39
ccording to commonly accepted
points of view, national security
policy should reflect a coherent
and consistent system of political, military,
economic and psychological means
that a state has at its disposal. This article
presents an analysis of President Putin’s
security policy. It starts with a comparison
between the most important entries
on security policy of the 2000 editions
of the National Security Concept (NSC),
the Military Doctrine and the Foreign
Policy Concept. In October 2003 the
Putin’s Security Policy in the Past,
Present and Future
An analysis of the security documents of 2000 compared
with the Defence White Paper of 2003
By Maj Marcel de Haas*
Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) published
The priority tasks of the development of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a
document which can best be described and
will be referred to as a ‘Defence White Paper’
(DWP). Following the assessment of
the security documents of 2000 this article
will compare these results with the contents
of the DWP 2003. Finally, based upon
the security documents of 2000 and 2003,
an outlook will be presented on Putin’s
security policy in his second term-in-office,
after his re-election in March 2004.
The NSC was produced by the Security
Council of the Russian Federation
(SCRF) and provides an overall view of
security policy of the Russian Federation
(RF), applying all means available to the
state. The Military Doctrine was drafted
by the MoD and deals with the military
means of the state. Finally, the Foreign
Policy Concept was drawn up by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo
Inostrannykh Del, MID), and relates to the
political and diplomatic means of the RF.
Since the NSC is the principle security
* Major Marcel de Haas is from the Royal Netherlands Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
Netherlands Ministry of Defence.
40
document, for reasons of unity and clarity,
the main entries of these three documents
as well as of the DWP 2003 will be
offered in the format of the NSC.1
Thus
the structure of the comparison of the
security documents is divided into four
parts: Russia in the world community,
Russia’s national interests, threats to
Russia’s security, and ensuring Russia’s
security.
1. Main Entries of the
Security Documents of
20002
1.1. Russia in the world
community: destabilising factors
A number of destabilising factors are
consistently mentioned in all documents:
• Dominance in the international community
of Western states led by the United
States;
• Unilateral power actions, bypassing
the UN Security Council (UNSC), by
using concepts such as ‘humanitarian intervention’
and ‘limited sovereignty’;
• (International) terrorism;
• Organised crime.
The enumeration of destabilising factors
demonstrates an emphasis on external
aspects. Another striking feature is the
prominence of negative tendencies with
reference to Western security policy. Over
the years, in the three security documents,
more and more entries have been included
related to this subject. Especially NATO’s
use of force in the former Yugoslavia
(Bosnia and Kosovo) was seen as a clear
example of its policy of ignoring Russia,
which claimed a decisive role in Europe,
as well as of disregarding the UN and the
standards of international law. Other concerns
were NATO’s new Strategic Concept
of April 1999 and its enlargement
with new member states in the East, adjacent
to Russia’s borders.
Internal destabilising factors seem to
be of less importance. Terrorism and
organised crime are included in all the
documents. Two of the three documents
mention illegal trade of arms and narcotics
as well as nationalistic and religious
strife as factors.
This leads to two conclusions. First,
the contents of internal destabilising factors
are not consistent in the security
documents. Apparently the security agencies
had different opinions on the domestic
situation. Secondly, external
destabilising factors outweigh internal
ones in the RF security policy. The security
agencies obviously were more focussed
on international developments.
1.2. Russia’s national interests
The following national interests are
prevailing in the documents:
•Primary interests are protection against
(international) terrorism, disasters of natural
or industrial origin, and the dangers
arising from wartime military operations;
• Improving economic development
and enhancing the standards of living;
• Preserving and strengthening of the
RF’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
and strengthening the basis of the constitutional
system;
• Eliminating the causes and conditions
contributing to political and religious
41
extremism and ethno-separatism;
• Strengthening Russia’s international
position as a great power;
• Developing mutually advantageous
relations, especially with the member states
of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS);
• Cooperation in the military-political
area and in the sphere of security through
the CIS (Collective Security Treaty), particularly
in combating international terrorism
and extremism.
The national interests as listed are a
mixture of provisions on domestic and
international matters. Nowadays the perception
that security is more than protection
with military means against an
external aggressor is widely accepted as
realistic. Chechnya has made clear to the
RF authorities that not only external but
also internal threats exist against national
security and that these threats are not
confined to the military dimension but
also have their roots in political, social
and economic dimensions. However, if
the RF authorities had taken this interdependence
between internal and external
national interests seriously, this should
have brought them to the conclusion that
conflicts of the type of the Chechen war
cannot be solved by military means. Consequently,
for ensuring a consistent national
policy security not only military
and diplomatic means come to the fore,
but also social (human rights), economic
(development projects, building and
maintenance of houses, schools and medical
facilities) and political (reform of the
bureaucratic apparatus) activities are essential.
A stable economic development is
a prerequisite for realising these activities.
These basic conditions are, in general
terms, reflected in the 2000 editions
of the NSC as well as of the Foreign Policy
Concept. However, in Russian civic society
they had not yet become visible. Probably,
this was due to the slow economic
development but surely also to the continued
presence of a deep-rooted bureaucracy,
which produced corruption. Therefore,
the implementation of the aforementioned
policy intentions in a broad spectrum
of security aspects is likely to be a
long-lasting process.
1.2. Threats to Russia’s security
The RF sees the fulfilment of its political-strategic
objectives as well as its internal
and external security threatened by a
number of causes. In discussing general
roots of threats the NSC above all points
out internal, socio-economic aspects: the
poor status of the economy, a failing governmental
apparatus, polarisation between
entities, (organised) crime, corruption and
terrorism. These internal aspects are further
elaborated in the enumeration of
internal threats in the three security documents.
Apart from internal threats these
documents naturally also recognise external
threats. When comparing the three
documents the following threats are pre-
vailing:
Internal threats
• Extremist national-ethnic and religious
separatism and terrorism;
• Trans-national organised crime;
• Erosion of the territorial integrity
of the state by separatist aspirations of a
number of constituent entities of the RF,
42
by poor organisation of state control; and
because of linking of some parts of the
executive and the legislature to criminal
organisations (corruption).
External threats
• Attempts to belittle the role of existing
mechanisms for international security
of the UN and the OSCE, by economic
and power domination of the United
States and other Western states;
• Attempts to ignore (or infringe on)
RF interests and influence in resolving
international security problems;
• The strengthening of military-political
blocs and alliances, above all the expansion
of NATO eastwards;
• NATO’s practice of using military
force outside the bloc’s zone of responsibility
without the UNSC sanction.
1.3. Ensuring Russia’s security
In this part of the documents the various
policy dimensions come together. It
consecutively portrays the principles of
socio-economic and domestic policies
(fundamentals and objectives), as well as
of foreign and security policies (military
security, the use of force and the deployment
of forces and troops abroad), for
the purpose of achieving the objectives
of Russia’s grand strategy and of ensuring
its national security. As a final point
this part of the security documents presents
a hierarchy of the institutions responsible
for national security.
