45Peter Uèeò
CENTRIST POPULISM AS A NEW
COMPETITIVE AND MOBILIZATION
STRATEGY IN SLOVAK POLITICS
Many post−communist countries including Slovakia have had experience
of parties that, although established shortly before elections, manage to
mobilize voters so effectively that they win seats in parliament and even
a place in government. In Western countries this phenomenon is seen less
frequently, but is also on the rise. Naturally, political scientists are anx−
ious to understand how and why these parties manage to enter the po−
litical scene.
Previous research dealing with the phenomenon of centrist populism
(Pop−Eleches, 2002; Učeň, 2003) has also attempted to find the answer.
In the party systems of some post−communist countries, this competitive
and mobilization strategy has clearly proven itself to be a reliable way of
overcoming the quorum for parliamentary representation and even open−
ing the door to executive power, in a relatively short time and at a rea−
sonable financial cost.
In his previous work (Učeň, 2003), the author focused on describing the
phenomenon of centrist populism, its chief features and the factors in its
success against the backdrop of the recent election success of two new
parties, namely Smer and the Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO). Both
parties based their success on the contrast between mainstream parties
and those (like ANO and Smer) that portrayed themselves as an alterna−
tive to the mainstream and capitalized on the growing feeling among many
voters that mainstream parties were failing to achieve almost anything
that they had set out to do.
The logic behind their arguments was as follows: The 1990s in Slovak
politics had been dominated by a conflict between two large and very an−
tagonistic political camps (Učeň, 1999; 2000), which could be expressed
46
Peter Učeň
in shorthand as “Mečiar vs. the SDK”. On one side of this conflict were
nationalist and authoritarian forces that mobilized their voters and sup−
porters by appealing to their nationalist instincts combined with their
nostalgia for past certainties and identities related to the period before
1989. This force was challenged by the “democratic opposition”, which
initially profiled itself in terms of the rejection of nationalist and social
populism, and subsequently against the growing authoritarianism and
the threat to democracy from the campaign of the nationalist populists
to remain in power. This group was further consolidated after it defended
a liberal democratic model of political system relations.
This conflict was dominant not only in the sense that it decided the
future rules of the game and political “survival”, but also because it meant
the only viable strategy for major political players was to stake out a po−
sition within this conflict, i.e. to identify with one of the two antagonis−
tic camps and join it for good. Any attempt to stand aloof from this prin−
cipal conflict and reject the associated behavior patterns was a ticket to
political obscurity.
During this period, mainstream parties (i.e. authoritarian nationalist
populists vs. liberal democrats) were formed amid the struggle over the
future character of the political system and regime. Their principal aim
was to become a constituent element of the party system, which was why
they joined the battle in this formative conflict. Their main argument was
that it was in the best interests of the country (nation, democracy, etc.)
that the battle be fought and the adversary defeated.
Alternative parties emerged as soon as the formative conflict and its con−
sequences began to arouse feelings of disappointment within certain popu−
lation segments over how the system worked. New parties sprang into ex−
istence to present themselves as an alternative to either side in the princi−
pal conflict. They advertised their alternative nature by promising they
would behave differently than the mainstream parties which – and this is
the key element – began to be viewed as the source of the problems.
Favorable conditions for the success of these alternatives were created
when the formative conflict began to be seen as pointless or even damag−
ing, and after a significant share of the population ceased to distinguish
between the parties involved in the conflict and began to lay blame equally.
Our principal thesis was the assertion that, in line with development
trends in some other post−communist countries, Slovakia’s politics had
undergone changes that laid the groundwork for the success of third way
strategies; in this case, the third way referred to a path between Mečiar’s
47
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
authoritarianism and the democratic opposition. These strategies included
distancing the new party from the dominant conflict, positioning the party
outside the struggle and questioning its relevance. What had seemed a
dead−end strategy shortly before now promised to pay huge dividends in
the form of voter support and access to power.
In other words, as soon as the decade−long struggle over the character
of the regime ended, parties like the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP),
Smer and Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) began to pursue new poli−
cies in terms of appealing to voters and drumming up support. This new
phenomenon in Slovak politics was initially christened new “centrist”
populism (Učeň, 2003; according to Pop−Eleches, 2002).
Why centrist? Mostly because this policy directly or indirectly refers
to the ideological or geometric center of the party system. It is a result of
the fact that centrist populism defines itself as an alternative to tradi−
tional mainstream parties (and their blocs) without inclining towards
extremist policies. Its essence is distancing the party from the (sins of)
mainstream politics; the central position is thus very suited to this type
of distancing. This is what distinguishes the distancing strategy of cen−
trist populists from that of extremists. It is not an anti−system extreme,
as it does not position itself on the periphery of the system.
Why do we speak of populism? Because this strategy corresponds
to what political scientists refer to as political populism. Over the past
several decades, political populism has evolved into a competitive and
mobilizing strategy based on an effort to distance a party from mainstream
entities that have begun to be seen as dysfunctional or as a source of prob−
lems. Populist politicians deliberately feed and cultivate this perception,
since the essence of populist politics is to manipulate the feeling of aliena−
tion between the elite and the masses. In their endeavor to discredit the
existing elite and take its place, populists use quasi−direct appeals to peo−
ple and quasi−personal communication with voters. Among the typical
features of their appeal is an anti−politics, anti−party, anti−elite and anti−
intellectual attitude and other forms of criticism of the establishment (see
Canovan, 1999; Mény – Surel, 2001; Učeň, 2003).
Centrist populism in Slovakia must be thoroughly examined because
in this country it seems to have the potential to influence or even deter−
mine the future of government policies. We must keep trying to describe
centrist populism as a competitive and mobilization strategy; it is equally
important to identify the presence of centrist populist appeals in policies
pursued by the SOP, Smer and ANO, albeit in a more detailed and sys−
48
Peter Učeň
tematic manner than in previous works (Učeň, 2003). Finally, it is help−
ful to address the prospects of centrist populism in terms of its viability,
durability and attractiveness for newly emerging political entities.
NEW POPULISM
In the West, the term “new populism” usually refers to the policies pur−
sued by some extreme right−wing parties. In our part of the world, how−
ever, new populism is located at the center of the political spectrum. The
adjective “new” is used to distinguish it from the nationalist populism of
former Slovak PM Vladimír Mečiar, whose dominant feature was the ar−
ticulation of the populist argument in nationalist terms, frequently in−
terchanging demos and ethnos.
In the Western context, populism is a strategy frequently used by po−
litical outsiders to gain power. This is also true of Slovakia, but in some
cases (the SOP) the strategy was used by “recycled” establishment politi−
cians who formed “new parties with old faces” to improve (or revive) their
chances to succeed.
New centrist populism is a form of political populism that empha−
sizes the anti−establishment element of its appeal (for details on the
differences between the various types of populism in post−communist
Europe, see Mudde, 2000). In the past, older forms of populism dealt par−
ticularly with “the virtues of the people” and the need to return them to
the heart of political life. In the Western and Latin American context, this
phenomenon was examined by Andreas Schedler (Schedler, 1996), who
refused to use the term populism at all and chose instead to employ the
more laborious term anti−political−establishment parties.
This anti−establishment appeal is a generally defining feature of
populism. It offers a view of political reality through the lens of an exag−
gerated dichotomy between the (unblemished) people and the (corrupt)
elite. The essence of anti−establishment attitudes is that they focus on
the ubiquitous conflict between the elite and the masses, between those
who govern and those who are governed, between the establishment and
ordinary people. They paint this conflict as acute, dramatic and ominous,
claiming that the elite has betrayed and deserted the people.
A typical populist argument contains three key elements that at the
same time may be considered the various stages of the appeal. First, the
49
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
people and their role in the political process are hailed as paramount.
