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Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe*
The ‘Old Left’ and the ‘New Right’
ZSUZSA FERGE**
Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd University, Budapest
Abstract: The situation of women was improved in many respects under the totalitarian
state socialist system. However, the improvement was brought about from the
top down, without civil participation and control. Also, many legal and financial
dispositions concerning the family, women and gender relations were fundamentally
conservative. Such politics may not be seen as left-wing. The socialists never analysed
their mistakes in this respect, so that a consistent left-wing agenda on family
and gender policy is still missing irrespective of whether they are in government or
in opposition.
Since the collapse of the old system, many new ‘right’ trends have gained ground.
Conservative trends are harming the reproductive rights of women and are questioning
the legitimacy of their work outside the home. Economic crisis and monetary
pressures are leading to a wholesale reorganisation of former social policy dispositions,
with a minimal state, the scaling down of universal and social insurance benefits,
the spread of individually targeted social assistance and market or quasi-market
solutions. This results in increasing child and female poverty. Also, the situation of
women on the labour market is worsening because of the weakening of rights and
the play of ‘free’ market forces.
The attitudes of women have been changing during and after ‘socialism’. This is one
of the foundations of further changes. The other and most important one is that in
the new system civil and political rights have been strengthened. This is a gain for
civil society in general. These rights allow the assertion of group interests, hence
they may effectively serve the interests of women. For this to happen, however, it
will take time, but this seems the only asset of women in the face of a ‘patriarchal’
state and an unrestrained market.
Czech Sociological Review, 1997, Vol. 5 (No. 2: 159-178)
1. The ‘Old Left’ – Before and After
It will take a long time before it is possible to give a credible brief account of the performance
of the Soviet-type state socialist systems or totalitarian socialism. The difficulties
of a fair assessment are not easily overcome in the case of women either, all the less
*) My own experience is limited to Hungary. Since there have been not only politically induced
similarities but also extremely important differences among the countries of the bloc, I tried to
gather information on other countries as well, so as to avoid unwarranted generalisations. The
systematic account of the various (similar or different) trends is a task which is yet to be done.
The paper was originally prepared for the conference Family, sexuality and labour markets:
the role of symbolic politics in the assault on the welfare state, University of Bergen, Norway,
May 26-28, 1995, and then rewritten in early 1997 thanks to an extended stay in the Institute of
Human Studies, Vienna. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers of the Czech Sociological
Review for making useful comments.
**) Direct all correspondence to Professor Zsuzsa Ferge, Dept. of Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd
University, Muzeum krt. 4/c, Budapest 1088, phone + 36 1 266 1008, e-mail ferge@ludens.elte.hu
Czech Sociological Review, V, (2/1997)
160
because politics varied a lot during the 40 or 70 years in question. Let us start this tentative
and cursory assessment with some ‘objective’ trends.
The ‘equality of women’ was long a declared objective of politics. One of its foundations
was the equalisation of formal rights. Acts were adopted at an early stage of the
system assuring equal rights for women in politics (the right to vote and to be elected),
and within marriage. This meant among other things the abolition of legal and social discrimination
against illegitimate children, the right to divorce or to inherit, and so forth.1
Whether all these rights materialised or not is a different issue. While women certainly
went to vote (the right having become an unconditional must for both sexes), they have
remained vastly underrepresented in all leading positions.2
Another foundation was the enhancement of educational opportunities. The schooling
of girls up to tertiary level was encouraged with no small success. For instance, the
rate of girls in higher education went up from a pre-war level of 20 percent or less to over
50 percent. In this case there was no real pressure, and sometimes – particularly in earlier
periods – some positive discrimination may have been applied in favour of women.3
Nonetheless, the educational structure of girls has remained somewhat crooked in all the
countries. They have been overrepresented in educational channels leading to less wellremunerated
or less ‘marketable’ jobs (such as teaching), and underrepresented particularly
in vocational training and in the technical sciences. These – more or less spontaneous
– one-sided options of girls has led to some segregation both in educational
institutions and, as a consequence, also in the world of work. Whether the survival of
traditional female educational and professional choices (operating usually against the
long-term interests of women) was biologically or socially conditioned was a matter for
debate even at the time [Ferge 1983].
The most important pillar of ‘emancipation’ was certainly the gainful employment
of women. In all the countries 80 to 90 per cent of women had gainful employment at the
end of the eighties. The anti-women bias – the underrepresentation of women on the
higher levels of the job-hierarchy, a more or less segregated job-structure, and the 20 or
30 percent lower pay for women even in similar jobs plagued state-socialist countries by
and large as much as most countries in Western Europe (with the possible exception of
Sweden and Norway).
It is nowadays a controversial issue to what extent the politics of the gainful employment
of women was motivated by strong ideological pressures; by the need of man-
1) One (male) Hungarian sociologist long maintained that the system gave more rights to women
than to men, allowing women to destroy the social fabric by undermining the family, socialising
children in a feminine way etc. [Hernádi 1988].
2) It is a rare pleasure to look at the paintings or photos representing the members of the ‘Politbureau’,
of the Central Committee or the Council of Ministers in any of the countries at any point in
time. Women are always conspicuous by their absence. One could find at most one or two ‘token’
women in those illustrious bodies. The ratio of female MPs was 30 percent at most.
3) In later years, in Hungary at least, some negative discrimination against women could be detected
in fields where they had become overrepresented, like in law, or where strong male interests
could successfully prevail to curtail the entrance of women. In fact, the relationship between the
prestige and the earnings of a profession on the one hand, and its degree of feminisation on the
other had been uncovered already in the sixties and has been demonstrated systematically ever
since [e.g. Sullerot 1968, Koncz 1985] which explains the increasing vocality of male interests.
Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe
161
power for extensive industrialisation; by the aspiration to hold down wages (so that only
families with at least two earners could manage); or by the political will to the exert
maximum control over the population. It is also debated whether the high activity rate of
women was only forced on society from the top down, or whether there was also a push
in this direction from the bottom up. Put more simply, the debate is about whether women
wished to work or were only coerced to do so.
