

Assessing Kosovo's Postwar Democratization Between External Imposition and Local Self-Government

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Abstract

Kosovo's democratic system under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (NATO/KFOR) was almost exclusively determined by outside actors. The building of Kosovo's postwar structures from scratch after 1999 and the role played by UNMIK as the proxy state executive, however, have resulted in a democratization outcome of mixed results.

Kosovo's postwar political system can be regarded as a functioning parliamentary democracy. Yet, the Kosovar polity and society became deeply segregated during the process, leading to "ethnicized" institutionalization rather than self-sustainable forms of ethnic tolerance and democratization.

The outcome shows the interdependence among postwar democratization processes, security promotion, and local capacity-building. KFOR security guarantees were a prerequisite for a democratic process to be initiated, and UNMIK's "state" capacities and aid provided a base for local democratic structures. However, the building of democratic institutions does not represent an adequate indicator for a self-sustaining democratization process. The main input would have to come from within Kosovo's society itself; international actors could only assist in this process.

Key words: Democratization, democracy promotion, international administration, peacebuilding, statebuilding, institution-building, postwar reconstruction, local self-government, external intrusiveness, Kosovo, Western Balkans, South-Eastern Europe, European integration, official donor contributions, official development aid.

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Kosovo's Postwar Democratization: A Multiple Outcome

Kosovo under UN administration on the basis of Resolution 1244 represents a special case of external intervention because its democratically elected organs of self-government did not enjoy the authorities of a sovereign state. Consequently, indicators for democracy that are based on elements such as the rule of law (including separation of powers) and legal accountability¹ do not apply. With the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) having held almost unlimited executive, legislative, and judicial powers and exercising veto powers on locally drafted law, the key democratic criterion of separation of state powers was not present in Kosovo. To put it differently: an international interim or transitional administration is by definition not meant to be an established democracy. Instead, scholars describe it as a form of “benevolent autocracy.”² However, the UN administration in Kosovo was mandated with establishing democratic institutions for self-government.³ Thus, measuring democracy in postwar Kosovo can refer only to the performance of these local institutions and the political processes.

Ethnicized Democracy

Most of Kosovo's local institutions can be described as extensively “ethnicized” in their set-up.⁴ In reference to rule-of-law institutions such as the local judiciary, for example, this means that there has been a general tendency to issue milder verdicts against members of the Albanian majority community than against members of Serb-speaking communities. Also, publications of the applicable law were unavailable for a long time in minority languages. This limited access to legal provisions and effective remedy before the law, severely challenging the principle of equality and equal treatment for *all* Kosovars.

The quality of judicial processes also has varied significantly. Due to generally low professional and educational standards, the quality of each presiding judge and state attorney could not be guaranteed. In principle, the local judiciary was placed under the supervision of international judges who presided or co-presided over cases at the regional level and above. However,

¹ As proposed by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, “The Quality of Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (2004): 20-31; see also, Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is and Is Not,” in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 39-53.

² Simon Chesterman, “Building Democracy through Benevolent Autocracy: Consultation and Accountability in UN Transitional Administrations,” in *The Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality*, ed. Edward Newman and Roland Rich (New York: United Nations University Press, 2004), 86-112.

³ UN Resolution 1244, arts. 10, 11.

⁴ See Aidan Hehir, “Autonomous Province Building: Identification Theory and the Failure of UNMIK,” *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 2 (2006): 200-213.

due to the lack of available international judges, this objective could not be fully accomplished. Consequently, and despite its formal dependency on international counterparts, the local judiciary could act quite independently in its jurisdiction. Local courts had absolutely no jurisdiction over international staff of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) or the NATO-led Kosovo Force (NATO/KFOR), whose personnel enjoyed general immunity.⁵ This severe limitation in local judicial independence essentially reduced the level of legal protection of individuals against the main state authorities of UNMIK. In addition, judicial protection for normal citizens proved to be largely ineffective whenever *grandeurs* of the local mafia or the political elite were involved. In such cases, most witnesses to a crime usually refused to testify before the court.⁶ With regard to state capacity to provide services and public goods in the rule-of-law sector, the local judiciary has been widely dependent on external assistance (i.e., training of legal staff by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE]). Also, after its declaration of independence, Kosovo received a significant amount of aid from the new EU-led Rule-of-Law Mission (EULEX) in that sector.

Voter participation in postwar Kosovo was very high during the first elections in 2000 and 2001, with turnouts above 90 percent. However, turnout declined rapidly over the following years. In addition, due to heavy pressure from Belgrade, 5-7 percent of Serb voters boycotted these elections and chose not to contribute to the political process. Overall, the electoral process drew significantly from the long democratic underground tradition of the Kosovo-Albanian community during the 1990s.

Following the war, Kosovo's polity was built in a decentralized manner, with the establishment of municipal parties and assemblies first, and their central counterparts second. Political parties were usually founded along ethnic lines, with few if any multi-ethnic parties or party programs in place. The international presence in postwar Kosovo largely supported the proper build-up and accreditation of political parties. This included issuance of the electoral code, the conduct and supervision of free and fair elections, control of central election bodies, and the guarantee of active and passive voting rights for all citizens. However, with respect to citizens in the Serb enclaves, Belgrade exercised heavy manipulation by allowance of, or withdrawal of, financial benefits, up to the point of direct threats and intimidation.

At the nongovernmental organization (NGO) level, although there was a high number of registered NGOs, in reality there were only a few active and relevant ones and even fewer interested and engaged on a multi-ethnic basis. It

⁵ UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, *On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo*.

⁶ ICG/International Crisis Group, "Will the Real Serbia Please Stand Up?" *ICG Update Europe Briefing* 49 (April 23, 2008): 11.

is estimated that no more than 10 percent of the 2,400 registered NGOs were actually implementing projects,⁷ which means that the vast majority of them must be regarded as nonoperational “shadow” NGOs, bolstered by international money.⁸ Such a degree of NGO “marketization” must not be confused with the development of a solid, functioning civil society, but rather seen as a means of alternative income generation. Also, the level of communication between citizens and elected representatives was marginal, despite comprehensive legal requirements for regular town-hall meetings, public hearings, and a petitioning procedure anchored in local law.⁹ In a similar context, critical journalists often were subject to intimidation when reporting on corruption or criminal activities, and the media, as such, often followed political party lines and based their reporting on a flawed ethnic “logic.” Unions and associations of professional groups remained marginalized.

The limited use of direct forms of citizen participation through petitions and public hearings also provided few effective ways of holding elected representatives accountable for their policies. This contributed to a widespread culture of corruption among state officials in Kosovo’s executive and judicial institutions.¹⁰ Consequently, the degree of vertical accountability for elected or appointed officials was low, as was the quality of horizontal accountability among officials. In reality, ties along party affiliations or family and clan lines proved stronger and largely have replaced the Weberian ideal of a rational-legal bureaucracy, free of corruption. Effective local accountability was upheld only when UN-led oversight bodies threatened local institutions with sanctions or withdrawal of competences or licenses. Here, the problem was that UNMIK staff members rarely led by good example themselves: cases of UN internal investigation of professional misconduct, up to such high positions as the Deputy SRSG, were conducted.¹¹

Overall, the combination of a successful series of democratic municipal and central elections, the reconstruction of functioning democratic political parties, and Kosovo’s newly established political institutions (the so-called Provisional Institutions for Self-governance [PISG]) have formed a postwar political and governmental regime which can be described as a functioning democracy in its nascent stage; this has been developed on both the “national” and “subnational” Kosovo-Albanian levels. However, this polity was established along ethnic lines, with the dominant Albanian majority on one side (dominating a range

⁷ Helmut Kramer and Vedran Dzihic, eds., *Die Kosovo-Bilanz: Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft?* (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2005), 36.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ UNMIK Regulation 2000/45, *On Municipal Self-Government in Kosovo*.

¹⁰ See UNDP, *Kosovo, Early Warning Report No. 17* (Pristina, Kosovo: UNDP, April-June 2007).

¹¹ UNMIK information provided to the author, October 2007.

of minor, mainly Muslim, minorities) and the Serbian minority on the other (establishing its own administrative system, parallel to the official one of the UNMIK/PISG).¹²

Another democratic shortcoming can be seen in the strong partisan and clan domination of the political arena and the widespread phenomenon of corruption at nearly all levels of public life. Taking UNMIK's civilian-administrative, KFOR's military, and the OSCE's institution-building tasks as starting points,¹³ the process of external aid for democratization has taken place for more than eight years since 1999, and is still ongoing. During this period, aid has shifted from building local capacities through direct external administration in 1999 (with nonbinding local consultation by prewar local key players) to a system of co-administration and gradual transfer of powers to new local ministries, following UNMIK's issuance of Kosovo's provisional constitutional framework. The framework provided for a new administrative structure of local departments and democratically elected office holders, without any preservation of prewar local structures (Provisional Institutions for Self-government from 2001 to 2008).

