1
Discourse of Generations: The Influence of Cohort, Period, and Ideology in Americans’
Discourse about Same-Sex Marriage
Abstract
How does cohort affect discourse about same-sex marriage? Existing research using a
demographic perspective shows that cohort replacement and intra-cohort attitude change are
causing public opinion to liberalize, but a cultural perspective that analyzes social generational
processes is needed to explain how and why cohorts develop distinct attitudes and discourses.
Moreover, attention to multiple levels of intra-cohort variation can illuminate how the influence
of cohort and period varies within cohorts. Analysis of qualitative interviews with two cohorts of
Midwestern Americans shows, first, how discourses emerge based on the interaction of cohort
and ideology in an informant’s cultural repertoire. Further analysis shows that cohort shapes
attitudes about homosexuality because of the mainstream cultural construction of it that
informants encountered when they came of age. Finally, in an analysis of the exceptions, I show
that countercultural networks can insulate cohort subgroups from social generational change and
that period effects are causing older liberals to change their preexisting worldviews. All three
analyses are consistent with Mannheim’s generational theory, and I argue that the analysis of
social generational processes, which distinguish the “generation as an actuality” from the cohort,
is an essential complement to the demographic perspective in generational theory.
Keywords: generations, cohorts, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, culture, public opinion
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Introduction
According to polling from Gallup1
and the Pew Research Center2
, in the 16 years
between 1996 and 2012, opposition to same-sex marriage in American public opinion fell 22
points (Gallup: 68%-46%; Pew: 65%-43%). This rate of change is exceptionally fast for a moral
issue involving gender and sexuality, and it has prompted debate about the cause. Many
explanations center on cohort replacement—that young supporters of same-sex marriage are
replacing the old opponents in the population—but the speed of change also implies period
effects. Some scholarly research supports this view: not only do young cohorts express more
positive attitudes regarding homosexuality and gay rights, but older liberals are also changing
their prior opposition to same-sex marriage (Lewis and Gossett 2008; Sherkat et al. 2011).
Mannheim’s (1952 [1928]) theory of generations—which posits that people’s
biographical encounter with history while “coming of age” creates a unique and enduring
worldview distinguishing that cohort from others—can explain why cohort and period effects are
occurring, but its utility is hindered by two problems: of analytic perspective and of intra-cohort
variation. First, generational theory implies both demographic and cultural perspectives
simultaneously: the demographic analysis is required for distinguishing age, period, and cohort
effects, while the cultural perspective is required for explaining how different cohorts’
encounters with history shape their worldviews. The different methodological requirements of
these two perspectives so vexed earlier research on generational theory (for reviews, see
Bengtson, Furlong and Laufer 1974; Kertzer 1983) that American sociology separated the two
1
http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx, accessed 5/22/13.
2
http://www.pewresearch.org/data-trend/domestic-issues/attitudes-on-gay-marriage/, accessed
5/22/13.
3
lines of inquiry, effectively banishing the cultural perspective on generations to the margins of
the discipline and defining the term narrowly in terms of kinship-descent (Kertzer 1983).
Unfortunately, defining the research agenda in terms of “cohort” deepened the problem of intracohort
variation: all members of a cohort are not alike, so analysis must distinguish those cohort
subgroups who are socially located in such a manner that they are uniquely affected by history,
as generational theory predicts, from those who are not; and it must further explain why
members of the same “generation” react differently to their shared encounter with history.
This study asks how cohort affects discourse about same-sex marriage in an effort to
overcome these problems in generational theory and to deepen knowledge of how and why
public opinion about same-sex marriage is liberalizing. I analytically distinguish the
demographic phenomenon of cohort replacement from the cultural and social psychological
processes of social generational change, and I measure the latter in the discourse of two cohorts
of Midwestern Americans in individual qualitative interviews. I confront the problem of intracohort
variation by comparing discourses simultaneously between and within cohorts. In doing
so, I show how the effect of cohort varies by how it interacts with religious and political ideology
to produce a pattern of discourses that is more complex than the simple cohort replacement
explanation implies. I argue that the interaction of cohort and ideology in discourse illuminates
the social generational processes that mark the boundaries between the cohort and the
“generation as an actuality,” and further, among generation units.
First, I show that supportive, oppositional, and two middle-ground discourses—
libertarian pragmatism and immoral inclusivity—are produced based upon how cohort interacts
with political and religious ideology to shape the cultural repertoires of informants. Second, I
isolate the influence of cohort on discourse through a controlled comparison of parents and
4
children, which allows me to control somewhat for the influence of parental socialization,
political ideology, and religious ideology. Cohort influences attitudes about homosexuality
because of how homosexuality was understood in mainstream American culture during the
period in which each cohort came of age: younger cohorts are more likely to think of
homosexuality as collective identity, while older cohorts are more likely to think of
homosexuality as deviant behavior. These two analyses demonstrate the existence of what
Mannheim calls the “generation as an actuality,” those cohort subgroups that articulate social
generational change in their discourses. In a third analysis of the exceptions to this pattern, I
show how counter-cultural networks can insulate other cohort subgroups from social
generational processes, and I show how period effects cause older liberals to change the attitudes
that they carried over from a previous period.
I argue that all three analyses are consistent with Mannheim’s theory of generations and
show how qualitative and cultural research can contribute to more robust theories of social
generational change. In order to understand how social generational change occurs, not only
must we complement demographic analyses of cohort replacement with cultural analyses of
social generational processes, but we must also deal with the problem of intracohort variation by
distinguishing the cohort from the actual generation, and the actual generation from the
generation units. Regarding same-sex marriage, this study shows that the influence of cohort
varies by a person’s social location within the cohort, such that attitude change is happening
unevenly within the population. It further suggests that the convention of measuring public
opinion only in terms of support and opposition obscures other meaningful attitudes.
Public Opinion about Homosexuality and Same-Sex Marriage
5
It is well known that attitudes about same-sex marriage in the United States are
liberalizing (Brewer and Wilcox 2005), a trend that accelerated after 2009. Although scholarship
explaining this trend is still relatively new (McVeigh and Diaz 2009; Powell et al. 2010),
evidence from longitudinal studies of public opinion shows that both cohort and period effects
are occurring (Lewis and Gossett 2008; Sherkat et al. 2011). This replicates findings regarding
the liberalization of attitudes about homosexuality (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Loftus 2001;
Treas 2002; Wilcox and Wolpert 2000) and gender ideology (Brewster and Padavic 2000;
Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Ciabattari 2001).
Two types of changes in public opinion are thus happening simultaneously. First, cohort
replacement is occurring, such that young supportive cohorts are replacing older, oppositional
cohorts in the population. Second, this slow process of demographic turnover is complemented
by intra-cohort attitude change, in which older liberals are changing their attitudes about the
issue. Both processes can be attributed to a single historical event or set of historical changes,
which causes younger cohorts “coming of age” during this period to develop a distinctive set of
attitudes and orientations to same-sex marriage, while also challenging members of older cohorts
to alter their pre-existing attitudes.
Although longitudinal, quantitative studies of public opinion, using techniques to
disaggregate age, period, and cohort effects, are necessary for establishing the existence of
cohort and period effects, these methods must be complemented by a theoretical explanation
and/or methodological intervention that can explain how and why these effects are occurring
(Winship and Harding 2008). In other words, the macro-level demographic analysis of public
opinion must be complemented by a cultural and historical account of how and why a historical
period shapes attitudes about same-sex marriage in different ways. Such a cultural and historical
6
analysis aims to uncover the “social generational” (Esler 1984; Pilcher 1994) processes that
cause cohort and period effects to become manifest in public opinion.
