

*The EU in Africa: Increasing Coherence,  
Decreasing Partnership*

The relationship between the European Union and Africa has undergone major changes since the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, the Cotonou Agreement, adopted in June 2000, brought transformations to the long-standing relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, particularly in the areas of foreign aid and trade. These transformations not only ended a system of preferential treatment, but also put a strain on the traditional partnership that had characterized the Lomé Convention. Second, the EU-Africa summit held in Cairo in April 2000 marked the EU's intention to pursue a continent-wide approach and to politicize its relations with Africa. The 2005 EU's Africa strategy and the 2007 joint Africa-EU strategy aimed to integrate trade, foreign aid, and political affairs in order to create a coherent EU foreign policy and give new emphasis to the idea of partnership. In reality, the second EU-Africa summit held in Lisbon in December 2007 showed that the two parties were pursuing different goals.

Against this background, this chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first section looks at EU-Africa relations in the context of the various EU-ACP conventions, with a focus on the Cotonou Agreement. Three areas of particular relevance are analyzed: the introduction and implementation of multi-year programming; the involvement of nonstate actors (NSAs) in the development process; and the negotiation of new economic partnership agreements (EPAs). The second section examines the evolution of EU-Africa relations since the Cairo summit. The conventional argument is that the partnership and the extended privileges that had distinguished the EU's approach to Africa from the 1960s through the 1990s have been replaced by a more normal relationship. However, although the new relationship puts an apparent emphasis on African ownership and responsibility, it often hides the pursuit of European interests. An

important component of this chapter is to understand the type of role that the European Union plays or wants to play in this process.

### **EU-ACP Relations between Rome and Cotonou**

The EU's policy toward Africa has its origin in the Treaty of Rome and has evolved through a number of agreements. Initially influenced by France, it was limited to francophone Africa and then, following the first EU enlargement in the early 1970s, was extended to cover the African members of the British Commonwealth, as well as other former colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The Yaoundé Convention (1963–75) maintained the system introduced by the Treaty of Rome: an aid allocation for five years, channeled through the European Development Fund (EDF), and a trade regime based on reciprocal preferences.

The ensuing Lomé Convention (1975–2000), negotiated at five-year intervals (Lomé II in 1980, Lomé III in 1985, Lomé IV in 1990, and Lomé IV-bis in 1995), was initially considered the most comprehensive, innovative, and ambitious agreement for North-South cooperation. First, it was conceived as a partnership: decisions were not imposed by the EU, but discussed and agreed with the ACP governments. A set of joint institutions was also established to ensure a permanent dialogue between the parties.<sup>1</sup> Second, it was based on a “contractual right to aid”: resources were committed to the ACP countries for a five-year period, irrespective of performance. Third, it reversed the previous trade regime to allow nonreciprocal preferences: almost all ACP goods entered the EU free of tariff or quota restrictions.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, the development record of the Lomé Convention was disappointing. Although a small number of ACP countries managed to improve their level of development, the conditions of the majority worsened. The progressive inclusion of economic and political conditionalities meant that by the mid-1990s the Lomé Convention was “no longer the model of development cooperation to which other agreements could aspire” and that “the unique features of the Convention have been so diluted and undermined as to become almost indistinguishable from other development aid programs.”<sup>3</sup>

Following a long period of consultation and negotiations, the Cotonou Agreement was signed in June 2000. It built on the Lomé *acquis*, but in several respects it represented a fundamental departure from it.<sup>4</sup> The major changes were as follows: aid allocation would be made conditional not only on needs but also on performance through a system of rolling programming; new free trade agreements, the so-called economic partnership agreements, to be negotiated and agreed on a regional basis before January 2008, would replace the previous preferential trade regime; nonstate actors (for example, civil society, social

groups, business associations) would be involved in all phases of the development process; the political dimension, which included issues that had previously fallen outside the field of development cooperation (peace and security, arms trade, migration, drugs, corruption) would be reinforced.<sup>5</sup>

These changes had profound implications. Adopting a neo-Gramscian perspective, Stephen Hurt argued that the nature of the relationships between the EU and the ACP shifted from “cooperation” to “coercion.”<sup>6</sup> The new trade arrangements and the need to comply with the principles and rules of the WTO were a reflection of the hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism. Kunibert Raffer argued that in the new Cotonou Agreement the idea of real partnership is largely absent: “The present ‘partnership’ is an Orwellian relation where one partner has no rights at all, the other perfect arbitrariness. It is a horse and rider relation, as the rider also depends on the horse as a means of transport while ACP countries appear to be a historical burden the EU might not be unhappy to get rid of.”<sup>7</sup>

