THE YUPPIE STRATEGY CHAPTER FIVE THE YUPPIE STRATEGY LIKE EVERY OTHER SOCIAL GROUP to rise to fleeting prominence, the yuppies were as much invented as discovered. The term was first employed in the press for the modest purpose of explaining Gary Hart's unexpected success in the 1984 presidential primaries. Someone had voted for him, someone young, urban, and professional, and there was brief hope that this new grouping would provide the Democrats with a much-needed new constituency. But what started as a neutral demographic category evolved with alarming speed into a social slur. Four years after their "discovery," Hendrik Hertzberg wrote in Esquire-. Yuppie is now understood almost universally as a term of abuse... . "You're a yuppie" is taken to mean not "you're a young urban professional" but rather "you have lousy values." Yuppie is a hybrid category—a mixture of age, address, and class. Other social classes are, in the middle-class imagination, age groups too: the poor as children, blue-collar workers as stern though somewhat pitiable fathers. But yuppies were by definition young adults, and thus subject to the moral judgments that older and more established people routinely pass on the young. From one angle, yuppies were the good children so sorely missed by neoconservatives like Midge Decter in the sixties and early seventies. They did not waste time "finding themselves" or joining radical movements. They plunged directly into the economic mainstream, earning and spending with equal zest. To Newsweek, the yuppie eagerness to "go for it" was a healthy sign of the "yuppie virtues of imagination, daring and entrepreneur ship." But they were also the very worst children, the apotheosis of middle-class forebodings about the corrupting effects of affluence. No one hurled the still-potent diagnosis of permissiveness at them, perhaps because by the eighties the word referred to so much more than childraising practices. Yet here they were, displaying that dread trait customarily assigned to the poor—"inability to defer gratification"—and even the desperate "orality" Oscar Lewis had once detected in the culture of poverty. Yuppies did not devote their youth to "that patient overcoming and hard-won new attainment" that Decter had endorsed as the prerequisite to adult middle-class life. They did not study; they "networked." They did not save; they spent. And they did not spend on houses or station wagons, but on Rolex watches, Porsches, quick trips to Aruba, and, most notoriously, high-status foods. In its "Year of the Yuppie" cover story, Newsweek found them on "a new plane of consciousness, a state of Transcendental Acquisition." Yuppies, of course, did not turn out to be a new constituency for liberalism. Their "virtues" of entrepreneurs hip and acquisition made them for the most part conservatives, though not in the fervid, ideological style of the neoconservatives or the New Right. Yuppies thought of themselves as members of an elite whose interests might naturally collide with those of the lower classes: They lived in gentrified neighborhoods from which the unsightly poor had been freshly cleared; they worked for firms intent on minimizing the "labor costs" of blue- and pink-collar workers; their lifestyle was supported by the labor of poorly paid, often immigrant, service workers— housekeepers, restaurant employees, messengers, and delivery "boys." Although they parted company with the New Right on the social issues, such as abortion and women's rights, self-interest kept them reliably Republican. Yet, despite their political conservatism, everyone sensed 196 197 FEAR OF FALLING -] that the yuppies were somehow connected to that last period of youthful assertiveness, the sixties. Some commentators presented them as grown-up radicals, covertly bearing the heritage of the sixties into the corporate rat race of the eighties. It was possible in fact to have been a radical in the first decade and a self-centered hustler in the second, as Jerry Rubin's transformation from rebel to networking impresario illustrates. The very word yuppie had originally been coined in 1983 to describe Rubin's transition from a "yippie"—the acronym for the anarch o-hippie Youth International Party organized by Rubin and Abbie Hoffman—to prototypical young urban professional. Newsweek saw yuppies as the "vanguard of the baby-boom generation," which had "marched through the '60s" and was now "speeding] toward the airport, advancing on the 1980s in the back seat of a limousine." Actually, the stereotypical yuppie, who was about thirty in 1984, was more likely to have spent the sixties bicycling around the neighborhood than marching on Washington. With equal disregard for the normal length of generations, yuppies were sometimes presented as the rebellious children of sixties radicals, who, in a stunning reprisal, were now horrifying their parents with their self-centeredness and political conservatism. Actor Michael J. Fox, the only yuppie actually pictured in Esquire's "Days of Wine and Sushi" cover story, can ordinarily be found in a sitcom whose single sustaining joke is the clash between Fox and his gentle, sensitive, sixties-generation parents. What yippies and yuppies did share was their class. Despite the frequent confusion of yuppies and baby-boomers in general, yuppies—defined by lifestyle and income—made up only about 5 percent of their generation. They were exemplars not of their generation but of their class, the same professional middle class that had produced the student rebels. Like the sixties rebels, the yuppies were at the cutting edge of their class, a kind of