The Surprising Significance Of African Elections
Lindberg, Staffan I., 1969Journal
of Democracy, Volume 17, Number 1, January 2006, pp.
139-151 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2006.0011
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THE SURPRISING SIGNIFICANCE
OF AFRICAN ELECTIONS
Staffan I. Lindberg
Since the onset of the “third wave” of democratization in the mid-
1970s, many have hailed elections as the hallmark of democracy.
Expectations for what elections can accomplish have been especially
high among democracy-promotion agencies, many of which focus on
supporting elections. Among scholars, however, there is skepticism regarding
the true value of elections for democratization. In 2002, Thomas
Carothers argued in the pages of this journal that “greatly reduced expectations
are in order as to what elections can accomplish as generators
of deep-reaching democratic change.”1
In declaring “the end of the transition
paradigm,” he argued that elections are in and of themselves
largely insignificant to democratization.
This begs the question: Is there a value inherent in the holding of
elections, or is the holding of elections merely an indicator of democratization?
I believe that the former is the case. My analysis of more than
two hundred third-wave elections in Africa shows that an uninterrupted
series of competitive elections imbues society with certain democratic
qualities. Repeated elections—regardless of their relative freeness or
fairness—appear to have a positive impact on human freedom and democratic
values. With a few exceptions,2
most theories of democratization
and democratic consolidation have failed to recognize this causal rela-
tionship.3
To gauge the strength of this relationship, we need a consistent
measure of democratization. In order to avoid tautology, such a measure
needs to be sufficiently independent of electoral processes. One
way of assessing the extent of democratization in a country, without
consulting election data, is by looking beyond the arena of contestaStaffan
I. Lindberg, assistant professor of transnational and comparative
politics at Kent State University in Ohio, received the 2005 Juan
Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy.
This article is based on his book Democracy and Elections in
Africa (2006).
Journal of Democracy Volume 17, Number 1 January 2006
© National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press
Journal of Democracy140
tion over office in order to examine the extent to which a regime respects
its citizens’ civil liberties.
While it is impossible to measure exactly the presence of civil liberties
in a democratizing society, Freedom House’s civil-liberties index is
the best available indicator of on-the-ground conditions and the only
source that provides annual scores each year during the period on which
this analysis is founded.4
Freedom House evaluates the level of civil
liberties based on 14 criteria, and assigns each country a score on a
seven-point scale (with 1 and 7 representing the most and least free,
respectively).
The level of civil liberties in a society relates to three key democratic
qualities: participation, competition, and legitimacy. First, citizen participation
requires freedom of assembly and open public debate, as well
as the right to form and join civic organizations (including trade unions).
The greater the prevalence of these liberties, the greater the democratic
quality of participation in society. Second, competition (beyond elections)
requires personal autonomy and economic rights in order to allow
for independent alternatives within the social sphere. Such rights include
freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependence on the
state as well as the right to private property. For competition to be
possible and somewhat fair, there also needs to be basic gender equality
as well as educational and professional opportunities. Third, the legitimacy
of a democratic government is indicated by such factors as the
peaceful coexistence of various social organizations, genuinely free
public discourse, and its ability to control violence and provide physical
security to peaceful citizens.
Elections and Civil Liberties in Africa
By June 2003, 44 of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 48 states had conducted
what are often referred to as “founding” elections, typically marking a
transition from a long period of authoritarian rule to fledgling democratic
government. Thirty-three of these countries had gone through a
second election cycle, twenty had completed three uninterrupted cycles,
and seven had held four or more consecutive elections (see Table 1).
Although some countries included in these numbers are cases of regression,
unchanging electoral authoritarian regimes, such as Chad under
President Idriss Déby (1990–) and Togo under Gnassingbé Eyadema
(1967–2005), the majority have become increasingly democratic with
every successive election. Even though most of the 44 countries that
have held at least one election are not full democracies, many of them
have in recent years been governed by civilian regimes, which in itself
represents an important turning point in the political history of Africa.
