Media Politics: A Citizen’s Guide
Shanto Iyengar & Jennifer A. McGrady
Excerpt from “Campaigning Through the Media”
(Draft with embedded video)
Advertising Strategy
Unlike press management, where success requires campaigns to cater to the needs
and values of journalists, advertising provides them with a much more “direct” route to
the minds of voters. There is a significant tradeoff, however; advertising is unmediated,
but a much less credible messenger than news reports
Effective advertising is not a simply a question of designing a persuasive and
memorable campaign jingle. Of course, the overall game plan is to strengthen the
sponsoring candidate’s “market share.” This may be accomplished by adjusting the
advertising message to the stage of the campaign and to the specific attributes of the
candidates in the race. In addition to synchronizing the advertising message to the
context, campaigns must decide on the precise mix of affirmative messages in favor of
the candidate (positive advertising) and negative messages designed to increase voter
aversion to the opposing candidate. It is the extensive use of negative appeals that is the
hallmark of political advertising. Commercial advertising stays positive; automobile
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companies or department stores rarely criticize their competitors. Political advertising is
different; candidates frequently attack their opponents.
Television advertising takes on a different role over the course of the campaign.
Before spelling out the temporal contours of advertising strategy, it is important to
understand that advertising is a highly targeted form of communication, no matter what
the stage of the campaign. Unlike brand name product appeals, which air on a national
basis, political advertising is much narrower in scope. As the use of local news
illustrates, candidates are primarily interested in reaching voters whose preferences may
be pivotal to the outcome of the race. Senator Kerry had little interest in any of the
California media markets in 2004 because he fully expected to win the state by a
comfortable margin. Conversely, even the most optimistic Democratic strategist will
avoid wasting advertising dollars in Texas where the probability of a Democratic victory
is near zero. By this logic, approximately 35 states are off the advertising table.
Residents of these “red” or “blue” states will typically see no presidential ads at all. The
remaining states, however, are blanketed with advertising (see maps below).
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The strategy is no different in statewide races. Those counties or areas that are
heavily Democratic or Republican will be bypassed; instead the candidates invest in
markets where a small movement in the numbers can make the difference between
winning and losing. In California, voter preferences in the Bay Area are too one-sided to
warrant an ad campaign and candidates for statewide office concentrate on the Central
Valley and the densely populated and more competitive southern California markets.
In addition to singling out particular locations, campaigns engage in a different
form of targeting designed to maximize the impact of advertising. For advertising to
“work,” the audience must include adults who intend to vote. Clearly, advertising on
children’s programs would be meaningless, and advertising on MTV would be just as
irrational given the low rate of turnout among youth. Ideally, the ad would air in a
program that draws likely voters. Local news, a form of programming that has enjoyed
steady increases in viewership, provides just such an audience -- people sufficiently
motivated to watch the news are also likely to vote. The first half of the local newscast is
thus a prime location for campaign advertising; the audience is tuning in to the top stories
of the day and their attention has yet to wander. Campaigns also rely heavily on “news
adjacencies” or time slots just before or just after a local newscast. In some battleground
states, the most desirable advertising slots (during local newscasts in particular) are
booked 90 days in advance. Residents of Michigan or Wisconsin, at least those who
watch television regularly, are exposed to the same ad so frequently that they can recite
the text in their sleep!
One other overarching factor affects candidates’ use of advertising -- the state of
the campaign budget. Advertising is the single-largest expenditure in most major
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campaigns. A single airing of a thirty-second commercial during a 6 p.m. newscast in the
two biggest television markets (New York City and Los Angeles) will cost approximately
7,000 dollars. In contrast, candidates can run the ad ten different times for that amount in
Las Vegas, and more than twenty times in South Dakota or Montana (Advertising Guide,
2004). Thus, allocating resources into ad campaigns depends not only on geography
(targeting battleground states) but also on cost considerations. Residents of smaller
media markets are likely to receive greater amounts of advertising simply because
candidates get more for their advertising dollar.
Given the cost, campaigns attempt to reach as many likely voters as possible with
each of their ads. The basic unit of exposure to advertising is the gross rating point.67
GRPs are scored to reflect the percentage of the media market that is exposed to the ad.