Less than two years after it had come into force (because of the protracted process of ratification), the Cotonou Agreement was revised in February 2005. The overall structure was not altered, but the changes largely reflected the EU’s priorities. Security became a central concern, and the new provisions in this area—such as combating terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), preventing mercenary activities, and committing to the International Criminal Court (ICC)—were strongly criticized by African countries. The EU’s proposal to introduce further flexibility into the EDF allocations so that funds could be made available to meet exceptional needs in the event of crises was also opposed by African countries out of fear that funds would be diverted from socioeconomic development to security-oriented programs. Nevertheless, a larger reserve was instituted, with the possibility to alter the amounts allocated for each country or region in light of special needs or exceptional performance or to cover international initiatives benefiting the whole ACP group.<sup>8</sup>

### *Foreign Aid*

One of the most important components of the Cotonou Agreement is the reform of aid management. Resources are disbursed using a three-step process. First, a draft country strategy paper (CSP) and an accompanying national indicative program (NIP) are prepared by the EU delegation in collaboration with local governments and nonstate actors, the EU’s member states, and other international donors. The CSP offers an analysis of a country’s situation and outlines the development strategy based on the EU’s comparative advantage, while the NIP provides a detailed account of how resources must be spent.<sup>9</sup>

Second, the draft documents are scrutinized by an interservice Quality Support Group (iQSG) and then by the EU member states in the EDF committee. Third, the CSP and NIP are adopted by the College of Commissioners. The CSP and the NIP can be adjusted in the course of the mid-term review (MTR) process, which is meant to assess how recipients have performed in the implementation of the development strategy.

The assessment of the first-generation CSPs produced mixed results. A report published by the European Commission in November 2002 emphasized the successful efforts to ensure coordination and complementarity between the EU and the member states and to involve NSAs in the programming process. Little analysis was devoted to how the money was used or how the EU aid contributed to poverty eradication.<sup>10</sup> A less optimistic view came from a number of assessments supported by European nonstate actors. The most important point concerns the contribution of the CSPs to poverty eradication. Budget support, which prioritizes human development, had indeed increased. But despite the fact that sub-Saharan Africa is the region that is the furthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), only a very small number of CSPs identified education and health as focal sectors. Moreover, the failure to mainstream gender implied that the EU's contribution to the fight against HIV/AIDS and child mortality was not optimal. Support to the transport sector, by contrast, appeared in a larger number of CSPs. While the European Commission often emphasizes that transport benefits poverty eradication, in a large number of cases the EU supported the building of international roads, which, unlike rural roads, are usually not driven by pro-poor interests.<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, during the mid-term reviews conducted in 2004, limited changes were made to the existing development strategies.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, new emphasis was given to political issues, such as the fight against terrorism, the protection of human rights, the promotion of democracy, and the prevention of migration.<sup>13</sup> Even the European Commission acknowledged this time that "there is obviously a tension between new policy commitments defined unilaterally by the EU and the principle of country ownership of national development strategies and donor support to them."<sup>14</sup>

The preparation of the second-generation CSPs for Africa started in early 2006. Although the revised Cotonou Agreement included the achievement of the MDGs as the key objective of the EU's development policy for Africa, initial evidence seemed to show that there was "a very distinct de-prioritization of the MDGs" and that the priorities set by the EU still dominated the various strategies. It should also be noted that the CSPs are developed worldwide at the same time and do not respect the economic and business cycles of the country in question. The involvement of local governments was in most cases

limited to the trade and transport ministries, whereas the social ministries were rarely consulted.<sup>15</sup> The EU delegations often imposed their priorities; in some instances the ACP officials even saw the programming process as a serious challenge to their sovereignty.<sup>16</sup>

