

This article argues that citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to survey questions about the European integration process. It develops a model of public opinion toward European integration based on attitudes toward the political system, the incumbent government, and establishment parties. With the help of data from Eurobarometer 34.0, the study tests political and economic models of public support for membership in the European Union in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. The analyses show that system and establishment party support are the most powerful determinants of support for membership in the European Union. The results also suggest that the relationship between economic factors and support previously reported in research on public opinion toward European integration is likely to be mediated by domestic political attitudes.

WHEN IN DOUBT, USE PROXIES

Attitudes Toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration

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Much of the recent literature on international political and economic relations stresses the domestic foundations of international politics by examining the ways in which domestic politics function as a constraint on states' actions in the international arena (see, e.g., Evans, Jacobson, & Putnam, 1993; Garrett & Lange, 1995; Keohane & Milner, 1996; Putnam, 1988). One important constraint originating from the domestic political arena is public opinion. Elites engaged in international politics pay close attention to

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public sentiment when formulating policies because they are concerned about their survival in office and because they care about satisfying domestic constituencies. Domestic elites involved in the European integration process are no exception in this regard, and a number of the developments within the European Union (EU) have been analyzed using a domestic politics framework (Bulmer, 1983; Cameron, 1992; Scharpf, 1988). Understanding what drives public opinion toward EU among the publics of the member states is thus an important consideration if one is to interpret past and future developments in the European integration process accurately.

Although functionalist and neofunctionalist theories of integration traditionally viewed the integration project as an elite-driven venture and therefore assumed that public opinion was unimportant (Anderson, 1995), recent research has reminded us of the important role that mass publics play in the European integration process (Dalton & Eichenberg, 1992; Niedermayer & Sinnott, 1995). In fact, as the referenda on the Maastricht treaty and EU membership in several European countries have shown, European mass publics have the ability and willingness to constrain and possibly forestall further progress toward a unified Europe. Yet, although it is apparent that citizens' attitudes are an important element of the integration process, we are only beginning to understand the complex nature of public opinion toward a unified Europe (Janssen, 1991).

This study examines the domestic political foundations of mass attitudes about European integration. It thus seeks to contribute to scholarship on the link between domestic and international politics by supplementing studies that focus mostly on the role of domestic and international elites in the integration process (e.g., Garrett, 1992; Moravcsik, 1991; Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989). Such studies typically do not consider the role of public opinion. Instead, they take preferences as given and examine the outcomes of bargains struck among elites. Yet, if domestic public opinion constrains states' actions in the international arena and if EU decision making is driven by political actors who pay close attention to domestic political developments both at home and abroad, citizens' attitudes toward Europe may influence the negotiations among member state governments (Schneider, 1995; Schneider & Weitsman, 1996). It is important to know whether mass publics are supportive of a unified Europe for reasons of economic performance evaluations, domestic political affiliation, approval of government policies, changing political values, or a general goodwill in the form of what has been termed a permissive consensus. Commitments or proposals made by one side may appear more or less credible to the players involved in the integration game depending on the nature of the underlying causes that drive domestic opinion about integration.

The structure of domestic opinion among the publics of the member states is likely to be a crucial ingredient that determines the types of bargains struck at the supranational level because it can impose different constraints on decision makers at the European level (Schneider, 1995).

The study also seeks to contribute to our understanding of public opinion about Europe in several ways. First, it develops a new and systematic individual-level conceptualization of the domestic political foundations of integration support by explicitly categorizing the ways in which different national contexts may affect people's attitudes about Europe. Specifically, it argues that because the citizens of the member states are largely uninformed about Europe, they employ proxies rooted in domestic political considerations (government, party, and system support) when responding to questions about the integration process. Moreover, this article goes beyond earlier studies that focused primarily on the economic foundations of support for Europe by developing a model of how people think about European integration that combines economic considerations with political ones. Finally, the study tests the relationship of attitudes toward domestic politics and support for European integration on the basis of directly comparable data collected in a number of member states. It thus provides a more general test of a domestically driven model of attitudes toward Europe than possible through, for example, studies of referenda on integration issues, given that such contests take place infrequently and only in member states that have constitutional provisions for such direct citizen input.

The next section reviews the literature on public opinion about European integration and considers why and how public opinion toward European integration is affected by attitudes about domestic politics. Next, the article develops three hypotheses about the interplay of public opinion about domestic politics and European integration. Specifically, it examines how support for the incumbent government, partisanship, and system support affects attitudes toward membership in the EU. A concluding section spells out the implications of these findings for future studies of public opinion and European integration.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Although it is well-known that public support for an integrated Europe fluctuates over time and varies among groups of the population, there have been only infrequent attempts to explain such variations (see Anderson, 1995, for

an overview). One of the few exceptions has been the research on the economic determinants of public support for an integrated Europe. This approach has focused on two sources of support for integration: economic conditions and economic benefits associated with membership in the EU.

First, scholars have sought to show that citizens' support for EU waxes and wanes with the business cycle. Following theories of economic voting (cf. Lewis-Beck, 1988), this approach argues that European mass publics associate national economic performance with the integration project. Studies have found that national levels of support for the integration project are higher when domestic economic conditions are favorable (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Inglehart & Rabier, 1978) and that individuals who assess economic performance favorably are more inclined to be supportive of integration (Gabel & Whitten, 1997; Sobisch & Patterson, 1995).

Second, scholars have argued that citizens base their support for integration on the perceived or real costs and benefits associated with being a member of the EU. Based on human capital and utility maximization theories of political behavior, researchers have found a positive relationship between economic benefits derived both by individuals and nation-states on one hand and support for a more tightly integrated Europe on the other (Anderson & Reichert, 1995; Duch & Taylor, 1997; Gabel, 1998).

Most of this research on the political economy of public support for European integration either implies or explicitly assumes that citizens have meaningful attitudes toward a united Europe. Thus, when citizens respond to a survey question by stating that they favor their country's membership in the EU, it is assumed that the responses reflect respondents' actual attitudes. Moreover and maybe more important, this research frequently assumes that citizens are economically rational or reasonably well-informed and able to recognize at least the broad contours of the political and economic consequences of the integration process.