The changing social construction of homosexuality is central to any cultural and
historical explanation of why cohort and period effects are affecting public opinion. Cohorts who
came of age before 1969 grew up in a society in which homosexuality was defined as a mental
illness. After the gay liberation movement replaced the homophile movement, in the wake of the
1969 Stonewall uprising and the 1973 elimination of homosexuality from the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, homosexuality was culturally
constructed as a deviant lifestyle. Although gays and lesbians began mobilizing for equality and
publicly asserting their collective identity, homosexuality remained stigmatized and marginalized
in mainstream American culture (Bernstein 2002).
This construction of homosexuality was further challenged in the 1990s; cohorts coming
of age after 1992 grew up in a culture in which homosexuality was constructed as a collective
identity. In the wake of the AIDS crisis, the election of President Bill Clinton, and the escalating
electoral battles with religious conservatives, gay rights tactics and discourse replaced gay
liberation tactics and discourse within the LGBTQ movement (Fetner 2008; Gallagher and Bull
2001; Rimmerman 2000). Movement activists began to assert their fundamental sameness with
heterosexuals to gain equal rights, “normal” gay characters became increasingly prominent in
mass media and popular culture, and gays and lesbians became increasingly open about their
sexual orientation in public life (Gross 2001; Seidman 2004; Walters 2001).
In sum, between the time that the Baby Boom cohort and their children came of age, the
social construction of homosexuality in American culture had shifted significantly. Younger
cohorts became more likely to express tolerance for homosexuality, to support equal rights for
7
gays and lesbians, to know gays and lesbians personally, and to view television shows and
movies that portrayed gay and lesbian characters sympathetically. In short, young cohorts were
more likely to think of homosexuality as a normal, taken-for-granted feature of American
society. Meanwhile, older cohorts had their previous views of homosexuality challenged by this
cultural shift.
This study aims to contribute to the explanation of how and why cohort and period
effects are occurring in attitudes about same-sex marriage by measuring the influence of cohort
on discourses about same-sex marriage. By examining variation in discourses both between and
within cohorts, it is possible to show how cohort and period shape the ways that people talk
about same-sex marriage and homosexuality. Like other qualitative research on cohorts (Small
2002; Whittier 1997), this study aims to show how the social encounter with historical time can
influence long-term patterns of social reproduction and social change.
Cohort and Generation
When studying cohort effects in attitudes, special attention must be devoted to
distinguishing two inter-related processes: cohort replacement and social generational change.
Whereas cohort replacement refers to the macro-level demographic process whereby the
population continually changes through the death and birth of individuals, social generational
change refers to the cultural and social psychological processes whereby a young cohort’s
encounter with social structures during the historical period in which they “come of age” shapes
their worldviews. Each process requires different analytic procedures, but they each imply the
other; the foundational statements of both generational theory (Mannheim 1952 [1928]) and the
8
cohort concept (Ryder 1965) illustrate the theoretical connections between these two concepts, as
do some paradigms in aging and the life course (Elder 1994; Riley, Foner and Riley Jr. 1999).
This distinction between cohort replacement and social generational change builds on,
and attempts to preserve, the related distinction between cohort and generation. Whereas a
cohort is defined simply as a group of people defined by a point in time (and space), the term
generation has multiple meanings (Alwin and McCammon 2007; Kertzer 1983). As a result of
the conceptual confusion generated by the numerous meanings of generation, Kertzer (1983)
recommended that the term be restricted to its kinship-descent meaning. Following Esler (1984)
and Pilcher (1994), I use the term “social generation” to refer to the cultural and social
psychological processes implied in generational theory, leaving the narrow definitions of both
cohort and generation intact.
Mannheim’s (1952 [1928]) generational theory underscores the importance of these
distinctions. Mannheim identifies four distinct generation concepts: the generation location,
generation as an actuality, generation unit, and generation entelechy3
. The generation location is
synonymous with cohort: a temporally-defined group. Sharing the same generation location is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for being part of a generation as an actuality, a subgroup
of a cohort that “participat[es] in the common destiny of this historical and social unit” (p. 303,
emphasis in original). To be part of an “actual generation,” one must share a common generation
location and a common social location within that cohort, such that one experiences history in a
similar way. However, such shared experience does not mean that everyone will react in the
3
I do not discuss “generation entelechy” because it is unnecessary for the conceptual exposition
here.
9
same way: there are multiple generation units—social groups who “work up the material of their
common experience in different specific ways”—within the actual generation (p. 304).
Mannheim’s model of generations is a nested model. Scholars frequently conceptualize
intra-cohort variation in terms of generation units (or “political generations”) (Alwin and
McCammon 2007; Klatch 1999; Larson and Lizardo 2007; Laufer and Bengtson 1974; Rintala
1963), but Mannheim actually distinguishes between two separate levels of difference within the
cohort. In a key passage, Mannheim describes the differences thusly:
Whereas mere common ‘location’ in a generation is of only potential significance, a
generation as an actuality is constituted when similarly ‘located’ contemporaries
participate in a common destiny and in the ideas and concepts which are in some way
bound up with its unfolding. Within this community of people with a common destiny
there can then arise particular generation-units. These are characterized by… an identity
of responses, a certain affinity in the way in which all move with and are formed by their
common experiences. (p. 306)
Not all members of a cohort are part of the actual generation, and not all members of the actual
generation are alike. Social generational processes are those processes that distinguish the
“generation as an actuality” from the cohort because of their unique cultural experience of
temporally defined social structures; the formation of “generation units” within the actual
generation depends upon other factors, such as political and religious ideology and social
networks.
A prominent empirical example illustrates these distinctions. Schuman and Scott (1989)
examine evidence of “generational imprinting” in the collective memories of different cohorts
10
and find that people are more likely to remember important historical events that happened
during the period in which they came of age. However, when they failed to find the expected
patterns of collective memory regarding the Civil Rights Movement, Griffin (2004) showed that
it was because they did not differentiate between those who lived in the South and those who did
not. Griffin confirms a logical expectation: that memory of the Civil Rights Movement will be
more pronounced the more intimately one experienced it. Living in the South was an indicator of
being part of the “actual generation,” because they participated in the “common destiny” of that
group; among those Southerners, different generation units formed, such as the whites who
resisted the Civil Rights Movement.
This example illustrates the importance of attention to the cultural and social
psychological processes of social generational change that distinguish the actual generation from
the cohort. Without such an analysis, scholars may produce null findings and broad, inaccurate
stereotypes of an entire cohort because they fail to distinguish among differences within cohorts.
Social generational processes only affect certain subgroups of a cohort who are socially located
in a way that gives them “fresh contact” (Ryder 1965) with the historical Zeitgeist.
The existing literature provides insight into the nature of the social generational processes
that distinguish the actual generation from the cohort. First, according to the impressionable
years hypothesis, late adolescence/early adulthood is the phase of the life cycle in which a person
“comes of age,” developing foundational attitudes and orientations about public issues (Alwin
and Krosnick 1991; Schuman and Scott 1989). Second, according to the aging-stability, or
persistence, hypothesis, the attitudes and orientations formed early in life will remain relatively
stable over the life course, once major life course transitions are accounted for (Glenn 1980;
Jennings and Niemi 1981; Miller and Sears 1986; Sears and Funk 1999). Third, generational
11
theory presumes a historical causality: that attitude differences are caused by significant
historical events or societal changes (Alwin and McCammon 2004; Firebaugh and Chen 1995;
Weil 1987). Finally, cohort analyses of attitude change attribute greater power to experiential
knowledge in shaping cognition than to knowledge acquired from secondary sources. Having
experienced a historical event first-hand is presumed to be of primary importance in shaping
one’s worldview (Ryder 1965; Schuman and Scott 1989).