In all probability, many of the above factors and perhaps others too, played some
role in shaping the final outcome. The impact of symbolic coercion or violence (to enforce
the norm to work outside the home) is undeniable, and so are its negative effects,
such as the overburdening of women, and the weakening of the already declining family.
It may also be that retrospective evaluation is highly influenced by the later political climate.
Right around the time of the collapse of the system it was indeed fashionable to
vilify everything belonging to the past, so that all the facts and measures concerning
women were interpreted by many as the malevolent intervention of a macho state wronging
women. In the later years opinions have become more nuanced. This diversity of
evaluation is easy to detect in the literature both East and West. It is emphatically present
in the current Eastern literature. For instance, Siemienska [1994] sees the work of women
in Poland as being only enforced from above. According to Panova et al. [1993: 17] in
Bulgaria “the right to work outside the family (…) turned into a burden, a compulsion”.
In Ostner’s [1994: 52] formulation based on survey results “East-German women not
only wanted but had to work to make ends meet”. Analysing historical evidence, Havelková
[1993: 64] suggests, though, that “In the Czech case, the high employment of women
(…) was not resented by women as much as is sometimes claimed today in sweeping
criticisms against the totalitarian system”. Szalai [1991] has also many doubts and queries.
I am unable to arbitrate in these debates. On the basis of personal experience and of
some – always debatable4 – statistics, it seems to me that in the early years the aspiration
of women for more freedom played a larger role, and the feeling of pressure from above
was weaker than in the later decades. This may only be an optical illusion, because I was
just at the beginning of my adult life in the post-war years and strongly identified with the
socialist view on the work of women. However, Heinen [1995: 95] notes also for Poland
that according to surveys done at different periods, there was a shift between the sixties
and the eighties in women’s attitudes towards work from a more ‘positive’ to a more
‘critical’ attitude.
The work of women outside the home was supported by a heavily subsidised network
of services offering alternatives to home chores (laundries, canteens, etc.), and more
importantly by alternative child care. Child-care institutions were spreading with some
delay: ideology was at its strongest in the fifties, while the expansion of the child-care
network started in all satellite countries in the sixties. From then on, it developed rather
rapidly almost everywhere. With the exception of Poland, for instance, from the 1980s
onwards, 80 to 90% of children between 3 and 6 had access to kindergartens. Nurseries
for children under 3 had always been less all-encompassing, often causing difficulties if
4) I am referring to the first post-war survey on women which was carried out by the Central Statistical
Office in 1960. In this the majority of women expressed their wish to, or satisfaction with,
paid work, and not only for financial reasons. These results may be suspect because the survey
was done in 1960, when self-censorship, or hidden political fears may have distorted the answers.
[Women… 1962].
Czech Sociological Review, V, (2/1997)
162
women with a young child wanted or had to continue to pursue a gainful occupation. It is
again a controversial issue whether these institutions served essentially indoctrination and
regimentation (for former East-Germany, see for example Ostner [1993]), or the genuine
needs of children and women or families.5
The need for the work of women weakened, however, with time. An alternative for
institutionalised early child care was found in the late sixties. The first paid and jobprotected
extended leave (initially two, somewhat later three years leave) was introduced
in Hungary in 19676 over and above the relatively long (around 20 weeks) fully-paid
maternity leave [Kamerman and Kahn 1991]. The other institutions for ‘parenting’ were
not weakened thereby, but ideological pressure changed the orientation, beginning to
favour child-rearing at home, and the home-making role of women. As a matter of fact, in
all the countries of the bloc ‘parenting’ politics had become strongly influenced by pronatalist
concerns from usually the late sixties onwards. The assessment of Heitlinger [1993:
96] for Czechoslovakia is valid for most countries: “With the arrival of socialist pronatalism
in the late 1960s, many facilities and measures adopted in the 1950s on egalitarian
grounds were expanded to meet explicitly demographic objectives.” It is also generally
valid that “While popular (…) the pronatalist measures had a predictable negative impact
on women’s careers and the domestic division of labour” [ibid.]. The pronatalist concerns
had a weaker or stronger impact on the right to chosen parenthood, to sexuality, and abortion
almost everywhere, with the most tragic practice and consequences in Romania [Harsanyi
1993].
All in all, however, the objective situation of women has probably improved everywhere
as compared to the pre-war situation. Their paid work outside the home contributed
to the well-being of the family (at least it helped to make ends meet); their
educational advancement and the work outside the home enriched (at least in the majority
of cases) their life experience; their status as earners weakened their former oppression
within and outside the family and made them (somewhat) less subservient in some walks
of life.7 Also, it attenuated female poverty, especially in the case of mothers who practically
all started to work, and of older women who obtained a pension in their own right.
Indeed, despite many inequities and inequalities subsisting between men and women, the
‘feminisation of poverty’ was much less salient than in most western countries.
The question is, to what extent was this policy left-wing? Formally it followed
some of the tenets laid down in the early classics (Bebel for one) or in socialist blueprints.
If, however, we try to apply to it to the welfare state models worked out by Jane Lewis,
we encounter serious difficulties. Lewis makes a distinction between three main gender
5) The pedagogical and psychological views influencing the work of teachers in Hungarian kindergartens
were, for instance, strongly influenced by Western ‘progressive’ or liberal child peda-
gogy.
6) The reasons were not exclusively ‘pro-family’. The nurseries were expensive; there was fear of
unemployment caused by the economic reform to be introduced in 1968, etc.. Still, the measure
became very popular and was gradually introduced in many countries.
