239
18
maurizio carbone
The EU in Africa: Increasing Coherence,
Decreasing Partnership
The relationship between the European Union and Africa has undergone
major changes since the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, the
Cotonou Agreement, adopted in June 2000, brought transformations to the
long-standing relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and
Pacific (ACP) group of countries, particularly in the areas of foreign aid and
trade. These transformations not only ended a system of preferential treatment,
but also put a strain on the traditional partnership that had characterized the
Lomé Convention. Second, the EU-Africa summit held in Cairo in April 2000
marked the EU’s intention to pursue a continent-wide approach and to politicize
its relations with Africa. The 2005 EU’s Africa strategy and the 2007 joint
Africa-EU strategy aimed to integrate trade, foreign aid, and political affairs
in order to create a coherent EU foreign policy and give new emphasis to the
idea of partnership. In reality, the second EU-Africa summit held in Lisbon in
December 2007 showed that the two parties were pursuing different goals.
Against this background, this chapter is divided into two broad sections. The
first section looks at EU-Africa relations in the context of the various EU-ACP
conventions, with a focus on the Cotonou Agreement. Three areas of particular
relevance are analyzed: the introduction and implementation of multi-year programming;
the involvement of nonstate actors (NSAs) in the development process;
and the negotiation of new economic partnership agreements (EPAs). The
second section examines the evolution of EU-Africa relations since the Cairo
summit. The conventional argument is that the partnership and the extended
privileges that had distinguished the EU’s approach to Africa from the 1960s
through the 1990s have been replaced by a more normal relationship. However,
although the new relationship puts an apparent emphasis on African ownership
and responsibility, it often hides the pursuit of European interests. An
240 The EU and Other Countries / Africa
important component of this chapter is to understand the type of role that the
European Union plays or wants to play in this process.
EU-ACP Relations between Rome and Cotonou
The EU’s policy toward Africa has its origin in the Treaty of Rome and has
evolved through a number of agreements. Initially influenced by France, it was
limited to francophone Africa and then, following the first EU enlargement in
the early 1970s, was extended to cover the African members of the British Commonwealth,
as well as other former colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific.
The Yaoundé Convention (1963–75) maintained the system introduced by the
Treaty of Rome: an aid allocation for five years,channeled through the European
Development Fund (EDF), and a trade regime based on reciprocal preferences.
The ensuing Lomé Convention (1975–2000), negotiated at five-year intervals
(Lomé II in 1980, Lomé III in 1985, Lomé IV in 1990, and Lomé IV-bis in
1995), was initially considered the most comprehensive, innovative, and ambitious
agreement for North-South cooperation. First, it was conceived as a partnership:
decisions were not imposed by the EU, but discussed and agreed with
the ACP governments. A set of joint institutions was also established to ensure
a permanent dialogue between the parties.1
Second, it was based on a “contractual
right to aid”: resources were committed to the ACP countries for a five-year
period, irrespective of performance. Third, it reversed the previous trade regime
to allow nonreciprocal preferences: almost all ACP goods entered the EU free of
tariff or quota restrictions.2
Nevertheless, the development record of the Lomé Convention was disappointing.
