Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War
and Territorial Conflict
Jaroslav Tir University of Georgia
According to the diversionary theory of war, unpopular leaders generate foreign policy crises to both divert the
public’s attention away from the discontent with their rule and bolster their political fortunes through a rally
around the flag effect. I argue that the puzzling lack of clear empirical support for the theory may be due to the
underspecification of the theoretical mechanism through which the public reacts to the particular issue at the center
of the diversionary ‘‘crisis.’’ Because people tend to react to territorial issues intensely, the embattled leader could
attempt to manipulate and exploit this proclivity by launching specifically a territorial conflict. By linking
government unpopularity with the initiation of militarized territorial conflicts and crises in a global sample of
countries, this territorial diversion argument receives strong empirical support. The initiation of fatal militarized
disputes over territory is, in addition, linked to economic underperformance.
A
ccording to the diversionary theory of war, the
cause of some militarized conflicts is not a
clash of salient interests between countries,
but rather problematic domestic circumstances.
Under conditions such as economic adversity or
political unrest, the country’s leader may attempt to
generate a foreign policy crisis in order both to divert
domestic discontent and bolster their political fortunes
through a rally around the flag effect (Russett
1990). Yet, despite the wide-ranging popularity of
this idea and some evidence of U.S. diversionary
behavior (e.g., DeRouen 1995, 2000; Fordham
1998a, 1998b; Hess and Orphanides 1995; James
and Hristolouas 1994; James and Oneal 1991;
Ostrom and Job 1986), after five decades of research
broader empirical support for the theory remains
elusive (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Gowa; 1998; Leeds and
Davis 1997; Levy 1998; Lian and Oneal 1993;
Meernik and Waterman 1996). This has prompted
one scholar to conclude that ‘‘seldom has so much
common sense in theory found so little support in
practice’’ (James 1987, 22), a view reflected in the
more recent research (e.g., Chiozza and Goemans
2003, 2004; Meernick 2004; Moore and Lanoue
2003; Oneal and Tir 2006). I argue that this puzzling
lack of support could be addressed by considering
the possibility that the embattled leader may antici-
pate1
achieving their diversionary aims specifically
through the initiation of territorial conflict2
—a
phenomenon I call territorial diversion.
The use of military force is seen in the diversionary
literature as attracting the public’s attention,
which, in the face of a perceived threat and via the
ingroup, outgroup mechanism (Coser 1956), is in
turn expected to translate into a feeling of loyalty to
the state and its leader. While I agree with the logic of
the attention-grabbing nature of the use of force,
I also argue that territorial conflicts have a better
capacity to elicit feelings of threat and unity than
other issues (e.g., trade, humanitarian intervention),
in part because territory speaks more directly and
convincingly to the people’s instincts and their conceptions
of national identity. That territorial conflicts
elicit greater emotional investment, mobilization, and
societal bonding provides the unscrupulous leader
with some important advantages—which may make
the territorial diversion logic work better. The question
addressed is therefore whether problematic
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2010, Pp. 413–425 doi:10.1017/S0022381609990879
Ó Southern Political Science Association, 2010 ISSN 0022-3816
1
Leaving the issue of whether diversions actually help leaders (see Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004) to future research helps keep the
study’s scope manageable and is common in diversionary research. Indeed, Smith (1996, 134) argues that diversions need not help
leaders in the end in order to motivate them to divert. Because they are already threatened with the loss of power, they simply continue
to suffer the same fate should the diversion fail.
2
I use the term ‘‘conflict’’ as a shorthand for conflict involving military force.
413
domestic conditions can be linked to territorial
conflicts.3
Importantly, reliance on territorial conflicts theoretically
opens up the diversionary option to the
leaders of just about all countries. This is in contrast
to the original version of the theory that relies on the
power-projection capability possessed by only the
most powerful states; accordingly, few works examine
behavior of countries other than the United States.4
This study joins a small but growing number of
recent works evaluating the merits of the diversionary
theory cross-nationally, such as Leeds and Davis
(1997), Russett and Oneal (2001), Chiozza and Goemans
(2003; 2004), Pickering and Kisangani (2005),
and Oneal and Tir (2006). None of these works has,
however, found strong support for the diversionary
theory, highlighting the importance of the current
study.
Furthermore, finding evidence in favor of my
argument would suggest that some international conflicts
are driven by the leader’s selfishness—and not
by national interest. Potential examples of (perceived)
territorial diversions are not difficult to find. The
quintessential diversionary case, the Falklands Islands
War, is a territorial conflict. More recent stories found
in the media include Evo Morales’ use of Bolivia’s
loss of its coastline to Chile in the 1879 War of the
Pacific as a way of obtaining support for his rule in
the face of continuing protests (Romero 2006); the
Thai-Cambodian border dispute over Hindu temples
has reportedly been used by both governments to
shore up support in face of the former’s continuing
unpopularity and the latter’s upcoming reelection bid
(Mydans 2008a, 2008b); Croatia has found the timing
of Slovenia’s escalation of their border dispute in the
run-up to the 2005 and 2008 Slovenian elections
suspect (Bernstein 2006; HRT 2008); and after initial
conciliatory gestures, South Korea’s Roh Moo-hyun
has become increasingly intransigent in his dealings
with Japan over the Dokto Islands dispute. Faced with
low approval ratings and an upcoming election, he
clearly attempted to cast the dispute over the remote
and uninhabited rock outcroppings as a matter of
national pride for the Korean people (Christian Science
Monitor 2006). Whether these allegations are consistent
with broader patterns is a topic of this work.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows.
