European Political Rituals: a Challenging Tradition in the Making
François Foret
Abstract
The emergence of the European Union as a supranational political order has given rise to new
political rituals. European rituals such as the dramatization of European governance via a
European ceremonial, the celebration of European memory in Europe Day, the European
anthem and the voting process in European elections offer various theoretical challenges. Given
the difficulty today of inventing traditions in relativist and disenchanted societies, the possible
obsolescence of the notion of ritual itself may be at stake. This paper argues that the
development of European symbolism is more likely to follow well-established, national paths
and pass via a cross-fertilization of national and supranational references. These national
processes may facilitate the incorporation of the European dimension in national identities and
practices but not their articulation in trans-national and/or supranational schemes. This leaves
open questions on the nature of the European polity and the symbolic functions it is required to
perform.
Key words: Anthem; European Union; European Identity; National identity; Political
Communication; Protocol; Rituals; Symbols; Vote.
Political Anthropology at the Conquest of the European Union
Since its foundation, the European Union has frequently been presented as the product
of a highly functionalist integration process in which interests were supposed to govern
ideas and identities. As a “regulatory state”, the EU appears to be a very rationalized and
utilitarian political body. Nevertheless, the emergence of a supranational political order
has produced a number of symbolic settings (Foret 2008): political roles, events,
commemorations, codified experiences and material symbols. Scenarios diverge. The
production of symbols has sometimes occurred directly in European arenas and been
shaped by European actors, although it remains circumscribed to elites and determined
by national backgrounds and actors. It sometimes takes place in trans-national networks
or in the Europeanization “from within” of national spaces.
This production of European symbols cannot be properly understood without
taking into account the structural changes in contemporary political communication.
Disenchanted European societies offer little raw material for any classic development
and dramatization of political narratives. But there is a social demand for renewed,
deinstitutionalized and individualized cultural codes. Europe is not de-ritualized if this
means the absence of symbolic markers of time and formal or informal social rules that
guide the political drama. Rather, the exposure of the games of power and the
dramatization of the relationships between rulers and ruled follow logics based on
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
56
immediacy and are structured by the recognition of relativism, and uncertainty. In this
context, European institutions have developed ad hoc patterns of symbolic legitimization.
This article focuses on European rituals that are to be compared with the
symbolic mechanisms, which helped in the making of nation-states. The rituals are used
as indicators of the potentiality of an autonomous European tradition or of the crossfertilization
of national traditions. The purpose is two-fold: to understand the conditions
and modalities of the political effort to produce meaning in the frameworks of
European integration; and, to assess the effects of this political effort on collective
belonging and allegiances. In achieving this purpose, three steps will be taken. Firstly, a
brief assessment of the state-of-the-art indicates how political anthropology has come to
terms with complex societies and how it has progressively developed in the study of
European fields. It will be shown that this development has grown alongside an interest
in the analysis of symbols as a way to understand new forms of domination that
increasingly rely on non-institutional and non-formal resources. Secondly, the
legitimization of the EU is put in the general context of the transformation of political
communication. The European polity is not the only level of power struggling to
regulate its society through rituals. The question is whether the nation-state's capacity to
structure a common temporality and spatiality organized around a political center is
definitively obsolete. Thirdly, four empirical examples are discussed: the EU order of
precedence among the rulers of the European multi-level polity; the use of the
European anthem; the celebration of Europe day; the organization of voting, the
founding ritual of democracy, in European elections1
. It appears that the center
(Brussels) is challenged by national peripheries as master of ceremonies. Its ability to
stimulate or enforce a common narrative that underlies homogeneous rituals in member
states is far from obvious. As a result, the development of European symbolism is more
likely to follow well-established, national paths and pass via a cross-fertilization of
national and supranational references. The question is whether the future will see the
incorporation of the European dimension in national identities and practices but not
their articulation in trans-national and/or supranational schemes. This leaves open
questions on the nature of the European polity and the symbolic functions it is required
to perform.
A political anthropology of Europe: from margins to institutions, and return?
A glance at the anthropological literature dealing with Europe shows well-known trends.
Anthropologists’ interest in modern societies is not new. But in looking at their own
societies, researchers have been obsessed by the quest for “authenticity”. Originally,
anthropologists wanted to find communities where human relations were interpersonal
and not mediatized. This narrowing of “the field” drove anthropologists towards
remote areas and peripheral social groups. Progressively, since the seventies, the
discipline has started tackling complex social formations and has dared to study urban
zones, elites and related institutions. This transformation is also marked by the shift
from a functionalist social anthropology focussed on structures to a cultural
François Foret European Political Rituals
57
anthropology devoted to symbolism and rituals of contemporary Europe (Boissevain
1994: 41-56). The European Union became an object for anthropologists at the end of
the eighties and the beginning of the nineties. Given the speculations about European
identity and the rather abstract notion many Europeans have of the EU, it may be seen
as the final outcome of the symbolic turn in the anthropology of Europe.
Relying on its rich expertise in analyzing micro-social realities, anthropology is
keen to underline how social formations are constantly reinterpreted by individuals and
altered by conflicts. To this extent, its perspective is complementary to political science,
which tends overall to have a primary interest in macro-dynamics. Furthermore, political
scientists offer a much-needed understanding of the way the state works and determines
individual and collective identities. This alliance of anthropology and political science
paves the way for a comprehensive conceptualization of the two dimensions of human
beings in the words of Abner Cohen: Symbolic Man and Political Man (Cohen 1974). The
study of symbols becomes more prominent and urgent when belongings are increasingly
regulated not by contractual but by informal disposals. At the center is the permanent
reconstruction of power relations and selfhood. The notion of ethnicity, understood as
a mechanism of adaptation to social change – notably to the evolving balance between
state and market – and as a product of intercultural interactions, is a good example
(Comaroff 2009). The transition from communism to democracy is another one (Wydra
2007). The transformation of national identities and systems of governance through the
process of European integration is a further case to be developed subsequently.
But how can one work on European integration anthropologically? Again, the
quest for “the field” has driven attention towards the rare places where the European
polity exists in flesh, namely the European institutions inhabited by specialized actors of
European affairs. Drawing on classic works depicting institutions as, on the one hand,
the matrices and the best expressions of culture, and on the other hand as the vectors of
integration and conflict (Douglas 1989), anthropologists of Europe have analyzed actors
and places (Bellier and Wilson 2000; Bellier 1999; Bellier 1995), policy communities
(Thedvall 2006), policy processes (Theiler 2005) and the production of political
discourses (Holmes 2000 and 2006). This scrutiny of the European bureaucracy has
provided valuable empirical and theoretical data. However, the danger may be to
overestimate the representative nature of the EU's structures and elites. There is a wide
gap between the realities of Brussels and the way Europe is lived in national societies. If
we want to assess the range and the meaning of the transformation brought about by
the emergence of the European political order it is necessary to document the symbolic
channels making the link between the institutional world and the average citizens.
Otherwise, the risk is to see anthropologists in European studies return to a fascination
with margins, conceiving of “eurocrats” as powerful but atypical social agents.