The question here, however, is whether first, second, and subsequent
elections in these countries have had a causal effect on the increase in
Staffan I. Lindberg 141
democratic qualities as measured by the Freedom House civil-liberties
index. If Carothers and his fellow skeptics are right, we should see no
such relationship. But as Table 1 shows, there is a relationship between
the number of elections that a country has held and the civil-liberties
score that it receives from Freedom House. Countries that have held
more elections tend to have better scores.
While remarkable, this observation still falls short of proving that
elections cause improvements in democratic qualities. In order to make
such a determination, we need to explore when these improvements
usually occurred, using a series of elections. To that end, I examine only
those countries that have completed at least two election cycles, which
gives us a data set of 184 elections in 33 countries (the last three columns
of Table 1). I then measure and compare the positive and negative
changes in scores for nonelection and election periods. For nonelection
periods, changes in civil-liberties scores are measured from four years
before to one year before elections. The data for election periods, on the
other hand, represent changes that took place during the year before and
the year of the election.5
Thus, the data capture the changes in civil
liberties that occur as a direct result of election-related activities, such
as campaigning and voter education and registration, as well as those
that occur in the years between elections (or preceding them, in the case
of first elections). Based on these data, Table 2 displays the mean
rankings and, more importantly, the average changes in civil-liberties
TABLE 1—SUCCESSIVE ELECTIONS AND FREEDOM HOUSE CIVIL
LIBERTIES RATINGS1
BREAKDOWN2
AND
CL RATING
ONE ELECTION
AND CL RATING
TWO ELECTIONS
AND CL RATING
THREE ELECTIONS
AND CL RATING
FOUR OR MORE
ELECTIONS AND
CL RATING
Angola
Central Afr. Rep.
Ivory Coast
Burundi
Liberia
Mean Rating
5
5
6
5
6
5.4
Comoros
DRC
Guinea Biss
Lesotho
Niger
Sierra Leone
4
4
5
3
4
4
4.0
Chad
Eq. Guinea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Malawi
Mozambique
Nigeria
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
4
6
2
5
4
3
4
5
3
2
3
5
4
3.8
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
CapeVerde
Djibouti
Gabon
Ghana
Kenya
Mauritania
Namibia
S~ao Tomé
Seychelles
Togo
Zambia
5
6
5
4
5
4
4
5
2
7
5
3
4
4.5
Benin
Botswana
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritius
Senegal
Zimbabwe
2
2
4
3
2
3
6
3.1
1
Ratings are as of 1 July 2003. Scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free).
2
These countries held elections during the period but the electoral regime subsequently broke down
as the result of a civil war, coup d’état, or similar episode.
Journal of Democracy142
scores from the period before founding elections through fourth and
later elections.
These numbers demonstrate the stark differences between election
and nonelection periods as regards improvements in civil liberties. Considering
the role that scholars often ascribe to first elections, the way
they appear in this analysis is particularly interesting. The rationale for
labeling first elections as “founding” rests on the premise that a democratic
regime is manifestly installed by the conclusion of first elections.
The empirical implication of this argument is that a major improvement
in civil liberties would be independent of and precede first elections.
That has generally not been the case in Africa. The present analysis
shows that such improvements often result from the immediate preparations
for and holding of elections.
The low average score of 5.3 on the 7-point scale during the first
preelection period indicates that there is much room for improvement;
yet the average positive change of 0.19 in the preelection period does
not bespeak any radical improvement in democratic quality. Positive
changes resulting from election-related activities are much more impressive.
The average change of 0.84 during the brief period of first
elections reveals significant progress—four times greater than during
the preelection period. The picture is further strengthened by the data
for successive election and nonelection periods, even if the recorded
changes decrease in magnitude with every cycle. This first analysis
suggests that in Africa, the holding of elections—regardless of their
quality—leads to democratic advances, and not vice versa.
Comparing the mean changes between election and nonelection periods
is a limited form of analysis, however, as it fails to show the extent
of the changes. Figure 1 therefore shows a graphic presentation of the
improvements. The graph plots the net changes in civil-liberties scores
in all African countries in each period, subtracting the number of negative
changes from the number of positive ones.
