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Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy: An
Organizational and Tactical Examination
Victor Asal
a
, Brian Nussbaum
a
& D. William Harrington
a
a
SUNY at Albany Rockefeller College, Albany, New York, USA
Version of record first published: 21 Dec 2006.
To cite this article: Victor Asal, Brian Nussbaum & D. William Harrington (2007): Terrorism as
Transnational Advocacy: An Organizational and Tactical Examination, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
30:1, 15-39
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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:15–39, 2007
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100600959713
Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy: An
Organizational and Tactical Examination
VICTOR ASAL
BRIAN NUSSBAUM
D. WILLIAM HARRINGTON
SUNY at Albany
Rockefeller College
Albany, New York, USA
This article attempts to shed light on the dynamics and machinations within terrorist
organizations by incorporating a heretofore overlooked literature which is directly
applicable, that of transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Terror networks have been
described using every possible analogy, from multinational corporations to organized
crime to the anthropomorphic classic “cut off the head, and the body will die.” In
reality, terrorist organizations function in much the same way, and using many of
the same techniques, as transnational advocacy networks concerned with issues like
the environment or human rights. By describing these characteristics, and comparing
TANs and Terror TANs (TTANs), this article aims to offer insight into the tactics and
motivations that define modern, as well as the much heralded post-modern, terrorism.
There has been a growing interest in the role that networks play in facilitating terrorist
tactical and strategic behavior (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 3; Tucker 2001; Zanini 1999)
but the current literature on terror networks is still in its infancy. Although there has been
some examination of how and why terror networks operate and adapt, overwhelmingly the
literature related to this topic has been of the historical case study and anecdotal variety.
Although this creates a vast body of literature from which to cull information for more
theoretical studies, it does little to increase understanding beyond individual historical
cases. Some important exceptions to this include the work of John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt (2001), Marc Sageman (2004), and some work that has come out of research and
policy institutions like the RAND Corporation (Cragin and Daly 2004).
This article is intended to further integrate one theory of social movement networks,
transnational activist networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999) into the study of
terrorist networks. This is useful for several reasons. First, the theoretical insights provided
can help one to understand the advantages that networks provide terrorists and also to better
understand why terrorist networks operate the way they do. Second, by adopting a model
of TANS a terrorist organization can be placed into a broader framework of groups that
use violence and groups that do not use violence, something that is rarely done. Finally by
Received 12 October 2005; accepted 2 January 2006.
Address correspondence to Brian Nussbaum, Rockefeller College, 135 Western Avenue, Albany,
NY 12222, USA. E-mail: bn1463@albany.edu
15
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16 V. Asal et al.
examining terrorist networks through the lenses of TANs the authors hope to raise questions
about why some activist networks use terror and others do not. This article will first briefly
examine the terrorist network literature then provide an overview of the TAN concept.
It then provides six mini case studies, illustrating the ways in which terrorist networks
share almost all behavioral attributes with nonviolent TANs—except the propensity to use
terror. Finally, it addresses some of the issues raised by this comparison and points out key
questions that need to be addressed by further research.
Terror Networks
Before 11 September 2001 very little attention was focused on what Arquilla and Ronfeldt
called Netwar (1996). The attack on the United States illustrated the dangerous capacity
held by tactical and strategic networks exploiting modern technology to use violence
destructively (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2002). Arquilla and Ronfeldt were leaders in arguing
the advantages that network organization offer violent groups. Arquilla and Ronfeldt
identified Netwar as a societal level counterpart to cyberwar, a state of affairs in which
combatants rely on networked organization and certain specific techniques and tactics, like
swarming. Swarming, or the temporary massing of resources and people for operational
purposes, is a new and functional approach to examining terrorist actions (2001, 12).
Whereas much of the research has focused on the tactical importance of networks (Krebs
2004) there has also been work illustrating the importance of networks at the strategic
level, networks where they allow for the collaboration of different groups for terrorist
purposes (Galeotti 2002; Jones, Smith, and Weeding 2003; Sageman 2004). Raab and
Milward (2003) have pointed out that “Dark Networks” can solve various management and
resiliency problems for illicit groups in the same way that social network theorists have
shown they help governments.
One of the most important works looking at terrorist networks is by Marc Sageman
(2004) who takes a psychological approach by beginning with the question of why someone
would join a terror network; Sageman attempts to reverse engineer the network from the
bottom up. His argument is that, contrary to the common conception, terror networks often
form in a sort of organic way from friendship and other relationships, rather than as a result
of a “top down” and heavily controlled approach (Sageman 2004).
Important work has also been done in the examination and interpretation of terror
networks at some of the policy think tanks that examine terrorism. The two-part Aptitude
for Destruction series from the RAND Corporation offers a novel approach to examining
terrorism, by incorporating the concept of organizational learning (Jackson et al. 2005).
By using a number of theoretical approaches brought in from organizational studies and
management, the authors were able to illustrate in new ways the adaptability and resilience
of terror networks. RAND also provided a unique rubric for examining terror networks
in Assessing the Dynamic Terrorist Threat. R. Kim Cragin and Sara Daly (2004), the
authors, provide a new way in which to analyze terror networks. The typology they
propose places terror networks on two axes, one measuring their operational capabilities
and the second their intent or motivation to attack the United States. Although this
study is not broadly geographically applicable, and not concerned necessarily with the
internal dynamics of these networks, it does offer an interesting approach to dissecting
them.
Although some have identified the commonality of terrorist networks and transnational
activist networks (Adamson 2005; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2002) this has been rare. This
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Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy 17
article focuses specifically on the theory of TANs as laid out by Keck and Sikkink (1998,
1999) and shows how the same dynamic can be seen in both nonviolent and terrorist TANS
can be observed—and explained.
Transnational Advocacy Networks
Keck and Sikkink (1998) offer up the approach of studying international movements
and organizations in terms of Transnational Advocacy Networks. These networks are
groups that work across borders to advocate for causes, issues, or people. They tend to
be made up of many types of actors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
foundations, political entrepreneurs, and individuals. These networks can also sometimes
include sympathetic government officials or agencies. They are networks because they fit
the definition of being “characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of
communication and exchange" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 91).
The conception of a Transnational Advocacy Group (TAN) is a very useful and tangible
one. Useful in that it gives an analytic framework to examine international politics beyond
merely state concerns, and tangible in that it offers a more concrete approach than some
of the more ethereal conceptions like “global civil society” (Brysk 2005) or “transnational
community” (Evangelista 1995).
One unique characteristic of TANs is the coalition of local and national groups to form
larger regional or international umbrella organizations. These larger groupings can range
from very informal to much more structured. An oft-cited example of this is the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), in which many local groups in countries that had
been plagued by conflict and the dispersal of mines came together under the aegis of the
ICBL to create international pressure to discontinue the use of landmines (Price 1998,
620).
Several other tactics, approaches, and organizational attributes also distinguish TANs
from more abstract descriptions of globalized civil society. One trait that is common to
most TANs is the employment of the Boomerang Effect (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12–13).
This is when a domestic challenger uses a TAN in order to influence either other powerful
states or International Organizations in an attempt to bring pressure back on their own
government. An example would be the 20 December 2000 demonstration in London, in
which 45 Kurdish protestors seized the London Eye Ferris Wheel in order to protest the
treatment of Kurdish prisoners in Turkey (Peacock 2000). This circular path to domestic
reform is a distinctive feature of Transnational Advocacy Networks. Keck and Sikkink call
this kind of exercise of influence using outside pressure leverage politics.