Janssen (1991) has speculated that such assumptions may not be warranted: "The issue of integration may be too difficult, too abstract or not interesting enough for the average citizen to form a well thought-out attitude" (p. 467). Empirical evidence from a variety of sources confirms this suspicion. Surveys gauging people's opinions regarding whether they are informed about European integration between 1992 and 1995 show that a significant majority—roughly 65% to 70%—typically feels uninformed about the EU (Eurobarometers 37-43).¹

1. I will refer to the organization associated with the European integration process as the

Other surveys suggest that these self-assessments indeed accurately portray Europeans' objective knowledge about integration. Some examples may help illustrate the point: In public opinion polls conducted throughout 1992 to 1995, only about 20% to 25% of respondents were able to identify the most powerful EU institution (the Council). In spring of 1995, only 11% of EU citizens managed to identify all member states of the EU—with the help of a map and a list of countries (Eurobarometer 43: 53-54). Similarly, when put to the test with the help of a battery of questions probing citizens' knowledge about the EU, only about a third qualified as knowledgeable (38% in 1993 and 28% in 1994).²

The fact that Europe's citizens are not particularly well-informed about the EU and are thus unlikely to conform to the strict definition of self-interested utility maximizers vis-à-vis the EU also is evident in citizens' responses to a myriad of other questions that gauge their knowledge about things, such as the president of the commission, the Maastricht treaty, and elections to the European Parliament (EP) (Eurobarometers 37.0, 1992 and 39.0, 1993). In a survey conducted in April/May 1994—only about 1 month prior to the EP elections—78% of respondents were unable to identify the approximate date of the upcoming poll.

Given that virtually all measures of knowledge, awareness, and information about European integration indicate that people have fairly little systematic information about even the most basic aspects of the integration project, how can such low levels of awareness and strong economic effects exist side by side? Specifically, how can mass publics be simultaneously ignorant about integration and act in an self-interested rational fashion when it comes to economic benefits to be secured from the integration process?

Instead of arguing against the theoretical possibility of economic influences on support for European integration among some citizens across some of the member states of the EU, this article seeks to emphasize alternative explanations that can be combined with economic ones. Specifically, it argues that attitudes about the advantages and disadvantages of integration are likely to reflect other, more firmly held and extensively developed, political beliefs that are the result of citizens' experiences with domestic political reality. As a result, economic effects, which typically have been modeled to have a direct influence on integration support, may in fact be mediated by attitudes toward domestic politics.

2. In an analysis of German data, Rattinger (1996) finds that more than two thirds of the

INFORMATION DEFICITS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Given that both subjective and objective indicators of awareness and knowledge reveal a citizenry that is only dimly aware of the European integration process, one might be tempted to scold Europe's citizens for not doing their homework. However, the fact that European mass publics are not particularly well-informed about or aware of the integration process is in line with research that shows that citizens generally have more information and more crystallized opinions about domestic politics than about foreign policy and international politics (Bailey, 1948; Bennett, 1996; Converse, 1964; Holsti, 1992; Rosenau, 1960). If this is true, how do European citizens construct responses to questions about the EU?

It may not be necessary for European mass publics to have much information to answer questions about the integration process. The relative lack of information about the integration project may result from its lack of relevance for people's lives and the uncertainty associated with the changing nature of a political and economic system still under construction. Moreover, the EU is a complex political phenomenon that often appears removed from domestic political reality. Survey data support such an interpretation. When knowledge about national institutions was tested alongside knowledge about the EU, citizens turned out to be much better informed about domestic politics than about the integration process (Eurobarometer 39: 53-62).³ However, there do not appear to be systematic differences across the countries regarding the gap in knowledge about the EU.

Starting with the assumption that people are not very well-informed about many aspects of international politics, this article develops a model of public opinion that portrays citizens as using the context of domestic politics to form opinions about the European integration process. Because it is likely that few citizens possess the kinds of cognitive structures that are required for the level of information processing that many economic models presume, I expect that people fill their knowledge gaps by using proxies when responding to queries about the integration process.⁴ Thus, given the gener-

3. This is consistent with related research on public opinion about international affairs among the American public (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993).

4. This notion is similar to what Lupia (1994) refers to as *shortcuts*. However, because what Lupia labels shortcuts also are labeled *heuristics* in social-psychological research, this study seeks to avoid any confusion by employing the more neutral term *proxies*. Note also that the social-psychological concepts of heuristics or shortcuts are slightly different from proxies. Heuristics or cognitive shortcuts are used when people lack the capacity or motivation to fully pro-

ally low levels of awareness about the EU among citizens of the member states, attitudes about the advantages and disadvantages of integration may essentially reflect other, more firmly held and extensively developed political beliefs that are the result of citizens' experiences with domestic political reality.

Research on voting behavior in European elections and referenda is consistent with such a conceptualization. Scholars have found, for example, that EP elections are regularly driven by domestic political concerns, alignments, and dynamics (Marsh & Franklin, 1996; Reif, 1984; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). Governing parties, for example, tend to do worse in such contests, whereas small and antiestablishment parties do better than in regular national elections. However, because these contests do not elect a European government and because Europe is seldom an issue in them (cf. van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996), such findings constitute only indirect evidence for the notion that citizens understand and think about the European integration process in terms of domestic politics.

Analyses of the recent referenda on the Maastricht treaty in Denmark, Ireland, and France as well as on EU membership in Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Austria provide more direct evidence by showing a link between domestic political considerations and vote choice (Franklin, Marsh, & McLaren, 1994; Schneider & Weitsman, 1996; Siune, Svensson, & Tonsgaard, 1994). According to this research, the outcomes of contests involving European questions are influenced both by the popularity of incumbent governments and attitudes about the issue to be decided in the referendum (Franklin, van der Eijk, & Marsh, 1995). However, it is complicated to make straightforward inferences about individuals' attitudes about Europe on the basis of these results given that referenda are held infrequently and only in a relatively small number of member states and because they differ with regard to the precise issue to be decided. Moreover, the specific role of governments in either putting such referenda before the people or making public recommendations on how to vote (Schneider & Weitsman, 1996) increases the probability that such contests are seen by voters as opportunities to support or oppose the incumbent government.

formation, people use a heuristic, such as source expertise, to assess the quality of the message. Proxies as used in this study, however, presume that people are capable of using information when available. However, in most cases, they are likely to lack the relevant information about EU when asked in a survey. Thus, proxies are used to fill gaps in people's knowledge. When asked to evaluate the EU, respondents may have little knowledge about the EU but instead substitute their attitudes toward similar political structures. Thus, differences between proxies as used here, and heuristics or shortcuts as used in social-psychological research are analogous to differences be-

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Citizens compensate for a gap in knowledge about the EU by construing a reality about it that fits their understanding of the political world. For most people, this means that they rely on what they know and think about domestic politics. Although much of the research on foreign policy attitudes in the United States has focused on ideology and party identification as cues that structure such attitudes (Sulfaro, 1996), the model of attitudes toward Europe developed below argues that people employ a slightly different set of proxies that also are related to a member state's domestic politics.