Continuation or overtaking of the nation-state?
An enquiry into the symbolic effects of European integration may help to frame
identity-politics in national societies. This also concerns the question of the salience and
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58
force of the EU as a polity. In short, two main scenarios are offered, illustrated by the
two most influential anthropologists writing on European affairs. Cris Shore promotes
the idea that European institutions, far from inventing a new type of politics, have
imitated processes of state-building current in the nineteenth century (Shore 2000).
European civil servants see themselves as an enlightened vanguard having the historic
responsibility of revealing to EU citizens their common identity. They are also political
entrepreneurs united by a true spirit of class and aiming for the maximization of their
material advantages. They use the spill-over effect theory as a justification, turning it
into the last big narrative inherited from the Enlightenment: this postulates the
achievement of integration by rationalization of politics and convergence of interests
(Ibid.: 207). The European project legitimates itself by a mythical reference to the
future rather than to the past (Ibid.: 50). Apart from this, it has everything in common
with the nation-state pattern. Europe borrows from this nation state many symbolic
resources with unequal success.
Marc Abélès shares numerous theoretical and methodological choices with Cris
Shore (Anthropology Today 2004: 10-14) but draws opposite conclusions. He insists on the
irreducible singularity of the European polity (Abélès 1996). Abélès emphasizes the
pregnancy of the European idea which underlies a societal trend towards rationalization
and harmonization. In this context, European civil servants are not a class working for
its own interest, but a group acting in collaboration with other social groups under the
pressure of societal and geopolitical forces. For Abélès, the absence of tradition and
territoriality, and the inability to promote cultural homogeneity radically distinguish the
EU from the nation-state model. Thus, the symbolic politics underlying the nation-state
is on the verge of obsolescence without the prospect of being replaced by a clear
alternating political order.
Is the EU the continuation of the nation-state or will it overtake the nationstate?
The answer to this question has big consequences for our view of the place of
rituals in contemporary Europe. A methodological choice has been to use as the main
(but non exclusive) toolbox French political anthropology. This literature has two main
assets. On the one hand, French anthropologists have heavily invested themselves in the
field, thus benefiting from a privileged access to European institutions since the nineties
(Foret 2008). On the other hand, the processes of nation-building by the centralized
French state have strongly drawn the attention of social scientists to symbolic matters.
Rituals Today: Europe as an “A-Ritual” Polity?
The deinstitutionalization of political symbolism
Political anthropology offers a qualified analysis of the transformation of present
political dramas. It is more accurate to speak of individualization and constant
reinvention of rituals rather than of “de-ritualization” of politics. According to Georges
Balandier, a founding father of modern political anthropology and a theoretician of
decolonization, one major transformation is the disappearance of the “local”, the
François Foret European Political Rituals
59
material or immaterial place where collective belonging, history and identity were rooted
(Balandier 2005: 4). At the same time, all political, social or cultural conceptions of a
unified entity become increasingly obsolete. Direct social relationships are seriously
affected by the effects on human life of technological innovation as well as by the
reconstruction of reality by mass media and cultural industries. In this era of weak
sociability, the human being is emancipated from all strong, cultural definitions by his
belongings and cut off from references to any transcendence and tradition. People are
left to themselves in a world of fragile connections that are based on affinities and
permanently endangered by mobility (Ibid.: 14, 90-91). Individuals have to determine
alone their own manière d’être au monde (being in the world). With the decline of traditions
that nurtured codified meanings, symbols have lost their significance. They are only kept
fully alive in specific arenas that maintain initiation and repetition over the long term.
Signs, on the other hand, proliferate. In contrast to a symbol, a sign carries temporary
meanings that are immediately understandable. Its use has exploded to express
interdictions or orientations in the constant movement of society. Signs are merely
functional, defined by their uses and, without any singularities, they can be duplicated
infinitely to mark “non-places of surmodernity” (Ibid.: 78; see also Augé 1992).
Political communication has been fundamentally transformed by these societal
evolutions. Power can no longer dramatise its omnipotence by the mobilization of
symbols. The use of symbols is restricted to times of celebration. It can be reactivated
when crises occur. But public authorities cannot rely on traditional symbolic resources
on a day-to-day basis to maintain their social control. They have to demonstrate
constantly their ability to master change and deliver efficiently the results expected by
citizens. Symbols still matter, but the construction of the political drama is radically
altered (Balandier 1992). The purpose of symbols for political power is the same: to
show strength and to express legitimacy. Technological means and cultural conditions
are incongruent. Leaders and institutions have the potential to reach anyone at any time.
They are under a continuous obligation to communicate, as silence would mean
indifference or helplessness. Power is permanently on stage (Schwartzenberg 1979). It is
no longer a distant center that appears at leisure in a carefully controlled ceremonial
setting, like the triumphant arrival of a king in a loyal city. It must be an interlocutor,
listening to citizens and responding to them. Mass media forbid the segmentation of the
public a priori (even if new media tend increasingly to do so in practice). It creates the
obligation to have a catch-all message with a neutral content that makes sense to the
majority of the audience without alienating any minority groups. In short, technology is
not only means of communication but also a communicative constraint.
This “revolution” in communication has deeply redefined power discourses.
Political orders see their external justifications (God, history and nation) challenged
more and more. They are sustained only by the adhesion of the ruled, and this adhesion
has to be constantly renegotiated. Leaders and institutions have to prove their
competence and desirability on a daily basis. In contrast to traditional societies where
rituals work on reproduction and repetition, “hypermodern” societies function on the
rhythm of the media, looking for innovation and originality. Symbolism is degraded to
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60
communication. Myths are still at the roots of authority, but current myths are rapidly
consumed and must be renewed perpetually to reaffirm the unity of the community and
the representativeness of power.
In pre-modern times, symbols were the way to regulate order and disorder.
Rituals organized limited periods of turbulence and inversion as a cathartic way of
enforcing the return of established rules in the end. In present times, rituals are too
weak and restricted to operate in such a regulatory fashion. It is up to leaders and
institutions to manage tensions and protests by seduction or “foreclusion”. The state
then has to organize the conflict by constructing an appropriate political drama. In this
game, political leaders are merely some players among many (journalists, experts,
representatives of civil society, etc.). They are both the organizers and the objects of the
spectacle. Individuals are free to choose whether to take part or not. Instead of speaking
of de-ritualization, it is therefore more pertinent to speak of the individualization and
deinstitutionalization of political symbolism. This is true at all levels of social
communication. As Erving Goffman has emphasized, the individual is the new principle
of sacrality structuring ordinary social relations. The individual is the unit at the centre
of the organization of human interactions in daily life and of the links between
institutions and citizens (Goffman 1974: 43, 85). Formerly, rituals celebrated collectivity;
now, they refer to individuals themselves, who have increasingly escaped definition by
public authorities while being ever more dependent on their immediate social groups or
networks. It is worth noticing that these groups and networks remain deeply national in
the context of Europeanization and globalization (Medrano 2003).
