## Game theory 1

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# Can suicide terrorism be rational?

## Many criticisms against Rational choice


- Common criticism of rational choice people behave irrationally
- Many times incorrect
- Rationality ≠ Sensibility
- Ordering preferences
- I can mostly prefer taking over the world and least painful death, but equally prefer most painful death and least taking over the world

## Rationality


- Defined by two key premises
  - Completeness
  - Transitivity
- Indifferent to normative assessment of preferences and choices

## Completeness

- Preference ordering complete if and only if for any two outcomes X and Y individual:
  - A) Prefers X to Y strong preference relation
  - B) Prefers Y to X strong preference relation
  - C) Is indifferent weak preference relation





### Incomplete preferences





## Transitivity


 For any three outcomes X, Y and Z, if X is preferred to Y and Y is preferred to Z, X must be preferred to Z












### Intransitive preferences

- Prefer X to Y, Y to Z and Z to X
- Doesn't make sense



## Other notions about preferences

- Preferences over outcomes are stable and do not change in the time of making decision – are fixed
- Preferences are ordinal they order actions but the difference between the two values has no meaning unless they state utility
- Compare two situations
  - $u(C_1) = 1, u(C_2) = 2, u(C_3) = 0$
  - $u(C_1) = 1$ ,  $u(C_2) = 200$ ,  $u(C_3) = -50$
- Both situations have same preference ordering
  - C<sub>2</sub> p C<sub>1</sub> p C<sub>3</sub>

## Other notions about rationality

- People do not calculate their actions the definition of rationality is narrower than common-sense one
- Rationality tells nothing about preferences over outcomes
- Rational actors may differ in choices in same situation
- Rational actors can err

## Types of games

## Types of games

- Games of perfect information
- Games of imperfect information
- Cooperative games
- Non-cooperative games
- Constant-sum game
- Positive-sum game

## Games of perfect/imperfect information

#### **Perfect information games**

- All players know other players' strategies available to them
- All players know payoffs over actions
- All players know other players know

#### Imperfect information games

 Some information about other players' actions is not know to the player

## Cooperative/non-cooperative games

#### **Cooperative games**

- Actors are allowed to make enforceable contracts
- Players do not need to cooperate, but cooperation is enfoceable by an outside party

#### Non-cooperative games

- Actors unable to make enforceable contracts outside of those specifically modeled in the game
- Players might cooperate, but any cooperation must be self-enforcing

## Constant-sum/Positive-sum games

#### **Constant sum games**

- Sum of all players' payoffs is the same for any outcome
- Gain for one participant is always at the expense of another
- Special case of zero-sum game where all outcomes involve a sum of all player's payoffs of 0

#### Positive-sum games

- Combined payoffs of all players are not the same in every outcome of the game
- Positive-sum game implies that players may have interests in common, to achieve an outcome that maximizes total payoffs.

## Introducing a game

## What makes a game the game


- Players
- Actions
- Strategies
- Outcomes
- Payoffs of player

## Game of grades

- Each pair can choose 2 actions:  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$
- If both choose  $\alpha$ , both will receive C
- If both choose  $\beta$ , both will receive B
- If one chooses  $\alpha$  and other  $\beta$ , one will receive A and other D applies to both players equally


## Game of grades – my grades

My pair




## Game of grades – my pair's grades





## Game of grades – normal form



## Games in normal form


## Normal form representation of a game

- Called also "strategic form" or "matrix form"
- Visualized as a matrix
- Represents a game as if agents were acting simultaneously

## Utilities (Payoffs)

- Grades are not utilites
- Utilities for game:
  - EU(A) = 3
  - EU(B) = 2
  - EU(C) = 1
  - EU(D) = 0
- Preference over outcomes: A > B > C > D -> APBPCPD


## Game of grades with payoffs



Me


## Solution concepts

- Nash Equilibrium
  - Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
  - Pure Strategy Equilibrium
  - Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
- Bayesian Equilibrium
- Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium




Me


My pair







My pair



### Prisoner's dilemma

- Both players are tempted to defect, since cooperate is strictly dominated by defect
- The outcome of the game is that both players betray the other one and end up choosing  $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$
- Both will end up with outcome that is less preferred than the optimal outcome β, β by seeking maximal gain from own action
- β, β is Pareto Efficient outcome brings best outcomes for all players – no one could be better-off without making someone worse-off

