Georgian conflicts - South
Ossetia
Mgr. Zinaida Shevchuk
Armed Conflicts in the South
Caucasus
• Armed conflicts in the Caucasus represent one of the most complex
challenges that emerged with the break of the Soviet Union.
• Patterns of political, economic, cultural discrimination, intensified
by historical grievances, the effects of political transformation and
economic development, national doctrines, the role of external
actors, have all contributed to the escalation of the conflicts in this
region.
• That created a challenge for the conflict analysis and has led to the
development of different interpretations emphasizing the role of
weak states, economic depression and external support.
South Ossetia
• According to the 1989 census:
100,000 out of 160,000 Ossetians lived
not in Georgia’s South Ossetia
Autonomous Region, but in other
parts of Georgia.
In South Ossetia: 65,000 – 66.2%
Ossetians
Georgian: 29 000 – 29%.
Language: Indo-European group and is
distinctly related to Iranian (Farsi) but
uses the Cyrillic alphabet with
Ossetian modifications.
Religious: Ossetians and Georgians
basically share orthodox
Christianity.
South Ossetia
• Ossetian mythology: Ossetians
first Iranian people to reach the
Caucasus region.
- The ancient Scythians in North
Caucasus 8th century B.C.E.
- Alan kingdom in the 7th century.
- Migration in the 13th century after
the Mongol invasion.
- Ossetians who invaded Georgia in
the 13th century were expelled in
the 14th – so the current
settlement of Ossetians in Georgia
(Inner Kartli), dates to 17th/18th
century – making the Ossetians
newcomers in Georgia.
South Ossetia
• “South Ossetia” – Bolshevik’s
invention from 19th century –
referring to an area that was the
heartland of eastern Georgia for
centuries.
• Ossetians – little evidence of
hostility toward ethnic rivals.
• Ossetians outside South Ossetia –
Georgianzed linguistically.
• Ossetians hostility in 1980s was
primarily a reaction against the
chauvinistic tendencies of
Georgian nationalism.
South Ossetia
• Janurary 1989 Ademon Nykhas (Popular Shrine0
- the South Ossetian Popular Front – Alan Chochiev.
• In the spring of 1989, the leader of Ademon Nykhas,
Alan Chochiev, published an open letter, declaring
his groups support for the Abkhazian campaign
against the opening of a Georgian branch of Tbilisi
university in Sukhumi, Abkhazia.
• Ademon Nykhas – secession from Georgia and
dominance over local Goergians
• - while Georgian nationalists – abolish South
Ossetia‘s name and autonomy.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• First clashes between Ossetians and Georgians in South
Ossetia 26 May, the anniversary of the declaration of
Georgian independence in 1918 clashes between irregular
groups of Georgians (encouraged by Zviad Gamsakhurdia).
• - at first it seemed an isolated incident.
• - however, in July, during the clashes over Abkhazia State
University:
-rumors that Ossetians were aiding the Abkhaz in Sukhumi,
- rumors, that armed Georgians were headed for South
Ossetia.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• South Ossetias Communist Party leader Anatolii
Chekhoev – denounces the demands of Ademon
Nykhas for union with North Ossetia
• Georgian press denounced the rumors about
plans for ethnic conflict.
• Ilia Chavchavadze Society issued appeals for
nonviolence and “the fraternal brotherhood of
nations.”
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• In August 1989, the Supreme Council of Georgia put
forward a State program on the Georgian
Language.
• This program involved not only increased use of the
Georgian language, but also, for example, a
Georgian language test for entry into higher
education, programs for the promotion of Georgian
history, the institutionalisation of previously
unofficial Georgian national holidays, creation of
republican military units comprising only
Georgians, and the resettlement of Georgians in
areas dominated by minorities.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• In September 1989, Ademon Nykhas - protesting
that the Georgian language programme was
antidemocratic and discriminatory – since
Ossetians lacked working language of Georgian.
• Georgian language street signs in South Ossetia
were defaced
• Slogans for Ossetian unification became
increasingly common.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• In November – a petition was sent to the
Georgian Supreme Soviet demanding the status
of autonomous republic for South Ossetia.