With the unilateral declaration of Kosovo as an independent democratic republic in February 2008,¹⁴ the approach of the international community changed to focus on external monitoring and advice (UNMIK to EULEX transition period in 2008). During this process of gradual devolution of powers to local bodies since mid-2002, local politics has been shaped by three different party coalitions in power and a peaceful handover of that power from one ruling coalition to the next. This accounts in part for the level of democratic maturity that the (Albanian elite-dominated) political system in Kosovo displays today. As long as Kosovo's political status remains unresolved in international legal terms, the political spectrum of Albanian parties remains relatively unified. This could be witnessed during the Ahtisaari negotiation process from 2006 to 2007, when the nominally opposing Albanian parties of Rugova (LDK), Thaci (PDK), Haradinaj (AAK), and Surroi (ORA) formed the so-called Unity Team. Thus, striving for Kosovo's independence from Serbia represents a powerful common bracket in the Albanian political arena.

Apart from the elite-led grand coalitions that officially supported UNMIK's democratization agenda, certain spoiler actors tried to make an impact.¹⁵ One was the civil-society-based student movement, "Vetevendosje" (meaning

¹² See OMIK/OSCE Mission in Kosovo, *Parallel Structures in Kosovo: Report of the Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law* (Prishtine/Pristina, Kosovo: OMIK, October 2003).

¹³ See OMIK mandate in "OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 305 of the 237th Plenary Meeting," PC.DEC/305 (July 1, 1999), *Permanent Council Journal*, No. 237, agenda item 2.

¹⁴ Kosovo's new constitution is based on the 2007 Ahtisaari Proposal and the counsel of U.S. and EU experts.

¹⁵ On spoilers, see Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 5-53.

Self-determination). Its leader, Albin Kurti, was placed under lengthy pretrial house arrest by UNMIK for (alleged) incitement of violence at several public demonstrations in 2006 and 2007. The other was the self-declared, paramilitary Albanian National Army (ANA). The ANA claimed responsibility for a number of bombing incidents and road blocks at night, but otherwise it remained a rather anonymous phantom organization, with certain links to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA; in Albanian, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, or UCK) in Macedonia and its counterpart in southern Serbia, the Liberation Army of Presevo-Medvedja-Bujanovac (UCPMB). Overall, public support for the two types of resistance movements was at a relatively low level,¹⁶ and could not effectively threaten the official political consensus among the ruling Albanian elites.

In contrast, the establishment of a parallel administrative system in Serb-populated northern Kosovo and a number of Serb enclaves since 2003 have provided a clear threat to official “state” authority in Pristina. In reaction to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in February 2008, Belgrade increasingly took over state powers in northern Kosovo and the Serb enclaves in the south and put heavy pressure on Serbian policemen and other officials to stop their cooperation with the authorities in Pristina.¹⁷ It is this deep ethno-political divide between Belgrade and Pristina that is responsible for the severe disagreement between the ethnic communities on whether promotion of democracy and institution-building in Kosovo is seen as a Western export and means of domination. The Albanian majority generally hailed these efforts as legitimate in their quest for more state control from UNMIK and independence from Belgrade. Serbs, however, generally considered such processes to be in breach of international law and the principle of state integrity, and as an overall Western attempt to allow Kosovo to split away from Serbia.

Security Aspects

The task of providing security in postwar Kosovo has been divided between NATO’s KFOR troops, which are responsible for overall security and order on the basis of Resolution 1244 and a bilateral agreement with Belgrade (Technical Military Agreement of Kumanovo),¹⁸ and UNMIK’s Civilian Police (CIVPOL), in cooperation with the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS). In 1999 and 2000, former paramilitary structures of the UCK were demobilized, and partially integrated into the new Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The KPC has a mandate to provide emergency assistance (i.e., in case of natural disasters)

¹⁶ UNDP, *Kosovo, Early Warning Report No. 17*, 2007.

¹⁷ See ICG/International Crisis Group, “Kosovo’s First Month,” *ICG Update Europe Briefing 47* (March 18, 2008): 6 ff.

¹⁸ See NATO, *Military Technical Agreement between KFOR and the Government of Yugoslavia and Serbia*, June 9, 1999.

and was “rearmed” in post-UDI Kosovo, in line with the provisions of the Ahtisaari Proposal. However, despite provision of such security forces, the record to provide physical security to Kosovo’s population is a mixed one, at best. Although a relapse into open warfare has been avoided successfully since 1999, a high degree of (reverse) ethnic violence took place in the second half of 1999, and again during the March riots of 2004, causing dozens of casualties and massive displacement of some 200,000 Kosovo-Serbs to Serbia, under the eyes of KFOR and international police. Apart from the 1999 and 2004 violence, the overall security situation usually has been described as “stable but tense,” which became a placard expression for both the international community’s general wariness about Kosovo’s security and its helplessness with regard to eventual violent eruptions.¹⁹

In general, Kosovo’s international and local security forces were able to provide public security only on a general level. They had less success in reducing the culture of intimidation (e.g., of witnesses before courts) and in reducing indirect ethnic cleansing (March 2004 riots). They usually also abstained from interfering with organized crime and mafia violence. Mafia and paramilitary groups, such as the ANA, as well as informal intelligence services of Kosovo’s ruling parties, added to an atmosphere of fear and corruption.²⁰ The population feels generally well-protected from a potential return of Serbian military (formerly the Yugoslav army, or VJ) and internal police and security forces (MUP) to Kosovo, as long as KFOR is operational, but it feels less safe in daily living within ethnically mixed communities.²¹ Moreover, in the aftermath of independence in 2008, a new deterioration of the security situation took place when UNMIK’s central authority was challenged in the Serb-populated north. Here, CIVPOL police in the city of Mitrovica and the Border Control and Custom Service had to end their presence and temporarily withdraw to the Albanian side in February and March 2008. Only the KFOR military succeeded in reestablishing some form of international control in the area. In addition, Serb members of the local KPS police refused to report to their Albanian superiors and (temporarily) quit their duties. Meanwhile, informal Serbian police, directed by Belgrade, took over some control in the northern municipalities; the same took place with regard to control over railway infrastructure leading to Serbia proper.²²

The recurring phase of instability did not have a significant impact on

¹⁹ See Reports of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Docs. S/2004/348, S/2004/613, S/2004/907, S/2004/932, S/2005/88, S/2005/335, S/2005/635, S/2006/45, S/2006/361, and S/2006/707.

²⁰ See UNDP, *Kosovo, Early Warning Report No. 14* (Pristina, Kosovo: UNDP, July-September 2006): 37-43.

²¹ Ibid.

²² ICG/International Crisis Group, “Kosovo’s First Month,” *Update Europe Briefing 47* (March 18, 2008): 5-6.

the overall promotion of democracy within the Albanian majority community; however, it did affect the prospects for democracy within the Serb-dominated communities. The Serb community has been highly influenced by the Belgrade government, which since 2004 has repeatedly prevented Kosovo-Serbs from cooperating with Pristina or from participating in official elections under the supervision of UNMIK. Instead, Belgrade has included Serb-populated areas of Kosovo in Serbia-wide elections. Overall, effective security provision in Kosovo has been highly dependent on NATO's military presence through KFOR to reestablish public order whenever needed in periods when official state authorities under Resolution 1244 have been challenged. This remains a valid finding also for Kosovo after its declaration of independence.

State Capacities and Legitimacy

State capacity, defined as the ability of the administration to establish and enforce autonomous decision making, applies to UNMIK only in official terms with regard to Kosovo's special condition under an international UN administration. As key "state" authorities have been transferred to PISG ministries, notably to the police and justice ministries, since December 2005, local "state" capacities have increased. However, the low level of professional skills and performance at the public-service level has significantly hampered the execution of decisions made by local structures. Despite multiyear institution and capacity-building programs run by the OSCE and by a wealth of other intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs, or INGOs (e.g., the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], the National Democratic Institute [NDI], and so on), a well-established, effective, and competent bureaucratic state apparatus is still not present in Kosovo. A recent World Bank report, for example, suggests that Kosovo's lack of professional and regulatory capacities in the economic sector hamper it from effectively absorbing large amounts of international financial assistance.²³ Attempts to establish a central education program for civil servants in the form of a Kosovo Institute for Public Administration (KIPA) also have been drafted on paper, but not yet realized.

The lack of professional skills might change in the post-UDI period, but it does not seem realistic without essential input from the European Union's presence in Kosovo. Given the level of institutional corruption, the opposite case might also occur. Political elites have shown the tendency of using their authority and positions to promote nepotism and clientelism by filling public slots with relatives, members of the ruling party, or family members of UCK war veterans. At the same time, a sufficient social welfare system has not been developed; monthly pension and welfare schemes are usually below €50 per month, even as average living prices are close to Western European levels.

²³ See *ibid.*

Moreover, in terms of state corruption, more than half of all respondents to a UNDP survey replied that they themselves had experienced corruption by public officials.²⁴ How such a corrupted usage of state capacities will develop in post-UDI times remains subject to an effective enforcement of EU standards in Kosovo, in accordance with the process of the EU's Stabilization and Association Process initiated in Kosovo in 2003.