Looking at the first wave of change, which signifies the effects on
civil-liberties ratings of the first election cycle, we find that the magnitude
of improvement is almost six times greater during an election year
than in the three-year preelection period. In other words, founding elecTABLE
2—CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN FREEDOM HOUSE CIVIL
LIBERTIES RATINGS
*Total number of elections
Mean change
Mean ranking
Total N*
First Election
Cycle
Third Election
Cycle
.21
4.2
61
.13
3.6
30
CHANGE
RESULTING
FROM
Second Election
Cycle
.19
5.3
70
-.05
4.3
60
.00
3.7
30
.00
3.2
21
Preelection
period
Fourth & Later
Election Cycles
Election
period
Nonelection
period
Election
period
Election
period
Election
period
Nonelection
period
Nonelection
period
.84
4.3
70
-.10
3.3
21
Staffan I. Lindberg 143
tions seem to be the cause—not the effect—of the first massive improvement
in civil liberties. Benin and Malawi saw their Freedom House
civil-liberties scores improve by as many as four points (both from 7 to
3) in this first period, while Nigeria improved by three points (from 6 to
3). The majority of countries improved by around two points each—
among them Zambia, Mali, and Gabon—while some countries saw more
modest one-point improvements.
In the interval between the first and second elections, when no election-related
activities took place, most countries experienced a period of
stagnating or even deteriorating civil liberties (this is indicated by the
balance of changes hovering around zero or even going into the negative).
Deterioration was seen in Mauritania, Zambia, Nigeria, and Uganda.
Chad’s civil-liberties score also worsened by one point, even though the
country had made no gains during the year of its first election.
Second elections produced positive changes—albeit less dramatic
than those of first elections—in countries like Ghana, the Gambia, Kenya,
Madagascar, Seychelles, Madagascar, Tanzania, Zambia, and even Ethiopia.
Michael Bratton was correct to note that second elections,
particularly delayed ones, generally tend to be of lower democratic quality
than first elections, and it is even more remarkable then that these
elections resulted in improved civil-liberties scores.6
The conclusion
that dubious electoral experiences also resulted in improvements of civil
liberties shows that elections do not have to be free and fair or fully
democratic to have democratizing effects. As for third elections in Africa,
recorded changes in civil-liberties scores were modest, which would
FIGURE 1—TOTAL CHANGES IN FREEDOM HOUSE CIVIL LIBERTIES
RATINGS OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES*
*The line represents the total sum of positive changes minus the total sum of negative changes in
FH CL scores in all African countries in each period.
■
TotalBalanceChange
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
Preelection Election Nonelection Election Nonelection NonelectionElection Election
First Period Second Period Third Period Fourth & Later
Periods
Journal of Democracy144
be expected given the significant gains resulting from the previous two
elections. Nonetheless, third elections still produced improvements
compared to the preceding nonelection period, during which scores
remained unchanged.
As a way to crosscheck the robustness of these findings, Figure 2
presents a third analysis. Instead of the means compared in Table 2 and
the net balance of positive and negative changes presented in Figure 1,
Figure 2 shows the share of elections in each of the nonelection and
election periods leading to positive and negative changes. By looking
at the number and share of elections associated with positive or negative
changes, rather than at the average magnitude of such changes, we
avoid the risk of being deceived by extreme values in a small number of
cases. Thus, Figure 2 shows that almost half of all founding elections
resulted in improved civil liberties, while only about a quarter of all
countries saw positive changes in the period preceding these elections.
In other words, during the first period (including both preelection and
election years), no less than two-thirds of all civil-liberties improvements
were direct effects of elections. This pattern is then repeated with
second and third elections. Thus, the findings shown in Figure 2 further
corroborate the hypothesis that elections as such can beneficially affect
democratization indicators.