Second, the elite that is currently in power is derided as having betrayed
the people. Finally, it is urged that the people’s supremacy in politics be
restored, meaning that the failed elite must be replaced by new leaders
who put the people first and respect their interests (Mény – Surel, 2001,
pp. 11 – 13).
How do populists describe the establishment? Their key strategy
is to deny the existence of any differences within the establishment. All
politicians are the same, they claim. In the better case, establishment
leaders are irrational, incompetent and stupid; in the worse, they have
lost the moral authority to govern because they are corrupt and rapacious.
In all cases, they are insincere because they do not care about the people,
but merely feign their “representative” roles and interest, and only care
about themselves (Schedler, 1996, pp. 294 – 297). Criticism of the exist−
ing form and practice of representation is part of all populist arguments.
How do populists present themselves? Almost without exception,
they define themselves as new people who are not part of the corrupt es−
tablishment. They also present themselves as apolitical, non−ideological
players who refuse to be defined on the left−right continuum, often dis−
missing this form of categorization. Not only are they homini nuovi, or
outsiders, they are also enemies of the establishment and frequently also
victims of its past intrigues and reprisals. They are trying to change and
remedy the current unsatisfactory state of affairs and are capable of
putting such remedies into effect (Schedler, 1996, pp. 298 – 301).
Compared to party democracy, populist movements have no ambition to
“educate the people” and shape their opinions within the framework of rep−
resentation, such as by explaining situations when leaders must act con−
trary to public opinion. Parties that incline to populism want to mirror the
people’s opinions and at the same time manipulate them in terms of how
they view the establishment. They want “the people” to identify with their
criticism of the establishment and to grant them a mandate to replace it.
To do that, they use extensive propaganda and rhetoric that differs funda−
mentally from traditional mainstream discourse in terms of the means of
expression and courage in addressing taboo issues. Part of the charm of
populism is that it speaks (or lies, according to many) about “skeletons in
the closet” that establishment players have allegedly agreed to conceal.
Our primary goal is to document the presence and extent of the
various features of centrist populism in the public appeals of the
SOP, Smer and ANO. We will not deal with how these parties portrayed
50
Peter Učeň
“their people” within the populist dichotomy between the people and the
elite (see Učeň, 2003). The principal focus of our examination will be these
parties’ use of populism and anti−establishment appeals as a competitive
strategy towards to the establishment and a mobilizing strategy with re−
spect to voters.
We will concentrate especially on how populist critics interpret and
criticize the establishment, how they distance themselves from it
and how they present themselves as solvers of problems caused
by the establishment. We will also touch on their use of anti−politics
and anti−ideology arguments and “third way” strategies.
CENTRIST POPULISM IN ELECTION COMPETITION
PARTY OF CIVIC UNDERSTANDING
In 1997, when it was first rumored that a new party would be established
and its possible political priorities began to be discussed, the future Party
of Civic Understanding (SOP, originally to be christened the Party of
National Understanding) was widely considered a tool in the hands of one
party to the aforementioned dominant conflict. Political commentators
outdid each other with expressions like “the HZDS’s subversive tactics”,
“asylum for Mečiar’s privatizers”, “the HZDS’s Trojan horse in the oppo−
sition camp”, and “Mečiar’s torpedo”.
The then−opposition parties hoped that the new party would lure away
voters of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and mobilize
the undecided. The governing parties, for their part, hoped the SOP would
diminish the SDK’s electoral support and that its main goal was “to modify
the character of the current opposition” (Kubín, 1998). Voices claiming
that the SOP represented a new political strategy were rare in the begin−
ning: “The [SOP’s] slogans about general reconciliation and helping Slo−
vakia are presented to voters with a single purpose in mind: to portray
the opposition as another party to the current conflict and as [a force] that
does not wish peace and well−being for the country, unlike the dovish
[SOP]” (Hríb, 1997).
It took everyone some time to understand that the SOP was from the
outset an independent power−seeking strategy used by a group of politi−
cal entrepreneurs with a left−wing background who understood that the
51
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
public was growing dissatisfied with the traditional players and was look−
ing for a non−extremist form of criticizing the dominant conflict between
Mečiarism and the opposition. The main reason for the party’s election
success was that it managed to define its attitude to the dominant con−
flict in a new and original way; it questioned the justification for the con−
flict, it morally distanced itself from it and claimed that its main aim was
to build a bridge between the two archrivals and heal the wounds the con−
flict had inflicted. Its campaign against the dominant conflict was waged
from the center.
At the beginning of the “civic understanding” project, one of the SOP’s
leaders, Pavol Hamžík, said the SOP had emerged as a manifestation of
people’s dissatisfaction with the ongoing confrontation in society, and
claimed that public opinion polls had corroborated the SOP leaders’ esti−
mates of the demand for a similar party (Sme, March 30, 1998). At the
party’s founding congress, Hamžík reiterated that “the principle of un−
derstanding is [our] reaction to the polarization of the political scene that
is dividing citizens… we wanted to transform the dissatisfaction with the
current state of affairs into a political attitude, so that the pursuance of
Slovakia’s internal and foreign policy aims was not complicated” (Sme,
April 3, 1998). These charming, self−exposing statements reveal an instru−
mental use of anti−establishment appeal in the SOP project.
The SOP’s criticism of the establishment always employed two ap−
proaches. One, represented by SOP Vice−Chairman Marián Mesiarik,
labeled both parties to the dominant conflict as extremist. The other,
embodied by SOP Chairman Rudolf Schuster, declared that the SOP had
always been a natural part of the anti−Mečiar coalition: “We belonged to
the opposition bloc from the beginning, that is why we were established”
(Sme, May 20, 1998). The dominance of the “Schuster view” within the
party led the SOP to attempt to combine its criticism of the elite (includ−
ing its partners in the anti−Mečiar alliance) with an openly anti−Mečiar
attitude, which required it to justify its alliance with Mečiar’s rivals.
While declaring itself part of the opposition, the SOP constantly tried
to distinguish itself from the other opposition parties. To a remark that
his party in the course of its campaign had occasionally abandoned the
rhetoric of civic understanding in favor of radical anti−Mečiarism, Schuster
said: “We are only playing the left−right game here. In practice, we will
be forced to adopt identical measures.” When asked whether the concept
of civic understanding was merely meant to trick voters, Schuster re−
sponded: “No. Our methods are different from the rest of the opposition.
52
Peter Učeň
We will make the concept of understanding between people a reality if
we win” (Domino Fórum, No. 36, 1998).
The SOP was also a pioneer in portraying itself as a chance for new peo−
ple and a party that cared about citizens’ everyday problems. In this re−
spect, the SOP was a contemporary of Róbert Fico, then an MP for the SDĽ.
SOP propaganda thus featured early forms of all centrist populist ar−
guments, including distancing itself from the mainstream, criticizing the
establishment, rejecting ideology and portraying itself as a third way
party.1
The key issues presented by the SOP featured many of the hall−
marks of centrist populism, particularly its criticism of the establish−
ment in its calls for reconciliation, dialogue and an end to political po−
larization.
From the outset, the SOP presented itself as a non−ideological or ideo−
logically amorphous force and a third way party; while it stuck to this
concept, it enjoyed solid public support. Without a doubt, it reacted to
demand among some voters for this style of criticism. If the SOP ever lifted
its non−ideology veil, the ideology that peeked out was indisputably left−
ist, decrying “too much capitalism and too little democracy”, with a strong
anti−authoritarian (or anti−Mečiar) slant.2
A conclusion may be drawn that
the SOP owed its success to its ideological amorphousness, and that its
eventual downfall was the direct result of disputes over the eventual defi−
nition of its political and ideological profile.
SMER
Perhaps even before the SOP project was fully conceived, Róbert Fico as
an member of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ) had come up with
his early anti−establishment argument formulated in generational terms.
