Problematizing Global Knowledge – Time 129
References
Adam, Peter (2003) ‘The Strange Story of Peter
Lynds’, The Guardian, 14 August.
Bergson, Henri (1998 [1907]) Creative Evolution.
Mineola, NY: Dover.
Bergson, Henri (1999 [1922]) Duration and
Simultaneity. Manchester: Clinamen.
Deleuze, Gilles (1988) Bergsonism. New York:
Zone.
Foucault, Michel (1977) Discipline and Punish.
Birth of the Prison. London: Allen Lane.
Galison, Peter (2003) Einstein’s Clocks,
Poincaré’s Maps. London: Sceptre.
Lynds, Peter (2003a) ‘Time and Classical
Event
Mariam Fraser
A
n event is not just something that happens.
As a philosophical concept, it exists in
relation to a specific set of problems,
including the problem of how to conceive of
modes of individuation that pertain not to being,
or to essences and representation, but to becoming
and effectivity. Event-thinking can be understood
to be part of an anti-reductionist project that seeks
to describe the relations between actual things,
bodies and happenings, and the independent
reality of these events in themselves. It is thus an
especially relevant concept with regards to the
problematization of knowledge, and in particular
to the philosophy of science. The concept of the
event brings with it implications for (among other
things): the relation between language and the
world; conceptions of substance and materiality;
ethics.
The event preoccupied the French philosopher
Gilles Deleuze for much of his career, during
which time he ‘renew[ed] and recreat[ed] a metaphysical
tradition that extends from the Stoics
through Leibniz to Bergson and Whitehead’
(Patton, 1996: 12). From the Stoics, Deleuze
distinguishes between two kinds of entities. On
the one hand there are bodies which exist in space
and in time (in the present) with their corresponding
‘states of affairs’, while on the other there are
incorporeal beings or transformations. Incorporeal
beings, Deleuze (2004: 7) writes, ‘are not things
or facts, but events. We cannot say that they exist,
but rather that they subsist or inhere’. They subsist
or inhere, for example, in the expressed of the
proposition, which Deleuze (2004: 22) calls sense,
that is, ‘an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible
entity, at the surface of things, a pure event’.
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze adds a fourth
dimension to the three generally agreed upon
relations of the proposition. These three are: denotation,
which is the relation of the proposition to
an external state of affairs; manifestation, which is
the relation of the proposition to the person who
speaks and expresses themselves; and signification,
which is the relation of the word to universal or
general concepts (Deleuze, 2004: 16–18). Unlike
the circle which characterises the proposition –
‘[f]rom denotation to manifestation, then to signification,
but also from signification to manifestation
and to denotation’ (2004: 20) – Deleuze
argues that sense should be understood as the
boundary between propositions and things, that it
is ‘the coexistence of two sides without thickness’
(2004: 25). Sense subsists in the proposition but
it does not merge with it, nor with the state of
affairs or the quality which the proposition
denotes: ‘It is this aliquid at once extra-Being and
inherence, that is, this minimum of being which
befits inherences’ (2004: 25). Significantly,
Deleuze’s use of the Stoic conception of the event
enables the relation between language and the
world to be reconfigured: denotation and manifestation
do not found language, but are rather made
possible with it, and what renders language
Keywords Deleuze, event, Stengers, White-
head
Quantum Mechanics: Indeterminacy vs.
Discontinuity’, Foundation of Physics Letters
15(3): 1–7.
Lynds, Peter (2003b) ‘Zeno’s Paradoxes: A
Timely Solution’. Available at: http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001197/
Lazzarato, Maurizio (2002) Puissances de
l’Invention. La Psychologie Économique de
Gabriel Tarde Contre l’Économie Politique.
Paris: Les Empêcheurs de Penser en Rond.
Sebastian Olma is finishing a PhD on intensive
capitalism at Goldsmiths College. He lives in
Amsterdam.
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possible is the event. Indeed, in The Logic of Sense
Deleuze argues that language, when it operates
actively and creatively (as it does in some literature),
not only expresses but also extends the
transformative power of an event.
For Deleuze, the relation of events to states of
affairs is not that of the possible to the real, but
of the virtual to the actual. The world is actualvirtual,
and as such maintains the power of virtuality;
the capacity of a thing to become differently.
This point is particularly well expressed by the
infinitive verb, which has two dimensions: on the
one hand it is virtual and incorporeal, it is a potentiality
or becoming, while on the other hand it
indicates a substantive relation to a state of affairs
which, as noted above, takes place in a physical
time characterized by succession. This is why the
infinitive is so important to Deleuze’s conception
of the event. It indicates that an event is not bound
to a particular space and time, but may be experienced
whenever and wherever it is actualized
anew. It is because an event can be actualized in
multiple ways that it retains an openness to reinventions
(or re-eventalizations). The concept of
the event, informed by the concept of the virtual,
not only contributes to an explanation of the
relations between things therefore, but also
accounts for the inexhaustible reserve or excess
that produces novelty.