Although a small number of ACP countries managed to improve
their level of development, the conditions of the majority worsened. The progressive
inclusion of economic and political conditionalities meant that by the
mid-1990s the Lomé Convention was “no longer the model of development cooperation
to which other agreements could aspire” and that “the unique features
of the Convention have been so diluted and undermined as to become
almost indistinguishable from other development aid programs.”3
Following a long period of consultation and negotiations, the Cotonou
Agreement was signed in June 2000. It built on the Lomé acquis, but in several
respects it represented a fundamental departure from it.4
The major changes
were as follows: aid allocation would be made conditional not only on needs but
also on performance through a system of rolling programming; new free trade
agreements, the so-called economic partnership agreements, to be negotiated
and agreed on a regional basis before January 2008, would replace the previous
preferential trade regime; nonstate actors (for example, civil society, social
Maurizio Carbone 241
groups, business associations) would be involved in all phases of the development
process; the political dimension, which included issues that had previously
fallen outside the field of development cooperation (peace and security,
arms trade, migration, drugs, corruption) would be reinforced.5
These changes had profound implications. Adopting a neo-Gramscian perspective,
Stephen Hurt argued that the nature of the relationships between
the EU and the ACP shifted from “cooperation” to “coercion.”6
The new trade
arrangements and the need to comply with the principles and rules of the WTO
were a reflection of the hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism. Kunibert Raffer
argued that in the new Cotonou Agreement the idea of real partnership is
largely absent: “The present ‘partnership’ is an Orwellian relation where one
partner has no rights at all, the other perfect arbitrariness. It is a horse and rider
relation, as the rider also depends on the horse as a means of transport while
ACP countries appear to be a historical burden the EU might not be unhappy
to get rid of.”7
Less than two years after it had come into force (because of the protracted
process of ratification), the Cotonou Agreement was revised in February 2005.
The overall structure was not altered, but the changes largely reflected the EU’s
priorities. Security became a central concern, and the new provisions in this
area—such as combating terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), preventing mercenary activities, and committing
to the International Criminal Court (ICC)—were strongly criticized by African
countries. The EU’s proposal to introduce further flexibility into the EDF
allocations so that funds could be made available to meet exceptional needs
in the event of crises was also opposed by African countries out of fear that
funds would be diverted from socioeconomic development to security-oriented
programs. Nevertheless, a larger reserve was instituted, with the possibility to
alter the amounts allocated for each country or region in light of special needs
or exceptional performance or to cover international initiatives benefiting the
whole ACP group.8
Foreign Aid
One of the most important components of the Cotonou Agreement is the
reform of aid management. Resources are disbursed using a three-step process.
First, a draft country strategy paper (CSP) and an accompanying national
indicative program (NIP) are prepared by the EU delegation in collaboration
with local governments and nonstate actors, the EU’s member states, and other
international donors. The CSP offers an analysis of a country’s situation and
outlines the development strategy based on the EU’s comparative advantage,
while the NIP provides a detailed account of how resources must be spent.9
242 The EU and Other Countries / Africa
Second, the draft documents are scrutinized by an interservice Quality Support
Group (iQSG) and then by the EU member states in the EDF committee. Third,
the CSP and NIP are adopted by the College of Commissioners. The CSP and
the NIP can be adjusted in the course of the mid-term review (MTR) process,
which is meant to assess how recipients have performed in the implementation
of the development strategy.
The assessment of the first-generation CSPs produced mixed results. A
report published by the European Commission in November 2002 emphasized
the successful efforts to ensure coordination and complementarity between the
EU and the member states and to involve NSAs in the programming process.
Little analysis was devoted to how the money was used or how the EU aid contributed
to poverty eradication.10
A less optimistic view came from a number of
assessments supported by European nonstate actors. The most important point
concerns the contribution of the CSPs to poverty eradication. Budget support,
which prioritizes human development, had indeed increased. But despite the
fact that sub-Saharan Africa is the region that is the furthest from achieving the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), only a very small number of CSPs
identified education and health as focal sectors. Moreover, the failure to mainstream
gender implied that the EU’s contribution to the fight against HIV/AIDS
and child mortality was not optimal. Support to the transport sector, by contrast,
appeared in a larger number of CSPs. While the European Commission
