31
Chapter Four
MAJOR SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR
COMPOSITION
Myriad individuals, institutions, and organizations play important
foreign policy roles in Iran. For issues of security policy—the focus of
this report—several organizations are particularly important, including
the intelligence services, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) and the paramilitary militia known as the Basij, and the regular
armed forces, or Artesh.
Recognizing the role of the Iranian armed forces and security services
is critical to understanding Iran’s security policy. These institutions
will respond to the challenges of the 21st century, be it the
return of Iraq as a major regional power, a powerful Turkish-Israeli
axis, possible domestic turmoil in the southern Gulf states, a meltdown
in Afghanistan, or other core concerns. Moreover, they must
do so with a relatively limited budget (of at most $5 billion a year),
inferior military equipment (relative to that of other regional powers),
and a divided political elite whose only priority and goal might
be survival. These organizations, their relative power, and their institutional
biases are discussed below.
THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
Iran’s intelligence services play an active role in its foreign policy,
particularly with regard to efforts to suppress Iranian dissidents and
to support coreligionists abroad. Open information on Iran’s leading
intelligence organization, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security
32 Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era
(MOIS), is extremely limited—this report offers at best a limited description
of the MOIS’s goals and actions.
Many MOIS functions are tied to defending the regime and ensuring
the strength of the government, and to protecting Iran’s interests
abroad. Under the constitution, the MOIS gathers and assesses information
and, more important, acts against conspiracies endangering
the Islamic Republic. The MOIS, controlled by Khatami’s allies,
has steadily purged hard-liners since Khatami’s election in 1997.1
IRAN’S TWO MILITARIES
Iran’s military forces are the heart of Iran’s security institutions. The
Islamic Republic began its life with two, often competing, military
forces, which maintain their separate existences to this day.
Iran’s regular military, the Artesh, stood aside during the revolutionary
turmoil that overwhelmed the Shah.2 The officer corps soon was
decimated through desertion, forced retirement, and execution at
the hands of the overzealous revolutionary courts.3 Before long,
Iran’s new political masters set about changing many of the organizational
structures of the regular armed forces. The regime implemented
a massive campaign of Islamization of the armed forces,
conducted through the newly established Ideological-political
Directorate. Although this did not instill revolutionary ardor into the
Artesh, it did stamp out any potential counterrevolutionary
sentiment and ensured that the armed forces remained responsible
to the political leadership. Despite having cowed the Artesh, the
clerical regime felt the need to create is own armed forces to ensure
internal stability and, over time, act as a major force in the war with
______________
1Gasiorowski, “The Power Struggle in Iran.”
2While the Imperial armed forces of the Shah were highly trained and enjoyed the
benefits of a motivated, professional, and loyal officer corps, the bulk of the army consisted
of a conscripted force that had little interest in defending the Pahlavi regime
against internal enemies. So, when the crunch came and the revolution gathered
pace, the soldiers were on the street, but their commanders were always in doubt
about their loyalty. For a fascinating account, see General Robert E. Huyser, Mission to
Tehran (London: Andre Deutsch, 1986).
3Buchta estimates that 45 percent of Iran’s officer corps was purged between 1980 and
1986. Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 68.
Major Security Institutions and Their Composition 33
Iraq. The result was two militaries, the regular military and the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Sepah-e Pasdaran.
The Emergence of an Islamized Military
From the start, the link between internal security and the armed
forces was tight. The Artesh did not pose a serious challenge to the
new order (relegating such events as the Nowjeh air force coup attempt
of July 1980 to a historical footnote). The challenge, when it
did come, was from leftist groups and ethnic uprisings, particularly
the Kurds but also the Turkomans, the Baluchi, and some Azeris.4
This challenge spawned the IRGC, which is today one of the main security
pillars of the Islamic Republic. The IRGC began as a modest
force of about 10,000 men dedicated to returning order to the country,
dampening counterrevolutionary trends among the regular
armed forces, and countering the growing influence of largely leftist
revolutionary armed groups such as the Fedayeen, Mujahedin-e
Khalq Organization (MKO), Peykar, Komleh, Kurdish Peshmerga, and
so on. Although it is almost impossible to be precise, the Fedayeen
and the MKO may have had as many as 10,000 fully armed volunteers
each. So, the IRGC at its inception was not a dominant military
force. Indeed, many of its initial activities had more to do with
guarding key personnel of the new regime and with keeping public
order than with fighting to defend the new order. Its size, power, and
influence steadily expanded as the regime tried to consolidate its
power.5
The Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 forced Iran’s political
and military leadership to face up to the command and structural
problems of having two very different armed forces existing in parallel.