Together, these propositions describe the social generational processes by which a
person’s cultural outlook is shaped by their historically-located encounter with social structures;
however, there is no scholarly consensus on what are the exact social generational processes.
Constructs like socialization (Demartini 1985), generational imprinting (Schuman and Scott
1989), cohort norm formation (Riley, Foner and Riley Jr. 1999), and historical participation
(Alwin and McCammon 2007) have all been proposed. In recent European theory, these
processes are theorized in Bourdieuian terms of habitus, hexis, field, and doxa (Eyerman and
Turner 1998; Gilleard 2004; Stevenson, Everingham and Robinson 2011), or in terms that derive
from cognitive, linguistic, performative, and queer theories (Cavalli 2004; Corsten 1999;
McDaniel 2004; Plummer 2010).
In this paper, I measure social generational processes in the production of discourse.
Social generational processes are measurable in discourse because language is shaped by social
structures and power relations (Foucault 1972; Williams 1976); as those structures change over
time, patterns of talk change accordingly. By analyzing individual interviews and comparing
discourses between cohorts, we should observe differences in how different cohorts draw from
their cultural repertoires (Swidler 2001) to construct attitudes and opinions about same-sex
marriage. Some components of a cultural repertoire are shaped by a person’s cohort-related
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encounter with social structure while coming of age, just as other elements of a cultural
repertoire are shaped by socialization, mass media, etc. Because the elements of a repertoire and
their patterns of use vary by a person’s social and historical location, differences in discourse
distinguish the “generation as an actuality” from the cohort and can be interpreted as
manifestations of social generational change.
Case and Methods
To the extent that the debate over same-sex marriage is ideologically predicated upon the
structural changes regarding gender, sexuality, marriage, and family that have reshaped
American society since 1969, the liberalization of attitudes about same-sex marriage is an ideal
case for studying social generational change. The bulk of these changes occurred roughly within
the space of a single biological generation and thus make social generational processes
measurable through cohort comparison.
I conducted 97 individual interviews with college students (n = 65) and their parents (n =
32) in northern Illinois between September 2008 and April 2009. The college students were born
in the United States between 1978 and 1990, while their parents were born in the United States
between 1945 and 1963. The parents reached adulthood in the 1960s and 1970s when
homosexuality was culturally constructed as a mental illness or deviant lifestyle, and they lived
through the rise in the divorce rate, the struggles of the gay liberation and second-wave feminist
movements, and the liberalization in attitudes regarding sexuality. By contrast, the students all
reached adulthood after 1996—after the ascent of gay rights discourse, after the major victories
of the feminist movement had been consolidated, and when gays and lesbians were increasingly
“out” in their personal lives and in mass media.
13
I recruited students at a four-year public university (Northern Illinois University, in
DeKalb) and a two-year community college (Rock Valley College, in Rockford). I selected these
colleges as recruitment sites to obtain variation in class and educational background, religious
and political beliefs, ethnicity, and city size; while at the same time maintaining a common
regional culture to the extent possible. These two colleges draw students primarily from the
northern Illinois region, which includes a large metropolitan city and suburbs, a mid-sized city,
and numerous small towns and rural areas. My comparative strategy was inspired by that of
Lamont (1992) insofar as the site selection was intended to facilitate the comparison between
cohorts rather than to make generalizable claims about public opinion. Upon completion of an
interview with a student, I asked for permission to contact one of their parents. Demographic
characteristics of the informants are listed in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Interviews lasted between 70 minutes and three hours. They were intended to elicit the
cultural foundations of the informant’s attitudes about same-sex marriage by posing questions
and prompts that would require them to draw from elements in their cultural repertoires to
formulate a response. My interview techniques combined the “responsive interviewing”
approach (Rubin and Rubin 2005) with Swidler’s (2001) techniques of using interviews to find
out how people “use” culture. Thus, in addition to asking questions about a person’s experiences
and opinions, I also included hypothetical scenarios, intentionally vague questions (e.g. “What
does the word ‘marriage’ mean to you?”), and questions that required respondents to take the
role of the other (e.g. “Why do you think some gays and lesbians want the right to marry?”).
The interview guide contained six sections. I began each interview with an extensive
“getting to know you” conversation, focused primarily on the present and on their teenage years.
14
I then asked a variety of questions about their media consumption habits. The heart of the
interview consisted of one section about marriage and relationships; one section about same-sex
marriage and civil unions; and one section about homosexuality and bisexuality. I wound down
the interview with a discussion of the 2008 presidential election.
All interviews were fully transcribed and analyzed using NVivo. In the open coding
period, I coded both inductively (e.g. keyword codes) and deductively (e.g. statements
expressing an attitude about particular topics); further axial coding was inductive (e.g. what
exactly was their expressed attitude). Analyses also included memos comparing each matched
student-parent pair, annotations of important passages, and fieldnotes for each interview.
Same-sex marriage discourses are operationalized as combinations of explicit statements
about same-sex marriage with more general beliefs, attitudes, and values regarding the topics of
homosexuality and marriage. My initial classifications of discourse were based on fieldnotes,
open coding, and memos about each matched student-parent pair. Based on the axial coding of
informants’ expressed attitudes and opinions about same-sex marriage, I revised the
classifications, noting fine-grained distinctions in discourse that were not initially apparent.
I also classify informants according to religious ideology and political ideology. For the
purposes of this analysis, I categorize each informant in one of three categories for each
dimension of ideology. For religious ideology, the categories are: “Secular/Atheist/Progressive,”
“Mainline/Moderate” (which includes institutionalized religions like Catholicism and Judaism)
and “Evangelical/Orthodox.” For political ideology, the categories are: “Liberal/Libertarian,”
“Moderate/Mixed/Non-partisan,” and “Conservative.” Libertarians are indistinguishable from
political liberals in my interviews because my interview guide ignored economic issues. All of
my classifications were interpretive; I included self-identification, life history information, and
15
other indicators from informants’ discourse (e.g. how they talked about the 2008 election) in an
effort to classify each informant according to actual ideological similarities rather than
idiosyncratic understandings of labels.
The majority of the analysis below focuses primarily on the 334
matched pairs of students
and parents because I use the parent-child relationship as a control, attempting to isolate the
effect of cohort from the effect of generation. I compare matched pairs of parents and children
who essentially agree with one another on issues related to politics, religion, marriage, and
sexuality in order to show how cohort shapes discourse. By controlling somewhat for the
influence of parental socialization and the power of political and religious ideologies, comparing
the discourses of students and parents who otherwise have similar views shows stronger
evidence that observed differences in discourses are due to cohort-related attitudes and
understandings of homosexuality.
Descriptive Results
Contrary to the culture war imagery that the same-sex marriage debate typically conjures,
patterns of talk failed to polarize into two irreconcilable discourses because of the numerous
ways in which people’s beliefs, attitudes, values, and experiences with homosexuality interacted
with their views on marriage, religion, and politics. After coding the discourses inductively, a
variety of “middle-ground” discourses between unambiguous support and unambiguous
opposition emerged. Table 2 shows that the two cohorts differed in how frequently they
constructed certain discourses.