From the vantage point of the average citizen, European integration activities can be construed in one of the following ways: (a) the EU as a set of political institutions, (b) the integration process as a series of regular political events that involve the governments of the member states, and (c) European integration as a political issue. Because I expected citizens to rely on political proxies when asked about the merits of the integration project in an opinion survey, I expected them to construe a picture of the EU by using information about political parties, the domestic political system, and those who govern it.

SYSTEM SUPPORT AS PROXY

Because the EU is a set of political institutions that includes an assembly, a judicial branch, and an executive, support for European integration was expected to reflect attitudes toward political institutions in general and the political system in which citizens live in particular. Such attitudes constitute very general orientations toward democratic governance that also have been referred to as diffuse support (Dalton, 1996). Citizens who display trust and goodwill vis-à-vis political institutions are assumed to be sanguine about the integration project (Martinotti & Steffanizzi, 1995). In other words, because states that seek to integrate must themselves be integrated (Hoffmann, 1966), countries with citizens who are satisfied with the performance of democratic institutions will support integration efforts. Conversely, this hypothesis predicts that those who are dissatisfied with the working of political institutions at home display higher levels of dissatisfaction with European institutions. In fact, because of the long-standing debate centering around the democratic deficit of the EU, they may be even less satisfied with the way democracy works at the European level.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AS PROXY

As a result of EU's institutional design, it is the governments of the member states—first and foremost—that participate in EU activities and decision making. Thus, aside from constituting a set of political institutions, the EU also consists of a series of regular and often highly publicized political events involving member state governments. Information about these activities is communicated via mass media that report on the meetings of ministers and heads of government for conferences and negotiations. Because EU's power center is located in the Council of Ministers—that is, a set of formally defined intergovernmental relationships—citizens regularly observe, read, and hear about heads of government and ministers meeting and negotiating the policies of the EU.⁵

If citizens viewed the integration process as a set of events in which their government takes part and form evaluations of the integration process based on their support for the incumbent government, I expected a positive relationship between government and integration support.⁶ In contrast to notions of general (or diffuse) system support mentioned above, the government support proxy corresponds to what has been labeled specific support. Attitudes toward the incumbent government were thus expected to be a key ingredient affecting public opinion about Europe in the member states of the EU, both for formal institutional reasons and reasons of information availability.⁷ This expectation was consistent with what we knew about the effects of government support and voting behavior in referenda. However, it is yet unclear whether such effects exist once we control for other political factors or when we examine political behavior in nonreferenda contexts such as public opinion polls.

5. This is an accurate characterization of EU decision-making mechanisms at the time the surveys analyzed here were conducted. It should be noted, however, that institutional reforms resulting from the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1993 have led to somewhat of a shift of power toward the European Parliament (Tsebelis, 1994). Note also that it may not matter as much for the present analysis whether the actual decision-making procedures have changed markedly but that citizens think the Council of Ministers is the central locus of power in the EU.

6. The one case where this hypothesis might not hold is Great Britain, especially under Margaret Thatcher as prime minister. It was therefore excluded from the analysis. Future studies are required to examine the British case in some detail.

7. Although it is true that some governments are less supportive of European integration than others, it would be difficult if not impossible to find member state governments that plead for outright dissolution of the EU (Schneider, 1995). Instead, controversy arises mostly from disagreements over the speed and depth of integration and not integration as a worthwhile goal per se.

ESTABLISHMENT PARTY SUPPORT AS PROXY

The third hypothesis tested below can be labeled the *establishment party support hypothesis*. It assumes that party support structures the distribution of preferences regarding European integration as a political issue. Because it is widely acknowledged that the institutional structure of the EU leaves little room for party politics to have an impact on the decisions taken in the council, many have assumed that parties do not matter to the politics of the EU (Hix, 1995).⁸ Yet, if the integration process is an elite-driven project, political parties can provide an important link between European publics and elites (Lawson, 1980).

Simply put, European integration and EU membership are political issues that are used by parties for purposes of domestic political competition. Parties and their programs reflect changes in society and the strategic considerations of party leaders; party support reveals differences across groups of voters regarding the EU. However, the conceptualization of how party support affects public opinion about Europe is not easily captured with the help of traditional categories of partisanship because regional integration is not an issue that is easily, if at all, represented on the classic Left/Right axis. This is because

party systems of today developed in a previous era when the major differences requiring representation had to do with matters of religion and with the degree to which market forces should be controlled in the interests of working people. The European question cuts across these differences. (Franklin, Marsh, & McLaren, 1994, p. 465; see also Deflem & Pampel, 1996; Wilson, 1995)

It should thus not come as a surprise that studies that have sought to show a correlation between Left/Right attitudes or party affiliation and support for integration have been largely unsuccessful (Featherstone, 1988; Hewstone, 1986; Wessels, 1995; see also Feld & Wildgen, 1976). Similarly, extensive research on foreign policy attitudes in the United States has failed to turn up consistent evidence for the view that attitudes toward foreign policy and international politics are structured along the Left/Right (or liberal/conservative) dimension (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987).⁹

8. See, however, Garrett's (1992) treatment of the negotiations about the SEA, which highlights the importance of party.

9. One might argue that a second reason would be that much of the conflict over the shape of a unified Europe is intraparty conflict and not conflict between political parties. However, although this may be the case, it also is true that political parties do use the EU as a political wedge that differentiates them from their competitors. Moreover, the issue at hand is not so much

Instead of a Left/Right cleavage on the European question, there appears to have developed a schism between establishment and new parties across the member states of the EU (Rattinger, 1994).¹⁰ By opposing European integration—both explicitly and implicitly—new parties and antiestablishment parties use the European issue as a sort of “ideological crowbar” (Taggart, 1998, p. 382)—that is, a symbolic issue that allows them to prove that they are both real political parties and different from the established parties that are accused of having become “cartel parties” (Katz & Mair, 1995). They are in a position to do so because, to many voters, the EU is a symbolic issue with little substantive content and because integration is supported by the vast majority of established parties. Thus, aside from being a series of events, the EU and European integration are also political issues that are used to score points in the domestic competition for voters. Thus, if the establishment party hypothesis of support for European integration were to hold, supporters of anti-Europe and antiestablishment parties should be less supportive of the integration project.¹¹

DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

To test these hypotheses regarding domestic political attitudes alongside other prominent explanations of support for European integration, I rely on a series of multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses conducted separately for individual countries. These are based on data collected in the fall of 1990 (Eurobarometer 34.0). Fieldwork was conducted in October and November of that year. This data set is particularly useful because it includes a set of questions about economic performance evaluations, which

whether there are significant intraparty differences on EU but whether voters perceive parties to be different on the issue and thus use party attachment as a proxy to answer questions regarding the integration process.

