

# Putin's Security Policy in the Past, Present and Future

**An analysis of the security documents of 2000 compared  
with the Defence White Paper of 2003**

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**A**ccording to commonly accepted points of view, national security policy should reflect a coherent and consistent system of political, military, economic and psychological means that a state has at its disposal. This article presents an analysis of President Putin's security policy. It starts with a comparison between the most important entries on security policy of the 2000 editions of the National Security Concept (NSC), the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept. In October 2003 the

Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) published *The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation*, a document which can best be described and will be referred to as a 'Defence White Paper' (DWP). Following the assessment of the security documents of 2000 this article will compare these results with the contents of the DWP 2003. Finally, based upon the security documents of 2000 and 2003, an outlook will be presented on Putin's security policy in his second term-in-office, after his re-election in March 2004.

The NSC was produced by the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) and provides an overall view of security policy of the Russian Federation (RF), applying all means available to the state. The Military Doctrine was drafted by the MoD and deals with the military means of the state. Finally, the Foreign Policy Concept was drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del*, MID), and relates to the political and diplomatic means of the RF. Since the NSC is the principle security

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document, for reasons of unity and clarity, the main entries of these three documents as well as of the DWP 2003 will be offered in the format of the NSC.<sup>1</sup> Thus the structure of the comparison of the security documents is divided into four parts: Russia in the world community, Russia's national interests, threats to Russia's security, and ensuring Russia's security.

## 1. Main Entries of the Security Documents of 2000<sup>2</sup>

### *1.1. Russia in the world community: destabilising factors*

A number of destabilising factors are consistently mentioned in all documents:

- Dominance in the international community of Western states led by the United States;
- Unilateral power actions, bypassing the UN Security Council (UNSC), by using concepts such as 'humanitarian intervention' and 'limited sovereignty';

- (International) terrorism;
- Organised crime.

The enumeration of destabilising factors demonstrates an emphasis on **external** aspects. Another striking feature is the prominence of negative tendencies with reference to Western security policy. Over the years, in the three security documents, more and more entries have been included related to this subject. Especially NATO's use of force in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) was seen as a clear example of its policy of ignoring Russia, which claimed a decisive role in Europe, as well as of disregarding the UN and the standards of international law. Other concerns were NATO's new Strategic Concept of April 1999 and its enlargement with new member states in the East, adjacent to Russia's borders.

**Internal** destabilising factors seem to be of less importance. Terrorism and organised crime are included in all the documents. Two of the three documents mention illegal trade of arms and narcotics as well as nationalistic and religious strife as factors.

This leads to two conclusions. First, the contents of internal destabilising factors are not consistent in the security documents. Apparently the security agencies had different opinions on the domestic situation. Secondly, external destabilising factors outweigh internal ones in the RF security policy. The security agencies obviously were more focussed on international developments.

### *1.2. Russia's national interests*

The following national interests are prevailing in the documents:

- Primary interests are protection against (international) terrorism, disasters of natural or industrial origin, and the dangers arising from wartime military operations;
- Improving economic development and enhancing the standards of living;
- Preserving and strengthening of the RF's sovereignty and territorial integrity and strengthening the basis of the constitutional system;
- Eliminating the causes and conditions contributing to political and religious

extremism and ethno-separatism;

- Strengthening Russia's international position as a great power;
- Developing mutually advantageous relations, especially with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);
- Cooperation in the military-political area and in the sphere of security through the CIS (Collective Security Treaty), particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism.

The national interests as listed are a mixture of provisions on **domestic** and **international** matters. Nowadays the perception that security is more than protection with military means against an external aggressor is widely accepted as realistic. Chechnya has made clear to the RF authorities that not only **external** but also **internal** threats exist against national security and that these threats are not confined to the military dimension but also have their roots in political, social and economic dimensions. However, if the RF authorities had taken this interdependence between internal and external

national interests seriously, this should have brought them to the conclusion that conflicts of the type of the Chechen war cannot be solved by military means. Consequently, for ensuring a consistent national policy security not only military and diplomatic means come to the fore, but also social (human rights), economic (development projects, building and maintenance of houses, schools and medical facilities) and political (reform of the bureaucratic apparatus) activities are essential. A stable economic development is a prerequisite for realising these activities. These basic conditions are, in general terms, reflected in the 2000 editions of the NSC as well as of the Foreign Policy Concept. However, in Russian civic society they had not yet become visible. Probably, this was due to the slow economic development but surely also to the continued presence of a deep-rooted bureaucracy, which produced corruption. Therefore, the implementation of the aforementioned policy intentions in a broad spectrum of security aspects is likely to be a long-lasting process.

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## ***1.2. Threats to Russia's security***

The RF sees the fulfilment of its political-strategic objectives as well as its internal and external security threatened by a number of causes. In discussing general roots of threats the NSC above all points out **internal**, socio-economic aspects: the poor status of the economy, a failing governmental apparatus, polarisation between entities, (organised) crime, corruption and terrorism. These internal aspects are further elaborated in the enumeration of internal threats in the three security documents. Apart from internal threats these documents naturally also recognise **external** threats. When comparing the three documents the following threats are prevailing:

### ***Internal threats***

- Extremist national-ethnic and religious separatism and terrorism;
- Trans-national organised crime;
- Erosion of the territorial integrity of the state by separatist aspirations of a number of constituent entities of the RF,

by poor organisation of state control; and because of linking of some parts of the executive and the legislature to criminal organisations (corruption).