## Dominance

## Dominant Strategy Equilibrium

• Strategy might be dominant

Two types of dominance

- Strict (strong) dominance
- Weak dominance

## Strict dominance

- Player i
- Payoff u<sub>i</sub>
- Dominant strategy s<sub>i</sub>
- Dominated strategy s<sub>i</sub>'
- Strategy of all other players s<sub>-i</sub>
- Player i's strategy si' is strictly dominated by player i's strategy si if and only if
- $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i', s_{-i})$  for **all**  $s_{-i}$
- utility of playing s<sub>i</sub> against others' strategies s<sub>i</sub> is greater than utility of playing s<sub>i</sub>' against others's strategies s<sub>i</sub> for all others' strategies s<sub>i</sub>

## Game of grades – strict dominance

Me

 α
 β

 α
 1,1
 3,0

 β
 0,3
 2,2

My pair

#### Weak dominance

- Player i
- Payoff u<sub>i</sub>
- Dominant strategy s<sub>i</sub>
- Dominated strategy s<sub>i</sub>'
- Strategy of all other players s<sub>-i</sub>
- Player i's strategy si' is weakly dominated by player i's strategy si if
- $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \ge u_i(s_i', s_{-i})$  for all  $s_{-i}$  and
- $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i', s_{-i})$  for **some**  $s_{-i}$
- utility of playing s<sub>i</sub> against others' strategies s<sub>-i</sub> is greater or equal to utility of playing s<sub>i</sub>' against others's strategies s<sub>-i</sub> for all others' strategies s<sub>-i</sub> and greater for some others' strategies s<sub>-i</sub>

## Game of grades – weak dominance

 α
 β

 α
 1,1
 3,0

 β
 0,3
 3,2

Me

My pair

# Never play dominated strategies

- Dominated strategy brings lesser payoffs than dominant strategy
- Dominated strategy brings lesser payoffs no matter what strategy is selected by other player
- Can't control minds of others to force them not to play dominant strategy
- Event if could control minds of others and be sure they'll play dominated strategy, than rational to play dominant strategy anyway

### Choosing numbers

- Choose integer between 1 100 incl.
- All numbers will be averaged
- Winner is the one who will be closest to the 2/3 of the group's average

### **Choosing numbers**

- Average = 100
- 2/3 of average = ~ 66.66
- X > 67 is strictly dominated strategy
  - Even if everyone else selected 100
  - One selected 67
  - I selected 68
  - Outcome 68 is dominated by 67
- What is the rational choice for this game?

## If all players were strictly rational, result is 1

## I know you know

- I know
  - Numbers above 67 are never rational
- You know that I know
  - You'll never select number above 67, therefore numbers above 46 are never rational either
- I know You know that I know
  - I know that You'll never select above 46, hence I should never select number higher than 30
- You know that I know that You know that I know
  - You know that I won't select above 30, therefore I should never select number above 20

# Get into opponent's shoes

#### Real life results

- 2012 Game theory online course
- 10 000 + players
- Mean 34
- Mode 50
- Median 33
- Winner 23
- Spikes: 50, 33, 20, 1


# Iterated deletion of dominated strategies

# Iterated deletion of dominated strategies


- Can delete dominated strategies as if they were not present in the game
- Game becomes simpler than the original one
- Can find equilibriums quickly games are dominance-solvable

#### Game of grades


My pair



#### My pair




#### My pair



# This game is dominance-solvable

#### Opponent



## $S_1 vs S_2$

		S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	s <sub>3</sub>
	S <sub>1</sub>	<mark>0</mark> ,1	<mark>-2</mark> ,3	<mark>4</mark> ,-1
Me	S <sub>2</sub>	<mark>0</mark> ,3	<mark>3</mark> ,1	<mark>6</mark> ,4
	S <sub>3</sub>	1,5	4,2	5,2