Socio-economic and domestic policies
• Decreasing Russia’s economic dependency
on other states by strengthening
state regulation of the economy and by
organising a common economic area in
the CIS;
• Improving the system of state power
of the RF, its federal relations and its local
self-government (constituent entities)
to reinforce the social and political stability
of society;
• Guaranteeing strict observance of the
laws by all citizens, public servants, state
institutions, political parties and social and
religious organisations to diminish crime,
corruption and terrorism;
• Adhering to the fundamental principles
and rules of international law.
President Putin regarded strengthening
of central authority as the main solution
for the socio-economic problems. In
his ‘vertical’ approach he made an effort
to enhance his grip on developments in
these and other fields, by withdrawing
power and influence from enterprises (especially
the oligarchs, who control vital
areas of the economy) and from the constituent
entities (governors of the regions)
for the benefit of the Kremlin.3
In this
way Putin wanted to increase government
revenues (taxes), to finance policy objectives
such as the fight against crime and
terrorism, as well as to enlarge influence
of the central apparatus on constituent
entities, by deploying presidential plenipotentiaries
at the regional level. Another
objective of the installation of plenipotentiaries
was to prevent or neutralise separatist
movements. It was doubtful that simply
increasing central authority over the
regions would result in improvement of
the relations between central and regional
powers. Still, reinforcing central authority
could also be beneficial for Russia. The
RF is a state without a heritage of civic,
43
democratic governance. Yeltsin’s period
of rule demonstrated that a vast and complicated
country such as Russia without
steadfast, centralised authority offers certain
groups, such as oligarchs and regional
governors, the opportunity of abusing
power. On the other hand, centralisation
of power demands guarantees for a democratic
development, in order to prevent
totalitarianism. In this respect it is important
to realise that since the introduction
of the Constitution of 1993 the powers
of the Legislative, to properly check
the Executive (President and Government),
have been restricted. Theoretically this
could lead to unlimited and uncontrolled
centralisation of powers. This tendency
was enhanced in autumn 2004. After the
hostage taking in Beslan, in September
2004, Putin took the opportunity to further
strengthen the centralised powers of
the Kremlin, at the expense of the governors
of the regions (federation subjects).4
Foreign policy
• Reinforcing vital mechanisms for
multilateral management of international
processes, above all under jurisdiction of
the Security Council of the United Nations
(UNSC);
• Partnership with all CIS member
states, and development of integration
processes within the CIS, as well as implementation
of other objectives of Russia’s
interests about the CIS;
• Defending and guaranteeing the legal
rights and interests of Russian citizens
(compatriots) resident abroad or of
the Russian-speaking population, in the
CIS as well as in the Baltic states.
Reinforcing mechanisms of international
security. The RF clearly rejects a
leading role in international politics of
other institutions than the UNSC. This
provision, of course, is related to the
objective of strengthening of Russia’s international
position. In the UNSC, the
RF possesses the right of veto and is thus
able to block undesirable resolutions.
Therefore, the objective of reinforcing
Russia’s international status can be promoted
within the constellation of the UN.
However, if NATO dominated international
politics, the situation would be
different. In such an arrangement of the
international system, the RF, without a
veto right, would be more or less ‘dependent’
on NATO’s policies. This explains
the prominence of the UN and the UNSC
especially in the relevant entries in the
documents.
Advancing regional stability. In the
practise of politics, Russia’s standpoints
on good neighbourhood (partnership)
and on regional conflict resolution in the
CIS get mixed up. On some occasions,
the RF allegedly has actively encouraged
regional conflicts, for instance in
Abkhazia, followed by an offer of conflict
solution, thus making a CIS state, in
this case Georgia, dependent on Russia
for ensuring its security. Subsequently,
this dependency in the field of security
was aimed at enhancing RF influence on
this state, thus ‘ensuring’ good
neighbourhood.
Protecting Russians abroad. This is a
recurring theme of the RF foreign policy.
In the Foreign Policy Concept, this pro-
44
vision is mentioned no less than four
times: under the heading ‘General principles’,
under ‘Human rights and international
relations’, and twice under ‘Regional
priorities’, in discussing relations
within the CIS and with the Baltic states.
The NSC as well as the Foreign Policy
Concept, in describing the location of
Russians abroad, use the term za rubezhom.
This term points at states adjacent to the
RF. The expression za rubezhom has an
emotional connotation: it refers to something
familiar, which binds together.5
In
the consecutive military doctrines, a provision
on the protection of Russians
abroad is also included under the heading
‘External threats’. In previous doctrines
in describing ‘abroad’ the same expression
was used as in the other two security
documents: za rubezhom. However, in the
2000 issue of the Military Doctrine this
term has been changed into inostrannykh.
Inostrannykh means out of the country in
general, it has a neutral, dispassionate
implication. Based upon the changed connotation
of the term for ‘abroad’ in the
Military Doctrine of 2000 the assumption
could be made that the General Staff/MoD
became less willing to use force if necessary
for the protection of Russian minorities
in a foreign country.
Security policy
With regard to security policy, analysis
of the three documents presents three fundamental
themes: ensuring military security,
methods of using forces and troops
and the deployment of forces and troops
abroad. These themes generate the following
entries, which are only mentioned in
the NSC and in the Military Doctrine:
• All forces and facilities available, including
nuclear weapons, will be used if
necessary to repel armed aggression, if all
other means have been exhausted;
• The RF must uphold nuclear deter-
rence;
• Forces and troops are employed in
local, regional, international and large-scale
conflicts, as well as for peacekeeping op-
erations;
• The interests of Russia’s national security
may require a Russian military presence
in certain strategically vital regions
of the world.
Ensuring military security. The NSC
and the Military Doctrine permit the use
of nuclear weapons to counter aggression.
However, the Military Doctrine is more
outspoken in this respect: it allows for
the use of nuclear arms to repel a conventional
attack as well, under certain not
specified critical circumstances for national
security. Conversely, the Foreign
Policy Concept emphasises the desire of
declining the role of military power, mentioning
reductions of conventional arms
as well as of weapons of mass-destruction,
ways against proliferation of these weapons
and other aspects of arms control,
such as confidence and security building
measures. Consequently, in contrast to the
other two documents, the Foreign Policy
Concept regards nuclear weapons not
primarily as a means of deterrence, but as
an object of arms control. In this case the
MoD, acting in its ‘own’ field, comes forward
as the most aggressive institution,
with regard to military interests. This attitude
is not unexpected, since a decline
in the position of the military instrument
of national security policy is likely to
45
cause diminishing power and influence
of the MoD as well.