Buying 100 GRPs for an ad, for instance, would mean one exposure for each viewer;
1000 GRPs would mean that viewers would see the ad ten times. In recent years, with
increased diffusion of cable and satellite channels, consultants have been forced to ratchet
up their ad buys to fight channel and advertising “clutter.” In the 1990s, for instance,
running a single ad five times was considered the norm. Today, an ad is likely to air ten
times (Farhi, 2004).
Ad buying is more art form than science. Depending on the ad, the stage of the
campaign, and the scale of the budget, buyers might opt for the same level of GRPs
throughout the campaign or, more likely, vary their buys to synchronize exposure to the
ad campaign with the level of news coverage. The expectation is that candidates get
67
A GRP is defined as the sum of all Nielsen rating points (1 Nielsen point is
approximately 1 percent of the media market in which the ad airs) for the programs in
which the ad was placed.
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more bang for their advertising buck when the campaign is in the news. This logic also
influences the content of advertising. When some particular issue or event grabs the
headlines, the candidates tend to incorporate that issue into their ads. In the 2001 and
2002 election cycles, the most popular spokesperson for Republican candidates across the
country was New York City Mayor Rudy Guiliani.
Planting the Seed: Early Stage Advertising
Early in the campaign, advertising introduces the candidate to the electorate.
Biographical spots focus on the candidate’s personal background and record of public
service. Military service is especially noteworthy as an indicator of fitness for office.
For candidates who cannot claim to have risked their lives for the nation, alternative
“qualifications” include humble beginnings, their ability to overcome adversity, strong
family ties, and adherence to a core set of political principles. By focusing on personal
virtues, campaigns attempt to instill confidence in the candidate’s suitability for public
office.
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In non-presidential races, where candidates might be unknown to voters, the first
goal of the ad campaign is more mundane, namely, a boost in the candidate’s name
recognition. In some cases, biographical spots focus specifically on the candidate’s
name. Ed Zschau and Wyche Fowler, both little-known candidates for the US Senate in
1986, opened their campaigns with ads that simply explained the correct pronunciation of
his name. In politics, familiarity is a necessary condition of electability; voters are
disinclined to vote for a name they do not recognize.
Image vs. Issue Spots
Once they have provided voters with a snapshot of their lives, candidates move on
to their credentials. “Image” ads maintain thematic continuity with the biographical
message by presenting the candidate as a likeable human being with a strong sense of
public service. “Issue” ads are more substantive and either focus on the candidate’s past
experience and record in public life, or outline the candidate’s positions on major policy
issues.
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The relative importance of image and issue advertising depends on the electoral
context. In 1984, the Cold War had ended and voters felt secure on the economic front.
This atmosphere of political tranquility was captured by the Reagan campaign in what is
generally considered the classic image ad. Labeled “Morning in America,” the ad listed
President Reagan’s accomplishments against a background of idyllic rural landscapes and
smiling children. Four years later, Vice-President Bush aired a textbook example of an
issue ad, calling into question Governor Dukakis’ credentials on the issue of national
defense.
When voters are concerned about the state of the country, both incumbents and
challengers turn to issue ads. As President Bush Sr. found out in 1992, voters worried
about losing their jobs were relatively forgiving of a challenger with questionable
personal attributes; they made their choices based more on questions of performance.
“Slick Willie” was not as relevant as “It’s the economy stupid”
From the beginning of advertising, image ads have inevitably portrayed the
candidate as a “man of the people.” American voters do not take kindly to millionaire
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candidates from privileged backgrounds. The focus on the common touch is ironic; most
presidential candidates are members of a distinctly elite group with appropriate prep
school and Ivy League credentials. One of President George H. Bush’s greatest liabilities
during the 1992 campaign was that he personified the gulf between the well-to-do and
middle class America. In a well circulated story, the President was said to have
expressed his delight with the advanced technology of price scanners at a local
supermarket, thus revealing his utter unfamiliarity with grocery store shopping.68
Issue ads fall into two broad classes -- performance messages touting the
sponsoring candidate’s experience and proven accomplishments as a public servant, and
policy messages summarizing the candidate’s preferences on public policy. Campaigns
featuring an incumbent will invariably gravitate to performance themes. In presidential
and gubernatorial contests, voters habitually frame the choice as a referendum on the
performance of the incumbent. Challengers broadcast ads suggesting that the incumbent
has weakened the economy, or that the Administration has done nothing to make the
world more secure from terrorism. Conversely, incumbents are quick to take credit for
economic growth, balanced budgets, reductions in crime, or other such indicators of
effective governance.