The next section argues that the potential link
between territorial conflict and diversionary theory
has not been studied directly and that the link can be
utilized to help address some of the most serious
critiques that have been leveled against the theory.
Theory of territorial diversion is then offered, followed
by the research design section. A presentation
of empirical results constitutes the penultimate part,
while concluding thoughts close the paper.
Diversionary Theory of War and
Territorial Conflict
In the voluminous diversionary literature,5
no prior
work has directly linked diversions with territorial
conflict. Because so much of the literature studies
U.S. behavior (e.g., Fordham 2002; Hess and Orphanides
1995; Ostrom and Job 1986), this is not
altogether surprising. U.S. diversionary scenarios
often involve far-away targets, not an expansion of
U.S. territory. Furthermore, cross-national diversionary
works tend to leave the diversionary issue unspecified
(for example, see Oneal and Tir 2006;
Pickering and Kisangani 2005); this is similarly the
case in Tir and Jasinski’s (2008) examination of diversion
against domestic ethnic minority targets. In
contrast, Kisangani and Pickering (2007) implicitly
argue against territorial diversions: leaders will opt
for low-politics diversions (e.g., humanitarian and
socioeconomic interventions) because they have
lower costs and risk of escalation, as opposed to high
politics, strategic diversions. So, territory would be
considered as too problematic to make a good diversionary
issue, although this premise is not addressed
directly; see also note 7 below.
In the territorial conflict literature, a connection
with the diversionary theory is also not made. These
works (for a recent and comprehensive review, see
Vasquez and Valeriano 2008; Tir and Vasquez 2010)
primarily focus on the neorealist-type dynamics
operating in the international environment, making
studies of the domestic origins of territorial conflict
quite rare. An example of an exception examining the
domestic politics of territorial disputes is Huth and
3
Beleaguered leaders have nondiversionary options (e.g., resignation,
addressing problems, repression, doing nothing, etc.).
Investigating why they choose one option over another suggests a
wider future research agenda.
4
For examples of works dealing with Israeli diversionary behavior,
see Barzilai and Russett (1990) and Sprecher and DeRouen
(2002); for the United Kingdom, see Morgan and Anderson
(1999).
5
For recent and exhaustive reviews, see Pickering and Kisangani
(2005), Chiozza and Goemans (2004), DeRouen (2000), Mitchell
and Prins (2004), and Oneal and Tir (2006).
414 jaroslav tir
Allee (2002), but their focus is on democratic norms
and institutions—and not diversionary dynamics.
Neglecting to link territorial and diversionary
research is important because the link could be used
to address important critiques leveled against the
theory. The critiques have emerged from the literature’s
inability to produce a set of unambiguous,
supportive findings. Even though domestic problems
may be encouraging leaders to contemplate diversions,
other factors may prevent these incentives from
being acted upon. Consequently, a reliable pattern
between diversionary incentives and use of force may
not be detectable. Below, I identify the two most
relevant types of critiques and argue that they can be
addressed successfully in the context of territorial
diversion.
First, Levy (1998; see also Tir and Jasinski 2008)
observes that suitable diversionary targets are quite
difficult to find. For just about all the states in the
international system, the loss of strength gradient
(Boulding 1962) is so serious that they are only able
to interact militarily with their immediate neighbors.
This would limit diversionary opportunities significantly
for all but the most powerful states. Furthermore,
many countries would make poor targets
because they are important economic, security, or
diplomatic partners or because the attack would go
against the constraints posed by the democratic peace
(Russett and Oneal 2001). Cognizant of these issues,
Mitchell and Prins (2004), for example, focus on
diversions between enduring rivals. Enduring rivals
(e.g., India-Pakistan) have a history of antagonism,
which indicates that they are willing and able to
interacting militarily. Moreover, the context of rivalry
can provide an aura of credibility to the leader’s claim
that their actions are conducted not out of selfish
interest but for the benefit of the country. And given
their already poor relations, the attacks would not
be particularly damaging to their relationship.6
The
problem, however, is that rivalry-related diversionary
opportunities are available to only few countries.
Enduring rivals constitute only 5.4% of dyads that
experience militarized international conflict (Diehl
and Goertz 2000) and an even smaller fraction of all
dyads (.4% to 3.75%, depending on how politically
relevant dyads are defined).
The above concerns may be lessened in the
context of territorial diversion. First, the power projection
capability is not necessarily an issue because
most territorial conflicts take place precisely between
neighboring countries (Tir 2003, 2006; Vasquez
1993). Second, diversionary action has to be perceived
by the population as so important that it is
persuaded that the conflict (i.e., the diversion) is
worth the cost of damaging or even breaking the
otherwise important ties. Territorial diversion is
arguably in a good position to help the leader do
this because territorial issues are seen as so central to
the matters of national survival and protection of
identity that economic, diplomatic, and other considerations
can be subordinated. These important
points suggest that diversionary behavior could be a
cross-national phenomenon, not limited to the most
powerful or rival states.