They also reference three other types of politics that concern transnational advocacy
networks. Information politics involves the exchange of information between nodes within
the network, and also from the network to the broader public. This exchange of information,
in the form testimonials and facts, allows the TAN to frame issues in the terms that they
choose. This is instrumental in their power to persuade both internally and externally.
Symbolic politics is the idea that through the interpretation of symbolic events, TANs
can further frame the issues, which they wish to address. By “identifying and providing
convincing explanations” for important events, TANs acquire the ability to shape the
discussion and debate. Finally, TANs engage in accountability politics. This is when TANs,
usually by way of their local and regional affiliates, monitor the situation in a locality
and publicize any deviations from what is considered acceptable according to international
norms. This publicity is used to shame states into action (Cameron 1999, 92).
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18 V. Asal et al.
Other traits specifically associated with TANs include rapid and effective transnational
information sharing, a focus on symbolic political statements and the presence of
conferences, workshops, or other events in which members of various geographically
separated organizations come together to meet and create bonds or relationships. Together
these characteristics create an organization that is both international in scope and local in
operation. This macro/micro dichotomy is perhaps the key element of TANs both in their
operations and in their effectiveness.
Although still a relatively new concept, the study of TANs has multiplied quickly. This
literature takes several approaches to TANs, all of which lead to a deeper understanding of
what they are, and how they operate. Some authors have examined TANs within the broader
context of globalization and transnational civil society (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Hudson
2001; Price 2003; Karkkainen 2004). Other authors have decided to focus more narrowly on
the mechanisms by which TANs operate (Thomas 2002). Many more have taken the TAN
framework and applied it to historical case studies ranging from indigenous rights to sexual
harassment (Brysk 1996; Sikkink 1993; Price 1998; Stillerman 2003; Armbruster-Sandoval
2003; Zippel 2004).
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) contributed to a great many positive changes
in recent decades including decreasing the use of anti-personnel landmines (Price 1998),
the saving of acres upon acres of rainforest (Rodrigues 2005), and serving to monitor
human rights violations throughout the globe (Sikkink 1993; Burgerman 1998). They have
contributed to all these things by combining international networking with local knowledge,
exploiting communication technologies, using international pressure, and focusing on
symbolic political action. Nonviolent TANs, however, are not the only political actors
who have used these techniques with increasing frequency in recent years. Unfortunately,
the same logistical and strategic approaches that have allowed TANs to become increasingly
effective, have also allowed terrorist networks to operate with far fewer restrictions. The
efficacy of transnational advocacy has risen along the same trajectory as transnational
terrorism. This similarity is no coincidence. The reality is that terrorist networks share a
great many characteristics with TANs.
It seems that there would be a substantial benefit to addressing at least some terror
organizations as violent transnational advocacy networks. This is because the operational
logic is so remarkably similar between nonviolent TANs and violent terrorist networks.
Terror networks seem to have, in many ways, evolved away from rigid hierarchical
structures, making the TAN approach increasingly applicable. Gilles Kepel claims that
older terror networks “were well known and each had an understandable structure.” He
contrasts this traditional structure with the newer networks which must be understood in
different terms. These innovative networks he argues are “new and largely unknown,”
characterized by a “loose system” of “cells and networks that are scattered all over the
world” (Wright 2004). This description could well have been culled from a description of
most any transnational advocacy network.
Like TANs, as they are traditionally conceived, terrorist networks have adopted the
embrace of local organizations, information technology, international pressure for political
leverage, and symbolic political action. They too have benefited from the on-the-ground
knowledge provided by ideologically parallel “franchise” networks. Like TANs, terrorists
have embraced information technology, like the Internet, to coordinate action, foster
ideological and tactical information exchange, and to serve as a virtual space for the creation
of a politically charged community. Like humanitarian or environmental networks, terror
groups are increasingly reliant on international public opinion and the use of international
political pressure for leverage. Finally, terrorists too have focused on symbolic politics as
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Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy 19
a useful tool for exerting political pressure. It is in these increasingly apparent parallels
that the existing study of Transnational Advocacy will offer an important lens for the
examination of terrorist phenomena.
Terrorists, organized crime, and violent insurgent movements have all profited from the
shift to transnational relations and the logistical advantages that it provides (Arquilla and
Ronfeldt 2001). Increasing technology and communication have enabled new methods for
transporting arms (Laurance 2002), laundering money (Basile 2004), setting up covert
logistical networks (Cronin 2002/03), and information sharing (Thomas 2002). These
changing avenues facilitate new models for violent and criminal organizations. Although
international crime and terrorism are not new, they are increasingly common and often
harder to combat. There has been much discussion of the changes that globalization has
fostered or enabled amongst these violent groups, or what Bartosz Stanislawski calls
“Transnational Bads” (Stanislawski 2004). Numerous scholars have explored transnational
violent and criminal groups in some depth (Stanislawski 2004; Hudson 2003; Sanderson
2004).
In many ways, the recent literature regarding transnational civil society mirrors
the literature regarding transnational crime and terrorism. Increases in technology and
communication, and the subsequent ease with which knowledge and goods can be
exchanged, are one way in which both the “good” and “bad” sides of globalization
seem to have benefited. An increasing reliance on networks for both communication and
organizational structure is another way in which changes in civil society are similar to
those in the criminal and militant spheres (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Despite the clear
similarities, few scholars have directly made the connection, or even drawn parallels,
between globalizing civil society and violent actors.
Certainly not all aspects of the knowledge base surrounding globalizing civil society
will be relevant to the study of terrorism; however, some will offer greater understanding
of how terror networks form, adapt, and behave. The attempt to find ways in which
the existing literature on civil society can inform the debate on terrorism is a valuable
one.
Bringing Together the Study of TANs and Terror Networks
Relatively little work has synthesized the study of transnational advocacy and that of terror
networks, which is odd considering how much overlap there appears to be in some of
the organizational and technical dynamics (two important exceptions are Adamson 2005;
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Most of what has been written has been general, focusing not
on TANs per se, but rather on the globalizing or transnational nature of terrorism (Cronin
2002/3; Scruton 2002; Schweitzer and Shay 2003).
One sub-genre of this literature compares global terror networks to another set of
transnational actors, criminal syndicates. Some authors take a broad approach, examining
how globalization, communications technology, and increased networking affect all illicit
or “dark” organizations (Angjeli 2003; Sanderson 2004; Stanislawski 2004). On the other
hand, some authors draw specific analogies between terror networks and individual criminal
enterprises like the Mafia or drug cartels (Schneider and Schneider 2002; Dishman 2005).
As a whole, this literature is useful in examining how various types of networks attempt to
avoid detection, transfer funds, and operate in response to law enforcement.
Another important place where the study of terrorism has come close to looking at them
as TANs is in the study of how charities and other nongovernmental organizations have
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20 V. Asal et al.
supported terrorism. In this case, the NGOs or TANs examined have tended to facilitate
terrorism by providing fund raising or other logistical support. Escobar’s study of the Al
Rashid Trust Corporation, Anatomy of a Terrorist NGO illustrates the ways in which an
NGO can exist almost solely to assist terror networks (Escobar 2001). Attanassoff has
argued that the increased level of activity by Islamic TANs in the Balkans has the potential
to increase the support base for terrorism (Attanassoff 2005).