Deleuze’s (1995: 160) problematizaton of
things is especially clearly laid out in The Fold
(2001) in which he turns to (or perhaps more
accurately, inhabits) the work of Leibniz and
Whitehead. Both Leibniz and Whitehead rejected
substance as the basic metaphysical category and
chose instead to privilege continuity. Theirs is not
the continuity of rectilinear tracks or of lines that
could dissolve into independent points however,
but of an infinite series of individuated monads
(Leibniz) or of actual entities or occasions, coalitions
of prehensions (Whitehead). Although there
are significant conceptual differences between
monadic and prehensive units, they nevertheless
share one striking feature. In each, all the elements
in the same world are in contact with or connected
to each other; there are no gaps, and there is no
outside. This challenge to absolute theories of
time, space and matter, and the role of the event
in posing that challenge, finds special relevance
with regards to the philosophy of science and in
particular to recent developments in contemporary
social science studies of science in which there
has been renewed interest in the work of Alfred
North Whitehead (Barry, 2005; Haraway, 1997:
146–7; Latour, 2004; Stengers, 2002). It is worth
pausing here briefly therefore to consider Whitehead’s
take on the event and how both Deleuze
and Whitehead’s work has influenced at least one
contemporary philosopher of science, Isabelle
Stengers, before returning to the main thesis of
(and problems with) The Fold.
For Whitehead (1920), the recourse to time
and space as a means of unifying nature – for
example the claim that the redness of the fire and
the agitation of the molecules occur at the same
time and in the same space – cannot suffice as an
explanation, for it demands that time and space be
apprehended independently of the events that
occur in time, or of the objects that occupy space.
The concepts of time and space cannot therefore
provide a metaphysical starting point. Whitehead
argues instead that they (along with subjects and
objects) are abstractions, reified entities that are
to be explained by the contingent, changing, but
nevertheless concrete elements and events from
which they are abstracted. In contrast to the
notion that time is an ordered succession of
instants without duration and that space is a
system of points without extension, Whitehead
suggests that duration is the field of the event:
points and instants, spatial and temporal divisibility
and extensiveness, are the ‘properties’ of a
duration. Duration ‘is the old-fashioned “present
state of the world”’ (Whitehead, 1978: 320). Time
is a succession of durations, and it is by ‘becoming
temporal’ that a duration incurs the realization of
an enduring object (Whitehead, 1985: 159). In
short, an event (a concert, or a sound, or a
molecule) does not move through time and space
and nor do changes occur in space and time.
Instead, motion and change are attributable to the
differences between successive events, each with
their own durations. ‘There is a becoming of continuity’,
Whitehead (1978: 35) writes, ‘but no
continuity of becoming’.
There are undoubtedly some points of resonance
between Deleuze’s understanding of sense
as ‘aliquid’ – as both extra-Being and inherence –
and Whitehead’s concept of an eternal object.
Eternal objects, for Whitehead, are ‘the pure
potentials of the universe’ (1978: 149). They can
be qualities, such as colours or sounds, or figures,
like pyramids. As such, they come close to being
universals – ‘though not quite’, Whitehead adds
(1978: 48). The point in the context of Whitehead’s
work is that eternal objects are neither
delusions nor secondary qualities (like the red of
the fire) that a mind mistakenly perceives to be an
attribute of matter. On the contrary, the perceiver
of the colour red is also part of (is enfolded into)
the event. Indeed Whitehead conceives of each
‘perceiver’ or element in an event to be a relation,
or rather a prehension, which is by definition
constituted by its prehension of and by other
prehensions in a nexus (an event). Thus, as
Deleuze (2001: 78) explains, ‘[t]he eye is a
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prehension of light’ and ‘seeing’ is an achievement
conditioned by the event. Nevertheless, although
prehending and being prehended are important
dimensions of process, they are not sufficient
(they do not deliver meaning) in themselves. It is
the manner in which prehensions are received –
their ‘subjective form’ – that shapes the character
of the entity: ‘how an actual entity becomes’,
Whitehead (1978: 23) writes, ‘constitutes what
that actual entity is’. The singularity of an event is
based not simply on the coming together of
prehensions therefore, but on their becoming
together in a particular way. The question as to
whether an entity – a scientific artefact or work of
art for example – is ‘real’ or whether it is a ‘representation’
is thus displaced in favour of the
question as to what it can do. What does this
particular set of relations and this specific mode of
belonging-together problematize?