7) A. Titkow supports this view with the usual necessary caveats: “It is probably true that coping
with the demand of paid work, superimposed on the traditional roles of women, has bettered women’s
self-evaluation. It has served not only as a source of gratification but as a counterweight to
the problems work caused to women’s mental and physical health, and also as an asset to women’s
authority in the family.” [Titkow 1993: 253]
Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe
163
welfare regimes, namely a strong male-breadwinner state (for instance Britain), a modified
male-breadwinner state (for instance France), and a weak male-breadwinner state (for
instance Sweden). The last model is the closest to what may be termed ‘left’ politics.
These categories are based on the politics concerning mothers and wives; on the respective
rules of social security, on the availability of supporting services, child-care in the
first place, and on the situation of women on the labour market. On the face of it, then,
many practices in the Eastern bloc countries were close to the weak male-breadwinner
model. However, already Lewis warns us that weak male-breadwinner policies may be
motivated not so much by concerns for gender equality as by labour market shortages or
pronatalism [Lewis 1992].
Taking into account the – to say the least – mixed motivation of family policy, and
also some political aspects to which we will soon turn, a former assessment of the state
socialist welfare regime also seems to apply to the politics concerning women:
“despite formal similarities, the liberal and emancipating dimension of the Scandinavian
model was entirely absent from the state socialist model of welfare. It had
even less in common with the other regime types in Europe. If one wants to label
the state socialist welfare system, it could be described as an anti-liberal- statisthierarchized-socialist
mix, with conservative bits thrown in” [Ferge and Kolberg
1992: 207].
It would be tedious to prove in detail the validity of this assertion. The anti-liberal, overcentralised,
statist character of all politics does not need detailed documentation here. Let
me just mention some of its salient characteristics. All decisions were always taken at the
top, and the influence of the citizens (or, rather, of the subjects) was, if it existed at all,
weak and indirect. It was in this case ‘politics for us, but without us’. Rigid antiliberalism
banned all forms of citizen’s participation, grass-root movements, spontaneous
associations as well as initiatives of individuals or of small groups. The totalitarian logic
(even when it became milder) rejected micro-solidarities or partial identities, that is solidarities
on a lower level than the international or the national, and identities other than the
global identity of “the socialist man” [Avineri 1991]. Hence spontaneous women’s
movements, feminist or otherwise, never emerged, and women could not identify with
each other, expressing collectively, for instance, the wrongs which harmed all of them.
The other, private dimension of this has perhaps even more serious implications.
Because of the impossibility of free public discourse, gender relations never became a
public issue. In public life, work, studies, culture, or even politics, women have become
(almost) equal, and they may have felt (almost) equal. But in the private sphere, in partner
relations, within the family as well as in the private (interpersonal) side of relations –
whether in politics or at the workplace – the traditional construction of the role of men
and women remained by and large untouched.
The conservatism of politics concerning women became particularly clear in the
later decades, when (essentially for better political control, but also for strengthening the
basis of the intergenerational transmission of recently acquired advantages and privileges)
politics started to idolise the family. This meant, as already pointed out, the provision of
welfare incentives for the home-making woman; more or less serious limitations of human
rights in the case of abortion and divorce; the condemnation of ‘illegal’, out of marriage
relationships; taboos placed on sexuality, especially on homosexual relationships,
on wife and child abuse, and such like. The ‘communist’ morality relating to women and
Czech Sociological Review, V, (2/1997)
164
the family varied from country to country, but in quite a few cases it became similar to
the most orthodox Catholic morality.
To sum up: there were undoubtedly many deliberate steps which improved the position
of women. However, the politics informing these decisions was always extremely
inconsistent, driven as much by half-understood socialist ideology as by non-explicit
male interests and the interests of ‘politics’. Because of these contradictory pressures and
the absence of a clear political framework the political practice was also extremely erratic.
In fact, after the consolidation of totalitarian socialism no political theorist ever tried
to elaborate a consistently left-wing (socialist or social democratic) family policy or gender
policy. The party-state just did not need them, and (the hardly existing) civil society
was not allowed to touch the issue.
The problems stemming from the lack of a consistently left-wing family and gender
policy have become apparent since the transition. While there was only one party, it
was by and large ‘natural’ that it was divided on many issues. But in a multi-party system
one would expect left-wing parties to have left policies, and right-wing parties right ones.
Such is not the case though in many countries, and emphatically not in the countries under
transformation. In Hungary for instance, where an ultra-conservative government was
in place for the first four years, the socialists, then in opposition, often reacted to conservative
endeavours (for instance, in the debate on abortion) with the ‘correct’ left-wing
arguments. But as soon as they came to power in 1994, and had to implement a consistent
policy, it became apparent that they had never reflected on the contents of the pretransition
family and gender policy, neither were they able to work out any new pro-
gramme.
2. The New Right
The neo-conservative and neo-liberal ideologies which are still in ascendance throughout
the world have had a particular attraction in the transition countries, where formerly only
one ideology was recognised as legitimate. This very understandable swing of the pendulum
has often been analyzed by political scientists. Here it is necessary to point out some
of the implications of these ideologies which have relevance for the situation of women.
2. 1. Conservatism
The well-known leading values of conservatism assign a high priority to religion, particularly
the Catholic Church, to the family, and in some cases to the nation.8 In the field of
social policy, over and above the encouragement of interpersonal charity, the main practical
principle advocated by the Catholic Church is subsidiarity, a shift of responsibility for
help or social action in general from the center or higher levels to the lowest practically
possible level. It is widely recognised that subsidiarity is a heavily gendered principle
[Duncan 1996, Ostner 1993]. The consequences of this principle coincide with those of
the neo-liberal efforts to cut back the state. From the present perspective they both imply
a growing role of the caring functions of the family, which means first and foremost increasing
the tasks and responsibilities of women for the care of children, the elderly, and
the sick. In post-socialist countries these old or increased burdens may have gone unattended,
or a particular ‘benefit for home nursing’ may have been introduced or adapted to
8) The racist/ethnocentric orientation of the extreme right will not be discussed here.
Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe
165
the new conditions. In this case institutional underpinning and official recognition have
been promoting the changing role of (mainly) women.9
However, the role of conservatism and the Church has a particular relevance for
family policy. This affects – to name only the most important elements – the work of
women outside the home, child bearing and child rearing.