Political drama in a risk-averse Europe
This fundamental transformation of political communication produces major effects at
all levels of political systems and communities, Europe simply being one of the most
visible stages. Using the French “no” to the constitutional treaty on May 29, 2005 as a
basis, Marc Abélès describes a general shift from the politics of convivance, based on
participation and shared identity in the present, to the politics of survivance, focused on
the priority of reducing risks and managing an uncertain and dangerous future (Abélès
2006: 94). The nation state was the universe of convivance, a stable setting for common
memory and destiny, a community whose continuity was the main purpose and the
main guarantee for the individual citizen (Ibid.: 104-105). But the nation state is no
longer able to face up to the challenge of global environmental security or socioeconomic
threats. Participation in the national political community is no longer a way of
having one’s say in an efficient process of control of private and collective destinies and
thereby loses its importance. The politics of survivance has more to do with the long-term
challenges of survival for humanity as a whole, but has yet to find its proper arenas for
political action and participation.
The rupture underlined by Abélès lies between the sphere of social and political
integration and the sphere of the effective regulation of reality. In pre-state societies, the
king was the nexus of a transcendent or immanent superpower, a combination of nature
François Foret European Political Rituals
61
and culture to ensure the preservation of life. This superpower was in touch with
superior forces that determined the future; it was also a social entity by which ritual
action was a way of influencing the future. The nation state signified a further step in
human history when integration in the civic community and participation in the
expression of national sovereignty were a means of taking part in the production of the
future. The welfare state and national politics were inclusive and decisive enough to
maintain the necessary fictional idea of the mastery of collective fate and the
accountability of the power in charge (Ibid.: 135-155). In both cases, political
ceremonies provided people not only with reassurance but also with a symbolic
empowerment thanks to the projection of the leader as an incarnation of the
representation of the community, allowing people to think of themselves as actors
rather than passive victims.2
Contemporary societies are desperately on the search for symbolic mechanisms
to restore the illusion of control and the link between participation and survival,
between belonging and destiny, between individual and collective life. New rituals of
exorcism have appeared, such as world conferences on global warming, charity events,
as well as networks in the wake of natural disasters or focused on the fight against
diseases. These new processes and settings linked to politics of survivance have developed
alongside traditional patterns of sovereignty. They remain widely dependent on states,
even if they constrain the state by imposing a partial redistribution of power and
resources due to the growing role of NGOs (Ibid.: 223). However, in this new scheme,
survival does not signify more participation by the public. Most often, new elites and
decision-makers are faceless to the average citizen. The public figures of this new order
are more often committed pop stars or generous benefactors rather than accountable
politicians (Ibid.: 224). Sources of superpower on the level of global threats therefore
escape collective control. A world state is still a utopia, as much feared as hoped for, and
this is not the goal of most people or of most actors’ strategies.
In this context, the European Union is simply a different level of governance,
not really able to offer symbolic resources of reassurance or patterns for the reappropriation
of power. The EU is less the cause than the manifestation of a deep
transformation in the connection with politics. According to Abélès, a restoration of the
classical articulation between participation and empowerment via a leader working for
collective survival is not to be expected in Brussels. Distancing himself from his
previous writings, Abélès puts forward the hypothesis that it may be necessary to forget
the search for an omnipotent and overhanging political centre, regardless of the level of
power being considered (Ibid.: 231). The idea of a hierarchical order of actors and
allegiances rooted in tradition within a well identified, limited and territorialized
community on the model of the nation state is outdated. The notions of justice and
right take on a meaning only when referring to the minimization of risk for the future
(Ibid.: 219). The mandate given by citizens to public authorities today is no longer to
implement a vision of progress and social engineering. It is rather to avoid any potential
danger caused by modern factors of progress: science, technology and politics. Rulers
are not expected to organise the change; on the contrary, they have to reduce
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
62
uncertainties. Here starts the problem of the European Union, which represents a major
change, in contradiction to popular expectations of politics. Fundamentally, the
European project is on the side of radical modernity and mobility.
The EU has promised transformations without offering reassurance and
compensation. Therefore, citizens rationally chose to vote “no” to its constitutional
dimension on the basis of controversy that was focused less on the actual tools of public
agencies as outlined in the treaty and more on the potential aftermath (Ibid.: 129). It was
a question of precaution rather than opposition to European integration in itself, and
was above all the manifestation of this new relationship to politics. The charisma of the
word “constitution” was mobilized at the launch of the process, very shyly put to work
in the writing of the draft treaty and totally abandoned in the public debate to promote
the text afterwards. It highlights the failure of the EU vis-à-vis the founding ritual of
modern political communities: a constitutional moment as a constitutive period of time,
the standardization of legal and political languages and references, the writing of a
fundamental charter as an expression of a common will, the summit of a hierarchy of
norms and values and an anchor for collective imagery. This unsuccessful attempt to
give Europe such a ritual has illustrated both the feeling that it was necessary and the
impossibility of achieving it.
Limited Emergence of Specific European Rituals
Precedence and exposure in a multi-level system of governance
Given this context, what can we say about the attempts to organize European political
symbolism? Indeed, every political order is led to offer (or to be attributed to) visions of
time, space and collectivity. Despite its weak and frequently negative media exposure,
the EU is no exception. The first example of this is the way that power games are
regulated and dramatized in Brussels. In order to test the resilience of the notion of
ritual in contemporary European governance, the political spectacle is not analysed here
via the prism of political roles and resources, but through the codification of protocol.
The weakly institutionalized, self-limited and ostentatiously modest EU ceremonial is
revelatory of the softness and secondary nature of the supranational political system.
Protocol is the symbolic system that expresses the political order, a hierarchy
that classifies actors and makes power relationships visible. It is the projection of the
structure of the relationship between rulers and ruled (Deloye, Haroche, Ihl 1996). In
historical state-building processes protocol provided the way for signifying and
performing the transition from a system of personal power and allegiances to a
formation of impersonal and rational domination, namely the modern state (Elias 1974).
Today, it is fashionable for political leaders to “play it cool” by displaying simplicity and
spontaneity. But in the event of dissent or disrespect they are quick to reactivate their
prerogatives. The discretion of the protocol only means that the self-regulation of
individuals via the incorporation of social norms is sufficient and privileged over
François Foret European Political Rituals
63
ostentatious control disposals (Elias 1975). In a situation of conflict or uncertainty,
formal norms are rapidly re-established, as in the French “co-habitation” when the
president and the prime minister belong to different parties (Monclaire 1992). The EU is
particularly interesting because it represents a universe of permanent uncertainty and
conflict, with overlapping and fluctuating arenas and hierarchies. As such, it is a very
challenging polity to dramatize in stable, codified forms. Historically, the choice has
clearly been to privilege a symbolic laissez-faire, thus giving advantage to the most
powerful players. An endogenous, European ceremonial has emerged, with sufficient
flexibility to integrate constant changes in the perimeter of the EU or the relationships
between leaders. Although the EU has been strengthened in the process it nevertheless
has remained subordinate to national governments.