Postwar Kosovo as a *de jure* and *de facto* state always has been dependent on foreign aid (be it humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the war, or ongoing development programs ever since) regardless of the constant, gradual increase of local decision-making powers since the establishment of the first PISG ministries in 2002. However, Kosovo's economy can survive only through further integration into the EU's trade and labor market. Overall, Kosovo's ministries have been able to deliver public services only through massive external support of nearly all fields of state capacities and responsibilities, including security, rule-of-law, public order, welfare, infrastructure, and so on. This structural dependency has generated a relatively high level of *output* legitimacy for KFOR and UNMIK since 1999. In contrast to this, a much lower level of procedural *input* legitimacy has been achieved by UNMIK due to UNMIK's often nontransparent and authoritarian ruling style.²⁵ The behavior of local and international officials has had devastating effects on these officials' public reputation over the long run and generated a high level of frustration, especially among Kosovo's younger people (under twenty-five years of age), who represent more than half of the population and whose economic expectations rest on legal or illegal opportunities of work migration to Western Europe.

External Intervention for Postwar Democratization

International intervention in Kosovo under UN Resolution 1244 took place immediately after its issuance on June 10, 1999, when NATO troops stationed in Albania and Macedonia since 1998 were immediately able to take control of the territory of Kosovo. Along with KFOR troops moving into Kosovo and parallel to the withdrawal of Serb security forces, the UN deployed a preparation mission to implement the proper set-up of the official UNMIK mission to Kosovo. In June 1999, KFOR and UNMIK began to deploy their personnel and have been operational in Kosovo ever since, regardless of the fact that the Kosovo parliamentary assembly declared the independence of Kosovo

²⁴ See UNDP, 2006.

²⁵ On the various aspects of legitimacy, see Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1960); David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); and Fritz W. Scharpf, *Legitimationskonzepte jenseits des Nationalstaats*, Working Paper 04/6 (Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 2004).

on February 17, 2008.²⁶ UN Resolution 1244 mandated UNMIK to “provide a [civil] interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy...while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing [local] institutions.” This also included “performing basic civilian administrative functions;...[organizing] the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including holding of elections; ... [and] transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions.”²⁷

While UNMIK took over all administrative state functions, including legislative, executive, and judicial powers, the initial mission report and strategy outline by Secretary-General Annan foresaw the set-up of UNMIK, with four constituent pillars: UNMIK’s core administrative pillar; the UNHCR pillar, which was tasked with coordination of the return of refugees and humanitarian assistance; the EU pillar, which was tasked with economic reconstruction; and the OSCE pillar (OMIK), which was entrusted with institution-building aimed at “strengthening the capacity of local and central institutions and civil society organizations, ... promoting democracy, good governance [and]...organizing elections.”²⁸ This latter task was comprised of training and raising “awareness and involvement of citizens in social and political change in Kosovo by strengthening the development of local citizens, ...professional, cultural and other associations...[and by initiating] programs to facilitate conditions that support pluralistic political party structures, political diversity and a healthy democratic political climate, ...[including] training of government officials and executive and administrative officers in procedures of good governance.”²⁹ This wide range of provisions represented the core elements in UNMIK’s mandate for the promotion of democracy and democratic institution-building. With regard to KFOR, Resolution 1244 also reaffirmed NATO’s preceding bilateral military agreement with Belgrade.

However, UNMIK was hardly able to exercise effective control over most of Kosovo’s territory during the first half year of its deployment due to a severe lack of sufficient resources and manpower capacities (administrative experts, civilian police, and international judges). This situation led to a political power

²⁶ Under the independence provisions, the Kosovo assembly and government declared the UN-sponsored Ahtisaari Proposal of February 2007 as fully binding upon independent Kosovo, which called for a continued presence of KFOR and the handover of UNMIK responsibilities to the EU rule-of-law mission of EULEX, within a transition period of 120 days.

²⁷ United Nations Resolution 1244, June 10, 1999, adopted by the Security Council, 4011th meeting, arts. 10, 11.

²⁸ UNSG Report S/1999/779, July 12, 1999, report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, par. 79.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pars. 80 and 84.

vacuum in late 1999 that was quickly filled by illegal, self-appointed, local administrative structures, led by the UCK in many Kosovar municipalities. In contrast to this, the NATO-led KFOR operation was in the convenient situation of having most of its troops and necessary means and equipment ready for quick deployment along the border of Kosovo in Macedonia and Albania. After 1999, and compared with other crisis areas in the world, the UN administration in Kosovo had a wealth of international donor contributions at its disposal.³⁰ It was not before 2002-2003 that international civilian and military peacebuilders in Kosovo faced a reduction of available resources and manpower, in the aftermath of 9/11 and a redirection of the international aid flow to Afghanistan and Iraq in conjunction with the “war on terror” led by the United States.³¹

On the civilian level, and given the novel four-pillar structure of UNMIK that was intended to display a high degree of division of labor among the UN, the OSCE, and the EU (with a final say by the UN, except over KFOR), the core of foreign countries that predominantly staffed and financed the UNMIK pillar structure in Kosovo was either member states of the EU, or the United States. On the military level, the main contributing (lead) nations of KFOR were the Western states that formed the informal Contact Group on the Balkans, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. This group of states pushed for the establishment of the UNMIK civilian administration and KFOR’s military occupation under a distinct pattern of power sharing: the SRSG was always to be seconded by an EU member state; his deputy, by the United States; and the post of the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) rotated annually between seconds of the Western NATO states that formed the Contact Group.³² Despite the initial intention of interagency consultation and harmonious division of labor, the coordination among the international organizations was characterized by severely conflicting elements: all pillar organizations enjoyed operational autonomy in principle (the UN, the OSCE, and the EU). On the other hand, the nominal subordination of the pillar organizations under the dictum of the SRSG’s office as the final decision-making organ often led to a suboptimal outcome in the missions’ performances, mainly due to interagency rivalry, different working cultures (top-down vs. consultative), and parallel reporting structures (Brussels, Vienna, New York). On top of that, the SRSG had no authority over KFOR operations, whose own national contingents remained absolutely autonomous

³⁰ See tables and figure 1 at the end of this article.

³¹ Helmut Kramer and Vedran Dzihic, eds., *Die Kosovo-Bilanz: Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft* (Vienna: LIT Verlag, 2005), 125.

³² Russia finally agreed to the deployment of UNMIK as an international administration for Kosovo in order to prevent a purely NATO-dominated military administration after the *de facto* surrender of the Serb government in the Kumanovo Agreement.

in their decision making, under the loose coordination of COMKFOR. Finally, and without a clear exit strategy for UNMIK or KFOR other than calling for a voluntary settlement of Kosovo's final status, the international administration abruptly changed its policy of blocking demands for Kosovo's independence and preventing a further transfer of state authorities to the PISG. Under the SRSGs Jessen-Petersen and Rucker, the international administration opted for a hasty "closing-the-shop" policy in the aftermath of the March 2004 riots. This handover process took place until international attempts to reach a mutual agreement between the government in Belgrade and the local delegation from Pristina were caught in a stalemate and when Russia had *de facto* vetoed the Ahtisaari Proposal in the UN Security Council.

Since the beginning of the direct external intervention into local affairs by UNMIK, Kosovo has been subject to extensive international election monitoring by the OSCE mission in Kosovo (OMIK) and other monitoring missions deployed by the EU, the Council of Europe, and various INGOs. Since 1999, the OSCE pillar of UNMIK actually has organized and controlled the entire electoral process in Kosovo. This role continued in 2000 and 2001 during the closely supervised municipal and central elections in Kosovo. "In order to prepare an environment [for] free, fair and multi-ethnic elections," OMIK was also tasked with conducting "wide-ranging activities related to ... the restoration of democratic political organizations and institutions...[and] the design and implementation of a comprehensive voter registration."³³ Also, Kosovo's human rights situation was, and still is, subject to intensive monitoring and reporting by a wealth of organizations and institutions. Here, OMIK also took the lead.

The work of the OMIK Department for Human Rights and Rule of Law (HRD) mainly covered four fields of engagement: (1) building the capacity of state officials, legal professionals, civil society, and so on (including the establishment of a local ombudsman institution for independent monitoring; (2) developing rule of law institutions; (3) monitoring cases of human rights violations and inadequate remedies in the legal system; and (4) public reporting on human rights, including detailed recommendations.³⁴ From 1999 until the present, the HRD has adapted its focus from primarily monitoring and reporting to one that emphasizes institutional capacity-building and advising local structures of self-government. In post-UDI Kosovo, OMIK is likely to return to its previous monitoring focus, together with the new EULEX mission, in order to assess the local government's compliance with the provisions of the Ahtisaari Proposal. Both missions will then concentrate on monitoring the rule-of-law situation in local courts and the conduct of the local police, with

³³ UNSG Report S/1999/779, pars. 80 and 84.

³⁴ OMIK/OSCE Mission in Kosovo, *Departmental Guide of Human Rights and Rule of Law Department*, Pristine/Pristina, Kosovo, May 2003.

special attention to the treatment of minority communities.

Democracy Imposed: Setting the Parameters

By UN Resolution 1244, UNMIK was given full control of executive, legislative, and judicial powers over the entire territory of Kosovo (in principle, also including the Serb enclaves and the north). On this basis, UNMIK's level of external intrusiveness was by definition very high. First and foremost, the SRSG, as the head of the mission, combined the roles of the prime legislator, the chief executive, and the head of the judiciary in Kosovo. Through the SRSG's office, UNMIK imposed regulations and determined what was applicable law in Kosovo, leading to a confusing legal framework.³⁵ Aside from UNMIK regulations, the SRSG declared, for example, as applicable law the old pre-1989 Yugoslav laws, based largely on the 1974 autonomous Kosovo constitution, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), among other international legal documents. Furthermore, in the case of legal gaps, the SRSG also made the 1989-1999 laws of the Milosevic era applicable, if they complied with international human rights standards.