The war, more than any other event, placed the structuring of the
Iranian armed forces and the state’s coercive machinery on the national
agenda.
______________
4Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1995).
5Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (London:
I.B. Tauris, 1985).
34 Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era
One direct impact of the war was to force the regime to reorganize
the IRGC into proper military units, which was accomplished by late
1981.6 Another direct by-product of the war was the rapid expansion
of the IRGC from 10,000 troops in 1980 to around 50,000 by the beginning
of 1982.7 The force as a whole experienced dramatic expansion
throughout the war years, from 150,000 in 1983, to 250,000 in
1985, and to 450,000 in 1987.
A third, structural change introduced in the early 1980s was the creation
of an Operational Area Command (in 1982) and a joint
Command Council, which brought the commanders of the IRGC in
direct and regular contact with their counterparts in the regular
armed forces. By now, the IRGC also enjoyed representation and an
influential voice in the highest military decisionmaking body, the
Supreme Defense Council.
While the regular armed forces had suffered numerous purges and
forced retirements in the 1980s, the IRGC flourished under a group of
commanders who not only had very close links with the clerical
establishment but were also closely allied with one another. The relationships
among these key individuals—Mohsen Rafiqdoust,
Mohsen Rezai, Yahya Rahim Safavi, Ali Shamkhani, and Alireza
Afshar—were reinforced by a low circulation of senior personnel
in the IRGC in the 1980s, ensuring that the IRGC could pursue its interests
coherently and systematically.8 These individuals have continued
their relationships as they have gone on to other important
economic and political positions in the Islamic Republic. Such continuity
in leadership also allowed the IRGC’s main strategists to be
permanently present at the highest levels in both governmental and
clerical circles, giving the IRGC the capacity to carve a niche for itself
as not just the defender of the revolutionary order but also a
guardian of the Islamic state’s borders and territory. In contrast,
regular army officials remained stigmatized by their association with
the Shah and their lack of revolutionary credentials.
______________
6Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War—
Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).
7International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (various years);
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Middle East Military Balance (various years).
8Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (London: Routledge, 1988).
Major Security Institutions and Their Composition 35
In the early 1980s, elements from the new leadership of the Artesh
pushed for the professionalization of the IRGC and for closer command
structures with this force. Senior officers, such as thencolonels
Ali Shirazi (who later became Ayatollah Khomeini’s representative
on the Supreme Defense Council) and Qasemali Zahirnejad
(later to become Chief of Staff), were among those arguing in favor of
the mechanization of the IRGC and closer integration of logistical
and support systems of the two forces.9
The moves to rationalize the military structures and command systems
continued throughout the 1980s, partly as a response to the
growing importance of the IRGC in the war and partly due to the
regular armed forces’ desire to transform the IRGC into a more professional
fighting machine. In the early days of the fighting, the
Artesh assumed the lion’s share of the burden for the war. Over time,
the IRGC’s role in the new order became so significant that it was
given a whole new administrative machinery, its own ministry, in
1982, with Mohsen Rafiqdoust as its first minister. This IRGC Ministry
mirrored the Defense Ministry, and the IRGC, by virtue of having
a ministry, acquired a powerful voice at the cabinet table and in
other central governmental agencies. The evolution of the IRGC into
a full fighting machine was completed fewer than three years later, in
1985, when, on a direct order from Ayatollah Khomeini, the IRGC
was given the task of setting up its own army, navy, and air force
units. It was also given control over Iran’s surface-to-surface missile
(SSM) force and right of first refusal on Iran’s increasingly scarce
military hardware, which includes Iraqi armor now being acquired at
the front.10 The IRGC also forged its own military-to-military ties to
a number of Iran’s allies, including Syria, Pakistan, and the Sudan.11
The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War
The war with Iraq left a strong imprint on Iranian defense thinking,
even among the clerical elite. The war cost between 350,000 and
400,000 Iranian lives, and the two countries have still not signed a
______________
9Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War.
10Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris,
1988).
11Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 68.
36 Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era
peace treaty ending the conflict. The failure of Iran to translate its
ideological fervor into military success undermined the idea that
military power counted for little, that professional military forces
were unnecessary, that revolutionary ardor mattered more than
professionalism, and that military hardware was unimportant. The
war underscored the importance of access to technology, professional
competence, regular exercises, and deterrence.
The war also made self-reliance in defense a cardinal goal. The war
saw the end of the supply of arms from the United States and the
need to shift from Western to Eastern suppliers for the air force. Iran
also built up its domestic defense industries. In addition, the lack of
spares for U.S.-supplied aircraft, together with the initiation of missile
attacks by Iraq from 1983, culminating in the 1988 “war of the
cities,” saw a shift to missiles instead of aircraft.
IRAN’S MILITARY FORCES AFTER THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR
After the end of the war, and particularly after the election victory of
President Rafsanjani in 1989, a major overhaul of the Iranian security
establishment began. Rafsanjani took steps to rationalize the regular
armed forces.12 At the same time, the process of professionalization
and institutionalization of the IRGC began. Thus, between August
1988 and September 1988, the IRGC’s ground forces were reorganized
into 21 infantry divisions, 15 independent infantry brigades, 21
air defense brigades, three engineering divisions, and 42 armored, artillery,
and chemical defense brigades. The IRGC was given new
uniforms, and, in September 1991, 21 new military ranks (divided
along four categories of soldiers, fighters, officers, and commandants)
were created, from private to general.
______________
12The first steps of the reforms, however, were being taken even before the implementation
of the UN-brokered cease-fire in July 1988, as the creation in June 1988
of a joint Armed Forces General Staff illustrates. It was then that Ayatollah Khomeini
took the unusual step of placing Rafsanjani as the acting commander in chief.
A month later, Iran had accepted Security Council Resolution 598. Anoushiravan
Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge, 1995).
Major Security Institutions and Their Composition 37
Another step in the reform process was the establishment in 1989 of
an overhauled defense-related structure, to be known as the Ministry
of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This new ministry,
headed by Akbar Torkan, a civilian and a former head of the
defense industries establishment, effectively curtailed the institutional
autonomy of the IRGC and brought it under the overall defense
umbrella. With this act, the IRGC Ministry was scrapped, and
its command structures were brought within the new MODAFL.
Insofar as the new structure placed restrictions on the operational
autonomy of the IRGC, it was a victory for not only the pragmatists
over the revolutionaries, but also the Artesh. The next big step was
the expansion of the joint staff office, which was hastily created in
1988, into a more enduring structure. The new single office of the
joint chiefs of staff, the General Command of the Armed Forces Joint
Staffs, was set up in early 1992, headed by Hassan Firouzabadi, a
prominent IRGC figure.13 These structural reforms, accompanied by
major new arms procurements for the Artesh, also signaled the postKhomeini
leadership’s interest in allowing the power pendulum to
swing back toward the regular armed forces.
The Artesh’s power further grew in 1998 in response to the crisis in
Afghanistan. Khamene’i created the position of Supreme Commander
for the regular military, a position that the IRGC had but the
Artesh did not—its services reported separately rather than to one
individual. This increased both the efficiency and the bureaucratic
clout of the regular armed forces. The fact that Khamene’i issued
this directive also suggests that the revolutionary leadership’s suspicion
of the military had declined.14
Since these reforms were enacted, the defense establishment has
demonstrated the growing integration of its various elements
through regular military exercises, on land and offshore as well.
Units from the IRGC and the Artesh have been seen working quite
closely in these exercises, sharing command and systems. The
navies of the two institutions are better integrated than are their land
and air forces. Nevertheless, considerable problems remain. The
two militaries do not have a coherent way of dividing up arms Iran
______________
13Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 147.
14Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 147.
38 Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era
procures abroad or develops at home. Friction is acute in the ground
and air forces, and integration in these services is fitful at best.
THE BASIJ
Another element of the post-revolution Iranian defense establishment
is the Basij, the large and initially highly motivated group of
volunteers who were trained by the IRGC and who often made the
first wave of Iranian offensives against Iraq. In essence, the Basij had
two functions: first, to fight the domestic enemies of the revolution
as the regime’s urban shock troops; and second, to provide the large
pool of reservists for front-line operations against Iraq.
In the 1980s, the Basij was required to fulfill both these functions simultaneously.
During the war with Iraq, the Basij’s numbers fluctuated
between 100,000 and 500,000, depending on the regime’s war
needs, but its role and presence in military campaigns were never
questioned. Today, the Basij’s numbers stand at around 100,000, but
the Basij reserve force is estimated to be around 1 million—most of
whom have received some military training or served at the war
fronts in the 1980s.
The end of the war and the demobilization of hundreds of thousands
of young men, many of whom were volunteer Basij, caused an immediate
headache for the government. The question was how to appease
these dedicated supporters and meet their material needs
while also tackling the structural problems of the economy—which
required reducing subsidies and other measures that populist
regimes traditionally use to sustain key constituencies.
Two responses were adopted with vigor. One policy was to use the
Basij for nonmilitary national reconstruction work, particularly relevant
during the Rafsanjani administration’s first five-year development
plan, when much state investment concentrated on capital
projects, the improvement of the country’s infrastructure, and the
rebuilding of the war-damaged regions. Engaging the Basij with reconstruction
priorities provided the men with an income and a role
serving the revolution as well.
The second policy initiated direct Basij intervention in society. The
youth who had gathered around the Basij in the 1980s were mobi-
Major Security Institutions and Their Composition 39
lized in the 1990s as the principle force responsible for upholding
Islamic norms in society. Some Basij were enrolled in the Ansar-e
Velayat, a paramilitary group that helps the regime control major urban
areas. This was a rather convenient solution to a serious problem
facing the Islamic elite—how to reweave the Basij back into a
peacetime institutional framework cost effectively while also including
it in a core function of the Islamic state.
With each passing year, the Basij becomes less of a military factor, let
alone an active player. The Basij is now rarely seen as the third military
pillar, as it was during the Iran-Iraq war. The Artesh in particular
has little time for the Basij. Even the IRGC, which once relied heavily
on the Basij, no longer views it as important, largely because it does
not meet the IRGC’s level of professionalism. However, the IRGC still
encourages the Basij to participate in maneuvers and other limited
forms of cooperation.
Yet the Basij still seeks some external security role. The Basij leaders
derive a great deal of prestige and legitimacy from their role as a military
factor and clearly do not want to lose this status. Most Basij
leaders do not want to lose their revolutionary edge and are committed
to following the IRGC’s instructions on training and other operational
procedures. However, for Basij leaders, official positions are
much more important than military training. The relationship between
the IRGC and the Basij leadership is a close one, driven as it is
by family ties, political association, and war experience.
OTHER PARAMILITARY GROUPS AND SECURITY PLAYERS
Numerous other actors also play a role in formulating and implementing
Iran’s security policy. These include paramilitary groups,
parastatal organizations, and cultural organizations. Also important
are several religious leaders, including many not affiliated with the
regime, who have a significant following outside of Iran. A complete
listing of these groups is beyond the scope of this study. However,
several of the more important ones are noted below.
The Ansar-e Hezbollah is a paramilitary force of little or no military
value but useful for defending the revolutionary order against an
array of its critics. In essence, the Ansar is a response to the rapid
social liberalization that has been going on in the 1990s. The Ansar
40 Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era
members are the thugs upon whom the right relies to intimidate
society.
Factionalism, a constant feature of the republican regime, has
caused Iran’s top leaders to recruit their own armed guards, who
have in the past been deployed against rivals. The most public instances
of such deployments were those between Ayatollah
Khomeini and Ayatollah Shariatmadari in the early 1980s and between
Khomeini and Ayatollah Montazeri in the late 1980s.
