P
olitics today is like the opening line in a Dickens novel: We seem to
live in the best of times . . . and the worst of times for the democratic
process. ln the last decade of the twentieth century, a wave of
democratization swept across the globe. The citizens of Eastern Europe,
South Africa, and several East Asian nations rose up against their autocratic
governments. The Soviet Empire collapsed, and millions of people
enjoyed new democratic freedoms. These events led a noted political analyst,
Francis Fukuyama (1992), to claim that we were witnessing "the end
of history." Humankinďs evolution was supposedly converging on a single
form of government- democracy- as the culmination of human development.
Even some experts who had previously ruminated about the limits to
democracy's expansion now trumpeted this third wave of democratization.1
The 1990s also brought unprecedented affluence and economic wellbeing
to the United States, as Americans experienced their longest period of
sustained economic growth in peacetime. Crime rates dropped, and progress
was made on many policy fronts. To a lesser degree, Western Europe
also enjoyed a peace dividend of economic stability and a new era of international
security. This was, it seemed, a positive time for Western democracy.
The Cold War was over, and we had won. ln addition, the citizens in
the former autocratic states of the Soviet Empire had won.
Despite these advances, public opinion surveys have found that people
are now more critical of politicians, political parties, and political institutions
than they were a generation ago (Dalton 2004; Norris 2011). This is
not a recent development resulting from the 2008 recession. The malaise
first appeared in the United States in the 1960s, and trust in government has
remained low since the late 1970s. These trends have stimulated a chorus
of voices claiming that American democracy is at risk (Macedo et al. 2005;
Wolfe 2006). Political dissatisfaction is also common in other advanced
industrial democracies. For example, if one is fortunate enough to browse
through Paris bookshops, one sees titles such as France in Freefall, Bankrupt
255
256 Chapter 12
Internet Resource
The Pew Research Center has an online survey on satisfaction with government
that allows you to compare your views to a representative sample of Americans:
http:/ I pewresearch.org/satisfaction
France, and France's Misfortune. Even while enjoying the fruits of economic
and political development, people have become more critical of their governments
and other institutions of democracy.
Admittedly, anxiety about the health of democracy is a regular feature of
political science and political punditry. An important discussion about America's
postwar goals took place during the administration of President Dwight
D. Eisenhower, and President John F. Kennedy asked Americans to renew
their commitment to state and nation (see Mueller 1999, ch. 7). A prominent
academic study of the 1970s nearly forecasted democracy's demise (Crozier,
Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). "Declinism" is an enduring school
of thought among French and German intellectuals. These earlier pessimistic
accounts of democracy's future fortunately proved to be overstatements.
lt does seem, however, that attitudes toward government are changing
in basic ways, and citizens in most established democracies are no longer
deferential and supportive of political elites. This development leads us to
ask whether such changes in the political culture put democracy at risk and
how they are affecting the democratic process.
This chapter looks at how people judge the democratic process today.
How is it that as democracy celebrates its success at the beginning of a new
millennium, its citizens are apparently expressing deep doubts about their
political system? In addition, we consider how the new style of citizen politics
may contribute to these misgivings and what the implications are for the
democracy's future.
The Types of Political Support
Political support is a term with many possible meanings. Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba (1963) referred to attitudes toward politics and the political
system as the "political culture" of a nation. Political culture encompasses
beliefs about the legitimacy of the system, the appropriateness of
structures for political input, and the role of the individua! in the political
process. The most important of these attitudes is a generalized feeling
toward the political system, or system affect. Such feelings are presumably
socialized early in life, representing a positive attitude toward the political
system that is relatively independent of the actions of the current government.
Almond and Verba believed that affective feelings toward the political
system assure the legitimacy of democratic governments and limit expressions
of political discontent.
Citizens and the Democratic Process 257
David Easton (1965, 1975) developed an influential theoretical framework
describing the various objects of political support: political authorities,
the regime, and the political community.
• Political authorities support includes opinions toward the incumbents
of political office or, in a broader sense, the pool of political
elites from which government leaders are drawn.
• Regime support refers to attitudes toward the institutions of government
rather than the present officeholders-such as respect for
the presidency rather than opinions about a specific president. This
also involves attitudes toward the procedures of government, such
as the principles of pluralist democracy and support for parliamentary
government.
• Political community support implies a basic attachment to the
nation and political system beyond the present institutions of government.
A sense of being "English" or "Scottish" is an example of
these attachments.
The differences among these levels of support are very significant. Discontent
with the political authorities normally has limited systemic implications.
People often become dissatisfied with political officeholders and
act on these feelings by voting the rascals out and selecting new officials
(rascals) at the next election. Dissatisfaction with authorities, within a democratic
system, is not usually a signal for basic political change. Negative
attitudes toward political officials can and do exist with little loss in support
for the office itself or the institutional structure of government.
When the object of dissatisfaction becomes more general-shifting to
the regime or the political community-the political implications increase.
A decline in regime support might provoke a basic challenge to political
institutions or calls for reform in government procedures. For example,
when Americans became dissatisfied with government in the mid-1990s
they enacted term limits on legislators and other reforms. Weakening ties
to the political community might foretell eventual revolution, civil war, or
the loss of legitimacy. Therefore, Easton said, "Not all expressions of unfavorable
orientations have the same degree of gravity for a political system.
Some may be consistent with its maintenance; others may lead to fundamental
change" (1975, 437).
In addition to the objects of political support, Easton identified two
kinds of support: diffuse and specific. According to Easton, diffuse support
is a state of mind-a deep-seated set of political attitudes that are deeply
engrained in belief systems. For example, the sentiment "America, right or
wrong" reflects a commitment to the nation that is distinct from the actual
behavior of the government. In contrast, specific support is more dosely
related to the actions and performance of the government or political elites.