1. In an interview for the Sme daily published on April 3, 1998, sociologist Vladimír Krivý
said that the SOP championed a different kind of populism than that previously pur−
sued by V. Mečiar.
2. Besides the elements already mentioned, the SOP appeal also featured a fairly strong
regional, local and anti−centralist accent (i.e. the east vs. Bratislava). The SOP’s pro−
file also contained a strong pro−Western and pro−integration dimension, which reliably
separated those disenchanted voters who became SOP sympathizers from those who
inclined to more extreme ways of expressing their disappointment. Apolitical and “apo−
litical” celebrities from the domains of culture and sports also played an important role
in the party’s propaganda.
53
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
Fico spoke of the need to change generations in Slovak politics and bring
in new faces. He argued there was a legally and politically viable solu−
tion to the pitiable state of affairs in Slovak politics, namely the joint res−
ignation of both archrivals, Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and Presi−
dent Michal Kováč. Fico claimed that the era of politicians like the ex−
treme−right Ján Slota, the former dissident Ján Čarnogurský, Mečiar and
Kováč was over, and urged them to consider their future status on the
country’s political chessboard (Pravda, January 20, 1997).
At first, this propaganda was widely considered to be an attempt by
Fico to promote himself within the SDĽ ranks and, subsequently, to gain
some executive post. Only later was it clear that it had been a forerunner
to Fico’s independent strategy to promote himself within the political
spectrum. In 1997, Fico gave only a hint of the complex populist propa−
ganda cocktail he began to serve in earnest after 1999.
In the beginning, Fico’s evolution from a lone populist into the leader
of a full−fledged populist project took place within the left−wing SDĽ. He
articulated his anti−establishment attitudes as part of his homage to the
centrist−left wing; for instance, shortly after the emergence of the SOP,
Fico expressed his hope that the SDĽ together with the SOP might win
such voter support that they could prevent either the HZDS or the Slo−
vak Democratic Coalition (SDK) from forming the next government (Sme,
June 20, 1998).
After the new SDK−SDĽ−SMK−SOP coalition government was formed,
Fico had many opportunities to act as an opposition figure as well as a
ruling coalition politician; nevertheless, this corridor soon became too tight
for him. Following the 1998 elections, Fico gradually drifted away from
the SDĽ (after he began to view traditional social democracy as ideologi−
cally too restrictive) as well as from the ruling coalition. He perceived both
establishment entities as burdens and began to seek justifying arguments
for having distanced himself from them. It was at this point that Fico did
a “Full Monty” in terms of his anti−establishment attitudes and his
backpedaling from the established players.
In January 1999, Fico renounced his post as SDĽ first vice−chairman.
At the time, Marián Leško wrote for the Sme daily that Fico was prepar−
ing to launch a third alternative, supporting his argument with Fico’s
voting patterns in parliament. “[Fico wants to] demonstrate that he be−
longs neither to those who have brought the country into crisis nor to those
who intend to rescue it by adopting a package of [restrictive] economic
measures” (Leško, 1999).
54
Peter Učeň
As time went by, Fico added to his reputation as a solo politician, both
through his legislative initiatives and his rhetoric, which respected no
unwritten rules in terms of issues and how they were handled.
Immediately after the 1998 elections, Fico declared that including the
ethnic Hungarian SMK party in government might lead to demands to
revise the so−called Beneš Decrees (edicts that had ordered the forced re−
patriation of ethnic Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovak terri−
tory after World War II). In an article written for the Práca daily in May
1999, Fico elaborated on the issue. He argued that the SMK had merely
brought its “regional agenda” to government and was successfully pur−
suing it. The gist of his argument was the proposal that the SMK be ousted
from the ruling coalition, which would subsequently govern with the tacit
support of the opposition parties. In support of his proposal, Fico argued
that the SMK’s success in pursuing its “regional agenda” might irk the
public and lead to growth in support for extremists like Mečiar or Slota
(Fico, 1999). This argument was unique because it played on anti−Hun−
garian and anti−Mečiar feelings at the same time!
In summer 1999, when Fico was still reluctant to admit to plans to found
a new party, he said in an interview: “People may not want new parties,
but they certainly want new people… Currently, my only interest is to
begin presenting to Slovakia new people who come up with new solutions”
(Národná obroda, June 3, 1999). In this period, Fico also proposed a thor−
ough overhaul of the cabinet, claiming that the government was in crisis
and that it was time for professionals and managers to take over. As a
legislator, he focused mostly on the issues of public order, public security
and combating corruption. These later became the “greatest hits” in Smer’s
repertoire; for instance, Fico proposed an amendment to the Slovak Con−
stitution that would extend the time people who had been arrested could
be kept in custody to 48 hours, and an amendment to the Criminal Code
to introduce punishment for giving bribes.
The accumulation of similar arguments clearly indicated that Fico was
evolving from individualistic self−promotion towards a full political project.
In September 1999, after defecting from the SDĽ and the ruling coalition,
Fico announced the formation of a new political entity.
At the party’s founding congress, Fico granted an interview to some
media in which he made clear that his new party was a finished product
that would respond to voter dissatisfaction with the establishment in a
sophisticated manner, and promote its own “third way”. This cocktail con−
tained all the ingredients of political populism:
55
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
• the rejection of ideology: “People in Slovakia do not distinguish be−
tween the right and left but between good and bad politicians and be−
tween those who want or don’t want something”;
• the criticism of partisanship and politicking: “If political parties
incorporate their ideological attitudes into expert problems, which sim−
ply happens, they can never lead this country out of its crisis”;
• denying differences within the establishment, to which he added
the SOP: “All political parties that are in government look first towards
their own political interests and only then at the essentials”;
• dramatically highlighting the coalition’s failures: “This country
needs strong solutions that seek to secure normal relations, order and
stability.”
Fico was highly critical of the coalition form of government (“Everything
we see in politics today is a matter of compromise, which is what harms
Slovakia the most… A compromise only satisfies those who govern. The
satisfaction of voters is secondary to them”), and claimed that after the
change in government in 1998, the new administration had begun to use
different methods, but the “quality and style of politics have not changed
at all” (Sme, December 11, 1999).
To clarify our description and simplify the problem, we can divide Smer’s
appeals between December 1999 and September 2002 into competitive and
mobilizing appeals.
The main purpose of competitive appeals is to gain a competitive
advantage by criticizing and discrediting political rivals. Classic exam−
ples of competitive appeals include centrist populist strategies such as
criticizing the establishment, partisanship, ideological politics and pro−
moting the “third way”.
As for criticism of politics as a vehicle to pursuing ideological
visions, even before Smer was founded its leader had publicly stated that
the single “internal philosophy of [Smer] will be rationalism and prag−
matism” (Národná obroda, October 20, 1999). In support of this, Fico
quoted a Chinese proverb: “It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or
white; what matters is that it catches mice” (Sme, May 26, 2000). In the
same interview, Fico provided an unwitting example of a populist jetti−
soning the ideological burden, and praised the advantages of his populist
project over the unwieldy social democracy he had rejected: “The SDĽ and
Smer still have a lot in common. But unlike the SDĽ, we do not have to
consider whether what we do or propose is in line with left−wing ideol−
ogy” (Sme, May 26, 2000).
56
Peter Učeň
Smer’s pragmatism has been often presented in contrast to the poli−
ticking of traditional parties. Its anti−partisanship has also been ex−
pressed through its rejection of the traditional organizational structure,
which according to Fico was largely why traditional parties had failed.
Soon after emerging, Smer’s leadership consisted only of its chairman,
members of the party presidium and the heads of its expert sections, which
was meant to underline that the party would focus on expert issues. As
Fico said: “We are not a classic political party and we don’t even wish to
become one. We don’t want to politick” (Sme, December 31, 1999).