often emphasizes that transport benefits poverty eradication, in a large number
of cases the EU supported the building of international roads, which, unlike
rural roads, are usually not driven by pro-poor interests.11
Similarly, during the mid-term reviews conducted in 2004, limited changes
were made to the existing development strategies.12
At the same time, new
emphasis was given to political issues, such as the fight against terrorism, the
protection of human rights, the promotion of democracy, and the prevention
of migration.13
Even the European Commission acknowledged this time that
“there is obviously a tension between new policy commitments defined unilaterally
by the EU and the principle of country ownership of national development
strategies and donor support to them.”14
The preparation of the second-generation CSPs for Africa started in early
2006. Although the revised Cotonou Agreement included the achievement of
the MDGs as the key objective of the EU’s development policy for Africa, initial
evidence seemed to show that there was “a very distinct de-prioritization
of the MDGs” and that the priorities set by the EU still dominated the various
strategies. It should also be noted that the CSPs are developed worldwide
at the same time and do not respect the economic and business cycles of the
country in question. The involvement of local governments was in most cases
Maurizio Carbone 243
limited to the trade and transport ministries, whereas the social ministries were
rarely consulted.15
The EU delegations often imposed their priorities; in some
instances the ACP officials even saw the programming process as a serious challenge
to their sovereignty.16
Participation
The new provisions on the participation of nonstate actors in the development
process are another major innovation of the Cotonou Agreement. NSAs,
which include business associations, social partners, and civil society, must be
involved in all phases of the programming process, including the elaboration of
the CSPs and the NIPs, the mid-term reviews, and the final evaluation.17
They
must also be provided with financial resources, to be agreed on during the programming
process; up to a maximum of 15 percent of the initial NIP allocation
could be directly allocated to nonstate actors. These provisions, according to
Jean Bossuyt, were important because they contributed to strengthening the
role of NSAs in countries where a participatory culture was largely absent and
to enhancing their visibility and the credibility of civil society in relation to
governments.18
By contrast, Stephen Hurt argues that the EU’s new emphasis on civil society
should be understood as part of the neoliberal nature of its relations with developing
countries, which supports the retrenchment of the state, the promotion
of the private sector, and the greater integration of developing countries into
the global economy.19
Claims to partnership and participation are thus designed
to give legitimacy to the Western model of democracy and to create conditions
that are conducive to the operation of a liberal market democracy. For these
reasons, Hurt argues, participation is often limited to those actors that support
the EU approach.
The first opportunity to assess the practice of participation was in the context
of the ninth EDF programming process. According to the European Commission,
in almost all countries some form of consultation took place. In half of
the cases, the draft CSP was changed, though nothing is said about whether the
changes were due to the involvement of the NSAs. In the remaining cases, no
changes were introduced because of a coincidence of intents between the NSAs
and the recipient governments, a lack of capacity by the NSAs to participate in
the programming process, and significant delays in the consultation process.
This trend was broadly confirmed in the case of the mid-term reviews, when
similar problems were faced. A number of reports funded by European NGOs
offered a more critical view. Several limitations were shown: a too-short period
set aside for consultation and invitations on short notice; ad hoc instead of
institutionalized dialogue; a limited range of NSAs involved, with urban NGOs
244 The EU and Other Countries / Africa
and private sector groups privileged; limited information provided before the
meeting and insufficient reporting back to NSAs on the results of the consultations;
government-led discussions.20
This situation did not change significantly in the context of the tenth EDF
programming exercise.Again, the European Commission claimed that“effective
consultation” occurred in about half of the countries, whereas in the remaining
cases dialogue was ad hoc and consultation took the form of information
sessions at a late stage in the process.21
A number of case studies written by
African NGOs maintained that the programming exercise failed to adequately
involve nonstate actors. While some forms of consultation occurred, the exercise
was neither inclusive nor comprehensive. In most instances, there was a
lack of transparency in the selection of participants, inadequate provision of
preparatory documents, and little feedback on the results.22
Trade
The most controversial innovation of the Cotonou Agreement is in the area of
trade. The European Commission argued that the existing preferential regime
had to be replaced by regional free trade agreements, compatible with the WTO
rules. The aim of these new trade arrangements was to accelerate the integration