Specific support is object specific in two senses. First, it normally applies to
258 Chapter 12
evaluations of political authorities; iťs less relevant to support for the political
cornrnunity. Second, specific support is typically based on the actual
policies and governing style of political authorities or political institutions.
The distinction between diffuse and specific support is important in
understanding the significance of different aspects of political support.
A democratic political system must keep the support of its citizens if the
system is to remain viable because it rules by the consent of the governed.
However, because all governments occasionally fail to meet public expectations,
short-term political failures must not directly erode diffuse support
for the regime or political cornrnunity. If one politician or government fails,
this shouldn't be an indictment of the entire political system. In other words,
a democratic political system requires a reservoir of diffuse support independent
of immediate policy outputs (specific support) if iťs to weather
periods of public disaffection and dissatisfaction (Almond and Verba 1963).
German history in the twentieth century highlights the importance of
diffuse support. The Weimar Republic (1918-33) was built on an unstable
foundation. Many Germans felt that the creation of this government at the
end of World War I had contributed to Germany's wartime defeat; from the
outset, the regime was stigmatized as a traitor to the nation. Important sectors
of the political elite-the military, the civil service, and the judiciaryand
many citizens questioned the legitimacy of the new regime and favored
a return to the former German Empire. The fledgling democratic state then
faced a series of major crises: postwar economic hardships, attempted rightwing
and left-wing coups, explosive inflation in the early 1920s, and the
French occupation of the Ruhr. Because the political system was never able
to build up a pool of diffuse support for the republic, the dissatisfaction created
by the Great Depression in the 1930s easily eroded support for political
authorities and the democratic regime. Communists and Nazis argued that
the democratic political system was at fault, and the Weimar Republic succumbed
to those attacks.2
The democratic transition in the German Democratic Republic in 1989-
90 also illustrates the importance of cultural and institutional congruence.
Surveys of East German youth found a marked decrease in support for the
communist principles of the German Democratic Republic during the 1980s
(Friedrich and Griese 1990). These youths led the populist revolt in the East
that weakened the regime in the fall of 1989. Revelations in early 1990
about the Communist Party's abuses of power further eroded the regime's
popular base and spurred the race toward unification with the West.
Early cross-national opinion studies argued that political support was a
requisite of stable democracy. Almond and Verba (1963) found that system
affect in the late 1950s was most widespread in the long-established democracies
of the United States and Great Britain. For example, 85 percent of
Americans and 46 percent of Britons spontaneously mentioned their political
system as a source of national pride. In contrast, system support was
more limited in West Germany and Italy: only 7 percent of West Germans
and 3 percent of ltalians mentioned their political system as a source of
Citizens and the Democratic Process 259
national pride. Low levels of support raised fears that democracy was still
fragile in these two formerly fascist states.
A cross-national study by Hadley Cantril (1965) found a similar pattern
in public opinion: positive national self-images were more common in the
stable, well-run democracies than in fledgling democracies. A more recent
set of comparative studies has similarly demonstrated that a democratic
political culture is strongly correlated with the stability of a democratic system
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Although one can never be certain whether
stable government produces political support, or whether political support
produces stable government, these two are interrelated. The support of its
citizens is necessary if a democracy is to survive over the long term.
Declining Confidence in Authorities
A few years ago I was visiting Germany during its national elections. On
the weekend before the vote I went to the town square with a friend to talk
to the parties' representatives about the election. At one booth I was given
a nice pen with a picture of the local candidate down the side. My friend
leaned over and whispered: Hurry up and use the pen now, because after the
election it will stop working-just like the politician. Such public skepticism
of elected officials and other political authorities has become a common
part of politics in most advanced industrial democracies.
Rather than focus on individua! officeholders, we examine citizen images
of political leaders in general. A variety of evidence points to Americans'
growing skepticism about political officials and the government over time
(figure 12.1). The early readings depicted a largely supportive public. ln 1958
most Americans believed that officials care what people think (71 percent),
that people in government are honest (68 percent), and that one can trust the
government to do what is right (71 percent). These positive feelings remained
relatively unchanged until the mid-1960s and then declined precipitously.
Beginning at about the time of the crises and political scandals of the 1960s
and 1970s-Vietnam, urban unrest, and Watergate-Americans' trust in
their politicians sank steadily lower. In 1979 President Jimmy Carter warned
that declining public confidence "was a fundamental threat to American
democracy." The upbeat presidency of Ronald Reagan temporarily
improved Americans' image of politics. By the end of the Reagan-Bush era,
however, trust in government was as low as it had been in 1980. These
indicators had hit historie lows in 1994 during the Clinton administration,
but they had partially improved by 2000. Yet even with the unprecedented
economic growth of the 1990s and the consolidation of democracy around
the globe, Americans' trust in government rebounded only to the levels of
Reagan's first administration. Support for incumbents and the government
briefly spiked upward after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States but soon faded. By the 2008 elections, trust had decreased to
the levels of the early 1990s. Media polls suggest that trust in government
had declined to a new low point in 2010-11.
260 Chapter 12
Qif!llfjl Trust in Government
J
Americans' trust in govemment dropped in the 1960s-70s and has remained low
since then.
70
Uí 60
5
Cl
-~ 50
(/)
~
~ 40Q)
Q)
Cl
~ 30
Q)
eQ)
o. 20
10
....,
'' ', ,„„ „---„„
' I ' , „" '' , \ ', ,,.,,..,,.
'„ I I .......
„ ... , I \
--Doright
- - - Honest
- - Officials care
-o- Government
benefits all
0-r---.-----r---.-----,----,.----,,---,..--...---.-----r---.-----,----f
1958 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Source: American National Election Studies, 1958-2008.