Although Fico’s appeal was anti−ideological, it was not anti−political –
he never rejected the power aspect of politics or the legitimacy of power
aspirations. On the other hand, he presented himself as someone inter−
ested in seizing power – perhaps even feeling a duty to do so – so he could
govern differently and better. With that in mind, Smer and Fico came up
with various ways to criticize the establishment and various forms
of distancing themselves from the established political players.
A prominent spot in this campaign was reserved for the need to change
the failed elite (i.e. the need for new faces). On January 20, 2000, Sme
published a truly charming quote from Fico: “It’s against our principles
for [Smer leaders] to accept anyone who has been an active member of
another party – except myself.”
The radicalism of Fico’s public statements climaxed after he began to
combine criticism of the establishment with a demand for strong govern−
ment. In May 2001, Fico said that since clientelism and corruption in Slo−
vakia had reached extreme and extraordinary dimensions, the government
had to find the courage to adopt extreme and extraordinary solutions. He
added that these decisions should not be taken by theoreticians but by
managers of large corporations, people who knew what real life was all
about (Sme, May 14, 2001).
The concept of the third way played an equally prominent role in
Smer’s crusade against the establishment, as it served as an instrumen−
tal argument to justify its policy of distancing itself from both of the two
principal camps, i.e. the government and the opposition. The concept of
“the third way” pooled all of Smer’s propaganda arguments. As a concept
it was flexible and vague enough to allow Smer to distinguish itself from
other parties while getting away with not subscribing to any concrete (and
hence verifiable) programs or principles. In other words, the concept al−
lowed Smer’s spin doctors to mix an attractive blend of economic, politi−
cal, moral and other arguments.
57
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
On February 8, 2001, Fico said for the Pravda daily: “For us, the third
way means political parties that do not come up with solutions just be−
cause they are to the right or to the left of center. A third way party fo−
cuses on the most pressing issues.” On August 14, 2001, Sme online quoted
Fico as saying that “Smer feels it is a third way party. It champions the
type of politics that combine a strong economy and the importance of the
market with a relatively strong role for a government managed by man−
agers.” In his party circular, Fico explained the advantages of the third
way to his party colleagues and defined the party’s main tactics: “We want
to take advantage of the situation, in which two camps are fighting each
other”(quoted according to Krištofík, 2001).
At its congress in December 2001, the party adopted a document called
Smer as a Party of the Third Way. In the document, Smer subscribed to
the third way concept represented by Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder.
Fico’s interpretation of the third way was this: “Simple right−wing and
left−wing solutions have failed. That’s why we have adapted the third way
philosophy to Slovak conditions and decided to bring forward a program
that respects values such as the market or production but at the same
time recognizes the role of government and a strong state. Slovakia needs
neither the left nor the right; it needs order, common sense and pragma−
tism” (Sme, December 17, 2001).
Columnist Marián Leško reacted by writing that in previous years, Fico
had used the third way concept merely as an “escape clause from politi−
cal self−identification” and an “avoidance maneuver that enabled him not
to follow suit politically” and “not to admit that he didn’t want to accept
any color after all.” Leško noted a glaring practical difference between
Smer and the parties it had identified with: “Unlike the new Labour Party
of Tony Blair and the SPD of Gerhard Schröder, a typical feature of the
third way pursued by Fico’s party has been that it identified with the
extreme left on some issues and with the nationalist right on others” (Sme,
December 17, 2001).
Leško pointed out that Smer used the third way as a propaganda tool.
By subscribing to the third way before elections, Fico attempted to ben−
efit from the advantages of non−ideology and pragmatism as well as capi−
talize on left−wing sentiment, and to create the impression that Smer was
the Slovak version of the third way.
Mobilization appeals are regularly used to raise public support and
often complement or elaborate on competitive appeals. In general, mobi−
lization appeals are designed to portray a political party as a guarantee
58
Peter Učeň
that proposals will be advanced to solve concrete problems that the es−
tablishment is unable or unwilling to tackle.
Already, as a lone, unaffiliated member of parliament, Róbert Fico had
been very active in terms of legislative initiatives. After Smer emerged
he stepped up his activity, unleashing a range of legislative proposals,
especially in the field of public order and security, the social security sys−
tem, the political system, governance and representation, and the
economy.
In the field of public security, Smer tried to capitalize on people’s feel−
ings of endangerment, criticizing the government’s inability to guarantee
public security and protect people’s property. Fico again proposed that the
Slovak Constitution be amended to extend the period of custodial arrest.
He also initiated a “farmers’ law” that gave landowners greater powers to
protect their crops against theft, an activity pursued mostly by the Roma.
Another notorious issue, perhaps the least controversial issue on Smer’s
agenda, was insisting that the government indemnify crime victims.
As for the welfare system, Fico chastised the government for tolerat−
ing the rampant abuse of unemployment and other welfare benefits: he
proposed to eliminate those who abused the system from the unemploy−
ment register, to introduce a ceiling on child allowance regardless of the
number of children a family had, and to make the disbursement of these
benefits conditional on the school attendance of the children (Sme, June
10, 2000). These proposals were obviously aimed at eliminating the sur−
vival strategies used largely by members of the Roma minority. To Fico’s
credit, it should be noted that many of these proposals were put into prac−
tice by the second Dzurinda administration in 2003 and 2004, although
at the time Fico proposed them they were branded as populist and anti−
Roma.
As far as the political system and governance were concerned, Fico and
Smer proposed to reduce the number of MPs in parliament and minis−
ters in the cabinet, to extend the powers of the president (especially to
dissolve the assembly), to introduce a majority or mixed electoral system,
and to increase the quorum for securing seats in parliament to 8 %.
In the field of the economy, Smer proposed a strong and active state,
but at the same time advocated more government for less money (i.e. by
reducing the tax burden). Smer argued that the government should not
be hasty in completing the privatization of state monopolies; naturally,
this attitude earned accusations that Smer wanted to postpone the pri−
vatization process until it won power and its representatives in the cabi−
59
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
net gained control over it. Smer even proposed that power over privati−
zation be transferred from the cabinet to parliament. Another notorious
Smer activity was its campaign to complete the Mochovce nuclear power
plant, which drew claims of a link between Smer and Slovakia’s nuclear
energy lobby.
The party’s typical approach to problem−solving surfaced during the
public debate over public administration reform, when Smer refused to
take a clear stand on the issue and said it would support the reform once
order was restored to the country. However, as soon as the final shape of
the reform was approved, Smer criticized it: “The government is surren−
dering powers in the education system and health service and transferring
them to self−governments because it doesn’t know what to do with them.
Public administration reform is the government’s attempt to throw respon−
sibility onto the shoulders of self−governments” (Sme, April 21, 2001).
Smer’s mobilization campaign peaked shortly before the 2002 parlia−
mentary elections, when it came up with the slogan “100 Solutions in the
First 100 Days”, underlining the party’s determination to act swiftly once
in power.
ALLIANCE OF THE NEW CITIZEN
When Pavol Rusko in January 2001 announced his intention to found a
new liberal party with a social undertone, most people already knew he
had previously considered entering politics through the left−wing SOP (see
Národná obroda, January 23, 2001). This shift in Rusko’s ideological ori−
entation merely strengthened the general skepticism and suspicion that
surrounded his new political project.
“In the beginning was a decision by an unnamed media mogul [Rusko]
to enter top politics. This predetermined all later steps, beginning with
market research, a media profile and ending with putting together a can−
didates’ list and choosing [potential] political allies,” wrote political ana−
lyst Juraj Marušiak (Marušiak, 2003). We should note that after conduct−
ing thorough market research, the new party – the Alliance of the New
Citizen (ANO) – put together an explicit and relatively convincing pro−
capitalist political program.