As far as work is concerned, the ideological pressure of the fifties, which forced
women out of the home, has been replaced by another ideological pressure suggesting
that the employment of women, and particularly mothers runs against the best interests of
the child, of the family, and therefore of society. Since the proper place of the woman is
supposed to be the home, the gainful employment of women is ideologically and politically
devalued. These efforts are well served by growing unemployment. In all the postsocialist
countries but Hungary, the rate of female unemployment is higher than that of
males. Moreover, the non-registered loss of jobs (returning home without registering as
unemployed) affects mainly women. Overall data are still scarce, but the former high
employment rate of women has certainly diminished. According to a survey covering five
Central-Eastern European countries, the rate of ‘active’ women in the 15-60 age-range
did not reach 70 percent even in the Czech Republic, and was near or under 50 percent in
two other countries. This was also in most countries significantly lower than the activity
rate of men. (This result is only slightly modified if we consider the 15-55 age-range for
women.) (See Table 1.)10
Table 1. The percentage rate of active earners within the 15-60 age range in five
countries
Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Germany Poland
Male rate 79 56 60 60 70
Female rate 67 47 55 50 64
n (all actives) 1336 1166 1077 887 1477
Source: SOCO.
Conservative views on child bearing have been forcefully presented in quite a few countries.
This picture is also varied though, depending on former practices. In Romania,
where the situation was by far the worst, the revolution started in Timisoara with doctors
performing free abortions, and legislation has been accordingly changed since [Harsanyi
1993]. Because of this past it is now practically impossible to put the issue on the political
agenda. In Bulgaria the issue of abortion has not been raised as yet [Todorova 1993].
In the Czech Republic where the practice became liberal in 1987, “since the fall of Com-
9) As was already mentioned in the case of child care grants, it is hard to evaluate unambiguously
benefits which reward and reinforce symbolically the traditional role of women. On the one hand
it is better to have some financial reward for a task one has to do anyway. On the other hand these
benefits have always a negative impact on the trends of ‘emancipation’ and gender equality.
10) The survey was carried out as part of the SOCO project initiated and co-ordinated by the Institute
for Human Studies, Vienna. The countries covered included the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia, and the eastern states of Germany that used to be East Germany. The first
results are presented in the International report on the Social Consequences of the Transition,
written by Zs. Ferge, E. Sik, P. Róbert, and F Albert. The survey is usually referred to as the SOCO
survey.
Czech Sociological Review, V, (2/1997)
166
munism, the abortion debate has been broadened (…) pitting ‘a woman’s right to choose’
against ‘protection of the unborn child’” [Heitlinger 1993: 101]. This author believes
though that the curtailment of rights is not likely in the Czech Republic, she is less sure
about future developments in Slovakia. According to Milic [1993], the curtailment of
women’s rights is on the agenda in all the countries of former Yugoslavia. The determined
attempt of the conservative parties under the first government (1990-94) in the
Hungarian Parliament to restrict birth control rights was defeated only under the pressure
of civil society. In Poland a draft law submitted to the Sejm in 1989 proposed just before
the parliamentary elections a total ban on abortion [Fuszara 1993]. Genuine mass mobilisation
prevented legislation going the whole way as proposed by the Senate. However,
the struggle has continued in 1997 as shown by the decision of the Supreme Court advocating
a change in the current legislation and a return to the position stressing the inviolability
of human life. The biggest losers seem to have been the women of former East
Germany where – despite extremely strong resistance – the more restrictive West German
legislation was extended to the whole of the newly united country. According to many
observers, this was the major bone of contention, and almost a stumbling block, in the
debates on the unification. The endeavours to promote giving birth by the ‘stick’ had
been to some extent counterbalanced by ‘carrots’ rewarding maternity. For instance, the
Hungarian Parliament extended in 1993 the family allowance to the yet unborn foetus.
(This measure was abolished in 1995.) They also introduced a sort of mother’s wage for
mothers with 3 or more children. Similar steps were also under consideration in other
countries. However, the neo-liberal forces successfully opposed all the efforts – conservative
or otherwise – to improve by state action the situation of mothers and children. In
some cases the ethnocentric bias of conservatism had a negative effect on families. One
case in point is the Serbian proposal (in 1990) to increase family benefits for families
with three children but to abolish all benefits for families with more than three children
(the majority of whom are Albanians).
Child-rearing has also become an ideologically loaded issue. If the place of the
woman is the home, and if the main duty and privilege of the woman is to bear and rear
children, then there is no more need of the former network of child-care institutions. As a
direct consequence, nurseries for the under-3s have become undesirable and their number
has contracted almost everywhere. The cuts also affected kindergartens, despite the fact
that their pedagogical role was more widely accepted. According to a UNICEF report
[“Children…” 1997], a smaller or larger decline of child-care institutions may be observed
in all the transition countries, if not for ideological, then for financial reasons, and
this affects both nurseries and kindergartens [Fajth 1996, “Children…” 1997] (Table 2).
These cutbacks harmonise, of course, with the minimalist welfare program of the neo-
liberals.
2. 2. Liberalism
Neo-liberalism had entered the scene in some countries, mainly Hungary and Poland,
already under the former system from at least the late seventies onwards. However, it
remained somewhat shamefaced and represented more of a hidden than an open agenda.
After the disappearance of the official ideology, it was able to become part and parcel of
official politics in all the countries in transition. Obviously, the liberalisation of the economy,
including the creation of a market and the reintroduction of private ownership, and
of politics complete with many freedoms and new institutions such as political parties,
Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe
167
independent courts and such like was everywhere an absolute must. These changes were
supported by a huge majority of the citizens. However, neo-liberal thinking also affects
social policy, and thereby the everyday living conditions of the citizens in many ways.