### ***External threats***

- Attempts to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for international security of the UN and the OSCE, by economic and power domination of the United States and other Western states;

- Attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests and influence in resolving international security problems;

- The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all the expansion of NATO eastwards;

- NATO's practice of using military force outside the bloc's zone of responsibility without the UNSC sanction.

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### ***1.3. Ensuring Russia's security***

In this part of the documents the various policy dimensions come together. It consecutively portrays the principles of socio-economic and domestic policies (fundamentals and objectives), as well as

of foreign and security policies (military security, the use of force and the deployment of forces and troops abroad), for the purpose of achieving the objectives of Russia's grand strategy and of ensuring its national security. As a final point this part of the security documents presents a hierarchy of the institutions responsible for national security.

### ***Socio-economic and domestic policies***

- Decreasing Russia's economic dependency on other states by strengthening state regulation of the economy and by organising a common economic area in the CIS;

- Improving the system of state power of the RF, its federal relations and its local self-government (constituent entities) to reinforce the social and political stability of society;

- Guaranteeing strict observance of the laws by all citizens, public servants, state institutions, political parties and social and religious organisations to diminish crime, corruption and terrorism;

- Adhering to the fundamental principles and rules of international law.

President Putin regarded strengthening of central authority as the main solution for the socio-economic problems. In his 'vertical' approach he made an effort to enhance his grip on developments in these and other fields, by withdrawing power and influence from enterprises (especially the oligarchs, who control vital areas of the economy) and from the constituent entities (governors of the regions) for the benefit of the Kremlin.<sup>3</sup> In this way Putin wanted to increase government revenues (taxes), to finance policy objectives such as the fight against crime and terrorism, as well as to enlarge influence of the central apparatus on constituent entities, by deploying presidential plenipotentiaries at the regional level. Another objective of the installation of plenipotentiaries was to prevent or neutralise separatist movements. It was doubtful that simply increasing central authority over the regions would result in improvement of the relations between central and regional powers. Still, reinforcing central authority could also be beneficial for Russia. The RF is a state without a heritage of civic,

democratic governance. Yeltsin's period of rule demonstrated that a vast and complicated country such as Russia without steadfast, centralised authority offers certain groups, such as oligarchs and regional governors, the opportunity of abusing power. On the other hand, centralisation of power demands guarantees for a democratic development, in order to prevent totalitarianism. In this respect it is important to realise that since the introduction of the Constitution of 1993 the powers of the Legislative, to properly check the Executive (President and Government), have been restricted. Theoretically this could lead to unlimited and uncontrolled centralisation of powers. This tendency was enhanced in autumn 2004. After the hostage taking in Beslan, in September 2004, Putin took the opportunity to further strengthen the centralised powers of the Kremlin, at the expense of the governors of the regions (federation subjects).<sup>4</sup>

### *Foreign policy*

- Reinforcing vital mechanisms for multilateral management of international processes, above all under jurisdiction of

the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC);

- Partnership with all CIS member states, and development of integration processes within the CIS, as well as implementation of other objectives of Russia's interests about the CIS;

- Defending and guaranteeing the legal rights and interests of Russian citizens (compatriots) resident abroad or of the Russian-speaking population, in the CIS as well as in the Baltic states.

**Reinforcing mechanisms of international security.** The RF clearly rejects a leading role in international politics of other institutions than the UNSC. This provision, of course, is related to the objective of strengthening of Russia's international position. In the UNSC, the RF possesses the right of veto and is thus able to block undesirable resolutions. Therefore, the objective of reinforcing Russia's international status can be promoted within the constellation of the UN. However, if NATO dominated international politics, the situation would be

different. In such an arrangement of the international system, the RF, without a veto right, would be more or less 'dependent' on NATO's policies. This explains the prominence of the UN and the UNSC especially in the relevant entries in the documents.

**Advancing regional stability.** In the practise of politics, Russia's standpoints on good neighbourhood (partnership) and on regional conflict resolution in the CIS get mixed up. On some occasions, the RF allegedly has actively encouraged regional conflicts, for instance in Abkhazia, followed by an offer of conflict solution, thus making a CIS state, in this case Georgia, dependent on Russia for ensuring its security. Subsequently, this dependency in the field of security was aimed at enhancing RF influence on this state, thus 'ensuring' good neighbourhood.