The party’s pitch featured all traditional centrist populist arguments,
although its anti−establishment attitude was more moderate than that
60
Peter Učeň
of Smer. It focused on criticizing incompetence rather than chastising the
elite for its moral failings; in particular, it criticized the unhealthy rela−
tionship between politics and the economy, as well as corruption and
clientelism.
Besides its commitment to economic liberalism and the absence of “un−
derstanding” in its political message, ANO’s appeal was similar to that
of the SOP. The new party’s founders stated: “The party’s motto is the
BRIDGE, since it aims to serve as a vehicle for new people to enter poli−
tics” (Sme, April 23, 2001). “This centrist and liberal party aims to ap−
peal to dissatisfied voters, who are in the majority in Slovakia. Its found−
ers’ main aim is to attract new people who will not just criticize [the sys−
tem] over a beer,” the daily wrote.
Unlike Smer, the new party openly declared its centrist position and
liberal orientation. ANO subscribed to reducing the role of the state. In
an interview for the Národná obroda daily (April 21, 2001), Rusko advo−
cated social liberalism. He said his party would support reducing the role
of the government, cutting the tax burden and developing the private
sector, while preserving a reasonable level of social solidarity. The agenda
ANO brought to the 2002 election campaign was ideal for disenchanted
center−right voters who were unhappy with the stalled reforms of the first
Dzurinda administration.
CENTRIST POPULISM IN THE TEST OF ELECTIONS
– IN POWER OR IN OPPOSITION
The common feature of all centrist populism parties was that they en−
tered election campaigns with great expectations (largely shared by the
public), but never scored the triumph they expected. In terms of voter
support, all three parties did very well during the period between their
founding and the elections; however, their eventual results were about
half of their maximum voter support as indicated by polls before elections.
In the case of both the SOP and ANO, this relative election failure was
still enough to propel them into government, but in the case of Smer it
resulted in its exclusion from government in 2002.
Let’s now take a closer look at the possible implications of election suc−
cess (or failure) on the future of centrist populist projects in terms of their
viability and position within the country’s party system.
61
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
PARTY OF CIVIC UNDERSTANDING
As early as March 1998, the specific nature of its appeal propelled the
SOP to great heights in public opinion polls.3
Having declared themselves
part of the anti−Mečiar alliance, SOP representatives reiterated that their
party’s mobilization capacity would give the opposition a victory over the
Mečiar bloc. The election results gave the anti−Mečiar alliance a quali−
fied (three−fifths) majority in parliament, empowering it to amend the
Constitution to cure some of the ills inherited from the Mečiar adminis−
tration; for this purpose, the incorporation of the SOP in the new ruling
coalition was unavoidable.
Although (or perhaps because) the SOP had no problems in joining the
anti−Mečiar and pro−Europe alliance, its stint in government brought it
neither stability nor consolidation. On the contrary, as soon as the party
fulfilled its purpose, it began to be deserted by voters as well as those who
had used it as a vehicle to power. The remaining SOP leaders eventually
returned to where they felt most at home (i.e. the political left), only to
later fuse with Smer.
Immediately after becoming part of the government, the SOP focused on
fulfilling its main purpose, namely gratifying the personal ambitions of its
leaders. The most glaring example of this was negotiations on the forma−
tion of the new government, when the party gave up a cabinet post it was
entitled to in exchange for a promise by its coalition partners to support
the candidacy of SOP Chairman Rudolf Schuster in presidential elections.
After Schuster abandoned the party and the personal ambitions of the
other leaders were fulfilled, the SOP entered a difficult stage of ideologi−
cal rebranding. This process was a direct result of the gradual decline in
the party’s voter support. It was accompanied by disputes over the par−
ty’s future orientation on the issue of social liberalism vs. socialism. At
3. These surveys also revealed a declining share of undecided voters, which was widely
attributed to the party’s mobilization efforts. Back then, Schuster said: “Our primary
goal is to appeal especially to those who have decided not to participate in elections,
as well as first−time voters” (Plus sedem dní, No. 35, 1998). An exit poll conducted by
the FOCUS agency for the International Republican Institute showed that these am−
bitions were well founded. Although the party’s final election result was approximately
half of its voting preferences in public opinion polls before elections, the party’s mobi−
lization impact on the camps of non−voters, undecided and first−time voters was sig−
nificant. Eventually, the party attracted especially non−voters and first−time voters, who
made up 29 % of its electorate; the remaining principal sources were the electorates of
the former opposition parties (24 %) and the former governing parties (29 %).
62
Peter Učeň
one point, party leaders proposed subscribing to the Neue Mitte (New
Center) concept and incorporating the “new center” term into the party’s
name, although this idea did not receive much support.
In October 2000, after a short flirtation with Neue Mitte and social lib−
eralism, the party definitively subscribed to social democracy. It gradu−
ally drifted towards criticism of government reforms and their impact on
citizens; along with the SDĽ, it acted as an internal left−wing opposition
within the ruling coalition. At the regional level, the SOP frequently
teamed up with opposition parties to support joint candidates in munici−
pal or regional elections. But the process of ideological redefinition did
not produce the desired results. On the left side of the spectrum, there
was no voter demand for another party, mostly because the SDĽ was still
relatively strong and Smer had already been founded. Attempts to team
up with other centrist parties (e.g. the LDÚ or the Greens) to increase its
relevance were also fruitless, and the SOP was unable to prevent a gradual
disintegration of its parliamentary caucus, the continuing decomposition
of its membership base and a fatal slump in the polls. The party never
ceased to be perceived as a destabilizing element in the ruling coalition.
We may assume that the main motivation for “new people” to support
the SOP was its status as “the third force”. Consequently, the party’s rapid
post−election fall may be due to the fact that this unstable group of sup−
porters abandoned the SOP4
as soon as the party lost this status.
The instrumental nature of this political project was obvious from the
outset. During its short existence, the SOP earned many unflattering nick−
names, such as “the disposable party” (see Kopeček, 2002). Mečiar, for
his part, satirized the party’s initials as standing for “Strana osobného
prospechu [Party for Personal Gain]” (Sme, March 28, 1998); he was far
from the only one who saw the SOP as a springboard to power.
Nevertheless, the SOP did have two historic meanings. First, by join−
ing the ruling coalition in 1998, the SOP enabled it to control a constitu−
tional majority of 93 votes in parliament, which not only represented a
symbolic end to the Mečiar era but also allowed for a practical remedy to
4. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the IVO in November 2000, “more than
one in three former SOP voters had joined the camp of undecided or non−voters by fall
2000. Approximately one in five former SOP voters switched to supporting Smer, which
was more than the share of supporters who remained loyal to the SOP” (Gyárfášová
et al, 2001, p. 109). Although hard data are unavailable to prove it, it is likely that for
many former SOP voters, the camp of undecided voters or non−voters was just a stopo−
ver on their path towards Smer and ANO.
63
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
most of its excesses. Second, the party’s success demonstrated that the
third way concept was viable in Slovakia and that the Slovak elec−
torate was susceptible to it. Two successors of the SOP’s pioneering
effort have made good use of this knowledge.
SMER
Like the SOP, Smer was a project based on its leaders’ yearning for po−
litical power; unlike the SOP, however, Smer did not achieve its objec−
tive in elections, since the aim had been to gain a dominant executive
position and not that of a strong opposition force. This unfulfilled goal
has forced the project’s designers to continue developing it, making the
future of the project far more interesting (unlike the SOP project). Indeed,
many ask whether the final product will match the HZDS in terms of size
and impact.