[Table 2 about here]
4
I count one parent twice for each child.
16
Consistent with existing research, members of the younger cohort were more likely to
construct unambiguously supportive discourses, while members of the older cohort were more
likely to construct unambiguously oppositional discourses. These two polar discourses are the
most common among my sample for numerous reasons; yet these discourses also contain an
ideological coherence that makes them easy to articulate. Specifically, these discourses emerge
when an individual’s political and religious ideology is consistent with their attitudes and beliefs
about homosexuality. Supportive discourses were articulated primarily by people with socially
liberal political views and with non-negative attitudes about homosexuality; oppositional
discourses were articulated primarily by religious conservatives who believe that homosexuality
is immoral. In each case, the logical implications of each factor for their opinion about same-sex
marriage are consistent.
By contrast, middle-ground discourses feature an incongruence between ideology and
attitudes and beliefs about homosexuality. Although not every middle-ground discourse is related
to cohort5
, below I describe the two discourses that are: immoral inclusivity and libertarian
pragmatism. These two discourses were articulated most often when a person’s religious or
political ideologies seemed to push them to take one position in the debate about same-sex
marriage, while their attitudes and beliefs about homosexuality seemed to pull them towards the
opposite position. The people most likely to use libertarian pragmatic discourses were socially
liberal parents with implicit negative attitudes about homosexuality, although a few students with
this same combination of ideology and attitudes also produced this discourse. The discourse of
5
For example, one discourse was produced when informants expressed support for same-sex
civil unions but refused to use the label “marriage,” either because of Catholic ideology or
because of a belief that all marriages recognized by the state should be called civil unions.
17
immoral inclusivity was produced exclusively by religious conservative students with nonnegative
attitudes towards homosexuality.
Libertarian Pragmatism
Libertarian pragmatism is a discourse that combines the value of individual liberty with a
refusal to judge the morality of another person’s action, as long as that person’s action has no
negative consequences for others. The discourse is libertarian because the speaker refuses to cast
a moral judgment on actions or behaviors that are considered private; it is pragmatic because this
libertarianism is predicated upon a specific outcome: that the action cause no harm to others.
Informally, the discourse declares, “It’s a free country; you can do what you want, as long as
you’re not hurting anybody.”
Applied to same-sex marriage, informants constructed this discourse by affirming that
gays and lesbians can live their lives any way they choose, by denying that homosexuality is a
sin while also expressing some negative attitude about homosexuality, and by either denying that
their opinion about same-sex marriage mattered or by expressing mixed views on the issue.
People used libertarian pragmatic discourse to affirm a person’s freedom to love who they want
to love, even though they might not approve of homosexuality:
I see [same-sex marriage] on TV and stuff like that, like everybody else, but I can’t judge
them people either. They, that’s their lifestyle, that’s what they love. They love
somebody just as well as somebody else. I’m not, I don’t go one way or the other. If
that’s what they want, then that’s what they should have, you know. (Jillian, age 49)
18
I don’t know, I really, what’s their business is their business. I honestly don’t really care
too much for it, but I’m not going to have a biased point of view and say it’s wrong.
That’s that person’s life, it’s not mine. It’s not affecting me in any way. (Dylan, age 23)
Because these informants do not think a person’s sexual preference affects them personally, they
do not think that it is their place to judge them.
Those who constructed the libertarian pragmatic discourse refused to state an opinion
about same-sex marriage, even when directly asked:
Q: Would you support legalizing same-sex marriage in our society?
R: You know, I don’t know that I would actively go into it, honestly, because it’s just not
an issue I really care about. It doesn’t affect me, and I’m being honest about that. Maybe
it’s because I don’t have anybody close to me that I know, you know…. I wouldn’t be
opposed to it, but I wouldn’t be active towards it either. (Maria, age 45)
This discourse contains within it a justification for not taking sides in a conflict. Rather than say
they support or oppose same-sex marriage, it allows informants to avoid getting involved.
Libertarian pragmatic discourse is premised upon an implicit or explicit negative
evaluation of homosexuality. For example, throughout my conversation with Harvey, age 23, it
was clear that he felt uncomfortable with homosexuality. At one point, he expressed his
discomfort by recalling an incident in one of his classes:
A gay guy was sitting there looking across the class, looking at me across the room,
looking at me like this [makes face]. Like that’s uncomfortable, you know what I mean?
19
Okay, maybe a girl, but that’s what we do as far as guys, but when a guy does it, then it’s
like, I want to beat him up. (Harvey, age 23)
The negative attitudes expressed in this statement are unusually explicit. The same look he gives
to women, when used on him by a man, makes him uncomfortable to the point of violence. But
he did not use this feeling as the basis for opposing same-sex marriage. When I asked him if he
personally had an opinion about same-sex marriage, he responded:
Like I said, I just don’t really even care…. It just really doesn’t affect me so I really can’t
just, you know, downplay somebody else who goes there. Like if I go to a club and like
somebody sees me talking to like a white female, and then it’s like, “oh you can’t do
that,” it’s like what am I doing to hurt you?... I got my own things to worry about. Samesex
marriage really isn’t one of the things on the table at the moment. (Harvey, age 23)
Harvey, who is African American, uses the example of interracial dating as an analogy to explain
his refusal to state an opinion. Simply because one does not approve of another person’s
behavior does not mean it is appropriate to pass judgment on them.
It should not be surprising that libertarian pragmatism was used by individuals with
socially liberal political beliefs because the ideas contained in this discourse are typically
associated with libertarian political ideology: tolerance, cultural relativism, and rejection of
prejudice. But the discomfort and negative attitudes about homosexuality that informants
expressed prevented them from supporting same-sex marriage. While this discourse might be
interpreted as a product of social desirability bias, it is so firmly embedded in American culture
20
(e.g. concerning motorcycle helmet laws) that it is unlikely to be solely the result of efforts at
impression-management.
Immoral Inclusivity
In contrast to the libertarian pragmatic discourse that was constructed primarily by older
liberals, the discourse of immoral inclusivity was constructed exclusively by conservative
Christian students to reconcile religious teachings about homosexuality with their feelings of
tolerance and support for gay rights. I refer to this discourse as immoral inclusivity because it
defines heterosexuals and homosexuals as equally immoral beings—albeit for different
reasons—and that it therefore would be wrong to treat gays and lesbians differently.
The informants who constructed this discourse often did so with difficulty, using the
interview to “talk out” their feelings on the issue. For example, Elizabeth, a 19-year old
conservative Christian told me that she is against same-sex marriage because of how The Bible
defined marriage and homosexuality. However, on the day that I interviewed her, in a debate
activity in one of her classes, she learned about the rights and benefits that are denied to gays and
lesbians because they are not allowed to marry:
As far as gay marriage, I don’t know a lot about the topic from the other point of view, so
it’s interesting to hear the person’s speech in support of it. I found out things like, you
know, they aren’t given a lot of the rights that they should be. So, I see that to be kind of
upsetting… (Elizabeth, age 19)
21
Elizabeth accepts the premise that gays and lesbians should be accorded rights they do not have.