There are no written rules for European ceremonies, neither as legal texts nor as
guides published by former civil servants. It makes the EU closer to the German than
the French model on this point. According to bureaucrats in charge of this task, the
topic is too controversial and variable.3
It means that oral tradition from one European
civil servant to another is the only source of reference. The case of the European
summits, the European political events most covered by the media, exemplifies the
emergence and the maintenance of a constantly reinvented tradition. The guardians of
this tradition are the civil servants of the general secretary of the Council of the
European Union, the institution in charge of the organization of summits under the
authority of the successive national presidencies. Their role is purely consultative,
deferring to member states as soon as a decision has to be reached. Yet, European
bureaucracy has been able to preserve the modus operandi of a ritualized dialogue between
heads of state and govern the recurrent conflicts due to various rounds of enlargement
and major extensions in the competencies of the EU.
The evolution of the “family picture” is good evidence of the tension between
continuity and adaptation. The picture represents a key moment in time of each summit
and is a symbol of European unity. The exploding number of participants in European
councils – including new and future member states, but also external guests – means
that the setting has to be more strictly organized. Before 2004, the arrangement of all
the leaders was rather loose, with the disordered presence of presidents and guests in
the front row of the photo the only constant element. After 2004, the tradition was
established of marking the place of everybody on the floor by using small, national flags,
with a far more precise order of precedence from the centre of the stage (the acting
president of the EU, the presidents of the European Parliament and of the European
Commission, the national rulers bearing the title of heads of state, the representatives of
the other member states in the order of the future presidencies).4
The initial preference for a very sober and simple European ceremonial is both a
matter of necessity and choice. European institutions do not have symbolic resources
such as military honours or decorations at their disposal.5
They have to find the smallest
common denominator between very different national traditions, hence the strategy to
depict a rationalized rather than theatrical political order. This is not only a solution by
default. It also constitutes the explicit wish to offer an appearance of political modernity
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
64
and pragmatic collaboration by breaking with the formal ceremonies of power politics,
as European discourse often attributes the catastrophe of two world wars to the
competitions of national prides. The underlying message is that the decorum of the past
is no longer required between countries engaged in long-term peace through reason.6
The relocation of the European summits to Brussels, where meeting sites provide
functional though not aesthetic settings, has reinforced the propensity to minimize the
solemnity of these meetings. The search for simplicity, with equality between member
states as the only guiding principle, is also at work in the management of bilateral
contacts and exchanges. It is a way of offering to decision-makers the best atmosphere
in which to reach an agreement and to the audience the image of rule by “common
sense” (a recurrent motto) and friendship between leaders.
The absence of any codification of behaviour and the equality between actors
mean that the self-regulation of leaders is crucial. The legacy of “diplomacy by intimacy”
inherited from the founding fathers is supposed to be sufficient to make the national
rulers comply and adopt the required friendly and cooperative manners. The media
coverage of European summits scrutinizes the slightest detail, thus making body
language as important as political discourse. Usually, this system has worked rather well
beyond the standard conflicts of national interests, even after the increase in the size of
the events as a result of EU enlargements. Nevertheless, some representatives of new
member states have been criticized for not respecting the courtesy and moderation
required among peers. Some examples have been provided by Polish representatives
who were accused of radicalization and the controversial use of historical references
during the renegotiations of the constitutional treaty in June 20077
, or by the Czech
executive acting as the presidency of the EU but pursuing mainly national priorities in
the first half of 20098
. Older member states have been subject to the same criticism,
especially Nicolas Sarkozy for his personal style as the president of the EU in the
second half of 2008, and Silvio Berlusconi for his unpredictable behaviour in several
European and NATO meetings9
.
The virtuous constraint to look for compromise and a representation of unity is
in permanent tension with the necessity to take into account national particularism
and/or to regulate potential conflicts. This is the anthropological function of rituals, a
way to restore a sense of continuity while allowing for adaptation to changes and
regulation of crises. The European ceremonial is flexible enough to adapt to new
situations. The rule has been to have no more than two representatives per member
state around the negotiating table in order to keep the size of the assembly small enough
to allow for personal contact. In 1986, during the first cohabitation in France, the prime
minister, Jacques Chirac wished to take part in the councils with the then president,
François Mitterrand. Other countries agreed in the name of the free choice of every
capital to compose its delegation10
, but on condition that the French minister of foreign
affairs leave the room. The presence of both the president and the prime minister has
become the common practice during the successive French cohabitations and other
countries have followed this method in similar configurations (e.g. Finland, Cyprus and
Romania). But the rule has not been so easily accommodated in other cases. Nicolas
François Foret European Political Rituals
65
Sarkozy, when acting as president of the EU, enforced the presence of a third French
delegate at the negotiating table in December 2008.11
The Polish delegation publicly
exposed its internal dissent, sparked by competition between the prime minister and the
president, in October 2008.12
These two recent cases have shown the limits of selfregulation
among EU actors, and also those of European tradition when it comes to
managing national tensions.
Basic symbolic principles established by history have a strong resilience,
however. The idea of taking two “family pictures” - one depicting the heads of state and
government and the other the ministers of foreign affairs - was rejected because it was
perceived as a violation of the original spirit of the exercise which was to underline
equality and unity not only between countries but also between leaders.13
In the same
way, the ceremonial of European summits has been able to integrate the arrival of new
players like the high representative for the common foreign and security policy, also
acting as general secretary of the council. The European Commission did not want
Javier Solana to have precedence over the Commission vice-president, but member
states imposed this hierarchy. The high representative has precedence over ministers of
foreign affairs and joins the heads of states and government during negotiations.
The European ceremonial is more codified when there is a conflict between
countries. At the Lisbon summit in March 2000, the Portuguese presidency had to
manage the crisis between the Austrian chancellor, Wolfgang Schüssel (who included
the populist Jörg Haider in his government) and the other national rulers. French and
Belgian representatives refused to appear together with Schüssel in the same picture.
This situation compelled the organisers to replace the “family picture” by a simple
“group picture” and to arrange the participants in such a way that leaders on bad terms
would not have to rub shoulders with each other.14
In the long term, the European ritual
has worked relatively efficiently to prevent major diplomatic incidents within the
European Union. But the details of the ritual itself have sometimes been a problem.
Since 2004, the tradition has been to mark everyone’s place for the “family pictures”
with a small, national flag. Two external guests, namely George Bush (USA) and Recep
Tayyip Erdogan (Turkey), judged this as an unacceptable trampling on their national
colours, providing evidence of a far less easy-going relationship with their national
identities than their EU counterparts.15
This is a good illustration of the difference
between the naturalized, informal and relativistic “domestic” symbolic order of the EU
and “normal” international diplomacy.