This is much less in line with the expectations of the large majority of the citizens who, at
the time of the transition wanted not only political freedom and a market, but also hoped
for a Swedish-type welfare state ‘written large’ [Myles and Brym 1992: 29]. All the surveys
conducted since demonstrate that these expectations have remained very intense
[e.g. Ferge et al. 1995], but have been heavily disappointed.
Table 2. Children in nurseries and kindergartens in selected CEE countries
Most recent year
1989 available since 1990 1989 1995
Children in nurseriesa Pre-primary enrolment rateb
Bulgaria 12.9 9.9 (’94) 93.0 (’85) 67.5
Czech 13.8 1.7 (’93) 99.3 88.6
Hungary 11.7 10.9(’95) 91.0 (’85) 86.9
Poland na na 48.7 45.3
Romania 4.4 3.2(’94) 82.9 58.4
Russia 34.7 19.8(’94) 69.3 54.0
Slovakia na na 91.5 70.8
a) Percentage of all 0-2 years old in nurseries
b) In percentage of the relevant population
Source: UNICEF: 97 and 158
New endeavours are aimed at assuring the free choice and the autonomy of citizens. The
instruments of this objective are the ‘minimal state’ with substantially reduced taxation,
the pluralisation, privatisation and marketisation of former public services and public
goods, and the limitation of state help (if any) to the ‘truly needy’. J. Kornai [1992]
coined the expression of a “premature welfare state”, implying that the Hungarian state in
the eighties was overdeveloped and profligate. He has suggested the introduction of another
“pure” model. In this model the responsibility of the state for public welfare should
be strictly limited: “the state gives financial help from the taxpayers’ money only to the
needy”, and builds up the legal framework for the operation of the non-profit and forprofit
insurance companies or of other marketed services including health and unemployment
insurance [Kornai 1994]. A Czech economist, Kinkor [1996] goes much further:
he negates the validity of such concepts as the public interest or the public good; he
maintains that the state had to stop interfering not only in the economy, but also in education,
health care, culture, and housing which should be regulated by free exchange; and
he qualifies unemployment as purely an individual problem, and therefore “the foolish
battle of governments with unemployment is nothing other than a distortion of this extremely
valuable information source” [Kinkor 1966: 119, quoted by Potùèek 1966: 6].
It is understandable that the enormity of the task and the lack of any historical experience
led to many mistakes. Partly because of the fatal attraction of the above ideology,
many of the badly needed reforms went overboard. As the authors of a World Bank
book note:
“Because the previous system failed to produce many of its predicted economic
and social benefits, radical reformers during the transition have been quick to con-
Czech Sociological Review, V, (2/1997)
168
demn, and even to discard, almost everything that existed during the past. As a result,
there is now a serious risk that, at least in the health sector, some of the countries
in Central and Eastern Europe may throw out the baby with the bathwater”
[Preker and Feachem: 289-290].
In fact, the risk has not been limited to the health sector. Too liberal policies in, for example,
foreign trade, or ideologically based solutions in privatization, or unthinking
monetarist shock-therapies have probably even harmed the economy. The vulnerability of
social policy has been much greater though. However, it is true that the fraction of the
GDP redistributed for social policy purposes has usually remained at its former level for
some years after the transformation, and has only lately started to shrink. (Of course in
absolute terms the value diminished from the start with a 15 percent or larger drop in
officially recorded GDP.)
The cuts go parallel with structural changes. Some of them have already taken
place, many more are in the offing. Some changes are responses to new needs such as the
introduction of unemployment insurance, the development of active labour market policies,
or the introduction of new forms of social assistance. Others operate in the abovementioned
direction of the minimal state. The bulk of price subsidies were abolished
without any compensation. Universal or near-universal (employment-related) benefits
such as the family allowance have been abrogated everywhere and replaced by meanstested
variants [“Children…” 1997: 100]. Universal services have been generally transformed
into insurance (in the case of health services) or partly marketised (some parts of
the health system, or schools in some countries). The level of benefits has been cut back,
not only because of the shortage of funds (affecting for instance pensions), but also on
ideological grounds. Unemployment benefits offered at first on a relatively good level
were cut back in order ‘to give more incentive to get people back to work’; social assistance
to stimulate self-help and to avoid a ‘dependency culture’; health and pension standards
in order to give space to, and incentive for, private (market) provisions. In many
areas low or no fees had been replaced by relatively high or market prices (homes for the
elderly, school meals). It has to be emphasised that the ‘quasi-market’ solution widespread
in England (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1994) implying that the state retains its financing
and regulatory role and abandons service delivery, is seen with less favour than
genuine marketisation.
Theoretically both the state and the market are gender-blind. In practice they are
not. Feminist analysts started to show over a decade ago [Williams 1989, Walby 1990,
Lewis 1993] the gender biases built into the operation of a ‘patriarchal state’.11 However,
it has long been recognised that the elimination of the ‘spontaneous’ or quasi-intended
gender bias of state politics needed deliberate intervention, often prompted by civil
movements, but ultimately implemented (paradoxically or not) by state action. Interestingly
enough, once civil and political rights had been extended to women, the bulk of
interventions to promote gender equality have usually focused – rightly or wrongly – on
the labour market, more precisely on the conditions enabling women to become equal
11) More recently, Skocpol [1992] argued that a ‘woman-friendly’ welfare state was historically
not inconceivable, since this is how welfare politics started in the United States. This seems to be,
however, a unique case.
Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe
169
partners (competitors) on the labour market.12 Practically all the directives and recommendations
of the European Union (starting with Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome of
1957 recommending the principle of equal pay to equal work) relate to this point.13 They
cover the equal pay of women (1975), equal treatment at work (1976), equal treatment in
social security (1979 and 1986), minimum maternity leave rights (1992), and the possibilities
of ‘reconciling occupational and family responsibilities’ (The Social Charter
1989) which seems possible only by providing public caring services [Duncan 1996].