As a result of such confusing legislation, the local judiciary in Kosovo was barely able to begin its work, and local judges often simply refused to apply legislation from the Milosevic era within their jurisdiction. On the executive, constitutional, and economic levels, UNMIK installed a completely new structure of local state institutions under UN oversight. These included the development of local courts, currency and fiscal authorities, taxation and trading authorities, the Kosovo consolidated budget, housing and property authorities, the Kosovo Police Service, and the Kosovo Protection Corps (for the demobilization of the UCK), as well as registries for business enterprises, media outlets, and NGOs, a civil and voter registry, a political party registry, electoral codes, and provisions for self-governing municipal structures.³⁶ UNMIK maintained its tight oversight powers over all these institutions. Many of these highly intrusive external measures took place without allowing effective input and decision making by local stakeholders. For example, it was not until February 2000 that UNMIK officially established the first local consultative bodies and co-administrative structures under a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) to inform central decision making of the SRSG and UNMIK's growing mission bureaucracy.³⁷ However, UNMIK's local counterparts were allowed to give only nonbinding and purely consultative advice to the SRSG

³⁵ UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, *On Applicable Law in Kosovo*, amended by UNMIK Regulation 2000/59.

³⁶ See UNMIK Gazette 2008, <http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/Econtents.htm> (accessed April 1, 2008).

³⁷ See Jens Narten, "Building Local Institutions and Parliamentarianism in Postwar Kosovo: A Review of Joint Efforts by the UN and OSCE from 1999-2006," *Helsinki Monitor* 17, no. 2 (2006): 145-146.

and UNMIK departments.

Following the first democratic elections on municipal and central levels in 2000 and 2001 and the appointment of legitimate local representatives and governments, UNMIK's policy of intrusiveness was maintained by the UNMIK-imposed Constitutional Framework for Kosovo.³⁸ This framework dictated the political system of the evolving Kosovar polity for the next eight years and also laid the foundation for the political system in post-independence Kosovo.

Despite massive pressure by SRSG Steiner, it took until early 2002 before the first central local government of the two big Kosovo-Albanian parties, LDK and PDK, was hammered out. Even after this enforced formation of a Kosovar government and a Kosovo parliamentary assembly, UNMIK departments transferred only minor administrative and executive functions and authorities to the new PISG ministries. They continued to withhold a significant number of powers reserved for the SRSG in key political areas, such as the police and the judiciary, in accordance with the Constitutional Framework. The SRSG regularly used his veto powers to block draft legislation of the Kosovo Assembly, if it was in contradiction to Resolution 1244, and maintained wide-ranging legislative and executive control through the issuance of administrative directions and regulations. However, the most intrusive policy applied by UNMIK to the local political system in Kosovo is illustrated by UNMIK's former policy of "Standards before Status," formulated by the office of SRSG Steiner in 2002. This policy imposed eight benchmarks to be fulfilled by the PISG (without their effective consultation) before the future status of Kosovo could be determined.³⁹ In the aftermath of the 2004 riots, UN Special Envoy Eide concluded in his evaluation report that UNMIK's Standards-before-Status approach was "untenable in its current form" and that UNMIK was in a state of "disarray [and] without direction and internal cohesion."⁴⁰

Following the riots, the new SRSG Holkeri quickly resigned from office and was succeeded in the summer of 2004 by SRSG Jessen-Petersen. The new SRSG accelerated the transfer of authorities from UNMIK to the PISG by

³⁸ UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, *On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo*.

³⁹ UNMIK, *Standards before Status* (Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK, April 2002). These benchmarks comprised the following elements: functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and reintegration, the economy, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protections Corps. However, the benchmarks did not contain clear indicators for their fulfilment. UNMIK was widely perceived as using these standards to counter early Kosovar demands for political independence from Yugoslavia. See David Buerstedde, "Violence in Kosovo Calls for a Fresh Look at the Mission's Priorities," in *OSCE Yearbook 2004*, ed. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 135-145.

⁴⁰ See Kai Eide, *Report on the Situation in Kosovo*, report on behalf of the UN Secretary-General and submitted to the President of the UN Security Council, New York, August 6, 2004.

establishing PISG ministries in the formerly “reserved power” sectors, such as the police and the judiciary, border customs, and the Kosovo Trust Fund (overseeing a UNMIK-enforced privatization process of former socially owned enterprises). Still, all these “transferred” sectors remained under effective veto control of UNMIK. At the same time, the SRSG reduced UNMIK’s overall bureaucracy and range of executive authorities.⁴¹ Jessen-Petersen also pushed the agenda of determining the future status of Kosovo, declaring that “UNMIK prepares to close shop in Kosovo,”⁴² at the point in 2006 when bilateral status negotiations between Belgrade and the Albanian Unity Team had begun in Vienna, led by Ahtisaari. Under Jessen-Petersen’s successor and current SRSG Rucker, UNMIK’s almost ad hoc shift from a high degree of political intrusiveness to a quick transfer of powers to the PISG continued. However, an indirect policy of informal intrusiveness remained after the arrival of the so-called EU Preparation Team (EUTP) in the summer of 2006. The EUTP, together with legal experts from the United States, had an immense influence on drafting new legislation and the new constitution for post-UDI Kosovo, in anticipation of the current EULEX supervision.

In conclusion, all areas of domestic sovereignty were reestablished and intensively controlled by the UNMIK administration after 1999. This initially took the form of complete takeover of formal state powers, and generated possibly the highest form of external intrusiveness into local affairs. It was only gradually (but then often in a hasty manner) that these authorities were transferred to local institutions, essentially triggered by the violent events of the March 2004 riots. However, local officials in post-UDI Kosovo have not yet retaken full control over the judiciary, police, and military affairs, with EULEX and KFOR maintaining external control over these areas until the present.

External-Local Interaction and Democratic Conditionality

The Serbian state elite and its Kosovo-Albanian counterpart differed significantly in their modes of attempting to secure their respective interests. As most political elite, the Belgrade government and the PISG government in Pristina were, first and foremost, interested in preserving their political and economic influence and power over the territory of Kosovo. But here is where their commonalities ended. The Albanian state elite, across nearly all party lines, became the main domestic change agent in Kosovo; they focused on consolidating their power through self-determination in the form of an independent state of Kosovo. In contrast to this, the Serbian state elite, both in

⁴¹ That process has also led to an increased handover of local police stations to the KPS and to a reduction in CIVPOL oversight rights.

⁴² Soren Jessen-Petersen, “Challenges of Peacebuilding: The Example of Kosovo,” *S+F Sicherheit und Frieden/Security and Peace* 24, no. 1 (2006): 10.

Belgrade and in the north of Kosovo, attempted to maintain their power through the *de facto* partition of Kosovo, autonomy from UNMIK and the PISG, and a reintegration of Serb-dominated areas into Serbia (after massive pressure from Belgrade on Kosovo-Serbs). Differing from both, the main preferences of the numerous and largely marginalized minority groups (other than Serb), such as the Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptiani, and so on, were mainly interested in preserving overall peace, personal safety, and security, as well as ensuring their collective cultural and economic survival. They faced intensive pressure to side with either the Albanian majority or the Serb community, the dominating fault line of conflict and politics in Kosovo.⁴³ With regard to peripheral elites within the Albanian community, mafia structures as well as paramilitary groups (ANA, Serb bridge watchers) displayed diametrically opposed preferences by having an interest in undermining democratic and institutional stability and/or by promoting corruption; in this way, they hoped to maintain or increase their political and economic gains, partially interwoven with the political establishment in Kosovo.

At the level of external actors, KFOR's main preference focused on establishing at least a "negative" peace in Kosovo. Through military might and deterrence, they hoped to prevent further outbreaks of violence that would threaten public order and security, such as the 2004 riots. In contrast to this, UNMIK's key interest was to build an effective Kosovar self-government and to establish a liberal market democracy, while struggling to facilitate a stable political solution for Kosovo's final status. When this latter aspect failed after the UDI, UNMIK refocused its attention on handing over its competences to EULEX, despite Russia's protest as the main veto player on Kosovo inside the UN.⁴⁴ The OSCE mission's interest in civil institution-building has largely been achieved, with most local institutions up and running. This has allowed UNMIK to refocus its role in post-UDI Kosovo on monitoring functions.

The EU, in concert with the United States, as the most influential international change agent in today's Kosovar affairs, has both economic and political interests and preferences. It is interested in creating peace and economic stability in Kosovo and the Western Balkans to further their integration into the EU and the EU's ongoing enlargement. And it aims to prove that its fragile and nascent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) can function: while KFOR and UNMIK faced immense cuts in available resources and manpower

⁴³ This fate is shared by the Serb community of the enclaves in the mainland of Kosovo, whose security situation remains precarious for the same set of reasons.