2. Defence White Paper
2003: The priority tasks
of the development of
the RF Armed Forces 6
In analysing this document, I will not
make a full comparison with the major
security documents of 2000, but concentrate
on some significant new developments.
2.1. Characteristics of current
wars and armed conflicts
Analysis of conflicts from the 1970s
until 2003, leads the Russian military-political
establishment to the following conclusions
in the DWP 2003:7
• A significant part of all the conflicts
has an asymmetrical nature. They demonstrate
fierce fighting and in a number of
cases result in a total destruction of a state
system;
• The outcome of conflicts is more and
more determined in its initial phase. The
party which takes the initiative has the
advantage;
• Not only military forces but also
political and military command and control
systems, (economic) infrastructure as
well as the population have become primary
targets;
• Information and electronic warfare
nowadays have a great impact in conflicts;
• The use of airborne, air mobile and
special forces has increased.
• Unified command and control, joint
warfare and a thorough cooperation between
ground and air forces in particular
has become essential;
• A prominent role in modern warfare,
as demonstrated in conflicts such as
those in the former Yugoslavia (1999),
Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), is
taken by long-range precision guided
munitions (PGMs) in combination with
airpower, after air superiority has been
established;
• Massive use of tanks and infantry has
to a large extent been replaced by longrange
guided weapon systems and massive
air raids, although the role of these
conventional forces is still important after
the initial stages of a conflict;
• The dominating role of airpower in
modern warfare requires a well-equipped
and electronic warfare resistible anti-aircraft
defence system.8
2.2. Ambivalence towards the West
In dealing with the West in general and
NATO especially, the DWP 2003 poses a
vision of two minds. On the one hand,
entries show concern on the enlargement
of the alliance and the possible deployment
of NATO forces on the territory of
new NATO members. But it also mentions
that the NATO-Russia partnership
will be further deepened, in spite of these
major differences. Furthermore, it states
that nuclear and large-scale wars with
NATO or other US-led coalitions are no
longer probable armed conflicts and that
Russia expects cooperation with the USA
and other industrialised countries to grow
in ensuring stability. On the other hand,
elsewhere in the DWP 2003 this appeasing
tone is set aside and replaced by an
46
antagonistic approach, underlining that
Russia expects that the anti-Russian entries
will be removed from NATO’s military
planning and political declarations.
Even stronger, the document states that
if NATO is preserved as a military alliance
with an offensive doctrine, cardinal
changes will be undertaken in Russia’s
military planning and development of the
RF Armed Forces, including its nuclear
strategy. At the time of publication of
the DWP 2003, these entries caused considerable
concern in circles within NATO.
The ambivalent character of the document
clearly gives evidence that it was written
by multiple authors. This has, to a certain
extent, affected Russia’s cooperation
with NATO, at least temporarily. Furthermore,
these contrasting entries have made
it more difficult to acquire a clear picture
of Russia’s intentions in the field of
security. Hopefully, the next RF security
document will be better coordinated to
prevent unnecessary negative conse-
quences.
2.3. Conclusions
Realistic view
Reviewing the military-strategic and
operational aspects of the DWP 2003, the
first and foremost conclusion can be described
in one word: realism. Standpoints
stressing the importance of information
and electronic warfare, unified command
and control and joint warfare, which were
already included in the Military Doctrine
of 2000, are repeated in this document.
Furthermore, the entries of the doctrine
of 2000, emphasising asymmetric warfare
and discussing military actions at lower
levels than military strategy, are continued
and even further expanded. Rightly,
this document focuses on asymmetric
conflicts as being on the forefront nowadays,
instead of large-scale conventional
wars. Clearly, analysis of recent Westernled
conflicts and of their own experiences
in Chechnya, has convinced the RF military-political
leadership to concentrate on
irregular warfare. Since this perception
in the DWP 2003 is expressed stronger
than in the doctrine of 2000, the assumption
could be made that the conservative
part of Russia’s security establishment has
lost influence in decision making, from
which modern thinking military leaders
have benefited.
Implementation
Carrying out this realistic approach
towards modern warfare might be a concern.
The observation that modern, specifically
irregular, warfare can only be
fought with sophisticated weapon systems,
such as PGMs and avionics providing allweather
capability, and by improving the
training level of personnel, requires financial
means. The current Russian armed
forces, massive in form and still aimed at
conventional large-scale warfare, demand
a lot of money for upkeep. So far military
reform plans have not offered a solution
to this dilemma. In October 2004, a
further downsizing of the personnel
strength of the Armed Forces by 100,000
men before January 2005 was announced.9
Optimistically, this reduction of ten percent
of the overall strength would provide
financial means for upgrading the
47
military for modern warfare. However,
the benefits of this reduction might also
be used for different (non-military) purposes.
Unless the military-political leadership
decides to radically change the structure
of the armed forces towards one
which is capable of conducting asymmetric
warfare, the envisaged adaptation of
the RF Armed Forces is expected to be
hampered.
Moderate style
The overall tone of the DWP 2003 is
more moderate than the major security
documents of 2000. The documents of
2000 mentioned without any restraint the
dominance of Western states led by the
USA in international politics, Western
institutions weakening the role of the
UNSC, as well as NATO’s practice of using
military force without the UNSC sanction.
As mentioned before – discussing
the entries on NATO – anti-Western tendencies
are still present in the DWP 2003.
This document repeats Russia’s concern
about the continuous dissolution of the
system of international relations and the
state of grave crisis of a number of international
security institutions, but – in
contrast to its predecessors of 2000 – does
not directly blame the West for these developments.
This tendency in Russian security
thinking offers some hope that the
contents of future major security documents
will show a sincere endeavour of
improving the relationship with the West
and – as the DWP states 2003 – of “dismantling
the Cold War vestiges.”
3. Outlook on Russia’s
Security Policy
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President
Putin took a pro-Western course. In
the long run, Putin desired to strengthen
Russia’s international position, not excluding
military means to achieve this.
However, Putin realised quite well, in
contrast to many Soviet leaders, that nowadays
influence on a global level is more
than ever based on economic leverage.
Taking this into account, his rapprochement
towards the West, and especially towards
Europe, did not seem strange.
Closer cooperation with the EU could
serve more than one objective of Russian
policy. Firstly, economic cooperation
with Europe would most likely bring
about growth of the Russian economy,
which in turn enhanced Russia’s international
position. Secondly, closer ties with
the EU might also weaken the relationship
between Europe and the USA, even
more so if Russia would be supporting,
or participating in, the further development
of an independent European security
policy with its own military power,
which possibly could be in contrast with
American interests. Russia naturally could
benefit in the international arena from a
weakening or even split in the Trans-Atlantic
camp, by promoting its foreign
policy principle of multipolarity in international
politics and Russia’s status as
a great power. At the time of the start of
the second Gulf War, in March 2003, Putin
was well aware of this policy option of
splitting the Trans-Atlantic, Western camp.