The second critique challenges diversionary
theory’s core logical mechanism, which is rooted in
the ingroup, outgroup premise (Coser 1956). Diversions
are launched to unify a fractured society (i.e.,
transform it into the ingroup) by painting the foreign
enemy as the outgroup.7
Morgan and Anderson
(1999; Morgan and Bickers 1992), however, argue
that overcoming the societal division to create a
cohesive ingroup is no easy task. If the leader calculates
that surmounting this important obstacle is
unlikely, then they would presumably be deterred
from diverting. I argue below that territorial diversion
provides what is probably the most promising option
for unifying the society, because territorial issues have
the unique ability to speak to and ‘‘connect’’ with the
broad swaths of the population.
Theoretical Argument
In this section, I present arguments specifying why
territorial diversion may be particularly attractive for
an embattled leader. I contend that territorial diversion
can provide the leader with certain advantages,
which are unlikely to be found in the realm of
conflicts over other issues. People have unique and
strong bonds to land, which can be manipulated by
the unscrupulous leader them to mask the true
intents of their actions, which include rally effects
and retention of power.
6
Even though Tir and Diehl (2002) find that enduring rivalries
are typically driven by territorial disputes, a potential link with
diversions is not explored.
7
Kisangani and Pickering (2007), in contrast, argue that diversion
is rather about the agenda setting process, which gives the leader
the power to shift the public debate away from domestic
problems to a low politics (per their argument) diversionary
issue. Yet, it is not clear that such diversions can go beyond being
distractions and cause rally effects that would heal societal
divisions. Territorial issues can arguably accomplish all this.
diversionary theory of war and territorial conflict 415
In explaining why researchers have repeatedly found
territorytobethemostwarproneissue(seeHensel2000;
Tir and Vasquez 2010), Vasquez (1993) notes that
humans’ tendency to define themselves as territorial
creatures is deeply ingrained into their collective
genetic and/or cultural inheritance—arguments well
known in the sociobiological and evolutionary psychology
literatures (e.g., Buss 1995; Valzelli 1981). The
tendency is seen in the great willingness of people to
fight over economically and strategically worthless
land, which suggests that the pursuit of territory is
more than just about rational, calculating behavior. It
may be either a function of how humans are wired
or of learning ‘‘that territorial issues .. . are ‘best’
handled by the use of force and violence’’ (Vasquez
1993, 140). While the related literature debates whether
the traits are more inherent or learned, the point is that
the bond people feel to land, their anxiety over who
controls it, and their willingness to support the use of
force to act on territorial disagreements can all potentially
be manipulated and exploited by the leader who
is seeking to distract the people’s attention from the
real problems plaguing the country.
A related argument focusing on how people
develop their conceptions of self is offered by the
constructivist school of thought. Among others,
Gottman (1973), Sack (1986), and Touval (1972)
find that people become socialized and emotionally
attached to the territory they think of as belonging to
them. The land becomes an integral part of their
identity, ingrained in the national psyche. This even
holds in cases where there are only weak objective
claims to the land in question. Witness, for example,
the fervor by which ordinary Chinese respond to
suggestions that Tibet is not legitimately Chinese
territory. Or consider the Serbian attitude toward
Kosovo. Despite the fact that few Serbs remain there,
Milosevic successfully rallied the Serb nation in the
late 1980s by arguing that it could hardly afford a
repeat of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo where that land
was lost. Such predispositions suggest that disagreements
over territorial control quickly turn into highly
emotionally charged affairs where objective facts hold
little sway. In fact, the territorial conflict literature
argues that the emotional connections and related
proclivities feed into the perceptions of land as zerosum,
indivisible, and unsubstitutable, where compromises
are seen as improbable, territorial disputes are
thought of as irresolvable, and brute force is counted
on as the only real means of obtaining (temporary)
control (Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Tir 2006; Vasquez
1993). Critically for this project, the emotions connected
to the land are something the unscrupulous
leader can attempt to tap into, manipulate, and
exploit for their own gain—much like Milosevic did.
Further relevant insights can be derived from
prospect theory (e.g., Jervis 1992; Kahneman and
Tversky 1979). According to the theory, people are
risk acceptant when they perceive that they are losing
(as opposed to gaining) something they value, that is
when they are operating in the domain of losses.8
The
reference point separating gains from loses is set
according to whether one is trying to protect existing
ownership versus acquire something new. Yet, if an
individual believes that the object outside of their
control rightfully belongs to them, this would imply
that the ‘‘loss’’ of the object took place at some point
in the past and the person would be in the domain of
losses. The psychological reference point is hence not
the objective status quo but rather a mental image
of the ‘‘rightful’’ distribution of valued resources
(Berejikian 2004). Undoing the ‘‘loss’’ thus becomes
a priority, even if it involves highly risky actions,
because accepting the objective status quo would
mean accepting the certain loss.