Immediately after the 2002 elections, Smer defined its position as “a
social alternative to the current rightist government.” Analyst Marián Leš−
ko (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 12, 2002) highlighted Fico’s
method of using ideological labels. While he used the term “rightist” as a
stigma to discredit his opponents, he refused to define Smer as a leftist
force and instead rejected the right−left dichotomy altogether. Other com−
mentators described the party as a fusion of a “social−democratic” wing
and a “non−ideological or pragmatic” wing that some maliciously branded
as entrepreneurial. To illustrate the conflicting opinions on the party’s
future profile, let’s examine two articles published on the same day, one
written by Smer Chairman Róbert Fico, and the other by then Vice−Chair−
man Boris Zala.
In his article called “The Slovak Third Way” Fico brought forward the
previous anti−ideological arguments of centrist populism and highlighted
the connection between Smer’s policy and the third way in Europe: “We
continue to reject the journalistic division of the political scene into the
wasteful left and the efficient right. We want to react, in a rational and
pragmatic manner, to all the challenges that have faced Slovakia in the
13 years since November 1989… The third way concept has developed from
classic social−democratic parties. Since they understood the reality of the
world, they survived and today they call the tune virtually across Europe…
Smer as a third way party did not emerge by transformation from a clas−
sic leftist movement. As a rational party that calls for the return of com−
64
Peter Učeň
mon sense, it was shaped this way from the very beginning…” (Pravda,
September 26, 2002).
Zala, in his article “Where Does Smer’s Path Lead?”, claimed: “In its
third way program, Smer has clearly profiled itself as a center−left politi−
cal force.” Zala even defined the gist of Smer’s “third way”. According to
him, it had evolved as an opposition to the two extremes in the Slovak
leftist movement (!), i.e. the “old SDĽ” and a more moderate wing under
former SDĽ boss Peter Weiss. Zala wrote he wished to develop Smer into
“an unorthodox party that can take under its wings the broadest range
of thought streams so it can preserve its perpetual ferment of thought:
From [pure] leftists through social democrats in the middle and national
liberals on Smer’s right wing” (Sme, September 26, 2002). Obviously, Zala
had in mind a slightly different party than his boss, and described it in
thoroughly ideological terms.
The glaring differences in the positions taken in these articles neatly
summed up Smer’s dilemma immediately after elections, when its top
officials had to decide whether to continue with their centrist populism
project, to which the party owed its “successful past”, or whether they
should move towards traditional social democracy, which promised a suc−
cessful future as the party had a strong chance to monopolize the left side
of the Slovak political spectrum.
Following the collapse of the SDĽ, Smer had a unique opportunity to
become the sole leader of the Slovak left, and it was clear that the leftist
course was now rationally justifiable. The only thing that could spoil it
was the strong reluctance of the party’s populist leader to return to the
boring and restrictive concept of social democracy that he had abandoned
before, and that would be difficult to blend with his populist antics. Be−
sides, interventions and restrictions by the Party of European Socialists,
which Smer would have to put up with for the sake of international ac−
ceptance, implied the need to give up authoritarian policies that would
not be accepted in Europe.
But arguments in favor of the shift toward “the ideological left” proved
overpowering. In December 2002, immediately after its election failure
and at a time when the party was struggling to adapt, it held a program
conference at which it defined its aim to occupy the center−left segment
of the political spectrum. Visibly reluctant to renounce the advantages of
non−ideological populism, the party set two parallel processes in mo−
tion: radicalizing party propaganda on social issues and subscrib−
ing to the political left in clearer ideological concepts.
65
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
Its traditional criticism of the competence and ethics of the ruling coa−
lition, together with its harping on corruption, bad governance and so−
cial and economic decline, became instrumental to Smer’s attempt to force
a change in government through early parliamentary elections: “As far
as Smer is concerned, its only adversary is the rightist policy pursued by
Mikuláš Dzurinda. We care for nothing else on Slovakia’s political scene,”
Fico said at a party congress in spring 2003 (Slovo, No. 20, 2003). This
effort peaked when Smer endorsed a petition started by the Slovak Con−
federation of Trade Unions that called for a referendum on ending the
current parliament’s tenure.
As part of its shift toward the left, Smer officials said they might change
the party’s name to “Smer – Social Democracy”, and complied with the
Party of European Socialists’ requirement that Smer’s candidates list for
elections to the European Parliament include representatives of small
traditional leftist parties, such as the SDĽ and Social Democratic Party
in Slovakia (SDSS).
These tendencies became more visible at the party’s congress in Decem−
ber 2003, at which Smer formulated a short−term policy of “going for the
government’s jugular”, and defined early elections as its main aim. Juraj
Marušiak interpreted Smer’s December resolution to turn itself into a
social democratic party as irreversible. However, he noted some curious
aspects of the move: “Particularly baffling was the rapid course of Smer’s
‘social−democratization’. This party, which two years after its emergence
still defined itself as pragmatic and non−ideological, has held no [inter−
nal] debate on changing course and choosing new values. And yet, its lead−
ers and members accepted the party’s new direction without a murmur
of disapproval; one might say that after pragmatic reflection, they became
social democrats…” (Marušiak, 2004).
Interpretations of Smer’s current position vary greatly, from praise for
the party for completing its natural ideological development, to accusa−
tions that Smer was trying to trick voters. One example of the former
opinion is the assertion that Smer has always been a center−left party of
the third way, or of the Blair−Schröder type, but unique Slovak conditions
have long prevented it from fully subscribing to this concept.5
The mid−
dle ground is occupied by the explanation that Smer’s recent self−defini−
5. Mr. Róbert Kaliňák, Smer MP, presented this opinion at the conference Party Govern−
ment in Slovakia: Experience and Prospects, when commenting the panel Parties and
their interactions.
66
Peter Učeň
tion as a “social alternative to the current rightist government” was a
compromise between Fico’s centrist non−ideological populism and the sud−
den opportunity to enter the leftist mainstream, and that the party has
not given up hope of combining these two approaches to its own benefit.
Radical criticisms include the opinion that Smer has instrumentally,
opportunistically, and formally seized the concept of social democracy to
benefit from the failure of the traditional left in Slovakia.
The process of Smer’s “social−democratization” brings back memories
of the SOP, which after its election success also returned to where its lead−
ers had come from, i.e. to the left. Both projects had one thing in com−
mon: An important circumstance attending their birth was the decision
to abandon a classic social−democratic appeal to the traditional left−wing
electorate, and to condemn it as a useless model without prospects. Some
analysts argue that Smer’s leaders see politics as some sort of enterprise,
and have merely replaced one vehicle to power – i.e. centrist populism –
with another, namely the “mainstream advantage”. But if sailing into the
mainstream is really another stop on Smer’s journey to power, will it be
able to avoid the fate that doomed the SOP? Smer certainly has a great
chance to monopolize the left; the question is whether it truly wants to
do so. Will Fico be able to pull it off by himself? Finally, will the new course
prove as ephemeral as the previous one?
Doubts over Smer’s willingness to abandon its populism focus on the
party’s leader. In a recent interview with the Pravda daily (February 4,
2004), Fico argued that Smer must use all means to achieve early elections
in order to thwart a conspiracy by the nouveau riches from the HZDS and
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ), who have teamed up
maliciously against the people. While adding this new ingredient to his tra−
ditional populist anti−establishment cocktail, Fico objected to accusations
that his party was a non−standard one, reasoning that the Socialist Inter−
national had accepted Smer. These facts indicate that Smer’s most likely
policy in the near future will be a blend of anti−establishment
populism and social radicalism in terms of the traditional left.
ALLIANCE OF THE NEW CITIZEN
After the 2002 parliamentary elections, ANO became part of the new gov−
ernment, allowing Smer to be relegated to opposition. Within a short time,
however, it managed to damage its relationship with almost all its coali−
67
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
tion partners. The party also harvested frequent public accusations that
the entire ANO project was a cynical bid for power.