In their plea in the UNSC for military
intervention against Iraq, the USA and
the UK were diametrically opposed to
Germany and France. Putin supported the
48
latter in their rejection of the use of force
by, just like France, threatening to use
the right of veto, and, after ‘Operation
Iraqi Freedom’ was launched, by strongly
condemning the use of force.10
Once
again, the RF reaction demonstrated the
dualistic nature of its policy. On the one
hand, Putin used the division in Western
camp to strengthen Russia’s status in
the international community. At the same
time, he apparently had instructed Foreign
Affairs Minister of the time, Igor
Ivanov, to use more measured words towards
the USA, thus serving the opposite
part of Russia’s dualistic policy: cooperation
with the West in order to
improve the RF economy.11
Putin’s
policy regarding the war against Iraq was
definitely also intended for domestic
consumption. His firm stand against the
USA raised goodwill among the conservative
representatives of the RF security
elite, who had rebuked Putin for his proAmerican
attitude since 9/11. Hence, in
the case of the second Gulf War, by adhering
to the customary dualistic approach,
Putin managed to accomplish
national as well as international objectives
of the RF foreign and security
policy.
4. Concluding Remarks
Russia’s present and future foreign and
security policy is laid down in three documents:
the NSC, the Foreign Policy Concept
and the Military Doctrine. Its defence
policy is further elaborated in the
DWP 2003. Major points of view of these
documents were an assertive attitude towards
the West, a strengthening of Russia’s
position within the CIS as well as on a
global level and, lastly, an emphasis on
military means as an instrument of security
policy. The leading security documents
have found their origin in the
Russian security establishment, consisting
of generals, politicians, diplomats and scientists.
Judging from their criticism of
Putin’s gestures towards the West, the state
of mind of this elite did not change after
9/11. Putin’s positive policy towards the
West since 9/11 had only manifested itself
in public statements. Thus Putin’s rapprochement
with the West did not imply
a structural change of Russian foreign and
security policy.
President Putin has to balance the pressure
of his security establishment with
reinforcing Russia’s economic capacity.
Putin’s policy is symbolic for its dualistic
nature. On the one hand, international
(economic) cooperation is continued and
internal conflicts receive a higher priority
in security thinking. On the other
hand, Russia continues to claim a great
power status in the international arena.
And a large part of the RF security establishment
remains focused on preparation
for large-scale conflicts, on sabre-rattling
with nuclear arms and in its feeling of
encirclement by the hostile West. RF security
policy is characterised by
manoeuvring between traditional Russian
imperial thinking, in terms of power and
influence, and in recognising Russia’s new
post-Cold War status, resulting in cooperation
with the West. Continuation of
this dualism is likely to be the future of
the foreign and security policy of the
Russian Federation.
49
Table 1: Main entries of the 2000 security documents and the Defence White Paper 200314
semehT
ytiruceSlanoitaN
0002yraunaJtpecnoC
enirtcoDyratiliM
0002lirpA
tpecnoCyciloPngieroF
0002enuJ
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3002rebotcO
YTINUMMOCDLROWEHTNIAISSUR.1
srotcafgnisilbatseD
-yratilimehtrof
noitautislacitilop
• ehtniecnanimoD
lanoitanretni
foytinummoc
nretsewdepoleved
ehtybdelsetats
.setatSdetinU sisihT
tademiayllaicepse
laretalinugniylppa
ehtgnidulcni,snoitulos
ot,ecrofyratilimfoesu
dlrownismelborpyek
ehtgnituolf,scitilop
foselpicnirplatnemadnuf
wallanoitanretni
nekaewotstroffe•
noitisops'aissuR
,yllacimonoce,yllacitilop
sallewsa,yliratilimdna
sdleifrehtoni
ehterongiotstpmettA•
niaissuRfostseretni
nismelborprojamgnivlos
snoitalerlanoitanretni
taerhtasesopmsirorreT
ytilibatsdlrowot
-lanoitantsimertxE•
suoigiler,cinhte
tsirorretdnatsitarapes
,stnemevom
dnasnoitasinagro
serutcurts
nekaewotstpmettA•
gnitsixe)erongi(
rofmsinahcem
lanoitanretnignirusne
ehtllaevoba,ytiruces
dnasnoitaNdetinU
ECSO
yratilimgniylppA•
ecrof fosnaemasa
nairatinamuh"
"noitnevretni tuohtiw
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ni,noitcnaslicnuoC
fonoitnevmucric
wallanoitanretni
• ehtfonoisnapxE
desinagrofoelacs
dnamsirorret,emirc
foedartlagelli
scitocrandnasmra
• snoitcalaretalinU nac
lanoitanretniehtesilibatsed
snoisnetekovorp,noitautis
etavargga,ecarsmraehtdna
,snoitcidartnocetatsretni
efirtssuoigilerdnalanoitan
• niecroffoesuehT
.N.Uehtfonoitaloiv
ufwalnusiretrahC dnal
ehtottaerhtasesop
eritneehtfonoitasilibats
lanoitanretnifometsys
snoitaler
otniecudortniotstpmettA•
ecnalraplanoitanretnieht
hcus sastpecnoc
nairatinamuh"
detimil"dna"noitnevretni
"ytngierevos otredroni
rewoplaretalinuyfitsuj
snoitca .N.Uehtgnissapyb
toneralicnuoCytiruceS
elbatpecca