10. Note that antisystem party support is both theoretically and empirically distinct from alienation or trust or government support, although they may be correlated. In fact, the overall bivariate correlations are fairly low (overall Pearson's r of party support and democracy satisfaction is .12; between party support and government support is .34). See also Appendices A and B.

11. Note, however, that not all party systems across the member states of the EU have such expressions of antiestablishment discontent. Moreover, conflict may also exist within parties rather than across them (Wilson, 1995). The British Conservatives are the most prominent examples of such a phenomenon. I exclude these cases for reasons of comparability. This means, however, that the applicability of the party hypothesis is limited to those systems with significant anti-

is one of the main alternative hypotheses for explaining variation in support for European integration.¹²

The countries included in this study were Belgium, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. These countries were selected because they provide meaningful variation across the independent variables, and because they include a mix of countries that joined the EU in the 1950s (Germany, France, Italy), the 1970s (Denmark, Ireland), and the 1980s (Portugal). Moreover, these countries were chosen because their party systems have significant elements of antiestablishment support that can be measured both at the level of national and EP elections (see Taggart, 1998).

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable was support for a country's membership in the EU.¹³ The exact question wording was as follows: "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?" Respondents were coded as 3 (*a good thing*), 2 (*neither good nor bad*), or 1 (*a bad thing*).

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables were measured by survey items that assess political attitudes (system, government, and establishment party support), economic performance assessments, interest in EU politics, political values, and demographic characteristics.

This analysis relied on satisfaction with the way democracy works as an indicator of system support.¹⁴ As a form of diffuse goodwill, satisfaction with the way democracy works gauges whether citizens are satisfied with the

12. Although there presumably are a number of Eurobarometer surveys that could be used to test the propositions contained in this article, no one recommends itself more than another. Testing them with the help of Eurobarometer 34.0, therefore, should be as valid as any other tests that could have been conducted. As noted below, further studies are needed to examine the validity of the findings reported here at different points in time.

13. Note that it is not necessary to use different questions eliciting support for the integration process because they tend to be highly correlated (Gabel & Palmer, 1995). I also analyzed the models presented below with the help of support for a unified Europe and support for a European government as the dependent variables. As expected, the results are very similar to those analyzed here.

14. Studies that have relied on satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of system support include, for example, Anderson and Guillory (1997), Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg (1993), Harmel

workings of political institutions in general regardless of whether they are national, subnational, or supranational institutions. The exact question wording was as follows: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?" Respondents were coded from 1 through 4, in which 1 = *not at all satisfied*, 2 = *not very satisfied*, 3 = *fairly satisfied*, and 4 = *very satisfied*.

Government support was a variable coded from responses to the following question: "If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" Respondents who indicated that they would vote for one of the governing parties were coded as supporters of the government (coded 1). All others were coded as nonsupporters (coded 0).

Support for establishment/antiestablishment and pro-/anti-EU political parties was measured with the help of a variable that was coded from responses to the following question: "Which party did you vote for in the last general election?" Respondents who indicated that they supported establishment parties were coded as 1; all others were coded as 0.¹⁵ Appendix B lists the coding of parties with regard to whether they fall into the establishment/antiestablishment or pro-EU/anti-EU categories.¹⁶

We measured economic assessments by responses to two questions that asked respondents to evaluate national and personal economic conditions, that is, to form sociotropic and egocentric evaluations of economic performance: "Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in this country is [fill in response]?" and "Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household now is [fill in response]?" Both variables were coded from 5 (*a lot better*) to 1 (*a lot worse*); 4 (*a little better*), 3 (*stayed the same*), and 2 (*a little worse*) were the intermediary categories.

Following the pathbreaking work by Ronald Inglehart (1977), the analyses also controlled for interest in EU politics and political values. Individuals who displayed greater levels of interest in the politics of the EU and individuals with postmaterialist value orientations were expected to display higher levels of support for integration (Inglehart, 1977; however, see Janssen, 1991,

15. The original research design called for using the following question: "Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party?" However, this question had a great number of missing cases because citizens were unable or unwilling to state their party attachment. Voting behavior in the last election is used as a proxy for partisan identification because there is a strong correlation between party attachment and actual vote (the average correlation across the seven countries investigated here is 0.78) and because there were fewer missing cases when voting behavior was ascertained.

16. Note that I also tested for the possibility that ideological self-placement on the Left/Right

for a contrasting view).¹⁷ The exact question wording of the political interest variable was as follows: "And as far as European politics are concerned, that is matters related to the European Community, to what extent would you say that you are interested in them?" Respondents were scored from 1 (*not at all*) through 4 (*a great deal*) (2 and 3 are intermediary categories). Based on the four-item political values battery, respondents also were classified as having materialist (coded 1), mixed materialist/postmaterialist (coded 2), and post-materialist (coded 3) value orientations.

Finally, I included the standard demographic indicators of education and income with the expectation that higher status respondents are more supportive of the integration process (Anderson & Reichert, 1995).

ANALYSIS

It should be noted that the relationships among government support, party support, democracy satisfaction, and support for European integration hypothesized above have implications for modeling the relationship between economic performance evaluations and integration support documented in earlier research (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Gabel & Whitten, 1997). Because economic conditions frequently have been found to affect both system support, support for the incumbent government, and vote choice in general (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Clarke, Dutt, & Kornberg, 1993; Lewis-Beck, 1988), models that include government, system, and party support as independent determinants of support for European integration need to be sensitive to the different ways in which economic conditions can influence integration support.¹⁸

Specifically, prior findings may have to be qualified because it is possible that the effects of economic evaluations on integration support are indirect rather than direct. If economic conditions affect government/system support and vote choice, which, in turn, affect support for integration, it is likely that economic conditions affect integration support only indirectly. Therefore, I

17. Presumably, the relationship between interest in EU politics and support for EU membership can be reciprocal. Because I simply control for interest given previous work on the subject, the inclusion of the interest variable is not intended to convey that the relationship is likely to work only in one direction.

