EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT II.
22 November 2016
Content
 European Security Strategy
 Developing civilian capabilities
 Civilian – military interaction
 Comprehensive approach
 Conflict prevention
 EU Police missions - strongest future?
 EU Global Strategy
 EU vs. NATO / UN / US
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ESS and its adoption
 core document of the normative strategic thinking
behind the ESDP
 drafted by Javier Solana
 adopted in 2003: “A Secure Europe in a Better World”
 considered politically unfeasible (“Atlanticists” vs.
“Europeanists”), interesting X not realistic
 Surprising scope, given the magnitude and
suddenness
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 normal decision-making procedures by-passed
(PSC) by means of formation (Solana)
 just a demonstration of regained unity after the
divide over the Iraq war? (high symbolic value but little
real impact?)
 ESS constantly referred to by all following documents
 tactical use of the strategy: the more convincingly a
proposed initiative can be linked to it, the more difficult it
is to oppose
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ESS and other strategies
 ESS not the first strategy in the field of EU’s foreign and security policy
 Amsterdam Treaty  “common strategies”
 Russia, Ukraine (1999)
 Mediterranean (2000)
 sectional strategies:
 European Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD (2003)
 European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005)
 lack of any coherent strategy from start of the ESDP  In support of which
political objectives forces were to be deployed?
 intra-European crisis over Iraq  stimulus that made a breakthrough
possible
 MS supporting the Iraq invasion  EU cares about the security threats perceived
by the US
 MS opposing the invasion  also other options available to deal with threats
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ESS and its content
(1) Global security environment
 key threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized
crime and regional conflicts
 stresses the complex causes behind contemporary conflicts
 EU faces the same problems as the US
(2) Strategic objectives of the EU
 (a) addressing the threats
 (b) building security in the neighbourhood
 (c) international order based on effective multilateralism
(3) Policy implications for the EU
 (a) more active
 (b) more capable
 (c) more coherent
 (d) working with partners
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ESS and the comprehensive approach
 comprehensive / holistic approach to security = integration of
all dimensions of foreign policy
 based off the work of UN, OSCE, esp. after the end of the CW
 terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001  renewed focus on
the politico-military dimension and defence against external
enemies
 EU: comprehensive response to terrorism (in-depth political
dialogue, need for economic, political and legal instruments, close
cooperation between states and international organizations)
 US: one-dimensional “war on terror” (common understanding of
security problems X different response – multilateralism, not
unilateralism)
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Comprehensive approach tasks
 Peace-keeping/-making
 Police
 Security Sector Reform
 Civilian/Military Mentoring
 Monitoring and Advising
 Rule of Law
 Humanitarian/Rescue Tasks
 Civilian administration
 Civil protection Monitoring
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CMCO vs. CIMIC
 civil-military interaction in 2 terms – internal and external
 Former inter-pillar activities and comprehensive crisis
management within the EU - Civil-military co-ordination (CMCO)
 Interaction in the field, tactical-operational level: with the
environment and other actors, including the populace - Civil-military
co-operation (CIMIC)
 Coordinator for comprehensive approach?
 Long-term: Civil-Military Cell in the EU Military Staff
 Short-term (case): Crisis Response Coordination Team – CRCT
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Application in Bosnia and Herzegovina
 CMCO BiH
 EUFOR Althea
 EUPM
 EUMM
 EU Delegation
 EU Special Representative
 CIMIC BiH
 National groups within Althea
 Protection of NGOs
 Reconstruction projects
 Taskforce establishment to build refugee camps
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Challenges to civ-mil progress
 CIMIC instruments less developed in multiple
external agent cooperation – NATO, UN, OSCE
involvement
 Both CMCO and CIMIC approaches within EU crisis
management may promote militarization of crisis
management
 Lack long-term impact within all segments of the
comprehensive approach – namely conflict prevention
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Civilian capabilities limitations
 Even civilian capabilities are hindered by
caveats
 MCM – stabilization, army reform, critical
period support, entry/exit gateway for complex
UN missions
 CCM – democratic standards, rule of law,
fighting organized crime, terrorism, corruption
 Monitoring missions – confidence building,
ceasefire observation
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Meeting Civilian Expectations
 Collective decision to deploy
 But individually funded
 Leads to unwillingness to foot the bill
 Need for experts at home
 They are a part of the regular police/civilian
security force
 No national contingents for EU use as with military
 Not as prestigious as military operations
 EU forced to often deploy ex-military experts
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Development of civilian capabilities
 Feira European Council (6/2000)  4 priority areas:
 (1) police
 (2) rule of law
 (3) civil administration
 (4) civil protection
 + decision to create a pool of police officers, judges, prosecutors
and civilian administration experts, assessment and intervention
teams
 2004 – Civilian Headline Goal 2008  6 priority areas:
 (5) monitoring capabilities
 (6) generic support capabilities
 quantity – ok X quality – shortfalls
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Conflict prevention within CM
 ESS - Preventive engagement
 Civil wars on average consume 30 years worth of the country’s GDP and
recovery takes approximately 14 years
 EU Early warning system?
 EU Delegation Reports
 More than 5000 staff in 140 locations
 Watch-lists
 Compilled by SITCEN/Crisis Room
 Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy
within the EEAS
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Crisis management in EU proximity
 Stronger possibilities in pan-European area through
structural prevention
 Appeal of enlargement
 Development aid
 Association agreements
 Regional programs
 EU Neighborhood Policy
 Political dialogue
 Civil society cooperation
 EU Election observation missions
 Real asset in opening political dialogue
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Economic instruments
 IfS - Instrument for Stability
 Dedicated EU financial instrument for immediate crisis response and longterm
stabilization
 ENP, IPA, DCI, EDF – geographical instruments
 ENI - European Neighborhood Instrument
 IPA – Instrument for Pre-accession
 DCI – Development Cooperation Instrument
 EDF – European Development Fund
 EIDHR
 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
 Humanitarian Assistance Programme
 ECHO
 European Commission's Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection Department
 Disaster and humanitarian relief
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EU in Afghanistan –
internal coordination model?