Virtually all long-term public opm10n series show similar downward
trends. For example, since 1966 the Harris poli asked, "The people running
the country don't really care what happens to you." In 1966, only 29 percent
shared this opinion; in 2011 a full 73 percent thought politicians didn't care.
The Pew Center for People and the Press (2010) studied attitudes toward
government in 2010 and concluded, "By almost every conceivable measure
Americans are less positive and more critical of government these days."
Looking back at this span of U.S. history, it's easy to cite possible reasons
for the public's growing doubts about their leaders (Nye, Zelikow, and King
1997). During any four-year electoral cycle, one can find multiple events
that may have diminished the reputations of Congress and the executive
branch: Watergate, the House banking scandal, lran-contra, the Abramoff
lobbying scandal, Bill and Monica, the invisible WMD in lraq, and so on.
In policy terms, candidates promise one thing at election time, but they
regularly fail to deliver and may even violate their promises once in office
(for example, George H. W. Bush's promise, "Read my lips, no new taxes").
In addition, some of the most distinguished members of Congress have
resigned from office, offering stinging indictments of the institution. As one
former representative said upon leaving the U.S. House: "May your mother
never find aut where you work."
Citizens and the Democratic Process 261
Such explanations of decreasing trust focus on the peculiar history of
the United States, or specific institutional features of American politics, but
we are not alone. The same trends are occurring in Great Britain, France,
Germany, and most other established democracies. Figure 12.2 tracks the
decline in the belief that politicians care what people think in aur set of four
nations.3 For example, 47 percent of the German public believed politicians
cared what they thought in 1972; by 2002, only 13 percent shared this
opinion. Similarly, in 1986 only 11 percent of the British public said they
never trusted the government-by 2010 this group had tripled in size (Curtice
2013).Other trends from these four nations generally display the same
pattern of decreasing trust in elected officials (Norris 2011; Mayer 2000).
Even more significant, public skepticism about politicians and government
officials is spreading to virtually all the advanced industrial democracies. A
cross-national inventory of questions measured support for politicians and
Qiiji!ilffl Do Politicians Care?
Belief that politicians care what people think has generally declined over time.
100
-- \ Great Britain
80 -~
-·-Cil
u
(/)
c:
Cil
·5
:E 60
oa.
Cii
~
o.r:.
:i::
Q) 40
•Cl
Cil
Germany
.......cQ)
eQ)
\ France
o.
20 „..
li ...••.. •ti
o
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Sources: United States, American National Election Studies, 1956-2008; Great Britain, 1974
Political Action Survey and British Social Attitudes Surveys, 1987-2000; Germany, German
Election Studies, 1969-2002; France, SOFRES Polls, 1977-97.
262 Chapter 12
government from national surveys in sixteen Western democracies (Dalton
2004; also see Norris 1999a, 2011a). Typically beginning in the late 1960s
or early 1970s, these trends show a downward slide in political support in
nearly alt the countries for which systematic long-term data are available.
Decreasing trust in government and elected officials is now commonplace in
contemporary democracies.
lt would be understandable if people had become frustrated with government
only after the 2008 recession and its consequences. However, the puzzle
is that this trend toward negativity occurred at a time when the political
systems of most advanced industrial societies were making real advances in
addressing the needs of their nations (for example, Bok 1996). In addition,
these trends have paralleled an apparent decrease in political corruption
and an increase in citizen access to politics. It was the best of times and the
worst of times. And now, when economic times are bad, dissatisfaction has
deepened.
Views of Political lnstitutions
Why do employees in the White House use the term "Mr. President" when
they talk to Barack Obama (I think Michelle can say "Barack")? In part, iťs
a matter of respect and etiquette. But this usage has a long tradition. The
logic is that people should think of the president as making decisions for
the nation rather than a person making individua! decisions. Thus, people
should respect the office of the president even if they don't like the person
or disagree with the policies.4
So our next question asks whether skepticism about political elites has
been generalized to more basic attitudes toward the institutions and strneture
of government. This question was first taken up by Arthur Miller
(1974a, 1974b) and Jack Citrín (1974). Miller argued that Americans were
generalizing their dissatisfaction with the repeated policy failures and political
scandals of government officials into broader criticism of the political
process. He spelled out the potentially grave consequences the loss of regime
support could have for the American political process.
Citrín felt that Miller was overstating the problem. He interpreted the
declines in political support as a sign of disenchantment with politicians in
general, not distrust in the system of American government. Citrín (1974,
987) claimed that "political systems, like baseball teams, have slumps and
winning seasons. Having recently endured a succession of losing seasons,
Americans boo the home team when it takes the field." He maintained that
these catcalls do not show deeper opposition to the game of government,
but only to the players in the lineup and their recent performance on the
field. Given a few new stars or a winning streak, the decline in public confidence
would reverse.
Citrin's cautiousness seemed warranted in 1974, but now, about four
decades later, public disenchantment continues. In addition, distrust has
Citizens and the Democratic Process 263
spread to the institutions of democratic government. One set of survey questions
taps public confidence in the people running major social, economic,
and political organizations: confidence in the leadership of virtually every
U.S. institution has tumbled downward. In the 1960s many Americans
expressed a fair amount of confidence in the executive branch (41 percent)
and Congress (42 percent), but these positive evaluations dropped substantially
over time (table 12.1). In 2012 only 15 percent of Americans had
confidence in the executive branch, and Congress fared even worse (7 percent).
Confidence in business, labor, higher education, organized religion,
the press, and the medical profession have suffered similar declines over the
past four decades. Separate trends from the Harris Poll show confidence in
Congress dropping to 6 percent in 2012 and confidence in the executive at
22 percent.
1ma1E11 lnstitutional Confidence
Confidence in the leadership of most American institutions has decreased since
the 1960s.