• Georgian response: remove South Ossetian party
chief Chekhoev from office.
• Two days later, Georgian claim of the right of
veto USSR laws and of the right to secede – both
considered threatening by Ossetians.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• November 23, 1989, thousands of Georgian led
by Gamsakhurdia piled into bussed to hold a
rally in Tskhinvali.
• The aim was to show “we are brothers”
• But, a counter-rally of Ossetians and the
presence of some Interior Ministry troops
stopped the busses - Georgians returned home
accusing each other in “atrocities”
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• In August 1990 Georgian Supreme Soviet passed an
election law for the elections scheduled for October 28.
- Provision barring the participation of the Abkhazian
Popular Front Aidgylara and the South Ossetian
movement Ademon Nykhas.
- 4% minimum needed for representation in parliament.
- Gamsakhurdia’s victory
- Tengiz Sigua – premier
- Tengiz Kitovani – commander of the Georgian National
Guard.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• The next month, National Congress – extremist
opposition – backed by Mkhedrioni led by Jaba
Ioseliani – a warlord, ex-convict- against the
new government.
• The trio of Sigua, Kitovani, and Ioseliani –
decisive importance in Gamsakhurdia’s and
Georgia’s future.
Armed conflict in South Ossetia
• On 20 September 1990, the South Ossetian
Autonomous Oblast declared independence as the
“South Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic.”
• In response to this and as a manifestation of their
independence from Tbilisi, the South Ossetians held
elections to their parliament in December 9, 1990.
According to Ossetian sources, 72% of the population of
the republic took part in the election, which exceeds the
percentage of the Ossetian population. The Georgian
response was swift. Within days the Georgian Supreme
Council cancelled the results of the election and voted to
abolish the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast as a
separate administrative unit within the Republic of
Georgia.
Armed conflict in South Ossetia
• December 11, South Ossetian legislature voted to
subordinate the region directly to Moscow –
independent of Georgia.
• December 12, Georgia imposed a state of
emergency on Tshkinvali.
Armed conflict in South Ossetia
• Adamia’s Merav Kostava Society and the
Gamsakhurdia “Society of the White George” –
mobilized early February 1991 – total blockage
of Tskhinvali.
• - blew up the a cliff block the road to North
Ossetia and sniped at construction crews, while
blockading all other roads and cutting off all
electricity and most natural gas supplies to the
city.
Armed conflict in South Ossetia
• “They (Ossetians) have no
right to a state here in Georgia.
The are national minority.
Their homeland is North
Ossetia ... Here they are
newcomers.”
• Gamsakhurdia claims to
abolish Ossetian autonomy
South Ossetia war
• 1,000 people died.
• 100,000 ethnic Ossetians fled from South Ossetia and
Georgia proper, mainly into North Ossetia.
• 23,000 Georgian fled from SO
• The flow of refugees into North Ossetia aggravated
the tense ethnic situation and played a significant role
in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.
South Ossetia
• On 24 June 1992, in the Russian city of Sochi, Russian and
Georgian leaders, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze
signed ceasefire agreement.
• The Sochi Agreement also set up the Joint Control
Commission (JCC), a Joint peacekeeping Forces Group
(JPKF) quadrilateral body with Georgian, Russian, North and
South Ossetian representatives, plus participation from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
• Also Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE)
• In 1996 the parties signed a Memorandum to Enhance
Security and Confidence Building Measures and agreed to
step-by-step demilitarization of the zone of conflict and
reduction of the number of JPKF frontier posts and guards.
Pattern of the conflict
First phase: late Soviet (Glasnost) period
Strong nationalist mobilization, accommodated by Republic
Communist Party
Strong minority counter mobilization;
Ethnic conflict likely
(Soviet intervention likely)
Second phase: Soviet Collapse
Democratic regime, with more nationalist government,
Ethnic conflict likely
Escalation likely to be immediate,
diffusion to “related” neighbors unlikely
Pattern of the conflict
• Ethnic minorities were more likely to feel
threatened by stronger reform nationalist
movements.