foegatstnerrucehT•
sitnempolevedlabolg
-oicosetucarofdeton
dnastcilfnoccimonoce
snoitcidartnoclacitilop
gnitfihssiytiruceS•
rawfosnoitseuqmorf
otecaepdna
,lacitilopdetacilpmoc
,cimonoce-laicnanif
,lanoitan-cinhte
rehtodnacihpargomed
smelborp
• foecnacifingisehT
ehtnirewopyratilim
dlrowralopib-tsop
,dehsinimidtonsah
forebmunaecnis
ytiruceslanoitanretni
nierasnoitutitsni
sisircevarg
50
semehT
tpecnoCytiruceSlanoitaN
0002yraunaJ
enirtcoDyratiliM
0002lirpA
tpecnoCyciloPngieroF
0002enuJ
repaPetihWecnefeD
3002rebotcO
STSERETNILANOITANS'AISSUR.2
-laicoS
imonoce
lanoitans'aissuRgnisilaeR•
ehtnoylnoelbissopsistseretni
cimonoceelbatsfosisab
ehtyhwsitahT.tnempoleved
niaissuRfostseretnilanoitan
senolaicurcehteradleifsiht
fostseretnilanoitanehT•
nieildleiflaicosehtniaissuR
anoitalupopehtgnieetnaraug
gnivilfodradnatshgih
denoitnemtoN lanretxeelbarovafetaercoT•
ydaetsrofsnoitidnoc
aissuRfotnempoleved
ymonoces'aissuRgnivorpmI•
fosdradnatsehtgnicnahnE•
noitalupopehtfognivil
denoitnemtoN
citsemoD ehtfoytilibatsehtgnidlohpU•
metsyslanoitutitsnoc
dnasesuacehtgnitanimilE•
otgnitubirtnocsnoitidnoc
suoigilerdnalacitilop
,msitarapes-onhte,msimertxe
.e.i,secneuqesnocriehtdna
suoigilerdnacinhte-retni,laicos
msirorretdnastcilfnoc
denoitnemtoN foytiruceselbailererusneoT•
dnaevreserpot,yrtnuoceht
dnaytngierevosstinehtgnerts
,ytirgetnilairotirret
ehtfosisabehtgninehtgnertS•
·metsyslanoitutitsnoc
tuogniyrracyllufsseccuS•
smrofercitarcomed
sthgirlaudividnignivresbO•
smodeerfdna
denoitnemtoN
-retnI
lanoitan
• s'aissuRgninehtgnertS
,rewoptaergasanoitisop -
fosertnecehtfoenosa
dlrowralopitlumaniecneulfni
yllautumgnipoleveD•
,snoitalersuoegatnavda
rebmemehthtiwyllaicepse
SICehtfosetats s'aissuRdna
srentraplanoitidart
ytiroirpsehcattaFRehT•
ehtotecnatropmi
fotnempoleved yratilim
etatshtiwnoitarepooc
SICehtotseitrap
ytaerTytiruceSevitcelloC ,
otytissecenehtfoesuaceb
sdrawotsecrofehtetadilosnoc
eht deifinuafonoitaerc
ecapsecnefed erusnedna
ytirucesyratilimevitcelloc
dnamrifeveihcaoT•
ehtnisnoitisopsuoigitserp
ylluftsom,ytinummocdlrow
htiwtnetsisnoc fostseretnieht
sa,rewoptaergasaFReht
laitneulfnitsomehtfoeno
dlrownredomehtfosertnec
aeveihcaotkeesllahsaissuR•
fometsysralop-itlum
snoitalerlanoitanretni
ehtfogninehtgnertS•
demrAFR yamsecroF
lanifehttneverp
ehtfonoitulossid
fometsys
lanoitanretni
snoitaler nopudesab,
wallanoitanretni
secroFdemrAFRehT•
nac labolgerusne
ytilibats
51
semehT
ytiruceSlanoitaN
tpecnoC
0002yraunaJ
enirtcoDyratiliM
0002lirpA
0002enuJtpecnoCyciloPngieroF
ecnefeD
repaPetihW
3002rebotcO
STSERETNILANOITANS'AISSUR.2
-retnI
lanoitan
aseusrupFRehT•
ycilopecnefednommoc
suraleBhtiw fodleifehtni
dnanoitasinagroyratilim
ehtfotnempolevedeht
ehtfosecroFdemrA
noinUehtfosetatsrebmem
A• ytiroirp ngierofs'aissuRniaera
laretalibdnalaretalitlumsiycilop
rebmemehthtiwnoitarepooc
SICehtfosetats
• setatsnaeporuEhtiwsnoitaleR
s'aissuRsi ngieroflanoitidart
ytiroirpycilop
fO• ecnatropmiyek snoitalerera
ehthtiw noinUnaeporuE )UE(
ehT• noitarepoocfoytisnetni
stinodnepedlliwOTANhtiw
ecnailpmoc ehtfosesualcyekhtiw
7991fotcAgnidnuoFFR-OTAN
yratiliM stignidnefeD•
sti,ecnednepedni
etatsstidnaytngierevos
ytirgetnilairotirretdna
yratilimgnitneverP•
aissuRtsniaganoissergga
seillastidna
denoitnemtoN ehtfoytiruceselbailererusneoT•
yrtnuoc
ahcattaeW• ecnatropmiytiroirp
drawotstroffetniojot gnilttes
nistcilfnoc setatsrebmemSIC
evitcelloCSICehthguorht,dnA•
tnempolevedehtot,ytaerTytiruceS
fo -yratilimehtninoitarepooc
aeralacitilop foerehpsehtnidna
gnitabmocniylralucitrap,ytiruces
dnamsirorretlanoitanretni
msimertxe
denoitnemtoN
52
semehT
tpecnoCytiruceSlanoitaN
0002yraunaJ
enirtcoDyratiliM
0002lirpA
tpecnoCyciloPngieroF
0002enuJ
repaPetihWecnefeD
3002rebotcO
YTIRUCESS'AISSUROTSTAERHT.3
lanretnI
staerht
dnamsirtnec-onhte,msioge-onhtE•
ecrofnierotgnipleheramsinivuahc
dnalacitilop,msilanoitan suoigiler
msitarapes-onhtedna,msimertxe
lagelehT• siyrtnuocehtfoytinu
tsitarapesybdedoregnieb
forebmunafosnoitaripsa
seititnetneutitsnoc ybdna,FRehtfo
lortnocetatsfonoitasinagroroop 51
• ehtfostrapemosfognikniL
oterutalsigelehtdnaevitucexe
snoitasinagrolanimirc
hciraotniyteicosfonoisividpeeD•
gnimlehwrevonadnawef
ytirojamdegelivirprednu
fohtlaehlacisyhpehtottaerhtehT•
niesirehtnineessanoitaneht
dnaesugurddnanoitpmusnoclohocla
ehtninoitcudercitamardehtni
efilegarevanidnaetarhtribs'yrtnuoc
ycnatcepxe
• lanoitanfognidnuf-rednuehT
wolyllacitircaotsdaelecnefed
tabmocdnalanoitarepofolevel
gniniart dnasecroFdemrAehtni
spoortrehto
seitivitcalufwalnuehT•
-lanoitantsimertxefo
dnasuoigiler,cinhte
tsirorretdnatsitarapes
,stnemevom
dnasnoitasinagro
serutcurts
otstpmettA• tpursid
dnaytinueht
foytirgetnilairotirret
etatseht otdna
lanretniehtesilibatsed
noitautis
worhtrevootstpmettA•
metsyslanoitutitsnoceht
fohtworgehT•
-cinhte,msitarapes
suoigilerdnalanoitan
msimertxe
fohtworgehT•
,msirorretlanoitanretni
desinagrolanoitansnart
sallewsa,emirc lagelli
sgurdnignikciffart
snopaewdna
tsniagaecroffoesU•
lanoitutitsnocs'aissuR
emiger
dnatpursidotsnoitcA•
etatsfoseidobesinagrosid
rewop
msirorretlanoitanretnI•
ytilibatsnicinhtE•