⁴⁴ Note that Russia is able to act only as a veto player in international legal terms and inside the UN Security Council by preventing a follow-up resolution to Resolution 1244; however, Russia could not prevent the Kosovo-Albanian side from establishing facts on the ground by declaring its independence with backing from the United States and most EU member states. On veto players in general, see David E. Cunningham, "Veto Players and Civil War Duration," *American Journal of Political Sciences* 50, no. 4 (2006): 883-885.

after 2002-2003, following the reorientation of Western aid on Afghanistan and Iraq, the EU's engagement in Kosovo has significantly increased after the UDI. On that basis, it has set up EULEX with an intended timeline of three to four years.⁴⁵

Overall, a five-step process of the interaction between internal and external actors can be observed by which confrontational, cooperative, captured, and co-opted phases can be differentiated from each other.⁴⁶ UNMIK enjoyed an initially high level of domestic legitimacy for its peacebuilding agenda and managed to consolidate its authority at the beginning of its mandate. This allowed for the dismantling of postwar UCK structures in the second half of 1999 and led to a rather *cooperative* form of internal-external interaction with the local Albanian elite. However, in order to establish a cooperative basis with the international actors on the ground, the Albanian side had to postpone demands for Kosovo's independence until a later stage. But due to the failure in guaranteeing real safety, particularly during the March 2004 riots, the interaction with the Serb minority in Kosovo increasingly deteriorated and became primarily *confrontational* (except for the Djindjic era from 2001-2003). Subsequently, after the relapse into violence during the March 2004 riots, UNMIK and KFOR found themselves in a situation of *captured* peacebuilding interaction with the Albanian majority community. During this period, the international administration and military forces had temporarily lost control and authority over essential local spaces and were, consequently, more or less forced to give in to local demands for independence. Only when UNMIK halted its overly intrusive policy making and signaled that it was prepared to begin a real and meaningful transfer of reserved powers and process to resolve Kosovo's final status could a compromise be reached with the PISG government that resulted in a *co-opted* form of peacebuilding interaction between internal and external actors.

However, due to increased resistance from civil-society movements and paramilitary groups that did not agree with the Kosovo-Albanian elite (such as the student movement Vetevendosje, local veteran associations, or the ANA), the achieved level of elite-based/international co-optation was under threat again. This development pushed Western powers of the Contact Group even more quickly to support and recognize Kosovo's independence in February 2008. In sum, the main winner of this multifaceted interaction process was the Kosovo-Albanian political elite who formed the Unity Team in 2006-2007. In the end, achieving this final level of internal-external co-

⁴⁵ Also, KFOR announced that it intends to remain active in Kosovo into the future; the United States military base, Bondsteel, for example, is based on a 99-year lease agreement.

⁴⁶ See Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, "The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood," in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (London: Routledge, 2009), 23-52.

option and interaction compromise seemed to be the only way for Western powers to secure relative peace in Kosovo and to appease the Albanian side, which had become increasingly frustrated with Kosovo's unclear status. This means that local politics ultimately superseded the initial level of external intrusiveness aimed at blocking demands for independence. However, the cost for the Albanian side was gaining "only" a semi-(in)dependent Kosovo, which lacks official recognition by the UN and remains under ongoing international supervision, with veto powers in local affairs. Post-UDI Kosovo thus represents a case study of a dangerous balancing act between violating the principle of territorial integrity (Serbia) and a protracted frozen conflict (North Mitrovica). However, in the end, neither the international veto player, Russia, nor domestic spoilers such as ANA, Vetevendosje, or Serb bridge watchers could effectively block the (semi-ideal) outcome of Kosovo's EU-supervised independence and recognition by Western states.

Clear-cut linkage policy and democratic conditionality⁴⁷ can be identified, especially in respect to UNMIK and the EU. The most visible policy of direct conditionality was SRSJ Steiner's rather punitive policy of "Standards-before-Status," which led to an extensive catalogue of Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) criteria to be fulfilled by the PISG government before consideration of Kosovo's future status and potential independence.⁴⁸ These criteria were aimed at establishing democratic conditionality and included a specific sectoral approach, relevant to the democratization process. However, following the March 2004 riots, a situation of withholding rewards did not effectively take place. Instead, UNMIK abandoned its "Standards-before-Status" policy, which had led to increased elite and public resistance at that time.

More rewarding than punitive, UNMIK's selective and often nontransparent policy of gradual transfer of reserved powers to the PISG provides another example of conditionality set by UNMIK. On the side of the EU, KSIP criteria and status standards imposed by UNMIK were later incorporated into the EU's European Partnership Action Plan for Kosovo as a core evaluation pattern for an annual review of Kosovo's progress in the fulfilment of these standards. This took place in order to inform Kosovo's further integration process into European structures and access to the European market, as well as to allow potential financial benefits from the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP tracking mechanism for Kosovo).⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Defined as the granting of valued tangible or intangible benefits (i.e., political or financial support, trade links, market access, security guarantees, membership in a desirable organization) to a target state or government by a state or an international organization, based on the fulfillment of certain conditions and democratic standards by that state or government.

⁴⁸ UNMIK/Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 2004, *KSIP*.

⁴⁹ UNSG Report S/2006/707 (September 1, 2007), *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*.

A final example of external conditionality was the PISG's acceptance of provisions in the Ahtisaari Proposal for ongoing international oversight and veto rights, municipal decentralization, and extensive minority rights for the benefit of the Serb community, as well as heavy restrictions on a future Kosovo army. Acceptance of these criteria was a precondition for, and a clear linkage with, further Western support for the Kosovo-Albanian struggle for independence. The Kosovo-Albanian elite largely accepted this set of conditionality once the question of Kosovo's final status and potential independence was reopened for discussion by the UN and Western powers, following UN Special Envoy Eide's follow-up report in August 2005.⁵⁰ Upon this elite-based consent for external-local cooperation, continued financial and political support was provided swiftly by Western powers. The domestic adoption costs of this process remained relatively limited, with only a few spoiler activities as a direct result. Moreover, the public majority in Kosovo continued to support the political elite in their cooperation with Western powers and organizations. This stands in diametrical contrast of the Kosovo-Serbs and their alignment with Belgrade. Such indicates that democratic conditionality was perceived in general, as well as among the Albanian political elite, as relatively credible. It also shows that the external actors who set these conditions had included enough bargaining power vis-à-vis the local government. Once the status question was reopened, the Albanian political elite and the PISG government appeared to be rather satisfied with the range and pace of Western support for independence. At this point, the Kosovo Albanian side did not have any real political alternative other than seeking Western support and responding to its conditionality. What they could offer in exchange was local elite support for the prevention of further violence in Kosovo.

Overall, Kosovo has always been dependent on external (conditional) financial, economic, and political support provided mainly by Western states and organizations, which stands in sharp contrast to the subtle alliance between Belgrade and Moscow. From the Western, and especially the European, perspective, a peaceful development in postwar Kosovo, in turn, has appeared to be essential for the EU's border and market security as well as its enlargement perspectives. Here, the EU could not have realistically opted for not granting its support. The Albanian elite, on the other hand, regardless, could be assured of overall Western and EU support in the longer term. These circumstances have resulted in relatively close ties between Western states and organizations and the Kosovo-Albanian elite, and promoted quite a harmonious bargaining relationship and a strategic-economic partnership, even though the cost was the

⁵⁰ Kai Eide, *A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo*, report on behalf of the UN Secretary-General and submitted to the President of the UN Security Council, New York, October 7, 2005. An initial report was compiled in August 2004, following the March 2004 riots. Also see, Eide, *Report on the Situation in Kosovo*.

institutionalization of a frozen conflict with Serbia and Russia over Kosovo's final status. Under these conditions and given the prewar democratic culture of the Kosovar majority population, the influx of massive external resources and personnel associated with development aid and the promotion of democracy, in general, can be considered fairly effective and conducive to opening transformative spaces toward democratization, at least within the Kosovo-Albanian community. However, at the same time, it has led to an alienation process from Western democratic principles and to nationalist radicalization within the Kosovo-Serb community, and, most likely, also within the political system of the Republic of Serbia, which threatens to undermine the future democratic development of both Kosovo and Serbia.

External Aid and Democracy Assistance

In the first five years of external intervention, Kosovo received a wealth of international aid and assistance. During that period, the quality of aid changed from emergency-related humanitarian assistance in 1999-2000, to longer-term reconstruction aid and development assistance afterward. This qualitative change in external aid reflected more or less the intended development outlined in Annan's 1999 strategy for the reconstruction of Kosovo, which foresaw a combination of humanitarian assistance and refugee aid by UNHCR (as former UNMIK pillar I) and economic and infrastructure reconstruction by the EU (UNMIK pillar IV).⁵¹ After the 2003 EU summit in Thessaloniki and through the mechanisms of its "Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe" and its "Stabilisation and Association Agreements" (SAA), the EU's commitment to increased economic aid and cooperation in the entire Balkan region intensified and transferred the responsibility for most economic aid from UN agents to EU programs.

Official Development Aid

According to the RIMS database of the Kosovar Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), overall official development aid (ODA) committed to Kosovo from 1999 until 2005 is estimated at €3,012 billion, while the ODA amount actually spent for the same period, according to the ministry, is estimated at €2,360 billion.⁵² In general, the trend of ODA contributions to Kosovo declined continuously by almost half per annum, after the abundance of aid received during 2000 (€1 billion) and 2001 (€615 million). This trend coincided with the end of reconstruction and emergency recovery efforts after the war in Kosovo. Remaining relatively stable during 2003, 2004, and 2005, the total

⁵¹ UNSG Report S/1999/779.