of the ACP countries into the global economy by enhancing production and the
capacity to attract investment, while taking into account different development
levels. During the negotiations in the Council of Ministers, various options were
on the table, such as preserving the status quo by asking the World Trade Organization
(WTO) for a waiver or integrating the whole ACP group into the EU’s
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).23
In the end, the European Commission presented the establishment of
regional economic partnership agreements as the most feasible option. The
preferences of the member states broadly reflected their approach and traditions
in international development. On one side, France wanted to preserve
the integrity of the ACP group and the existing trade regime; it also wanted
to avoid trade liberalization as a way to protect its agricultural sector. On the
opposite side, Germany wanted to “normalize” relations between the EU and
the developing world and therefore suggested regrouping the ACP states into
three regions. Trade liberalization and regional integration would complement
this project. In the middle, the United Kingdom and the Nordic states shared
concerns about the potential marginalization of the least-developed countries
(LDCs) caused by the proposed free trade agreements. The final compromise
softened the initial proposal by granting an extended interim period before the
EPAs entered into force in January 2008, and by maintaining trade privileges for
“essentially all products” coming from the LDCs.24
Maurizio Carbone 245
Using a two-level game theory, Genevra Forwood argues that the EU’s margin
to maneuver in the negotiations with the ACP was restricted by its negotiating
mandate, which had been the result of a compromise that could not easily be
changed.25
On the contrary, the ACP group, rather than playing a proactive part
in the negotiations, often reacted against the EU mandate. The weakness of the
ACP group can be explained by the lack of a coherent and firm position, which
followed the rule “the more, the better.” It should be added, however, that the
ACP group is a more informal entity than the EU; it also lacks a strong supranational
institution. The ACP Secretariat had no formal role in the negotiations,
whereas the European Commission played a key role.
The EU’s mandate and subsequent negotiation strategy, therefore, were
heavily influenced by the achieved compromise. The European Commission,
with the Directorate-General for Trade in the lead, drafted a ”vague” negotiation
mandate that left little room for changes during the Council discussions.
Some member states (Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom) were still critical
of the mandate and expressed their doubts in the official minutes of the meeting,
a highly unusual practice in EU trade politics. The negotiation mandate
was agreed to unanimously in June 2002 because all the member states wanted
to present a united front to the outside world. Negotiations with six regional
groups—four for Africa, one for the Caribbean, and one for the Pacific—started
in September 2002, but for a few years there was little publicity and only marginal
involvement by the member states.
The negotiations conducted by the Directorate-General for Trade emphasized
the trade aspect of the EPAs to the detriment of the development side. Still,
it was surprising that in March 2005 the United Kingdom issued a statement in
which it urged the EU to stop its“mercantilist approach and offensive interests.”
This statement was followed by some “non-papers” (informal discussion documents)
underlying the social and development aspects of the EPAs sent to the
Council committee in charge of monitoring the negotiations.26
The majority of
African countries acted passively since they perceived the European Commission
to be ignoring the concerns of the developing world.
As time passed and the ACP countries and NGOs became more dissatisfied,
additional member states publicly criticized the Commission’s approach.
In March 2005 the U.K. trade and development secretaries issued a very critical
statement that was immediately censured by the European Commission.
This statement was not coordinated with the “friends of EPAs,” a group that
included Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and sometimes Ireland, Belgium,
and France. They became more vocal in the Council group that monitored the
EPA negotiations, emphasizing the development and social dimension of the
EPAs. This behavior started to have its effects, and the European Commission
246 The EU and Other Countries / Africa
was forced to take into account these heterodox views.27
By the autumn of 2007,
it was clear that no full EPA would be signed with African countries. This meant
that the LDCs would be subject to the provisions of the “everything but arms”
(EBA) regulation and non-LDCs were subject to the Generalized System of Preferences.
Some alternatives to the EPAs were requested, such as the extension of
the previous preferential regime through the prolongation of the WTO waiver
and the granting of GSP+ (duty-free access to European goods in addition to the
preferences extended by the standard GSP) to all ACP countries. The European
Commission stated that there were no alternatives to the EPAs. Many African
countries continued to denounce the pressure exercised by the European Commission,
which was contrary to the partnership principle. It was not surprising
that,by the agreed deadline,no full EPA had been signed with any African region.