evisrevbusfosnoitcA•
rolanoitan,tsitarapes
spuorgsuoigiler
gnikciffartgurD•
snartdnadesinagrO•
emircredrob
• demralagellI
ebotsnoitamrof
/aissuRotdehctapsid
seillasti
• noitamrofnI
snoitca)lacigolohcysp-(
seilla/aissuRotelitsoh
53
semehT
tpecnoCytiruceSlanoitaN
0002yraunaJ
enirtcoDyratiliM
0002lirpA
tpecnoCyciloPngieroF
0002enuJ
repaPetihWecnefeD
3002rebotcO
YTIRUCESS'AISSUROTSTAERHT.3
lanretxE
staerht
setatsetarapesybstpmettA•
latnemnrevogretnidna
otsnoitasinagro ehtelttileb
gnitsixefoelor
ehtrofsmsinahcem
-retnifoecnanetniam
yliramirp,ytiruceslanoitan
NUeht ECSOehtdna
,lacitilopehttahtregnadehT•
yratilimdnacimonoce
ehtniaissuRfoecneulfni
decudereblliwdlrow
fogninehtgnertsehT•
dnascolblacitilop-yratilim
ehtllaevoba,secnailla
OTANfonoisnapxe
sdrawtsae
foecneserpelbissopehT•
dnasesabyratilimngierof
stnegnitnocyratilimegral
foytinicivetaidemmiehtni
sredrobnaissuReht
ehtfogninekaewehT•
ehtninoitargetnifosessecorp
SIC
dnatnempolevedehT•
otesolcstcilfnocfonoitalacse
naissuRehtforedrobetatseht
lanretxeehtdnanoitaredeF
setatsrebmemehtfosredrob
SICehtfo
FRhtiwecnerefretnI•
sriaffalanretni
erongiotstpmettA•
FR)noegnirfniro(
gnivlosernistseretni
ytiruceslanoitanretni
smelborp
esoppootstpmettA•
foesaercnieht
noFRehtfoecneulfni
levellabolga
fonoisnapxeehT•
dnascolbyratilim
secnailla
fonoitcudortniehT•
spoortngierof
NUehttuohtiw(
licnuoCytiruceS
ehtot)noitcnas
suougitnocfoyrotirret
htiwyldneirfsetats
FReht
• fonoisserppuS
FRfosthgireht
daorbasnezitic
( hkynnartsoni )
nasdrawotdnertgniworG•
dlrowehtfoerutcurtsralopinu
ehthtiw dnacimonoce
ehtfonoitanimodrewop
setatSdetinU
• desiargnieberasekatS
snoitutitsninretseWyb dna
,noitisopmocdetimilfosmurof
aybdna ehtfogninekaew
ytiruceS.N.Uehtfoelor
licnuoC
• ehtelttilebotstpmettA
tatsngierevosafoelor sae
fotnemelelatnemadnufeht
-enegsnoitalerlanoitanretni
-retniyrartibrafotaerhtaetar
sriaffalanretnihtiwecneref
• s'OTAN lacitilopyad-tneserp
senilediugyratilimdna tonod
ytiruceshtiwedicnioc
FRehtfostseretni dna
tcidartnocyltceridyllanoisacco
meht
• snrecnocyliramirpsihT
s'OTANfosnoisivorpeht
tpecnoCcigetartSwen ,
-esuehtedulcxetonodhcihw
s'OTANfoedistuoecrof-fo
enozytaerT ehttuohtiw
ytiruceSNUehtfonoitcnas
licnuoC
• ngieroffotnemyolpeD
wenfoyrotirretehtnispoort
srebmemOTAN seirtnuocdna
colbehtniojoteripsataht
rewopyratilimfoesularetalinU•
etadnamCSNUehttuohtiw
dnamedretaergsegaruocne
ssamfosnopaewrof
noitcurtsed
• ybdesuecrofdemrA
snoitilaocdemrofyliraropmet
• sepytoeretsrawdloC
gnitavargga,tsixeoteunitnoc
noitautislanoitanretnieht
ssamfosnopaewfonoitarefilorP•
noitcurtsed
• ylgnisaercnisiecrofdemrA
cimonocegnitcetorprofdesu
stseretni ngierofsegralnehcihw,
gnisurofstnemeriuqerycilop
ecneloiv
CSNUehtfoelorehtgnicudeR•
ycnednetsuoregnadasaneessi
• ytirucesfonoitasilanoitaneR
lartneCnisetatsfoycilop
rotsaEraFeht,aisA
SICehtnierehwesle lepmoclliw
asanoigerehtredisnocotaissuR
,stcilfnoccinhtefoecruoslaitnetop
-yratilimdnasetupsidredrob
ytilibatsnilacitilop
54
semehT
tpecnoCytiruceSlanoitaN
0002yraunaJ
enirtcoDyratiliM
0002lirpA
tpecnoCyciloPngieroF
0002enuJ
repaPetihWecnefeD
3002rebotcO
YTIRUCESS'AISSUROTSTAERHT.3
lanretxE
staerht
sahmsirorretlanoitanretnI•
otngiapmacneponadehsaelnu
aissuRninoitautisehtesilibatsed
• gnisufoecitcarps'OTAN
ecrofyratilim s'colbehtedistuo
ytilibisnopserfoenoz tuohtiw
licnuoCytiruceSNUeht
ehtotdetavelewon,noitcnas
enirtcodcigetartsafoknar ,
eritneehtesilibatsedotsnetaerht
noitautiscigetartslabolg
stisniateraissuR• evitagen
noisnapxeehtsdrawotedutitta
OTANfo
• nitcilfnocdetcartorpehT
laerasetaercnatsinahgfA
ehtfoytirucesottaerht
dnasredrobSICnrehtuos
naissuRstceffayltcerid
stseretni
lanretnihtiwecnerefretnI•
sriaffaFR
yratilimfonoitartsnomeD•
fosredrobehtotesolcrewop
aissuR
scolbyratilimfonoisnapxE•
• cimalsIfogninehtgnertS
FRehtotesolcmsimertxe
sredrob
sthgirehtnotnemegnirfnI•
naissuRfostseretnidna
(setatsngierofnisnezitic az
mohzebur )
YTIRUCESS'AISSURGNIRUSNE.4
-adnuF
slatnem
dna
sevitcejbo
dnanoitceted,noitciderpylemiT•
dnalanretxefonoitasilartuen
staerhtlanretni
ytngierevosehtgnieetnarauG•
ytirgetnilairotirretdna
• gnimocrevO naissuReht
lacinhcet,cifitneicss'noitaredeF
dna ecnednepedlacigolonhcet
secruoslanretxeno
• fometsysehtgnivorpmI
ewopetats laredefsti,FRehtfor
-nrevog-fleslacolsti,snoitaler
dnawalpugninethgit,tnem
laicosehtgnicrofnierdnaredro
yteicosfoytilibatslacitilopdna
otserehdaFRehT
latnemadnufeht
dnaselpicnirp
foselur
wallanoitanretni
ehT• snoitaNdetinU tsum
ehtniamer rofertnecniam
lanoitanretnignitaluger
snoitaler
yletuloserllahsFRehT• esoppo
foelorehtelttilebotstpmetta
NUeht nilicnuoCytiruceSstidna
sriaffadlrow
• fosutatsehtfonoitavreserP
ehtfosrebmemtnenamrepeht
licnuoCytiruceS.N.U
• licnuoCytiruceS.N.UehtylnO
otytirohtuaehtsah esunoitcnas
ecroffo foesoprupehtrof
ecaepgniveihca
elacs-egraldnaraelcuN•
rehtoroOTANhtiwsraw
onerasnoitilaocdel-SU
elbaborpregnol
noitarepoocstcepxeaissuR•
rehtodnaASUehthtiw
otseirtnuocdesilairtsudni
erusneotredroniworg
ehtgniltnamsiddnaytilibats
segitsevraWdloC
ehthtiwsnoitalercimonocE•
rehtruflliwseirtnuocUE
poleved
55