**Protecting Russians abroad.** This is a recurring theme of the RF foreign policy. In the Foreign Policy Concept, this pro-

vision is mentioned no less than four times: under the heading 'General principles', under 'Human rights and international relations', and twice under 'Regional priorities', in discussing relations within the CIS and with the Baltic states. The NSC as well as the Foreign Policy Concept, in describing the location of Russians abroad, use the term *za rubezhom*. This term points at states adjacent to the RF. The expression *za rubezhom* has an emotional connotation: it refers to something familiar, which binds together.<sup>5</sup> In the consecutive military doctrines, a provision on the protection of Russians abroad is also included under the heading 'External threats'. In previous doctrines in describing 'abroad' the same expression was used as in the other two security documents: *za rubezhom*. However, in the 2000 issue of the Military Doctrine this term has been changed into *inostrannykh*. *Inostrannykh* means out of the country in general, it has a neutral, dispassionate implication. Based upon the changed connotation of the term for 'abroad' in the Military Doctrine of 2000 the assumption

could be made that the General Staff/MoD became less willing to use force if necessary for the protection of Russian minorities in a foreign country.

### **Security policy**

With regard to security policy, analysis of the three documents presents three fundamental themes: ensuring military security, methods of using forces and troops and the deployment of forces and troops abroad. These themes generate the following entries, which are only mentioned in the NSC and in the Military Doctrine:

- All forces and facilities available, including nuclear weapons, will be used if necessary to repel armed aggression, if all other means have been exhausted;
- The RF must uphold nuclear deterrence;
- Forces and troops are employed in local, regional, international and large-scale conflicts, as well as for peacekeeping operations;
- The interests of Russia's national security may require a Russian military presence in certain strategically vital regions of the world.

**Ensuring military security.** The NSC and the Military Doctrine permit the use of nuclear weapons to counter aggression. However, the Military Doctrine is more outspoken in this respect: it allows for the use of nuclear arms to repel a conventional attack as well, under certain not specified critical circumstances for national security. Conversely, the Foreign Policy Concept emphasises the desire of declining the role of military power, mentioning reductions of conventional arms as well as of weapons of mass-destruction, ways against proliferation of these weapons and other aspects of arms control, such as confidence and security building measures. Consequently, in contrast to the other two documents, the Foreign Policy Concept regards nuclear weapons not primarily as a means of deterrence, but as an object of arms control. In this case the MoD, acting in its 'own' field, comes forward as the most aggressive institution, with regard to military interests. This attitude is not unexpected, since a decline in the position of the military instrument of national security policy is likely to

cause diminishing power and influence of the MoD as well.

## **2. Defence White Paper 2003: The priority tasks of the development of the RF Armed Forces<sup>6</sup>**

In analysing this document, I will not make a full comparison with the major security documents of 2000, but concentrate on some significant new developments.

### ***2.1. Characteristics of current wars and armed conflicts***

Analysis of conflicts from the 1970s until 2003, leads the Russian military-political establishment to the following conclusions in the DWP 2003:<sup>7</sup>

- A significant part of all the conflicts has an asymmetrical nature. They demonstrate fierce fighting and in a number of cases result in a total destruction of a state system;
- The outcome of conflicts is more and more determined in its initial phase. The

party which takes the initiative has the advantage;

- Not only military forces but also political and military command and control systems, (economic) infrastructure as well as the population have become primary targets;
- Information and electronic warfare nowadays have a great impact in conflicts;
- The use of airborne, air mobile and special forces has increased.
- Unified command and control, joint warfare and a thorough cooperation between ground and air forces in particular has become essential;
- A prominent role in modern warfare, as demonstrated in conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), is taken by long-range precision guided munitions (PGMs) in combination with airpower, after air superiority has been established;
- Massive use of tanks and infantry has to a large extent been replaced by long-range guided weapon systems and massive air raids, although the role of these

conventional forces is still important after the initial stages of a conflict;

- The dominating role of airpower in modern warfare requires a well-equipped and electronic warfare resistible anti-aircraft defence system.<sup>8</sup>

### ***2.2. Ambivalence towards the West***

In dealing with the West in general and NATO especially, the DWP 2003 poses a vision of two minds. On the one hand, entries show concern on the enlargement of the alliance and the possible deployment of NATO forces on the territory of new NATO members. But it also mentions that the NATO-Russia partnership will be further deepened, in spite of these major differences. Furthermore, it states that nuclear and large-scale wars with NATO or other US-led coalitions are no longer probable armed conflicts and that Russia expects cooperation with the USA and other industrialised countries to grow in ensuring stability. On the other hand, elsewhere in the DWP 2003 this appeasing tone is set aside and replaced by an

antagonistic approach, underlining that Russia expects that the anti-Russian entries will be removed from NATO's military planning and political declarations. Even stronger, the document states that if NATO is preserved as a military alliance with an offensive doctrine, cardinal changes will be undertaken in Russia's military planning and development of the RF Armed Forces, including its nuclear strategy. At the time of publication of the DWP 2003, these entries caused considerable concern in circles within NATO. The ambivalent character of the document clearly gives evidence that it was written by multiple authors. This has, to a certain extent, affected Russia's cooperation with NATO, at least temporarily. Furthermore, these contrasting entries have made it more difficult to acquire a clear picture of Russia's intentions in the field of security. Hopefully, the next RF security document will be better coordinated to prevent unnecessary negative consequences.