Perhaps the most interesting work regarding terror networks and NGOs comes from
a small section of Jessica Stern’s Terror in the Name of God (2003). In that book she
makes an analogy that terror networks operate in much the same way that nongovernmental
organizations or businesses do. She describes today’s terror networks as being similar to
many humanitarian groups in their day-to-day operations, which include advertising their
mission and successes, meeting with potential donors, and competing for their place in the
market (Stern 2003).
The only work that directly compares the ways in which terrorist networks operate
to those of TANs is Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s Networks and Netwars. Even then, however,
the comparison is oblique, not explicit, and is part of a larger focus on networking and its
outcomes for politically motivated groups. Arquilla and Ronfeldt explore Netwar and how
the concept applies to both TANs like the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, as
well as to terror groups like Al Qaeda.
The TAN concepts allows two usefully theoretical things. First, it will allow the
application of the concepts, particularly the boomerang effect, that have been so successful
in looking at transnational NGOs to transnational terror networks to help understand them
better. Second, it will allow comparison of violent and nonviolent TANs, increasing variance
and allowing researchers to ask why some TANs turn to violence and others do not.
A comparison of both nonviolent transnational advocacy networks and violent Terrorist
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TTANs) across all their constituent characteristics
should enable their similarities to show through, while also drawing into relief their
differences. In order to synthesize the literature between TANs and Terrorist Networks,
it is important to examine them in similar terms. The rest of this article looks at six
different transnational movements, three nonviolent and three violent and explores them
within the context of TAN theory. The same dynamics that shape the behavior and
strategies of nonviolent TANS are doing the same for Terrorist Activist Networks with
one critical exception—the Terror TANS kill people. The authors first look at the Human
Rights TAN and Al Qaeda, both broad-based TANS with many facets and very varied
agendas across a global arena and find that the same techniques used by the components
of the Human Rights movement are being used by Al Qaeda. They then look at four
more TANS, The Anti-Deforestation Movement, The International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, Hezbollah, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Strategically these
groups use similar means with the exception that the latter two have added violence to their
repertoires.
Human Rights Campaigns
There are many facets to the human rights movement in the same way that there are in many
transnational movements. Like the environmental movement, the human rights movement
is not about a narrowly defined issue but rather a broad and diverse group of individuals
and organizations that share certain philosophical and tactical tenets. Using these shared
elements, these groups are able to create and maintain an international advocacy community.
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Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy 21
Some groups have local or regional focus, and others focus on specific issues like torture,
political freedom, or indigenous rights (Sikkink 1993).
In the case of the anti–capital punishment movement, there was a distinct international
approach that incorporated not just traditional human rights NGOs, but also other
institutions like the Catholic Church. Human rights advocacy groups such as Amnesty
International, The Holy See, the World Council of Churches, and the Mennonite Central
Committee utilized the popular international network structure to develop their human
rights agenda, rather effectively for the abolition of the death penalty (Ferrari 2003, 29).
In an attempt to affect policy change, a network of NGOs in Europe, Australia, and North
America have created strong communications channels and information flows to create a
viable international community with a united goal to end capital punishment.
This international cooperation is vital to the success of human rights TANs.
Documentation and information-gathering skills increased with the new resources the
contacts with these international communities provided. In the Mexican case this
was achieved by groups like the Americas Watch and Amnesty International (AI),
with the cooperation of political opponents of the PRI (Keck and Sikkink 1998,
113).
Others have used this approach, attempting to influence government action through
the use of transnational information flows. The Red Cross successfully utilized this tactic
with the Chilean government after the military coup through the utilization of strong
information politics. With the Red Cross effectively and freely operating in Chile to monitor
the detainment of individuals, the world community and the United States became convinced
that the government was acting in the interests of Human Rights. Through the influence of
the Red Cross and the presence in the country, the human rights situation became improved
through indirect action (Forsythe 1976, 618–619).
Using a political approach to frame a specific issue is another tactic of human rights
TANs. The primary goal of the abolition of capital punishment movement was to engage
policy actors by framing the issue to showing that convicted felons were a vulnerable
population under the state, and draw the connection that capital punishment is therefore a
violation of basic human rights. Through the utilization of transnational information flows,
the movement has had difficulty in reforming policy in nations such as the United States, but
has made progress in shifting public attitudes on the issue of the death penalty, a necessary
first step in any wide-sweeping policy reform (Ferrari 2003, 30).
By rapidly utilizing transnational information flows AI successfully informed the
world community, and brought pressure and eventually a change in policy on the Argentine
government. By publishing a regular report AI showed that disappearances had led to
interrogations and even killings of political prisoners. Not only did this lead to a Nobel
Prize and international recognition, but also to intense pressure for European nations and
the Carter administration to change their policy toward the Argentine government (Sikkink
1993, 424).
Boomeranging a targeted entity through the involvement of international organizations
or larger powers has proved to be the central tactic of TANs. This combination of leverage
and information politics can be very effective in changing policy. This was the case with
Argentina in the 1970s. The more intense the pressure from the international community, the
more likely the Argentine government was to change its policies. U.S. pressure in the region
was vital to eventually ending the human rights violations by the Argentine government; and
the primary source of information available to the U.S. was from Amnesty International. The
domestic human rights organizations began to swiftly develop external contacts to enhance
the dissemination of information. Through these networks, members got information out to
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22 V. Asal et al.
the media and partnership organizations in Europe and North America (Keck and Sikkink
1998, 105).
The increased awareness of the public at large, and the support in policymaking circles
would begin to bring the boomerang effect into effect for the broader international human
rights coalition. The transnational efforts came to play a significant role in the 1976 U.S.
presidential elections. The Carter campaign quickly seized on the growing popularity of the
human rights movement and led to a weakening of the political base of the Ford campaign
as it took a more conservative approach to this international movement (Thomas 2002,
32–34).
With the change in stance on human rights with the new administration the network
successfully continued its efforts to inform policymakers on the human rights situations
throughout the world in an attempt to make human rights a priority policy concern. This
brought about U.S. spearheading the engagement of specific human rights issues throughout
the world. This included influencing the U.S.’s appointment of its ambassador to different
international conferences where human rights would be an issue, and even caused the
United States to turn its attention for the first time to human rights violations taking place
in Eastern European countries under the influential sphere of the communist bloc (Thomas
2002, 29–31).
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda has in many ways become the prototypical transnational terrorist organization.
Although many terror networks operate regionally or even globally in their logistical
and fund-raising efforts, relatively few possess anything approaching a global operational
capability. However, in a very real way, Al Qaeda maintains cells and individuals capable
of mounting serious and catastrophic terrorist attacks throughout the world. This ability to
act globally has stemmed directly from the organization’s unique history and its birth in the
late 1980s.
