10/30/15   1   •  Announcements ▫  Begin thinking about your topic for the seminar paper –  See instructions in the IS ▫  Nov 5: Midterm exam –  Exam review sheet will appear in the IS •  The plan for today ▫  What is identity? ▫  European identity in the EU (some empirics) ▫  How is identity related to support for the EU? Three major explanations of support for the EU • Utilitarian explanation • Cueing rationality ▫  Domestic proxies (cues) • Identity What is political identity? •  Affective (emotional) attachment to the political community (e.g. the EU or the nation) ▫  Strength of the attachment ▫  Exclusivity of the attachment (exclusive v. multiple identity) Exclusive identity v. multiple identity •  Marks (1999): conceptualizing territorial identity No (or weak) attachment Exclusive identityMultiple identity Source of the figure that follows: Marks (1999). Territorial Identities in the European Union. In Anderson Jeffrey (ed.). Regional Integration and Democracy. Rowman and Littlefield. NY. 10/30/15   2   Exploring European identity: Some empirical data •  Eurobarometer data: •  3 ways of measuring EU identity: 1.  Future identity 2.  Feeling an EU citizen 3.  Feeling attached to the EU a.d. 1 •  “In the near future, do you see yourself as ▫  Nationality only ▫  Nationality and European ▫  European and nationality ▫  European only” Source: Eurobarometer 77 report. 10/30/15   3   a.d. 2: Feeling a citizen of the EU Source: Eurobarometer 77 report. a.d. 3 Feeling attached to the EU Source: Eurobarometer 77 report. Source: Eurobarometer 77 report. 10/30/15   4   Reading empirical articles: Some more explanation •  Interquartile range ▫  Take all observations on a variable (all respondents in a survey) ▫  Order the values from lowest to highest ▫  Interquartile range is between the value on the 25th percentile and the value on the 75th percentile –  Reach the 25th by going from the top of the line until you reach 25% of respondents. The same for 75% percentile. Group work •  How is identity related to attitudes towards the EU? •  Work in groups of 3-4 ▫  Be prepared to share with the class ▫  When other groups present, write down notes and think about overall conclusions thatindividuals who identify themselves exclusively as Belgian or exclusively as Flemish oppose multi-level governance, while those who identify themselves as both Belgian and Flemish supportit (Maddens et al. 1996). We expect to find something similar at the supranationallevel. Under what circumstances will citizens perceive their national identity as exclusive or inclusive? While national identities are normally formed before adolescence (Druckman 1994), we hypothesize thattheir consequences for particular political objects, such as European integration, are continuously constructed through socialization and political conflict (Strath andTriandafyllidou 2003; Diez Medrano 2003). But who does the framing? Literatureon American public opinion suggests thatpublic opinion may be cued by political elites (Zaller 1992, 97-117). The sharperthe divisions among national elites on the issue of Europeanintegration, the greaterthe scope for national identity to be mobilized, and the more we expect exclusive national identity to bite. One sign of such division is the existence of a radical right political party.Parties like the Vlaams Blok in Belgium and the French FrontNational make a fetish of exclusive national identity with slogans such as "Boss in Our Own Country"and "Wegive them our factories; they give us their immigrants. One solution: The Nation." Such sentiments reinforce Euroskepticism.5In countries where the elite is squarely behind the Europeanproject, we expect national identity to lay dormant or to be positively associated with supportfor integration. In countries where the political elite is divided on the issue, national identity is likely to rearits head. Analysis To measure supportfor European integration we combine three complementary elements of support:the principle of membership, the desired speed of integration, and the desired direction of futureintegration. The results reportedbelow are robust across these component measures. This and other variables in our analysis are detailed in the appendix.6We use multilevel analysis to probe variation at the individual, party,and country level.7 Table 1 presents unstandardizedcoefficients and standarderrors for variables of interest.8 Figure 1 illustrates the relative effect of the most powerful variables. The solid boxes encompass the inter-quartilerange and the whiskers indicate the 5th to the 95th percentiles, holding all other independent and control variables at their means. For example, an individual at the 5th percentile on Multiculturalism Figure 1 Effects of Independent Variables 0 80 0. 70---------- ......