But when I asked her whether or not gays and lesbians deserved equal rights, she contradicted
herself:
I don’t, not as far as marriage. I just don’t like the idea that a man and a man can get
married and then raise children…. As far as rights for people, I don’t like that they’re
discriminated against. I think that they should be viewed as people. I mean, don’t
discriminate against them just like you wouldn’t discriminate [against] someone because
of their race. But then I guess I’m kind of contradicting myself when I say that I don’t
think that they should have the right to get married. So, I don’t know, it’s kind of a
confusing issue for me. (Elizabeth, age 19)
Elizabeth acknowledges the apparent contradiction in her views and admits that she is not really
sure how she feels about the issue. She describes gays and lesbians as human beings who deserve
equal rights; but she consistently drew upon her religious upbringing to justify why she does not
think gays and lesbians should have the right to marry.
Even students with well-formed opinions combined their religious ideology with their
desire to be tolerant and supportive of gays and lesbians in complex ways. Some students spoke
confidently about the inerrancy of The Bible and the sinfulness of homosexuality, while
maintaining that gays and lesbians should be accorded equal rights under the law. For example,
Carl, age 19, argues that same-sex marriage should be recognized on legal grounds, even though
he personally disagrees with it. He dislikes the strong anti-gay rhetoric that he hears in church:
22
I mean, their sin isn’t any worse than anyone else’s, so… that’s why I think it’s horrible
when some people just go on this tirade about gay marriage and stuff. There’s no room
whatsoever for someone to act like that. (Carl, age 19)
Despite these feelings, Carl said he would vote against same-sex marriage because of the
religious conception of marriage that he finds meaningful.
Bethany, age 22, constructs a similar discourse using her beliefs about sin to justify her
support for gays rights. She is sympathetic to the cause of same-sex marriage because she
believes that homosexuality is no more of a sin than other sins:
God says that marriage is between a male and a female. You’re right, he does say that.
You’re right, I do believe that. However, just as much as I really can’t cast stones at
people who get divorced or people who overeat or people who are alcoholics, God says
all of those things are just as much of a sin…. You want to get married, go right on
ahead, it really doesn’t bother me. And they want to be entitled to the same views
because their level of commitment is more or greater or as equal to the happiest married
heterosexual couple and that, you know, I think that’s really important when it comes
down to it. I mean, heaven forbid if my significant other got into a car crash or
something; I wouldn’t want it to fall on his great aunt who he never talks to, who is his
only surviving family member; I would want that decision to be up to me, and I
understand why they’re fighting for those rights. (Bethany, age 22)
Bethany empathizes with same-sex couples who love each other and who want to commit to
each other, imagining a scenario in which one person cannot take care of their partner because
23
the relationship is not legally recognized. In doing so, she affirms the legitimacy of gays’ and
lesbians’ fight for same-sex marriage.
Thus, students used the discourse of immoral inclusivity to construct a variety of opinions
about same-sex marriage. Elizabeth wasn’t sure how she felt about it; Carl said he would
ultimately vote against it, even though he thinks it should be legal; Bethany said she would
support same-sex marriage, even though she disagrees with it. It is difficult to classify any of
these discourses as being entirely supportive or oppositional; rather, the discourse is a
manifestation of the conflict between conservative religious teachings and their positive, tolerant
attitudes towards gays and lesbians.
Analytic Results
Thus far, I have argued that four main discourses—supportive, oppositional, libertarian
pragmatism, and immoral inclusivity—are produced because of how an individual’s religious
and political ideology interacts with their cohort-related attitudes and beliefs about
homosexuality. The claim that religious and political ideologies shape discourses about same-sex
marriage is uncontroversial, but it is not clear that cohort, rather than some other variable, such
as education6
(Ohlander, Batalova and Treas 2005), should account for people’s attitudes about
homosexuality. In this section, I restrict my analysis to the 33 matched pairs of children and
parents, which allows me to isolate the effect of cohort on discourse somewhat by controlling for
the influence of ideology and of generation. Among ideologically-matched pairs of students and
6
The fact that all students have relatively equal, and incomplete, educational attainment makes a
test of a competing explanation impossible with this data.
24
parents, any difference in discourse may be plausibly attributed to their cohort-related views on
homosexuality.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 locates each of the 65 individuals, classified by their political and religious
ideologies, in a three-by-three table; it also displays the kinship ties of each informant and
whether each informant articulated a supportive, opposing, or middle-ground discourse of some
type. If one reads Figure 1 spatially, like a two-dimensional plane, the ideological proximity of
matched pairs suggests several notable findings about the relative power of cohort to shape
discourse about same-sex marriage.
First, the importance of ideology in shaping discourse is clear. Not only do supportive
and oppositional discourses cluster as expected, but even middle-ground discourses are most
common among moderates. Second, the conventional cohort replacement story is also supported
in this figure. Only one of the thirty-two parents articulates a discourse that is more supportive
than that of the student’s (an unusual case, in which the student supports same-sex marriage but
opposes the rights of gays and lesbians to adopt children)7
. Third, the power of parental
socialization is clear in how ideologically similar most children are to their parents; in only four
cases does the kinship tie cross more than one ideological “line.” Indeed, in my qualitative
memos comparing each student to their parent, I identified only six pairs in which some
ideological influence probably accounts for a difference in discourses.
7
A second student-parent pair seems to follow this pattern, but does not because of a semantic
disagreement. In this case, a student fails to articulate an unambiguously supportive discourse
only because he insists that marriage is a religious institution and that all marriages should be
called civil unions. He is supportive of equal rights for same-sex couples.
25
In this paper, however, I wish to focus on a fourth pattern in the data: the cohort-related
difference in same-sex marriage discourse that exists among ideologically similar kin. Among
the eight student-parent pairs who share political and/or religious conservative ideologies, four
students articulate middle-ground discourses rather than oppositional ones like their parents.
Similarly, five of the sixteen parents who share a liberal/libertarian and/or secular/progressive
ideology with their children articulate a middle-ground discourse. In-depth examination of the
similarities and differences of these matched pairs can illuminate how cohort influences
discourse, apart from any other ideological or generational influence.
The influence of cohort in libertarian pragmatism becomes clear when one compares
liberal parents and children to one another. Older liberals are like their liberal children in that
they deny that homosexuality is immoral and argue that discrimination is wrong; however, they
are like their more conservative age-mates when they express discomfort with homosexuality or
refuse to support same-sex marriage. Parents who constructed middle-ground discourses to talk
about same-sex marriage did not accept homosexuality unproblematically, like their children, but
instead talked about homosexuality as a stigmatized, unnatural lifestyle. Because homosexuality
was culturally constructed as a deviant lifestyle during the period in which they came of age, they
continue to hold negative associations with it.
Consider, for example, Matthew, age 51, and his son Nate, age 19. Matthew raised Nate
in the same small town in rural Illinois in which he himself grew up; they are both politically
liberal atheists who have supportive attitudes about cohabitation, premarital sex, and divorce.
Despite the similarities, they spoke about same-sex marriage in very different ways.
Matthew’s discourse exemplified libertarian pragmatism. When asked about same-sex
marriage, Matthew responded with few words: “I don’t really approve of it, but whatever floats
26
your boat.” Like many parents, Matthew expressed discomfort with homosexuality, but he
seemed unwilling to say it is okay to limit someone’s civil rights. Ultimately, he said he was
okay with homosexuality as long as he didn’t have to see it: “I’m not completely for [it], but I’m
not really completely against it either. As long as they stay away from me and mine, that’s fine. I
just don’t want to get involved in it.”
By contrast, Nate is very explicit that he supports same-sex marriage, and he strongly
rejects arguments against it:
It’s mostly religious organizations combating the gays, which in my opinion, from a legal
standpoint is extremely contradictory to what this country was founded on, you know.