Further Testing the Hypothesis
The above analyses looked at elections without consideration to the
developments over time in individual countries. But in order for us to
conclude that elections do indeed cause improvements in civil liberties,
this pattern must apply to a large number of countries as we look at
their electoral histories. Therefore, to further examine my findings, I
change the unit of analysis from elections to countries and look at how
many individual countries fit the hypothesis. Such a country-based
analysis finds that 21 of the 33 countries that have had at least two
successive elections (as of June 2003) and have surviving electoral
regimes fit the wave-like pattern described above. Only six countries
contradict the hypothesis and five provide evidence neither for nor
against.
What impact do other well-known causal factors of democratization
have on these findings? There seem to be no regional effects, as countries
across the continent are among those that fit the pattern. Likewise,
regime type seems to have little influence, as among the 21 countries
there are both hard-line authoritarian regimes, such as Swaziland and
Equatorial Guinea, and democratic success stories, such as Ghana, Kenya,
and Benin. There are unstable societies, such as Nigeria, and countries
that have enjoyed peace and stability for a long time, including the
continent’s oldest democracies, Botswana and Mauritius. There are
Staffan I. Lindberg 145
wealthier nations, such as South Africa with an adjusted GDP per capita
exceeding US$10,000, as well as poorer nations, such as Sierra Leone
with a GDP per capita of $556 (figures from 2003). There are those with
negligible Muslim populations, such as Madagascar and Zambia, as well
as those where a majority of the populace is Muslim, such as Mauritania.
Taking these facts into consideration, it is fair to argue that in SubSaharan
Africa the power of elections is a region-wide phenomenon.
Overall, the emphasis that most of the literature on democratic transitions
places on founding elections and the period of liberalization
that precedes them generally does not apply to Africa, where most transitions
to democracy have taken place over several electoral cycles.
Some of the twelve African countries that do not conform to the powerof-elections
hypothesis have nonetheless made significant democratic
advances, but their improvements are not attributable to the holding of
elections. These countries—including Mozambique, Namibia, S~ao
Tomé, and Senegal—conform to the common view that civil liberties
deepen most radically before the holding of founding elections. The
cases of Burkina Faso and Tanzania reveal the same pattern, albeit to a
lesser extent.
There are also a few cases that contradict the power-of-elections hypothesis.
Guinea, for example, has held regular elections since 1993,
but has remained largely authoritarian, with no significant increase in
civil liberties. The country has had only two presidents since independence
in 1958: Seko Touré, who remained in power until his death in
1984, and Colonel Lansana Conté, who, despite legalizing political
parties and presiding over the country’s first multiparty presidential
FIGURE 2—PERCENT OF AFRICAN ELECTIONS RESULTING IN POSITIVE AND
NEGATIVE CHANGES IN FREEDOM HOUSE CIVIL LIBERTIES RATINGS
Positive change
Negative change
PercentofElections 50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Preelection Election Nonelection Election Nonelection NonelectionElection Election
First Period Second Period Third Period Fourth & Later
Periods
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
Journal of Democracy146
election in 1992, later removed the two-term limit and bestowed greater
powers on the presidential office.
How Elections Advance Democracy
Despite the few cases that contradict the hypothesis, the present research
shows that, in general, elections promote democratization in
Africa. Yet, the question remains of how the mere holding of elections
leads to improvements in democratic indicators such as civil liberties.
There are at least six issue areas and causal mechanisms that link elections
and civil-liberties improvements in transitional societies.
Citizens become voters. Elections bring to the fore fundamental features
of equal citizenship: the right to universal and equal suffrage, the
right to choose between candidates and parties, freedom of opinion and
voice, and the right to form and lead associations. These are rights and
freedoms that the citizen encounters for the first time as a voter in conjunction
with a country’s first elections. Citizens are likely to be targeted
by voter-education campaigns and messages conveyed by politicians,
activists, and the media. As a result, citizens gain an awareness of their
own roles as equal members of the sovereign power, endowed with rights
to participate in the political process and to choose between alternatives
under legitimate procedures. Once the election is over, many
citizens retain this awareness; some may even become “norm entrepreneurs,”
transferring their awareness to others in the social sphere. The
empowerment that comes from voting has important implications beyond
the political sphere.
