as scale reliability, questionnaire construction, nonresponse, questionnaire wording, index building, recoding, and so on. (Smith 1991). Because of the absence of other reliable alternatives measuring mass opinions, a cautious use of scales is legitimate.
21. For example, increased German-Jewish/Israeli tensions during the Gulf War in December 1991, seem to have influenced response patterns in the *Spiegel* (1992) survey compared to the polls of 1990 and 1994. Questions that show atypical variations over time were "Jewish world influence," "drawing a line," "reparation payments to Israel," "Jewish exploitation of the Holocaust," the German-Israeli relationship, Arab-Israeli relations, and questions about the Middle East peace process.
22. See B. Rommelspacher, cited by Bergmann and Erb (1991a: 295, n. 7).
23. In interpreting survey data, it is important to distinguish between widely reported violent incidents against mainly asylum seekers, Gypsies, Arabs, Turks, and non-White

foreigners—often undertaken by small groups of apolitical youth gangs, local skinheads, and drunks—and mass opinion analyzed here (see Farin and Seidel-Pielen 1993).

24. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient r is a dimensionless index that ranges from a value of -1 (a perfect negative) to $+1$ (a perfect positive linear relationship between two data sets). A value of 0 indicates no linear relationship. Gamma γ is a measure of association between two ordinal-level variables. Gamma γ is symmetric and ranges from 0 (no relationship) to 1 (perfect relationship).

25. The latency questions are: "Many do not dare to give their true opinion about Jews" and "For me the whole Jewish topic is somewhat unpleasant." Unfortunately these questions were only available for the Spiegel 1992 poll.

26. Questions with wording that provoked strong sentiments and biased judgment were more often refused and more often categorized under the nonresponse group. Questions with high percentages of undecided respondents in the Spiegel 1992 poll were those about "drawing a line" [*Schlußstrich*], "Jewish Holocaust exploitation," "collective responsibility of Germans," "Jewish world influence," "reparation for East Germany," "truth of Holocaust reports," "superiority of Germans," and the alleged "Jewish deicide." The fact that many respondents refused to give answers to simplistic or stereotypically worded questions may, as Karmasin (1992) has demonstrated for Austria, reveal awareness about the prejudicial character of a question or issue and indicate that such preset answers do not capture the complexity and variation of respondent motives.

27. See Selznick and Steinberg (1969), Clark and Martire (1982), Weil (1990: 140, 157), Bergmann and Erb (1991a), Smith (1991), Sniderman and Piazza (1993), and Smith (1994).

28. The "Republicaner" offer simple solutions for various national and social problems: statism, ethnocentrism, rewriting of German history, fixation on traditional family structures and gender roles, hypernationalism, and so on (Jaschke 1990).

29. Scale type 2 respondents display similarities with scale type 1 persons. Therefore and because of their relatively small size, they were excluded from further analysis.

30. The characteristics of the contrast groups are similar to findings of a qualitative study among 2,000 West Germans in January 1991 about historical awareness (see F. P. Lutz 1993: 157 ff.).

31. See Minkenberg (1992: 59–70, 1994: 174 ff.), Kowalsky and Schroeder (1994), and Kurthen and Minkenberg (1995: 188 f.).

32. See, for example, Ackerman and Jahoda (1950), Allport (1954), Bettelheim and Janowitz (1964), Simpson and Yinger (1972).

33. The questions were, "Do you believe in an enduring peace in a time not too far?" and "Who should be more conciliatory after the first peace negotiations in Madrid in November 1991—Israelis or Palestinians?"

34. During Israel's involvement in the Lebanon War of the 1980s, U.S. ratings of Israel declined parallel to an increasing political rift between the United States and Israel. In contrast, the threat to Israel during the Gulf War and the recent peace initiatives of the Israeli Rabin-Peres government have increased sympathy toward Israel.

35. During the Gulf War, the Green Party was blamed for Left antisemitism and anti-Zionism. However, the party has developed a self-critical and open dialogue, particularly during and after the Gulf War (Martin W. Kloke, cited in Strauss, Bergmann and Hoffman 1990: 152). Simplistic and antagonistic views on the Middle East conflict and the Israeli-Arab peace process have been more critically debated in this party than in any other. Post-unification polls verify that Green Party supporters are the least antisemitic and least xenophobic group.

36. Fifty-nine percent of Israeli Jews have a negative and 17% a neutral view (mean -1.6 on a scale from -2 to $+2$). Israelis perceive Germans as negative as they do Pales-

tinians. Only a minority of Israeli Jews are willing to distinguish between Nazi Germany and Germany today. Twenty percent of Israeli Jews perceive Germans sympathetically and 4% "very sympathetically," in contrast to those who see Germans unsympathetically (25%) or very unsympathetically (34%).

37. A preliminary evaluation of the Israeli survey using scales found that about 38% of Israeli respondents displayed strong anti-German resentment; among them were 25% who expressed negative attitudes about Germans in connection with strong memories about the Holocaust. Another 26% were proremembrance but had no coherent negative view about Germany. Thirty-five percent of all respondents had neither strong memories about the Holocaust nor were they anti-German. This group was typically Israeli-born males with weak ties to Orthodox Judaism or the political Right and with low interest in German affairs. The strongly anti-German group represented in particular highly educated females with strong attachment to religion and a strong interest in German affairs.

38. The sympathy gap between Israeli Jews and Germans also shows up in mutual trait surveys. Measuring 22 traits on a scale from 1 (positive trait) to 7 (negative trait), German respondents judged Israeli Jews more positively (mean: 3.22). In contrast, Israelis' judgment about Germans (mean: 4.15) was more negative. When asked, many respondents in both countries chose stereotypical traits about the other group. However, respondents in both countries gave each other surprisingly similar evaluations regarding traits such as independence, decisiveness, creativeness, self-consciousness, conscientiousness, cosmopolitanism, trustfulness, and tolerance. This may indicate a shift to a more realistic and reciprocal perception in which Germans and Israelis discover commonalities that may create a bridge from the past to the future.

39. "A world of difference exists between a wave of antisemitism and a wave of articles and television programs about antisemitism" (Cesrani 1991: 14).

40. See a similar effect for Israel (Smith 1991: 24, n. 15) and M. Zimmermann (1992).

41. See also F. P. Lutz (1993: 170) and scale type 4 respondent characteristics.

42. One has to avoid trying to "build a mandatory guilt feeling into a conscience, be it individual or national. [because it would create] . . . a situation that demands release—release from the tensions of always being guilty, of being irredeemable. Ultimately it leads to denial, because denying the past is easier than bearing the guilt" (John G. Gagliardo, cited in Levkov 1987: 461).