Although the contemporary Belgian philosopher
of science, Isabelle Stengers, does not
conceive of an event in exactly the sense that
Deleuze and Whitehead do, her understanding of
it is certainly informed by a similar interest in
problems. For Stengers, a scientific experiment is
an event only if it makes a difference between a
before and an after, that is, if it is able to invent
new practices, and new ways of thinking and
feeling about a problem. This is precisely why
Stengers puts modern science under the sign of
the event, for by inventing ‘the power to confer
on things the power of conferring on the experimenter
the power to speak in their name’ (2000:
88) a new relation between fact and fiction was
introduced. The event constitutes one of the
most important and valuable aspects of Stengers’
approach to science, because it enables her to
respect the singularity of modern science without
confirming its privilege on this basis. For although
the event is the creator of difference, it does not
identify in advance for whom it will make a
difference, or in what way. It is not the bearer of
signification. Instead, ‘[t]he scope of the event is
part of its effects, of the problem posed in the
future it creates’ (Stengers 2000: 66). All those
who are touched by an event define and are
defined by it, whether they align themselves to
it or oppose it. Not only does the event have no
privileged representative therefore (science is not
the domain of scientists alone), it is also impossible
for any participant in an event, by definition,
to stand outside of it and to pass judgement on
it, or to explain it away with reference to a
history, culture or geographical area. As in
Deleuze and Whitehead’s conception of an event,
this is an understanding that foregrounds contingency,
‘without basing contingency on some
specific ontological foundation (such as language,
discourse, the body, or materiality)’ (Mackenzie,
2005: 9).
In The Fold Deleuze draws on Leibniz and
Whitehead in order to emphasize the constant
enfolding, unfolding, and refolding of matter, time
and space. ‘The unit of matter,’ he (2001: 6)
writes, ‘the smallest element of the labyrinth, is
the fold, not the point’. In this way, Deleuze
delivers a profound blow to any philosophy that
rests on a distinction between the knowing subject
and the object for knowledge. In Deleuze’s
‘objectless knowledge’ (Badiou, 1994: 67), the
object refers not to a spatialized relation of formmatter,
but to a temporal modulation, a variation,
in a continuum. Correlatively, the subject, which
also represents variation, is a ‘point of view’. This
does not mean that the subject ‘has’ a point of view
(which would imply a pre-given subject), or that
the truth varies from subject to subject (which
would imply that the truth is relative), but rather
that the point of view is ‘the condition in which
the truth of a variation appears to the subject’
(Deleuze, 2001: 20). For Deleuze, truth is variation.
And, as an immanent inflection of the
continuous, the event is the condition of truth, the
condition of what is possible to be true in any local
situation (thus the opposite of the truth, in
Deleuze’s account, is not the false but the absurd,
or that which is neither true nor false). Which is
precisely the problem for Alain Badiou. The event,
understood by Deleuze as that which emerges out
of an ontological univocity, ‘as what singularizes
continuity in each of its local folds’ (Badiou, 1994:
56), is too much of the world, is so much a part
of the world, in fact, that Badiou feels obliged to
call its singularity into question: how is it possible
to distinguish an event from a fact if ‘everything is
event’? Deleuze’s concept of the fold is so
profoundly antiextensional, Badiou argues, so
labyrinthine and directly qualitative, that he is
unable to account for the singularity of an event
or rupture at all.
Perhaps Deleuze’s contribution to eventthinking
should ultimately be judged by the extent
to which he was able to invent concepts that affirm
and extend events. This, he argues in What is Philosophy?
(with Guattari, 1994), is the role of philosophy
itself: ‘There is a dignity of the event that
has always been inseparable from philosophy as
amor fati: being equal to the event, or becoming
the offspring of one’s own events’ (Deleuze and
Guattari, 1994: 158). Being equal to the event
means willing the event in a way that involves
neither resignation nor ressentiment, that is
affirmative, that transforms the quality of the will
itself. In this ethical task, Deleuze owes as much
to Neitzsche as he does to the Stoics. Indeed in
this context, Philip Goodchild (1996: 53) argues
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that the eternal return should be understood ‘not
[as] a theory of time, but [as] a technique for living
the event’. Less ambitiously however, one might
argue that Deleuze’s conception of the event – and
particularly his emphasis on the problem, and on
the way that the problem, which is conditioned by
the event, will always be different and irreducible
to the solutions it engenders (just as an event
always exceeds the bodies in which it is actualized)
– offers a practical orientation for the way that
ethics itself, including Deleuze’s own ethics, might
be judged. That is: ‘less by the types of solutions
that are being proposed for the problems than by
the way in which the positioning of the problem
and the solutions proposed situate and involve
those to whom they are addressed’ (Stengers with
Ralet, 1997: 221–2). This does not involve inventive
problem-solving. It involves inventive
problem-making.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Andrew Barry, Andrew Goffey, Adrian
Mackenzie and Alberto Toscano for comments on
earlier drafts of this entry. All errors are my own.
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Mariam Fraser is a senior lecturer in Sociology at
Goldsmiths College, University of London. Her
research focuses on facts, values, ethics and
process, especially in relation to science and
bioethics.
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