Democratic “lock-in” mechanisms. A second area of linkage is provided
by those individuals and groups who learn to identify with the
values inherent in democratic electoral practices. Once people perceive
themselves as protagonists of democratic participation and competition,
and are recognized as such among friends, family, and perhaps
even enemies, they have a vested interest in voicing their concerns in
the social sphere. Such “lock-in” mechanisms may even influence leaders
who are not committed democrats but whose social status or role
becomes associated with a prodemocratic stance when citizens empowered
by electoral socialization expect their leaders to defend democratic
principles. For example, a citizen subjected to unjustified imprisonment
is more likely to have the case brought to the public by family and
friends or civic organizations in an electoral regime with such lock-in
effects at work than is a citizen in a nonelectoral regime. The same
would most probably be true for citizens affected by gender discrimination,
denial of a fair trial, invasion of personal autonomy, or infringement
of religious or associational rights. In electoral regimes, expectations
placed on leaders become weapons in the fight for expanded democratic
qualities in society.
Staffan I. Lindberg 147
Self-fulfilling prophecies. When a critical mass of citizens have reason
to believe that crucial elites—from military officers to political
leaders—and a majority of citizens will accept and play by the democratic
rules, this can become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. At
this point, even risk-averse and nondemocratic individuals are likely to
demand and uphold democratic principles in society. A similar mechanism
applies to political leaders. For example, when an autocratic regime
holds elections—even if these are not free and fair—those elected unavoidably
gain a certain interest in maintaining their respective electoral
bases. Thus, elections lead to changes in the power distribution within
the party or ruling group, and regimes that receive strong electoral support
may also see less need to infringe on citizens’ rights and liberties.
Moreover, to the extent that independent electoral commissions are in
fact independent, they too play a role in advancing a prodemocratic
mindset—among both their members and the general public.
Civic organizations. A fourth possible causal link between elections
and civil-liberties improvements is provided by organizations already
in place and those spawned with the coming of elections. Through various
election-related activities—including election observation and
voter-education campaigns—such organizations build social capital
and gain organizational experience while learning about democratic
ideas and values related to transparency issues, the detection of electoral
fraud, and the protection of political rights and civil liberties. The
future status and recognition of these organizations thus become dependent
upon their being prodemocratic. Similarly, trade unions and
other organizations may draw inspiration from or even copy the tactics
of political parties, using the space freed up during the election to push
for liberties such as professional equality or personal autonomy.
New roles for state institutions. The fifth area of possible linkage is
in relation to the legal system in the broader state apparatus. With the
coming of electoral rules and regulations, the authorities in charge of
law enforcement and adjudication are given a formal role in the protection
of political rights. The courts, the military, the police, and various
security agencies can by means of prodemocratic actions advance their
status and prominence, and thus the default option is not necessarily to
be antidemocratic. When it becomes obvious that competitive elections
will remain part of the political game, some state officials begin to look
for a career defending civil rights rather than beating them down. When
democratic procedures and standards begin to take hold, suppressing
civil liberties can potentially be a detriment to these officials’ careers.
The functions that these authorities fill in conjunction with elections—defending
people’s rights to vote and demonstrate, filing
complaints, and calling on the police for voter protection—are likely to
carry over into other, non–election-related spheres. While this has not
happened in more authoritarian countries, such as Cameroon, Chad,
Journal of Democracy148
and Zimbabwe, it is increasingly seen in many of the other countries
that conform to my central hypothesis.
The role of the media. During election periods, media entrepreneurs
are likely to stretch and redefine the boundaries of what may be said or
written. As a transmitter for prodemocratic advocacy, the media can
advance civil liberties and other democratic qualities by pressuring
politicians and the authorities and by airing political debates openly.
Of course, an autocratic ruler may maintain a tight grip on the media,
using them as a means of voter manipulation and indoctrination. Yet
with the procedural and substantive political rights that follow from
repeated elections, it seems likely that such a posture will be difficult to
maintain.