Al Qaeda (translated as “the base”) grew out of the Afghan resistance to Soviet
occupation following the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union encountered
strong opposition to their invasion, much of it in the form of foreign Muslims who came
to Afghanistan to be involved in what they saw as the defense of an Islamic country from
a godless superpower. Many were in fact also fleeing government persecution in their
home countries, because of their involvement in such Muslim fundamentalist groups as the
Muslim Brotherhood (Baer 91–105). Originally Al Qaeda’s precursor group was a network
designed to help families throughout the Islamic world keep track of their loved ones who
had traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the anti-Soviet jihad, or holy war (Smith
2002, 2). It grew into the Makhtab al Khidmat (MAK) or “services office,” a worldwide
jihad recruiting and fund-raising organization (Mannes 2004, 33). It is this unique origin
that gives Al Qaeda its distinctive international character. Because the mujahideen came
from Islamic communities throughout the globe, Al Qaeda was from the very beginning
distinctively global.
With the end of the Soviet occupation many of these war-hardened Muslim
fundamentalist soldiers were left without a cause for which to fight. Although some stayed
in Afghanistan and prospered under the subsequent Taliban regime, many returned to their
own nations, creating a Diaspora of trained jihadi warriors.
Under the stewardship of Osama bin Laden, this collection of operatives spread
throughout the world was to become what is currently known as Al Qaeda. Beginning
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Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy 23
in the 1990s, Al Qaeda embarked on an increasingly ambitious series of terrorist attacks.
These attacks included the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, the attack on the
U.S.S. Cole, and culminating in the massive logistical and operational undertaking that
was the 9/11 attack. Subsequent attacks by Al Qaeda or their affiliated groups included the
Bali nightclub bombing, Jakarta Marriott bombing, and Madrid subway attack (Mannes
2004).
Al Qaeda as a Transnational Advocacy Network
Al Qaeda has been described and approached in many ways. Peter Bergen describes it
in business terms, comparing Al Qaeda to a multinational corporation of jihad or Holy
War Inc. (Bergen 2001). Others have used analogies varying from Al Qaeda being an
Afghan resistance alumni association (Engel 2001), to a computer network (Deibert 2002),
to the biologically based descriptions of the group as either a living organism (Desker and
Ramakrishna 2002) or a virus (Smith 2002). Although each of these comparisons illustrates
something about the nature of Al Qaeda, perhaps a more useful framework through which
to view Al Qaeda is that of TANs. In fact, Marc Sageman has implicitly suggested as
much “Al Qaeda is not a hierarchical organization, and never was. . . . It was always a social
movement” (Wright 2004).
Like the human rights movement, Al Qaeda is actually not one cohesive and rigidly
hierarchical group, but rather a number of affiliated groups sharing ideological tenets and
members to create a highly adaptable and complex network. Its affiliate groups among others
include a veritable roll call of Islamist terror groups: Al-Jihad and Gamaah-Islamayyah in
Egypt, Jemaah Islamayah in Indonesia, Group Islamique Arm´ee and the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat in Algeria, Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in
the Phillipines, as well as numerous groups in the Kashmir region of Pakistan (Mannes
2004, 3–99). All these groups operate with varying degrees of input and coordination from
Al Qaeda’s leadership, while maintaining much operational and logistical independence.
Al Qaeda has also cooperated with groups that are not constituents, and even have very
different aims; for example, the Shi’ite Muslim group Hezbollah (Mannes 2004, 162–163).
Finally, Al Qaeda throughout its existence has benefited from the help of governments
ranging from the directly supportive, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Sudan, to more
indirect support from sympathetic elements within the Pakistani intelligence service ISI
(Bergen 2001, 220).
Al Qaeda, like the human rights movement, is quite sophisticated in its approach, using
transnational information flows and financial resources to advance its agenda. Similar to
Amnesty International, Al Qaeda has made humanitarian appeals, collecting funds through
Islamic charities (Comras 2005). It has in addition collected funds through front businesses,
wealthy individuals, and involvement in organized crime (Comras 2005). This money has
been covertly collected, distributed, and otherwise manipulated using international banks,
precious commodities like diamonds and gold, and exploitation of the Hawala system
(Comras 2005). Hawala is an informal fund transferring system, often used by Muslim
Diasporas to remit funds, which is based on personal connections and often leaves little
paper trail.
Communication technology, allowing for the easy spread of information, has been an
undeniable boon to Al Qaeda as it has been for the human rights movement. They have
proven very adept at using the Internet and other technological break-throughs to create
a virtual space in which they are able to communicate. Al Qaeda members have been in
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24 V. Asal et al.
touch using e-mail, chat rooms, websites, satellite phones, and have even used commercially
available encryption software to protect their communications (Mannes 2004, 33).
Keck and Sikkink’s different types of politics as used by the human rights movement
are also quite evident in Al Qaeda’s operations and rhetoric. Information politics is evident
in the widespread use of the Internet to communicate within the group, but also to distribute
manifestos and videotapes to the wider public. To this end, Al Qaeda has also used
certain news outlets, like the Al-Jazeera television network, in its attempts to spread its
ideas.
Symbolic politics is pervasive in the Al Qaeda case. The “symbolic interpretation”
that Keck and Sikkink find so important for network formation and cohesiveness is one of
bin Laden’s key strategies. Taking several American foreign policies, including the U.S.
presence in Saudi Arabia and continued mutual antagonism with Iraq, bin Laden offered the
interpretation “these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration
of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims” (Foundation of American Scientists).
This symbolic interpretation is one of the key planks of the Al Qaeda platform as it
were.
Leverage politics is another omnipresent tactic employed by Al Qaeda. Ultimately, Al
Qaeda has several goals including creating a Pan-Islamic caliphate, over-throwing apostate
regimes, and expelling Westerners from Muslim nations (Bergen 2001). Although these
goals are rather wide ranging, they are centered in the Muslim world, yet Al Qaeda has
carried out deadly operations in North America and Europe. These attacks are aimed at
getting Western, specifically American, troops out of the Middle East and lowering the
levels of Western support for the indigenous “apostate” regimes (Johnson 2005). This
dynamic is often discussed in terms of the concepts of the “near enemy,” or local Islamic
governments seen as corrupt, and the “far enemy,” the West in general and America in
particular (Johnson 2005; Henzel 2005; Sageman 2005).
The Al Qaeda view of these apostate regimes is seen in bin Laden’s 1996 comments
about the Saudi Regime in an interview with Nida’ul Islam magazine “the regime does
not cease to cry in the open over the matters effecting the Muslims without making any
serious effort to serve the interests of the Muslim community apart from small efforts in
order to confuse people and throw some dust into their eyes” (fas.org). He goes on to say
that attacks on America serve to illustrate that “people today feel that the Americans have
exceeded their limits both politically and economically, the (Saudi) regime now knows that
the public are aware that their sovereignty is shared . . .” and that the “most important goal
would be to change the current regime, with the permission of Allah” (fas.org).
As with the human rights movement in its targeting of Argentina, Al Qaeda seeks
to “influence American and Western opinion to demand abandonment of . . . US/Western
support of existing Islamic governments” (Clarke 2004, 11). This use of the boomerang
effect is classic leverage politics. Al Qaeda has grievances, real or imagined, against the
West; however, it seems that their attacks on Western targets are often in large part meant to
change conditions domestically by removing Western troops and as such removing support
for the current regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other nations.