### *Participation*

The new provisions on the participation of nonstate actors in the development process are another major innovation of the Cotonou Agreement. NSAs, which include business associations, social partners, and civil society, must be involved in all phases of the programming process, including the elaboration of the CSPs and the NIPs, the mid-term reviews, and the final evaluation.<sup>17</sup> They must also be provided with financial resources, to be agreed on during the programming process; up to a maximum of 15 percent of the initial NIP allocation could be directly allocated to nonstate actors. These provisions, according to Jean Bossuyt, were important because they contributed to strengthening the role of NSAs in countries where a participatory culture was largely absent and to enhancing their visibility and the credibility of civil society in relation to governments.<sup>18</sup>

By contrast, Stephen Hurt argues that the EU's new emphasis on civil society should be understood as part of the neoliberal nature of its relations with developing countries, which supports the retrenchment of the state, the promotion of the private sector, and the greater integration of developing countries into the global economy.<sup>19</sup> Claims to partnership and participation are thus designed to give legitimacy to the Western model of democracy and to create conditions that are conducive to the operation of a liberal market democracy. For these reasons, Hurt argues, participation is often limited to those actors that support the EU approach.

The first opportunity to assess the practice of participation was in the context of the ninth EDF programming process. According to the European Commission, in almost all countries some form of consultation took place. In half of the cases, the draft CSP was changed, though nothing is said about whether the changes were due to the involvement of the NSAs. In the remaining cases, no changes were introduced because of a coincidence of intents between the NSAs and the recipient governments, a lack of capacity by the NSAs to participate in the programming process, and significant delays in the consultation process. This trend was broadly confirmed in the case of the mid-term reviews, when similar problems were faced. A number of reports funded by European NGOs offered a more critical view. Several limitations were shown: a too-short period set aside for consultation and invitations on short notice; ad hoc instead of institutionalized dialogue; a limited range of NSAs involved, with urban NGOs

and private sector groups privileged; limited information provided before the meeting and insufficient reporting back to NSAs on the results of the consultations; government-led discussions.<sup>20</sup>

This situation did not change significantly in the context of the tenth EDF programming exercise. Again, the European Commission claimed that “effective consultation” occurred in about half of the countries, whereas in the remaining cases dialogue was ad hoc and consultation took the form of information sessions at a late stage in the process.<sup>21</sup> A number of case studies written by African NGOs maintained that the programming exercise failed to adequately involve nonstate actors. While some forms of consultation occurred, the exercise was neither inclusive nor comprehensive. In most instances, there was a lack of transparency in the selection of participants, inadequate provision of preparatory documents, and little feedback on the results.<sup>22</sup>

### *Trade*

The most controversial innovation of the Cotonou Agreement is in the area of trade. The European Commission argued that the existing preferential regime had to be replaced by regional free trade agreements, compatible with the WTO rules. The aim of these new trade arrangements was to accelerate the integration of the ACP countries into the global economy by enhancing production and the capacity to attract investment, while taking into account different development levels. During the negotiations in the Council of Ministers, various options were on the table, such as preserving the status quo by asking the World Trade Organization (WTO) for a waiver or integrating the whole ACP group into the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).<sup>23</sup>

In the end, the European Commission presented the establishment of regional economic partnership agreements as the most feasible option. The preferences of the member states broadly reflected their approach and traditions in international development. On one side, France wanted to preserve the integrity of the ACP group and the existing trade regime; it also wanted to avoid trade liberalization as a way to protect its agricultural sector. On the opposite side, Germany wanted to “normalize” relations between the EU and the developing world and therefore suggested regrouping the ACP states into three regions. Trade liberalization and regional integration would complement this project. In the middle, the United Kingdom and the Nordic states shared concerns about the potential marginalization of the least-developed countries (LDCs) caused by the proposed free trade agreements. The final compromise softened the initial proposal by granting an extended interim period before the EPAs entered into force in January 2008, and by maintaining trade privileges for “essentially all products” coming from the LDCs.<sup>24</sup>

Using a two-level game theory, Geneva Forwood argues that the EU's margin to maneuver in the negotiations with the ACP was restricted by its negotiating mandate, which had been the result of a compromise that could not easily be changed.<sup>25</sup> On the contrary, the ACP group, rather than playing a proactive part in the negotiations, often reacted against the EU mandate. The weakness of the ACP group can be explained by the lack of a coherent and firm position, which followed the rule "the more, the better." It should be added, however, that the ACP group is a more informal entity than the EU; it also lacks a strong supranational institution. The ACP Secretariat had no formal role in the negotiations, whereas the European Commission played a key role.