These are six possible mechanisms by which the repeated holding of
contested multiparty elections translates into improvements in democratic
qualities. The list is not exhaustive, and these hypothesized effects
are severely simplified. The key to these linkages lies in the logic of
elections as a struggle for political power. It is during election campaigns
and their immediate aftermath that most individuals and
organizations engage in activism. Being the largest peacetime mobilization
of political activism, elections provide opportunities for political
challenges and change. The element of competition inherent in elections
provides voters and organizations with a means to pressure
incumbents and demand concessions from politicians. The promise to
improve democratic liberties provides a rallying cry for opposition parties.
Combined, these forces can lead to a competition over who can
most improve civil liberties and other democratic freedoms.
Finally, during elections a country is more likely to be under the
scrutiny of the international community and news media. Watchdog
organizations capitalize on these occasions, lending weight to the efforts
of those advocating political reform and broader civil liberties.
The link between elections and democratic qualities, however, is not
contingent upon the freeness and fairness of elections. Indeed, the disappointment
that results from flawed electoral practices—including
padded voter rolls, political violence, fraudulent voting, and voter and
candidate intimidation—may stimulate activism to an even greater extent
than do free elections. Thus, positive effects are not restricted to
free and fair elections, at least not in the early stages of democratization.
Long Live the Transition Paradigm
The research presented in this article shows that elections are not a
mere indicator of democracy, but that—at least in sub-Saharan Africa—
they have a significant positive effect on democracy as measured by
improvements in civil liberties. While this research does not suggest
that elections are the only or even the principal causal factor behind
Staffan I. Lindberg 149
democratization, it shows that the repeated holding of elections in new
electoral regimes promotes and breeds democratic qualities: The more
successive elections, the more democratic a nation becomes.
What are some of the implications of these findings? The evidence
shows that first elections signify a step in the transition process rather
than the founding of a democratic regime. This conclusion challenges
the pervading pessimism that surrounds “hybrid” regimes and suggests
that such regimes—even if they remain largely authoritarian for an extended
period—tend to advance democratization because they allow
for the holding of elections. Thus, regardless of how academic observers
choose to label Africa’s emerging regimes, the fact remains that
successive cycles of elections are likely, with time, to lead to democratic
improvements as measured by civil liberties ratings.7
Samuel P. Huntington has suggested that protracted transitions have
a greater likelihood of success because incremental progress favors accommodation
and adaptation by political elites.8
Many of Africa’s
democratic transitions have stretched across decades, with repeated free
and fair elections playing a key role. Madagascar is a case in point: The
country’s transition began with elections in 1982, when Freedom House
gave it a very poor score of 6 on civil liberties. Two decades and five
successive presidential and parliamentary elections later, that score has
improved to a 3, moving the country from the Not Free to the Partly Free
category. This shows that democratization by elections may often be a
lengthy process, and that many of Africa’s hybrid regimes may in fact be
on a slow but steady track to democracy.
It is also noteworthy that elites in so many diverse countries across
Africa seem to adjust their behavior and strategies as a result of repeated
elections. Fear and mistrust among former combatants and political rivals
in places like Mali, South Africa, Mozambique, and Namibia have
slowly been replaced by mutual coexistence, acceptance, and peaceful
competition. Even longstanding ethnic rivalries that constituted major
divides in countries like Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal seem to have over
a few electoral cycles lost their potential for generating violent conflict.
While it may be too early to pass definitive judgments on more
long-term social processes such as these, it appears that democratic
frameworks for political competition and participation lead to greater
levels of acceptance and peaceful coexistence.
A common misconception among democracy scholars is that opposition
groups and parties are always prodemocratic. The dubious character
of this assumption is illustrated by the behavior of many African opposition
parties: Even in those elections during the period of this study
considered free and fair by independent international observers, losing
parties immediately endorsed the results (within 72 hours) in only 40
percent of the cases. Many of these were elections in which the incumbents
rightfully stayed in power but the opposition parties still refused
Journal of Democracy150
to accept the defeat. In an additional 44 percent of elections, it took up
to three months for losing parties to accept the results. By disputing the
results and questioning the legitimacy of fair elections, losing parties
often willfully undermine and discredit the democratic process.