We have freedom of religion in this country, and to take the legal standpoint that says the
two people of the same sex cannot be married—that’s ridiculous because you have no
real argument to stand on other than God, and God says, “no”… So I’m really curious to
hear somebody else’s argument about that, about why it’s bad rather than just from a
religious standpoint. I personally think it’s a great idea. I think it should happen, you
know, because people should be allowed to pursue their freedoms. (Nate, age 19)
Not only is Nate supportive of same-sex marriage, he has trouble even imagining a legitimate
reason that someone would give for opposing it. Like other liberal students, Nate expresses
tolerant attitudes toward gays and lesbians, denies that there is anything immoral about
homosexuality, and rattles off a list of people he knows who are lesbian, gay, or bisexual.
In contrast with Matthew’s understanding of homosexuality as a deviant lifestyle—as
evidenced by his desire that “they stay away from me and mine”—Nate seems to take
homosexuality for granted as a collective identity, like race or ethnicity. When Nate recalled
27
learning that someone in his high school came out as gay, his memory of the conversation
conveys how unremarkable the news was:
I heard somebody mention that he was gay, and it was like, ‘Oh. That’s news to me.’
‘Yeah, he came out a couple months ago.’ ‘Oh really? Great. Good for him.’ But I don’t
think he was necessarily looked down upon… People were like, ‘Okay.’ I think people
had their suspicions earlier anyway. (Nate, age 19)
Nate tells this story as though other students already anticipated his coming out, and he describes
the act as an achievement worthy of recognition: “Good for him.” Although Nate acknowledges
that many people in society still label homosexuality as deviant, there is no indication in his
discourse that either he or his friends think in those terms.
As with libertarian pragmatism, comparing simultaneously between and within cohorts
can show how cohort shapes the discourse of immoral inclusivity. Young religious conservatives
are like their conservative parents in that they draw from a common set of religious beliefs to
talk about the immorality of homosexuality; however, they are like their more liberal age-mates
when they say that people should be more tolerant of gays and lesbians. Like young supporters
of same-sex marriage, many young conservatives seem to simply accept homosexuality as a
person’s inherent sexual orientation, and they do not problematize gay and lesbian identities.
Because they came of age in a society in which gays and lesbians are culturally constructed as a
legitimate status group, like African Americans and Hispanics, they say it would be wrong to
deny equal rights to gays and lesbians, just as it would be wrong to do so to other minorities.
Comparing Bethany (age 22) with her mother, Andrea (age 45), shows how the two
cohorts draw from different understandings of homosexuality in order to talk about same-sex
28
marriage. Both are evangelical Christians, and both identify themselves as politically
conservative. Their religious faith is extremely important to them, and they both disapprove of
divorce and cohabitation. They even agree that homosexuality is sinful. However, Bethany
constructed a discourse of immoral inclusivity, whereas Andrea constructed an unambiguously
oppositional discourse.
As described above, Bethany argues that gays and lesbians should have the same rights as
heterosexuals because, in her mind, the sin of homosexuality is no different than any other sin.
While she believes that there is an element of choice involved in pursuing one’s sexual desires,
she argues that that is no reason to deny them equal rights. Moreover, she expresses positive
attitudes toward gays and lesbians. When I asked her about her memories of the first time she
encountered someone who is gay, she told me about a teacher she had in college:
Oh, I didn’t know gay people were so cool…. It was almost like, “Really? One up for
you.” I mean, so I was more like excited to see someone, to be subjected to someone,
who I thought was intelligent, knew what they were doing, had their stuff together, you
know. They weren’t a bad person, you know, cause I, just as much as I was raised by The
Bible, I mean, God, your gut instinct tells you a whole lot about people before you even
know it. (Bethany, age 22)
It is striking that, given her conservative religious and political background, she would describe
such a positive reaction to the first gay person she ever met. She never admits to questioning her
teacher’s gay identity or feeling uncomfortable with his sexuality. This may be because she grew
up during a time when gays and lesbians were beginning to be portrayed sympathetically in
popular culture and mass media. When I asked her about homosexuality’s portrayal in mass
29
media, she responded by mentioning Ellen and Will and Grace, two television shows that are
historically significant for their casting of gay characters in lead roles:
Will and Grace portrayed it, you know, did they have some deep episodes? Yeah, I
wasn’t a faithful watcher, but as someone who doesn’t have, like growing up in high
school, I mean that show was like a popular show, and seeing it and having that be my
only connection with the homosexuality world, I think it portrayed it in a really lighthearted,
not a serious [way]. (Bethany, age 22)
Although Bethany does not think the portrayals of gays and lesbians in the media represent
reality, she describes how they gave her “light-hearted” contact with gays and lesbians even
when she didn’t know anyone personally. Consistent with the parasocial contact hypothesis
(Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes 2006), such mediated contact should reduce prejudice against gays
and lesbians.
Bethany’s mother, Andrea, also regards homosexuality as a sin that is no worse than her
own sins. However, she drew very different conclusions about homosexuality and same-sex
marriage:
Absolutely, you choose to act upon your impulse. I don’t classify it any different than a
pedophile or… a nymphomaniac, you know. I believe that in your heart and in your mind
and your soul, you can be driven to commit and perform and act against another person
that is improper, and it’s up to you to not proceed with those acts. Specifically, I think
that God tells us, if your right hand is going to offend you, better that you cut off your
right hand than be damned to hell because you can’t stop stealing. (Andrea, age 45)
30
Rather than accepting that person’s sexual orientation as part of who they are, Andrea talks about
homosexuality as a behavior from which one must refrain. By comparing homosexuality with
pedophilia, nymphomania, and stealing, Andrea emphasizes the behavioral dimension of
homosexuality. Even if it were proven that one’s sexual orientation is innate or genetic, Andrea
would insist that it is still deviant:
If [a gay male] looked at me and said, ‘I feel that I was born—all my life—more attracted
to men,’ I would say, ‘I believe you, but I feel that you should turn away from this act.’
(Andrea, age 45)
Because Andrea understands homosexuality as a sinful behavior and deviant lifestyle, the
solution to homosexual feelings is to repress them, and she believes that the institution of
marriage should not be altered to accommodate immoral behavioral choices.
As these comparisons demonstrate, the tolerant attitudes expressed by young
conservatives in immoral inclusivity discourse and the negative attitudes implicit in libertarian
pragmatism appear to be rooted in how homosexuality was constructed in mainstream American
culture when each cohort came of age. I argue that the cohort differences in how informants talk
about homosexuality can be traced to the changing cultural construction of homosexuality.
Parents came of age during the 1960s and 70s, when homosexuality was considered to be either a
mental illness or a deviant behavior, akin to gambling. By contrast, students came of age after
gay rights discourse had replaced gay liberation discourse in politics and after gay and lesbian
characters had become normalized in popular culture. They were thus more likely to develop, in
their cultural repertoire, an understanding of homosexuality as collective identity, akin to
31
ethnicity. Cohort thus shapes attitudes about homosexuality because of the mainstream cultural
construction of it that they encountered during the period in which they came of age.
Exceptions
What about the other parent-child pairs who are similar in all respects, including their
discourses about same-sex marriage? How can we account for the liberal parents who are just as
supportive of same-sex marriage as their children and for the conservative students who are just
as opposed as their parents? An examination of these cases shows that the effect of cohort can be
overridden by period influences or immersion in countercultural networks. Because generational
theory attributes cohort and period effects to the same underlying social encounter with history, I
argue that these are exceptions that prove the rule. Period influences affect people of all ages,
and the existence of cohort effects does not preclude intra-cohort attitude change. Likewise,
social generational processes imply contact with and acceptance of mainstream cultural
constructions of reality; so people who are immersed in countercultural networks are often
insulated from or resistant to the influence of mainstream culture.