18. Although the different domestic proxies are sufficiently distinct conceptually, it is possible that they are not distinct empirically. Note, however, that there are no multicollinearity problems among the independent variables. The bivariate correlations among them, albeit positive, are modest and thus are unlikely to affect the efficient estimation of effects. The correlations are

test below whether economic conditions affect integration support directly, that is, in addition to government, system, or party support, or indirectly by way of the mediating political variables.

There are two ways to test for indirect economic effects on support for EU membership. One involves what is called an instrumental variable approach (e.g., Hanushek & Jackson, 1977); the other involves the estimation of economic effects on the dependent variable of interest with and without the (potential) mediating variables included in the model (Baron & Kenny, 1986; James & Brett, 1984; Judd & Kenny, 1981).¹⁹ I have chosen to display the latter results because they are of greater substantive interest and because they are easier to interpret.

According to Baron and Kenney (1986), testing for mediation involves estimating three equations. First, I examine the effects of the independent variable(s) (economic assessments) on the dependent variable (support for EU membership); second, I estimate the impact of the mediating variable(s) (democracy satisfaction, government support, and establishment party support) on the dependent variable (support for EU membership); Stage 3 involves regressing the dependent variable (support for EU membership) on both the mediating variable(s) (democracy satisfaction, government support, and establishment party support) and the independent variable(s) (economic assessments) in the model. Mediation is concluded if the effects of the independent variable(s) (economic assessments) drop out when the mediating variable(s) (democracy satisfaction, government support, and establishment party support) are included (see the example discussed in Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1177).²⁰

The models whose results are shown below are thus:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EU} = & \gamma_1 \cdot \text{IC} + \gamma_2 \cdot \text{PEC} + \gamma_3 \cdot \text{NEC} + \gamma_4 \cdot \text{EUIN} \\ & + \gamma_5 \cdot \text{PM} + \gamma_6 \cdot \text{ED} + \gamma_7 \cdot \text{INC} + \epsilon_t \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EU} = & \gamma_1 \cdot \text{IC} + \gamma_2 \cdot \text{D} + \gamma_3 \cdot \text{G} + \gamma_4 \cdot \text{P} + \gamma_5 \cdot \text{EUIN} \\ & + \gamma_6 \cdot \text{PM} + \gamma_7 \cdot \text{ED} + \gamma_8 \cdot \text{INC} + \epsilon_t \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

19. In the present context, the instrumental variable approach involves a so-called two-stage procedure. This approach is difficult to implement here because there are few if any appropriate instrumental variables—that is, variables that are highly correlated with the independent variable with which it is associated but uncorrelated with the disturbances. Moreover, this procedure leads to much higher variances than OLS. Thus, this estimation technique achieves consistent estimates at the cost of high variance and bias (Kennedy, 1985, p. 115; see also Hanushek & Jackson, 1977, pp. 234-243).

20. Separate analyses revealed that economic assessments indeed affected satisfaction with democracy and incumbent support. This means that I found support for significant effects of the

$$EU = \gamma_1 \cdot IC + \gamma_2 \cdot D + \gamma_3 \cdot G + \gamma_4 \cdot P + \gamma_5 \cdot PEC + \gamma_6 \cdot NEC + \gamma_7 \cdot EUIN \quad (3)$$

$$+ \gamma_8 \cdot PM + \gamma_9 \cdot ED + \gamma_{10} \cdot INC + \epsilon_i$$

The acronyms in the above equations are as follows: EU = support for membership in the EU; IC = intercept; PEC = personal economic evaluations; NEC = national economic evaluations; EUIN = interest in EU politics; PM = postmaterialism/materialism scale; ED = Education; INC = income; D = democracy satisfaction; G = government support; and P = establishment party support.

The analysis proceeds in three stages. Stage 1 involves testing what can be considered a traditional or politics-free model of support for EU membership. In contrast to models of public support for European integration, which are based on aggregate time-series or pooled cross-sectional data, I first test the usefulness of traditional explanations of support for EU membership at the individual level in single-country analyses. This serves several purposes: to assess the validity of economic models at the level of individual countries, to obtain an estimate of economic effects in the absence of political variables, and to establish a baseline against which the performance of the political hypotheses can be compared. Stage 2 consists of testing the political hypotheses of public opinion toward European integration, and Stage 3 involves testing the political hypotheses in combination with economic factors.²¹

RESULTS

STAGE 1: THE INDEPENDENT EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Table 1 shows the results of a series of OLS regressions of support for EU membership on interest in EU politics, political values, demographic variables, and economic evaluations.

Economic Evaluations

In this politics-free model, both personal and national economic performance assessments affected support for EU membership. However, whereas

21. Although it is possible to test for country-specific effects in the context of pooled models with dummy variables, this article proceeds at a more basic level of analysis by analyzing each country separately. Given the more than adequate number of cases available, this is unlikely to

Table 1
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Effects of Economic Evaluations on Support for European Union Membership in Seven Member States

Independent Variable	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Portugal
Economic evaluation (personal)	0.057** (0.021)	0.037 (0.029)	0.081*** (0.020)	-0.018 (0.027)	0.034* (0.020)	0.038* (0.022)	0.022 (0.026)
Economic evaluation (national)	0.050** (0.019)	0.169*** (0.028)	0.042* (0.021)	0.066** (0.022)	0.039* (0.018)	0.039* (0.018)	0.100*** (0.023)
Interest in European Community politics	0.176*** (0.019)	0.205*** (0.030)	0.150*** (0.021)	0.204*** (0.021)	0.122*** (0.020)	0.105*** (0.018)	0.114*** (0.022)
Postmaterialism	0.007 (0.027)	-0.170* (0.043)	0.014 (0.031)	0.085** (0.030)	0.019 (0.032)	0.030 (0.028)	0.006 (0.030)
Education	0.017 (0.013)	0.043 (0.027)	0.090*** (0.021)	0.012 (0.020)	0.061** (0.024)	0.041** (0.016)	0.043* (0.018)
Income	0.000 (0.001)	0.014* (0.006)	0.009* (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)
Constant	1.915*** (0.091)	1.397*** (0.157)	1.586*** (0.096)	1.778*** (0.112)	2.054*** (0.100)	2.125*** (0.090)	1.942*** (0.098)
R^2	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.07	0.07	0.09
SEE	0.517	0.755	0.580	0.557	0.573	0.507	0.547
N	926	956	966	953	973	995	917

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$; two-tailed test.

the coefficients for evaluations of national economic performance achieved statistical significance and were in the expected direction in all seven member states analyzed here, personal assessments failed to clear the .1 threshold (two-tailed) in Denmark, Germany, and Portugal. The largest effects of personal economic evaluations on support for EU membership were found in France, whereas national economic evaluations had the strongest impact on support for EU membership in Denmark and Portugal.