The EU's mandate and subsequent negotiation strategy, therefore, were heavily influenced by the achieved compromise. The European Commission, with the Directorate-General for Trade in the lead, drafted a "vague" negotiation mandate that left little room for changes during the Council discussions. Some member states (Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom) were still critical of the mandate and expressed their doubts in the official minutes of the meeting, a highly unusual practice in EU trade politics. The negotiation mandate was agreed to unanimously in June 2002 because all the member states wanted to present a united front to the outside world. Negotiations with six regional groups—four for Africa, one for the Caribbean, and one for the Pacific—started in September 2002, but for a few years there was little publicity and only marginal involvement by the member states.

The negotiations conducted by the Directorate-General for Trade emphasized the trade aspect of the EPAs to the detriment of the development side. Still, it was surprising that in March 2005 the United Kingdom issued a statement in which it urged the EU to stop its "mercantilist approach and offensive interests." This statement was followed by some "non-papers" (informal discussion documents) underlying the social and development aspects of the EPAs sent to the Council committee in charge of monitoring the negotiations.<sup>26</sup> The majority of African countries acted passively since they perceived the European Commission to be ignoring the concerns of the developing world.

As time passed and the ACP countries and NGOs became more dissatisfied, additional member states publicly criticized the Commission's approach. In March 2005 the U.K. trade and development secretaries issued a very critical statement that was immediately censured by the European Commission. This statement was not coordinated with the "friends of EPAs," a group that included Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and sometimes Ireland, Belgium, and France. They became more vocal in the Council group that monitored the EPA negotiations, emphasizing the development and social dimension of the EPAs. This behavior started to have its effects, and the European Commission

was forced to take into account these heterodox views.<sup>27</sup> By the autumn of 2007, it was clear that no full EPA would be signed with African countries. This meant that the LDCs would be subject to the provisions of the “everything but arms” (EBA) regulation and non-LDCs were subject to the Generalized System of Preferences. Some alternatives to the EPAs were requested, such as the extension of the previous preferential regime through the prolongation of the WTO waiver and the granting of GSP+ (duty-free access to European goods in addition to the preferences extended by the standard GSP) to all ACP countries. The European Commission stated that there were no alternatives to the EPAs. Many African countries continued to denounce the pressure exercised by the European Commission, which was contrary to the partnership principle. It was not surprising that, by the agreed deadline, no full EPA had been signed with any African region.

### **EU-Africa Relations between Cairo and Lisbon**

With the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and the institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it became clear that the European Union wanted to play a significant role in international politics. The Treaty of Maastricht also introduced the principle of coherence, which referred to the fact that all EU external policies must work in synergy. Africa became the natural place to exercise these ambitions. Traditional EU policy toward Africa had to broaden its original goals from foreign aid and trade preferences to include more political issues, such as democracy, human rights, and conflict prevention and management.<sup>28</sup>

Moreover, the adoption of the European Consensus on Development in December 2005 committed member states and the European Community to a common view on the promotion of international development. The Africa strategy became the first opportunity to operationalize the European Consensus on Development.<sup>29</sup> The evolution of EU-Africa relations was also strongly influenced by events in Africa. The adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the setting up of the African Union (AU) reassured the international community that African leaders wanted to take ownership in their future.<sup>30</sup>

This context contributes to understanding why, since the beginning of the 2000s, the European Union has attempted to pursue a unitary policy toward the entire African continent, under the slogan “one Europe, one Africa.” This task was not easy. In addition to relations with the members of the ACP group, the EU had developed formal relationships with North Africa through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),



and with South Africa through the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). Moreover, the EU member states had different development priorities that were not easy to reconcile.

The first EU-Africa summit in 2000 was an initial attempt to address these issues. One of the unofficial messages of the summit was that Europe cared about Africa, but not enough to commit new resources.<sup>31</sup> European representatives placed more emphasis on political issues, notably democracy and peace and security, while African representatives concentrated on economic aspects, notably trade and aid.<sup>32</sup> The ensuing Cairo plan of action laid out the main aims of the new Africa-EU dialogue: to strengthen political, economic, and sociocultural relations between the EU and Africa; to eradicate poverty and attain the MDGs; and to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.<sup>33</sup>

New plans were made for a second meeting in Lisbon in April 2003, but the summit was postponed owing to lack of agreement over the presence of Robert Mugabe and other Zimbabwean leaders. The EU member states did not want to allow President Mugabe to enter the EU area and urged African leaders to take a stronger stance against his poor record on human rights and democratic practices. African leaders, however, argued that it was not possible to hold a meeting without representation from all the African states.<sup>34</sup> In the absence of a more formalized dialogue at the highest political level, the European Commission tried to pursue an alternative strategy, such as holding regular meetings between senior officials.