EU-Africa Relations between Cairo and Lisbon
With the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and the institutionalization of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it became clear that the European
Union wanted to play a significant role in international politics. The Treaty
of Maastricht also introduced the principle of coherence, which referred to the
fact that all EU external policies must work in synergy. Africa became the natural
place to exercise these ambitions. Traditional EU policy toward Africa had
to broaden its original goals from foreign aid and trade preferences to include
more political issues, such as democracy, human rights, and conflict prevention
and management.28
Moreover, the adoption of the European Consensus on Development in
December 2005 committed member states and the European Community to
a common view on the promotion of international development. The Africa
strategy became the first opportunity to operationalize the European Consensus
on Development.29
The evolution of EU-Africa relations was also strongly
influenced by events in Africa. The adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) and the setting up of the African Union (AU) reassured
the international community that African leaders wanted to take ownership in
their future.30
This context contributes to understanding why, since the beginning of the
2000s, the European Union has attempted to pursue a unitary policy toward the
entire African continent, under the slogan “one Europe, one Africa.” This task
was not easy. In addition to relations with the members of the ACP group, the
EU had developed formal relationships with North Africa through the EuroMediterranean
Partnership (EMP) and European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),
Maurizio Carbone 247
and with South Africa through the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement
(TDCA). Moreover, the EU member states had different development priorities
that were not easy to reconcile.
The first EU-Africa summit in 2000 was an initial attempt to address these
issues. One of the unofficial messages of the summit was that Europe cared
about Africa, but not enough to commit new resources.31
European representatives
placed more emphasis on political issues, notably democracy and peace
and security, while African representatives concentrated on economic aspects,
notably trade and aid.32
The ensuing Cairo plan of action laid out the main aims
of the new Africa-EU dialogue: to strengthen political, economic, and sociocultural
relations between the EU and Africa; to eradicate poverty and attain the
MDGs; and to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.33
New plans were made for a second meeting in Lisbon in April 2003, but the
summit was postponed owing to lack of agreement over the presence of Robert
Mugabe and other Zimbabwean leaders. The EU member states did not want
to allow President Mugabe to enter the EU area and urged African leaders to
take a stronger stance against his poor record on human rights and democratic
practices. African leaders, however, argued that it was not possible to hold a
meeting without representation from all the African states. 34
In the absence of
a more formalized dialogue at the highest political level, the European Commission
tried to pursue an alternative strategy, such as holding regular meetings
between senior officials.
Meanwhile, Africa had taken a central place on the global as well as the European
agenda, as confirmed by a number of important initiatives and commitments.
Following the report of the Commission for Africa, the United Kingdom
was instrumental in the adoption of the Gleneagles commitments on foreign
aid and debt relief. At the European level, under the leadership of the European
Commission, in April 2005 the EU decided to boost its volume of aid, including
doubling development assistance to Africa by 2010. In the same context, a new
ambitious agenda was agreed to on policy coherence for development.35
A number of decisions and initiatives confirmed that the European Union
saw its involvement in conflict prevention and management as necessary to
become a significant player in Africa. In June 2003 the Council of Ministers
adopted a resolution authorizing the presence of EU military forces in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. According to some this was meant to show that,
following the failures in the context of the war in Iraq, the EU member states
were still willing and able to work together. In March 2004 a decision to establish
the Africa Peace Facility concluded a long discussion on the importance of
tackling conflict prevention as a precondition to development.36
248 The EU and Other Countries / Africa
The EU’s Africa Strategy
Following up on the April 2005 initiatives and a specific request of the June 2005
European Council, the European Commission published a communication in
which the central concern was the achievement of the MDGs. Peace, security,
and good governance were also seen as preconditions to development. These
views were emphasized even more in a paper written by the High Representative
for the CFSP, Javier Solana, in which he argued that peace and security were not
only central to the new EU’s strategy for Africa but also to the CFSP.37
In December 2005, the European Council adopted a rather short document
entitled“The EU andAfrica:Towards a Strategic Partnership.” This new EUAfrica
strategy, which set up a single framework for all EU players (that is, the European
Commission, its member states, and nonstate actors), rested on three elements:
(1) peace, security, and good governance as preconditions to development; (2) a
central role for regional integration and trade in fostering economic growth; and
(3) the need for better access to social services (such as health and education) and
environmental sustainability in order to achieve the MDGs by 2015.38
The EU Africa strategy did not, however, result in any new commitment by
Europe to support Africa’s efforts to develop.For instance,it was decided that the
strategy would be implemented with existing financial resources, while major
emphasis was placed on non-aid policies through the ambitious agenda on
policy coherence for development.39
Integration into the world trading system
would be ensured through the new EPAs. Finally, the EU’s Africa strategy did not
mention the issue of political conditionality, but the EU spelled out its support
of the African peer-review mechanism (APRM), an instrument for assessing
governments’ progress toward democracy and the protection of human rights.40
But the EU’s Africa strategy was criticized not only for its lack of ambitions,
but also because it was agreed without adequate consultation of all stakeholders.
