The Russian-Georgian armed
Conflict
Background information
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/cis_europe_pol_2003.jpg
Population
• 4,4 mil.
Population
•142 mil.
Background information: breakaway regions
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South
Ossetia
• 70,000
Abkhazia
• 216 ,000
Ajaria
• 376,000
Background information: history of conflict
• Late 18th century – Ossetia was incorporated into the
Russian Empire and divided into northern and
southern regions
• 1918-1921 – Georgian independence from Russian
Empire
• 1921 - Georgia was annexed by the Soviet Union
• 1922 - South Ossetia was established as an
autonomous region of the Soviet Republic of Georgia
Background information: history of conflict
• 1989-1990 - South Ossetia tried to gain
independence from Georgia
• April 1991 - Georgia received independence
• 1991-1992 - brutal clashes between South Ossetians
and Georgians, 1,000 dead*
• 1992 – Ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia
*http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5623&l=1
Background information: history of conflict
• 2003 – “Rose Revolution” in Georgia
• 2004 – fighting broke out in South Ossetia.
• 2007 – Georgia calls for internationalization of
peacekeeping force in the region
• August 2008 – 5 days armed conflict between Russia
and Georgia
The second phase of escalation
• The second stage of escalation of the conflict started 18 years
after the ceasefire agreement in 1992. State weakness was
the key problem that undermined Georgia´s development
since its independence. National-building efforts to achieve
national integration were ill-prepared as well as state
effectiveness (or “state capture”) to provide territorial control.
After Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, he launched a policy
of consolidating the Georgian state, developing the
elementary features of functional statehood
The second phase of escalation
• Saakashvili´s major goals were to accomplish a process of transformation of
Georgian state, struggle against corruption and poverty in the country,
achieving NATO membership and territorial integrity.
• Georgia verbally emphasized its desire for a peaceful settlement of the
conflicts. The new Georgian government emphasized the need to deal with
the issue of territorial control to build a strong state.
• The first success on this way was achieved in Achara by overthrowing Aslan
Abashidze´s regime in 2004. This event meant double victory for Georgian
government:
• 1. the victory over autocratic ruler in the name of democracy
• 2. a victory in the state building process.
• After Adjara had become a part of Georgia without major international
complications or an outbreak of violence, the Georgian government started to
deal with the issue of South Ossetia.
Thes second phase of escalation
• Before 2004 there was no major deterioration of situation on the conflict
zone with South Ossetia.
• Georgians and South Ossetians were engaged in active trading across the
zone.
• Georgian government believed that the problem was only the corrupt clan
of Eduard Kokoiti ruling in South Ossetia and South Ossetians would be
willing to struggle against him.
• In 2004, Georgia launched a campaign against smuggling in South
Ossetia. Unlike expected outcome, Ossetians consolidated behind the defacto
government. That led to a crisis culminating in August 2004, when an
outbreak of armed conflicts between Georgian and Ossetian soldiers
erupted. Unlike the triumph in Achara this development indicated overall
setback and worsening relationship in the conflict zone.
South Ossetia
• Since the development in 2004,
Saakshvili´s strategy was to
achieve success through
internationalization of Georgian
conflicts, NATO membership and
gaining support of from the
West.
• In July 2005, President Saakashvili
announced a new peace plan for
South Ossetia that offered
substantial autonomy and a
three-stage settlement,
consisting of demilitarization,
economic rehabilitation, and a
political settlement.
• South Ossetian “president”
Eduard Kokoiti rejected the plan.
South Ossetia
• In March 2007, President Saakashvili proposed another
peace plan for South Ossetia that involved creating
“transitional” administrative districts throughout the
region.
• In July 2007, President Saakashvili decreed the
establishment of a commission to work out South Ossetia’s
“status” as a part of Georgia.
• The JCC finally held a meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia, in October
2007, but the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the
Georgian emissaries made unacceptable demands in order
to deliberately sabotage the results of the meeting. No
further meetings were held.
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/09/16/world/16georgia_600.jpg
Roki Tunnel – Only road passage from Russia to South Ossetia
Convoy of Russian soldiers by the Caucasus mountains
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Russian forces in Goergia
Conflict Analysis: Interests
Stakeholder Interests
Georgia • Return breakaway regions
• Display that territorial integrity is under threat
• Promote NATO membership
•Demonstrate Russia’s aggressiveness
South Ossetia • Demonstrate violation of human rights
• Show that Georgia is aggressive state
•Get international recognition of their plight
• Desire for independence or incorporation into Russian Federation
Russia •Undermine Georgia’s territorial integrity
•Prevent Georgia from joining NATO
• Send strong message to Ukraine
• Protect its sphere of influence
•Control of the Caucasus and its energy resources
•Promote “regime change” in Georgia? West’s recognition of
Kosovo? U.S. Missile Defense Shield?
Conflict Analysis: Interests
EU • Human rights protection
• Observance of international law
• Access to energy resources
NATO/US • Security and stability in the region
• Observance of international law
• Energy security
• Commitment to idea of democracy
•NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)
Stakeholder Interests
Oil and Gas pipeline that pass through Georgia
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aijan_map_570xvar.gif &alt_tag=Diagram of Azeri project comprising four platforms in the Azeri field
Conflict Analysis: Actions
Stakeholder Actions
Georgia • Accusing Russia of supporting separatist movements
• Military attack on Tskhinvali, capital of South Ossetia
• Accusation of violation of human rights and ethnic cleansing
• Attack South Ossetian-populated villages in S.O.