avant-garde, charting a new direction and , agenda. They were also, in their own way, rebels. Both radicals and yuppies rejected the long, traditional path to middle-class success, but the defining zeal of the yuppies was to join an- \ other class—the rich. THE YUPPIE STRATEGY The actual number of demographically official yuppies— people born between 1945 and 1959, earning over $40,000 a year in a professional or managerial occupation, and living in urban areas—was only about 1.5 million, hardly enough to warrant excitement. If yuppies were further defined as greedy, shallow people prone to burble about the joys of real estate investment, like those depicted in Newsioeek's cover story, then, as a commentator in the New Republic observed, there were probably no more than 113 of them nationwide. But there was certainly a yuppie style of work and consumption, as well as what could be called a yuppie strategy for success, and these embraced, to a greater or lesser extent, many thousands of middle-class people beyond the demographic category. Here I will use yuppie in a loose, rather than demographically precise, sense, for someone who adopted the strategy and more or less fit the style. Hardly anyone, of course, deserves to bear the full burden of the stereotype. But even the stereotype plays an important role in our chronicle of emerging class awareness. With the image of the yuppie, the normally invisible, normally "normal" middle class finally emerged in the mass media as a distinct group with its own ambitions, habitats, and tastes in food and running gear. The class usually privileged to do the discovering and naming of classes had itself been discovered by the media and, with scant respect for its dignity, named with a diminutive that rhymes with puppy. Of course, those who followed the yuppie strategy did not represent all of their class. They were a select segment, just as the right's version of the New Class had been a selected subset of the larger professional middle class. In fact, the two groups —yuppie and New Class—are, technically speaking, complementary. The New Class, as defined by the neoconservatives, was that part of the professional middle class that finds an occupational home in the media, in the public sector, and in the nonprofit world exemplified by the university, the foundation, the social-welfare agency. And the New Class, by the right's definition, was solidly and unrepentently liberal. The yuppies, on the other hand, represented the more than 60 percent of the middle class that earns its living in the direct 198 199 FEAR OF FALLING THE YUPPIE STRATEGY service of corporate power, as executives, corporate lawyers, and other sorts of business-employed professionals, consultants, or brokers. They were the fulfillment of the neoconser-vatives' dream that "intellectuals," or at least members of the professional middle class, might abandon any remaining concerns for the lower classes and become the trusted courtiers of the corporate elite. But the very frivolity of yuppies—and hence of the very subject of yuppies—was a distraction from the deeper changes their appearance signaled. In the eighties, the class contours of American society were undergoing a seismic shift. The extremes of wealth and poverty moved further apart, and, as if stretched beyond the limit of safety, the ground in the middle began to tremble and crack. Whole occupational groups and subpopulations—farmers, steelworkers, single mothers— began to tumble toward the bottom. Other groups—lower-level white-collar employees, schoolteachers, even higher-status professionals and their families—found themselves scrambling to remain in place. In the confusion, only one group, outside of the very rich, seemed to have a clear strategy for success. And perhaps it was t because that strategy involved such a betrayal of traditional } middle-class values—such a wholesale surrender to the priorities of profit and the pleasures of consumerism—that the media turned so quickly against those who followed it. Implicit in the media's half-mocking, half-indulgent "discovery" , of yuppies was the incipiently liberal understanding that their I strategy might not, after all, be the way to go. THE POLARIZATION OF AMERICA It was possible, until the eighties, for a comfortable American to think of class as a form of cultural diversity, parallel to ethnicity or even "lifestyle." The emphasis had been on the culture of poverty, or of the supposedly parochial subculture of the working class. In the mass media, class often 200 appeared to be a way of life, even a set of optics adding color W and texture to an otherwise increasingly homogeneous Amer- / ica. In 1985, for example, a sidebar in U.S. News and World \Jj Report titled "Beatniks, Preppies, and Punkers: The Love Affair with Labels" juxtaposed, as "categories" of Americans, both faddists and economic groups: Valley Girls, 1981. .. fun-loving teens with materialistic values and their own style of dress (leg warmers, cut-out sweatshirts). .. Undeeclass, 1982 ... a part of the American population seemingly mired in poverty. Yuppies, 1984 .. . "young urban professionals" . .. [known for their] consumerist lifestyle. But there is another, much dryer and less judgmental way of thinking about class: as an index defined solely by money— who has it and who doesn't. In the 1980s, this grimmer view of class became harder tiian ever to avoid. Those who "had" had more than ever, and those who "had not" were more numerous, and more undeniably miserable, than at any time since poverty was "discovered." Sometime in the late sixties American society had begun to lurch off