MATTHEWS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM (Application no. 24833/94)

32.  The Court observes that acts of the EC as such cannot be challenged before the Court because
the EC is not a Contracting Party. The Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to
international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured”. Member
States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer.

33.  In the present case, the alleged violation of the Convention flows from an annex to the 1976
Act, entered into by the United Kingdom, together with the extension to the European Parliament’s
competences brought about by the Maastricht Treaty. The Council Decision and the 1976 Act (see
paragraph 18 above), and the Maastricht Treaty, with its changes to the EEC Treaty, all constituted
international instruments which were freely entered into by the United Kingdom. Indeed, the 1976
Act cannot be challenged before the European Court of Justice for the very reason that it is not a
“normal” act of the Community, but is a treaty within the Community legal order. The Maastricht
Treaty, too, is not an act of the Community, but a treaty by which a revision of the EEC Treaty was
brought about. The United Kingdom, together with all the other parties to the Maastricht Treaty, is
responsible ratione materiae under Article 1 of the Convention and, in particular, under Article 3
of Protocol No. 1, for the consequences of that Treaty.

34.  In determining to what extent the United Kingdom is responsible for “securing” the rights in
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of elections to the European Parliament in Gibraltar, the
Court recalls that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or
illusory, but  practical and effective (see, for example, the above-mentioned United Communist
Party of Turkey and Others judgment, pp. 18-19, § 33). It is uncontested that legislation emanating
from the legislative process of the European Community affects the population of Gibraltar in the
same way as legislation which enters the domestic legal order exclusively via the House of
Assembly. To this extent, there is no difference between European and domestic legislation, and no
reason why the United Kingdom should not be required to “secure” the rights in Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 in respect of European legislation, in the same way as those rights are required to
be “secured” in respect of purely domestic legislation. In particular, the suggestion that the
United Kingdom may not have effective control over the state of affairs complained of cannot affect
the position, as the United Kingdom’s responsibility derives from its having entered into treaty
commitments subsequent to the applicability of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to Gibraltar, namely the
Maastricht Treaty taken together with its obligations under the Council Decision and the 1976 Act.
Further, the Court notes that on acceding to the EC Treaty, the United Kingdom chose, by virtue of
Article 227(4) of the Treaty, to have substantial areas of EC legislation applied to Gibraltar (see
paragraphs 11 to 14 above).

35.  It follows that the United Kingdom is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for
securing the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in Gibraltar regardless of whether
the elections were purely domestic or European.