On the European side, the drafting process was led by the European Commission
and the British Presidency, with the remaining member states and nonstate
actors playing a marginal role, if any. On the African side, there was limited consultation
outside the AU Commission.41
In light of this criticism, at the EU-AU
ministerial meeting in Bamako in December 2005 it was agreed to develop a new
joint EU-Africa strategy—“a partnership with Africa, rather than a strategy for
Africa.”42
This time the drafting process was more participatory. Negotiations
started in February 2007 and an earlier draft was approved in May 2007. The
final version was presented at the second EU-Africa summit in December 2007.
The joint Africa-EU strategy was a much longer and comprehensive document
than its predecessor. The starting point was the idea of a “new strategic
partnership” based on a “Euro-African consensus on values, common interests
Maurizio Carbone 249
and common strategic objectives.” Four main objectives were included: (a) to
address issues of common concern, in particular peace and security, migration
and development, and a clean environment; (b) to strengthen and promote
peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, and sustainable
development, and to ensure that all African countries meet the MDGs by 2015;
(c) to jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, making
sure that the system of global governance is more representative, and to
tackle global challenges together; (d) to promote people-centered development,
including a better involvement of nonstate actors.
To meet these objectives, a very detailed action plan for the 2008–10 period
was adopted, including eight EU-Africa partnerships: peace and security; democratic
governance and human rights; trade and regional integration (including
the implementation of the EU-Africa Partnership for Infrastructure, launched
in 2006); Millennium Development Goals; energy; climate change; migration,
mobility, and employment; and science, information society, and space. In sum,
as Siegmar Schmidt has cogently argued, there was hardly any field where EU
and Africa were not meant to cooperate.43
Unavoidably, the EU’s renewed interest in Africa cannot be separated from
the threats coming from China’s heavy involvement in Africa as well as the new
strategic interest of the United States. Moreover, although the joint Africa-EU
strategy was a comprehensive document, the result of an extensive dialogue
between European and African actors, the EU’s motivations and views were still
dominant. The Lisbon summit was overshadowed once again by the debate over
the presence of Mugabe, which several EU member states opposed. Although
the British prime minister did not attend the summit, the African leaders did
not publicly condemn Mugabe’s behavior. But the differences ran deeper, and it
seemed clear that leaders on the two continents still had different agendas: for
the EU, the priorities were security and migration; for Africa, they were more
and better aid and improved trade deals.
Conclusion
Following the end of the cold war, it seemed that the EU was losing interest
in Africa. The post-Lomé debate and the adoption of the Cotonou Agreement
showed that the relationship with the ACP group had become almost “normal.”
Changes in the areas of foreign aid, trade, and political dialogue sent a clear
signal: the preferential treatment given to post-colonial Africa had come to an
end. The process toward a comprehensive strategy for Africa, beyond the division
of northern and sub-Saharan Africa, which started in Cairo in April 2000
and culminated in the joint Africa-EU strategy adopted in Lisbon in December
250 The EU and Other Countries / Africa
2007, meant that the EU was trying to play a leading role in international politics
and development.