Connecting these arguments with those of constructivism
implies that the tendency to become
emotionally attached to the land people think of as
their own sets their reference point to the domain of
losses, irrespective of whether the defense of currently
held land (i.e., an objective loss) or acquisition of
land that someone else is controlling (i.e., an objective
gain) is in question. That is, by perceiving the
disputed land as rightfully theirs, the people interpret
not controlling it to mean a loss—regardless of
whether this land ever belonged, or how long ago,
to them. Consequently, the people become willing to
support risky courses of action in the belief that they
would be ‘‘retaking’’ the land.
A series of important inferences follows from the
above insights. The most basic one is that the above
attitudes and tendencies toward territory are common
human responses. As such, they apply to the
populations of states, which opens them up for
manipulation and exploitation by unscrupulous leaders
for personal gain. The leader can manufacture,
use, or escalate a territorial conflict with another
country in an attempt to manipulate the people’s
emotions into becoming willing to give the leader
carte blanche or at least a greater benefit of the doubt
8
DeRouen (1995, 2000) relies on prospect theory to argue that
U.S. Presidents will engage in increasingly risky behavior—such
as diversionary actions—when they face the prospect of losing
office.
416 jaroslav tir
for taking what under more objective circumstances
may be seen as an unnecessary, questionable, and
risky action. The end result, the leader hopes, is that
via the mechanism of territorial conflict, the population
will increasingly support and rally behind
them. Importantly, the above indicates that the leader
can expect their manipulation to be more successful
when territorial issues are at stake, rather than some
more poorly defined threats to the country, including
low politics issues that can distract people’s attention
but not elicit the same level of passion.
Furthermore, because territorial issues are at the
heart of human perceptions of identity, they can be
used by the leader to overcome societal divisions. The
leader can argue that the society as a whole is the
ingroup with a common territorial interest and cast
the state controlling, or attempting to control, the
land that ‘‘rightfully’’ belongs to the leader’s country
as the outgroup. Few other issues are expected to
provide as strong of a bonding experience for a
population. Examples of societies like South Korea,
which is plagued by deep political divisions, suggest
that in the face of territorial crises such as the dispute
over the Dokto Islands with Japan, the society
becomes more unified. Territory could therefore be
one of the few issues that could, at least temporarily,
be used by leaders to overcome internal divisions—
including those that may be caused precisely by
controversy over the leader’s rule.
The traditional diversionary argument also relies
on portraying the diversionary action as protecting a
vital national interest. Yet, the leader’s initiation of a
crisis with a far-away, unknown-to-the-public foreign
enemy (a scenario satirized in the movie Wag the
Dog) and over an issue not clearly vital to the national
interest would have a hard time capturing the
public’s attention and creating belief in—and let
alone fervent support for—the leader. After all, many
ordinary people know about the diversionary theory,
so the leader has to overcome the public’s—and
particularly the political opposition’s—natural skepticism
that the action is a mere diversion meant to
manipulate the populace. The issue of land control,
via the above-described mechanisms—stands a much
better chance of accomplishing these tasks.
In sum, territorial diversions are able (1) to
capture the public’s attention, (2) to tap into the
people’s instincts and/or and feelings about their
identity, and (3) to help the leader unify a fractured
society behind them. The logic of territorial diversion
is thus arguably more compelling and plausible than
that of the more standard version of the theory. The
discussion leads to the following hypothesis.
H1: Domestic unpopularity problems that threaten
the leader’s ability to retain effective control over
their office are associated with an increased
likelihood of territorial conflict initiation.
Given the relative ease with which the leader can
exploit the population’s instincts and/or attitudes
toward territorial control may make territorial diversion
appear a relatively risk-free, no-cost option. Yet,
this is certainly not the case. The leader does not
know that the diversion will for sure have the desired
popularity-boosting effect. They are acting with
the hope of a rally, but the rally is by no means
guaranteed; prior research generally reports only
small and short-lasting rallies (e.g., Lian and Oneal
1993; see also Chiozza and Goemans 2004, 424).
Furthermore, engaging in prolonged or frequent
diversions would likely outlast the desired rally effect,
as the public tires of the issue and costs and casualties
mount (Gartner and Segura 1998). The leader is
hence expected to use diversion sparingly, such as
during times when their leadership abilities are in
question—just as the hypothesis suggests. Moreover,
the diversion carries with it the inherent risk that the
action will not go as planned. Becoming embroiled in
protracted, escalating, stalemated, costly, or losing
conflicts is likely to hurt the leader’s popularity
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Their calculus
should therefore be affected by a variety of constraints;
the key ones are considered control variables
and are discussed in the next section.