All human beings are born equal,
with equal rights to participate in government.
Elections, despite their flaws, are
the best available mechanism for translating
this right of self-government into the
effective governance of a modern state.
Even countries that at first glance may not
seem to possess the necessary preconditions
for democratic rule may still benefit
from participatory, competitive, and legitimate
elections. Such elections provide
more than just an arena for political contestation:
They sometimes give rise to
new, independent institutions and often
force political actors to adapt at least partly to voter preferences.
Writing in 1971, Robert Dahl posited that polyarchy will not develop
in a country where the conditions are unfavorable—which is the
case in most African nations.9
The present research suggests that Dahl’s
prediction has not held true in Africa, as even those societies with poor
conditions for democracy have seen positive effects in the field of civil
liberties as repeated elections have rolled forward. Such increases in
freedoms and rights not only are of fundamental value in themselves,
but also serve to propel the forces of democratization. Thus, even if a
transition at the outset seems condemned to failure, there is little reason
to believe that the struggle for democracy is lost. Any transition, even a
faltering one, offers hope for democratization and is better than no transition
at all.
NOTES
The author wishes to acknowledge invaluable comments from Joel Barkan, Michael
Bratton, John F. Clark, Michael Coppedge, Steven Fish, Axel Hadenius, John
Harbeson, Göran Hyden, Magnus Jerneck, KC Morrison, Gerardo Munck, Winifred
Pankani, Andreas Schedler, Richard Snyder, and Nicholas van de Walle.
1. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy
13 (January 2002): 16.
2. Joel D. Barkan offered some suggestions in “PR and Southern Africa: Elections
in Agrarian Societies,” Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 106–16; and
“Protracted Transitions Among Africa’s New Democracies,” Democratization 7
(Autumn 2000): 227–43. On Mexico, see Todd Eisenstadt, Courting Democracy in
Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004). On Central America, see Mitchell A. Seligson and John A.
Even countries that at
first glance may not
seem to possess the
necessary preconditions
for democratic
rule may still benefit
from participatory,
competitive, and
legitimate elections.
Staffan I. Lindberg 151
Booth, Elections and Democracy in Central America Revisited (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1995).
3. For example, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) posited
founding elections as the hallmark of a completed transition to democracy. See
also Larry Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries.
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993) and Larry Diamond, ed., Developing
Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1999). Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) argue that the date of
the first election should be considered the end of the transition process. This idea
was then incorporated in Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic
Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
4. See www.freedomhouse.org. Freedom House does not provide a score for
each indicator but only a composite rating, which implies a certain limitation on
this analysis. Some readers may argue that Freedom House’s two scores—civil
liberties (CL) and political rights (PR)—are closely related, and that CL rankings
are influenced by PR scores. Since PR scores are based in part by assessment of
electoral activities, however, taking PR scores into consideration would undermine
the present analysis. The two scores are based on different evaluation criteria and
are devised to assess different conditions. For example, while a flawed election is
likely to lead to a downgraded PR score, it can still have the effect of improving the
CL ranking—which is indeed exactly what my analysis shows.
5. This is to some extent moderated by the timing of the election during the
election year. Some countries (for instance Kenya and Ghana) hold their general
elections in the last quarter of the election year; in these cases, the year before
election year is not included in the elections period, but the year following the
election is. This seems to be the most reasonable way to account for variations
using the Freedom House scores, considering that rankings are yearly and do not
account for when significant changes occurred.
6. Michael Bratton, “Second Elections in Africa,” Journal of Democracy 9 (July
1998): 51–66.
7. Larry Diamond, “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid
Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002): 21–35; Terry Lynn Karl, “The
Hybrid Regimes of Latin America,” Journal of Democracy 6 (July 1995): 72–86;
and Robert Luckham, “Dilemmas of Military Disengagement and Democratization
in Africa,” IDS Bulletin 26 (April 1995): 49–61.
8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), chs. 4 and 5.
9. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971).