South Ossetia • Encouraged support from Russia
• Militias attack and loot Georgian-populated villages in S.O.
Russia • Disproportionate counter-offensive attack
• Invasion of Georgian cities and ports
• Accusation of violation of human rights and ethnic cleansing
• Recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states
EU • Shuttle diplomacy between Russia and Georgia
• Signing ceasefire agreement, ambiguity
• Accusing Russia of disproportionate response
• Appeal of use of diplomatic means to resolve conflict
• Suspension of EU-Russia Partnership talks
NATO/US • Accusing Russia of disproportionate response
• Suspension of NATO-Russia Council
Conflict Analysis: Stages
• 1992-2008 – Frozen Conflict
(Summer 2004 – Active)
• 2008 – Escalation of Conflict
• 2009 – Conflict Unresolved
Conflict Analysis: Consequences
• Deterioration of peace, stability and security in
Europe and beyond
• Dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations
• Energy security
• Disregard for and enforcement of international law
• 158,000 displaced people (according to UNHCR)
• Reconstruction and Reconciliation
Georgian soldiers in Gori
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Tskhinvali: the Aftermath
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Six-Point Ceasefire Plan
• 1. Not to resort to force;
• 2. To end hostilities definitively;
• 3. To provide free access for humanitarian aid;
• 4. Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to
their usual bases;
• 5. Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the
lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending
an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping
forces will implement additional security measures;
• 6. Opening of international talks on the security and
stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Geneva talks
• In the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian war in
August 2008, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) called for the
establishment of a mediation forum aimed at
security and stability in the South Caucasus. The
initiative goes back to the “Six-Point Ceasefire
Plan” reached by French (and then EU) President
Nikolas Sarkozy and his Russian counterpart
Dmitry Medvedev, which brought to an end
themilitary confrontation between Moscow and
Tbilisi.
Geneva talks
Geneva talks
• Initially Georgia urged the forum to include also
the replacement of Russian military forces with
international peacekeepers, EU monitoring within
the separatist entities (i.e. an extension of
EUMM); and the restoration of Georgia’s
territorial integrity.
• By contrast, Russia insisted on modifyingthe
mandates of the OSCE and UN missions in the
region. The parties failed to reach an agreement
and the OSCE as well as the UN were forced to
leave.
• Establish an international peace mediation
and monitoring process
• Encourage dialogue and reconciliation
• Aid the return of displaced persons
• Reconstruct areas damaged or destroyed by
the conflict
Recommendations
Challenge for the International Community
How to establish a mechanism or process to
hold Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia
accountable for their actions, but without
isolating them from the international
community in order to prevent such
aggressive actions from happening in the
future?
Consequnces
• Because of the war, Georgia has become a country without
definite borders of its own territory, and hence it does not
meet one of the key requirements for new NATO members
declared in a NATO study on its potential expansion.
Opponents of Georgian membership in NATO have been using
this unquestionable fact intensively in recent years. However,
it is only a secondary argument. The main problem lies in the
lack of willingness in the West to provide Georgia with any
obligations, as it is unable to defend it.
• The conflict in the 90s was about how to define political arrangements in
Georgian state; it was more about the clashes between national projects
and their legitimacy. The conflict which took place almost five years ago
was more about state borders and territorial integrity. Furthermore, unlike
the situation in 90s, Georgian states demonstrated its ability to resist and
survive military defeat: the political regime maintained in power even
after the conflict and continue to function; even the armed forces
reformed their ranks, without undergoing disintegration or collapse. Most
importantly, the Russian-Georgian armed conflict demonstrated that the
radical nationalism of 80s and 90s has changed to a form of state
patriotism, when armed confrontation is organized by states and the
clashes between regular armies.
• Mass mobilization which was a key factor in the first escalation phase disappeared
as a factor in the second escalation phase. Mobilization of masses, which led to
the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, was a struggle against electoral frauds,
corrupted elites and state weakness. In the latter one, the state is not endangered
by popular movement, rather the state itself is the actor, initiating change through
its military might rather than through nationalistic appeals of political leaders
manipulating with the aspect of ethnicity.
• The conflict which erupted in 1980s was sparked by the fear from assimilation and
fear to lose cultural heritage of minor groups. This time the conflict did not touch
the hearts of Georgian and the issue of their self-identification. It was more about
defending Georgian territory and state’s borders. The issue in stake in 2008 was
the pro-Western orientation of Georgia and Russia´s interests to undermine the
penetration of other powers in the South Caucasus region. In this way, we can
argue, that territorial issues, that played a primary role in the second escalation
phase were correlated with ideological aspects.
Consequences
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4P4nePpB
HKc
References
• Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout. International Crisis Group,
Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008
• Sabine Freizer, Crisis group’s Europe Program Director
discusses the implications of the Georgian-Russian conflict
http://www.crisisgroup.be/tests/georgia_sep08/georgia_pres.
html
• A Strategic Conflict Analysis of the South Caucasus With a
Focus on Georgia, Svante E. Cornell et all, SIDA, 2005
• Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia
and the World, Svante E. Cornell et all, Policy paper, August
2008, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies
Program