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### **2.3. Conclusions**

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#### ***Realistic view***

Reviewing the military-strategic and operational aspects of the DWP 2003, the first and foremost conclusion can be described in one word: realism. Standpoints stressing the importance of information and electronic warfare, unified command and control and joint warfare, which were already included in the Military Doctrine of 2000, are repeated in this document. Furthermore, the entries of the doctrine of 2000, emphasising asymmetric warfare and discussing military actions at lower levels than military strategy, are continued and even further expanded. Rightly, this document focuses on asymmetric conflicts as being on the forefront nowadays, instead of large-scale conventional wars. Clearly, analysis of recent Western-led conflicts and of their own experiences in Chechnya, has convinced the RF military-political leadership to concentrate on irregular warfare. Since this perception in the DWP 2003 is expressed stronger

than in the doctrine of 2000, the assumption could be made that the conservative part of Russia's security establishment has lost influence in decision making, from which modern thinking military leaders have benefited.

#### ***Implementation***

Carrying out this realistic approach towards modern warfare might be a concern. The observation that modern, specifically irregular, warfare can only be fought with sophisticated weapon systems, such as PGMs and avionics providing all-weather capability, and by improving the training level of personnel, requires financial means. The current Russian armed forces, massive in form and still aimed at conventional large-scale warfare, demand a lot of money for upkeep. So far military reform plans have not offered a solution to this dilemma. In October 2004, a further downsizing of the personnel strength of the Armed Forces by 100,000 men before January 2005 was announced.<sup>9</sup> Optimistically, this reduction of ten percent of the overall strength would provide financial means for upgrading the



military for modern warfare. However, the benefits of this reduction might also be used for different (non-military) purposes. Unless the military-political leadership decides to radically change the structure of the armed forces towards one which is capable of conducting asymmetric warfare, the envisaged adaptation of the RF Armed Forces is expected to be hampered.

### *Moderate style*

The overall tone of the DWP 2003 is more moderate than the major security documents of 2000. The documents of 2000 mentioned without any restraint the dominance of Western states led by the USA in international politics, Western institutions weakening the role of the UNSC, as well as NATO's practice of using military force without the UNSC sanction. As mentioned before – discussing the entries on NATO – anti-Western tendencies are still present in the DWP 2003. This document repeats Russia's concern about the continuous dissolution of the system of international relations and the state of grave crisis of a number of inter-

national security institutions, but – in contrast to its predecessors of 2000 – does not directly blame the West for these developments. This tendency in Russian security thinking offers some hope that the contents of future major security documents will show a sincere endeavour of improving the relationship with the West and – as the DWP states 2003 – of “dismantling the Cold War vestiges.”

## **3. Outlook on Russia's Security Policy**

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President Putin took a pro-Western course. In the long run, Putin desired to strengthen Russia's international position, not excluding military means to achieve this. However, Putin realised quite well, in contrast to many Soviet leaders, that nowadays influence on a global level is more than ever based on economic leverage. Taking this into account, his rapprochement towards the West, and especially towards Europe, did not seem strange. Closer cooperation with the EU could

serve more than one objective of Russian policy. Firstly, economic cooperation with Europe would most likely bring about growth of the Russian economy, which in turn enhanced Russia's international position. Secondly, closer ties with the EU might also weaken the relationship between Europe and the USA, even more so if Russia would be supporting, or participating in, the further development of an independent European security policy with its own military power, which possibly could be in contrast with American interests. Russia naturally could benefit in the international arena from a weakening or even split in the Trans-Atlantic camp, by promoting its foreign policy principle of multipolarity in international politics and Russia's status as a great power. At the time of the start of the second Gulf War, in March 2003, Putin was well aware of this policy option of splitting the Trans-Atlantic, Western camp. In their plea in the UNSC for military intervention against Iraq, the USA and the UK were diametrically opposed to Germany and France. Putin supported the

latter in their rejection of the use of force by, just like France, threatening to use the right of veto, and, after 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' was launched, by strongly condemning the use of force.<sup>10</sup> Once again, the RF reaction demonstrated the dualistic nature of its policy. On the one hand, Putin used the division in Western camp to strengthen Russia's status in the international community. At the same time, he apparently had instructed Foreign Affairs Minister of the time, Igor Ivanov, to use more measured words towards the USA, thus serving the opposite part of Russia's dualistic policy: cooperation with the West in order to improve the RF economy.<sup>11</sup> Putin's policy regarding the war against Iraq was definitely also intended for domestic consumption. His firm stand against the USA raised goodwill among the conservative representatives of the RF security elite, who had rebuked Putin for his pro-American attitude since 9/11. Hence, in the case of the second Gulf War, by adhering to the customary dualistic approach, Putin managed to accomplish

national as well as international objectives of the RF foreign and security policy.

## 4. Concluding Remarks

Russia's present and future foreign and security policy is laid down in three documents: the NSC, the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine. Its defence policy is further elaborated in the DWP 2003. Major points of view of these documents were an assertive attitude towards the West, a strengthening of Russia's position within the CIS as well as on a global level and, lastly, an emphasis on military means as an instrument of security policy. The leading security documents have found their origin in the Russian security establishment, consisting of generals, politicians, diplomats and scientists. Judging from their criticism of Putin's gestures towards the West, the state of mind of this elite did not change after 9/11. Putin's positive policy towards the West since 9/11 had only manifested itself in public statements. Thus Putin's rap-

prochement with the West did not imply a structural change of Russian foreign and security policy.