the track leading to the American dream of affluence and equality. So one could have known it at the time, but those were the last years in which economic inequality among Americans declined. Since then, in a sharp reversal of the equalizing trend that had been under way since shortly after World War II, the extremes of wealth have grown farther apart and the middle has lost ground. Some economists even began to predict that the middle class—defined simply as those with middling amounts of money—would disappear altogether, leaving America torn, like many third-world societies, between an affluent minority and an army of the desperately poor. There is still a "middle class" in the statistical sense. At least, a graph of income distribution still comes out as a bell-shaped curve, with most people hovering near the mean income rather than at either extreme. (If the middle range of 201 FEAR OF FALLING income actually disappeared, the curve would have two humps, rather than one smooth peak in the middle.) But in the last decade the curve has slumped toward the lower end and flattened a little on top, so that it begins to look less like a weathered hill and more like a beached whale. To the untrained eye, the shift is not alarming, but income-distribution curves do not change capriciously. Any change commands at- v tention. The change is evident no matter how you slice up the population—whether you compare the top fifth to the bottom fifth, or the top 40 percent to the poorest 40 percent—and whether you look at individual earnings, household earnings, or employ occult-sounding measures of inequality like the economists' "Gini coefficient." In 1985, for example, the top fifth of American families—those earning more than §48,000 a year—took in 43 percent of all family income, a postwar high. The bottom fifth—families earning less than $13,200 a year—got only 4.7 percent, their lowest share in twenty-five years. Families in a somewhat arbitrarily defined middle range ($15,000 to $35,000 a year) saw their share fall to 39 percent of total family income "' from 46 percent in 1970. According to the Census Bureau, the \ i income gap between the richest and the poorest families was wider in the mid-eighties than at any time since the bureau began keeping statistics in 1946. The widening gap between the extremes was in no small part the result of the conscious efforts of the Reagan administration. At the same time that the administration sliced viciously away at social programs designed to help the down-and-out, it rewarded Reagan's constituency of wealth with a series of generous tax reductions. The combination of spending cuts for the poor and tax cuts for the rich produced a massive, government-induced upward redistribution of wealth. / Between 1980 and 1984 alone, the richest one-fifth of Ameri- / can families gained $25 billion in income and the poorest one- // fifth lost $6 billion. /; Meanwhile, income at the extremes was also diverging. The poor faced wages held down by that miserly standard, the minimum wage, which remained, throughout most of the 202 THE YUPPIE STRATEGY " eighties, at $3.35 an hour, or $6,900 a year—more than $4,000 [ less than what the federal government defined as the poverty I level for a family of four. In early .1988,) t/.S. News and World Report, which had once questioned the very existence | of "poverty" in the United States, acknowledged that there * were now 9 million working American adults whose wages ;| were not sufficient to lift them and their families above the i poverty level: % | They are people like Glen Whitbeck, a short-order cook j whose $8000 annual salary doesn't stretch to cover his two 1 little girls' medical bills. Or like Charlie Scott, a construction i worker whose money woes forced him and his wife into a | shelter and then, most recently, provoked a separation. Or | Pamela Kelley, a onetime airline-passenger screener who % shifted to canned food at home because pot roast was too expensive for her and her two-year-old daughter. I As if rubbing its eyes in disbelief, U.S. News noted that the I poor of the eighties did not fit the stereotype defined by } the culture of poverty and the ideologues of the New Right. ;l The concept of the poor as "shiftless, black urban males un- s able to hold jobs, or as inner-city mothers on welfare whose \ sole work experience is the repeated bearing and raising of i illegitimate children," the magazine admitted, was "woefully ■I overblown." 1 At the other extreme, where wages are known more ele- 1 gandy as "compensation," there is of course no parallel to the minimum wage—no "maximum wage" to contain the greed of the already rich. In the eighties, while the median income of American families actually declined, the compensation of top executives rose dizzily. In 1986, top executives earned an average of $679,000 a year, up 9 percent from the year before. Executive incomes over $1 million (from salary and bonuses) ;; became routine; only incomes over $10 million raised eye-!; brows. Reporting on then-chairman of NCR Inc. William S. : | Anderson's annual compensation of $13,229,000, the New York '' \ Times noted dryly: 1 I FEAR OF FALLING The kind of salary reported for Mr. Anderson brings out strong feelings in those who believe that the men at the top of the corporate pinnacle are wildly overpaid, members of an elite that pretty much sets its own pay. In this decade of political reaction, no conscience, no shame, or, more likely, no fear of the have-nots seemed to restrain the ultra-rich. Consider this society-page description of a party thrown by Malcolm Forbes of Forbes magazine ("The