Interest in EU Politics and Political Values

The results show that interest in EU politics was the most significant and consistently important variable affecting support for EU membership. Those who were interested in EU politics also were more supportive of their country's participation in the EU. The effects for education and income were somewhat mixed, although they were in the expected direction when statistically significant. In contrast to expectations, however, postmaterialism was not a strong determinant of support for EU membership. In fact, it was statistically significant only twice (Denmark and Germany) and displayed a negative coefficient in the Danish case. The Danish results suggest that individuals who held materialist values were actually more supportive of Denmark's EU membership (cf. Anderson & Reichert, 1995).

STAGE 2: INDEPENDENT POLITICAL EFFECTS

Table 2 shows the independent effects of the political variables—system, government, and establishment party support—on support for membership in the EU. The results established that democracy satisfaction had the most consistently significant and most powerful effects on support for EU membership. It was statistically highly significant in each of the member states analyzed here. The strongest effects were found in Denmark and followed by France and Germany, whereas the weakest effects existed in Italy and Ireland.

Government support had significant effects only in Denmark, whereas establishment party support had a strong influence on EU support in Denmark, Portugal, and France (and somewhat weaker but also significant effects in the Irish case). This suggests that government supporters were more supportive of EU membership only in Denmark, whereas antiestablishment party supporters were considerably less supportive of EU membership in the Danish, Portuguese, and French cases.

The effects for the political interest, political values, and demographic variables were similar to those found in the estimation of Model 1. The re-

Table 2
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Effects of Democracy Satisfaction, Party Attachment, and Government Support on Support for European Union Membership in Seven Member States

Independent Variable	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Portugal
Democracy satisfaction	0.110*** (0.026)	0.164*** (0.031)	0.133*** (0.029)	0.130** (0.033)	0.072* (0.024)	0.065** (0.024)	0.121** (0.043)
Government support	-0.004 (0.047)	0.318*** (0.055)	0.073 (0.054)	0.062 (0.045)	0.026 (0.044)	0.067 (0.047)	0.054 (0.059)
Party attachment	0.004 (0.062)	0.216*** (0.056)	0.206*** (0.064)	0.059 (0.073)	0.091* (0.055)	-0.002 (0.047)	0.220** (0.085)
Interest in European Community politics	0.159*** (0.023)	0.155*** (0.030)	0.163*** (0.028)	0.190*** (0.025)	0.125*** (0.023)	0.103*** (0.020)	0.087* (0.035)
Postmaterialism	0.024 (0.033)	-0.136** (0.042)	0.036 (0.040)	0.104** (0.036)	0.039 (0.036)	0.042 (0.031)	-0.017 (0.046)
Education	0.021 (0.018)	0.052* (0.028)	0.057* (0.029)	0.022 (0.027)	0.064* (0.030)	0.049** (0.017)	0.043 (0.039)
Income	0.000 (0.033)	0.009 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)	-0.011* (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.007)
Constant	1.981*** (0.116)	1.352*** (0.153)	1.416*** (0.122)	1.541*** (0.145)	1.866*** (0.125)	2.181*** (0.086)	1.968*** (0.175)
R ²	0.12	0.17	0.19	0.15	0.08	0.07	0.07
SEE	0.490	0.720	0.550	0.546	0.572	0.499	0.574
N	596	899	544	687	774	797	416

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$; two-tailed test.

and Kenny (1986) because the mediating variables influenced the dependent variable in the expected fashion.

STAGE 3: COMPARING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFECTS

Table 3 shows the results of a series of OLS regressions with support for EU membership as the dependent variable and system support, government support, and support for establishment parties as independent variables (in addition to those variables analyzed in Table 1). Although there were some noteworthy cross-national differences, the results furnish consistent evidence that European mass publics construe the EU in particular ways and with domestic politics in mind. The coefficients, when significant, consistently were in the expected direction, thus providing strong support for the satisfaction with democracy hypothesis, somewhat weaker support for the establishment parties hypothesis, and little to no support for the government support hypothesis. Moreover, when considered on a country-by-country basis, it also is clear that different domestic political attitudes structure opinions about European integration in different countries, suggesting that the domestic politics of the member states need to be considered separately when examining public support for integration.

Economic Evaluations

Looking at the effects of economic performance evaluations on support for EU membership in the full models that included the political variables, the results shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 suggest that the effects of economic conditions on support for European integration were at least partially indirect and mediated by the political variables. Whereas Table 1 shows robust and sizable economic effects on support for EU membership, Table 3 (which includes the political variables) shows much weaker and statistically less significant effects.

These findings are noteworthy because economic performance evaluations display less powerful effects than those reported in analyses that did not control for domestic political attitudes as possible influences on support for EU membership. The results presented here thus stand somewhat in contrast to studies that have relied heavily on economic motivations as causes of attitudes toward Europe and shed new light on the ways in which economic performance evaluations (and, by implication, objective economic performance) may affect support for European integration.

on Support for European Union Membership in Seven Member States

Independent Variable	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Portugal
Democracy satisfaction	0.096*** (0.027)	0.133*** (0.032)	0.125*** (0.031)	0.110** (0.034)	0.060* (0.025)	0.051* (0.025)	0.068 (0.048)
Government support	-0.008 (0.048)	0.302*** (0.056)	0.068 (0.054)	0.049 (0.046)	0.016 (0.045)	0.078 (0.048)	0.032 (0.060)
Party attachment	0.007 (0.063)	0.246*** (0.056)	0.223*** (0.065)	0.050 (0.074)	0.095* (0.056)	-0.017 (0.048)	0.190* (0.085)
Economic evaluation (personal)	0.042 (0.027)	0.034 (0.029)	0.069** (0.026)	-0.021 (0.033)	0.043* (0.023)	0.022 (0.024)	0.045 (0.041)
Economic evaluation (national)	0.023 (1.20)	0.137*** (0.028)	-0.025 (0.027)	0.057* (0.028)	0.010 (0.021)	0.033 (0.021)	0.082* (0.036)
Interest in European Community politics	0.157*** (0.024)	0.160*** (0.031)	0.162*** (0.028)	0.188*** (0.025)	0.117*** (0.024)	0.101*** (0.021)	0.055 (0.035)
Postmaterialism	0.019 (0.034)	-0.122** (0.042)	0.037 (0.040)	0.096** (0.036)	0.034 (0.037)	0.048 (0.032)	-0.009 (0.045)
Education	0.020 (0.018)	-0.032 (0.028)	0.052* (0.030)	0.029 (0.027)	0.063* (0.031)	0.045** (0.018)	0.033 (0.039)
Income	0.000 (0.001)	0.009 (0.006)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.010* (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.008)
Constant	1.819*** P (0.135)	0.955*** (0.134)	1.312*** (0.161)	1.494*** (0.133)	1.780*** (0.106)	2.055*** (0.182)	1.799***
R ²	0.13	0.20	0.20	0.15	0.09	0.08	0.09
SEE	0.490	0.714	0.549	0.545	0.574	0.498	0.561
N	579	868	533	674	759	765	404