President Putin has to balance the pressure of his security establishment with reinforcing Russia's economic capacity. Putin's policy is symbolic for its dualistic nature. On the one hand, international (economic) cooperation is continued and internal conflicts receive a higher priority in security thinking. On the other hand, Russia continues to claim a great power status in the international arena. And a large part of the RF security establishment remains focused on preparation for large-scale conflicts, on sabre-rattling with nuclear arms and in its feeling of encirclement by the hostile West. RF security policy is characterised by manoeuvring between traditional Russian imperial thinking, in terms of power and influence, and in recognising Russia's new post-Cold War status, resulting in cooperation with the West. Continuation of this dualism is likely to be the future of the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation.

**Table 1: Main entries of the 2000 security documents and the Defence White Paper 2003<sup>14</sup>**

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>1. RUSSIA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY</b>				
<p><b><i>Destablising factors for the military-political situation</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Dominance in the international community of developed western states led by the United States.</b> This is especially aimed at applying unilateral solutions, including the use of military force, to key problems in world politics, flouting the fundamental principles of international law</li> <li>• efforts to weaken Russia's position politically, economically, and militarily, as well as in other fields</li> <li>• Attempts to ignore the interests of Russia in solving major problems in international relations</li> <li>Terrorism poses a threat to world stability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist and terrorist movements, organisations and structures</li> <li>• Attempts to weaken (ignore) existing mechanism for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and OSCE</li> <li>• Applying military force <b>as a means of "humanitarian intervention"</b> without the UN Security Council sanction, in circumvention of international law</li> <li>• <b>Expansion of the scale of organised crime, terrorism and illegal trade of arms and narcotics</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Unilateral actions</b> can destabilise the international situation, provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate contradictions, national and religious strife</li> <li>• <b>The use of force in violation of the U.N. Charter is unlawful</b> and poses a threat to the stabilisation of the entire system of international relations</li> <li>• Attempts to introduce into the international parlance such concepts as <b>"humanitarian intervention" and "limited sovereignty"</b> in order to justify unilateral power actions <b>bypassing the U.N. Security Council are not acceptable</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The current stage of global development is noted for acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions</li> <li>• Security is shifting from questions of war and peace to complicated political, financial-economic, ethnic-national, demographic and other problems</li> <li>• <b>The significance of military power in the post-bipolar world has not diminished, since a number of international security institutions are in grave crisis</b></li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>2. RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS</b>				
<b>Social-economi</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Realising Russia's national interests is possible only on the basis of stable economic development. That is why the national interests of Russia in this field are the crucial ones</li> <li>• The national interests of Russia in the social field lie in guaranteeing the population a high standard of living</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To create favorable external conditions for steady development of Russia</li> <li>• Improving Russia's economy</li> <li>• Enhancing the standards of living of the population</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>
<b>Domestic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Upholding the stability of the constitutional system</li> <li>• Eliminating the causes and conditions contributing to political and religious extremism, ethno-separatism, and their consequences, i.e. social, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts and terrorism</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To ensure reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity,</li> <li>• Strengthening the basis of the constitutional system</li> <li>• Successfully carrying out democratic reforms</li> <li>• Observing individual rights and freedoms</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>
<b>Inter-national</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Strengthening Russia's position as a great power</b>, - as one of the centres of influence in a multipolar world</li> <li>• Developing mutually advantageous relations, <b>especially with the member states of the CIS</b> and Russia's traditional partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The RF attaches priority importance to the development of <b>military cooperation with state parties to the CIS Collective Security Treaty</b>, because of the necessity to consolidate the forces towards the <b>creation of a unified defence space</b> and ensure collective military security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with <b>the interests of the RF as a great power, as one of the most influential centres of the modern world</b></li> <li>• Russia shall seek to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthening of the RF Armed Forces may <b>prevent the final dissolution of the system of international relations</b>, based upon international law</li> <li>• The RF Armed Forces can <b>ensure global stability</b></li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>2. RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS</b>				
<b>Inter-national</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RF pursues a <b>common defence policy with Belarus</b> in the field of military organisation and the development of the Armed Forces of the member states of the Union</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A <b>priority area</b> in Russia's foreign policy is multilateral and bilateral <b>cooperation with the member states of the CIS</b></li> <li><b>Relations with European states</b> is Russia's <b>traditional foreign policy priority</b></li> <li>Of <b>key importance</b> are relations with the <b>European Union (EU)</b></li> <li>The <b>intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on its compliance</b> with key clauses of the NATO-RF Founding Act of 1997</li> </ul>	