The Anti-Deforestation Movement
The international deforestation movement grew out of activities in response to local
situations such as the Rondonia environmental movement in Brazil against the Polonoreste
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development project (Rodrigues 2005), or the local environmental group Sahabat Alam
Malaysia (SAM) in Sarawak, Malaysia in response to industrial lumbering and deforestation
activities (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 131). One example was in the Brazilian province of
Rondonia, where the massive development project known as Polonoreste began intense
lumbering that lead to deforestation. Despite the varied and apolitical nature of the
indigenous peoples in the Rondonia region, efforts to halt the Polonoreste lumbering project
began to take shape (Rodrigues 2005). Concerned individuals and groups began to form
coalitions in an effort to preserve the forests and curtail the massive industrial and political
obstacles leading to the degradation of the environment (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The
international environmental movement initially interested in supporting these local groups
was the environmental nongovernmental organization (ENGO), the Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF). Along with other ENGOs, EDF began to become involved in the local situation
and worked to create a network that what would be termed the Rondonia Forum. This
Forum helped to develop the environmental movement as a unique international community
through the establishment of flows of information. As the TAN of environmental activists
became a cohesive network working together, pressure was applied on banks financing the
endeavor and the Brazilian government (Rodrigues 2005).
As the environmental situations in Sarawak Malaysia and Brazil began to gain
international attention, the global environmental movement began to emerge. Many groups
with different environmental causes joined forces with ENGOs. In a process similar to
that of Al Qaeda, environmentalists motivated by the need to confront large corporations
and nation-states, these groups shared the commonality of being individually ineffective
in making achievements in the face of their much larger opponents. To circumvent this
problem these groups came together and established effective flows of information and a
global network emerged (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 156–159). By placing the local problems
in an international context, essentially re-framing the depletion of the world’s tropical
forests, these groups allowed for a more salient message to be brought to world powers and
international organizations.
The ENGOs have also engaged the WTO, IMF, and World Bank to develop more
environmental friendly procedures in their regular activities. They did this by using leverage
and information politics. Due to the weighed voting system of these institutions based on
monetary support ENGOs have particularly targeted the states with most influence and
funding to these institutions, specifically nations like the U.S. and Germany, who in turn
influence the policies of the WTO, IMF, and the World Bank. By influencing these states,
and subsequently the larger institutions to develop environmental safeguards the ENGOs
are continually utilizing leverage politics to get large international actors to make specific
environmental considerations (Mason 2004).
Hezbollah
Since its foundation, Hezbollah, or the “Party of God,” has been closely intertwined
institutionally with the leadership of the religious elite of Iran. Hezbollah’s command
leadership and the clergy of Iran were natural allies in creation of the Party of God; it
was this initial coordination of like-minded entities that would eventually grow to reach
global proportions (Ranstorp 1994). Similar to the deforestation movement’s targeting of
supportive groups outside of the problem countries, Hezbollah party operatives began to
coordinate with sympathetic Lebanese businessmen, who would conduct and coordinate
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26 V. Asal et al.
illegal fund-raising activities. These activities quickly found great vitality and success
among the strong Lebanese Diasporas sympathetic to the radical positions of Hezbollah.
Eventually the movement spread to adopt more fanatical extremist Islamic supporters
(Meehan 2004, 10–11).
The primary goals since its conception have been the establishment of an Islamist State
in Lebanon, the destruction of Israel, and the recapture of Jerusalem. In addition to this
many Hezbollah leaders felt that the real enemy, especially recently, has been the United
States (Mannes 2004, 147–153).
Hezbollah has carried out the tactic of suicide/vehicle bombings successfully
throughout the world, and is considered the innovator of the tactic among terrorist
organizations. This was the case in 1983 in Beirut when a bombing at the U.S. Marine
Barracks eventually lead to a U.S. withdrawal of forces in 1984 (Mannes 2004, 147). In
1992 Hezbollah was involved in the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, as well
as the Argentine–Israeli Community Center in 1994. This was all part of its transnational
approach to achieve the goal of defeating the government of Israel and the United States.
Soon after investigating the attacks, it became evident that Hezbollah was involved with
other extremist Islamic groups in the area conducting numerous criminal activities in the
TBA to fund these operations here abroad (Hudson 2003, 12–23).
Hezbollah as a Transnational Advocacy Network
Similar to the international deforestation movement, Hezbollah is not a unitary actor, but
rather a network of smaller networks, organizations, and individuals. As Magnus Ranstorp
describes Hezbollah: “. . . Hezbollah is not a monolithic body with total subservience to
Iran but rather a coalition of Lebanese Shiite clerics, who each have their own views and
networks of followers as well as ties to Iran’s clerical establishment” (Ranstorp 1994).
This structure is indicative of the way in which many terror networks take on the same
organizational dynamics as advocacy networks.
Hezbollah has thrived through branching out and connecting with local groups, and
these groups have become vital to Hezbollah’s existence. Organizational integration has not,
however, been limited to local and like-minded groups. In fact, Hezbollah has had important
interaction with many other terrorist groups and networks from around the world. One clear
example of this is the fact that Hezbollah camps have trained operatives from such disparate
groups as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the Basque
Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), and Italy’s Red Brigades (Goldberg 2002).
Given Hezbollah’s global ideology, various communities have proved to hold religious
goals that are in line with Hezbollah’s own strategic goals (Meehan 2004). Due to its high
Shi’ite population and various communities of the Lebanese Diaspora, an African continent
plagued by ineffective governments and local law enforcement entities has been a key
fund-raising and logistical support base. Hezbollah has found tremendous financial and
political support abroad. Israeli intelligence reporting predicts that Hezbollah fundraising
activities raise hundreds of thousands of dollars (U.S.) annually from the region, specifically
from the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Benin, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South
Africa (Levitt 2004a).
In addition to Iran, Africa, and North America one of the fastest and most vital regions
of the world to the transnational efforts of Hezbollah is the Tri Border Area (TBA) in
South America of Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay. Due to limited government capability and
investigation by the local governments, exact details of Hezbollah’s activities there are
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Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy 27
not known; but according to Paraguayan officials, Arab communities in the TBA have
contributed remittances of between $50 and $500 million (U.S.) between 1998 and 2001
to Islamic terror groups in the Middle East, Hezbollah being one of the primary recipients
(Meehan 2004, 32).
Following the attacks of 11 September, the U.S. put increased pressure on the
government of Paraguay to crack down on criminal actions linked to terrorist group
activity in the TBA. Very soon after the attacks, 16 Lebanese nationals were arrested on
immigration violations. Other arrests of suspected terrorists leaders soon followed, which
yielded evidence of periodic payments to Hezbollah of amounts ranging from $25000 to
$50000 and literature intended to increase recruitment into terrorist organizations linked to
Hezbollah (Madani 2002).
Hezbollah utilizes modern communications to conduct terrorist activities and even has
television network, Al-Manar, or “The Beacon.” In conjunction with the American telethon
format Hezbollah has raised substantial cash donations with its 24-hour televisions station,
many of the proceeds of which were funneled to Palestinian efforts in Israel (Mannes 2004,
160). These funds are then channeled to several Lebanese-based banks that are immune
to having their assets frozen or confiscated by the government; these banks in turn have
connections with many large U.S. banks, which prove useful in the channeling of funds
abroad for terrorists’ activities. These banks include such high profiles banks as Bank of
New York, Wachovia, and JP Morgan Chase (Jorisch 2003).
