Russian History – A Matter of National Security
Gudrun Persson
FOI Memo 4542 RUFS Briefing No. 19
Project No: A11301 August, 2013
Approved by: Johannes Malminen
In July 2013, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced
the creation of a unit in the Armed Forces with
the task of combating the “falsifications of history”. The
company is to specialize in the history of the Second
World War, and to “work out irrefutable arguments
against historical falsifications that are multiplying today
both within Russia and abroad”, according to Vice-Minister
of Defence Nikolai Pankov.
It might appear paradoxical to involve the Armed
Forces in a battle usually fought by scholars – not by
armies – but, at a closer look, it is not so strange. The
involvement simply follows the logic of the development
in recent years wherein Russian history is deemed an
essential part of Russia’s national security policy.
The use of history has become an increasingly important
strategy for nation-building in today’s Russia,
and the victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) is
being given an exceptional place. The National Security
Strategy (2009) stipulates that “…attempts to revise the
history of Russia, her role and place in world history…”
have a negative influence on Russian national security.
In the newly adopted Foreign Policy Concept (2013),
one of Russia’s objectives is to “…strongly counteract …
attempts to rewrite history by using it to build confrontation
and to provoke revanchism in global politics, and
to revise the outcomes of World War II”.
Russia is trying to come to terms with its tsarist and
Soviet past. The imperial Cadet Corps has been reintroduced,
and the Suvorov schools for military training and
the Cossack movement are being supported. The legacy
of the Soviet military organization DOSAAF (Volunteer
Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet)
is cherished. After briefly changing its name DOSAAF
reinstated its Soviet name in 2003. A monument honouring
the victims of the First World War is to be erected
for the first time. For the past ten years former officers
on the White side during the Civil War (1918–21) have
been re-buried in Russia, commemorative plaques have
been put up, and statues have been built.
Furthermore, the Russian Military-Historical Society
was re-founded in March 2013 (it was originally founded
in 1907 and was disbanded in 1917). The Russian Historical
Society was re-founded in 2012 (1866-1917). In
line with this policy, the historical names of the imperial
Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii regiments have been
added to modern military units: the 154th Independent
Commandant’s Regiment has added Preobrazhenskii to
its name, and the 1st Infantry Separate Regiment has
added Semenovskii.
One might wonder why the political leadership is
paying so much attention to Russia’s historical past. After
all, the Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 explicitly states
that one of Russia’s objectives is to “[contribute] to the
de-politicization of historical discussions to ensure their
exclusively academic character”.
However, this objective is not stopping the political
leadership from making statements on historical matters.
For instance, President Vladimir Putin recently claimed
in a controversial statement that the Soviet Union
launched the Winter War with Finland in order to “correct
mistakes” that had been made when Finland gained
its independence in 1917.
The engagement in issues relating to the past is an
effort of the current political leadership to try to create a
national identity for the country and its Armed Forces.
Without a clear objective, armies rarely win wars. This
effort is a normative process that is politically controlled.
The Chairman of the Russian Historical Society, Sergei
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Naryshkin, is also the Speaker of the Duma. Naryshkin
– then Head of the Presidential Administration – was
appointed Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on the falsification of history that existed briefly between
2009 and 2012. The Chairman of the Russian
Military-Historical Society, Vladimir Medinskii, is the
Minister of Culture.
Considering the importance being given to history
it is not surprising that the official history now needs to
be rewritten in school textbooks. For a long time, Putin
has been unhappy with the different interpretations of
Russian history. At a meeting with teachers in 2007, he
expressed his dissatisfaction by saying that the lack of
common standards led to “porridge in the head” (kasha v
golove). This is now being rectified – or at least attempts
at resolution are being made.
In February 2013, Putin ordered the Ministry of Education
to create new history textbooks for schools that
should contain a single interpretation of Russian history.
He underlined that the new textbooks should not contain
any “contradictions or double interpretations”.
The working group set up to do this – consisting
of the Minister of Education, the Minister of Culture,
the Russian Historical Society, the Military-Historical
Society, and experts from the Russian Academy of Sciences
– published the outlines for a “historical-cultural
standard for Russian history” in July. The entire project
is to present the final results by 1 November, and then a
competition will be held. The new textbooks should be
ready by 2015.
However, the content of the outlines merits attention.
Nine points of recommendations are listed that form the
basis for the concept of the new textbooks. First, the material
in the textbook should be directed towards patriotic
education, civic spirit (grazhdanstvennost), and inter-ethnic
tolerance. Second, the aim is to instil a feeling of
pride in their country among the younger generation. It
is also stated that patriotic feelings should be linked to
the military victories, in particular the “mass heroism” in
1812 and 1941–45. The history books should be written
from the perspective that Russia is “a great country with
a great past”, which in turn should make it possible to
write “logically and irrefutably on multi-ethnic relations”.
Religious history should focus on the Orthodox Church.
Furthermore, the outlines say that revolutions and civil
wars are not a result of foreign or internal conspiracies,
but a consequence of “objective contradictions inside
the country”. An explanatory note makes clear that the
new textbooks must “exclude the possibility of internal
contradictions and mutually exclusive interpretations of
historical events”.
In other words, Russia needs a history of successes
and military victories – which is not at all strange
per se. But it echoes of the history writing of the 19th
century, the kind of history usually associated with the
German nationalist Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96).
It is a very different methodology from a more current
approach to history writing that emphasizes a critical
approach – to both sources and historical events.
Whether these textbooks will achieve the desired
result – in a multi-ethnic state like Russia – may seem
doubtful. Newer generations of teachers have become
used to the post-1991 period. The Defence Minister,
Sergei Shoigu, seems to be sceptical about the project’s
success. Just in case, he has ordered that a special short
course of the history of the Russian Army should be written
– a mandatory book for all military servicemen.
It is sometimes said that Russia’s history is as unpredictable
as its future. The current political leadership
clearly puts Russia’s national security – and, hence, its
future – in the past.
Gudrun Persson