• 1. lose out from political, economic and cultural
transition. Privileged position in government –
imperiled by the transition to democracy and a
market economy. And, they often faced language
laws that would require them to supplement
their existing Russian competence with some
fluency in the titular ethnic language.
Pattern of the conflict
• 2. Institutional transitions would be used as a
levers of active discrimination – imperiling
political rights, economic opportunities and
cultural identities.
- Confronted with strong countermobilization by
ethnic minorities.
- Minority self-determination demands more or
less mirrored those of the titular ethnic group in
the Republic as a whole.
• Political issues at stake provoked the spiral of violence, causing increasing
distrust between titular nation and South Ossetian minorities.
• In the atmosphere of accumulating tension South Ossetia adopted a
declaration on the “sovereignty of South Ossetia” on September 20, 1990,
which emphasized a right of self-determination of the Ossetian people.
• The demands of South Ossetians at this stage included the follow aspects:
• 1. Convert South Ossetian Autonomous Region into the South Ossetian
Soviet Democratic Republic.
• 2. Ask the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to take South Ossetia in the Soviet
Union as an independent entity of the federation;
• 3. Request the republics of the USSR to sign a treaty of friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance with South Ossetia.
Conclusion
• The Soviet thaw unleashed a strong Georgian nationalist
movement, and simultaneous minority
countermovements.
• Soviet forces made an early attack on nationalist
demostrators in Tbilisi, and local Soviet troops openly
supported and armed Abkhaz and Ossetian
paramilitaries.
• Fighting stopped once the Abkhaz and South Ossetians
had achieved their goals of winning de facto statelets.
• Political settlement is unlikely – no Georgian leader will
recognize the independence of separatist regions.
Conclusion
• Second feature characteristic for the conflict was the process of collapsing
existing political institutions and the challenge to create a new one. The clashes
that took place between titular nations (Georgians) and ethnic groups (South
Ossetians) were about national project how to organize political arrangements
in the newly creating states.
• In early 1990s South Caucasus states had started constructing its state
structures, they did not have armed forces and the conflicts were led by
paramilitary armed formations often inspired by nationalistic ideology
motivated by self-enrichment and criminal interest .
• In accordance to the Georgian political establishment, these conflicts were not
ethnic, as South Ossetians and Abkhazians were not recognized as nonGeorgians.
Armed conflict in South Ossetia was “political”, because the conflicts
were about statehood and territorial integrity of post-Soviet Georgia state. In
other words, it has been argued that Georgia was not fighting specific ethnic
groups but “separatists” – that is, people who are challenging its territorial
integrity, whatever their ethnic origin”.
Conclusion
• According to this logic, the conflicts inside Georgia with separatists were not caused
by ethnic hostility. They were rather struggles about the national-state, over status of
some specific groups and were caused by contradictions between their national
projects . Conflicts in Georgia were about defending territory, political status and
independence. However, nowadays mutual relation of conflict parties are ethnically
hostile. This can lead to the conclusion that ethnic animosity was not the cause,
but the result of the armed conflict in South Ossetia.
• On the other side for Ossetian minorities, the conflicts were about self-determination
and reinforcement of their political rights on their ethnic homes. Ossetians
themselves claimed that they did not have any better choice than looking for security
guarantees from Kremlin “striving for survival as an ethno-historian entity – and
identity – drove us “to side with Soviet Russia” – not our genetic love for bolshevism,
sovietism and other “isms”…
Conclusion
• Finally, the armed conflict in the South Ossetia was accompanied by mass
mobilization. Clashes between popular movements were led under
nationalist slogans of former dissidents and intellectual. They played a
significant role in the events and “re-writing” the history of the Caucasian
nations. The clashes at the mass level violence involved attempts to define
the strength, territory and rights for independence . As Georgia were
seeking to change its status from a Soviet republic, the former autonomous
region - South Ossetia – was trying to do update their positions. South
Ossetian parliament demanded to transform its status from an
“Autonomous region” to an “Autonomous Republic .
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ykJaN0Q9P
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