On the one hand, ANO was criticized for abandoning its liberal philoso−
phy; on the other, it was accused of never having stood on a truly liberal
platform, and of using liberalism as a mere mobilization tool. Other crit−
ics claimed the party’s policy line was subordinated to “private politics”
of its leader, Pavol Rusko, whose main aim was to prevent his dodgy busi−
ness past from catching up with him.
However, the main reason for the early troubles in relations between
ANO and its coalition partners was the aggression and energy ANO dis−
played in its drive for government posts. The party dove into political dis−
putes with its partners and did not hide its appetite for power, in obvious
contradiction to its pre−election rhetoric. Before elections, Rusko had criti−
cized the politicking of traditional parties, and advocated clear relations
between politics and business. Later, after Róbert Nemcsics and Branislav
Opaterný were ousted from ANO along with their personal support for
liberalism, many felt that the “bridge” the party had supposedly built to
bring new people into politics was a tool of conquest rather than commu−
nication. ANO dissidents testified to the party’s hunger for power (see
Pravda, August 11, 2003).
ANO almost eliminated itself from the ruling coalition after a series of
noisy disputes with its coalition partners, particularly the Christian−
Democratic Movement (KDH), as well as several instances of voting with
opposition parties in parliament; its coalition partners also demonstrated
on certain occasions that they were able to govern without ANO. In the
end, the party was saved from being booted out of government by a coin−
cidence beyond its control: After Prime Minister Dzurinda and his SDKÚ
ran into grave problems, ANO came in handy as an ally helping Dzurinda
restore his influence in the cabinet and the coalition. Had that not hap−
pened, ANO would likely not have survived, as its elimination from power
would probably have led to its collapse.
In the beginning, ANO was occasionally compared to Forza Italia,
largely because of similarities between Silvio Berlusconi and Pavol Rusko
(e.g. their media ownership). Later, the party received several accolades
phrased in business terms. For instance, Milan Šútovec christened it a
“go−getting joint−stock company” and a symbol of how (even rightist) poli−
tics could evolve into “a pragmatic business in compliance with the law
on political parties” (Sme, March 9, 2003). Juraj Marušiak used the term
“Political Ltd.” (Marušiak, 2003). All these labels referred to the sheer
68
Peter Učeň
instrumentality of the ANO project, which clearly exceeded levels accept−
able in other political parties. Most importantly, the ANO project leaves
the firm impression that its instrumentality is of a highly private nature,
and that the party is motivated exclusively by private ambitions. Its hun−
ger for power is even balder than that of Smer, which is why ANO is of−
ten called a tool for satisfying individual ambitions.
The truth is that as a vehicle to power that uses a moderate, newly popu−
list mobilization strategy aimed at center−right voters, the ANO project has
undoubtedly been successful. Its prospects now depend on various factors,
including the future of Rusko’s “private politics” and the attitude of law
enforcement organs to them. Also, it will be important how long ANO’s
mutually beneficial alliance with the SDKÚ lasts; once it ends, ANO might
become a scapegoat or the object of revenge by those who very reluctantly
accepted its chairman as a coalition leader and economy minister. Last, the
party’s fate will depend on how Pavol Rusko performs in his ministerial
post, and how this affects the balance of power within the party.
ATTRACTION AND PROSPECTS
OF CENTRIST POPULISM
In developing democracies that are seen as problematic, political outsid−
ers on the warpath against the establishment use populism as a strategy
to gain power with ever−greater frequency. The voter support that popu−
list political projects often receive may be seen as a reaction to defects in
the functioning of the political system, especially its representation mecha−
nisms, as well as a message to the elite about the level of voter dissatis−
faction. In this sense, populism represents an alternative to voter apa−
thy and non−participation. From the viewpoint of the elite, populism is
the cat among the pigeons that prevents them from resting on their lau−
rels. In any case, populism will always remain a source of unpredictable
political behavior and, as such, will always provoke reactions from other
political players.
New anti−establishment populism parties emerge as coalitions of the
ambitious (i.e. those who know exactly why they joined the project and
who expect concrete benefits from it) and the disenchanted but hope−
ful (i.e. those who support the project out of disappointment, protest and
frustration while hoping for a remedy). The fate of these coalitions de−
69
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
pends on how both groups’ attitudes develop. Leaders may desert the
project for various reasons, while followers may turn their backs on it if
they come to believe their hopes have been dashed. In such cases, they
may return to the mainstream or invest their hopes in another “alterna−
tive”, rushing off to another potential disappointment.
According to Mény, “the fact that populist parties are neither as stable
nor as sustainable as governing parties derives from their very nature.
Their fate is either to be integrated into the mainstream, to fold or to re−
main in permanent opposition” (Mény – Surel, 2001, p. 18). Karin Bot−
tom argues that the incorporation of populists into the mainstream is vir−
tually impossible. First, it is far from certain that they will want or be
able to do so. However, the main obstacle is the centrality of their anti−
establishment appeal to the logic of populism (Bottom, 2003).
Based on his Latin American expertise, Schedler offers a more system−
atic but also more speculative view of the prospects of populist parties.
He argues that they have four basic choices: normalization (i.e. a shift to
moderate platforms and incorporation into the mainstream); radi−
calization and a move to anti−system platforms; marginalization and col−
lapse; and institutionalization (Schedler, 1996, pp. 304 – 306).
The key factor in which of these options is pursued is the behavior of
anti−establishment populists once they gain power. If they are content with
mainstream perks, there is a high probability that they will become nor−
malized. If they grow radical while in power, they may well disrupt the
system. However, the most interesting option is if they try to capitalize
on their mainstream position and simultaneously cling to their anti−es−
tablishment platforms. If they succeed, the final result may be the birth
of rule by decree. If they don’t succeed, they may face a no−confidence vote
and removal. If the result is even, a deadlock may ensue.
What are the political implications of centrist populism parties winning
recognition and breaking through? What are they capable of bringing to
politics and what can they actually contribute? Some may well become
comets that streak by without leaving a trace. The opposite extreme is
that they leave the system in ruins. However, it is most likely that they
shake up the system and have a permanent and perceptible impact, such
as by redefining the political agenda (i.e. when mainstream parties be−
gin to deal with issues introduced by populists) or enlivening the party
competition (i.e. when mainstream parties begin to experiment with
populists’ methods). They may also provoke waves of counter−mobiliza−
tion or cause de−alignment in some other way.
70
Peter Učeň
As far as post−communist countries are concerned, centrist populism
may quickly fade as a relevant political force, largely because it features
a strong element of short−term instrumentality motivated by efforts to gain
power. The willingness to keep centrist populism parties alive may eas−
ily dissipate after their protagonists (leaders, patrons and clients) reach
their goals. However, it is also possible that centrist populism will become
a more permanent solution to the problems of these political systems,
especially the consistent failure of mainstream parties and their inabil−
ity to keep their election promises. Centrist populism can only benefit from
the fact that more and more ordinary people are beginning to realize the
main reason for this failure is outright corruption, greed and abuse of
power and trust.
Apart from Smer, centrist populism in Slovakia is relatively re−
strained. While it does focus on criticizing the establishment, the inten−
sity of this criticism – again, with the exception of Smer – doesn’t begin
to compare to Mečiar’s populism at its peak. Especially in the case of
the SOP and ANO, their criticism of established political players has
been moderate. Against the background of this vague criticism, these
parties deploy a “third way” argument whose effectiveness may decline
with time.