semehT
tpecnoCytiruceSlanoitaN
0002yraunaJ
yratiliM
enirtcoD
0002lirpA
tpecnoCyciloPngieroF
0002enuJ
repaPetihWecnefeD
3002rebotcO
YTIRUCESS'AISSURGNIRUSNE.4
-adnuF
slatnem
dna
sevitcejbo
• tcirtsgnieetnarauG
swalehtfoecnavresbo llayb
etats,stnavrescilbup,snezitic
dnaseitraplacitilop,snoitutitsni
snoitasinagrosuoigilerdnalaicos
• yratilimehtgnisiaR
etatsehtfolaitnetop dna
hgihyltneiciffusatatigniniatniam
level
agnisinagrO• nommoc
ehthtiwaeracimonoce
SICehtfosetatsrebmem
asesopdnalufwalnusiecroffoesurehtO•
eritneehtfonoitasilibatsehtottaerht
snoitalerlanoitanretnifometsys
• fostseretnidnasthgirehttcetorpoT
stoirtapmocdnasneziticnaissuR
daorba mohzeburaz( ) fosisabehtno
stnemeergalaretalibdnawallanoitanretni
etauqedaniatbootkeeslliwFRehT•
fosmodeerfdnasthgirehtrofseetnaraug
yehterehwsetatsnistoirtapmoc
dnaniatniamotdnaediseryltnenamrep
mehthtiwseitevisneherpmocpoleved
snoitasinagroriehtdna
ngieroF
ycilop
sevitcejbo
rofyrenihcamlativgnicrofnieR•
dlrowfotnemeganamlaretalitlum
,sessecorpcimonocednalacitilop
ehtfonoitcidsirujrednullaevoba
licnuoCytiruceSNU
• sthgirlagelehtgnidnefeD
naissuRfostseretnidna
daorbatnedisersnezitic az(
mohzebur )
ehthtiwsnoitalergnipoleveD•
dna,SICehtfosrebmem
noitargetnignipoleved
niSICehtnihtiwsessecorp
stseretnis'aissuR
toN
denoitnem
etomorpoT• noitanimile gnitsixeehtfo
laitnetopfoecnegremeehttneverpdna
dnanoisnetfosdebtoh snoigernistcilfnoc
FRehtottnecajda
stisasdrageraissuR• tnatropmitsom
tabmocotksatycilopngierof
msirorretlanoitanretni
setatsrehtohtiwetaroballocllahsaissuR•
-ciffartgurdlagellitabmocotyllufesoprup
emircdesinagrofohtworgehtdnagnik
• rebmemSICllahtiwpihsrentraP
setats rennameudanitnuoccaotniekatot
fosmretnignidulcni,FRehtfostseretnieht
naissuRfosthgirfoseetnaraug
(stoirtapmoc mohzeburaz )
• aissuR-OTAN
sipihsrentraP
etipseddeniatniam
secnereffidrojam no
fotnemegralnefoseussi
ngierofstidnaecnaillaeht
snoitarepoyratilim
lanoitanretniniamehT•
eraaissuRfosnoitagilbo
eht,NUehtotdetaler
ytaerTytiruceSevitcelloC
,SICehtfonoitasinagrO
eht iahgnahS
noitarepooC
noitasinagrO dna
suraleB
56
semehT
tpecnoCytiruceSlanoitaN
0002yraunaJ
enirtcoDyratiliM
0002lirpA
tpecnoCyciloPngieroF
0002enuJ
repaPetihWecnefeD
3002rebotcO
YTIRUCESS'AISSURGNIRUSNE.4
ngieroF
ycilop
sevitcejbo
smragnitsixefonoitatpadA•
noitcudersmradnalortnoc
nisnoitidnocwenotstnemeerga
fi,dnasnoitalerlanoitanretni
wengnidulcnoc,yrassecen
gninrecnocyliramirp,stnemeerga
gnidliubytirucesdnaecnedifnoc
serusaem
• ,ainauhtiLybtcepseR
ainotsEdnaaivtaL fo
nignidulcni,stseretninaissuR
tcepserfonoitseuqyekeht
ehtfosthgirehtrof
gnikaeps-naissuR
noitalupop mohzeburaz( )
• ehttahtstcepxeaissuR
lliwseirtnenaissuR-itna
yratilimmorfdevomereb
lacitilopdnagninnalp
OTANfosnoitaralced
srebmem
gnirusnE
yratilim
ytiruces
dnarawfonoitneverpehtnI•
sevigFReht,stcilfnocdemra
,citamolpid,lacitilopotecnereferp
yratilim-nonrehtodnacimonoce
noitca
• seitilicafdnasecrofllA
raelcungnidulcni,elbaliava
desueblliw,snopaew fi
demraleperotyrassecen
snaemrehtollafi,noissergga
detsuahxeneebevah
ytilibapacecnerretedapupeeK•
gnitneverpfotseretniehtni
,elacsrevetahwnonoissergga
erasmraraelcunnehwgnidulcni
seillastidnaaissuRtsniagadesu
• raelcunevahtsumFRehT
secrof ynatsniagaesurof
fonoitilaocroetatsrossergga
setats
yratilimgnirusnE•
ytiruces
fonoisserppuS•
sdrawotnoissergga
FReht sti)ro(dna
seilla
sniaterFRehT•
sutatsrewopraelcun
gnirretedrof
tsniaganoissergga
FReht ro(dna sti)
seilla
ehtsniaterFRehT•
raelcunesuotthgir
esnopsernisnopaew
ssamfosnopaewot
nidnanoitcurtsed
-ediwotesnopser
noisserggaelacs
lanoitnevnocgnisu
snoitautisnisnopaew
lacitirc FRehtrof
aevigotderaperpsiaissuR•
aottnesnoc rehtruf
raelcunstifonoitcuder
laitnetop fosisabehtno
ehthtiwstnemeergalaretalib
ASU
keesllahsaissuR•
odnanoitavreserp ecnavresb
ehtnoytaerT2791ehtfo
citsillaB-itnAfonoitatimiL
)MBA(smetsySelissiM eht-
cigetartsfoenotsrenroc
ytilibats 61
ehtfonoitatnemelpmiehT•
etaercotASUehtfosnalp
ecnefedelissimlanoitana
ylbativenilliwmetsys lepmoc
etauqedatpodaotFReht
serusaem stigniniatniamrof
reporpataytiruceslanoitan
level
• sadevreserpsiOTANfI
nahtiwecnaillayratilima
,enirtcodevisneffo
eblliwsegnahclanidrac
s'aissuRninekatrednu
dnagninnalpyratilim
FRehtfotnempoleved
stignidulcni,secroFdemrA
ygetartsraelcun
lliwsecroFdemrAFR•
-yratilimdnayratilimniatnoc
staerhtlacitilop
erusnelliwsecroFdemrAFR•
lacitilopdnacimonoces'aissuR
lairotirretstidnastseretni
ytirgetni
• foytirucesehtgnirusnE
demranisneziticnaissuR
fosnoitautisdnastcilfnoc
ytilibatsni
57
semehT
tpecnoCytiruceSlanoitaN
0002yraunaJ
enirtcoDyratiliM
0002lirpA
tpecnoCyciloPngieroF
0002enuJ
repaPetihWecnefeD
3002rebotcO
YTIRUCESS'AISSURGNIRUSNE.4
gnirusnE
yratilim
ytiruces
tnatropmitsomehtfoenO•
cigetarts yratilimfosevitcejbo
dnanoitcaretniehtsiytiruces
rebmemehthtiwnoitarepo-oc
SICehtfosetats
rehtrufotsdnetniaissuR•
fogninehtgnertsehtetomorp
gnitapicitrapybytilibatslanoiger
dnagnicuderfosessecorpehtni
demralanoitnevnocgnitimil
secrof
fonoitarefilorpehtgnitrevA•
rehtodnasnopaewraelcun
noitcurtsedssamfosnopaew
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58