19605 19705 19805 19905 20005 2010 2012 DIFFERENCE
Medicine 72 54 50 45 41 42 39 -33
Higher 61 38 32 16 24 20 26 -35
education
Banks and 37 26 20 27 10 11 -26
finance
Military 62 37 33 41 49 54 55 -7
Organized 41 35 30 26 24 20 22 -19
religion
Supreme 50 35 32 33 34 31 29 -21
Court
Major cor- 55 26 27 25 20 13 17 -38
porations
Press 29 25 18 11 10 11 9 -20
Executive 41 19 18 14 15 17 15 -26
branch
Congress 42 17 14 10 13 10 7 -35
Organized 22 14 12 11 10 13 12 -10
labor
Average 48 31 27 22 24 22 23 -25
Sources: 1966 from Harris Poli; 1973-2012, General Social Surveys.
Note: Table entries are the percentages expressing a"great deal" of confidence in the people
running each institution.
264 Chapter 12
Furthermore, the drop in confidence in democratic institutions is not
unique to the United States. Opinion trends in other advanced industrial
democracies show that trust in the national legislature has fallen in most
democracies-including all four of our core nations (Dalton 2004, 37-39).
ln Germany, for example, the ALLBUS surveys find that those trusting the
Bundestag decreased from 50 percent in 1984 to only 26 percent in 2008.
Similar evidence is available for Britain and France.
The 2005-08 World Values Survey (WVS) compared confidence in institutions
across our four nations (see tahle 12.2).5
The question wording
and set of institutions differ from those in tahle 12.1, so the results are not
directly comparable. Still, the results present a familiar pattern: people have
little confidence in the institutions of representative democracy. Roughly a
third in each nation expresses "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence
in the national government or the national legislature. Perceptions of political
parties are even more critical. Based on the original six European Union
(EU) member states, the 2008 European Values Survey (EVS) found that
only 16 percent had confidence in political parties-far below the average
for the other social and political institutions it examined. In addition, despite
the downward trend in political support in all four nations, Americans
remain more trustful of political institutions.
People express more confidence in nonpolitical institutions of government,
such as the judiciai system or the civil service, than in the institutions
of representative democracy. This finding is ironie. The members of the U.S.
Supreme Court are not subject to election, and the justices serve for life; but
people are more positive about the Court than about elected government
Confidence in lnstitutions across Nations
Confidence in political institutions is low in all four nations, with Americans
more positive than Europeans.
UNITED GREAT
STATES BRITAIN FRANCE GERMANY
National government 41 34 29 27
National legislature 36 36 35 26
Courts 66 60 40 60
Civil service 61 46 54 34
Political parties 22 18 16 15
Press 26 14 39 34
Major companies 32 37 40 26
Labor unions 36 30 39 34
Environmental groups 59 70 65 60
Source: 2005-08 World Values Survey.
Note: Table entries are the percentages expressing "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence
in each institution. Missing data were excluded from the calculation of percentages.
Citizens and the Democratic Process 265
officials. These numbers suggest a growing public dissatisfaction with the
style of representative government and the actions of elected politicians.
Support for a Democratic Regime
If we return to Citrin's baseball analogy, the loss of trust in government and
political institutions can have even more fundamental implications. Iťs not
just that the home team has had a losing season (or two, or three). Rather, iťs
that people see most politicians and governments in most nations as suffering
a long-term losing streak. Presidents, prime ministers, and chancellors alike
have been replaced during this losing streak, but the skepticism continues.
At some point, we must worry that dissatisfaction about the team (the government
or the political institutions) generalizes to dissatisfaction with the game
itself (democracy and its values). Indeed, these doubts are growing. ln 1973, the
MORI poll showed that about half of the British public thought the political
system could be irnproved quite a lot; in 2010 this had increased by two-thirds.
Similarly, in 1988 the ALLBUS survey found that only 16 percent of Germans
described the political system as needing much reform or as already broken; by
1994 almost three tirnes as many people (44 percent) shared these sentiments.
If politics were a baseball game, this implies that people want to see changes
in the nature of the game and not just the players or managers in the dugout.
In earlier historical periods, dissatisfaction with politicians or political institutions
often led to (or arose from) disenchantment with the democratic process
itself. This was the case with the antidemocratic challenges that faced the United
States and many European democracies in the 1920s and 1930s. Even during
the years immediately following World War II, dissatisfaction with democracy
in Europe was often concentrated among antidemocratic extremists on the Left
or Right. If people lose faith in the norms and principles of the democratic process,
they may reject government authority or question whether democracy is
sustainable or desirable. Such sentirnents would place democracy at risk.
But the news is not all bad. The available evidence suggests that the current
situation is different from these historical examples. Support for democratic
norms and procedures have grown over the past generation--even
while trust in government has decreased. For example, long-term trends
indicate that people have become more politically tolerant during the postwar
period. Americans' tolerance of five potentially contentious social and
political groups has trended upward during the past four decades, and
expressed support for civil liberties is more common (Dalton 2009a, ch.
5; Nie, Junn, and Stehlík-Barry 1996).6
The extension of democratic rights
to women, racial and ethnic minorities, and homosexuals has profoundly
altered the politics of advanced industrial democracies within the span
of a generation (also see chapter 6). Other evidence points to the breadth
of democratic values among contemporary publics, especially among the
young (Thomassen 2007; Dalton 2009a). Ronald Ingleharťs (1990, 1997)
research on postmaterial value change also highlights the growing emphasis
on political and social participation as core value priorities. At least in
266 Chapter 12
principle, there is widespread public endorsement of the political values and
norms that underlie the democratic process.