--------------- -------- Ed ation o National Type of Attachment o Capitalism Personal 0 Fiscal Economic . Exclusive Tr er Prospects 3 National Multiculturalism Identity M Interquartilerange for independent variable in fully specified 60 .. ..............model where al other variables are held at their..means. S5 percent - 95 percent range for independent variable in fully specified model where all other variables are held at their means has a score of 65.9 on Supportfor European Integration on a 0-100 scale, and an individual at the 95th percentile scores 74.3. The variables towards the left of Figure 1 have the largest effect across their inter-quartilerange. Citizens do appearto take economic circumstances into account. The EU redistributesmoney from rich to poor countries, and this gives rise to a predictable patternof opposition and support.Fiscal Transferis the most powerful economic influence that we find. A citizen of Greece, the country with the highest per capita net receipts from the EU, will be 15%more supportive of Europeanintegration than a citizen from Germany,the country with the highest net contribution, controlling for all other variables in our analysis. The differing length of the 95% whiskers in Figure 1 for this variable indicates thatits association with supportfor Europeanintegration is not linear.Fiscal Transfersharply delineates four countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland) thatreceive the bulk of cohesion funding and which tend to be pro-EU. We also confirm the effect of Typeof Capitalism. Support for Europeanintegration is higher in countries whose economic institutions are less likely to be challenged by EU legislation because they are close to the EU median.9 Together, seven variables that tap individual and group economic interest (listed in the appendix) account for 15%of total variance in public opinion, which is in line with previous studies. The surpriseis thatthese economic influences are overshadowed by identity. Three variables thattap identity-Exclusive National Identity, Multiculturalism, andNational Attachment-together explain 20.8 %of the variance in Supportfor European Integration. These variables also account for more thantwo-thirds of the variance across countries. The paradox thatwe identified earlier is apparent:national identity both contributes to and diminishes supportfor European integration.Attachment to one's country is positively correlated with Supportfor European Integration in bivariate analysis."I But national identity is Janus-faced: under some circumstances it collides with Europeanintegration. The extent to which national identity is exclusive or inclusive is decisive. A Eurobarometerquestion compels respondents to place either European or national identity above the other, and separatesthose who say they think of themselves as "only British (or French, etc.)" from those who say they have some form of multiple identity. Estimates for Exclusive National Identity are negative, substantively large, and significant in the presence of any and all controls we are able to exert." On average, an individual in our sample who claims an exclusive national identity scores 53.3 on our thermometer scale for supportfor European integration, compared to 72.8 for a person who does not. The difference, 19.5%, is the baseline in Figure 2.12 In some countries, citizens who have exclusive national identity are only slightly more Euroskeptical than those with multiple identities. In others, exclusive national identity is powerfully associated with Euroskepticism. In Portugal, exclusive national identity depresses a citizen's supportby just 9.5%. In the UK, at the other extreme, the difference is 29.5%. How can one explain this variation?Ourhunch, derived from what we know aboutAmerican public opinion, seems to be on the right track.The more divided a country's elite, and the more elements within it mobilize against European integration, the stronger the causal power of exclusive national identity. Political parties are decisive in cueing the public, and the wider their disagreement, the more exclusive identity is mobilized against Europeanintegration. Divisions within political parties are positively correlated PSOnlinewww.apsanet.org 417 This content downloaded from 128.210.78.213 on Thu, 6 Jun 2013 11:36:46 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Source: Hooghe and Marks (2004). Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration? PS&Politics 37(3). Source: Hooghe and Marks (2004). Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration? PS&Politics 37(3). 10/30/15   5   Source: McLaren, L. M. 2002. "Public support for the European Union: Cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat?" Journal of Politics 64 (2):551-66. The Europeanization of National Polities? 