Acronyms
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent
States
DWP – Defence White Paper
MID – Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MoD – Ministry of Defence
NSC – National Security Concept
SCRF – Security Council of the Russian
Federation
UNSC – United Nations Security
Council
Notes
1
Disclaimer: the views expressed are those of
the author and not necessarily those of the
Netherlands Ministry of Defence.
2
See Table 1: ‘Main entries of the 2000
security documents and the Defence White
Paper 2003’ for an overview of the main entries
of the four discussed security documents.
3
The paragraph on the 2000 editions of the
major RF security documents is to a large extent
derived from M. de Haas, Russian Security
and Air Power (1992-2002): The development of
Russian security thinking under Yeltsin and Putin
and its consequences for the air forces (London,
New York: Frank Cass Publishers, ISBN 0-714-
65608-9, August 2004), pp. 74-97.
See the following sources for the contents
of the 2000 editions of the three principle
security documents:
National Security Concept (January 2000):
Russian: ‘Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti’,
Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 1 (14
January 2000), p. 1. www.scrf.gov.ru/Docu-
ments/Decree/2000/24-1.html
English: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/
doctrine/gazeta012400.htm
Military Doctrine (April 2000):
Russian: ‘Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy
Federatsii’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye,
15 (28 April 2000). www.scrf.gov.ru/Docu-
ments/Decree/2000/706-1.html
English: www.freerepublic.com/forum/
a394aa0466bfe.htm
Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000):
Russian: ‘Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki
Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye, 25 (14 July 2000), p. 4.
www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/
07-10.html
English: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/
doctrine/econcept.htm
4
M.A. Smith, Putin’s regime: administered democracy,
E108 (Camberley: Conflict Studies
Research Centre, June 2000).
5
‘Putin announces broad reorganization of
political system in Russia’, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty Newsline, (Vol. 8), (No. 174), Part
I, 13 September 2004.
6
As explained to the author by Irina Kirilova,
lecturer in Russian studies, University of Cambridge,
at a Wilton Park Conference, March
2001.
7
‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’,
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 25 December 1993,
www.gov.ru:8104/main/konst/konst0.html,
articles 80, 84 and 85.
8
Defence White Paper of 2003: Aktual’nyye
zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhënnykh Sil Rossiyskoy
Federatsii (The priority tasks of the development
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation),
RF MoD, 2 October 2003. www.rian.ru/
rian/intro.cfm?doc_id=261; http://
supol.narod.ru/archive/official_documents/
doctrine/war_doctrine.htm
9
DWP 2003, pp. 34-38.
10
For a broader assessment of the militarystrategic
and operational aspects of the DWP
2003 see: M. de Haas, ‘The contours of new
Russian airpower thinking’, NATO School Polaris
Quarterly, Volume 1, Issue 1, spring 2004,
pp. 21-29.
11
V. Solovyev, ‘Russia’s military faces 10%
59
downsizing’, Moscow News, 20-26 October
2004; A. Babakin and V. Myasnikov,
‘Aviatsiya i podvodnyy flot nuzhny men’she
vsego’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No.
39 (399), 15 October 2004, pp. 1, 3.
12
‘Putin says Iraq crisis most serious conflict
since end of cold war’, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Security Watch, (Vol. 4), (No. 13) 1
April 2003.
13
‘Foreign minister concerned by U.S. efforts
to seize Iraqi assets’, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty Security Watch, (Vol. 4), (No. 12)
26 March 2003; ‘Putin stresses need to avoid
conflict with U.S.’, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Security Watch, (Vol. 4), (No. 14) 9 April
2003.
14
The citations are mostly not literally derived
from the different security documents,
but are adapted by the author. Remarkable
differences between the documents or vital
entries are printed in bold type. The grouping
of related entries as used here is for the purpose
of clarity and does not necessarily correspond
with the original documents.
15
Constituent entities or subjects are administrative
authorities within the Russian
Federation, below the federal, national level,
with specific self-governing legislative, executive
and judicial powers.
16
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
of 1972, agreed between the USA and the
USSR, restricted the installation of defence
systems against intercontinental ballistic
nuclear missiles of both superpowers. See K.
A. Nederlof, Lexicon politiek-militair-strategische
termen (Alphen aan den Rijn (NL) / Brussels:
Samson, 1984), pp. 20, 26 and 133.