Much like the international deforestation movement, which made links to other
environmental organizations, Hezbollah has branched out culturally as much as it has
geographically. It has efforts to pool its resources with Sunni groups, most prominently Al
Qaeda and its affiliates such as Egypt’s Al-Jihad and Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group. Some
of Hezbollah’s founding members were even associated with the Fatah/Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) elite unit Force 17 (Mannes 2004, 161–165).
In terms of symbolic interpretation of the kind associated with TAN behavior, there
have been two key successes for Hezbollah. Hezbollah has interpreted its terrorist tactics
as successful, and many argue that they indeed were, in two key historical cases (Goldberg
2002). The first case was the U.S. and French withdrawal of peacekeepers after Hezbollah’s
1983 bombings of the U.S. embassy, a U.S. Marine Barracks, and a compound housing
French peacekeeping troops (MIPT). The second case, perhaps less prestigious but certainly
more closely related to Hezbollah’s raison d’etre, was the decision in the year 2000 of Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Barak to remove Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon. This retreat
had left Hezbollah as the only terror or guerilla group with the demonstrated ability to force
Israel to engage in troop withdrawals (Goldberg 2002), although others have taken credit
for the recent withdrawal of settlers from the Gaza Strip.
By targeting their enemy (primarily Israel) throughout the globe, they have forced
the world community to take notice. This increased global attention leads to sympathetic
groups emerging elsewhere and completes the boomerang tactic employed by Hezbollah
in its effort to achieve its objective (Ranstorp 1994). Although Hezbollah’s immediate and
concrete goals all involve the domestic politics in Israel and Lebanon, they have carried
out attacks on a Kuwaiti airline in Thailand, a U.S. airline in Denmark, and hijacked a
TWA flight from Athens to Rome (MIPT). None of these actions had an instrumental
effect of changing policies in Israel or Lebanon, rather using the boomerang effect and
leverage politics, they were designed to accomplish goals by putting international pressure
on Hezbollah’s side. This same kind of pressure was used by the international deforestation
movement targeting Western states and international governmental organizations to use the
boomerang effect on Malaysia and Brazil.
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28 V. Asal et al.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is an umbrella organization that
coordinates and facilitates for its myriad local affiliate groups. Although these local groups
may have parochial aims, they have joined together with similar groups, creating one of the
most impressive transnational advocacy networks ever assembled. At the close of the Cold
War small civil conflicts became increasingly common, and problematically, increasingly
likely to involve huge numbers of antipersonnel (AP) landmines. The proliferation
and widespread use of AP landmines, which do not distinguish between civilians and
combatants, began to raise the ire of many in the international community.
AP Landmines, because they are weapons of attrition, often simply (and purposely)
maim their victims, thereby creating a strain on the resources of the opposing force.
However, communities that had previously suffered through conflict and were attempting
to create or recreate a functioning society were increasingly feeling this burden. As this
became more and more common, disparate nongovernmental organizations began calling
for a ban on AP landmines. Beginning in 1991 a number of human rights groups came
out in favor of a ban, including Asia Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, the Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation, and Medico International (Price 1998, 633, 642).
This momentum continued, and within a year, the NGO community had created a
steering committee of six NGOs to address the issue of AP landmines. As high profile
groups like Handicap International and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) began to pressure the world’s most powerful nations for moratoriums on AP
landmine exports and use, the efforts began to snowball. In 1993 the ICRC held a conference
in Switzerland devoted to the problems of AP landmines, which brought together NGOs,
medical practitioners, military experts, de-mining groups, and various media. After 1993,
the disparate NGOs and local anti-landmine groups would operate under the aegis of the
ICBL (Price 1998).
The ICBL would go on to make great progress in their attempts to mitigate the harmful
effects of AP landmine usage. Eventually it would encompass over 1,400 local NGOs and
organizations in over 90 countries (ICBL.org). The ICBL ultimately facilitated the creation
of a mine ban treaty signed in 1997 by 122 governments worldwide. Although 122 does
seem like a very large number, it is important to note that nonsignatory states include
the United States, China, India, and Russia (ICBL.org). Further, in 1997, the ICBL and its
coordinator Jody Williams were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to eliminate
AP mines (Rutherford 2000).
ICBL as a Transnational Advocacy Network
The Campaign to Ban Landmines is an archetypical TAN. Similar to the way Al Qaeda
formed, the ICBL was a natural outgrowth of numerous local NGOs doing similar tasks
and confronting similar challenges in different geographical locales. Because of increased
interaction between these NGOs, both in real and virtual space, the ICBL emerged. In fact
it was from this interaction that understanding that there existed an AP landmine problem
arose, and was subsequently politicized. After the issue was identified, the ICBL became
a clearinghouse for information, statistics, and rhetorical approaches (Deibert 2003). This
coordination function for local organizations is a key aspect of the transnational advocacy
network approach.
Another important facet of TANs is that they have transnational information and
resource flows. Although resources indeed cross borders, one of the most important aspects
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of what ICBL did was to collect and distribute information like statistics that contextualized
the problems associated with AP landmines for an audience that had not previously known
there was a problem. These information flows, especially utilizing the Internet after 1995
(Deibert 2003) were so extensive that Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe the ICBL as a “seminal
case of worldwide netwar” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 5). Along with using the Internet
or virtual space to forge connections between local groups worldwide, the holding of
conferences like those in Montreux, Switzerland and Vienna, Austria also create a real
world forum for interaction and network consolidation (Price 1998).
The ICBL also used textbook examples of Keck and Sikkink’s different types of
politics. Information politics, or sharing and making available information, led to the
emergence of the issue on the global scene as well as to increased understanding of the
scope of the problem (Price 1998). Leverage politics were also key to the ICBL strategy.
The ICBL routinely published lists of the worst AP landmine offenders and their policies
used to pressure nations to reform (Cameron 1999, 91). This strategy, what Cameron calls
“mobilizing shame” is a classic TAN technique. In trying to mobilize the Muslim world Al
Qaeda has used the same method. Symbolic politics, what Keck and Sikkink describe as
framing issues by “identifying and providing convincing explanations” for events, was also
an important tactic used by the ICBL (Keck and Sikkink 1998). For years AP landmines
had been seen simply as one of many disarmament problems; however, the ICBL was able
to recast the issue in far graver terms; framing it in the perspective of both human rights
and its role as a stumbling block to economic and human development (Cameron 1999,
87). Finally, the idea of accountability politics is where the ICBL is currently doing the
bulk of its work. There are over 100 researchers in 90 countries that monitor the progress
and compliance of various states in regards to AP landmines (ICBL.org/lm).
The boomerang effect is also evident in the activities of the ICBL. One of the
most common forms of protest that the ICBL used was what was termed shoe piles or
shoe pyramids. These mounds of donated shoes were designed to represent the limbs
lost to AP landmines throughout the world (Price 1998). The shame mobilization was
not, however, used only in countries plagued by landmines, or even in Landmine Ban
nonsignatory states; shoe piles were also employed in states that were sympathetic to the
ban, like France (calm.org.nz) and those that vigorously worked for the ban, like Canada
(Minesactioncanada.com). In this case, these protests were not intended to change the
policy of the state they occurred in, but rather to help pressure these governments to exert
influence over other states.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Among the most dangerous and well-organized terrorist organizations in the world is the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who have been waging war on the Sri Lankan
government since 1983. The group, whose principal aim is to create a self-governing
homeland for the Tamil minority within the island nation of Sri Lanka, has proven itself
innovative, effective, and deadly. They claim that the majority Sinhalese oppress and repress
the Tamil population, which is concentrated in the north of the island. The Tigers have at
times controlled large portions of northern Sri Lanka, specifically the Jaffna Peninsula
(MIPT). The group is led by Vellupillai Prabakharan, who has focused violent attacks not
just on Sri Lankan officials and civilians, but also against those Tamils who would compete
with him or the Tigers (Van de Voorde 2005, 183, 185).