68
After the campaign, the story was exposed as Democratic spin; no such event occurred.
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The Principle of Issue Ownership
Policy advertising follows a simple formula -- highlight the candidate’s positions,
but focus only on issues where your candidate is favored. There are two specific
implications to this directive. First, do not publicize your support for unpopular or
controversial positions (that task will be taken up by your opponent). Second, single out
issues on which you and more importantly your party are seen as more likely to provide
relief. In sum, campaign advertising features “owned issues.”
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Issue ownership is a by-product of American political culture. Long before they
reach voting-age, most Americans are socialized to associate each party with a set of
interests and, by inference, with a set of issues or problems on which they will deliver
(Iyengar, Valentino, Ansolabehere, & Simon, 1997; Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, &
Hansen, 2003). In general, “Republican-owned” issues include national security,
defense, and the conduct of foreign affairs. That is, the public typically acknowledges
that Republicans are better able to deal with these issues than Democrats. Conversely,
voters favor Democrats on most “quality of life” issues including job and income
security, healthcare, and social welfare. Of course, there are other issues, e.g., balancing
the budget and strengthening the public schools, on which the public rates the two parties
evenly.
How did voters rate the parties on the salient issues in 2004? In California, a
recent poll (see Figure 6.3) showed that Republicans owned terrorism, the Democrats
were preferred on healthcare, but neither party could claim ownership over the economy.
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The Bush campaign in 2004 attempted to capitalize on their reputation by making
the war on terrorism the centerpiece of the campaign. The first round of Republican ads,
released on March 5, made frequent references to September 11 and terrorist threats.
Later in the campaign, the Bush team produced “Wolves,” an ad that attacked Senator
Kerry as being weak on defense. Interestingly, this ad borrowed heavily from “Bear in
the Woods,” President Reagan’s 1984 ad promoting a strong military posture vis-à-vis
the Soviet Union. For their part, the Kerry campaign followed the standard Democratic
script and promoted Kerry’s positions on job loss and healthcare while attacking Bush as
a stooge of the wealthy.
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The principle of issue ownership extends to attributes of the candidate other than
party affiliation. Gender is an especially visible attribute, and American culture provides
ample cues about the traits of males and females. Given these widely-held gender
stereotypes, men and women candidates have reason to project their masculinity and
femininity respectively. “Masculine” issues such as defense, terrorism or crime will
resonate well for a male candidate, whereas child care and matters of educational policy
will confirm voters’ beliefs about the credentials of a woman candidate.
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In-between “owned” issues are policy areas in which neither party enjoys a
decisive advantage. These are “leased” issues on which parties can claim short-term
occupancy depending on the nature of the times or the track record of particular
candidates. The Bush Administration’s policy of pre-emption and the massive
intelligence failure on which the policy rested provided Kerry with the opportunity to
challenge on the issue of national security. Similarly, the Enron scandal and other
instances of corporate corruption allowed Democrats to exploit white collar crime. On
the other side, Governor Bush’s successful efforts to enact comprehensive school reform
in Texas and the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act during his first term as
president gave him sufficient credibility to contest the issue in 2004.
Although leased issues attract ads from both candidates, the principle of playing
to one’s strengths creates few opportunities for candidates to engage in a back-and-forth
exchange on issues. Advertising campaigns generally do not resemble a dialogue
between the competing candidates. Instead, they typically offer two essentially unrelated
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streams of messages. Candidates prefer to talk past each other in the hope of promoting
their comparative advantages (Simon, 2002).
There is one notable exception to this pattern. The frequent use of negative
advertising means that the spiral of attack-counterattack is a typical outcome of ad
campaigns. Before we discuss negative advertising, however, we take up a further
iteration of the strategy of agenda control.
Wedge Appeals; Us versus Them
Assume the following scenario. As the traditional kickoff of the 2004 fall
campaign approached, the economy remained stagnant, the federal budget deficit had
ballooned and American troops died every day in Iraq. Obviously, this state of affairs
would have represented a serious liability for President Bush. Boxed in by the war on
one side and the domestic economy on the other, the only way out would be for his
campaign to introduce so-called wedge issues into campaign discourse. Wedge issues are
designed to pit groups against each other, for the candidate to appeal to voters’ sense of
group identity. When candidates turn to wedge appeals, it is generally a tacit
acknowledgment that they are losing the debate on generic issues.