To tap support for the principle of democracy and a democratic form of
government, opinion surveys typically ask whether democracy is the best
form of government compared to all the rest. Although we lack long-term
time series for this question, the current high degree of support suggests no
major erosion in these sentiments (table 12.3).7
On average, about 90 percent
of the public in advanced industrial democracies agree that democracy
is better than other forms of government (also see Inglehart 2003; Dalton
2004, ch. 2). Another question in the WVS/EVS asked about support for the
I ftjtji fJj Support for Democracy
The democratic ideal is almost universally supported in these nations.
DEMOCRACY IS BETIER THAN DEMOCRATIC SYSNATION
OTHER GOVERNMENTS TEM IS GOOD
Australia 87 89
Austria 96 92
Belgium 90 92
Canada 87 91
Denmark 99 99
Finland 96 92
France 93 91
Germany 94 90
Great Britain 89 87
Greece 97 97
lceland 96 96
Ireland 85 83
Italy 96 97
Japan 92 88
Netherlands 93 92
New Zealand 87 94
Norway 95 95
Portugal 93 93
Spain 96 96
Sweden 95 94
Switzerland 96 97
United States 88 86
Sources: 2008 European Values Survey; 1999-2002 and 2005-08 World Values Survey for
the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand.
Note: Table entries are the percentages agreeing with each statement. Missing data were
excluded from the calculation of percentages.
Citizens and the Democratic Process 267
idea of democracy. Assent to the statement "The democratic system is good"
shows that support is nearly universa! in Western democracies. Moreover, in
comparison to a Eurobarometer survey of the late 1980s, support for democratic
government has strengthened in most Western European nations.
ln summary, this evidence suggests that current expressions of political distrust
or disaffection are not a critique of democracy per se, as it was in the
past, but exist among citizens who remain committed to the democratic ideal.
Community Support
A final aspect of political support concerns orientations toward the political
community and society. Community support involves the system affect
described by Almond and Verba (1963). A strong emotional attachment to
the nation presumably provides a reservoir of diffuse support that can maintain
a political system through temporary periods of political stress. Most
Western democracies endured at the start of the Great Depression because
people had faith that democracy would address the problems, and such a
reservoir of popular identification helps a political system endure during
periods of crisis. One would expect national attachments to also help societies
manage the dislocations caused by the 2008 recession.
One measure of such feelings is pride in one's nation. Figure 12.3 displays
the percentages of citizens who feel very proud of their nation within
the advanced industrial democracies in the early 1980s and again in the
2005-08.8
Overall, feelings of national pride are relatively high, but with
significant national differences (Smith 2009).
National pride is exceptionally high in the United States: 76 percent of the
public in 1981 and 65 percent in 2005 felt "very proud" to be an American
(nearly all the rest felt "proud"). Those chants of USA! USA! USA! are not limited
to Olympie competition; they signify a persistent feeling among Americans.
Most Europeans voice their national pride in more moderate tones; the
relative raking of nations also has changed only marginally over time. Germans,
for example, were hesitant in their expressions of national pride in
the 1980s and are still today; the trauma of the Third Reich burned a deep
scar in the German psyche in both West and East. Young Germans especially
feel that the nationalist excesses of the past must never be repeated.
The Federal Republic therefore has avoided many of the emotional national
symbols that are common in other industrial nations. Germany celebrates
few political holidays or memorials; the national anthem is seldom played;
and even the anniversary of the founding of the Federal Republic attracts
little public attention. Although most people are proud to be German, they
refrain from any unquestioning emotional attachment to state and nation.
Beyond these cross-national variations, it's clear that national pride hasn't
eroded over the past few decades. These surveys suggest that national pride
is generally growing, which is surprising given the high baseline of opinions
in the first survey in the early 1980s. When longer time series are available
for specific nations, they too show a pattern or relative stability or growth
in national pride over time (for example, Smith 2009). As one should expect
268 Chapter 12
from affective feelings of toward the nation, these sentiments have been
relatively impervious to the erosion in other aspects of political support.
Qi§i'i!fll National Pride
Feelings of national pride vary widely across democracies.
1981-1983 2005-2008
80
Ireland
United States
New Zealand
Australia 70 Canada/Australia
Ireland Greece
United States/Portugal
Canada lceland
60 Norway
lceland Spain
Finland
Britain
Britain
Spain
50
Denmark
Austria
ltaly/Sweden
Swiss
Norway
Italy 40
Finland
France
France
Denmark/Japan/Sweden 30
Belgium Belgium
Netherlands
GermanyW. Japan
20 Germany
Netherlands
Sources: 1981-83 World Values Survey; 2005-08 World Values Survey; 2008 European Values
Survey.
Note: Figure entries are the percentages feeling "very proud" of their nation. Missing data
were excluded from the calculation of percentages.
Citizens and the Democratic Process 269
Dissatisfied Democrats
As previously noted, by some measures this time may be considered the
golden age of democracy. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, more
nations in the world have become or strive to be democracies than at any
other point in human history. Most of the other political ideologies that
once stood as major rivals to democracy, such as fascism and communism,
have lost their legitimacy. Democracy has brought peace, freedom, and
prosperity to billions of people in the world.
At the same time, people have grown more critical of political elites, more
negative toward political parties, and less confident of political institutionsand
their attitudes represent a basic change in the political norms of democratic
publics. The deference to authority and political allegiance that once
was common in many of these nations has been partially replaced by skepticism
about elites. In most democracies, people are more cynical about the
key institutions of democratic governance. At the same time, however, people
are simultaneously expressing strong support for the democratic creed.
These mixed sentiments produce a new pattern of "dissatisfied
democrats"- people who are dissatisfied with political institutions but supportive
of democratic principles (Klingemann 1999). Dissatisfied democrats
appear to be another characteristic of the new style of citizen politics,
although researchers debate this point.
The significance of the trends rests in part on what is shaping these new
citizen orientations. Political scientists interpret these trends in dramatically
different ways. The remainder of this section discusses the two contrasting
views of the changes.