⁵² UNMIK Pillar IV, *Trends in Assistance Flows* (Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK Pillar IV Fiscal Affairs Office, 2006).

amount of ODA commitments ranged between €200 and €238 million.⁵³

This pattern of aid flows can be explained by several factors. First, external aid flows typically increase in the case of an external intervention in the aftermath of a violent conflict, due to the necessity to satisfy the most pressing postwar needs. This was the case in Kosovo in the first two to three years, from 1999 to 2001, during which period the reconstruction and relief efforts absorbed the largest portion of aid. After moving beyond immediate humanitarian and reconstruction needs, external donors focused on economic consolidation, and their contributions decreased when a worldwide redirection of development aid to other crisis areas, such as Afghanistan, took place. Parallel to that, the decrease in ODA contributions for Kosovo coincided with improved macro-economic indicators of Kosovo that showed an increase of the local GDP per capita, general GDP growth, public and private spending and investment, and UNMIK's ability to mobilize its own tax revenues.⁵⁴

From 1999 to 2005, the United States was the largest bilateral donor of project-related support, followed by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, and Canada. In 2005,⁵⁵ donor commitments of the United States, the Netherlands, Italy, Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, the World Bank, and the European Union and its Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) provided the largest amount of ODA contributions, comparatively equal to those made in 2004. According to MEF data, aid commitments from bilateral donors accounted for 56.96 percent of the assistance in 2005, or €135.8 million in total.⁵⁶ Aid from multilateral agencies accounted for 42.7 percent of the assistance, or € 102.6 million in total, the same year. The major bilateral donors since 2001 were the United States, whose aid accounted for 47.4 percent of the bilateral aid, followed by Germany with 16.12 percent, the Netherlands with 8.81 percent, Sweden with 7.85 percent, the United Kingdom with 5.31 percent, and Switzerland with 4.78 percent.⁵⁷

⁵³ Ibid.; also see table 1.

⁵⁴ The Kosovo Consolidated Budget demonstrated significant positive performance with regard to consolidated government domestic revenues (excluding donor support), which increased from 7.3 percent of GDP in 2001-2002, to 24 percent of GDP in 2004, and reached 27.7 percent and 31.1 percent of the GDP, respectively, in 2005 and 2006. This increase means that most of the capital investments, once funded by the donor community, were heavily financed by the Kosovo Consolidated Budget. See UNMIK Pillar IV, *Trends in Assistance Flows*.

⁵⁵ Note that UNMIK's Pillar IV Fiscal Affairs Office provided a comprehensive annual assessment of ODA only for the year 2005. However, based on UNMIK information to the author, these figures more or less equal the ODA situation in 2004, and, therefore, can be taken as an analytical substitute for the previous year.

⁵⁶ UNMIK Pillar IV, *Trends in Assistance Flows*.

⁵⁷ Ibid.; also see table 2.

The EU remained the largest multilateral donor in 2005, providing €84.5 million in assistance, an increase of 12 percent in comparison to 2004. Project support remained the most preferred aid modality for both bilateral and multilateral donors alike. In 2005, bilateral and multilateral donors implemented a total of 318 projects, of which 196 were new ones, according to MEF data.⁵⁸ Among the multilateral organizations, the EU remained the main source, providing more than one-third of the total budget support amount during the mentioned period, followed by the World Bank. Bilateral and multilateral donors, which frequently provided project-related grants, were the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, the United States, the Netherlands, Greece, and Austria, but also international agencies such as UNICEF, the UNDP, the International Labor Organization, the International Organization for Migration, the European Agency for Reconstruction/EU, and the World Bank. The official figures of ODA contributions (provided by the MEF) differentiate between modes of delivery according to (1) capital investment, (2) technical assistance, (3) supply of equipment, (4) credit, (5) training, and (6) other considerations, such as a combination of different modes.⁵⁹ Here, the modes of capital investment and technical assistance accounted for the largest number of ODA contributions. From 1999 to 2005, of €3.01 billion in allocated ODA, €1.2 billion were allocated to capital investments, representing 43 percent of the allocated aid and 47 percent of the aid spent. Technical assistance during that period accounted for over €1 billion of the committed amount, or 36 percent of the allocated aid and 30 percent of the aid spent.⁶⁰ Capital investments continuously declined following 2002, with major project investments directed toward post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.

MEF statistics also provide official figures for ODA budget support, designated grants, and project support from 1999 to 2005. The total amount of budget support aid was €199,336,299.62, mainly disbursed from 1999 to 2002. According to the same source, donor-designated grants (DDG) accounted for 7.73 percent of the total disbursed ODA to Kosovo from 1999 to 2005. This ODA support funded a variety of sectors such as culture, democratization, good governance and civil society, education and science, health, justice, labor, social welfare and employment, local administration, public services and utilities, trade and industry, economy and finance management, minority rights, and mine clearance. During 2005, sixty-six new projects were funded through DDG aid.⁶¹ For 2005, the RIMS database of the Kosovar Ministry of

⁵⁸ UNMIK Pillar IV, *Trends in Assistance Flows*.

⁵⁹ See table 3. Modes (1) and (4) appear to be related to budget funding, whereas modes (2), (3), and (5) relate to technical assistance in the broader sense.

⁶⁰ See figure 1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Economy and Finance also differentiates among overall ODA contributions per sector, which gives a rough indicator for the years 2003 and 2004 as well (but not for the prior humanitarian period). Here, justice and home affairs remained the prime recipients, with 26.7 percent of all aid (69 percent of which went to the Kosovo Police Service); public utilities (energy, water, and waste) ranked second with 19.3 percent of all aid. Other sectors receiving relatively large amounts were democracy, human rights, and civil society (11.3 percent), trade and industry (9.7 percent), and public administration (9.1 percent). Sectors receiving relatively small amounts were economy and finance (4.7 percent), housing and social welfare (4.4 percent), labor and employment (3.1 percent), agriculture and forestry (3 percent), education, vocational training, and science (2.9 percent), health (2.4 percent), transport and infrastructure (1.4 percent), environment and spatial planning (1.3 percent), and culture, youth, and sport (0.7 percent).⁶² In addition, the UNMIK administration in Kosovo established a special Kosovo Trust Fund, which currently holds about €300 million in reserve from money generated through the EU pillar-led privatization process of formerly socially owned enterprises.⁶³ In sum, Kosovo always has been highly dependent on external resources, such as ODA. However, the trend toward less dependency has been clear. International aid was more than 60 percent of Kosovo's GDP in 2000 and declined to less than a quarter by 2004.⁶⁴

Democracy-related Assistance

Of the roughly €2.4 billion ODA spent from 1999 to 2005, the exact official share of ODA contributions that was related to projects promoting democracy is not provided by the MEF. However, a rough estimate of the annual amount of such aid can be made by separating those sectors of the overall ODA figures that relate to democratization in a broader sense. In the tables found at the end of this essay, the numbers behind each sector indicate the sectors of the research template: (1) elections and the political processes; (2) rule of law, accountability, anticorruption, human rights, and minority rights; (3) institutional infrastructure (parliamentary and public administration, decentralization, and administration capacity); (4) civil society, media, civic education, and empowerment; and (5) civil-military relations, DDR, and security sector reform.⁶⁵ Also, a rough crosscheck of these official ODA figures

⁶² See table 4.

⁶³ UNDP/United Nations Development Programme, *Early Warning Report 17* (Pristina, Kosovo: UNDP, 2007), 4, and UNDP/United Nations Development Programme, *The Kosovo Mosaic* (Pristina, Kosovo: UNDP, 2006), 13.

⁶⁴ UNDP/United Nations Development Programme, *The Kosovo Mosaic*, 12-13, and UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006* (Pristina, Kosovo: UNDP), 29. Other estimates differ from these figures (e.g., the IMF estimates a 61 percent external aid share of the GDP in 2000, 25 percent of GDP in 2001, 14 percent in 2002, 9 percent in 2003, 8 percent in 2004, and 10 percent in 2005). See UNMIK Pillar IV, 2006.