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30 V. Asal et al.
Their attacks have ranged from individual assassinations, to large-scale assaults that
mirror those by conventional military forces (Byman et al. 2001). The Tigers are so effective
that they are the only terrorist network that has been responsible for the assassinations of
two heads of state, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan leader Ranasinghe
Premadsa (Chalk 2000).
The Tigers are deadly for several reasons, not least of which is their large-scale use
of suicide bombing. This tactic has been one of the most important in their arsenal, with
the LTTE having an entire wing or unit (The Black Tigers) devoted to suicide attacks (U.S.
State Deptartment). The Black Tigers had conducted well over 100 suicide attacks using
innovative bomb technology, and even incorporating training with gliders and micro-light
aircraft (Chalk 2000). One of the most interesting aspects of the Tigers is the extent to
which they have diversified their operations beyond suicide and car bombings. In fact, their
military wing has naval and airborne sections, capabilities virtually unheard of among even
the most developed terror networks (Chalk 2000).
The operational history of the Tigers illustrates a group that is extremely capable, and
incredibly vicious. The 1996 bombing of the Central Bank in Colombo killed 96 people and
injured over 1,400. Although that was the largest single attack, it does not seem particularly
un-representative of the tactics and results of the Tigers. A 1987 railway blast in Madras
killed 25 and injured 100, and a bus bomb in Maradana killed 32 and injured over 250 in
1998 (MIPT). An examination of these attacks quickly shows how effective the Tigers are
operationally, and the extent to which bloodshed seems not to bother them.
The LTTE as a Transnational Advocacy Network
The LTTE may not, at first glance, seem particularly well suited to the TAN analogy. They
are a terror group that is relatively narrowly focused on a nationalist struggle, and whose
attacks have been confined to only two countries: Sri Lanka and India. This group might
seem to lack the international operational character of Al Qaeda or Hezbollah. In this case
however, looks are deceiving. Although the attacks of the LTTE have been geographically
concentrated, the support network and logistical base that enables them is anything but. The
violence may be parochial, but it relies on a massive global network of NGOs, charities,
and individuals connected by information technology (Van de Voorde 2005, 191). India,
Canada, the United States, Britain, Continental Europe, Singapore, and Malaysia are just
a sample of the many places that support streams to the LTTE front (Wayland 2004,
418–419).
The network that supports the LTTE is vast, and generally agreed to be divided into
three major roles: publicity, fund-raising, and weapons procurement (Byman 2001; Chalk
2000). Each of these roles is undertaken by a related network of individual members of the
Tamil Diaspora, small Tamil interest NGOs, and larger umbrella organizations that help
to coordinate these many disparate groups into a TAN to support the LTTE. For example,
the publicity role is in large part conducted by organizations of smaller Tamil interest
groups throughout the world. A mere sampling of these groups is purported to include
the United Tamil Organization in Britain, the Federal Association of Canadian Tamils, the
Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations out of Australia, and the French Federation of
Tamil Associations (Byman et al. 2001). These groups coordinate with the LTTE leadership
in bases of operation like the Eelam House in London, which, exploiting relatively liberal
Western laws and multiculturalism, has served openly as by the de facto headquarters of
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the LTTE outside of Sri Lanka (Byman et al. 2001). This worldwide information-sharing
network plays the same role in educating constituencies around the world that Amnesty
International and similar organizations did for the human rights movement.
The fund-raising operations take on a similar character as the publicity machine. Using
the Tamil Diaspora and the charities and NGOs that it supports, the LTTE has managed
to create a massive worldwide financial pipeline. In fact, some estimates are that they
bring in as much as 80 million dollars per year (Wayland 2004, 421). The funding sources
are as diverse as wealthy individuals, skimming money from legitimate charities, and
involvement in organized crime. An example of the wealthy individuals is Shan Sunder a
“medical practitioner” living in California who has contributed almost four million dollars
to the Tigers (Byman et al. 2001). This “entrepreneur” as Keck and Sikkink would refer to
him is representative of one type of funding opportunity that is presented to the LTTE.
Another major source of funds is the confiscation of money out of legitimate charities
that claim to be doing social and humanitarian work for Tamils in Sri Lanka (Chalk 2000).
This method of funding is in no way unique to the LTTE, but in fact is seen in areas of
conflict around the world (Raphaeli 2003). Organized crime has also played prominently
into the LTTE’s finances. They have been involved in drug running (Chalk 2000), human
trafficking, and extortion of members of the Tamil Diaspora (Byman et al. 2001).
The Tigers have also embraced information technology both in terms of communication
and coordination, as well as a way in which to broadcast its message and perspective to the
rest of the world (Wayland 2004, 419–420). The Tigers have established a strong Internet
presence using not only websites but also news groups, and extensive use of e-mail (Byman
et al. 2001). They also maintain their own homepage, which offers updates, news, and
propaganda (www.eelam.com). Finally they have even embraced the Internet as a forum
for further terrorism. In 1996 the Tigers’ engaged in a cyberterror attack on the computers
of several Sri Lankan embassies. By sending massive numbers of e-mails to the consulate’s
computer systems, the Tigers were able to create a “virtual blockade” (Zanini and Edwards
2001). The Internet, however, is only the beginning of the Tigers’ embrace of information
technology. They have their own radio shows and telephone hotlines (Byman et al. 2001)
as well as their own television station (BBC 2005).
The LTTE also engage in much of Keck and Sikkink’s typology of politics. Information
politics is the realm of the publicity arm, which by way of its various web portals and other
media attempt to spread a multitiered message (Wayland 2004, 418). This message focuses
on one hand on the discrimination against and oppression of Tamils in Sri Lanka and on
the need for a homeland, but on the other hand it embraces the “legitimacy” of armed
resistance (Eelam). This attempt to frame the debate in terms of human rights violations
and self-determination, as opposed to in terms of terrorism or insurgency is key to the
Tigers achieving the level of international acceptance that they have. The use of framing is
the same as that being used by the land mines and deforestation movements.
Tied in with information politics is the conception of leverage politics. This idea,
using international pressure to reform the host or local government is clearly present in the
Tigers case. The aforementioned information politics have been used to confer an unusual
status on the LTTE. In the international community the Tigers and the Tamil struggle for
a homeland has been supported by several major NGOs including the World Council of
Churches, International Federation of Journalists, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center
for Human Rights, and the International Human Rights Law Group (Chalk 2000). This
attempt to gain legitimacy and international support is a sort of indirect attempt to utilize
the boomerang effect.