Besides being a system to regulate actors, the political ceremonial is also a way of
structuring territoriality. Hierarchies among representatives of power express the
differences between centres and peripheries. The EU is a place of business-like
exchanges where European politicians and civil servants are considered “at home”
everywhere in Europe. The former president of the European Commission Jacques
Santer once wondered why he had to be on his own in the traffic jams of Paris,
regretting the time when he was the prime minister of Luxemburg with an escort of
motorcyclists to open the road (Quermonne 2001: 74). However, Europe remains
divided by national boundaries in terms of the symbolic treatment EU dignitaries
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
66
receive in domestic hierarchies of honour. In Germany, for example, members of the
European Parliament are treated like members of the national parliament according to
the official protocol; they precede their domestic counterparts in Greece, but in France
they are far behind MPs in terms of the concession of official honours. European
representatives are often held in higher regard at the local level and especially in the
margins of national territory than in the capitals.16
The laissez-faire approach and the
absence of a unified European norm lead to a reinforcement of the status of already
well-established national actors. The EU has to submit to the national symbolic order at
all times. The guests invited to Brussels have to pass through the Belgian authorities.
The diplomatic delegations accredited by the EU have to follow three timetables in the
matter of displaying the flag – their national one, the one of the EU, but also the one at
work on Belgian territory.17
European rituals always take place in a temporality and a
spatiality which are structured by national powers and traditions.
So how does one assess the evolution of European rituals? Some progress –
since De Gaulle’s indignation in the mid-1960s about the demand by Walter Hallstein
and the Commission for a diplomatic ceremonial (the famous “red carpet”) similar to
the one for a head of state – is undeniable. The EU has developed an ad hoc, modest and
flexible practice that reflects the logic of its own structures (multiplicity of centres,
diversity of traditions) and the political constraints (sensitivity of member states to any
abuse). The question is whether the ceremonial has been able to play a constitutive role
similar to the institutionalization of the nation state, especially with regard to three
points: firstly, as a codification separating political symbolism from the individual in
power and linking honours to a function rather than a person; secondly, as a way of
developing civil servants’ loyalty by imposing codified behaviour and a standardized
bureaucratic imagery; and thirdly, as the integration of all administrative units into a
unified, institutional setting dominated by a centre (Ihl 1996: 235; see also Kantorowicz
1989; Giesey 1987). As far as the depersonalization of functions is concerned, the laissezfaire
approach within the EU is in contradiction to the process of the depersonalization
of functions at it provokes strong variations depending on the resources of the
incumbents of holders of the public office. With regard to codification of behaviour of
civil servants, the self-image of eurocrats is characterized by a cult of intimacy and low
profile. Politics in Europe appears to be driven by an ‘enlightened vanguard’ untainted
by conventional politics but committed to further the general interest. However, the
laissez-faire in terms of symbols goes hand-in-hand with the growing inability of
European institutions to structure the identity and ideological preferences of its agents.
Finally, on the third point, the polycentrism of the EU and the lack of any unity in its
ceremonial practices make the integration of all administrative components into a
unique, institutional setting dominated by one center unlikely. To conclude, the
European political system has distinguished itself from national orders by developing sui
generis a partial codification of symbols, albeit a weakly institutionalized and a barely
visible one.
The discretion and simplicity of European rituals are to be understood in
connection with the general impoverishment of social rituals today. Nevertheless, in the
François Foret European Political Rituals
67
fundamental redefinition of political communication towards less collective and
repetitive forms and towards more individualized and continuously innovative patterns,
the EU does not have the same established positions and resources as national states. A
European tradition may emerge and regulate the behaviour of the actors involved with a
certain amount of efficiency, but it does not make full sense to the vast majority of
citizens. European representatives are condemned to stay in positions that are
subordinate to national ones in most cases. They do not have the means to be both the
expected embodiments of change in progress and the reassuring signs of continuity and
unity. Their situation exemplifies the hiatus between Europeanized, decision-making
processes and the systems of accountability that remain resolutely national. The
symbolic sobriety and the matter-of-fact style have been the conditions for successes in
the European integration process. The absence of protocol has aided the avoidance of
asking embarrassing questions about the transfer of competencies and the redefinition
of hierarchies. The challenge is probably not to restore the majesty of political power
but to locate more clearly where this power is exercised. It is a condition of its
democratic control and its capacity to win allegiances. The anthropological function of
ceremonial has been two-fold across time: firstly, to domesticate political domination by
conditioning the allocation of honours on precise criteria; secondly, to convert social
inequalities into political equality by replacing an arbitrary hierarchy by another one
based on common utility (Schemeil 2006). Europe does not currently implement this
transfiguration of unilateral power relationships into submission by consent.
The silence of the European anthem
Another indicator of the limitations in the creation of European rituals is the anthem.
Singing or listening to music contains ritual aspects given that codified behavior
involves a level of constraint in the way that respect and collective communion are
expressed. The melody of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony was chosen in 1955 by the
Council of Europe, which remains the legal owner of its intellectual rights. It was
adopted in the middle of the 1980s by European Community to illustrate the continuity
of the European idea through its different institutional phases. Taking a piece of
classical music has been understood as the wish to refer to a common, European
cultural heritage that pre-exists the standardization of cultures by nation states in order
to justify the existence of a post-national polity. It has also been said that the choice of a
well-known piece of music, despite its previous use by totalitarian regimes, or
companies, underlines the priority of reinforcing the public profile of European
institutions rather than long-lasting, identity-building strategies. The fact that it is an
element of high culture rather than popular folklore has also been interpreted as
evidence of the elitist dimension of European integration (Buch 1999: 268, 271, 276).
The European anthem does not have the same political meaning as its national
counterparts. The European institutions do not use it very often. However, the
European Parliament has announced its intention to generalise the playing of the “Ode
to Joy” to welcome foreign delegations or during celebrations as a riposte to the
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
68
suppression of European symbols in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007.18
The music sometimes
forms part of the diplomatic ceremonial in honour of the presidents of the Commission
or of the Parliament abroad. Another important setting for anthems is the army. The
first use of the European anthem in a military context occurred with the creation of the
Eurocorps in Strasbourg on November 5, 1993.19
Since this date, it has been played
during parades such as the one on the Champs-Elysées in Paris on July 14, 2007 with
troops from all the member states. But the European anthem is far from being a
naturalized way to celebrate Europe. Commissioners who stood up to salute it in the
European Parliament were criticized by an MEP who argued that the EU was neither a
nation nor a state and did not have to be saluted in such a way.20
“The Ninth” was more
recently played for the opening session of the European assembly on July 14, 2009 and
all MEPs stood in honour except those from extreme right formations.21
The Council of
Europe has tried to make the piece more popular by featuring hip-hop, techno or jazz
versions on its website. Unlike the frequent conflicts with regard to reinterpretations of
national anthems, these alterations have not raised much interest or controversy.
Beyond its relatively peripheral use and the resistance it may encounter, the
European anthem has the weakness of having no words. The initial wish to write a song
for such a common symbolic act was never put in practice. A poem by Friedrich Schiller
has often been associated with the music but has no official basis and does not create a
consensus as it is frequently considered either too universal or too mannered. The
writing of an ad hoc text would raise insoluble questions about the choice of language
(some suggested Latin as a neutral solution), and about references and meanings.