The parastatal organizations, the bonyads, also play a role in foreign
policy.15 Many bonyad leaders have ties to the security institutions.
The archetypal example is the former head of the Bonyad-e
Mostazafan, Mohsen Rafiqdoust, who went from being Khomeini’s
driver to assuming a leading IRGC position before heading the
Bonyad-e Mostazafan. Huge sums are transferred from the bonyads,
particularly the Bonyad-e Mostazafan, to the Supreme Leader. This
gives him considerable autonomy and the ability to exercise policy
without support from other Iranian institutions. The bonyads at
times act without the formal support of all of Iran’s policy makers.
The Bonyad-e 15
th
Khordad established, and raised, the bounty on
Salman Rushdie, despite efforts by Khatami to annul the edict calling
for his death, effectively hindering Iran’s rapprochement with
Europe. Many Iranians believe that the bonyads provide support to
the Lebanese Hezballah, but hard evidence is lacking. In 1993, however,
Hezballah leaders claimed that the Jihad al-Binaa would provide
$8.7 million to repair houses damaged by Israeli strikes. The
Bonyad-e Shahid also provides stipends to families of martyrs.16
Various cultural and information agencies play an important role in
Iran’s foreign policy. Cultural bureaus acting out of embassies often
represent the Supreme Leader, placing their activities outside the
formal control of Iran’s Foreign Ministry. These institutions provide
financial support to friendly Muslim movements and proselytize.17
The Islamic Propagation Organization (IPO) also devotes some re-
______________
15The Jihad-e Sazandeghi (Reconstruction Crusade) is also technically part of the security
forces, as it is allowed, in emergencies, to apply force to ensure order in rural areas.
Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 65.
16Hala Jaber, Hezballah: Born with a Vengeance (London: Fourth Estate, 1997), p. 124.
17Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 50.
Major Security Institutions and Their Composition 41
sources to proselytizing and organizing supporters abroad, particularly
in Lebanon. The IPO, active in Europe, Pakistan, and India, appears
to have increased the level of its activities in recent years.
COMPARING THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
In general, the various institutions emphasize different issues, to
their mutual satisfaction, though in practice they overlap considerably
in their duties. The intelligence services and the IRGC are far
more focused on the defense of the revolution from its internal enemies
than is the Artesh. Often, in their view, this requires attacks on
dissidents abroad and coercive actions against Iranian citizens, both
of which have implications for Iranian foreign policy. The IRGC also
focuses on less traditional defense duties, particularly those that involve
unusual missions or capabilities. These duties range from
stopping smuggling and controlling Iran’s WMD (weapons of mass
destruction) and missile forces to preparing for closing the Straits of
Hormuz. In contrast, the Artesh focuses its efforts on more traditional
threats, such as an Iraqi attack.
These different missions affect the institutional ethos of the various
security institutions. The Artesh is content with a strategy of damage
limitation and risk minimization. The IRGC and the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS), in contrast, are more proactive and
interested in actively defending the republic’s interests and developing
their own niches.18
The institutions’ respective stars rise and fall according to their
match with Iran’s overall ambitions. When exporting the revolution
or countering internal enemies such as the MKO is deemed vital, the
MOIS’s and IRGC’s profiles rise. When economics, ethnicity, and
geopolitics dominate, the Artesh’s views become more important.
______________
18There is little sign that the IRGC’s internal security duties are hindering its conduct
of broader military operations. Of course, different bits of the IRGC are encouraged to
train for different types of operations. The potential danger is that they may not get
the appropriate training, etc., with regard to their particular operational activities and
parameters.
42 Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era
THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND IRAN’S
MILITARY POSTURE
In general, Iran’s limited economic resources and restrictions on its
purchases from abroad have prevented military officials from dramatically
improving Iran’s forces. As Table 4.1 makes clear, Iran has
not made a major drive to modernize its forces in the last decade,
and most of its force structure is aging. Iran’s military budget has
stayed relatively limited. Though Iran has made major purchases,
including T-72 tanks, MiG-29 fighters, and Kilo submarines, it has
not purchased these in large enough numbers to significantly alter
the regional military balance.