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What We Can Learn from the TAN Analogy
What is most striking when looking at the cases is that despite the stark relief offered by the
distinction between violent and nonviolent tactics, there remains so much similarity. Indeed,
some of the nonviolent networks differ more from each other than they do from the terrorist
networks. Even so, the organizational dynamics, tactics, and avenues for communication
and coordination are in many ways exactly the same. The same organizational and technical
changes that have enabled an increasing level of international vigilance against human rights
violations have also enabled the exponential increase in the danger posed by groups like Al
Qaeda and Hezbollah. As seen in Table 1, when it comes to the key components of TANs
all of the miniature case studies share the key characteristics of TANs. These organizations
are Transnational Activist Networks and seeing them as such helps to understand them
better.
TANs operate the way they do because they provide particular advantages to
nongovernmental organizations facing stronger actors. It’s clear that Arquilla and Ronfeldt
understood this when they observed: “Ethno-nationalists, criminals, and terrorists—all have
found new power in networking. But so too have emerging global civil society actors . . .”
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 20). TANS allow for the adoption of boomerang and leverage
strategies. Whether it is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines organizing shoe pile
protests in Paris or Al Qaeda organizing the bombing of the Madrid subway, organizations
are able to operate more effectively using a coalition of international coordinating groups,
local affiliates, and entrepreneurial individuals. These symbolic acts were done to motivate
policy change about places thousands of miles away—classic boomerang politics. Both
were successful.
The boomerang pattern is not alone in being a tactic that crosses the violence divide
between TANs and TTANs. Information politics is as important to the environmental
movement as it is to the Tamil Tigers. Greenpeace must make others aware of its successes,
failures, and what problems remain; so too must the Tigers keep their constituents abreast
of their successes and failures, as well as bringing news of the cause to the outside world.
That is why both groups maintain websites devoted to informing the public and mobilizing
the supporters (www.greenpeace.org, www.eelam.com).
Leverage politics is also clearly evident across the spectrum from TANs to TTANs.
The boomerang effect, attempting to manipulate international attitudes to apply pressure
to domestic or local authorities, is readily apparent in both terror networks and issue-based
advocacy groups. The more than 15 attacks on Germany in 1995 by the Kurdish Workers
Party had far less to do with influencing the treatment of Kurds in Germany (MIPT), than
it did with influencing their treatment in Turkey. In the same way, the groups supporting
Planafloro and their lobbying effort before the U.S. Congress had virtually nothing to do
with instrumentally affecting American domestic policy; rather it had to do with bringing
the U.S.’s considerable international power to bear, in the form of political pressure, on the
domestic situation in Brazil.
Symbolic politics too crosses the boundary between advocacy and terror. Symbolic
interpretation of the type Keck and Sikkink discuss has been useful not just to advocacy
groups, but to groups of all stripes. For example, terrorist use of symbolic politics is very
clear in the emergence of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade during the recent intifada in Palestine,
which resulted from the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Al Aqsa Mosque in September of 2000
(Council on Foreign Relations 2005).
Finally, even accountability politics, which may seem, of the four, the least suited to
TTANs is in some ways evident in terror networks. Although it is clear that Amnesty
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Table1
ComparingTANsandterroristTANs
Networks/characteristic
Human
Rights
Campaigns
TheAnti-
Deforestation
Movement
The
International
Campaignto
BanLandminesAlQaedaHezbollah
TheLiberation
TigersofTamil
Eelam
Characterizedbyvoluntary,reciprocal,and
horizontalpatternsofcommunicationand
exchange
YesYesYesYesYesYes
CooperationbetweenactorsfromdifferentcountriesYesYesYesYesYesYes
SharingofinformationintegraltothenetworkYesYesYesYesYesYes
Useofleverage,symbolicandaccountability
politics
YesYesYesYesYesYes
UseoftheboomerangeffectYesYesYesYesYesYes
LevelofstructureVariesMediumHighLowHighHigh
UseofviolenceNoNoNoYesYesYes
33
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34 V. Asal et al.
International’s reports on Human Rights violations are an attempt to hold nations
accountable for their actions, in a similar yet distorted way the fatwa encouraging attacks
on American civilians issued by Osama bin Laden is an attempt to do the same. Both
are essentially proclamations, which attempt to hold a nation accountable for a real or
perceived grievance. The difference is that one endeavors to do so using international
norms and shame, whereas the other relies on the threat of force.
One can better understand the strategies of transnational terrorist groups by
understanding that they are following a set of repertories that has been proved useful
by many other nongovernmental organizations. Terrorists adopt the TAN model because it
is one that brings with it a new range of repertoires, boomerang, leverage, symbolic and
accountability politics, that often work. By understanding terrorist transnational networks
as violent nongovernmental movements that are pursuing a strategy similar to that of other
transnational nongovernmental an understanding is gained of why terrorist transnational
networks behave the way they do. For example, international terrorism can be thought of
as a violent boomerang effect motivating disengaged or unsupportive actors to take the
Terrorist TANs seriously and to put pressure on the governments of interest to change their
ways. The rise of international terrorism and international human rights movements and
other world culture movements (Meyer et al. 1997) at the same time makes sense—they are
part of the same phenomena except that some TANs choose to use indiscriminate violence
and others do not.
Implications and Conclusions
There is a growing need to understand how terrorist networks function and the strategies and
tactics they use to achieve their goals. This article argued that the theoretical framework of
TANs is a useful one for thinking about terrorist transnational networks and can help frame
them in such a way that they fit into the larger theoretical effort to understand international
relations.
Of equal importance in identifying transnational terrorist networks as TANs begins to
help one understand why such networks arose when and where they did. The enabling role
of information technology, for example, offers an important explanation of how the former
mujahideen leaving Afghanistan, and returning to their native countries were able to stay
in touch creating perhaps the first truly global terror network in Al Qaeda.
This analogy also offers us some explanatory power in terms of why these networks
behave the way they do and select the targets that they do. The Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK) may not have had instrumental goals in its bombings in Western Europe; however,
the importance of the boomerang effect and international leverage offer valuable insight
into why instrumental goals are not sufficient for explaining much terrorist action.
Finally, by identifying terrorist transnational networks as TANs one can begin to
look at terrorist networks as something other than a sui generis phenomenon and start
to explore questions such as some groups turn to terrorism and why others do not while
comparing the same units of analysis. This is important so as to remove the all too common
view of the terrorist as crazed lunatic or irrational hate monger. Rather, the TAN analogy
shows that terrorists operate in the same manner as other non-state actors attempting to
affect change in the international system. By exploiting the same technologies and power
dynamics, terrorists show clearly that they cannot be discounted as unique and perverse
political actors, but rather must be viewed contextually as part of a spectrum of international
political action.
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Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy 35
This brief look at six TANS, three violent and three not, suggests that different kinds of
ideologies may lead to different uses of violence by TANS. TANS that embrace norms that
are inclusive in a World Culture (Meyer et al. 1997) sense may be less prone to violence
whereas older religious and nationalist norms may use the framework of TANS but have
less hesitancy to marry them to the tool of violence. However, this assertion is not without
qualification. There exist many nonviolent religious advocacy networks, and there have in
fact been many groups that have embraced terrorism as a tactic for traditional TAN goals like
environmental advocacy or to bring attention to human rights violations. It may, however,
be worth noting that the goals expounded by both terror TANs and traditional TANs are,
whether stopping acid rain or reestablishing the divine kingdom on earth, couched in terms
of changing the world for the better. There are good norms and bad norms, violent and
nonviolent movements, and understanding how TANs can help either advance will shed
light on all of them.
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