Meanwhile, Africa had taken a central place on the global as well as the European agenda, as confirmed by a number of important initiatives and commitments. Following the report of the Commission for Africa, the United Kingdom was instrumental in the adoption of the Gleneagles commitments on foreign aid and debt relief. At the European level, under the leadership of the European Commission, in April 2005 the EU decided to boost its volume of aid, including doubling development assistance to Africa by 2010. In the same context, a new ambitious agenda was agreed to on policy coherence for development.<sup>35</sup>

A number of decisions and initiatives confirmed that the European Union saw its involvement in conflict prevention and management as necessary to become a significant player in Africa. In June 2003 the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution authorizing the presence of EU military forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to some this was meant to show that, following the failures in the context of the war in Iraq, the EU member states were still willing and able to work together. In March 2004 a decision to establish the Africa Peace Facility concluded a long discussion on the importance of tackling conflict prevention as a precondition to development.<sup>36</sup>

*The EU's Africa Strategy*

Following up on the April 2005 initiatives and a specific request of the June 2005 European Council, the European Commission published a communication in which the central concern was the achievement of the MDGs. Peace, security, and good governance were also seen as preconditions to development. These views were emphasized even more in a paper written by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, in which he argued that peace and security were not only central to the new EU's strategy for Africa but also to the CFSP.<sup>37</sup>

In December 2005, the European Council adopted a rather short document entitled "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership." This new EU Africa strategy, which set up a single framework for all EU players (that is, the European Commission, its member states, and nonstate actors), rested on three elements: (1) peace, security, and good governance as preconditions to development; (2) a central role for regional integration and trade in fostering economic growth; and (3) the need for better access to social services (such as health and education) and environmental sustainability in order to achieve the MDGs by 2015.<sup>38</sup>

The EU Africa strategy did not, however, result in any new commitment by Europe to support Africa's efforts to develop. For instance, it was decided that the strategy would be implemented with existing financial resources, while major emphasis was placed on non-aid policies through the ambitious agenda on policy coherence for development.<sup>39</sup> Integration into the world trading system would be ensured through the new EPAs. Finally, the EU's Africa strategy did not mention the issue of political conditionality, but the EU spelled out its support of the African peer-review mechanism (APRM), an instrument for assessing governments' progress toward democracy and the protection of human rights.<sup>40</sup>

But the EU's Africa strategy was criticized not only for its lack of ambitions, but also because it was agreed without adequate consultation of all stakeholders. On the European side, the drafting process was led by the European Commission and the British Presidency, with the remaining member states and nonstate actors playing a marginal role, if any. On the African side, there was limited consultation outside the AU Commission.<sup>41</sup> In light of this criticism, at the EU-AU ministerial meeting in Bamako in December 2005 it was agreed to develop a new joint EU-Africa strategy—"a partnership *with* Africa, rather than a strategy *for* Africa."<sup>42</sup> This time the drafting process was more participatory. Negotiations started in February 2007 and an earlier draft was approved in May 2007. The final version was presented at the second EU-Africa summit in December 2007.

The joint Africa-EU strategy was a much longer and comprehensive document than its predecessor. The starting point was the idea of a "new strategic partnership" based on a "Euro-African consensus on values, common interests

and common strategic objectives.” Four main objectives were included: (a) to address issues of common concern, in particular peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment; (b) to strengthen and promote peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, and sustainable development, and to ensure that all African countries meet the MDGs by 2015; (c) to jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, making sure that the system of global governance is more representative, and to tackle global challenges together; (d) to promote people-centered development, including a better involvement of nonstate actors.

