EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT II.

22 November 2016

Content

- ☐ European Security Strategy
- ☐ Developing civilian capabilities
- ☐ Civilian – military interaction
- ☐ Comprehensive approach
- ☐ Conflict prevention
- ☐ EU Police missions - strongest future?
- ☐ EU Global Strategy
- ☐ EU vs. NATO / UN / US

ESS and its adoption

- □ core document of the **normative strategic thinking** behind the ESDP

- □ drafted by **Javier Solana**

- □ adopted in 2003: "**A Secure Europe in a Better World**"

- □ considered **politically unfeasible** ("**Atlanticists**" vs. "**Europeanists**"), interesting X not realistic

- □ **Surprising scope**, given the **magnitude** and **suddenness**

- normal **decision-making procedures by-passed** (PSC) by means of formation (Solana)

- just a **demonstration of regained unity after the divide over the Iraq war?** (high symbolic value but little real impact?)

- **ESS** constantly referred to by all following documents

- **tactical use of the strategy**: the more convincingly a proposed initiative can be linked to it, the more difficult it is to oppose

ESS and other strategies

- ESS not the first strategy in the field of EU's foreign and security policy

- **Amsterdam Treaty → "common strategies"**
  - Russia, Ukraine (1999)
  - Mediterranean (2000)

- **sectional strategies**:
  - European Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD (2003)
  - European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005)

- **lack of any coherent strategy** from start of the ESDP → In support of which political objectives forces were to be deployed?

- **intra-European crisis over Iraq → stimulus** that made a breakthrough possible
  - **MS supporting the Iraq invasion** → EU cares about the security threats perceived by the US
  - **MS opposing the invasion** → also other options available to deal with threats

ESS and its content

(1) Global security environment
- key threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime and regional conflicts
- stresses the **complex causes** behind contemporary conflicts
- EU faces the same problems as the US

(2) Strategic objectives of the EU
- (a) addressing the threats
- (b) **building security in the neighbourhood**
- (c) international order based on effective multilateralism

(3) Policy implications for the EU
- (a) more active
- (b) more capable
- (c) **more coherent**
- (d) working with partners

ESS and the comprehensive approach

- **comprehensive / holistic approach to security** = integration of all dimensions of foreign policy

- based off the work of **UN**, **OSCE**, esp. after the end of the CW

- **terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001** → renewed focus on the politico-military dimension and defence against external enemies

  - EU: **comprehensive response to terrorism** (in-depth political dialogue, need for economic, political and legal instruments, close cooperation between states and international organizations)

  - US: **one-dimensional "war on terror"** (common understanding of security problems X different response – multilateralism, not unilateralism)

Comprehensive approach tasks

- Peace-keeping/-making
- Police
- Security Sector Reform
- Civilian/Military Mentoring
- Monitoring and Advising
- Rule of Law
- Humanitarian/Rescue Tasks
- Civilian administration
- Civil protection Monitoring

CMCO vs. CIMIC

- civil-military interaction in 2 terms – **internal and external**

- **Former inter-pillar activities** and comprehensive crisis management **within** the EU - Civil-military co-ordination (**CMCO**)

- **Interaction in the field, tactical-operational level**: with the environment and other actors, including the populace - Civil-military co-operation (**CIMIC**)

- Coordinator for comprehensive approach?
  - Long-term: **Civil-Military Cell in the EU Military Staff**
  - Short-term (case): **Crisis Response Coordination Team – CRCT**

Application in Bosnia and Herzegovina

- CMCO BiH
  - EUFOR Althea
  - EUPM
  - EUMM
  - EU Delegation
  - EU Special Representative

- CIMIC BiH
  - National groups within Althea
  - Protection of NGOs
  - Reconstruction projects
  - Taskforce establishment to build refugee camps

Challenges to civ-mil progress

- **<u>CIMIC instruments less developed in multiple external agent cooperation – NATO, UN, OSCE involvement</u>**

- Both CMCO and CIMIC approaches within EU crisis management may **<u>promote militarization of crisis management</u>**

- Lack long-term impact within all segments of the comprehensive approach – **namely conflict prevention**

Civilian capabilities limitations

- Even civilian capabilities are hindered by caveats

- **MCM** – stabilization, army reform, critical period support, entry/exit <u>gateway for complex UN missions</u>

- **CCM** – democratic standards, rule of law, fighting organized crime, terrorism, corruption
    - Monitoring missions – confidence building, ceasefire observation

Meeting Civilian Expectations

- Collective decision to deploy
  - But **individually funded**
    - Leads to unwillingness to foot the bill
- **Need for experts at home**
  - They are a part of the regular police/civilian security force
    - No national contingents for EU use as with military
- **Not as prestigious** as military operations
- EU forced to often deploy ex-military experts

Development of civilian capabilities

- **Feira European Council** (6/2000) → 4 priority areas:
    - (1) police
    - (2) rule of law
    - (3) civil administration
    - (4) civil protection

- \+ decision to create a pool of police officers, judges, prosecutors and civilian administration experts, assessment and intervention teams

- 2004 – **Civilian Headline Goal 2008** → 6 priority areas:
    - (5) monitoring capabilities
    - (6) generic support capabilities

- **quantity** – ok X **quality** – shortfalls

Conflict prevention within CM

- ESS - **Preventive engagement**
  - Civil wars on average consume 30 years worth of the country's GDP and recovery takes approximately 14 years