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

The Political Hypotheses

The results revealed that the system hypothesis was supported across six of the seven countries investigated here. The finding that satisfaction with democratic institutions translates into higher levels of support for European unification underscores the notion that those citizens who are more supportive of the way political institutions work at home are more likely to support European institutions and their country's participation in them. Satisfaction with democracy influenced support for EU membership most strongly in Denmark, France, and Germany and had a weaker effect in Belgium, Ireland, and Italy.

The second most successful hypothesis was the establishment party hypothesis. It was confirmed in Denmark, France, and Portugal, indicating that followers of establishment parties had more favorable attitudes toward EU membership in these countries. These results are consistent with what we know about the domestic political context in all three countries because they also had the most significant anti-EU movements among antiestablishment parties in Western Europe (Taggart, 1998). Although the coefficient for establishment party support achieved statistical significance in the Irish case as well, the substantive effects were considerably weaker.

There was remarkably little evidence for the government support hypothesis, however. The only country in which the government support hypothesis was corroborated was Denmark, indicating that supporters of the Danish government were more likely to favor their country's membership in the EU. Moreover, additional analyses (results not shown here) revealed that government support structured Danish attitudes about EU membership to a greater extent than either democracy satisfaction or establishment party support: The standardized coefficient for government support was about twice as large as that of the other two political variables.

Overall, the results for the political hypotheses of support for EU membership showed that Denmark was the country where citizens appeared to use domestic politics as a proxy for EU support most consistently. Conversely, public opinion toward membership in the EU appeared to be least driven by attitudes toward domestic politics in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, suggesting that the publics in these member states have opinions about Europe that are less constrained by domestic political attitudes.

DISCUSSION

The analyses showed that European mass publics are largely uninformed

tant consequences for the study of public opinion about Europe. Because citizens lack crucial information about the integration process, they resort to proxies derived from domestic political reality to comprehend and form opinions about it. This does not mean that opinions about Europe are irrational or lack coherence. Instead of seeking out information about the minutiae of the EU when they have more pressing demands on their time, citizens view the integration process through the lens of how they feel about their own political system, political parties, and, to a lesser extent, their government.

On the basis of survey data collected in seven EU member states, the study was designed to test the validity of three political hypotheses. The first hypothesis, labeled the system support hypothesis, postulated that domestic system support is positively associated with support for EU membership, whereas the second hypothesis (the government support hypothesis) argued that those who support the current government also are more supportive of the integration process. The third hypothesis, finally, suggested that supporters of establishment parties display higher levels of support for their country's membership in the EU (establishment party hypothesis).

The analyses revealed that the system support hypothesis and the party hypothesis received the most consistent support across the countries investigated here. However, party support seems to matter differently than has often been assumed. The results indicate that researchers need to pay attention to which parties stand to gain in support from opposition to the integration process and which parties actively seek out opposition to Europe as a way to appeal to voters across the political spectrum. The importance of system support and the weakness of government support also suggest that, in contrast to referenda, European citizens generally do not rely on attitudes toward the national government to determine the extent of their affinity for integration project. Instead, they appear to rely on the more diffuse satisfaction with the way democratic institutions work as a proxy regardless of who is currently in power.

Although attitudes toward Europe are structured by domestic political concerns and beliefs in powerful and predictable ways, the mass publics of the EU member states are not homogenous with regard to support for European integration. Instead, they reflect variable domestic political contexts across the member states of the EU. Specifically, I find that among the states examined here, Danish public opinion is driven by all three domestic political attitudes hypothesized to affect support for EU membership. In contrast, system support is the proxy used by Belgian, German, and Italian mass publics, whereas French, Irish, and Portuguese public opinion about Europe is to a significant extent driven by support for establishment parties.

The findings also point to the different ways in which economic performance evaluations (and, by implication, objective economic performance) may affect support for European integration. Specifically, the findings show that purely economic models, that is, models that do not control for attitudes about domestic politics, are likely to overestimate direct economic effects, given that they work through government and system support. The results help resolve the incongruence of a coexistence of strong economic effects and widespread ignorance about the integration process by pointing to an alternative individual-level model of attitude formation. They also stand in some contrast to the currently predominant approach to integration support based on cost/benefit considerations, which presumes very high levels of cognitive abilities on the part of average citizens.

There are, however, several questions that have been left unanswered. First, the analyses presented here say little about the dynamics of public support for European integration. Because the research strategy employed here made use of data collected at one point in time to demonstrate the general logic underlying attitudes about Europe, future studies are needed to establish the validity of the findings at different points of the integration process. Furthermore, the analysis was not designed to make statements about those cases—most notably Great Britain—in which there are substantial intraparty struggles about parties' positions concerning the future of Europe. Although it is likely that the effects of the system support variable would not change, it is not clear what the effects of government support and partisanship would be in such a context. In addition, because of its exclusive focus on macro-economic performance evaluations, the analysis did not address the cost/benefit dimension of economic effects on support for a united Europe documented in previous research (Anderson & Reichert, 1995).²²

CONCLUSION

What do these results mean for the European integration process? If domestic public opinion constrains states' actions in the international arena and if EU decision making is driven by elites interested in their domestic political fortunes, citizens' attitudes toward Europe matter to the negotiations among member state governments. The structure of domestic opinion among the

22. It should be noted that it is in principle possible that some of the findings are driven by marginal distributions such that it is easier to find significant effects of government, party, and system support on integration support depending on the marginal distribution of the variables in the overall population. I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for pointing this out.

publics of the member states is likely to be a crucial ingredient determining the types of supranational bargains that are struck because it can impose different constraints on decision makers at the European level.