Research Design
Dependent Variables, Spatial-Temporal
Domain, and Method of Analysis
In the diversionary research, diversionary activity is
not measured directly but rather by associating
governmental use of force with diversionary incentive
variables that tap into domestic discontent with the
government. I follow a similar approach but focus on
uses of military force9
that concern the issue of
territorial control. To check the findings’ robustness,
I utilize three different operationalizations of my
dependent variable. The first two versions rely on
the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set
9
I purposefully do not limit my study to wars. The theory’s
original name (diversionary theory of war) is a misnomer because
a diversion is not meant to start a war. War’s high costs generally
do not help national leaders retain office (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003).
diversionary theory of war and territorial conflict 417
(Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004), which identifies
militarized disputes between countries, their timing,
the dispute initiator, whether a territorial revision
was sought, and fatality numbers.10
Combining this
information, I identify (1) all territorial MID initiations
(my main dependent variable) and (2) fatal
territorial MID initiations; I use the fatality restriction
because disputes involving fatalities may have an
easier time capturing the public’s attention and
inspiring a rally. Finally, the International Crisis
Behavior (ICB) project defines a foreign policy crisis
as a situation in which the highest-level decision
makers perceive ‘‘a threat to one or more basic values
[to their state], along with an awareness of a finite
time for response to the value threat, and a heightened
probability of involvement in military hostilities’’
(Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 3). The project
notes the timing of the crisis, perceived initiator (i.e.,
in this case the state from which the crisis-related
threat is emanating), and whether a territorial threat
is involved (i.e., threat of integration or annexation of
a part of the target’s territory). By matching perceived
initiators with territorial threats, I derive a list of (3)
territorial crisis initiations. Each of the three dependent
variables enters into the below-defined data set
dichotomously, depending on whether the relevant
event took place in a given year.
The directed dyadic approach, which can simultaneously
capture conditions within the prospective
initiator country as well as the identity of and
relationships with potential target states, is utilized.
Monadic design, popular in early studies of diversion,
is equipped to perform only the first task (Bennett
and Stam 2000b). With the help of the EUGene
software (Bennett and Stam 2000a), I create a
directed dyad-year (my unit of analysis) data set of
all contiguous (up to 400 miles of water)11
pairs of
states. The analyses are restricted to the post-World
War II period due to availability of economic data.
Given the dichotomous structure of the dependent
variables, I rely on logit for my analyses. Robust
standard errors are employed to account for the
observations from the same dyad being related. I
use the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) binary timeseries
cross-section correction to account for the fact
that my data are composed of several cross-sections
(i.e., dyads) and to deal with potential duration
dependence as these cross-sections are observed over
time. To save space, the associated years of peace and
natural cubic spline (with three interior knots)
variables are omitted from the table. And finally, all
the right-hand-side variables (with the exception of
elections) are lagged by one year, in order to make
sure that the presumed causes actually precede the
use of force; such a setup is also reasonable as it may
take a little bit of time for discontent to spur the
leader into a territorial diversion.
The Main Independent Variables
The ideal indicator of the diversionary incentive, the
leader’s popularity rating, is either unavailable for a
broad range of countries or cannot be trusted as it is
subject to governmental manipulation. As a substitute,
I rely on two proxy indicators of the leader’s
(un)popularity. The first one captures the extent to
which the citizens of a country are visibly dissatisfied
with their government. I sum the incidents of
protests, strikes, and riots from the Cross-National
Time-Series (CNTS) Archive (2005) into an index
reporting the number of unrest activities in a given
country in a given year.12
Pickering and Kisangani
(2005; Kisangani and Pickering 2007) have a similar
approach. The second indicator, the economic
(GDP) growth rate is typically used in the diversionary
research (e.g., Hess and Orphanides 1995;
James and Oneal 1991; Oneal and Tir 2006; Pickering
and Kisangani 2005) because the state of the economy
is seen as an important predictor of leaders’
popularity (Hibbs 1987; MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson 1992). To check the robustness of my
findings, I rely on two different sources for the
growth rate, Gleditsch (2002), abbreviated below as
KSG, and the CNTS Archive (2005).13
10
MIDs are ‘‘cases in which the threat, display or use of military
force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed
towards the government, official representatives, official forces,
property, or territory of another state’’ (Jones, Bremer, and
Singer 1996, 168). The initiator is the state that takes the first
militarized action while a territorial coding notes its attempt ‘‘to
gain control over a piece of turf that it claims but does not
effectively possess’’ (178).
11
The spatial restriction is used because disputes and claims over
homeland territory occur almost exclusively between neighboring
states (Huth and Allee 2002; Vasquez 1993). The 400-mile
radius—set by the contiguity project (Stinnett et al. 2002) as
the limit beyond which militarized interaction becomes prohibitively
costly for most states—serves to capture potential territorial
confrontations over islands.
12
The CNTS Archive unfortunately does not specify the location
of the activities, so I am unable to distinguish between unrest
taking place in the center versus periphery of a given country.
13
Using the growth data from Penn World Tables (Summers et al.
1995) did not yield appreciably different results.
418 jaroslav tir
Control Variables
I control for several influences that have been found to
affect the likelihood of dyadic conflict. To capture
countries’ relative power, I use the Correlates of
War project’s combined index of military capabilities
(Singer 1988) and create a measure that takes the
natural logarithm of the ratio of the stronger country’s
capabilities to those of the weaker member of the dyad.
I control for whether the dyad is democratic by noting
whether both member states achieve a score greater
than 6 on Polity IV’s (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) scale.