Race and ethnicity constitute the single most powerful group cleavage in
American politics. From the Civil War through the passage of landmark civil rights
legislation in the 1960s to current debates over affirmative action and reparations,
Americans have divided by race. One set of wedge appeals seeks to capitalize on this
racial division. Typically, the strategy is used by Republican candidates, who hope to
attract white Democrats and independents on the basis of their opposition to race-based
policies such as affirmative action in employment and diversity credits in college
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admissions.69
In recent years, the emergence of immigration-related issues has injected a
parallel Latino vs. Anglo divide into campaigns. In this case, the strategy is for
candidates to position themselves as opponents of immigration. When California
Governor Wilson ran an ad (see Media Insert 6.10 below) that began with the line “They
keep coming,” most Californians immediately understood what he meant. In short,
wedge appeals based on race or ethnicity are aimed at capturing white votes by depicting
the candidate as taking a stand against the threatening demands of blacks or Hispanics.
The appeal is either explicit -- as in the case of immigration or affirmative action -- or
implicit, as in the case of crime, drug abuse, or “law and order.”
Cultural identity or “family values” provides an alternative basis for dividing
voters. Initially introduced by President Nixon in 1968 as an appeal to conservative
southern Democrats, based on Republican opposition to school busing, the slogan has
since been broadened into a codeword for general conservatism and opposition to nonmainstream
lifestyles. A call for family values is generally interpreted as opposition to
abortion, feminism, gay rights, and sex education in the public schools. For President
Bush, the values theme represented a clear advantage in 2004. In February 2004, the
decision by the Mayor of San Francisco to issue same sex marriage licenses attracted
considerable media attention across the country. It was not coincidental that the
Republican-controlled Senate took up the proposed constitutional amendment banning
same-sex marriage (framed by Republicans as the amendment to “save traditional
marriage”) two weeks before the Democratic Convention. They hoped to elevate values
69
Since there are more Democrats than Republicans in the national electorate, and the
Democrats have traditionally enjoyed near-unanimous backing from the AfricanAmerican
community, the incentive to use wedge appeals based on race is especially
enticing for Republican candidates.
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as a criterion for differentiating between Kerry and Bush. Conservative groups placed
measures banning same sex marriage on the November ballot in eleven states (including
the key battleground states of Ohio and Oregon).70
Moral issues became a battle cry for
conservative Republicans, many of them Evangelical Christians. In fact, the response
“moral issues” was checked as the “most important issue” in the 2004 exit poll by over
20 percent of voters. This group voted for President Bush by a 4:1 margin.
Explicit appeals to wedge issues occurred in both the 1996 (illegal immigration)
and 1988 (crime) presidential campaigns. Given the one-sided nature of the 1996
election, it is unlikely that Senator Dole’s attempts to run on the immigration issue had
any role in the outcome. In August 1988, however, the airing of the notorious “Willie
Horton” ad, attacking Michael Dukakis for his support of prison furlough programs was
thought to have played a major role in the Bush campaign’s ability to overcome what was
then a double-digit deficit in the polls.
70
It is too early to tell whether these ballot measures had any impact on the presidential
vote. All eleven measures passed, however, suggesting that the median voter is to the
right of the center on issues involving gay rights.
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Although recent presidential campaigns have steered clear of race-based wedge
appeals, the same cannot be said of candidates for statewide office. In 1990,
Conservative Republican Senator Jesse Helms was locked in a close race with Democrat
Harvey Gantt (the African-American Mayor of Charlotte). During the closing days of the
race, Helms released an ad opposing the use of affirmative action in employment
decisions. This “white hands” ad is credited with producing a significant surge in white
support for Helms. Eight years later, the tables were turned. Opponents of Proposition
209, a measure to end affirmative action California, aired an ad featuring David Duke, a
well-known member of the Ku Klux Klan, in the hope that the negative imagery of
hooded Klansmen and cross burnings would weaken moderate whites’ support for the
measure. The strategy failed and Proposition 209 passed easily.
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