⁶⁵ See table 5.

can be made by breaking down democratization-related spending of UNMIK's main pillar organizations in Kosovo (UNMIK pillar I and II; OSCE pillar III; and EU pillar IV through the EAR).⁶⁶ Here, expenditures of the UNMIK pillars I (Police) and II (Administration) relate to the sectors of "Institutional Infrastructure" and "Security Sector."⁶⁷ Expenditures of the UNMIK pillar III (OSCE Mission) relate to the sectors of "Elections," "Rule of Law," "Institutional Infrastructure," "Civil Society," and "Security."⁶⁸ Expenditures of the UNMIK pillar IV (European Union) relate to the sectors of "Rule of Law," "Institutional Infrastructure," "Civil Society," and "Security."⁶⁹

Official figures for the overall KFOR budget do not exist.⁷⁰ Kramer and Dzihic present one of the few estimates of the overall costs for the entire KFOR operation. They estimate the KFOR expenditure at €15-17 billion for the period 2000 to 2004.⁷¹ With regard to overall external financial contributions, however, it can be concluded that international development aid has contributed significantly not only to Kosovo's financial and economic reconstruction, but also to the overall success of the democratization process. Without these contributions, the build-up of all five democracy-related sectors identified above would have been severely hampered. Although during the first years of the democratic reconstruction of postwar society in Kosovo the infrastructure-related build-up was at the core of international engagement in the field of democracy promotion, the current level of relative professionalism in Kosovo's PISG structures hardly could have been reached without the increased focus on external training and capacity-building measures in the following years. To give an example, in the absence of external democracy aid, the Kosovar polity likely would have been able to continue its democratic culture of holding fair elections; however, most probably it would not have been able to include the current level of legal provisions for minority protection, municipal

⁶⁶ Please note that, over the period of the first three years after intervention (and partially beyond), genuine local authorities, such as a Kosovar government and ministries, were not present in Kosovo and that budget-administrative functions were taken on exclusively by the UN administration of UNMIK. Its institution-building pillar of the OSCE provided the necessary training and local capacity-building in the field of promoting democracy, on which indigenous institutions could be formed at a later stage. While UNMIK's annual budgets thus can be added to the external budget funding for Kosovo, OMIK's annual budgets accounted for most of the technical and training assistance in the field of promoting democracy and institution-building. The average ratio between UNMIK's and OMIK's annual expenditures is approximately 1 to 10 (about \$350 million annually for UNMIK vs. €35 million annually for the OSCE mission for the period from 2000-2005). See tables 6 and 7.

⁶⁷ See table 6.

⁶⁸ See table 7.

⁶⁹ See table 8.

⁷⁰ Nor are they available as rough figures at the KFOR information liaison office in Kosovo, due to individual budgeting by each KFOR contributing state.

⁷¹ Kramer and Dzihic, *Kosovo-Bilanz*, 125-126.

decentralization, and self-governance into its constitutional framework and its post-UDI constitution. This assessment can be extended to nearly all fields of democracy promotion, such as democratic policing, rule of law, or human rights. In sum, it was only with the help of external technical expertise that this level of local (legal) performance could be reached. Given the enormous amount of money spent in Kosovo, however, it is unlikely that an additional increase of external aid during 1999 to 2004 would have had a significantly increased impact on Kosovo's overall development and democratization process. Beyond a certain amount of external financial aid, it is more a question of professional and political willingness to reach the highest standards in terms of applied rule of law and democracy, than of money spent or overall amount of training held. What finally overshadowed, if not paralyzed, many sectors of the democratic build-up in Kosovo was the unsolved status question under Resolution 1244. If the status of Kosovo had been clarified at the beginning of the intervention, the build-up of the polity would have been much more focused in terms of transfer of powers to local actors and the enablement of external actors, so as to hold them responsible and accountable. By 2003-2004, a feeling of political stagnation in the form of UNMIK's "standards policy"⁷² had robbed the nascent Kosovo polity of its earlier dynamics. From 2004 on, factors of applied external democracy aid did not become irrelevant (none of them were), but they lost much of their significance compared with the overarching political question of Kosovo's unsolved status. This assessment remains valid even for the contemporary situation in Kosovo after the UDI.

Conclusion

In UNMIK-administered postwar Kosovo, aspects of democracy, security, and state capacities were starkly interlinked with each other. In the light of an estimated overall financial contribution of about €20 billion, or U.S. \$25 billion, spent on Kosovo by international organizations and donors from 2000 to 2004 (including the UNMIK budget, EU reconstruction aid, KFOR expenditures, and contributions of international NGOs), one can conclude that the provision of military security and policing and the promotion of postwar electoral and other democratic processes could not have been realized without such massive external contributions. With UNMIK administering and steering large parts of this aid, UNMIK's external "state" capacities provided an essential base from which local democracy could unfold. Whether state capacities in newly independent Kosovo will become professional enough to fully replace UNMIK remains to be seen.

⁷² UNMIK 2002, *Standards before Status*; also see UNMIK/Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, *Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan/KSIP* (Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK, March 31, 2004).

Kosovo's set-up under international supervision and shared sovereignty is ongoing under UNMIK's successor mission, EULEX. In a similar context, the provision of external security guarantees by KFOR continue to be a prerequisite for securing conditions in which the postwar democratic process was initiated, starting with the demobilization of the UCK and its self-proclaimed municipal administrations in 1999 and the holding of the first democratic elections in 2000 and 2001. In that regard, a "security-first" argument holds true. Whether an "institutions-first" argument also applies is much more difficult to answer. UNMIK missed the chance to follow a "clean-slate" policy to replace prewar and wartime elites in 1999 and to facilitate a transparent political process, free of corruption and clientelism. Instead, UNMIK built on Kosovo's polity structures that were dominated by prewar Albanian party elites (LDK and PDK). If UNMIK's rhetoric of a tolerant and truly multi-ethnic postwar Kosovo had been taken seriously, an early institutionalization on the basis of a cross-ethnic political agenda would have been highly advantageous, although difficult to implement. The way that the Kosovo postwar polity was established, however, reduced such multi-ethnicity to pure political lip service. What took place, instead, was the construction of a postwar polity on an ethnic basis, reinforced by UNMIK's imposition of local institutional structures and ethnic quotas through its highly intrusive decision- and "constitution"-making powers. Under these circumstances, the postwar political process was instantly captured by ethnic entrepreneurs, disallowing a sustainable and essentially tolerant liberalization process. Overall, "ethicized" institutionalization on the basis of a rather superficial provision of public security prevailed over self-sustainable forms of multi-ethnic tolerance and democratization. Kosovo's build-up as a functioning democracy is a success in itself, and it demonstrates the strong interdependence between postwar democratization processes and efforts in security promotion and local capacity-building.

Table 1. Official Development Assistance from 1999-2005 (thousands €)

Year	Commitment	Contracted	Spent
1999	€337,066.96	€202,021.15	€177,516.94
2000	€1,061,654.92	€876,985.98	€607,382.04
2001	€615,251.91	€773,582.46	€593,194.38
2002	€343,727.20	€321,215.05	€398,715.49
2003	€215,418.16	€188,226.47	€276,717.09
2004	€200,932.38	€155,665.59	€169,082.60
2005	€238,587.48	€163,231.74	€137,992.73
Total	€3,012,639.01	€2,680,928.44	€2,360,601.27

Source: Kosovar Ministry of Economy and Finance/MEF, *RIMS database* (Pristina, Kosovo: MEF, 2006).

Table 2. 2005 ODA by Donor (thousands €)

Donor	Committed	Contracted	Spent
Bilateral Donors			
Austria	€3,663.25	€3,663.25	€2,993.25
Belgium	€36.40	€36.40	€29.73
Denmark	€21.99	€22.04	€11.23
Finland	€4,734.90	€3,863.65	€3,863.65
Germany	€21,904.00	€22,750.00	€15,375.86
Ireland	€250.00	€1,962.00	€1,838.00
Italy	€1,454.41	€1,973.93	€2,154.65
Luxembourg	€1,760.93	€1,760.93	€2,297.48
Netherlands	€11,966.00	€8,280.00	€8,198.35
Sweden	€10,663.43	€8,941.62	€8,945.92
United Kingdom	€7,215.24	€5,475.51	€5,018.17
Total EU Member States	€63,670.55	€58,729.32	€50,726.28
European Commission	€4,865.42	€5,090.11	€2,515.32
European Union (EAR)	€79,700.00	€55,894.52	€43,634.65
Total EC and Member States	€148,235.97	€119,713.95	€96,876.25
Japan	€670.20	€670.20	€72.35
Norway	€103.71	€103.71	€103.71
Switzerland	€6,493.47	€6,368.16	€5,717.49
United States	€64,469.54	€23,113.78	€22,505.37
Total other donor countries	€485.40	€473.40	€438.40
Financial Institutions & UN			
UNDP	€4,236.12	€6,314.32	€6,089.72
UNICEF	€1,565.37	€1,565.37	€1,565.37
World Bank	€11,532.72	€4,608.24	€4,388.71
Other Nongovernmental	€794.98	€300.61	€235.36
Total	€238,587.48	€163,231.74	€137,992.73


Source: Kosovar Ministry of Economy and Finance/MEF, *RIMS database* (Pristina, Kosovo: MEF, 2006).

Table 3. Cumulative Table by Type of Intervention, 1999-2005 (thousands €)

Type of Intervention	Committed	Contracted	Spent
Capital Investments	€1,291,343.90	€1,217,220.26	€1,110,884.11
Technical Assistance	€1,088,670.92	€863,786.08	€705,300.35
Supply of Equipment	€209,824.54	€202,290.42	€195,835.59
Other	€204,763.55	€182,615.80	€150,538.43
Credit	€122,222.67	€120,213.29	€114,001.85
Training	€95,813.49	€94,802.59	€84,040.92
Total	€3,012,639.07	€2,680,928.44	€2,360,601.25

Source: Kosovar Ministry of Economy and Finance/MEF, *RIMS database* (Pristina, Kosovo: MEF, 2006).

Figure 1. Cumulative Chart by Type of Intervention



Source: Kosovar Ministry of Economy and Finance/MEF, *RIMS database* (Pristina, Kosovo: MEF, 2006).