Africa therefore became central not only to the EU’s development policy, but
to all of its external relations. The cases of trade and aid, however, show that
the rhetoric of partnership does not match the reality. On the one hand, the
EU seems too preoccupied with improving its development record and image;
on the other hand, it has failed to take into account the voice of the developing
countries. Another element that has characterized the EU’s approach to Africa
since the turn of the century is the attempt to pursue a coherent external policy.
To some, however, this attempt has purposely concealed the real concerns of
the EU: security and migration. This may or may not be true, but the search for
coherence has once again bypassed the traditional partnership that had typified
the EU’s approach when the Lomé Convention was signed in the 1970s. The
2007 joint Africa-EU strategy seems to go in the right direction, but its implementation
will be central to understanding whether a new chapter in the EU’s
external relations has begun.
Notes
1. These institutions include the Council of Ministers, which comprises the members
of the Council of the European Union (or EU Council) and one government representative
from each ACP country and has the authority to make changes to the EU-ACP
Partnership Agreements; the Committee of Ambassadors, which prepares and monitors
the work of the EU Council; and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which is composed
of members of the European Parliament and parliamentarians from the ACP countries
and is a forum for dialogue.
2. See Enzo Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries (Cambridge
University Press, 1993); Marjorie Lister, The European Union and the South: Relations
with Developing Countries (London: Routledge,1997);William Brown,The European
Union and Africa: the Restructuring of North-South Relations (London: IB Taurus, 2002).
3. Gordon Crawford, “Whither Lomé? The Mid-Term Review and the Decline of
Partnership,” Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 3 (1996): 516.
4.Martin Holland,The European Union and theThirdWorld (NewYork:Palgrave,2002).
5. Two issues were discussed at length: good governance and migration. The EU
wanted good governance to be included as an “essential element” of the partnership,
whose violation could lead to suspension of aid, but after extensive discussions it was
included only as a “fundamental element”: only serious cases of corruption constitute
grounds for suspension of aid. As for the migration issue, while the right to fair treatment
of the ACP workers in the European Union was reaffirmed (through legal migration),
the issue of illegal migration was very controversial: the ACP group agreed to
accept the readmission of people illegally present on the territory of an EU member state
at that member state’s request and without any further formalities.
Maurizio Carbone 251
6. Stephen Hurt, “Civil Society and European Union Development Policy,” in New
Pathways in International Development: Gender and Civil Society in EU Policy, edited by
Marjorie Lister and Maurizio Carbone (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 109–22.
7. Kunibert Raffer, “Slowly Undoing Lomé’s Concept of Partnership,” European
Development Policy Study Group Discussion Paper 10 (Manchester: EDPSG, 2001).
8. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd
ed. (London: Routledge, 2006); Amelia Hadfield,“Janus Advances? An Analysis of the EC
Development Policy and the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement,”European
Foreign Affairs Review 12, no. 1 (2007): 39–66; Maurizio Carbone, The European Union
and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid (London: Routledge, 2007).
9. Following the adoption of the EU development policy statement in November
2000, it was decided to concentrate aid in two sectors (three in some exceptional cases).
10. Maurizio Carbone,“Better Aid, Less Ownership: Multi-annual Programming and
the EU’s Development Strategies in Africa,” Journal of International Development 20, no.
2 (2008): 118–229.
11. Mirjam Van Reisen, 2015-Watch: The EU’s Contribution to the Millennium Development
Goals. Halfway to 2015: Mid-term Review (Copenhagen: Alliance 2015, 2007);
Walter Eberlei and Denise Auclair, The EU’s Footprint in the South: Does European Community
Development Cooperation Make a Difference for the Poor? (Brussels: CIDSE,
2007); Carbone,“Better Aid, Less Ownership.”