The Democratic Elitist Perspective
One group of scholars cites widespread political dissatisfaction as evidence
ofa crisis of democracy (Zakaria 2003; Macedo et al. 2005; Wolfe 2006). Some
researchers claim that excessive public demands are overtaxing governments'
ability to satisfy them. Thus, these analysts use the elitist theory of democracy
(see chapter 2) to offer a solution to this crisis. In a crude exaggeration of democratic
theory, they maintain that if a supportive and quiescent public ensures
a smoothly functioning political system, then we must redevelop these traits in
contemporary publics. The centrifugal tendencies of democratic politics (and
the demands of the public) must be controlled, and political authority must be
reestablished. Samuel Huntington assumed the ermine robes as spokesperson
for this position when political trust first started to decline:
The problem of governance in the United States today stems from an
"excess of democracy." ... [T]he effective operation of a democratic
political system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement
on the part of some individuals and groups. The vulnerability
of democratic government in the United States comes ... from
the internal dynamics of democracy itself in a highly educated, mobilized,
and participatory society. (1975, 37-38)
270 Chapter 12
More recently, Fareed Zakaria (2003, 248) is even blunter in his critique
of American democracy: "What we need in politics today is not more
democracy, but less." There is limited research on the Tea Party movement
or the Occupy Wall Street movement, but I suspect these elitists would be
critical of both as excesses of populism.9
In short, these analysts maintain that a crisis of democracy has developed
because too many people want to apply its creed of liberty and equality
to themselves but democratic systems cannot meet these expectations. The
critics contend that democracy has become overloaded because minorities
are no longer apathetic, women are demanding equality, students are no
longer docile, and the average citizen is no longer deferential. If these groups
would only leave politics to the politicians-and their expert advisers"democracy"
would again be secure.10
Another element of the elitist perspective calls for a reduction in the scale
of government. These analysts argue that governments have assumed too
large a role in society, which contributes to the overload. This tenet was one
of the underpinnings of Thatcher's, Reagan's, and other neoconservatives'
attempts to limit the size of government starting in the 1980s and has been
revived in reaction to the economic strains we now face. However, such
calls for retrenchment are often biased in determining which programs the
government should no longer support; usually targeted for cuts are social
services or environmental programs rather than programs that benefit conservative
constituencies.
John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2002) claim that people want
to be less involved in government; they suggest that democracy be reformed
to spare them the burdens of democratic citizenship. This is a provocative
argument, but it runs counter to the study's own evidence as well as the
evidence presented here and in other research. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's
survey of American public opinion found that 86 percent favored more ballot
initiatives and an expansion of democracy (2002, 75). Similarly, the British
public strongly favors a variety of institutional reforms that will expand
citizen access and input into the political process, such as greater use of
referendums and direct election of local candidates (Curtice 2013).
Taken together, the cures offered by elitist theorists are worse than the
problem they address; democracy's very goals are ignored in its defense. The
critics of citizen politics forget that democracy means popular control of
elites, not elite control over the populace.
The New Politics Perspective
The New Politics perspective offers a contrasting image of contemporary
democracy. Political dissatisfaction has generally increased the most
among the young and the better educated-those who disproportionately
hold New Politics values and who benefit most from the social modernization
of advanced industrial societies (Klingemann 1999; Dalton 2004, ch.
5; Dalton and Welzel 2013). These individuals have higher expectations
Citizens and the Democratic Process 271
of government: they are more demanding of politicians and more critical
of how the process functions. Because they follow politics and are more
concerned about what government does, they hold government to a higher
standard than people did in the past.
Consequently, dissatisfied democrats may represent another step in
democracy's progress toward its ideals. Just as earlier periods of dissatisfaction
led to the expansion of the mass franchise, the granting of voting rights
to women, and populist reforms that strengthened the democratic process,
we may be in a new period of democratic reform.
The link between postmaterial value change and the growth of dissatisfied
democrats is illustrated in figure 12.4. The figure shows that postmaterialists
are distinctly less likely than materialists to express confidence
in government. At the same time, postmaterialists are much more likely
to believe that democracy is a good thing. Only 48 percent of materialists
in our four care nations strongly agree that democracy is a good form of
government, compared to 65 percent of postmaterialists.11
Postmaterialists
therefore illustrate the creedal passion in support for democracy that
some analysts lament-but that offers the potential for democracy to move
toward its theoretical ideal, on the horizon.
W§l!i!fji Changing Expectations
Postmaterialists are more supportive of democratic principles but express less
confidence in their govemments.
Cl
c
"iii
70
60
~ 50
Cil
<I>
~
a5 40
e<I>
a..
30
Democracy a good system
Confidence in government
2o_j_::::===============::::;.~~~~~~~~------,
Materlist Mixed Postmaterialist
Source: Combined data from United States, Britain, France, and Germany from the 2005-08
World Values Survey.
Note: Figure plots the percentages of those strongly agreeing that democracy is a good system
of government and those who are confident in the national government.
272 Chapter 12
In short, the New Politics approach offers a different diagnosis of current
patterns of political support. People today are better informed and more
highly skilled than previous electorates, and they carry different expectations
about how the democratic process should function. People are also
more conscious of their political rights and more demanding in their individualism.
The new style of citizen politics encourages a diversity of political
interests (issue publics), instrumental choice in contrast to the affective
partisan loyalty of the past, and more direct styles of political action.
Dissatisfied democrats are also likely to change their patterns of political
participation to use protest, direct action, and other forms of contentious
action (chapter 4). These new forms of activism often strain the democratic
process, as demonstrators challenge established political elites and current
government structures. The rise of new social movements and citizen interest
groups further institutionalizes the changing nature of citizen politics.