The SOP’s version of the third way, together with its idea of civic un−
derstanding, is pretty much dead. Its only importance was in demonstrat−
ing that the concept was viable in Slovakia, and that a political party could
walk the third way, at least to parliament. Its successors, Smer and ANO,
have never flirted with the moderate appeal of reconciliation and under−
standing. Instead, they have played the evergreen part of post−commu−
nist populism, creating the impression that, unlike traditional players,
populist politicians and their parties put the interests of the people above
their own. What was one of the two principal reasons for Mečiar’s suc−
cess is also the main aim of the activities pursued by Róbert Fico or Pavol
Rusko, for all that their mobilization strategies are different.
ANO targeted its restrained populism at the disenchanted voters of
the right; however, its heavily self−serving behavior makes it a poten−
tially short−term project that may not survive once it no longer has ac−
cess to the spoils of power. The prospects of Smer are much more inter−
esting, mostly because its leaders’ failure to attain executive posts has
forced them to continue with their populist project and even to attempt
to institutionalize it. Smer has taken the path of subscribing to main−
stream social democracy and leading the Slovak left. This may have
71
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
taken the radicalism out of some of its populist arguments, especially
anti−partisanship and anti−ideology. However, we can expect that in the
near future, one of the major sources of initiative in Slovak poli−
tics will be Smer’s attempt to combine the advantages of its sta−
tus as an established player with the freedom enjoyed by a popu−
list agitator.
CONCLUSION
What is the attraction of centrist populism for existing and newly estab−
lished parties in Slovakia?
It is often argued that Smer and ANO have something in common with
the SDKÚ. The main reason for drawing such a parallel is their pragma−
tism and avoidance of ideological disputes. However, this does not justify
speculations that the SDKÚ is also a centrist populist party. It is not,
largely because it has never portrayed itself as an alternative to the main−
stream. In the most extreme case, it has presented itself as a new ver−
sion of one of the mainstream parties.
Most importantly, though, the SDKÚ has established its legitimacy as
a declared successor to the SDK with the ambition to unite the entire non−
left segment of the mainstream, a mission that has been rewarded by its
voters. No matter how attractive or even rational centrist populism might
appear to individual SDKÚ officials, they seem to realize that it is im−
possible to represent both the mainstream and an alternative to it at the
same time. Besides, due to questions of legitimacy, tactics and interna−
tional acceptability, it has been crucial for the party not to question its
declared affiliation to the mainstream European right. Certain similari−
ties between the SDKÚ on the one hand and Smer and ANO on the other
definitely exist; however, they differ from the focus of this paper, and
deserve to be examined separately.
Another topical question is whether centrist populism may become a
viable option for the Free Forum (SF), a recent splinter from the SDKÚ.
For the time being, the party defines its program as a revival of the origi−
nal program of one of the mainstream parties (the SDKÚ); however, the
gates of centrist populism remain open to it. The SF may resort to this
type of politics when it chooses to distinguish itself from the entire rul−
ing coalition, as opposed to only Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda and
72
Peter Učeň
his SDKÚ.6
If the SF is able to keep its current distance from the opposi−
tion in future political disputes, it may gradually develop its own version
of the third way. We might wonder if it will walk this path in Smer’s
shadow.
REFERENCES
1. Bottom, Karin A.: Populist Parties in Government: Perspectives for Entry into
the Cartel. A paper prepared for the ECPR Conference in Marburg, Septem−
ber 18 – 21, 2003.
2. Canovan, Margaret: Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democ−
racy. Political Studies, No. 47, 1999, pp. 2 – 16.
3. Dočkal, Vít: Aliance nového občana – populistická či protestní strana? [Alli−
ance of the New Citizen – A Party of Populism or Protest?]. Central European
Political Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2002.
4. Fico, Róbert: Strana maďarskej koalície doniesla do vládnej koalície len svoju
agendu [The Hungarian Coalition Party Merely Brought Its Own Agenda to
the Ruling Coalition]. Práca, May 26, 1999.
5. Gyárfášová, Oľga – Krivý, Vladimír – Velšic, Marián et al: Krajina v pohybe.
Správa o politických názoroch a hodnotách ľudí na Slovensku [A Country on
the Move: Report on the Political Views and Values of People in Slovakia].
Bratislava, Institute for Public Affairs 2001.
6. Hríb, Štefan: Šustermarš [Schuster Marches], Domino Fórum, No. 35, 1997.
7. Kopeček, Lubomír: Strana občanského porozumění – strana ‘na jedno použití’
[Party of Civic Understanding – A Disposable Party]. Central European Po−
litical Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 2−3, 2002.
8. Krištofík, Matúš: Ideové a programové vymedzenie strany Smer [Ideological
and Program Definition of the Smer Party]. Central European Political Stud−
ies Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2001.
9. Kubín, Ľuboš: Zápas o charakter opozície [Struggle for Character of Opposi−
tion]. Sme, March 23, 1998.
6. The “sociological turnaround” in the appeal of the Freedom Forum (SF) deserves spe−
cial attention in this respect, when Zuzana Martináková enlivened the somewhat stale
value−oriented arguments of SF Chairman Ivan Šimko by adding a little sociology. Z.
Martináková pointed out that the ruling coalition (i.e. not just Dzurinda and his SDKÚ)
was pursuing policies that benefited only the rich while ruining the middle class. If
the SF begins to argue that the current reforms are problematic and that the negli−
gent and insensitive governing elite is to blame, then this is likely to be interpreted as
an attempt to attract the center−right electorate through centrist populism.
73
Centrist Populism as a New Competitive and Mobilization Strategy in Slovak Politics
10. Leško, Marián: Robert Fico ako politik ‘politickej politiky’ [Robert Fico as a
Politician of ‘Political Politics’]. Sme, January 22, 1999.
11. Marušiak, Juraj: Zlyhania politických eseročiek [Failures of Political Ltd’s].
Slovo (V), No. 36, 2003.
12. Marušiak, Juraj: Smer sociálna demokracia? [Towards Social Democracy?].
Slovo, No. 1, 2004.
13. Mény, Ives – Surel, Ives: The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism. In: Mény,
Ives – Surel, Ives (eds.): Democracies and the Populist Challenge. New York,
Palgrave 2001, pp. 1 – 21.
14. Mudde, Cas: In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People:
Populism in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Society, Vol. 14, No.
2, 2000, pp. 33 – 53.
15. Pop−Eleches, Grigore: Radicalization or Protest Vote? Explaining the Electoral
Success of Unorthodox Parties in Eastern Europe. A paper prepared for the
2002 Annual Meeting of the American Association for Advancement of Slavic
Studies, Pittsburgh, November 21 – 24, 2002.
16. Schedler, Andreas: Anti−Political−Establishment Parties. Party Politics, No.
2, 1996, pp. 291 – 312.
17. Učeň, Peter: A Decade of Conflict Within the Slovak Polity: The Party Politics
Perspective. In: Dvořáková, Vladimíra (ed.): Success or Failure? Ten Years After.
Praha, Česká společnost pro politické vědy, Slovenské združenie pre politické
vedy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 1999.
18. Učeň, Peter: Desať rojov vývoja straníckej politiky a jej formatívny konflikt
[Ten Years in the Development of Party Politics and Its Formative Conflict].
In: Pešek, Jan – Szomolányi, Soňa (eds.): November 1989 na Slovensku. Sú−
vislosti, predpoklady a dôsledky [November 1989 in Slovakia: Context, Assump−
tions and Implications]. Bratislava, Nadácia Milana Šimečku, Historický ústav
SAV, Katedra politológie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Komenského 2000.
19. Učeň, Peter: Faktory úspechu strán stredového populizmu [The Parties of Cen−
trist Populism and the Factors in Their Success]. In: Mesežnikov, Grigorij –
Gyárfášová, Oľga – Kollár, Miroslav (eds.): Slovenské voľby ‘02: výsledky, dô−
sledky, súvislosti [Slovak Elections 2002: Results, Implications, Context]. Bra−
tislava, Institute for Public Affairs 2003.