To meet these objectives, a very detailed action plan for the 2008–10 period was adopted, including eight EU-Africa partnerships: peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; trade and regional integration (including the implementation of the EU-Africa Partnership for Infrastructure, launched in 2006); Millennium Development Goals; energy; climate change; migration, mobility, and employment; and science, information society, and space. In sum, as Siegmar Schmidt has cogently argued, there was hardly any field where EU and Africa were not meant to cooperate.<sup>43</sup>

Unavoidably, the EU’s renewed interest in Africa cannot be separated from the threats coming from China’s heavy involvement in Africa as well as the new strategic interest of the United States. Moreover, although the joint Africa-EU strategy was a comprehensive document, the result of an extensive dialogue between European and African actors, the EU’s motivations and views were still dominant. The Lisbon summit was overshadowed once again by the debate over the presence of Mugabe, which several EU member states opposed. Although the British prime minister did not attend the summit, the African leaders did not publicly condemn Mugabe’s behavior. But the differences ran deeper, and it seemed clear that leaders on the two continents still had different agendas: for the EU, the priorities were security and migration; for Africa, they were more and better aid and improved trade deals.

## Conclusion

Following the end of the cold war, it seemed that the EU was losing interest in Africa. The post-Lomé debate and the adoption of the Cotonou Agreement showed that the relationship with the ACP group had become almost “normal.” Changes in the areas of foreign aid, trade, and political dialogue sent a clear signal: the preferential treatment given to post-colonial Africa had come to an end. The process toward a comprehensive strategy for Africa, beyond the division of northern and sub-Saharan Africa, which started in Cairo in April 2000 and culminated in the joint Africa-EU strategy adopted in Lisbon in December

2007, meant that the EU was trying to play a leading role in international politics and development.

Africa therefore became central not only to the EU's development policy, but to all of its external relations. The cases of trade and aid, however, show that the rhetoric of partnership does not match the reality. On the one hand, the EU seems too preoccupied with improving its development record and image; on the other hand, it has failed to take into account the voice of the developing countries. Another element that has characterized the EU's approach to Africa since the turn of the century is the attempt to pursue a coherent external policy. To some, however, this attempt has purposely concealed the real concerns of the EU: security and migration. This may or may not be true, but the search for coherence has once again bypassed the traditional partnership that had typified the EU's approach when the Lomé Convention was signed in the 1970s. The 2007 joint Africa-EU strategy seems to go in the right direction, but its implementation will be central to understanding whether a new chapter in the EU's external relations has begun.

## Notes

1. These institutions include the Council of Ministers, which comprises the members of the Council of the European Union (or EU Council) and one government representative from each ACP country and has the authority to make changes to the EU-ACP Partnership Agreements; the Committee of Ambassadors, which prepares and monitors the work of the EU Council; and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which is composed of members of the European Parliament and parliamentarians from the ACP countries and is a forum for dialogue.

2. See Enzo Grilli, *The European Community and the Developing Countries* (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Marjorie Lister, *The European Union and the South: Relations with Developing Countries* (London: Routledge, 1997); William Brown, *The European Union and Africa: the Restructuring of North-South Relations* (London: IB Taurus, 2002).

3. Gordon Crawford, "Whither Lomé? The Mid-Term Review and the Decline of Partnership," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 3 (1996): 516.

4. Martin Holland, *The European Union and the Third World* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

5. Two issues were discussed at length: good governance and migration. The EU wanted good governance to be included as an "essential element" of the partnership, whose violation could lead to suspension of aid, but after extensive discussions it was included only as a "fundamental element": only serious cases of corruption constitute grounds for suspension of aid. As for the migration issue, while the right to fair treatment of the ACP workers in the European Union was reaffirmed (through legal migration), the issue of illegal migration was very controversial: the ACP group agreed to accept the readmission of people illegally present on the territory of an EU member state at that member state's request and without any further formalities.

6. Stephen Hurt, "Civil Society and European Union Development Policy," in *New Pathways in International Development: Gender and Civil Society in EU Policy*, edited by Marjorie Lister and Maurizio Carbone (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 109–22.

7. Kunibert Raffer, "Slowly Undoing Lomé's Concept of Partnership," European Development Policy Study Group Discussion Paper 10 (Manchester: EDPSG, 2001).

8. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006); Amelia Hadfield, "Janus Advances? An Analysis of the EC Development Policy and the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12, no. 1 (2007): 39–66; Maurizio Carbone, *The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid* (London: Routledge, 2007).

9. Following the adoption of the EU development policy statement in November 2000, it was decided to concentrate aid in two sectors (three in some exceptional cases).