The way that period effects can cause attitude change during later stages of the life course
is evident in the narratives of attitude change that older liberals constructed to talk about why
they changed their attitudes about homosexuality and same-sex marriage. These individuals’
positions are consistent with generational theory because they all report growing up in a society
in which homosexuality was constructed as deviant. They encountered and accepted the
dominant cultural construction of homosexuality from that period, and they remark how different
it is now:
32
I think society has changed, has been more accepting. I mean, from when I was a kid, if
you tell somebody was homosexual or gay, it was like the end of the world… And
nowadays, I think its much more accepted. (Tom, age 47)
[Homosexuality] was never mentioned in our household. And again, back then, that
wasn’t something that was as open as it is now. So you really didn’t know, or it was kept
in the closet. (Rochelle, age 47)
Many individuals who reported how different homosexuality was considered to be when they
grew up constructed narratives of attitude change. Most narratives attributed the changing
attitudes to significant personal contact with gays and lesbians:
I gotta admit, the first time I met people like that, I was very uneasy. But I was brought
up to think that it was wrong…. I didn’t even know it existed until I was hit upon by a
woman, and it just blew my mind because I didn’t know what the heck was going on, and
I was appalled. But that’s because it was like an experience out of the blue that I didn’t
know would ever exist, you know. As I got older, you know, and as my kids grew up, I
got a lot more accepting of it because they had a lot more homosexual friends. And
actually, I’ve gotten along with every one of them I’ve ever met better than a lot of the
straight friends. (Bonnie, age 46)
It is noteworthy in this quote that Bonnie gained her personal contact with gays and lesbians
through her daughter. This shows how the same cultural process that shapes young cohorts’
worldviews can also cause attitude change among older adults.
33
Whether or not personal contact is a correct explanation for attitude change is less
important than the fact that the narrative is constructed in the first place. After entering a new
historical era characterized by a different popular understanding of homosexuality, these parents
feel they must modify (or struggle to modify) their existing beliefs. For example, Laura reported
that the moral disapproval of homosexuality that was ingrained in her still affects her, even
though she rejects it:
I remember I used to think, “Oh, that’s wrong.” But that was somebody else’s idea
planted in me. And so now I try not to think that way. And I’m not going to lie, it comes
up. You know, but I tell myself, “Whoa, I can’t be the judge of that”… So yeah, there are
times sometimes I think it’s wrong, but I catch myself. (Laura, age 49)
The fact that parents who both support and oppose same-sex marriage report persistent negative
attitudes regarding homosexuality is strong evidence that the cultural construction of
homosexuality that they encountered when they came of age has had lasting effects on their
attitudes regarding homosexuality.
Other exceptions show that immersion in countercultural networks can insulate
individuals from the cultural change that causes cohort effects. Just as many older liberals
rejected the dominant construction of homosexuality as deviant behavior in the 1960s because of
their liberal families or their participation in the New Left countercultures, many younger
conservatives today reject the dominant construction of homosexuality as collective identity
because of their religious families, churches, and friendship groups.
Many liberal parents who support same-sex marriage rejected the dominant cultural
construction of homosexuality that they encountered when they grew up. For example, David, a
34
50 year-old social worker, reported that his upbringing in a liberal household taught him that he
should not judge people who are different. Even though he didn’t know any gays or lesbians
growing up, he applied the lessons learned from the political controversies of the 1960s to issues
that arose later, such as homosexuality and mental illness:
My parents, they just, back in 1968 and 1970, you didn’t really talk about homosexuality.
It just wasn’t talked about. Mental illness wasn’t talked about. But you had this
understanding that you accept people for who they are. It’s you know, the content of their
character, not the color of their skin. (David, age 50)
In this quote, David paraphrases Martin Luther King Jr. to explain why he has been supportive of
gay rights since he was young. His family background shaped his political beliefs, and he draws
from that aspect of his cultural repertoire to explain why he has long rejected the notion that
homosexuality is wrong.
The situation with young conservatives is analogous to that of older liberals. Students
who oppose same-sex marriage do so because they have rejected the dominant cultural
construction of homosexuality as collective identity. It is not ignorance or a lack of personal
contact with gays and lesbians that causes these students to oppose same-sex marriage; rather, it
is a strong religious identity, combined with negative personal contact and/or social networks
that are overwhelmingly conservative, that allow them to construct an oppositional cultural
definition of homosexuality.
Some students who oppose same-sex marriage report negative experiences with gays and
lesbians. For example, Taylor, age 20, has had significant contact with gays and lesbians through
work and school. But he reported having several unpleasant experiences with his gay coworkers:
35
One time, because somehow we got on the topic of what kind of girl I like, and then for
some reason, he told me what kind of guy he liked.... And everything he said was kind of
what I looked like that day, and I was like, “You’re sick.” (Taylor, age 20)
Taylor said he felt uncomfortable about this incident, and that he had been made to feel like an
outsider by his coworkers. These types of negative experiences, along with his conservative
Christian identity, enable Taylor to construct an oppositional discourse to same-sex marriage.
If young conservatives are immersed in social networks that are overwhelmingly
conservative, even positive personal contact with gays and lesbians will be neutralized and
interpreted according to that ideological worldview. For example, Renee, age 19, reported having
a gay cousin whom she likes very much. But because her intimate social networks are composed
almost exclusively of religious conservatives, she interprets her encounters with her cousin
through that lens. Her mother and her siblings are evangelical Christians; she went to an
evangelical Christian school and attends church there; even her college friends are all evangelical
Christians. Thus, when I asked her about same-sex marriage, she repeated much of the
conservative Christian discourse. She said that she believed humans “were created” to marry
someone of the opposite sex, and she qualified her opposition to same-sex marriage, saying that
it wasn’t personal:
I don’t have anything against them as a pers[on]—Like, I can be friends and love
someone when I don’t support their way of life-style. ‘Cause one of my cousins is gay,
but I love him to death. I just don’t support his way of life. (Renee, age 19)
36
The insistence that one hates the sin but loves the sinner is an element in the conservative
Christian repertoire that was used frequently in my interviews, and it is an indicator of how
religious ideology has shaped Renee’s views. Thus, Renee rejects the dominant cultural
construction of homosexuality, despite her positive contact with her gay cousin, because her
immersion in religious networks provide her with an alternative view.
Discussion
In sum, the preceding analyses show how the influence of cohort on discourse about
same-sex marriage varies by how it interacts with political and religious ideologies, and more
generally, on the extent to which cohort subgroups are situated within social networks and social
structures that expose them to the historical changes in the mainstream American cultural
construction of homosexuality. By analyzing how informants use their cultural repertoires to
produce discourse, I show how the cultural processes of social generational change, caused by an
individual’s biographical encounter with history, helps to explain why cohort effects are
occurring in public opinion. This study also shows how qualitative and cultural analysis of social
generational processes can complement the demographic perspective that is essential for
identifying cohort and period effects in order to produce more thorough explanations of
generational change.
