

AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

2 December 2014

Content

2

- African Union
- Need for peace enforcement
- Structure
- Reasoning
- Forces
- Missions
- ECOWAS in APSA

A need for a regional actor

3

- UN consensus hindrance
- Strategic interests of major powers not in Africa
- Delayed reaction, speed is key
- Lack of possibility to get consent
- Failed state and CPE challenges

- Imperialist and interventionist resentment
- Local ownership means African ownership

Character of African peace challenges

4

- All in **African context** – the most conflict prone


- **Fewer** conflicts
 - ▣ Peak already reached in 80s and then in 90s
- Less deadly conflicts
 - ▣ **More peripheral** conflicts
- **Transnational** conflict
- **Extremist** conflict

- But **protracted, less international-intervention-prone**
- African ownership

African Union

5

- 54 member states
- Organization of African Unity 1963
AU 2002
- 2004 PSC – Peace and Security Council - **consensus**
- from **non-interference** to **non-indifference**
- (g) non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
- (h) the **right of the Union to intervene** in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: **war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity**;
- African solutions first




Crisis management structure

7

- **PSC – 15 elected members –**
 - ▣ Main crisis management body, reactive not preventive
- **CEWS –**
 - ▣ Addis Ababa, evolved, but understaffed and underrated by the PSC
- **Panel of the Wise –**
 - ▣ Preventive diplomacy body, facilitator and mediator, since 2009
- **Peace Fund –**
 - ▣ Main fund for CMOs, subsidized by the EU
- **Standby Force (ASF)**
 - ▣ Similar to EU Battlegroups, so far not utilized
 - ▣ Only for CM goals, no relief or assistance, 2500 troops within 30days, 1000 within 14days, robust RoE

AU - African Peace Security Architecture - APSA

8



Crisis management operations

9

- conditions for CMOs require
 - **unconstitutional changes of government**
 - do now include not only military coups, rebel uprisings, but also illegal means of usurping power, i.e. rigging elections
 - **humanitarian intervention**
 - so far not invoked (not even Darfur or Libya)
- CMOs consist of military element only

AU crisis management tools


10

- **Political engagement** in prevention
 - ▣ early and strong engagement from the **PSC** can serve to diffuse crises prior to escalation
- **Suspension** of membership –
 - ▣ Madagascar 2009, CAR 2012, Egypt 2013
- **Sanctions** –
 - ▣ economic, financial, or travel bans
 - ▣ Togo 2005, Guinea, 2008, Eritrea 2009
- **Preventive deployment**
 - ▣ observation missions Comoros 2008, Rwanda 2009
- **Peace support operations**

African Standby Force

11

La Force africaine en attente - The African Standby Force



Mission	Location	Duration	Size (approximate maximum)	Main Troop Contributors	Main Task(s)
AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	Burundi	2003–2004	3,250	South Africa	Peacebuilding
AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC)	Comoros	2004	41	South Africa	Observation
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	Darfur	2004–2007	c. 7,700	Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana	Peacekeeping/ Civilian Protection
Special Task Force Burundi	Burundi	2006–2009	c. 750	South Africa	VIP Protection
AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	2006	1,260	South Africa	Election Monitor
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Mogadishu	2007–present	c. 9,000	Uganda, Burundi	Regime Support
AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES)	Comoros	2007–2008	350	South Africa	Election Support
Democracy in Comoros	Comoros	2008	1,350 (+450 Comoros)	Tanzania, Sudan	Enforcement
AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (UN pays)	Darfur	2008–present	c. 23,000	Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia,	Peacebuilding/ Civilian Protection

Largest current AU operations

13

- Somalia – AMISOM – 17000
- Sudan/Darfur – UNAMID – 14 000
- Central African Republic – MISCA – 3000
- Regional Task Force against LRA – 3500

- Overwhelming part of the CMOs **budget comes from outside of Africa** (EU, UN, US, China)
 - Insufficient funding and capabilities to deploy and maintain full-fledged CMOs

Budget

14

- Hindrance of external funding to African ownership
- **US\$416,867,326**
- **US\$169,833,340** Member States
- **US\$247,033,986** International Partners.
 - ▣ Majority for administrative costs
 - ▣ 5 largest states account for majority of contributions, many late payers or defaulters
- Proposed solution 2016: 0.2% levy on imports to African countries

Burundi success - AMIB

15

- First AU PSO
- Model mission

- Support of political solution agreed upon by belligerents
- Strong and reputable head of mission
- Strong drive of head country and commitment of adequate resources


Deficiencies of the AU PSOs

16

- inappropriate mission planning (no DPKO or Field support body)
- inadequate and restricted peacekeeping mandates
- planning peace missions with unrealistically small force numbers
- Planning incompatibility with UN forces to take over
- Lack of any aerial capabilities, C2 structures

ECOWAS

17

- 15 members, established in 1975
- 370 mil. Population, very low HDI
- Following EC  EU integration model
- 1981 Protocol, Article 4:
 - ▣ *ECOWAS is compelled to intervene in internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community*
 - ▣ legitimate internal intervention clause (unlike AU or UN)
- ECOWAS peacekeeping force – **ECOMOG**
 - ▣ Soon to become ESF (within the AU ASF)

ECOWAS crisis management

18

□ **Goals** reframed within AU APSA

- *conflict prevention, management and resolution; humanitarian action and disaster response; post-conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and disarmament; counter-terrorism and the prevention and combating of trans-national organized crime; border management; capacity building, training and knowledge sharing; and resource mobilization*

□ **Current formula**

- Crisis \longrightarrow political solution (mediation, facilitation)
Council of the Wise \longrightarrow sanctions/suspension of membership (AU element since 2012 Mali) \longrightarrow vanguard force deployment to separate \longrightarrow stabilization force upgraded \longrightarrow conversion to UN mission

ECOWAS crisis prevention?

19

- **Reactionary** rather than preventive (apart from economic integration and development support)
 - ▣ however success in Guinea Bissau (2003) and Togo (2005)
- **ECOWAS Early Warning System**
 - ▣ only 30 field monitors
 - ▣ effective subsidiary of the CEWS
- ***2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework***
 - ▣ admission of ECOWAS shortcomings and insufficient capabilities to deal with
 - ungovernable regions (Niger delta, Ghana/Mali/Niger borders)
 - population boom (430 mil. by 2020 – 45% under 15)

ECOMOG force

20

- Formerly ad hoc, BUT with UN mandate
- 1999 - *Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*
- ECOWAS CMOs often serve as interim bridgeheads, before **re-hatting** to UN forces
 - ▣ very fast ability to deploy
 - ▣ stopgap forces mostly without ANY civilian components
 - ▣ but preparing for future UN force structure with increased fact-finding and civilian oversight

ECOMOG/ESF operations

21

- **Liberia 1990-1998, 2003** (3500 troops)
 - ▣ 12,000 troops
- **Sierra Leone 1996-1999**
 - ▣ 13,000 troops
- **Guinea-Bissau 1998-2000** (1000 troops)
- **anti-LURD 2001**
 - ▣ 1,800 troops
- **Cote d'Ivoire 2002**
 - ▣ 2000 troops
- **Mali 2012 -**
 - ▣ 7,400 troops