Evidence suggests that even when directives, pieces of legislation, monitoring, some civil
control and even a court of redress exist, the situation of women may deteriorate because
market forces under the present conditions are increasingly hard to curb, and public support
in employment and child care are low priorities. Thus the position of women relative
to men has deteriorated on the labour market in the last decade or so in the European Union
in terms of unemployment, job segregation, their presence in atypical and nonprotected
jobs, and the earning gap [Women… 1994]. Also, the feminisation of poverty
seems to be on the increase mainly because of the increasing number of single mothers.
The question is what happens to women when public commitments are shrinking,
when the state is both unwilling and unable to intervene in market transactions, and when
the gender issue is almost absent from the political agenda. The answer is almost selfevident.
If nothing happens to counteract the sociologically foreseeable consequences of
very unequal conditions and power relations, the majority of women are likely to be
among the losers of the social transformation. The winners among them will be – and
already are – the best educated younger women who have an entrepreneurial spirit: the
world has opened for them.
Of course, the processes which may be detrimental to women have only started.
They are also not always properly followed up by appropriate statistics or monitoring.
Still, some information is already available, and informed guesses may also be advanced.
As far as the position of women on the labour market is concerned, the decline of economic
activity in the case of both sexes, and the higher risk of unemployment for women
have already been noted. The preparation of men and women for the requirements of the
market seems to be increasingly unequal. While the educational level of men and women
used to be equal or women had an advantage, the type of education of men seems to have
been always more ‘market-oriented’ and therefore better adaptable to the new conditions.
Nowadays men appear to be more and more overrepresented in those educational streams
leading to highly rewarded posts.
More detailed studies show some causes and consequences of the increasing vulnerability
of women. Women have more difficulties in getting a job (even with the same
qualifications as men) because they are less ‘flexible’. In other words, when young, they
are a risk to the employer because of absences due to pregnancy or the illness of a child.
(Heinen [1995: 94] reports cases when private company directors requested a written
12) Some particularly vulnerable female groups, like mothers or old women, the core groups leading
to the feminisation of poverty may appear as exceptions. The redress of their situation may
require only additional benefits. Ultimately though, their poverty is also caused by their tenuous
relation to the labour market.
13) Of course, the documents of the Union repeatedly emphasise that the Union concerns itself
rather ‘with workers than with citizens in general’ [Duncan 1996: 407], and this in itself is signifi-
cant.
Czech Sociological Review, V, (2/1997)
170
promise from women applicants not to get pregnant for a certain period. Kotowska [1995:
85] records that the personal characteristics and family conditions of female applicants
are more closely scrutinised than those of men.) Because labour laws or legislation protecting
women are weakened or may be easily disregarded, women have to accept unhealthy
jobs, long hours or work-shifts hard to adjust to family needs, and various new
forms of exploitation and harassment [Moghadan 1996].14 Even when these and similar
practices are illegal, women do not protest for fear or not getting or losing a job. Where a
benefit still exists, such as extended child care leave, a decreasing proportion of women
are making use of it and for a shorter time. They are also anxious for their job because
they may be made redundant if not immediately after the return, then shortly afterwards.15
‘Higher’ age (over 40 or so) is in general an obstacle to re-employment, but in case of
women increasing sexism creates additional difficulties. Both women and men are
harmed by unprotected jobs on the black market, but women may be in an even weaker
situation. The wage gap has increased partly because women seem to accept low wages
and bad working conditions more easily than men, and partly because the rapid widening
of inequality in earnings profits particularly those in top positions rarely attained by
women. One may assume, albeit research would be needed to prove the point, that the
specific psychological disposition of women may mean that they are less ready (in a statistically
significant way) than men to espouse, and to adjust their behaviour to, the dominant
values of the market, especially competitiveness and exclusively profit-oriented
‘rationality’. If true, this may harm their chances in reemployment, promotion, and so on.
The withdrawal of the state from the social sphere and the institutional changes in
welfare provisions have a negative impact on families and individuals in general, but they
may affect women in particular ways. The shrinking of child-care services is a clear case
in point. If there are no free or cheap institutions offering good day care for children, the
work of the mothers becomes either extremely difficult, or too costly, or outright impossible.
The consequence is a decrease in income, or increasing poverty. The result is similar
when family benefits become targeted and their level is eroded.
Children (or families with children) in general, and single mothers in particular
have become particularly vulnerable. The ratio of children in poverty has increased dramatically,
usually more than that of the whole population (Table 3). This obviously hits
parents as well.
There are hardly any data on single mothers. According to the SOCO survey (covering
five Central-Eastern European countries) their situation was particularly bad in Poland
and East Germany (Table 4). In East Germany mothers have become one of the
poorest groups because of a combination of all the above problems and because unemployment
benefits were relatively good for men at least [Engfer 1995]. According to Engfer,
the adverse conditions of single mothers represent a new development in East
14) The book referred to is a collection of papers about the experiences of women with the market
covering China, Vietnam, Cuba and the European countries Bulgaria, Poland, and Russia. The
book is still in manuscript so that quotations and references cannot be offered. It is though a fascinating
chronicle covering legislation, statistics and case studies, all written by women from the
respective countries.
15) Under state-socialism – with state enterprises and co-operatives – it was easy for the state to
enforce the protection of these jobs. With private employers, especially with foreign companies
the situation is different.
Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe
171
Germany. As shown in the same table, families with one or sometimes two children are
usually better off than families with more than two children, so that larger families are in
particular danger of poverty. However, single mothers seem to be even in greater danger.
On the basis of Table 4, the Hungarian situation seems to be relatively favourable, but in
1994 the family benefits had as yet been untouched.