Table 4.1
Selected Iranian Military Order-of-Battle Information
1989/1990 1992 1997
Defense
expenditures
($ billion)
5.77 2.3 4.7
Total armed
forces
604,500 513,000 545,600
Main
battle tanks
(estimates)
Perhaps 500 total:
largely
T-54/-55; T-62;
some T-72;
Chieftain Mk3/5;
M-47/-48;
M-60A1
Perhaps 1,245 total:
including around 150
T-72; 190 T-54/-55;
260 Ch T-59; 150
T-62; 135 M-60A1; 135
M-47/-48
Some 1,345 total: including
400 T-54/-55
and T-59; 75 T-62;
480 T-72; 140
Chieftain Mk3/5;
150 M-47/-48;
100 M-60A1
Key naval
assets
3 destroyers;
5 frigates;
10 missile craft;
7 amphibious
2 Kilo submarines;
2 destroyers; 3 frigates;
10 missile craft; 8
amphibious
3 Kilo submarines;
3 frigates;
9 amphibious;
20 missile craft
Key air
assets
4 squadrons
F-4D/E;
4 squadrons
F-5E/F;
1 squadron with
15 F-14
4 squadrons F-4D/E; 4
squadrons F-5E/F;
4 squadrons F-14;
1 squadron F-7;
1 squadron Su-24;
2 squadrons MiG-29
4 squadrons F-4D/E;
4 squadrons F-5E/F;
1 squadron Su-24;
2 squadrons MiG-29
Source: The Military Balance (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1989, 1994, and 1999).
Major Security Institutions and Their Composition 43
Budget limits aside, Iran’s military, however, has influence over several
aspects of its own development. These include the drive to build
a domestic arms industry, an overall quest for increased military
professionalism, an emphasis on missile programs, and a desire to
gain WMD. Accomplishing all these goals, however, requires political
backing.
The Drive for Military Autonomy
Iran has made much of the principle of self-sufficiency when arming
its conventional forces. In practical terms, this has meant producing
arms and spare parts domestically, an enterprise that is both expensive
and likely to lead to a larger gap in military technology between
Iran and countries armed by the West. Iran’s emphasis on selfreliance
reflects the lessons it learned from the war with Iraq, when
its former Western suppliers refused to sell it arms. As the industry
has developed, it has gained its own voice, and it now represents an
important domestic interest.
Both the Artesh and the IRGC support the domestic arms industry by
ordering main battle tanks, howitzers, munitions, and other arms
from the state-owned firms affiliated with the logistics wing of the
Ministry of Defense. The IRGC is particularly focused on supporting
the domestic arms industry and otherwise preserving autonomy.
The IRGC usually takes the initiative, but it frequently draws on the
Artesh to provide expertise.
A Commitment to Military Professionalism
Iran’s commitment to enhanced military professionalism and better
military coordination appears secure. Instability along Iran’s borders
and the formal U.S. military and political presence in the
Persian Gulf have increased the premium on Iran’s maintaining a
modern, well-equipped, and efficient army. Iranian leaders have
learned through bitter experience that a ramshackle amateur army of
volunteers—an army of “professional martyrs,” as some Iranians
44 Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era
have called it—is no match against today’s armies.19 The need,
therefore, for a well-equipped and drilled army that can respond in a
coordinated fashion to several challenges simultaneously is accepted
by almost all of Iran’s leaders.
Iran’s security policies in the 1990s reflected these concerns. Iran’s
rearmament drive of the 1990s required investment in all the services
and the import of new military hardware. More important still, to
realize its objectives, the regime had to upgrade its relations with the
regular armed forces, giving them due recognition and a greater
public presence. Military parades have again become commonplace,
and senior members of Iran’s clerical elite seem to make a habit of
attending military rallies and of being seen with military officers.
Both the IRGC and the Artesh have increased their emphasis on
professionalism. They are increasing the technical training offered
to soldiers and basing promotion criteria more on education and
expertise.
______________
19Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions and Impact
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994).