These groups change the style of interest representation, because people can
focus their efforts on specific policy concerns-and work through methods
of direct action. (One might add the creation of an omnipresent mass media
to this change in the pattern of politics.) Public interest groups also present a
challenge to political parties and the established processes of representative
government. The structures of representative democracy that were created
in the late 1800s often seem ill suited to deal with the plethora of new interests,
articulated in new ways and functioning by new rules.
Democratic governments need to accommodate the changing patterns of
citizen politics. For example, the structured system of representative democracy
limits the potential for citizen participation, especially in Western
Europe. Opportunities for electoral input are scandalously low for most
Europeans; the option to cast only a few votes during a multiyear electoral
cycle is not an admirable democratic record. Moreover, beyond elections,
many democracies offer their citizens few ways to participate in the
decisions of government that affect their lives. Indeed, governments often
shielded themselves from public scrutiny and intentionally limited the direct
impact of the citizenry-as in the constitutional structure initially devised
by the founders of the United States (or the constitutional structure of many
European parliamentary systems). The fundamental structure of contemporary
democratic institutions was developed in the nineteenth century-and
society has changed a good deal since then.
The emphasis on new forms of citizen access and influence is not simply a
call for participation for participation's sake. Expanding citizen participation
can open up political systems that have become sclerotized by corporatist policymaking,
political cartels, and bureaucratized administration. The triumvirate
of business-labor-government in many advanced industrial democracies often
restricts the political interests of other groups. A system that distorts access to
the political process is necessarily inefficient in meeting all of society's needs.
Opening up the political process may also prompt governments to
become more responsive to a broader spectrum of political demands. This
method doesn't increase the quantity of political demands-the needs of the
environment, women, consumers, and other groups exist-but it ensures
Citizens and the Democratic Process 273
that the demands receive fair attention from the government and thereby
improves the governmenťs ability to address all societal needs.
Greater political involvement also educates citizens in the democratic process.
James Wright (1976, 260) noted a basic irony in the elitists' criticisms
of citizen participation. The democratic elitists believe that governments can
generate more support by convincing citizens of a lie (a sense of political
efficacy that is fictitious) than by encouraging citizens to participate and
learn of the necessary limits to their influence. The "big lie" may work for
a while, but as soon as someone points out the gap between myrh and reality,
the political credibility of the system falters. lt happened to the Eastern
European governments in 1989-91. Cali it co-optation, pragmatism, or Jeffersonian
idealism, but involving citizens in the democratic process is one
method to increase their identification with the process.
Finally, greater citizen input ultimately ensures the quality of government
decision making. There is some evidence that an active, critical citizenry
leads to better governance (Geissel 2008; Putnam 1993). As we noted in
chapter 1, Thomas Jefferson viewed the public as the major constraint on
the potential excesses of government officials. Citizen participation is not,
however, a panacea for all of modem society's ills; even educated, informed,
and politically involved citizens will still make errors in judgment. As Benjamin
Barber (1984, 151) also noted,
Democracy doesn't place endless faith in the capacity of individuals to
govern themselves, but it affirms with Machiavelli that the multitude
will on the whole be as wise or wiser than princes, and with Theodore
Roosevelt that "the majority of plain people will day in and day out
make fewer mistakes in governing themselves than another smaller
body of men will make in trying to govern them."
Since I presented this evaluation of contemporary democratic politics in
the first edition of Citizen Politics, the calls for political reform have become
more commonplace. And there are encouraging signs that politicians and
governments are responding.
Significant institutional reforms are restructuring the democratic process
(Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003; G. Smith 2009). Many nations are
reforming administrative procedures to give citizen groups access to the formerly
closed processes of policy administration. In Germany local citizen
action groups have won changes in administrative law to allow for citizen
participation in local administrative processes. Similar reforms in the United
States offer individua! citizens and citizen groups greater access to the political
process. New Freedom of Information laws and ombudsman offices are
making government more transparent and accessible to its citizens (Cain,
Fabrinni, and Egan 2003).
Other forms of direct democracy are also more apparent. Citizen groups
in the United States and Europe are making greater use of referendums to
involve the public directly in policymaking (Pállinger et al 2007; Bowler
and Glazer 2008). More individua! citizens and public interest groups are
274 Chapter 12
turning to the courts to guarantee their rights of democratic access and
influence (G. Smith 2009; Cichowski and Stone Sweet 2003). Environmentalists
in many nations have gained legal standing in the courts so they can
sue to curb the harmful actions of municipalities or government agencies.
Reforms can be seen within the structured system of party government.
The formation of new parties is one sign of adaptation, but even the established
parties are changing internally to give their members more influence.
The term limits movement is one expression of these reformist sentiments.
A majority of U.S. states have now enacted some type of term limits legislation,
normally through citizen initiatives.
These institutional changes are difficult to accomplish. They proceed at a
slow pace and often have unintended consequences. But once implemented,
they restructure the whole process of making policy that extends beyond
a single issue or a single policy agenda. The degree of institutional change
during the past three decades rivals the reformist surge of the Populist movement
of the early 1990s (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003). The processes
of contemporary democracies are being transformed to reflect the new style
of citizen politics.
Indeed, these adaptations reflect the ability of democracy to grow and
evolve; the lack of such adaptivity is what brought about the downfall of
communism. As German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf noted,
What we have to do above all is to maintain that flexibility of democratic
institutions which is in some ways their greatest virtue: the
ability of democratic institutions to implement and effect change
without revolution-the ability to react to new problems in new
ways- the ability to develop institutions rather than change them
all the time- the ability to keep the lines of communication open
between leaders and led- and the ability to make individuals count
above all. (1975, 194)
Such change in the style of representative democracy is not without
risk. The political process may experience some growing pains as it adjusts
to greater citizen participation, especially in the more tightly structured
European political systems.