Table 3. Incidence of poverty among the whole population and children in selected
countries
Low income Poverty
(35,40 or 45% of the average wage) (60% of low) income line
Total Total
population Children population Children
Bulgaria 1990 13.8 17.7 2.0 32.7
(45%) 1994 63.5 71.9 32.7 42.5
Czech Republic 1989 4.2 4.2 0.2 0.3
(35%) 1992 26.7 40.1 1.4 1.2
Hungary 1989 10.1 7.0 1.1 1.8
(40%) 1994 22.0 27.5 6.1 9.5
Poland 1989 23.1 30.6 5.8 8.4
(40%) 1992 36.3 52.6 10.9 19.9
Romania 1989 28.2 34.3 7.0 8.9
(45%) 1994 65.7 75.7 29.1 37.5
Slovakia 1989 4.1 5.8 0.1 0.1
(40%) 1993 31.3 52.1 5.1 9.4
Source: [“Children…”: 24].
Table 4. Equivalent income in families with children in % of households without
children, head under 60, 199416
Czech Republic Poland Hungary Germany Slovakia
Single parent 69 42 81 63 66
couple, 1 child 89 56 90 90 89
couple, 2 children 78 48 86 76 74
couple, 3 +children 55 44 85 94 57
Source: SOCO
The increasing poverty of families affects women also in other ways. According to previous
research [Sas 1976] they have always been predominantly responsible for the finances
of the household, and they have been the main agents in official matters relating to
the family. Hence they may experience more difficulties than previously in making ends
16) The number of the families observed is relatively low in some sub-groups, so that the results
have to be handled with caution:
Czech Republic Poland Hungary Germany Slovakia
n, families total 112 203 150 101 143
out of it:
Single parents 52 60 76 142 48
couple, 3+ children 39 123 49 24 80
Czech Sociological Review, V, (2/1997)
172
meet.17 And it is probable that the humiliating experience of asking for assistance and
dealing with bureaucratic red tape is also mostly their lot.
The gains from liberalism are basic. The basic liberal value is freedom, and indeed
the foremost gain of the transition is freedom in many meanings of the term. It is thanks
to the liberal strand in politics that civil and political rights have become firmly established.
The new freedoms also allow women to correct former failures, to start grass-root
movements, to initiate a public discourse both on gender-relations and on the ‘women’s
issue’ in general, or to put pressure on politicians to take this issue seriously, if not for
other reasons than in order to conform to the established norms of the European Union.
However, as will be shown presently, very little seems to be happening in this area.
3. Changing Attitudes
3.1. Attitudes
The transformation of social relations on the macro and micro level was part and parcel of
the egalitarian socialist project from 1945 onwards. The relationships in practically all the
countries of Central-Eastern Europe before the war were heavily hierarchised, inegalitarian,
and sometimes, as in Hungary, almost feudal. This meant extremely asymmetrical
relations between rich and poor, employer and employee, and also between men and
women. This asymmetry was built into the ‘habitus’ of people, and expressed itself
among others in body language as well as in verbal communication. In the Hungarian
language for instance, as in French or German, there are two ways of addressing people.
The asymmetry meant that the employer addressed the worker with “tu”, and the worker
had to answer “vous”. This same pattern could prevail between master and servant, parent
and child, or husband and wife.
The forty years of state socialism can be seen as a forced modernization project.
One element of it was the modernization of the above relations. Apparently, in this case
there was a breakthrough. The spontaneous subservience of workers or servants practically
disappeared. After all, even if workers never believed that they were the ‘ruling
class’, and used to make fun of this slogan, they could not help but feel a change in their
social standing concerning their objective conditions as well as their relative position
within society [Kemény 1985]. The same applies to women. The spontaneous deference
and submission both in private and public life has weakened – even though vestiges have
survived. One of the most telling ones is that in public debates (political or scientific
meetings included) the ‘big white man’ may address the woman opponent by her given
name, while he expects the woman so addressed to give him his full title and/or family
name.
All in all it seems that despite the big divide between the power elite and the rest of
the population under the former system, people in different walks of life started to believe
themselves less submissive, less dependent, and more equal. The habitus started to
17) The vastly increased supply of consumer goods and the disappearance of queuing in the ‘consolidated’
countries are certainly a gain for everybody. However, we do not know to what extent
is this a compensation for those who can afford only the cheapest products. Also, price-hunting
which is practised by a large majority everywhere [Sík 1995] is also time-consuming. More psychological
tests would be needed to know how people in general, women in particular, evaluate
these various trade-offs.
Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe
173
change. And since this element of the socialist project cannot be considered particularly
socialist, but an integral part of a normal process of modernisation, one may hope that the
change cannot and will not be reversed.
Attitudes have also changed in other areas of life. One important field is the attitude
to work. I have already discussed the controversial experience under state socialism.
The situation is no less controversial nowadays. There are comparative survey data relating
to 1988 and 1994 on this issue. Apparently, men used to be far more conservative
than women before the transition and came closer to the outlook of women in 1994.
However, this is not only because men have become somewhat less conservative, but also
because women may have become more so. The opinion according to which mothers,
especially mothers with small children, have to remain home has become more prevalent
[Tóth 1995]. This shift does not seem to hold for all the aspects of women’s work. In
most countries women seem to be starting to re-evaluate their former working experience.
“Bulgarian women entered the post-communist epoch with a very positive attitude to
working. Only one-fifth of women, compared to one-third of men, think that women
should stay home and not work (…) Even if they were fully secure financially, 70 percent
of working women would still prefer to work full-time” [Petrova 1993: 26]. In several
surveys in Russia it was found that around 90 percent shared this view [Waters 1993:
292].18 Šiklová [1993: 82] quotes results from a relatively early Czech survey with lower
figures, but still with a positive bias for work outside the home. (28% would ‘definitely’
work, 32% ‘would consider it’, and 40% would ‘definitely not work’). Women of former
East Germany continue to be more work-oriented than their Western counterparts.
It is anybody’s guess as to what extent the changes are influenced by new ideological
pressures, by real convictions which could not be expressed freely beforehand, or by
the weakening supports for working women; and to what extent are the continuities motivated
by the inertia of habits, by continued or increased existential necessities, or by a
genuine wish to work, for whatever reasons. My own impression is that women resent
being forced out of work or being condemned as ‘bad wives and mothers’ if they work at
least as much as they resented it when they were forced to perform low-paid, inhuman
jobs, to have a double burden, or to come under ideological pressure for not working.