Allies may fight each other less because they share
common security interests; I control for this with data
from Gibler and Sarkees (2004). To capture the
potential deterrent effects of trade, I divide the sum
of the initiator’s exports and imports with the prospective
target by the initiator’s GDP (all from
Gleditsch 2002); the measure captures the extent to
which the initiator’s economy is dependent on the
target. Because for most states the ability to fight is
determined primarily by geographic proximity—I control
for the effects of distance between the dyad
members (Stinnett et al. 2002); see also note 11. Finally,
diversions are thought to be the most likely right before
elections, because this is when the leaders are the most
likely to need a boost in their popularity ratings (e.g.,
Hess and Orphanides 1995; Smith 1996). I code
upcoming elections by using the CNTS Archive (2005).
Results and Discussion
Each Model in Table 1 employs a different combination
of territorial conflict (the dependent variable)
and economic growth (an independent variable)
operationalizations. Starting the evaluation of H1
with the government unpopularity variable, its coefficient
is consistently significant and positive in
Models 1–6. The likelihood of territorial conflict
initiation increases significantly as the government
becomes more unpopular, and this finding is robust
to all the alternate specifications of the dependent
variable. With the hope of deflecting attention from
domestic unrest and creating a rally effect, embattled
leaders initiate territorial conflicts. By focusing on
territorial diversions, my findings thus provide clear
support for the detrimental effects of domestic
unrest. Other than in Tir and Jasinski’s (2008) work
on diversion against domestic ethnic groups, findings
for domestic unrest proved to be elusive in Rummel
(1963) and Tanter (1966) and inconsistent in Pickering
and Kisangani’s (2005; see also Kisangani and
Pickering 2007) study. None of these works, however,
consider the possibility of territorial diversion.
Empirical support for the economic growth rate
is much weaker. The finding that poor economic
performance is associated with a higher likelihood of
territorial conflict initiation is significant only in
Models 3–4.14
The weak results are not altogether
surprising given the findings from prior literature. In
accordance with the insignificant relationships of
Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for
example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President
will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might
create incentives both to divert the public’s attention
with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the
economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act
abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen
(1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a
poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore,
Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflictinitiating
behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is
unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and
Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in
global studies. In contrast and more in line with my
findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4),
Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that
economic recessions are linked with forceful action by
an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s
(2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some
effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake
(2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s
attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national
studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow
growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes,
as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States;
slow growth does not affect the behavior of other
countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some
significant associations, but they are sensitive to model
specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a
clearer link between economic underperformance and
increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While
none of these works has focused on territorial diversions,
my own inconsistent findings for economic
growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the
literature.15
14
Because economic underperformance could motivate expressions
of antigovernment sentiments, multicollinearity may be
responsible for growth’s insignificance in four of the Models. Yet,
dropping the government unpopularity variable fails to yield
significant results for economic growth.
15
A few studies have found a pattern opposite to the one
predicted by the diversionary argument. A well-performing
economy creates additional resources that can be put toward
military objectives (e.g., Goldstein 1988).
diversionary theory of war and territorial conflict 419
Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the
unpopularity variable but only weak support via the
economic growth variable. These results suggest that
embattled leaders are much more likely to respond
with territorial diversions to direct signs of their
unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to
general background conditions such as economic
malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via
territorial diversions while fixing the economy would
take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort.
Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the
most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This
implies that leaders may be reserving the most
high-profile and risky diversions for the times when
they are the most desperate, that is when their power
is threatened both by signs of discontent with their
rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the
country (i.e., an underperforming economy).
Next, I conduct a series of follow-up tests
suggested by an anonymous Reviewer; results based
on the reanalysis of Model 1 are presented in the
online appendix. Evaluating the implication that
territorial diversions are indeed more likely to result
from diversionary conditions than nonterritorial diversions,
I set up a multinomial logit model that
contrasts the initiation of territorial MIDs versus
nonterritorial MIDs (base outcome). The results
show a positive and statistically significant coefficient