## $S_1 vs S_3$

Opponent

		S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	S <sub>3</sub>
Me	S <sub>1</sub>	<mark>0</mark> ,1	<mark>-2</mark> ,3	<mark>4</mark> ,-1
	S <sub>2</sub>	0,3	3,1	6,4
	S <sub>3</sub>	<b>1</b> ,5	4,2	<mark>5</mark> ,2

## $S_2 vs S_3$



		S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	S <sub>3</sub>
	S <sub>1</sub>	0,1	-2,3	4,-1
Me	S <sub>2</sub>	<mark>0</mark> ,3	<mark>3</mark> ,1	<mark>6</mark> ,4
	S <sub>3</sub>	<b>1</b> ,5	<b>4</b> , 2	<mark>5</mark> ,2

 $\mathbf{S}_1 \ \mathbf{VS} \ \mathbf{S}_3$ 

		S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	s <sub>3</sub>
Me	S <sub>1</sub>	o, <b>1</b>	-2,3	4,-1
	S <sub>2</sub>	0,3	3,1	6 <i>,</i> <b>4</b>
	S <sub>3</sub>	1, <b>5</b>	4,2	5,2


 $\mathbf{S}_1 \ \mathbf{VS} \ \mathbf{S}_2$ 

		S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	s <sub>3</sub>
Me	S <sub>1</sub>	0,1	-2 <b>, 3</b>	4,-1
	S <sub>2</sub>	o, <b>3</b>	3,1	6,4
	S <sub>3</sub>	1, <b>5</b>	4,2	5,2

 $S_2 VS S_3$ 

Opponent

		S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	S <sub>3</sub>
	S <sub>1</sub>	0,1	-2 , 3	4,-1
Me	S <sub>2</sub>	0,3	3,1	6 <i>,</i> <b>4</b>
	S <sub>3</sub>	1,5	4 , <b>2</b>	5 <i>,</i> 2




Opponent

#### Opponent

	S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	S <sub>3</sub>
S <sub>2</sub>	<mark>0</mark> ,3	3,1	<mark>6,</mark> 4
S <sub>3</sub>	<mark>1,</mark> 5	4,2	5,2

#### $s_1$ vs $s_3$ after deletion

Opponent




#### $s_1$ vs $s_2$ after deletion


Opponent



#### $s_2$ vs $s_3$ after deletion

Opponent





Me

#### Opponent

#### $S_1$ **S**<sub>3</sub> S<sub>2</sub> <mark>0</mark>,3 <mark>6</mark>,4 S<sub>3</sub> 5,2 1,5

Opponent

#### $S_1$ **S**<sub>3</sub> S<sub>2</sub> <mark>0</mark>,3 **6** , 4 S<sub>3</sub> <mark>5</mark>,2 **1** , 5

Me

#### Opponent

#### $S_1$ **S**<sub>3</sub> S<sub>2</sub> 0,3 6,**4** S<sub>3</sub> 5,<mark>2</mark> 1,5

Opponent


# Sometimes not solvable, but simplified

# Limits of iterated deletion of dominated strategies

- Strictly dominated strategies may be deleted in a random order
- Deleting weakly dominated strategies in some order might delete equilibriums
- This solution concept is not always applicable sometimes game simply don't have dominance


# How to solve the game without dominance?

Opponent



# How to solve the game without dominance?

Opponent




## Nash Equilibrium

### Nash Blonde Game

- 2 or more lusty males
- Several interested females
- At least one more female than male
- Just one female blonde
- Every male prefers blonde to brunette and brunette to no companion

# Nash Blonde Game – normal form





M2


## Nash Equilibrium

- Set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change her action
- Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead player to earn less (considering strategies of others') than if she remained with her current strategy
- Mutual best response to others' choices

		L	С	R
	т	1,1	<mark>0</mark> ,0	<mark>0</mark> ,0
В	Μ	0,2	<b>1</b> ,1	<mark>2</mark> ,-1
	В	<mark>0</mark> ,0	<mark>1</mark> ,2	<b>2</b> ,1







# Games might have more NE

## Pure strategy equilibrium

- Two equilibriums in this game
- ( T , L )
  - u(A) = 1
  - u(B) = 1
- ( <mark>C</mark> , B )
  - u(A) = 1
  - u(B) = 2
- These are **pure strategy equilibriums**