3.2. Women’s movements
One of the puzzling facts about the new democracies is that women are not keen to use
the new freedoms to improve their position. With the exception of the limitation of rights
to birth-control, which is mobilising women everywhere whenever there is a threat of the
issue of abortion being placed on the legislative agenda, there is no significant self-
mobilisation.19
The participation of women in politics has remained insignificant. The ratio of female
MPs was around 30 percent in the last decades of the former system. This was an
18) It is seldom added – as it is by the Russian researcher Posadskaya quoted by Waters – that men
have always been forced to work, but nobody is concerned about whether they would like to work
less or not at all [Waters 1993: 292].
19) It has to be added that when the Hungarian government introduced some restrictions on abortion
in the early seventies, this event triggered the only civil initiative of women, producing a large
number of signatures against the restrictions at a time when there was some genuine risk in participating
in this enterprise.
Czech Sociological Review, V, (2/1997)
174
improvement over the first decades due partly to international pressure after the UN took
up the issue. The relatively significant presence never meant, though, that the women
could give voice to an independent view. Still, the drop in this ratio is not reassuring.
After the first free elections the rate of female MPs was 8% in Bulgaria [Panova et al.
1993: 18]; 5% in Croatia and 10% in Slovenia [Drakulic 1993: 124]; 10% in Czechoslovakia
[Šiklová 1993: 76]; 9% in Poland [Fuszara 1993: 250]; 7% in Hungary in 1990, and
11% in 1994 and so forth. Their absence at the top levels of decision making is as conspicuous
as ever. All this is seen with complete indifference or equanimity by women as
well as by men.
The legislation on equal human and political rights was mostly already in place under
the old system. The enforcement of these rights is not much better ensured, however,
than before, except in cases when there is an elected ombudsman (Poland, Hungary) to
protect human rights, which also includes the rights of women. Meanwhile the employment
rights and the social rights of women have been weakened, as discussed above.
Also, former taboos concerning for instance sexual harassment at the workplace have
survived, and many new sexist phenomena go unattended.
The most important development is the revival of ‘civil society’. There are everywhere
beginnings and new initiatives. However, feminist movements are usually weak,
with low membership, low public support, and the sympathisers or members come almost
exclusively from academia. The majority of women who avail themselves of the new
right of association are more likely to join conservative or religious groups. (Pro-life
movements also belong to this category and they may be quite strong.)
In other words, the necessity of the consciousness raising of women is hardly felt.
The question of the absence of women’s liberation movements has recently appeared on
the agenda of social science as witnessed by all the writings referred to in this paper. Research
is still scarce, and opinions, when gauged, are of course highly contradictory or
inconsistent. One of the radical Hungarian journals addressed, for instance, an all-round
inquiry in 1994 to some prominent people, among others, on the issue of women’s
movements [“Körkérdés…” 1994, Hadas 1994]. The answers varied considerably – and
this variation is recurring in the other countries. Some invoked the lack of necessity for
women’s mobilisation arguing that women had already more rights than men [Hernádi
1994]. Women (in this inquiry as in instances already mentioned above) often asserted
that they never felt discriminated against, and did not see therefore the need for selfmobilisation.
The very difficult situation of women has often been invoked as a reason of
non-involvement: under their heavy double or triple load women never had time or energy
to think about themselves. A similar argument suggested that after the transition,
slow or rapid impoverishment added to the worries of women, so that they became even
less interested in politics. This view also seems rather widespread. Elena Bonner, one of
the radical democratic leaders in the former USSR visited the USA in 1990. She answered
a question concerning the role of women in her country in the following way:
“You know, our country is on such a low socio-economic level that at the moment we
cannot afford to divide us into ‘us women’ and ‘us men’. We share a common struggle
for democracy, a struggle to feed the country” [Todorova 1993: 30].
One of the most widespread explanations is that the totalitarian system destroyed
solidarities and infantilised people to such a degree as to render them unable to organise
themselves. It is sometimes added that feminism was presented by politics in such a dire
Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe
175
light as to turn everybody against it. The anti-feminist arguments advanced by women are
noted also by Havelková [1993: 65]. Some researchers (Neményi [1994], myself) think
that women living in the totalitarian system had to find fearful the rhetoric of early feminism
which claimed, among others, that “the private is political”. On the one hand, totalitarianism
was about invading every sphere including the private, and women and men
had the utmost difficulty in retaining some freedom – which was possible only in the
family. On the other hand, the rhetoric of early feminism (domination, oppression, liberation,
revolution etc.) was too reminiscent of the Bolshevik rhetoric, even the word ‘feminism’
was too close to ‘communism’.
Whatever the real explanation is, it is significant that while political and other
movements have started to proliferate with the new freedoms, women have remained by
and large silent. But it is also worth noting that in the most recent years the absence of
feminism has become an issue: public discourse may just be emerging now.
It may well be – albeit I heavily dislike this argument – that an old political cliché
describes the current situation: it has to get much worse before it starts to be better. Only
in this particular circumstance the cliché has to be slightly modified: maybe it has to get
much worse for women before they start to fight to make it a bit better. Whether civil
society will be strong enough to fight the indifference of politics and the enmity of the
market in relation to women is an open question. But as more and more people note, the
grass-roots struggle, or in other words a strong civil society is the only hope for emanci-
pation.
ZSUZSA FERGE has since 1988 been Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Sociology and
Social Policy at Eötvös Lóránd University in Budapest, where she was head until 1996. She has
been visiting professor at several European and American universities, and recently received an
honorary degree from Edinburgh University. In 1997 she was visiting fellow at the Institute for
Human Studies in Vienna. Her main areas of research and teaching include social structure,
stratification, social reproduction, and social and societal policy. She has had numerous books
and papers published in both Hungarian and English.
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