- EU Early warning system?
  - <u>EU Delegation Reports</u>
    - <u>More than 5000 staff in 140 locations</u>
  - <u>Watch-lists</u>
    - <u>Compilled by SITCEN/Crisis Room</u>

- Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy within the EEAS

Crisis management in EU proximity

- Stronger possibilities in pan-European area through **structural prevention**
  - Appeal of enlargement
  - Development aid
  - Association agreements
  - Regional programs
  - EU Neighborhood Policy
  - Political dialogue
  - Civil society cooperation
  - EU Election observation missions
- Real asset in opening political dialogue

Economic instruments

- **IfS** - Instrument for Stability
  - Dedicated EU financial instrument for immediate crisis response and long-term stabilization

- **ENP, IPA, DCI, EDF** – geographical instruments
  - ENI - European Neighborhood Instrument
  - IPA – Instrument for Pre-accession
  - DCI – Development Cooperation Instrument
  - EDF – European Development Fund

- **EIDHR**
  - European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

- **Humanitarian Assistance Programme**

- **ECHO**
  - European Commission's Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection Department
  - Disaster and humanitarian relief

- **EUSR** –
  - lack of financial resources, lack of political weight
  - Conflict prevention instrument in military intervention and counter-insurgency setting

- **EUPOL** –
  - Insufficient personnel, inability to deal with adverse conditions on the ground without NATO support
  - Police training and Interior Ministry reform on small scale

- **Individual member state missions and initiatives**
  - Fell short in comparison to NATO effort, originally a strain on security management and thus resource allocation

EU in Afghanistan – internal coordination model?

- **Commission** –
  - Variety of construction projects, trust fund allocations, paying for civil servants in administration
  - Purely a financial actor, (paying almost in full for police operation)
- **Lack of institutional coherence** to create enough political leverage for a coordinated application of multiple instruments
  - Diverging priorities of MS
  - No own military instruments
  - Prevention and reconstruction instruments filling gaps in NATO mission, rather than coherently for greater effect

EUPOL – can the EU be a significant player outside its traditional zone of influence?

- **EUPOL** – EU police mission in Afghanistan

- **2007-**

- up to 235 police and justice training experts (compared to ~1500 EULEX)

- **Mandate**: *building a civilian police service that operates within an improved rule of law framework and in respect of human rights*

- **No executive mandate** – <u>only limited to advising</u>

- Preceded by German GPPO police project - deemed insufficient and ineffective

- Completely voluntary basis in opting for Afghanistan civilian mission, EULEX a much bigger draw and safer conditions

- EULEX in comparison, has executive mandate, is integrated with border, customs, judiciary, prosecution, even prisons and anti-corruption

EU in Afghanistan – external coordination model?

- <u>NATO dominance</u>

- No near-EU financial, economic, or development instruments available – ad hoc financing models

- <u>Many parallel local efforts</u> organized by EU members states through NATO PRTs

- Eventually superseded by NATO <u>NTM-A (CTSC-A) 2009-2014</u>, which took over the coordination role of training in the security sector

- No NATO-EU security agreement, because **Turkey declined to share security information with Cyprus**

Accurate EuObserver assessment 2015

- EU countries were shy to pledge manpower. Eupol was bedeviled by hundreds of **bureaucratic "milestones**" issued by Brussels, and tender procedures for projects took ages

- The EU mission also faced **needless "competition" from other structures**, such as **Eurogendfor**, a European military police body based in Italy, or **NTM-A**, a Nato police-training project

- Extreme casualty sensitivity and recruiting hurdles

- Incapable of overcoming local problems

- When Eupol arrived, in 2007, 80 percent of Afghan police were illiterate and corruption was "pervasive", Taliban attacks claimed hundreds of lives - in 2012 alone it killed 57 Afghan prosecutors, targeted EU staff as well

- **30 percent** of mission budget on security: hundreds of armoured cars and round-the-clock protection by **Hart, a small, British private security firm**

New ESS in the year 2016 - expectations

- Calls for updating
- Much **heavier emphasis on developing diplomatic instruments**
- **New mediation strategies** incorporation
- New security environment, rising China, real threat from non-state actors, withdrawing USA, **rising costs** of "small group" or "**mini-lateralism**" approaches to crisis management
- **Integration/enlargement** still a viable universal solution to stabilization?
- **Regional determination of priorities**? Africa EU/Asia USA
- **Larger role in peacekeeping** with "transformative capabilities"
- **European army?**
  - "EU's soft power must be matched by collective hard power and a more efficient use of our €210 billion yearly defence spending."

EU Global Strategy

- **PESCO** – Permanent Structured Cooperation - two=speed integration
- Rapid response relevance and deployability
- EU global strategy
  1. **Respond to crises in full cycle**
     1. Focus on prevention
  2. **Build capacity of partners**
     1. Improving parner resilience
     2. CBSD – capacity building for security and development
  3. **Protect the union within**
     1. Counter disinformation, trafficking, ...

EU Global Strategy

- Revise Feira 2000 in new environment
  - 4 priorities
  - the police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection
- Focus on training, rapid force generation, and enforcing generic functions for deployability
- Intellignece, reconnaissance, cyber security, maritime security, strategic enablers
- Level of Ambition to inform capabilities

EU impasse? Between UN / NATO

- Soft power vs. hard power
- US cooks meals, EU does dishes?
- Maintaining an acceptable image
  - Too weak to threaten
  - Too fragmented to promote a single interest
  - Too diverse to avoid partial initiatives
  - Too economy driven to get deeply involved
  - Non-confrontational
  - Extremely casualty sensitive

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