Capitalist Tool") in May 1987: Mr. Forbes' latest Highland fling (the Forbes clan hails from Scotland) included a regiment of 140 tartan-clad bagpipers and drummers marching through simulated mist. There were baronial Scottish stage sets whipped up by a designer of opera sets. There were 11-foot-tall flower arrangements dense with onopordon thistle, Grucci fireworks, laser beams, and, as party favors, copies of "The Sayings of Chairman Malcolm" for the lads and inscribed Revere bowls from Tiffany for the lasses .... Once there, the guests, seated at 106 tables, supped on a meal whose raw materials included 24 hams, 700 baby pheasants, 100 pounds of foie gras, 400 pounds of haricots verts, 1,500 pounds of Scotch salmon, 24 legs of lamb, 60 country pates, 3,000 artichokes, 720 pints of raspberries and strawberries, 150 quarts of cream and 15 gallons of butterscotch sauce. .. . The Forbeses also let them eat "celebration cake" and "capitalist cookies." No one could any longer imagine that America was the land / of one vast, undifferentiated middle class. In cities like Los Angeles and New York, the contrasts in wealth and poverty scandalized European visitors: high-rise buildings where two-bedroom apartments cost more to rent than most Americans earn in a month, while at street level, makeshift cardboard structures sheltered the homeless. The streets carried fleets of stretch limos, their windows discreetly shaded to frustrate the curious, while on the sidewalk, beggars of all ages searched trash cans for edible crusts; breakdancers performed for quar- 204 THE YUPPIE STRATEGY ters; hawkers sold ballpoint pens, watches, used clothing, old magazines, drugs. While these lurid, distinctly un-American images came to characterize the extremes of wealth and poverty, no less dramatic changes were taking place in the middle range of income. For one thing, a middle-level income no longer guaranteed such perquisites of middle-class status as home ownership. According to the National Association of Home-builders, in 1984 a family needed an income-of approximately $37,000 to afford a median-priced home, but in the same year the median family income was only $26,167—almost $11,000 short. That gap marked a sharp deterioration in the prospects of middle-income, mostly working-class people. According to economists Frank S. Levy and Richard Michel, a typical wage-earner in the 1950s faced housing costs equivalent to about 14 percent of his gross monthly pay. In 1984, however, a thirty-year-old man who purchased a median-priced home had to set aside a staggering^ 44 percent of his income for carrying charges. For the first time in postwar America, a middle-level income no longer guaranteed what we have come to think of as a middle-class lifestyle. But the big news was that the "middle class," or more precisely, the middle range of income, was becoming ever more sparsely inhabited. If the middle range was defined as lying between family incomes of $20,000 and $50,000, the fraction of families with middle-range incomes declined from 53 percent in 1973 to less than 48 percent in 1984. Some people were climbing out and up, but others were sinking down toward the bottom.* * At this point, there does not seem to be a consensus as to whether more people moved downward from the middle range of income, or upward. Different studies offer different answers. Economist Stephen J. Rose reported in 1983 that three-fourths of those leaving the middle-income range in the late seventies and early eighties suffered decline. Likewise, economist Katherine L. Bradbury, studying middle-income shrinkage from 1979 to 1984, found most of those leaving the middle class heading downward. However, a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics study covering middle-class shrinkage between 1969 and 1986 found that, in that seventeen-year period, "most of the decline in the proportion of families in the middle has gone to the upper class, not the lower." 205 1 FEAR OF FALLING Many arbitrary factors determined whether a given family ) moved up or down: Had they purchased a house before the \ real estate boom of the seventies? Had they refrained from having too many children? Were they able to get help from their parents? By and large, though, the new cleavage in the middle range of income followed familiar class lines. The blue-collar working class was skidding downward, while the professional middle class was holding its own or gaining ; ground: In 1987 the median income for men with five or more years of higher education was $34,731, and that for women with the same education was $26,399—or $61,130 for a couple. A high-school-educated working-class couple earned a total of $36,888, more than a third less. | The phrase the disappearing middle class, which I, among others, used to describe the enormous changes of the eighties, in some ways missed the point. It was the blue-collar working class that was "disappearing," at least from the middle range of comfort. In the New Right's imagination the working class was a precious avatar of "traditional values," a human bulwark against permissiveness. But to the business interests that ; commanded the New Right's deepest loyalties, the American blue-collar working class—with its once-strong unions and real tradition of workplace defiance—had become a burden. Beginning in the seventies, the corporate elite did everything possible to shake this burden loose. They "out-sourced" their manufacturing jobs to the lower-paid and more intimi- : dated work force of the third world. They shifted their capital from manufacturing to the quick-profit realm of financial spec- ^A