Furious debates took place in some member states about national anthems: in Spain the
debate centered on finding appropriate words; in Germany the concern was to correct
aggressive words; in France the issue was whether the words should be sung at all;
Italy’s debate focussed on whether to contest allegiance to Rome; and in Belgium the
question was whether or not the French song should be sung. This all makes it less and
less likely that any words will be adopted for the “Ode to Joy”. No authority at the EU
level has the legitimacy and the will to take on such a political challenge. The European
anthem cannot be sung in chorus, which according to numerous analysts prevents it
from reinforcing identification (Hedetoft 1995: 141). Like the European flag (Foret
2009), the anthem remains an elegant and selective celebration of a European idea that
can be appreciated and admired, but not really appropriated.
Europe Day, a communicative event rather than a political celebration
Commemorations have long been constitutive of European nations. Public holidays
have been opportunities for the state to display its power and for the community to
dramatize its unity through popular celebrations of the founding dates of national
history (Girardet 1990: 139-173). Such rituals have been a matrix of collective discipline.
By inviting the citizen to adopt specific behaviour patterns of public and private
sociability (participation in processions, meetings and family events), it has also been a
way to build and transmit a memory, a normative relation to the past as a major
François Foret European Political Rituals
69
narrative that grounds a shared identity. Europe Day, a commemoration of the
Schuman declaration of May 9, 1950 was an idea based on the same logic. The official
creation of the ritual in 1985 produced few reactions, and it is only thanks to the
mobilization of the European Movement in France in 1993 that the event has been at all
celebrated. Since this date, the mobilization has slowly spread out in other countries but
remains most frequently marginal in the public space and does not attract much media
attention. The purpose is to promote the symbols of Europe, to educate the citizen
about European affairs and to organize multicultural meetings. Schools and universities
are the main actors in this education, providing also the locations for the activities
marking this day: conferences, cultural festivals, events facilitating familiarity with other
member states through food and music, and so on.22
Europe Day is difficult to decipher for the average citizen. It is a celebration
more of the European idea than of the EU as a political system (again, the true creator
of Europe Day is the Council of Europe). The member states as public authorities
endorse the commemoration but are not directly involved in the collective organization
of the ritual.23
Public spaces do not see military parades or mass political
demonstrations. It is up to civil society to mobilise people and events, and so what takes
place on May 9 reflects the limited and selective social basis of pro-Europe activists and
the limited effect they have in terms of expanding their constituency.
Europe Day has only one of the four attributes of classic national days (Elgenius
2005: 365): it is the commemoration of an historical event in which memory is carefully
developed and maintained; but it is not a public holiday that would make people
available for collective or private rituals; it is not an annual meeting of the community
that aims to be a shared experience, because it is unknown and not experienced as such
by the citizens; and it is not a symbol of the human collectivity of which it is supposed
to be an emblem because the potent representations of collective identity are still
associated with sovereign nation states. The creation of Europe Day has led neither to
the participation of the masses in processions or popular rejoicing, nor to displays of
power and majesty by public authorities via military parades or heavyweight political
events. Europe Day is not a traditional ritual because it lacks a center, a focal point for a
symbolic setting that would give the event an overall meaning. With its weak tradition,
an absence of consensus on its meaning and the elite-focused24
participation, May 9
resembles October 3 in Germany, the celebration of German reunification. October 3 is
commonly taken as an example of the failure to establish a national holiday (Ibid.: 377-
380).
The same logic has prevailed for most European commemorations. Ambitious
proposals were expressed by the Commission to mark the 50th birthday of the Rome
Treaty in 2007, for example the organization of a song contest among the citizens.
These proposals were refused or hugely downscaled by the member states who were
fearful of the cost, the political risk or the possibility that the operation may simply have
come to appear ridiculous. But in order to give an honest view it is necessary to take
some fundamental changes in society into account. May 9 is not Bastille Day on July 14,
but July 14 is itself no longer what it used to be. In a context of the deinstitution-
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
70
alization and individualization of rituals, Europe Day is less a potential matrix for
European identity and unity than a communicative act, similar in its organization,
content and effect to the usual European communication policy.
Shortcomings of the electoral ritual
In representative democracy, voting remains the main source of legitimacy and the most
efficient provider of authority in Europe. European governance has been looking for
alternative doctrines such as participative democracy or a functionalist justification by
results. Nevertheless, elections have still been the essential setters of the political agenda.
Voting and the activities linked to it (selection of candidates, manifestos, activism in
parties, campaigning and media coverage) have structured a liturgy by which to organize
and regulate electoral competition and conflict. Voting also sustains global narratives on
the origins and unity of the political community. It contributes to the maintenance of a
common sense of belonging by soliciting the same gesture at the same time from all
members of the group following the same rules. The issue is to discover whether a
specific repertory has developed since the introduction of universal suffrage to directly
elect the members of the European Parliament in 1979.
European elections do not exactly create a “common activity” because they do
not follow uniform calendars and rules. In 2009, as in 2004, the vote took place over
four days to conform to different electoral customs (Deloy 2009; Deloye and Reynié
2005; Bruter and Deloye 2006). There was controversy about respecting the embargo on
announcing the results in various member states of the EU so as not to influence the
last electors to go to the ballot boxes. It was the seventh set of direct elections for some
countries, and the first for others (Romania and Bulgaria voted separately in 2007).
Other elections were held alongside the European ones in seven member states.
Different national (or infra-national) electoral rules were applied. Controversy was
sparked by stories of citizens voting twice in different countries or by the frustration of
immigrants from non-European origins who were unable to vote and who consequently
felt discriminated against because citizens from other member states who had arrived
more recently in the country could vote. Estonia experimented with electronic voting,
which helped increase participation significantly. In short, the European electoral ritual
was neither simultaneous, nor homogeneous, nor egalitarian.
In general, European elections do not create a specific temporality, a time of
promises and projects, suppressing the usual constraints of the political game. Due to
the absence of a clear majoritarian scheme and the impossibility of political alternation
when the opposition replaces the force in power, the vote does not have the role of
sanction and revival. There is not the ritual humiliation of rulers as illustrated by
anthropologists: elections reaffirm the conditional and delegated dimension of power in
democracy by temporarily inverting the relation of domination between politicians and
masses. In European campaigns, it has become routine to see guests from “friendly
parties” in other member states participating in meetings. But this is not sufficient to
turn elections or campaigns into attractive events. The attractiveness of European
François Foret European Political Rituals
71
elections has declined, along with its novelty, since the first ballot – especially when
broadcast on television, which has played an increasing role in politics (Leroy and Siune
1994). The politicization of the designation of the Commission president, depending on
the results of the European elections, as stipulated in the Lisbon treaty and already
sketched out in practice, could be a way to dramatize the process. The experience of
2004 showed that it was not sufficient to increase and change the tonality of media
coverage significantly (Gerstlé, Neumayer, Colomé 2005). In some countries media
attention has even declined, highlighting an ebb in interest regarding European
integration. It was a similar story in 2009. Media exposure was weak and mainly centred
on national issues (Brack, Rittelmeyer, Stănculescu 2009). Uncertainties concerning the
ratification of the Lisbon treaty left a shadow of doubt on the final number of MEPs to
be elected, the extension of the European Parliament’s powers and the procedure for
the appointment of the President of the Commission. At the time of the election, the
president-in-charge, José Manuel Barroso was widely expected to seek a second term
and, to a small extent, this polarized the campaign between supporters and opponents
of the Portuguese leader. Much remains to be done, however, if there is to be a real
competition among candidates endorsed by rival parties and clearly distinguishable
manifestos to attract the votes of citizens.