However, because different domestic attitudes matter to people in different countries, it is not simply the case that all facets of domestic political attitudes matter equally for elite decisions aimed at pushing integration forward. Given that public opinion in two different countries may be driven by different mass attitudes, the results presented here have implications for the strategic considerations of the players involved in the bargaining among member state governments.

An example may help explain why: Although it is correct to say (and important to know) that public support for European integration is low in Denmark and high in France or Italy, it may be more important for negotiators involved in reaching intergovernmental compromises to know that Danish public opinion is driven by establishment party support and government approval, that government popularity does not matter at all in the French case, or that party support does not affect European attitudes among the Italians at all. Moreover, it reminds us that whereas Danish support may be low and French support high, there are clearly important and identifiable segments of the respective populations whose enthusiasm for an integrated Europe varies and who can possibly be mobilized by political entrepreneurs seeking to generate support for their positions.

The consistent importance of democracy satisfaction across the countries investigated here suggests that citizens predominantly rely on broad notions of diffuse support for democratic institutions as a proxy for evaluating the integration process. However, this also means that recent downward trends in system support across European systems do not bode well for major initiatives aimed at greater political integration. Thus, the results add a political dimension to findings that suggest that hard economic times lead to a drop in support for Europe. Naturally, the two are related, in which case decision makers may want to hold back on proposals until the time is right. The successful signing of the Single European Act (SEA) and the 1992 initiative during a period of good economic and political times should serve as a reminder that timing is important when it comes to initiatives for changing the EU (Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989). Moreover, the results presented in this article suggest a noneconomic source for temporary breakdowns of the integration process. When citizens are unwilling to support the pro-Europe policies of unpopular governments or parties, for example, economic conditions may have a smaller and indirect influence on the ups and downs of the integration process.

But there is more to such good and bad times than weathering a recession or overcoming periods of discontent with domestic political actors and institutions. When antiestablishment and anti-European parties gain public support by opposing the unification of Europe, even established parties may be tempted to advocate policies critical of European agreements if they promise electoral pay-offs. Moreover, as the Danish case shows, unpopular governments may have a harder time convincing citizens that further integration is a good thing, even when citizens are fairly trusting of the system and political institutions in general.

Overall, the findings reported in this study call for the inclusion of political variables in models of public opinion about Europe. Although economic aspects of an integration process aimed at creating a common market in goods, services, labor, and capital are obviously important, an exclusive focus on economic considerations may neglect important political dimensions that underlie citizens' attitudes toward a unified Europe and lead to an incomplete portrait of public support for European integration. If, as can be expected for the foreseeable future, attitudes toward domestic politics continue to play a key role in the formation of citizens' attitudes toward European integration, a sense of supranational community or identity as conceptualized by scholars such as Deutsch and Inglehart may not be necessary to generate high levels of integration support among the publics of the member states—so long as there is significant support for key domestic political actors and institutions. For domestic elites involved in supranational bargaining and decision making, this means, however, that they would do well to remain closely attuned to the public moods of the member states as they plan further steps down the path of integration.

APPENDIX A

Pearson Correlations of Political Variables by Country

		Democracy Satisfaction	Government Support	Establishment Party Support
Belgium	Democracy satisfaction	1.0000	.1238	.0771
	Government support	.1238	1.0000	.4724
Denmark	Democracy satisfaction	1.0000	.1705	.0252
	Government support	.1705	1.0000	.2794
France	Democracy satisfaction	1.0000	.2479	.2236
	Government support	.2479	1.0000	.3507
Germany	Democracy satisfaction	1.0000	.2561	.1736
	Government support	.2561	1.0000	.2738
Ireland	Democracy satisfaction	1.0000	.1128	.0701
	Government support	.1128	1.0000	.3245
Italy	Democracy satisfaction	1.0000	.2272	.1497
	Government support	.2272	1.0000	.6393
Portugal	Democracy satisfaction	1.0000	.1627	.1476
	Government support	.1627	1.0000	.0439

Country	Establishment/Pro-Europe Party	Antiestablishment/Anti-Europe Party
Belgium	Parti des Reformes et de la Liberté (PRL) Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang (PVV) Parti Socialiste Belge (PS) Belgische Socialistische Partij (SP) Parti Social-Chrétien (PSC) Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) Volksunie (VU) Front-Démocratique Francophone et Rassemblement Wallon (FDF-RW)	Parti Communiste Belge (PCB) Parti Ecologiste (Ecolo) Anders Gaan Leven (Agalev) Union Démocratique pour le Respect du Travail—Respect voor Arbeid en Democratie (UDRT-RAD) Vlaams Blok
Denmark	Socialdemokratiet (SD) Radikale Venstre (RV) Konservative Folkeparti (KF) Centrum-Demokraterne (CD) Retsforbundet (RFB) Kristeligt Folkeparti (KrF) Venstre (V) Venstresocialisterne (VS)	Socialistisk Folkeparti (SFP) De Grønne Det Humanistiske Parti (HP) Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (DKP) Fælles Kurs (FK) Fremskridtpartiet (FP) Enhedslisten
France	Parti Socialiste (PS) Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (MRG) Parti Socialiste Unifié et Extrême Gauche (PSU) Union pour la Democratie Française (UDF)(and constituent parties) Rassemblement pour la République (RPR)	Parti Communiste (PCF) Ecologistes—Les Verts Front National (FN)

Germany	Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christlich Soziale Union (CDU/CSU) Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)	Nationaldemokratische Partei (NPD) Die Grünen Die Republikaner Linke Liste/Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (LL/PDS)
Ireland	Fianna Fail (FF) Fine Gael (FG) Labour Party Progressive Democratic Party (PD)	Workers Party (WP) Green Party Sinn Fein (SF)
Italy	Democrazia Christiana (DC) Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI) Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano (PSDI) Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI) Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) Sinistra Indipendente Partito Sardo d'Azione (PSDA)	Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) Federazione delle Liste Verdi Partito Radicale (PR) Democrazia Proletaria (DP) Lega Lombarda
Portugal	Partido da Democracia Christa (PDC) Partido Popular Monarquico (PPM) Partido Socialista (PS) Partido Social Democrata (PSD)	Coligacao Democratica Unitaria (CDU) Partido do Centro Democratico Social (CDS) Partido Renovador Democratico (PRD) Uniao Democratica Popular (UDP) Movimento Democratico Portugues (MDP-CDE)

Source: Lane, McKay, & Newton (1991); Taggart (1998).

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