<b>Military</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defending its independence, its sovereignty and its state and territorial integrity</li> <li>Preventing military aggression against Russia and its allies</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To ensure reliable security of the country</li> <li>We attach a <b>priority importance</b> to joint efforts toward <b>settling conflicts in CIS member states</b></li> <li>And, through the CIS Collective Security Treaty, to the development of <b>cooperation in the military-political area</b> and in the sphere of security, particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>3. THREATS TO RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<b>Internal threats</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethno-egoism, ethno-centrism and chauvinism are helping to reinforce nationalism, political and <b>religious extremism, and ethno-separatism</b></li> <li>• The legal <b>unity of the country is being eroded by separatist aspirations of a number of constituent entities</b> of the RF, and by poor organisation of state control<sup>15</sup></li> <li>• <b>Linking of some parts of the executive and the legislature to criminal organisations</b></li> <li>• Deep division of society into a rich few and an overwhelming underprivileged majority</li> <li>• The threat to the physical health of the nation as seen in the rise in alcohol consumption and drug use and in the dramatic reduction in the country's birth rate and in average life expectancy</li> <li>• <b>The under-funding of national defence leads to a critically low level of operational and combat training</b> in the Armed Forces and other troops</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The unlawful activities of extremist national-ethnic, religious and separatist and terrorist movements, organisations and structures</li> <li>• Attempts to <b>disrupt the unity and territorial integrity of the state</b> and to destabilise the internal situation</li> <li>• Attempts to overthrow the constitutional system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The growth of separatism, ethnic-national and religious extremism</li> <li>• The growth of international terrorism, trans national organised crime, as well as <b>illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of force against Russia's constitutional regime</li> <li>• Actions to disrupt and disorganise bodies of state power</li> <li>• International terrorism</li> <li>• Ethnic instability</li> <li>• Actions of subversive separatist, national or religious groups</li> <li>• Drug trafficking</li> <li>• Organised and trans border crime</li> <li>• <b>Illegal armed formations to be dispatched to Russia / its allies</b></li> <li>• <b>Information (-psychological) actions hostile to Russia / allies</b></li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>3. THREATS TO RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<b>External threats</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attempts by separate states and intergovernmental organisations to <b>belittle the role of existing mechanisms for the maintenance of international security, primarily the UN</b> and the OSCE</li> <li>• The danger that the political, economic and military influence of Russia in the world will be reduced</li> <li>• The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all the <b>expansion of NATO eastwards</b></li> <li>• The possible presence of <b>foreign military bases and large military contingents in the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders</b></li> <li>• The weakening of the processes of integration in the CIS</li> <li>• The development and escalation of conflicts close to the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of the member states of the CIS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interference with RF internal affairs</li> <li>• Attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests in resolving international security problems</li> <li>• Attempts to oppose the increase of influence of the RF on a global level</li> <li>• The expansion of military blocs and alliances</li> <li>• The introduction of foreign troops (without the UN Security Council sanction) to the territory of contiguous states friendly with the RF</li> <li>• <b>Suppression of the rights of RF citizens abroad (inostrannykh)</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Growing trend towards an unipolar structure of the world with the <b>economic and power domination of the United States</b></li> <li>• <b>Stakes are being raised by Western institutions</b> and forums of limited composition, and by a <b>weakening of the role of the U.N. Security Council</b></li> <li>• <b>Attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state</b> as the fundamental element of international relations generate a threat of arbitrary interference with internal affairs</li> <li>• <b>NATO's present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with security interests of the RF</b> and occasionally directly contradict them</li> <li>• <b>This primarily concerns the provisions of NATO's new Strategic Concept</b>, which do not exclude the use-of-force outside of NATO's Treaty zone <b>without the sanction of the UN Security Council</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Deployment of foreign troops in the territory of new NATO members</b> and countries that aspire to join the bloc</li> <li>• Unilateral use of military power without the UNSC mandate <b>encourages greater demand for weapons of mass destruction</b></li> <li>• <b>Armed force used by temporarily formed coalitions</b></li> <li>• <b>Cold war stereotypes continue to exist, aggravating the international situation</b></li> <li>• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</li> <li>• <b>Armed force is increasingly used for protecting economic interests</b>, which enlarges foreign policy requirements for using violence</li> <li>• Reducing the role of the UNSC is seen as a dangerous tendency</li> <li>• <b>Renationalisation of security policy of states in Central Asia, the Far East or elsewhere in the CIS</b> will compel Russia to consider the region as a potential source of ethnic conflicts, border disputes and military-political instability</li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>3. THREATS TO RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<b>External threats</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International terrorism has unleashed an open campaign to destabilise the situation in Russia</li> <li>• <b>NATO's practice of using military force</b> outside the bloc's zone of responsibility <b>without the UN Security Council sanction, now elevated to the rank of a strategic doctrine</b>, threatens to destabilise the entire global strategic situation</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia retains its <b>negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO</b></li> <li>• <b>The protracted conflict in Afghanistan creates a real threat to security of the southern CIS borders and directly affects Russian interests</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interference with internal RF affairs</li> <li>• Demonstration of military power close to the borders of Russia</li> <li>• Expansion of military blocs</li> <li>• <b>Strengthening of Islamic extremism close to the RF borders</b></li> <li>• Infringement on the rights and interests of Russian citizens in foreign states (<i>za rubezhom</i>)</li> </ul>
<b>4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<b>Fundamentals and objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timely prediction, detection and neutralisation of external and internal threats</li> <li>• Guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity</li> <li>• <b>Overcoming</b> the Russian Federation's scientific, technical and <b>technological dependence on external sources</b></li> <li>• <b>Improving the system of state power</b> of the RF, its federal relations, its local self-government, tightening up law and order and reinforcing the social and political stability of society</li> </ul>	The RF adheres to the fundamental principles and rules of international law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <b>United Nations</b> must remain the <b>main centre for regulating international relations</b></li> <li>• The RF shall resolutely <b>oppose attempts to belittle the role of the UN</b> and its Security Council in world affairs</li> <li>• <b>Preservation of the status of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council</b></li> <li>• <b>Only the U.N. Security Council</b> has the authority to <b>sanction use of force</b> for the purpose of achieving peace</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nuclear and large-scale <b>wars with NATO or other US-led coalitions are no longer probable</b></li> <li>• Russia expects cooperation with the USA and other industrialised countries to grow in order to ensure stability and dismantling the Cold War vestiges</li> <li>• Economic relations with the EU countries will further develop</li> </ul>



Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<b>Funda-mentals and objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Guaranteeing strict observance of the laws</b> by all citizens, public servants, state institutions, political parties and social and religious organisations</li> <li>• <b>Raising the military potential of the state</b> and maintaining it at a sufficiently high level</li> <li>• Organising a <b>common economic area with the member states of the CIS</b></li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Other use of force is unlawful and poses a threat to the stabilisation of the entire system of international relations</li> <li>• <b>To protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad (za rubezhom)</b> on the basis of international law and bilateral agreements</li> <li>• The RF will seek to obtain adequate guarantees for the rights and freedoms of compatriots in states where they permanently reside and to maintain and <b>develop comprehensive ties with them and their organisations</b></li> </ul>	
<b>Foreign policy objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reinforcing vital machinery for multilateral management of world political and economic processes, above all under jurisdiction of the UN Security Council</li> <li>• <b>Defending the legal rights and interests of Russian citizens resident abroad (za rubezhom)</b></li> <li>• Developing relations with the members of the CIS, and <b>developing integration processes within the CIS in Russia's interests</b></li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To promote <b>elimination</b> of the existing and prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and <b>conflicts in regions adjacent to the RF</b></li> <li>• Russia regards as its <b>most important foreign policy task to combat international terrorism</b></li> <li>• Russia shall collaborate with other states purposefully to combat illegal drug trafficking and the growth of organised crime</li> <li>• <b>Partnership with all CIS member states</b> to take into account in a due manner the interests of the RF, including in terms of <b>guarantees of rights of Russian compatriots (za rubezhom)</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>NATO-Russia Partnership is maintained despite major differences</b> on issues of enlargement of the alliance and its foreign military operations</li> <li>• The main international obligations of Russia are related to the UN, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation of the CIS, the <b>Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</b> and Belarus</li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<b>Foreign policy objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adaptation of existing arms control and arms reduction agreements to new conditions in international relations and, if necessary, concluding new agreements, primarily concerning confidence and security building measures</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Respect by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia of Russian interests, including in the key question of respect for the rights of the Russian-speaking population (<i>za rubezhom</i>)</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Russia expects that the anti-Russian entries will be removed from military planning and political declarations of NATO members</b></li> </ul>
<b>Ensuring military security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the prevention of war and armed conflicts, the RF gives preference to political, diplomatic, economic and other non-military action</li> <li>• <b>All forces and facilities available, including nuclear weapons, will be used</b> if necessary to repel armed aggression, if all other means have been exhausted</li> <li>• Keep up a deterrence capability in the interest of preventing aggression on whatever scale, including when nuclear arms are used against Russia and its allies</li> <li>• <b>The RF must have nuclear forces</b> for use against any aggressor state or coalition of states</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensuring military security</li> <li>• Suppression of aggression towards the RF and (or) its allies</li> <li>• The RF retains nuclear power status for deterring aggression against the RF and (or) its allies</li> <li>• The RF retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction and in response to wide-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical for the RF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia is prepared to give a consent to a further reduction of its nuclear potential on the basis of bilateral agreements with the USA</li> <li>• Russia shall seek preservation and observance of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) - the cornerstone of strategic stability<sup>16</sup></li> <li>• The implementation of the plans of the USA to create a national missile defence system will inevitably compel the RF to adopt adequate measures for maintaining its national security at a proper level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>If NATO is preserved as a military alliance with an offensive doctrine, cardinal changes will be undertaken in Russia's military planning and development of the RF Armed Forces, including its nuclear strategy</b></li> <li>• RF Armed Forces will contain military and military-political threats</li> <li>• RF Armed Forces will ensure Russia's economic and political interests and its territorial integrity</li> <li>• <b>Ensuring the security of Russian citizens in armed conflicts and situations of instability</b></li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<b>Ensuring military security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of the most important strategic objectives of military security is the interaction and co-operation with the member states of the CIS</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia intends to further promote the strengthening of regional stability by participating in the processes of reducing and limiting conventional armed forces</li> <li>• Averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fight against international terrorism, political extremism and separatism</li> <li>• Preservation of a strategic deterrence potential aimed at preventing power politics or aggression against Russia / allies</li> </ul>
<b>Deployment of Armed Forces and Other Troops abroad</b>	<p>The interests of Russia's national security may require a Russian military presence in certain strategically vital regions of the world. The stationing of limited military contingents (military bases, Navy units) in these regions should ensure that Russia is ready to help to establish a stable military-strategic balance of forces in the regions, should give the RF an opportunity to respond to a crisis situation in its initial stage, and should enable the state to meet its foreign policy goals</p>	Limited contingents of the RF Armed Forces and the other troops may be deployed in the regions of strategic importance, outside the RF territory, as combined or national task forces and bases	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The strong Russian Armed Forces have a geopolitical significance</li> <li>• The RF Armed Forces can, by a decision of the President, conduct operations in the regions of vital economic and political interest to Russia</li> </ul>