 EUSR –
 lack of financial resources, lack of political weight
 Conflict prevention instrument in military intervention and
counter-insurgency setting
 EUPOL –
 Insufficient personnel, inability to deal with adverse conditions
on the ground without NATO support
 Police training and Interior Ministry reform on small scale
 Individual member state missions and
initiatives
 Fell short in comparison to NATO effort, originally a strain on
security management and thus resource allocation
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EU in Afghanistan –
internal coordination model?
 Commission –
 Variety of construction projects, trust fund allocations, paying
for civil servants in administration
 Purely a financial actor, (paying almost in full for police
operation)
 Lack of institutional coherence to create enough
political leverage for a coordinated application of
multiple instruments
 Diverging priorities of MS
 No own military instruments
 Prevention and reconstruction instruments filling gaps in NATO
mission, rather than coherently for greater effect
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EUPOL – can the EU be a significant player
outside its traditional zone of influence?
 EUPOL – EU police mission in Afghanistan
 2007
up to 235 police and justice training experts (compared to ~1500 EULEX)
 Mandate: building a civilian police service that operates within an improved
rule of law framework and in respect of human rights
 No executive mandate – only limited to advising
 Preceded by German GPPO police project - deemed insufficient and
ineffective
 Completely voluntary basis in opting for Afghanistan civilian mission,
EULEX a much bigger draw and safer conditions
 EULEX in comparison, has executive mandate, is integrated with border,
customs, judiciary, prosecution, even prisons and anti-corruption
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EU in Afghanistan –
external coordination model?
 NATO dominance
 No near-EU financial, economic, or development
instruments available – ad hoc financing models
 Many parallel local efforts organized by EU members
states through NATO PRTs
 Eventually superseded by NATO NTM-A (CTSC-A)
2009-2014, which took over the coordination role of
training in the security sector
 No NATO-EU security agreement, because Turkey
declined to share security information with Cyprus
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Accurate EuObserver assessment 2015
 EU countries were shy to pledge manpower. Eupol was bedeviled by
hundreds of bureaucratic “milestones” issued by Brussels, and tender
procedures for projects took ages
 The EU mission also faced needless “competition” from other
structures, such as Eurogendfor, a European military police body based
in Italy, or NTM-A, a Nato police-training project
 Extreme casualty sensitivity and recruiting hurdles
 Incapable of overcoming local problems
 When Eupol arrived, in 2007, 80 percent of Afghan police were illiterate and
corruption was “pervasive”, Taliban attacks claimed hundreds of lives - in
2012 alone it killed 57 Afghan prosecutors, targeted EU staff as well
 30 percent of mission budget on security: hundreds of armoured cars and
round-the-clock protection by Hart, a small, British private security firm
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New ESS in the year 2016 -
expectations
 Calls for updating
 Much heavier emphasis on developing diplomatic instruments
 New mediation strategies incorporation
 New security environment, rising China, real threat from non-state
actors, withdrawing USA, rising costs of “small group” or “minilateralism”
approaches to crisis management
 Integration/enlargement still a viable universal solution to
stabilization?
 Regional determination of priorities? Africa EU/Asia USA
 Larger role in peacekeeping with “transformative capabilities”
 European army?
 “EU’s soft power must be matched by collective hard power and a more
efficient use of our €210 billion yearly defence spending.”
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EU Global Strategy
 PESCO – Permanent Structured Cooperation two=speed
integration
 Rapid response relevance and deployability
 EU global strategy
1. Respond to crises in full cycle
1. Focus on prevention
2. Build capacity of partners
1. Improving parner resilience
2. CBSD – capacity building for security and development
3. Protect the union within
1. Counter disinformation, trafficking, ...
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EU Global Strategy
 Revise Feira 2000 in new environment
 4 priorities
 the police, strengthening the rule of law, civil
administration and civil protection
 Focus on training, rapid force generation, and
enforcing generic functions for deployability
 Intellignece, reconnaissance, cyber security,
maritime security, strategic enablers
 Level of Ambition to inform capabilities
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EU impasse? Between UN / NATO
 Soft power vs. hard power
 US cooks meals, EU does dishes?
 Maintaining an acceptable image
 Too weak to threaten
 Too fragmented to promote a single interest
 Too diverse to avoid partial initiatives
 Too economy driven to get deeply involved
 Non-confrontational
 Extremely casualty sensitive
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Sources
 Biscop, S. (2008): The European Security Strategy in Context, in: Biscop, S. –
Andersson, J.J. (eds.): The EU and the European Security Strategy, Oxon,
Routledge.
 Biscop, S. – Andersson, J.J. (2008): Introduction, in: Biscop, S. – Andersson, J.J.
(eds.): The EU and the European Security Strategy, Oxon, Routledge.
 EU (2003): A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, online
text (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).
 EU (2008): Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union (Treaty of
Lisbon), Official Journal of the European Union C 115/13, on-line text (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF).
 Howorth, J. (2007): Security and Defence Policy in the European Union,
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan.
 Mölling, Ch. (2008): Comprehensive Approaches to International Crisis
Management, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, Vol. 3, No. 42, s. 1-3, on-line text
(http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=10&fileid=0F000603-3181-
4CFD-9153-D8AADAAF6337&lng=en).
 Quille, G. (2004): The European Security Strategy: A Framework for EU Security
Interests?, International Peacekeeping, Vol 11, No 3, pp. 422-438.
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