12. For details, see Carbone, “Better Aid, Less Ownership”; and Maurizio Carbone,
“Theory and Practice of Participation: Civil Society and EU Development Policy,” Perspectives
on European Politics and Society 9, no. 2 (2008): 241–55.
13. Eberlei and Auclair, The EU’s Footprint in the South.
14. Cited in Carbone,“Better Aid, Less Ownership,” p. 227.
15. Reisen, 2015-Watch.
16. Florent Sebban, We Decide, You “Own”! An Assessment of the Programming of
European Community Aid to the ACP Countries under the 10th EDF European Development
Fund (EDF) (Brussels: Eurostep, 2006); Carbone,“Better Aid, Less Ownership.”
17. The Cotonou Agreement established that NSAs should be also involved not only
in the aid pillar of the Cotonou Agreement, but also in the political and trade pillars. But
little progress has been made. For additional analysis, see Jean Bossuyt,“Mainstreaming
Civil Society in ACP-EU Development Cooperation,” in New Pathways, edited by Lister
and Carbone, pp. 123–38.
18. Bossuyt,“Mainstreaming Civil Society.”
19. Stephen Hurt, “Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between
the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention,” Third World
Quarterly 24, no.1 (2006): 161–76.
20. Carbone,“Theory and Practice of Participation.”
21. Ibid.
22. Sebban, We Decide, You “Own”!
23. The GSP gives tariff preferences to developing countries, with the aim of providing
an incentive to traders to import products from developing countries. The EBA
regulation gives the fifty poorest countries in the world (least-developed countries)
252 The EU and Other Countries / Africa
duty-free access to the EU for all products except arms and ammunition, including rice
and sugar, for which duty-free quotas are established until full liberalization is achieved
in September 2009 (for rice) and October 2009 (for sugar).
24. Genevra Forwood, “The Road to Cotonou: Negotiating a Successor to Lomé,”
Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 3 (2001): 423–42; Olufemi Babarinde and
Gerrit Faber, eds., The European Union and Developing Countries: The Cotonou Agreement
(Leiden: Brill, 2005).
25. Forwood,“The Road to Cotonou.”
26. Ole Elgström and Jes Pilegaard, “Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic
Partnership,” Journal of European Integration 30, no. 3 (2008): 363–80.
27. Elgström and Pilegaard,“Imposed Coherence.”
28. Gorm Rye Olsen, “Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for
New Choices: The Africa Policy of the EU,” The Round Table 93, no. 375 (2004): 425–36;
Mary Farrell,“A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European
Union and Africa,” Journal of European Integration 27, no. 3 (2005): 263–83.
29. Carbone,“Better Aid, Less Ownership.”
30.House of Lords,The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership (London,2006).
31. Olsen,“Challenges to Traditional Policy Options.”
32. European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), The EU and
Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership (Maastricht, 2006.).
33. House of Lords, The EU and Africa.
34. Ibid.
35. Carbone, The European Union and International Development.
36. Gorm Rye Olsen, “Coherence, Consistency and Political Will in Foreign Policy:
The European Union’s Policy towards Africa,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society
9 no. 2 (2008): 157–71.
37. Carbone,“Better Aid, Less Ownership.”
38. See Council of the European Union,“The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership”
(http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/87673.pdf [October
2008]).
39. In 2006 and 2007 the European Union began implementing some of the actions
outlined in the EU Africa strategy. The EU launched the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership
and the EU Governance Initiative, increased funding for an AU-led peace support
operation (such as the AMIS mission in Darfur) under the African Peace Facility
(APF), and provided support for the AU’s Neyere program for student exchanges and
opened up the European Erasmus Mundus program for African universities, professors,
and graduate students.
40. Siegmar Schmidt, “Towards a New EU-African Relationship—A Grand Strategy
for Africa?” Foreign Policy in Dialogue 8, no. 24 (2008): 8–18.
41. ECDPM, The EU and Africa.
42. House of Lords, The EU and Africa.
43. Schmidt,“Towards a New EU-African Relationship.”