A skeptical public is likely to act differently (Hetherington 2005). Public
opinion surveys suggest that people who think their government wastes tax
money and is unresponsive to their interests may feel they are justified in
fudging a bit on their taxes or bending the law in other ways. The skeptical
citizen may also be hesitant to serve on a jury or perform other public service
activities. In short, political support is part of the social contract that enables
democracies to act without coercion and with the voluntary compliance of
the citizenry. Decreasing support erodes this part of the social contract.
Another potential problem is the possibility of a growing participation
gap between sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens (see chapter 3).
Citizens and the Democratic Process 275
Because the resources required to lobby government directly or to organize
a public interest group are greater than those required to vote, a change in
the style of political activity may leave behind those in society who lack the
education and other skills and resources needed for direct action politics.
Democracies must also face the challenge of balancing greater responsiveness
to specific interests against the broader interests of the nation. In
the vernacular of political science, we have seen a dramatic increase in the
expression of interests over the past generation but an erosion in the ability
to integrate these interests in coherent government programs. ln other
words, citizen interest groups, social movements, individua! citizens, and
various political groups are now more vocal about their political interests
and have greater access to the democratic process. At the same time, political
institutions struggle to balance contending interests-and to make interest
groups sensitive to the collective needs of society. The collective interest
is more than just the sum of individual interests, and one of the pressing
needs for contemporary democracies is to find new ways to bring diverse
interests together.
Participatory democracy can produce political overkill, but it also contains
an equilibrium mechanism to encourage political balance. ln the long
political history of the United States, the process has generally succeeded in
retaining the benefits of new ideas while avoiding the ominously predicted
excesses of democracy. We should remember that democratic politics is not
supposed to maximize government efficiency or to increase the autonomy
of political elites. Just the opposite. In fact, efficiency is partially sacrificed
to ensure a more important goal: popular control of elites. Expanding participation
is not a problem but an opportunity for the advanced industrial
democracies to come doser to matching their democratic ideals.
ln summary, the current crisis of democracy is really just another stage
in the ongoing history of democracy's development. Democracies need to
adapt to present-day politics and to the new style of citizen politics. As
Dahrendorf (2000, 311) has observed, "Representative government is no
longer as compelling a proposition as it once was. Instead, a search for new
institutional forms to express conflicts of interest has begun." This process
of democratic experimentation and reform may be threatening to some, and
it does present a risk-but change is necessary. The challenge to democracies
is to discover whether they can continue to evolve, to guarantee political
rights, and to increase the ability of citizens to control their lives. Can we
move democracy doser to its theoretical ideals?
Suggested Readings
Dalton, Russell. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The
Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
276 Chapter 12
Dalton, Russell, and Christian Welzel, eds. 2013. The Civic Cu/ture
Transformed: Prom Allegiant to Assertive Citizens. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Hetherington, Marc. 2005. Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust
and the Demise ofAmerican Liberalism. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Hibbing, John, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. Stealth Democracy:
Americans' Beliefs about How Government Should Work. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa. 2011. Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic
Governance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Nye, Joseph, Philip Zelikow, and David King. 1997. Why People Don't
Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pharr, Susan, and Robert Putnam, eds. 2000. Disaffected Democracies:
WhaťsTroubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: PrincetonUniversity
Press.
Notes
1. ln the mid-1980s, Samuel Huntington (1984) was explaining why there
would be no more democracies in the world, a theme consistent with
his elitist view of democracy. By the end of the decade, he was describing
democratization as a wave that was transforming the international
order (Huntington 1991).
2. The argument is also made that diffuse regime support existed in other
Western democracies in the 1930s and that dissatisfaction focused only
on the performance of political elites. These beliefs were channeled
within the political process, and the basic structure of democratic government
persisted in the United States, Britain, and France.
3. The question wording and coding categories differ slightly across
nations, so one shouldn't directly compare the cross-national levels
of support in the figure. For such comparisons, see Norris (2011) and
tables 12.2 and 12.3 in this chapter.
4. Watch old episodes of the television program West Wing. ln seven seasons,
there are only a handful of times when anyone except his immediate
family doesn't address Jed Bartlett as "Mr. President."
5. For a more extensive comparison of confidence in institutions, see
Dalton (2004) and Norris (2011).
6. Some counter evidence is apparent for Britain, where the British Social
Attitudes survey shows a drop in tolerance and civil liberties in 2005
Citizens and the Democratic Process 277
(Johnson and Gearty 2007). But a good deal of time has passed since
the previous survey, and the 2005 result may have been affected by the
terrorist attacks in London that occurred in the midst of the interviewing
for the survey.
7. The two questions were as follows: "Democracy may have problems
but iťs better than any other form of government. Do you agree or disagree?"
and "Would you say iťs a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or
very bad way of governing this country: Having a democratic political
system?"
8. The 2005-08 World Values Survey shows little change for the four core
nations: United States (93 percent), Britain (86 percent), France (86
percent), and Germany (68 percent). The question was asked, "How
proud are you to be (nationality)?" The responses were (1) very proud,
(2) quite proud, (3) not very proud, and (4) not at all proud. The figure
presents the "very proud" and "proud" responses.
9. ln fact, throughout 2011 Zakaria used his appearances on CNN to call
the Tea Party antidemocratic and a threat to democracy; then various
Fox News reporters were equally critical about Occupy Wall Street.
10. Huntington's advice on limiting political demands overlooks the possibility
of constraining the input of Harvard professors, corporate
executives, and the upper class. His focus solely on the participation of
average citizens suggests that he has confused the definitions of plutocracy
and democracy.
11. These results are from the 2005-08 World Values Survey combining
results from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany. The
democracy item asks about approval of a democratic form of government;
the confidence in government question is the same as presented
in tahle 12.2.