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## Acronyms

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CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

DWP – Defence White Paper

MID – *Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

MoD – Ministry of Defence

NSC – National Security Concept

SCRF – Security Council of the Russian Federation

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

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## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> *Disclaimer*: the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.

<sup>2</sup> See Table 1: ‘Main entries of the 2000 security documents and the Defence White Paper 2003’ for an overview of the main entries of the four discussed security documents.

<sup>3</sup> The paragraph on the 2000 editions of the major RF security documents is to a large extent derived from M. de Haas, *Russian Security and Air Power (1992-2002): The development of*

*Russian security thinking under Yeltsin and Putin and its consequences for the air forces* (London, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, ISBN 0-714-65608-9, August 2004), pp. 74-97.

See the following sources for the contents of the 2000 editions of the three principle security documents:

National Security Concept (January 2000): Russian: ‘Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti’, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 1 (14 January 2000), p. 1. [www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24-1.html](http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24-1.html)

English: [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm)

Military Doctrine (April 2000):

Russian: ‘Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 15 (28 April 2000). [www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/706-1.html](http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/706-1.html)

English: [www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm](http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm)

Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000):

Russian: ‘Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 25 (14 July 2000), p. 4. [www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/07-10.html](http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/07-10.html)

English: [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm)

<sup>4</sup> M.A. Smith, *Putin’s regime: administered de-*

*mocracy*, E108 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2000).

<sup>5</sup> ‘Putin announces broad reorganization of political system in Russia’, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newswire*, (Vol. 8), (No. 174), Part I, 13 September 2004.

<sup>6</sup> As explained to the author by Irina Kirilova, lecturer in Russian studies, University of Cambridge, at a Wilton Park Conference, March 2001.

<sup>7</sup> ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 25 December 1993, [www.gov.ru:8104/main/konst/konst0.html](http://www.gov.ru:8104/main/konst/konst0.html), articles 80, 84 and 85.

<sup>8</sup> Defence White Paper of 2003: *Aktual’nyye zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhënnyykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii* (The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), RF MoD, 2 October 2003. [www.rian.ru/rian/intro.cfm?doc\\_id=261](http://www.rian.ru/rian/intro.cfm?doc_id=261); [http://supol.narod.ru/archive/official\\_documents/doctrine/war\\_doctrine.htm](http://supol.narod.ru/archive/official_documents/doctrine/war_doctrine.htm)

<sup>9</sup> DWP 2003, pp. 34-38.

<sup>10</sup> For a broader assessment of the military-strategic and operational aspects of the DWP 2003 see: M. de Haas, ‘The contours of new Russian airpower thinking’, *NATO School Polaris Quarterly*, Volume 1, Issue 1, spring 2004, pp. 21-29.

<sup>11</sup> V. Solovyev, ‘Russia’s military faces 10%

downsizing', *Moscow News*, 20-26 October 2004; A. Babakin and V. Myasnikov, 'Aviatsiya i podvodnyy flot nuzhny men'she vsego', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No. 39 (399), 15 October 2004, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>12</sup> 'Putin says Iraq crisis most serious conflict since end of cold war', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security Watch*, (Vol. 4), (No. 13) 1 April 2003.

<sup>13</sup> 'Foreign minister concerned by U.S. efforts to seize Iraqi assets', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security Watch*, (Vol. 4), (No. 12) 26 March 2003; 'Putin stresses need to avoid conflict with U.S.', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security Watch*, (Vol. 4), (No. 14) 9 April 2003.

<sup>14</sup> The citations are mostly not literally derived from the different security documents, but are adapted by the author. Remarkable differences between the documents or vital entries are printed in bold type. The grouping of related entries as used here is for the purpose of clarity and does not necessarily correspond with the original documents.

<sup>15</sup> Constituent entities or subjects are administrative authorities within the Russian Federation, below the federal, national level, with specific self-governing legislative, executive and judicial powers.

<sup>16</sup> The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

of 1972, agreed between the USA and the USSR, restricted the installation of defence systems against intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles of both superpowers. See K. A. Nederlof, *Lexicon politiek-militair-strategische termen* (Alphen aan den Rijn (NL) / Brussels: Samson, 1984), pp. 20, 26 and 133.