0 Present EU Scope 0 Future EU Scope Education Manual worker National economic performance Left- right self-placement Pro-EU score of party ID Identification with incumbent National political institutions Confidence in EU institutions -oEuropean external efficacy Exclusive national identity Attachment to Europe Political sophistication Media exposure Age Male -0.3 -0.2 - 0.1 0.00 0.1 0 0.20 0.30 0 0 0 Figure 6.1 . Dot plot representation of the standardized regression coefficients (error bars represent 9So/o confidence intervals) EU representation. And finally, when the question is clearly posed in terms of increasing EU powers in the future, none of the 'economic costs and benefits' variables prove to be statistically significant correlates of support for a broader EU scope of government. Thus, it seems that economic explanations of differences in views about scope of government provide us very little leverage, and there is no evidence that they play any role at all when respondents are invited to think about the issue in more prospective terms. In contrast, the same clearly cannot be said for identity: whether respondents see themselves as being 'exclusively national' turns out to be one of the strongest (negative) P correlates of views on Present EU Scope (albe EU Scope). Second, evidence concerning the cueing encouraging. It is true that we are more l rightists among supporters of a broader scop today or in the future, as well as (in this case Scope) individuals attached to parties that ar But again, these empirical relationships are to the role played by other variables. Most importantly in relation to the 'po towards the domestic political system seem different from that hypothesized by the e integration. It is definitely not the case th government of the day or have more positiv mance of their national political system are a powers for the EU. On the one hand, identif visible role in driving these attitudes. On th that differentiates individuals with higher lev making role is precisely the fact that their v tions are less favourable, especially where su future is concerned. In fact, in this case, the larger than those found for either of the 'ide The final relevant aspect of the results con the EU. The results confirm that, as we had no means the only attitudinal feature that di of their support for a broader European sco who are more favourable to a stronger politic more likely to perceive European decision-m interests and, especially, to place greater trus pean Union. In the case of Present EU Sco associated with 'Confidence in EU institut opposite direction) as that associated with 'E as for the prospective question, Confidence correlate of support for scope of governmen scale of EU trust produces an increase of 0.27 a future broader policy scope of the EU. A country-by-country replication of the an dataset reinforces these general conclusions. values of the standardized coefficients foun applied country-by-country, as well as the coefficients were statistically significant wi only between 1000 and 1082) with either Source: Magalhaes, Pedro (2012). The Scope of Government of the European Union: Explaining Citizens' Support for a More Powerful EU. In Sanders et al. Europeanization of National Polities. Oxford University Press: Oxford, p. 126. Source: De Vreese, Claes H. and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. “Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and Support for European Integration.” European Union Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2005): 59-82. Source: De Vreese, Claes H. and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. “Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and Support for European Integration.” European Union Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2005): 59-82. 10/30/15   6   31 Figure 3: Coefficient on interaction between Identity Orientation and Sociotropic Economic Evaluation is .168 (t-ratio = 8.88). Coefficient on interaction between Identity Orientation and Egocentric Economic Evaluation is -.070 (t-ratio = -2.69). Identity Orientation MarginalEffectof SociotropicEconomicPerception EU Oriented Equally Attached Nation Oriented -0.10.00.10.20.3 Identity Orientation MarginalEffectof EgocentricEconomicPerception EU Oriented Equally Attached Nation Oriented -0.10.00.10.20.3 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 -0.3-0.2-0.10.00.1 Sociotropic Economic Evaluation MarginalEffectof IdentityOrientation 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 -0.3-0.2-0.10.00.1 Egocentric Economic Evaluation MarginalEffectof IdentityOrientation Marginal Effects of Interacted Variables on EU Support Source: Levy, Naomi and Bonnie Phan. 2014. “The Utility of Identity: Explaining Public Support for the EU after the Crash” Polity. 46 (4). Overall conclusions? •  Exclusive national identity, fear of immigration, and fear of other cultures are related to support for the EU ▫  Lower support for the EU ▫  Support for the EU is related to identity at least as strongly as to factors such as self-interest or trust in national political institutions •  Identity conditions the effect of sociotropic and egocentric economic considerations ▫  Each of the economic considerations affect people differently, based on what kind of identity they have What does this mean for the EU as a political regime? •  Does it make the EU well equipped for surviving a time of crisis?