for the government unpopularity variable (first column
of Table 3), meaning that higher levels of
government unpopularity are more likely to produce
territorial rather than nonterritorial MIDs. Further
checks include performing rare events logit (King and
Zeng 2001) and population-averaged logit analyses to
verify whether the rare events nature of the dependent
variable or cross-sectional characteristics of the
data alter the findings, respectively. The findings for
the two independent variables remain unchanged (see
Table 3, columns two and three). Finally, protesting
behavior in more populous countries could be
considered more ‘‘normal’’ and less threatening to
the government, potentially lowering the incentive to
divert. Dividing the government unpopularity variable
by the log of country’s population (from the Correlates
of War National Capabilities data set, Singer
1987) reveals that the population size-standardized
TABLE 1 Logit Analyses of Territorial Conflict Initiation
Territorial
MID
Fatal Territorial
MID
ICB Territorial
Crisis
Economic Gr. Data / KSG Data CNTS Data KSG Data CNTS Data KSG Data CNTS Data
Independent Variable Y Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Government Unpopularity .032**
(.010)
.033**
(.010)
.038**
(.012)
.041**
(.012)
.039**
(.010)
.040**
(.010)
Economic Growth 2.164
(.348)
2.388
(.290)
21.313*
(.578)
21.254*
(.650)
2.510
(1.057)
.203
(.142)
Power 2.265**
(.051)
2.255**
(.057)
2.382**
(.075)
2.380**
(.087)
2.183**
(.070)
2.173*
(.075)
Democracy 2.092
(.278)
2.099
(.282)
.276
(.390)
.395
(.401)
2.287
(.501)
2.301
(.510)
Alliance 2.047
(.157)
2.037
(.168)
2.222
(.190)
2.208
(.213)
2.060
(.225)
2.072
(.231)
Trade 2108.69
(70.835)
295.609
(67.316)
2507.08*
(216.68)
2595.59*
(274.66)
2197.42
(203.14)
2175.42
(194.42)
Distance 2.445**
(.078)
2.458**
(.084)
2.694**
(.119)
2.800**
(.160)
2.653**
(.122)
2.655**
(.126)
Elections .059
(.099)
.094
(.104)
.226*
(.119)
.323**
(.128)
.104
(.204)
.059
(.217)
Constant .136
(.208)
.114
(.220)
.093
(.294)
.137
(.321)
23.248**
(.330)
23.278**
(.339)
N Chi-square 36789 789.59** 35468 750.61 36783 436.10** 35468 449.75** 36783 109.24** 35468 107.22**
Notes: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). All significance levels are one-tailed, **p # .01, *p #
.05. MID 5 Militarized Interstate Dispute. ICB 5 International Crisis Behavior. Economic growth data sources codes are KSG 5
Gleditsch (2002) and CNTS 5 CNTS (2005). Statistics correcting for the binary time-series cross-sectional nature of the data (see Beck
et al. 1998) are omitted from the table.
420 jaroslav tir
government unpopularity variable remains positive
and significant; see Table 3, final column.
Concerning the control variables, the effects of
power and distance are consistent with expectations
and across the Models in Table 1. Democracy,
alliance ties, and trade coefficients have mostly the
expected dampening influence on territorial conflict
initiation; but only trade exhibits a significant impact
and only when the dependent variable is the fatal
territorial MID (i.e., in Models 3–4).16
These results
are somewhat surprising, but the reader is reminded
that the effects of alliance are highly contested (see
Maoz 2000), while the impact of trade has not been
established in the domain of territorial conflict.
Similarly, recent research shows that the democratic
peace weakens considerably in the context of territorial
conflict (James, Park, and Choi 2006) and that
the democratic peace may be epiphenomenal to
territorial peace (Gibler 2007).17
Importantly, the
control variable results imply that some of the related
interests (e.g., security, regime ties) may indeed be
subordinated to the territorial diversion impetus.
Revisiting the link between regime type and
diversion, some scholars argue that democratic leaders
have a greater motivation—due to the need for
popular support—for diversion (e.g., Gelpi 1997;
Russett 1990; Smith 1996). Yet, others (e.g., Downs
and Rocke 1994; Miller 1995; Pickering and Kisangani
2005) assert that authoritarian leaders need popular
support in order to appear legitimate. Because they
cannot derive legitimacy from democratic institutions
and elections, they look to diversions to help them
achieve this goal. Autocrats can also divert with
greater impunity due to the lack of institutional
checks and balances. In follow-up tests available from
the online appendix, Table 4, I restrict the set of
initiator countries in Model 1 to democracies only,
autocracies only, all nondemocracies, and all nonautocracies.
That the findings hold suggests that both
democratic and autocratic leaders value territorial
diversions. Nevertheless, resolving the broader debate
is beyond the scope of this study.
Returning to Table 1, the final control variable’s
positive coefficient means that approaching elections
increase the likelihood of the use of force over
territory. Yet, the coefficient obtains significance only
in Models 3 and 4, that is when fatal territorial MID
is the dependent variable. This again suggests that
leaders may be reserving the most serious diversions
precisely for when they need help the most. The
significant relationship in the two Models notwithstanding,
the predominant finding of no relationship
is consistent with that of other studies (e.g., Leeds
and Davis 1997). Perhaps this is because there is
‘‘a permanent referendum on elected officials’’
(Russett 1990, 134), a phenomenon Lowi (1985) calls
plebiscitary democracy. If public approval is always
an important political asset, diversionary use of force
could occur at any stage in the election cycle.18
Next, I calculate marginal effects for the key
Models’ significant variables (from Table 1), by
holding each of the variables at its mean or mode
value and varying the value of the focal variable by
one-half standard deviation on each side of its mean
or to the nonmode value. As shown in Table 2,
unpopularity increases the likelihood of territorial
MID, fatal territorial MID, and territorial crisis
initiation by 11%, 14%, and 17%, respectively. Yet,
these effects are small vis-a`-vis those of power
(242%, 257%, and 225%) and distance, whose
greater values nearly eliminate the probability of
initiation in Models 3 and 5. Model 3 results provide
insights about the relative importance of the state of
the economy (214%) and approaching elections
(114%). A theoretical worst-case scenario (unrest,
bad economy, approaching elections) would increase
the likelihood of fatal confrontations by about 42%.