The first analysis showed that discourses about same-sex marriage are produced by how
the influences of cohort and ideology interact in the structure and use of the informant’s cultural
repertoire. Beyond the unambiguous discourses of support and opposition, the middle-ground
discourses of libertarian pragmatism and immoral inclusivity are constructed based on the
relative compatibility between the individual’s political and religious ideologies and their cohort-
37
related attitudes about homosexuality. The second analysis isolated this effect of cohort on
discourse by comparing parents and children who agree ideologically; it showed that informants
produce different discourses about same-sex marriage because their attitudes about
homosexuality are rooted in the cultural construction of homosexuality that was dominant during
the period in which they came of age. Some younger conservative Christians produce discourses
of immoral inclusivity, rather than unambiguous opposition, because they think of
homosexuality as a collective identity and support equal rights for gays and lesbians. Similarly,
older liberals produce discourses of libertarian pragmatism, rather than unambiguous support,
because they think of homosexuality as deviant behavior and have negative associations with it.
The main pattern of how cohort shapes discourse illustrates what Mannheim calls the
“generation as an actuality,” the cohort subgroups who are socially located such that they are
exposed to the cultural construction of homosexuality that was dominant in the period that they
came of age. Within each of these two “actual generations,” the varying influence of religious
and political ideologies cause multiple “generation units” to form. Among the younger cohort,
for example, one generation unit articulates the discourse of immoral inclusivity because they
attempt to reconcile their cohort-related understanding of homosexuality as a collective identity
with their ideological definition of homosexuality as a sin. Most certainly, other generation units
exist within each cohort, and future research should attempt to identify them: for example, by
analyzing how cohort interacts with race, class, area of residence, etc.
The third analysis of exceptions to this pattern bolsters the social generational
interpretation of the data in two ways. Some of the exceptions illustrate the difference between
the actual generation and the cohort (or “generation location,” in Mannheim’s terms). Not all
members of a cohort experience history in the same way, and cohort subgroups who are
38
immersed in countercultural networks are thereby insulated from social generational processes.
This is the case for young religious conservatives who articulate oppositional discourses and for
many older liberals who articulate supportive discourses. Just as participation in the
counterculture of the New Left taught older liberals to reject the cultural construction of
homosexuality as a deviant behavior, so too does immersion in the conservative Christian
counterculture cause those young conservatives to reject secular understandings of
homosexuality as a legitimate collective identity.
Other older liberals who articulate supportive discourses illustrate the power of period
effects to cause attitude change later in the life-course. Many informants constructed narratives
of attitude change to explain how their previous understanding of homosexuality as a deviant
behavior has been challenged. Thus, the same cultural and historical influences operating in the
current period that have caused young cohorts to develop liberal attitudes about homosexuality
are also causing some older liberals to change their previous views. While some perspectives
treat cohort and period effects—attitude persistence vs. attitude change—as opposites, the results
of this study, interpreted according to social generational theory, show that they are both
products of the same cultural and historical processes.
Broadly, this study shows how qualitative and cultural research can serve as a
complement to quantitative and demographic analyses that are required to disentangle age,
period, and cohort effects. Specifically, qualitative and cultural methods can be useful at showing
how social generational processes cause young cohorts to make “fresh contact” (Ryder 1965)
with social structures and develop unique cultural worldviews as a result; they also can show
how period effects cause older cohorts to modify their previously established worldviews. With
an analysis of these social generational processes, studies of social reproduction and social
39
change can produce a fuller understanding of how the numerous intersections of history and
biography, of temporal location and social location, continually reshape social structures in
uneven and complicated ways.
This study also shows how the problem of intra-cohort variation is more complex than is
typically acknowledged in empirical studies and how further attention to Mannheim’s
conceptualization of “the problem of generations” can help scholars move beyond broad claims
about whole cohorts. Although many studies acknowledge the existence of multiple generation
units within a cohort, few studies attempt to simultaneously distinguish the generation as an
actuality from the cohort on one side and from the generation unit on the other. The fact that
Mannheim’s conceptualization of generations implies three distinct levels of intra-cohort
variation means that we cannot dismiss the problem of intra-cohort variation with a
methodological caveat about the probabilistic nature of statistical analysis without seriously
compromising the theory as a whole. Scholars should devote renewed attention to the distinction
between the cohort and the generation as an actuality in order to prevent both academic studies
and popular commentaries from constructing crude stereotypes of whole cohorts based on the
distinctiveness of only a subgroup of the cohort. Here again, the “fuzziness” of qualitative
research can provide a useful—though admittedly inconvenient—complement to the parsimony
of quantitative research.
Lastly, this study has two main implications for studies of public opinion about same-sex
marriage. First, the interaction of cohort with religious and political ideology in the production of
discourses suggests that regression models of attitudes about same-sex marriage should include
one or more interaction terms for cohort. The influence of cohort on attitudes about same-sex
marriage should vary depending upon political ideology, religious ideology, or other measures of
40
beliefs about homosexuality. Second, the existence of middle-ground discourses, like libertarian
pragmatism, suggests that the conceptualization of opinion in binary terms (support/agree vs.
oppose/disagree) neglects opinions that are both theoretically and empirically meaningful. An
informant who constructed the libertarian pragmatism discourse, when confronted with such a
dichotomous survey choice, would likely be counted as “don’t know” or “refused to answer”—
and thus eliminated from further analysis. My study shows that these are meaningful responses
for both the respondent and the analyst. To the extent that public opinion studies exclude such
attitudes from measurement or analysis, our understanding of public opinion and theories of
social change are weakened.
There are clear geographical and temporal limitations of this study, because it is likely
that discourses vary considerably across regions of the United States and may have changed
somewhat in the years since 2009. Moreover, this study is limited because my argument is
interpretive in nature: I have interpreted differences in discourse through the lens of generational
theory, although there are likely other confounding influences, such as education, that are
unmeasured in the discourse. Further studies should test the limits of the claims about same-sex
marriage discourse presented here. Finally, my argument about the nature of social generational
processes in relation to Mannheim’s theory of generations is supported in this case, but it may
not be in others. Application of this theoretical perspective to other cases is essential for refining
our understanding of how societies change over time through the complex interactions of history,
demography, and political action.
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48
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Informants
Students (n = 65) Parents (n = 32)
Student’s School
Age (median)
Gender
Ethnic Identity
Parent’s Education
NIU
Rock Valley
Female
Male
White non-Hispanic
Black
Hispanic white
Mixed (white/other)
High school diploma
Associate or professional degree
Bachelor’s or Master’s degree
55%
45%
21
40%
60%
72%
11%
12%
5%
--
--
--
62.5%
37.5%a
50
69%
31%
81%
3%
6%
10%
31%
28%
41%
a. One parent had two students in the study, one at NIU and one at RVC; the student from RVC
contacted me for an interview first.
Notes: Not all percentages sum to 100 due to rounding. Although I purposefully refrained from
asking about sexual preferences or behaviors, one student voluntarily identified as gay and three
students voluntarily identified as bisexual. Two heterosexual-identified parents admitted having
homosexual feelings and/or experiences in the past.
49
Table 2: Percentage of Students and Parents using Discourses about Same-Sex Marriage
Students (n) Parents (n) Total (n)
Unambiguous Support
Libertarian Pragmatism
Other Middle Ground
Immoral Inclusivity
Unambiguous Opposition
57% (37)
5% (3)
18% (12)
11% (7)
9% (6)
38% (12)
13% (4)
16% (5)
0% (0)
34% (11)
51% (49)
8% (8)
18% (17)
7% (7)
18% (17)
Total 100% (65) 100% (32) 100% (97)
Notes: Not all percentages sum to 100 due to rounding.
50
Figure 1: Same-Sex Marriage Discourses of Parent-Child Pairs in Two-Dimensional
Ideological Space