Campaigns have divergent – sometimes opposite – dynamics in all member
states. Political parties do try to Europeanize political discourses by producing
transnational manifestos. But national factors are overwhelming in terms of the
decisions of citizens. The timing of vote is not a break with normality; the repetition of
some forms of codified behaviour can be seen, but without much effect.25
Innovation
remains rare and non-cumulative. This means that the level of the ritualization of
European elections is weak. At the national level, electoral rituals have produced specific
discursive resources (metaphors, key words, slogans) aiming to make sense to the large
public. This is not the case in European elections at the level of the EU. Language
barriers, low levels of competency among citizens regarding European affairs as well as
the national framing of the debate are constraints that prevent the possible emergence
of a truly European political vocabulary. Specialized idioms of actors in European
affairs are too complex and too remote from the classic political discourse to make
symbolic expressions politically effective. Even “eurocrat-bashing”, the criticism of
European institutions widely practiced all over the EU, is very nationally structured.
Scandinavian countries, for example, insist more than others on the corruption and the
lack of transparency in Brussels, while France emphasizes the lack of democracy and
political leadership.
There is scarce symbolism with regard to elections at the European level. The
twelve stars of the European flag are frequently used in electoral propaganda and, on
this point, European elections may have been useful in terms of naturalizing this
emblem. The creativity of symbols, however, is increasingly concerned with resistance
to Europe. Take for example the case of the silver “£” used by the United Kingdom
Independence Party to celebrate the British attachment to the pound, or the imaginative
posters to support the “no” campaign in the run-up to the Irish referendum in 2008. In
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
72
the same way, candidates in the European elections do not allow a strong
personalization of the stakes. Campaigns remain informative or focused on party
strategies and expected results, but are mainly faceless and devoid of issues (Maier and
Tenscher 2006; de Vreese, Lauf, Peter 2007). Generalizing the vote on lists in territorial
constituencies has not yet produced major effects on the creation of a reinforced link
between the citizens and their potential representatives. The trend has still been to fill
the lists with seasoned, specialized political players, youngsters in expectation of greater
destinies, losers in search of a post after a defeat in domestic politics and stars from civil
society attracted by the idea of some political experience. This mix is associated with a
significant turnover of MEPs in the European Parliament. European careers are still
considered as second-rate options in the cursus honorum of an ambitious political leader.
Alternatively, some devoted MEPs are not able to secure their re-elections because
candidates are selected by their national party authorities who are poorly impressed by
their achievements in Brussels and Strasbourg. This confirms the status of European
elections as second-order elections. As a vicious circle, the weak political salience of the
consultation maintains the low profile of MEPs, whose roles are little known, little
understood and little highlighted.
To conclude the comparison, the national electoral ritual has produced founding
narratives that structure belief systems underlying political allegiances. The most
important of these narratives is concerned with popular sovereignty and the ability of
the collectivity to decide its own destiny. European elections have damaged this
narrative because of a steadily decreasing turnout since the introduction of electoral
suffrage in 1979. In 2004, less than a half of citizens went to the ballot boxes across the
whole of the EU, less than a quarter in the new member states. There was a fresh
decline in 2009 (43.23%, with strong variations between countries). The overall picture,
however, is far more complex than the cliché depicting citizens as hostile or indifferent
to European integration. Euro-sceptic and extremist formations have been contained or
have declined. Beyond the traditional sovereignist criticisms of supra-nationality,
“rhetorical” rejections of EU-membership such as in 2004 have had no further
consequences (United Kingdom Independence Party) or even lost ground (Danish
People's Party). Formations promoting a “constructive distrust” of Europe, a call for
profound reform in Brussels or a circumscription of European competencies have
resisted unequally. Since 2004, the dogma of an ever-closer union has clearly been
challenged and the idea of a European political community has been increasingly
discussed, even if integration itself is only marginally contested (Cautrès and Tiberj
2005: 210). Bold interpretations can speculate on the advantage for the EU of conflictformation
and actual politicization of the debate to integrate dissent, turning the
European Parliament into a polarized arena. In 2004, as in previous European elections,
the agenda was focused on national concerns. Not even the on-going constitutional
debate and enlargement were able to lead the debate towards issues on the nature of the
EU or issues of identity and values (with reference, for example, to the Christian
heritage of Europe or to the candidature of Turkey). In 2009, the economic crisis and
the institutional blockade of the Lisbon Treaty by some member states (Ireland, Czech
François Foret European Political Rituals
73
Republic, to a far lesser extent Germany) saw national political imperatives dominate
political discourse. In short, universal suffrage has not functioned as a ritual constitutive
of a European political community. It has more difficulties playing this role at the
national level, too. Again, the EU’s problems and specificities have to be relativized
considering the similar questions confronting other political arenas.
Conclusion
Legitimization of the European polity is not characterized by the disappearance of the
symbolic dimension, but by a deep change of its forms and principles. Political, cultural
and religious institutions have lost a part of their control over their social constituencies
and have to constantly reinvent ad hoc communicative resources to attract the loyalty of
individuals and groups.26
It is not to say that local and national belongings are obsolete.
The exacerbation of memory debates and the increasing affirmation of particularism are
evidence of collective expectations and strategies to reframe existing frameworks in a
more pluralist and flexible way. Structures of opportunities have opened for symbolic
entrepreneurship. The European Union is one of the arenas and levels where this recomposition
is at work. The supranational scale is neither the most salient (in terms of
identity) nor powerful (in terms of agency). The European reference is alternatively
perceived as a threat, a complement or a substitute in the reshaping of identity and
authority patterns. Its status may vary according to the circumstances, the socio-political
configuration or the actors concerned. In this context, speaking of European rituals
involves adopting an updated and rather weak definition of what rituality is. There is no
sufficiently strong transcendental dimension to the European polity, neither religious
(Schlesinger and Foret, 2006) nor political, which could generate a “European liturgy”.