The moderate impacts of the diversionary variables
are consistent with the diversionary theory, as it
claims to explain only some armed conflicts. We
would also not expect diversionary motives to alter
the nature of international politics so fundamentally
that effects of relative power and distance would be
negated.
In sum, the several tests of H1 show much support
for it via the government unpopularity variable.
Support via the economic performance variable is
weak and inconsistent, though the related findings
are the strongest when the initiation of fatal territorial
MIDs is analyzed. This pattern repeats itself
with the trade and elections control variables, suggesting
that the closest empirical fit for the territorial
diversion argument can be found in the initiation of
fatal disputes.
16
Few surprises are revealed in the online appendix tables. The
findings for power and distance variables continue to be negative
and significant, while they are mixed for alliances and trade, and
insignificant for the regime type.
17
Because the inclusion of multiple liberal variables could be
creating multicollinearity, in follow-up tests I excluded various
combinations of these variables. Yet, only the trade variable
became significant.
18
Contrary to the diversionary argument, Gaubatz (1999) and
Huth and Allee (2002) argue that force is likely to be used after
elections, that is when leaders are most insulated from potential
use of force failures.
diversionary theory of war and territorial conflict 421
Finally, I briefly turn to the strategic interaction
argument advanced by Smith (1996, 149), who argues
that diversion-related domestic problems make a
leader not only a willing initiator but also a problematic
target. Precisely because an embattled leader is
motivated to divert, they would welcome being
attacked, much like Margaret Thatcher welcomed
the invasion of the Falkland Islands. The attack would
give the target’s leader a credible excuse to fight back
and thus increase their own popularity. This would in
turn increase the danger of conflict escalation and
protraction for the initiating leader, who would
therefore be better off targeting a country whose
leader is not experiencing domestic problems. If
Smith is correct, one should observe a drop in the
likelihood of a country experiencing domestic problems
being targeted.19
In a preliminary set of tests
available from the online appendix, Table 5, I add to
the key Models from Table 1 the government
unpopularity index and economic growth variables
for the prospective target countries. The results do
not, however, bear out Smith’s (1996) expectation of
deterrent effects of diversionary pressure within the
prospective target countries. The target’s economic
growth rate is insignificant while the target’s government
unpopularity actually seems to invite territorial
aggression.20
Conclusion
Earlier diversionary works may have underspecified
the inner workings of the diversionary theoretical
mechanism, by neglecting to consider that the leader
anticipates that the population may react to territorial
issues in ways that are more consistent with the
diversionary expectations. Finding empirical support
for my territorial diversion argument not only shows
that it has merit but also that the diversionary theory
has broad applicability that goes beyond the ‘‘usual
suspects’’ cases such as the United States or Israel;
this has seldom been demonstrated in the earlier
works. Finally, and unfortunately, my findings indicate
that some international conflicts may indeed
be motivated by very narrow, personal interests.
This study points to at least two main directions
for future research. First, do territorial diversions
actually cause the anticipated rally effects? Investigating
this would allow for the assessment of the
effectiveness of territorial diversions and is a topic
Chiozza and Goemans (2003, 2004) investigate in the
context of leader survival. Second, forthcoming
research should integrate the full scope of options
available to an unpopular leader, such as territorial
diversion, diversion over other issues, repression,
implementation of policies to address the underlying
grievances, resignation from office, doing nothing,
etc. The decision mechanisms by which one option
chosen over another suggest a broader research
agenda.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Jeffrey Berejikian and Doug Stinnett
for their helpful suggestions. Follow-up analyses for
Tables 3–5 are available from the online appendix,
located at http://tir.myweb.uga.edu/.
Manuscript submitted 12 January 2009
Manuscript accepted for publication 11 August 2009
TABLE 2 Marginal Effects for Statistically
Significant Variables
Territorial
MID
Fatal
Territorial
MID
ICB
Territorial
Crisis
Independent
Variable Model 1 Model 3 Model 5
Government
Unpopularity
+11% +14% +17%
Economic
Growth
214%
Power 242% 257% 225%
Trade 246%
Distance 278% 298% 298%
Elections +14%
Notes: Cell entries report marginal effects for significant variables
based on select Models from Table 1.
19
While Leeds and Davis (1997) find that problematic domestic
conditions reduce the chances that developed countries are
targeted and Clark (2003) reports evidence of strategic interaction
in U.S. diversionary behavior, others have not found clear
support for strategic interaction. For example, Oneal and Tir
(2006) find no support, Chiozza and Goemans (2004) find only
‘‘qualified support’’ for their modified version of the argument
focusing on target countries only, and Kisangani and Pickering’s
(2007) results are inconsistent.
20
Admittedly, this is only a simple test of strategic interaction. A
more sophisticated test would link the initiator-target interaction
with the leader survival prospects in both countries via multiple
simultaneous equations (see Chiozza and Goemans 2004).
422 jaroslav tir
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Jaroslav Tir is an Associate Professor in the
Department of International Affairs at the University
of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, USA.
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