Table 4. 2005 ODA by Sectors (thousands €)

Year - 2005			
Sector	Committed	Contracted	Spent
Agriculture and Forestry	€7,185.24	€8,478.82	€7,272.52
Culture and Youth	€1,655.02	€2,767.56	€1,804.06
Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society	€27,039.20	€23,340.44	€22,587.36
Economy and Finance	€11,289.64	€11,428.18	€11,183.46
Education, Vocational Training, and Science	€6,839.12	€5,511.49	€6,137.85
Environment and Spatial Planning	€3,083.34	€5,087.89	€6,260.89
Health	€5,792.60	€5,066.90	€5,603.10
Housing and Social Welfare	€10,532.01	€8,930.50	€11,169.11
Justice and Home Affairs	€63,641.52	€21,870.75	€19,869.45
Labor and Employment	€7,302.32	€4,709.83	€6,408.75
Public Administration	€21,703.53	€7,166.37	€8,544.74
Public Utilities	€46,071.98	€40,164.74	€16,871.91
Trade and Industry	€23,053.31	€13,869.46	€10,299.57
Transport and Infrastructure	€3,398.70	€4,838.83	€3,979.98
Total	€238,587.54	€163,231.76	€137,992.75

Source: Kosovar Ministry of Economy and Finance/MEF, *RIMS database* (Pristina, Kosovo: MEF, 2006).

Table 5. ODA from 1999 to 2005 by Democratization Sector (thousands €)

Year - 2005			
Sector	Committed	Contracted	Spent
Culture and Youth (4)	€1.655,02	€2.767,56	€1.804,06
Democracy/Human Rights/Civil Society (1/2/4)	€27.039,20	€23.340,44	€22.587,36
Education and Science (4)	€6.839,12	€5.511,49	€6.137,85
Justice and Home Affairs (2/5)	€63.641,52	€21.870,75	€19.869,45
Public Administration (3)	€21.703,53	€7.166,37	€8.544,74
Year - 2004			
Culture (4)	€3.583,63	€855,65	€573,31
Democratic Governance and Civil Society (1/2/4)	€21.409,53	€18.275,17	€11.490,73
Education and Science (4)	€7.164,64	€6.009,79	€10.450,08
Justice (2)	€11.488,11	€10.014,00	€10.353,23
Kosovo Police Service (5)	€1.386,33	€1.890,33	€1.780,53
Local Administration (3)	€7.929,15	€4.320,53	€3.025,66
Minority Rights and Returns (2)	€25.971,05	€16.952,08	€14.448,14
Public Services (3)	€3.100,72	€2.830,96	€1.999,06
Youth (4)	€1.438,94	€588,94	€576,98
Year - 2003			
Culture (4)	€939,56	€1.325,46	€1.180,89
Democratic Governance and Civil Society (1/2/4)	€13.918,53	€16.970,32	€16.673,91
Education and Science (4)	€15.057,85	€8.706,66	€9.870,84
Justice (2)	€16.056,16	€8.383,05	€8.640,62
Kosovo Police Service (5)	€2.572,42	€2.799,19	€5.612,97
Local Administration (3)	€3.885,69	€4.907,36	€16.207,63
Minority Rights and Returns (2)	€4.078,27	€4.078,27	€4.058,27
Public Services (3)	€8.120,58	€8.824,55	€8.207,81
Youth (4)	€619,13	€110,83	€92,75
Year - 2002			
Culture (4)	€1.553,69	€844,66	€1.339,20
Democratic Governance and Civil Society (1/2/4)	€27.742,81	€26.959,59	€31.640,97
Education and Science (4)	€16.672,92	€13.328,22	€24.728,83
Justice (2)	€19.235,11	€13.555,99	€10.412,84
Kosovo Police Service (5)	€7.364,34	€6.365,64	€23.430,88
Local Administration (3)	€17.481,66	€27.287,05	€8.620,10
Minority Rights and Returns (2)	€143,65	€143,65	€121,24
Public Services (3)	€6.920,07	€5.852,51	€5.151,87
Youth (4)	€1.007,10	€990,46	€1.168,29

Year - 2001			
Sector	Committed	Contracted	Spent
Culture (4)	€5.010,10	€3.833,75	€3.845,43
Democratic Governance/Civil Society (1/2/4)	€26.091,82	€22.940,19	€21.224,20
Education and Science (4)	€27.449,60	€51.354,85	€26.626,86
Justice (2)	€14.453,02	€12.504,99	€12.572,81
Kosovo Police Service (5)	€15.596,88	€6.335,29	€5.405,66
Local Administration (3)	€17.754,84	€13.538,00	€12.388,86
Minority Rights and Returns (2)	€199,34	€1.499,34	€468,62
Public Services (3)	€19.255,18	€12.565,00	€8.114,83
Youth (4)	€1.019,95	€1.275,30	€1.041,28
Year - 2000			
Culture (4)	€4.682,57	€4.326,40	€2.142,28
Democratic Governance/Civil Society (1/2/4)	€52.066,67	€72.592,04	€10.290,17
Education and Science (4)	€71.818,28	€48.957,37	€40.614,15
Justice (2)	€13.673,58	€16.692,64	€8.269,14
Kosovo Police Service (5)	€5.380,50	€49.056,40	€27.718,50
Local Administration (3)	€8.413,66	€7.759,77	€6.551,32
Minority Rights and Returns (2)	€2.027,11	€727,11	€715,38
Public Services (3)	€16.633,75	€17.335,38	€19.631,48
Youth (4)	€3.612,66	€3.256,78	€2.005,35
Year - 1999			
Culture (4)	€1.603,03	€151,57	€151,57
Democratic Governance/Civil Society (1/2/4)	€27.975,80	€4.134,10	€974,65
Education and Science (4)	€13.044,51	€5.918,30	€5.632,38
Justice (2)	€9.505,89	€13,26	n.a.
Kosovo Police Service (5)	€45.843,40	€2.167,50	€2.167,50
Local Administration (3)	€12.943,32	€5.239,46	€166,04
Public Services (3)	€5.068,06	€3.060,00	n.a.
Youth (4)	€51,51	€51,51	€29,58

Source: Kosovar Ministry of Economy and Finance/MEF, *RIMS database* (Pristina, Kosovo: MEF, 2006).

Table 6. UNMIK Annual Budget/Expenditure
(Civilian/Police/Non-KFOR Military) from 1999 to 2005 (thousands \$)

Budget Period	UNMIK budget for the fiscal year	Expenditure (3/5)	Civilian Personnel (3)	Civilian Police/Mil. Observers (5)
99-00	427,061.8	361,789.8	(216,543.4)	(2,696.2)
00-01	474,401.8	383,462.0	280,113.5	5,918.4
01-02	400,000.0	360,248.0	184,775.0	125,537.0
02-03	391,076.2	329,967.8	170,595.0	115,208.7
03-04	315,518.2	315,509.2	163,458.9	106,598.1
04-05	294,625.2	294,497.0	154,162.2	106,253.3

Sources: Annexes to Reports of the General Assembly of the United Nations, UN docs. A/54/807; A/56/802; A/57/678; A/58/638; A/59/623; A/60/637.

Table 7. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2003-2005 Expenditure (in Euro)⁷³

Main Program	2003 Expenditure	2004 Expenditure	2005 Expenditure
Office of Head of Mission	2,149,988	2,420,887	4,320,529
Fund Administration Unit	17,060,798	14,411,530	6,080,567
<i>Common Operational Costs</i>			5,657,393
Police Education and Development (5)	7,405,894	5,128,396	4,452,620
Democratization (1/3/4)	5,354,006	5,200,458	5,263,306
Human Rights/Rule of Law (2)	4,051,059	4,045,568	3,600,569
Temporary Media Commission/IMC (4)	220,315	212,173	155,088
Elections (1)	2,337,092	4,689,846	847,203
Ombudsman Institution (2)	363,157	271,763	186,722
The Secretariat Augmentation	3,000,900	3,167,038	3,109,798
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Augmentation	216,300	238,794	284,816
TOTAL FUND BUDGET	42,159,509	39,786,453	33,958,611
The Secretariat Augmentation	(3,000,900)	(3,167,038)	(3,109,798)
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Augmentation	(216,300)	(238,794)	(284,816)
TOTAL FUND RESOURCES	38,942,309	36,380,621	30,563,996

Source: Adapted from OMIK OMIK/OSCE Mission in Kosovo, OMIK Programme Outlines & Programme Budget Performance Reports, 2005-2007 (Vienna: OSCE 2005, 2006, 2007).

⁷³ Similar data for the years 1999-2002 are not available on the OSCE databank.

Table 8. European Agency for Reconstruction Budget for Kosovo, 1999 to 2006 (in Euro)

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Allocated (€million)	115	430	143	163	59	73	76	46.5
Contracted / allocated	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	93%	73%	68%
Paid / allocated	100%	100%	100%	100%	85%	72%	41%	17%
Democratic Stabilization	€44 million							
Minority Rights and Returns (2)	(€33 million)							
Civil Society and Media (4)	(€11 million)							
Good Governance and Institution Building	€176 million							
Justice, Police, and Integrated Border Management (2/5)	(€45 million)							
Public Administration Reform (3)	(€131 million)							

Source: Adapted from EAR/European Agency for Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the European Parliament, April to June 2007 (at 5/7/2007) on EU Assistance Programmes to Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.*

Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of Ethnicity



Source: Ethnic composition according to OSCE, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Kosovo.