Democratic principles consecrating the primacy of individual rights may figure as
sacralized sources of legal and symbolic orders. Codified behaviour and repertories do
regulate interactions between European rulers, are able to integrate change while
preserving continuities and, to a certain extent, prevent conflicts from endangering the
functional balances of EU governance. These low-public-profile behaviour codes and
repertories do not fulfil the same function of ostentation as national ceremonials have
done in the building of nation states: to focus attention on a centre and to siphon off
allegiances. It reflects prevailing contemporary political idioms that rely more on
persuasion and seduction than constraint. Another major difference between would-be
European rituals and national ones is that the former are, emotionally speaking,
relatively poor, except for people who are direct actors (which could suggest that there
is no difference of nature but rather of degree and audience). Symbols are aimed at
enforcing predefined affective representations and perceptions, either actually felt or at
least considered as legitimate, in order to promote compliance with the existing political
order. The example of the European anthem suggests that EU symbolism is ill-equipped
and/or too recent and elitist to play such a role. European institutional strategies are
ambiguous and sometimes contradictory, oscillating between the “founding narrative”
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
74
philosophy and the short-term and prosaic practice of communication policy. Overall,
voting illustrates the importance and the limits of European rituals. The selection and
regulation of rulers, the resilience of the national matrix, and the existence of transnational
interactions show the potential of both integration and fragmentation.
In order to establish its legitimacy, the EU has to face all the difficulties posed
by pluralistic, secularized and relativistic societies. In opposition to national states, the
European polity can rely neither on the inertia of established structures and practices
nor on the “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995) which is so deeply internalized by
individuals that it does not need to be displayed through rituals and symbols. Our
empirical work suggests that such a “symbolic acquis communautaire” could presently exist
to a limited extent only at the level of elites, among actors directly in touch with
European institutions and networks. The emergence of such a “banal Europeanism” as
a mass phenomenon is far from obvious. What is arguably discernible is an
Europeanization from the inside of national imaginaries. The reformulation of collective
identities and symbolic practices cannot do without taking on board the European
reference. Visions of Europe which are thus incorporated are very diverse in their
meaning and intensity. Again, there is nothing new in such a scenario: conflicts between
competing versions of what should be the “We” have framed the nation. The key point
is the potential emergence of a centre to subsume and hierarchize this plurality. It has
been argued above that the EU must face the same social claims as previous political
orders in terms of reassurance on the continuity of personal and collective identities,
security and welfare. The idea has also been defended that such an enterprise requires a
certain restoration of the verticality of politics and that sectoral dynamics in European
symbolism testify to these needs. This is the reason why the obsolescence of the search
for a “focal point” diagnosed by Abélès in his late writings may be contested.
Conversely, the thesis of the duplication of the national state’s model by the EU as
suggested by Shore does not match empirical findings. European policies are not likely
to produce homogeneity and to ensure the congruence between politics and culture in a
near future. The European polity would more relevantly be labelled as a regional state
(Schmidt 2006: 8), a consociation of states or a new-look benevolent Empire.27
So the
story is not to put old things in new clothes, but rather to accommodate new social
realities in timeless but reshaped outfits.
Notes
1 The author would like to thank the two anonymous referees of International Political Anthropology
for their stimulating comments. He is also grateful to Harald Wydra for his inspiring remarks
during the editorial process and to Jean-Pascal Daloz, organizer of the conference “Political
rituals” in Oxford (4-5 May 2009) where this paper was initially presented.
2 This is not to be taken as an idealized vision of rituals that have also been mechanisms of
domination, division and alienation.
3. A former civil servant in charge of protocol at the European Parliament testified that the
establishment of a written norm had been considered but had to be abandoned because of the
resistance of some national delegations defending their national practices, see Mestat (2001: 31).
4. Interview with Hans Brunmayr, Head of protocol, Council of the EU, 17 October 2005.
François Foret European Political Rituals
75
5. Interview with Wilfried Baur, Head of protocol, European Parliament, 29 April 1999.
6 The anthropological function of ceremonial is to prevent conflict. In military honours,
showing arms means that they will not be used. The renunciation of any ceremonial is not then
a symbolic silence but on the contrary a sign that the prevention of conflict is no longer
necessary because conflict itself is unlikely.
7http://athomeineurope.blogactiv.eu/2007/06/23/pologneeurope-les-fruits-de-la-prise-enotage,
accessed 27 April 2009.
8 La Libre Belgique, “Les Tchèques en roue libre”, 27 April 2009.
9http://www.rtlinfo.be/rtl/news/article/231834/berlusconi+pendu+au+telephone+avec+erdogan+snobe+merkel,
accessed 27 April 2009.
10. This has been true since the origins of the Council of ministers in the fifties. It was recently
illustrated by the presence of Nicolas Sarkozy, head of the French state, at a meeting of the
Eurogroup instead of his finance minister.
11 See Quatremer J., “La chaise de Jean-Louis Borloo”,
http://bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/coulisses/2008/12/la-chaise-de-je.html#comment-
6a00d83451b56c69e2010536622729970c, accessed on the 27 April 2009. Sarkozy exemplifies
here a significant fondness for issues of protocol despite his supposed spontaneity. He faced
less tolerance in other arenas like NATO, where his demand to change the order of precedence
to sit in a more prestigious place was satisfied only for the public part of the event.
http://www.rtbf.be/info/sarkozy-traite-au-sommet-de-strasbourg-selon-les-normes-habituellesdu-protocole-81906,
accessed 27 April 2009.
12http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/monde/europe/0,,4124331,00-le-president-polonais-file-a-l-anglaise.html,
accessed 27 April 2009.
13. Interview with Hans Brunmayr, op.cit.
14. Le Monde, 24 March 2000; Libération, 24 March 2000.
15 Interview with Hans Brunmayr, op. cit.
16. French MEPs are more highly regarded in overseas departments than in Paris, see “Décret
95-1037 du 21 September 1995 relatif aux cérémonies publiques, préséances, honneurs civils et
militaires”.
17. “Vade-mecum à l’usage du corps diplomatique accrédité auprès des Communautés
européennes”, Commission européenne, January 1999, 291-292.
18 R. Rivais, “Les eurodéputés déplorent le retrait des symboles du futur traité”, Le Monde, 11
July 2007.
19. Armée et Défense, 616 (November/December 1993), 10.
20. Written question E-3318/00 asked by Esko Seppänen (GUE-NGL) to the Commission, JO
n° C 136 E du 08/05/2001, p. 0193.
21 P. Canfin, “Premiers pas dans l’arène…”, http://ecologie.blogs.liberation.fr/euroecolos/2009/07/arlement-day-one.html,
accessed 14 July 2009.
22. For a broad view of the events, see the website http://www.feteleurope.fr.
23 Intense lobbying by the Commission and the European Parliament was necessary to declare
Europe Day a “cultural event” in order to allow financial support from the EU for these
activities
24 Elite-focused means circumscribed to the elites in its effects, not by vocation, which means
that it is not elitist in principle.
25. The failings of European campaigns must be understood in comparison with the massive
influence of the – very national – campaign in the run-up to the French referendum in May
2005 (Gerstlé and Piar 2005: 42-7).
26 This view corroborates many points on the conception of ritual as social performance. As
Jeffrey Alexander suggested, Europe struggles to manage “refusion” from still national cultural
scripts and institutionally poor performers (Alexander 2006, 1-28).
27 For further discussion of these concepts see Foret (2008, chapter 1).
International Political Anthropology Vol. 3 (2010) No. 1
76
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