10. Maurizio Carbone, "Better Aid, Less Ownership: Multi-annual Programming and the EU's Development Strategies in Africa," *Journal of International Development* 20, no. 2 (2008): 118–229.

11. Mirjam Van Reisen, *2015-Watch: The EU's Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals. Halfway to 2015: Mid-term Review* (Copenhagen: Alliance 2015, 2007); Walter Eberlei and Denise Auclair, *The EU's Footprint in the South: Does European Community Development Cooperation Make a Difference for the Poor?* (Brussels: CIDSE, 2007); Carbone, "Better Aid, Less Ownership."

12. For details, see Carbone, "Better Aid, Less Ownership"; and Maurizio Carbone, "Theory and Practice of Participation: Civil Society and EU Development Policy," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9, no. 2 (2008): 241–55.

13. Eberlei and Auclair, *The EU's Footprint in the South*.

14. Cited in Carbone, "Better Aid, Less Ownership," p. 227.

15. Reisen, *2015-Watch*.

16. Florent Sebban, *We Decide, You "Own"! An Assessment of the Programming of European Community Aid to the ACP Countries under the 10th EDF European Development Fund (EDF)* (Brussels: Eurostep, 2006); Carbone, "Better Aid, Less Ownership."

17. The Cotonou Agreement established that NSAs should be also involved not only in the aid pillar of the Cotonou Agreement, but also in the political and trade pillars. But little progress has been made. For additional analysis, see Jean Bossuyt, "Mainstreaming Civil Society in ACP-EU Development Cooperation," in *New Pathways*, edited by Lister and Carbone, pp. 123–38.

18. Bossuyt, "Mainstreaming Civil Society."

19. Stephen Hurt, "Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no.1 (2006): 161–76.

20. Carbone, "Theory and Practice of Participation."

21. Ibid.

22. Sebban, *We Decide, You "Own"!*

23. The GSP gives tariff preferences to developing countries, with the aim of providing an incentive to traders to import products from developing countries. The EBA regulation gives the fifty poorest countries in the world (least-developed countries)

duty-free access to the EU for all products except arms and ammunition, including rice and sugar, for which duty-free quotas are established until full liberalization is achieved in September 2009 (for rice) and October 2009 (for sugar).

24. Genevra Forwood, "The Road to Cotonou: Negotiating a Successor to Lomé," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39, no. 3 (2001): 423–42; Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber, eds., *The European Union and Developing Countries: The Cotonou Agreement* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

25. Forwood, "The Road to Cotonou."

26. Ole Elgström and Jes Pilegaard, "Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership," *Journal of European Integration* 30, no. 3 (2008): 363–80.

27. Elgström and Pilegaard, "Imposed Coherence."

28. Gorm Rye Olsen, "Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The Africa Policy of the EU," *The Round Table* 93, no. 375 (2004): 425–36; Mary Farrell, "A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa," *Journal of European Integration* 27, no. 3 (2005): 263–83.

29. Carbone, "Better Aid, Less Ownership."

30. House of Lords, *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership* (London, 2006).

31. Olsen, "Challenges to Traditional Policy Options."

32. European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership* (Maastricht, 2006.).

33. House of Lords, *The EU and Africa*.

34. Ibid.

35. Carbone, *The European Union and International Development*.

36. Gorm Rye Olsen, "Coherence, Consistency and Political Will in Foreign Policy: The European Union's Policy towards Africa," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9 no. 2 (2008): 157–71.

37. Carbone, "Better Aid, Less Ownership."

38. See Council of the European Union, "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership" ([http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/87673.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/87673.pdf) [October 2008]).

39. In 2006 and 2007 the European Union began implementing some of the actions outlined in the EU Africa strategy. The EU launched the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership and the EU Governance Initiative, increased funding for an AU-led peace support operation (such as the AMIS mission in Darfur) under the African Peace Facility (APF), and provided support for the AU's Neyerere program for student exchanges and opened up the European Erasmus Mundus program for African universities, professors, and graduate students.

40. Siegmund Schmidt, "Towards a New EU-African Relationship—A Grand Strategy for Africa?" *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 8, no. 24 (2008): 8–18.

41. ECDPM, *The EU and Africa*.

42. House of Lords, *The EU and Africa*.

43. Schmidt, "Towards a New EU-African Relationship."