AFRICAN UNION PEACE
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
2 December 2014
Content
 African Union
 Need for peace enforcement
 Structure
 Reasoning
 Forces
 Missions
 ECOWAS in APSA
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A need for a regional actor
 UN consensus hindrance
 Strategic interests of major powers not in Africa
 Delayed reaction, speed is key
 Lack of possibility to get consent
 Failed state and CPE challenges
 Imperialist and interventionist resentment
 Local ownership means African ownership
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Character of African peace challenges
 All in African context – the most conflict prone
 Fewer conflicts
 Peak already reached in 80s and then in 90s
 Less deadly conflicts
 More peripheral conflicts
 Transnational conflict
 Extremist conflict
 But protracted, less international-intervention-prone
 African ownership
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African Union
 54 member states
 Organization of African Unity 1963
AU 2002
 2004 PSC – Peace and Security Council - consensus
 from non-interference to non-indifference
 (g) non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of
another;
 (h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant
to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
 African solutions first
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AU capacity AU members
agenda
AU ambitions
Crisis management structure
 PSC – 15 elected members –
 Main crisis management body, reactive not preventive
 CEWS –
 Addis Ababa, evolved, but understaffed and underrated by the
PSC
 Panel of the Wise –
 Preventive diplomacy body, facilitator and mediator, since 2009
 Peace Fund –
 Main fund for CMOs, subsidized by the EU
 Standby Force (ASF)
 Similar to EU Battlegroups, so far not utilized
 Only for CM goals, no relief or assistance, 2500 troops within
30days, 1000 within 14days, robust RoE
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AU - African Peace Security Architecture
- APSA
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Crisis management operations
 conditions for CMOs require
 unconstitutional changes of government
 do now include not only military coups, rebel uprisings, but
also illegal means of usurping power, i.e. rigging elections
 humanitarian intervention
 so far not invoked (not even Darfur or Libya)
 CMOs consist of military element only
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AU crisis management tools
 Political engagement in prevention
 early and strong engagement from the PSC can serve to diffuse
crises prior to escalation
 Suspension of membership –
 Madagascar 2009, CAR 2012, Egypt 2013
 Sanctions –
 economic, financial, or travel bans
 Togo 2005, Guinea, 2008, Eritrea 2009
 Preventive deployment
 observation missions Comoros 2008, Rwanda 2009
 Peace support operations
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African Standby Force
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Largest current AU operations
 Somalia – AMISOM – 17000
 Sudan/Darfur – UNAMID – 14 000
 Central African Republic – MISCA – 3000
 Regional Task Force against LRA – 3500
 Overwhelming part of the CMOs budget comes
from outside of Africa (EU, UN, US, China)
 Insufficient funding and capabilities to deploy and
maintain full-fledged CMOs
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Budget
 Hindrance of external funding to African
ownership
 US$416,867,326
 US$169,833,340 Member States
 US$247,033,986 International Partners.
 Majority for administrative costs
 5 largest states account for majority of contributions, many late
payers or defaulters
 Proposed solution 2016: 0.2% levy on imports
to African countries
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Burundi success - AMIB
 First AU PSO
 Model mission
 Support of political solution agreed upon by
belligerents
 Strong and reputable head of mission
 Strong drive of head country and commitment
of adequate resources
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Deficiencies of the AU PSOs
 inappropriate mission planning (no DPKO or
Field support body)
 inadequate and restricted peacekeeping
mandates
 planning peace missions with unrealistically
small force numbers
 Planning incompatibility with UN forces to take
over
 Lack of any aerial capabilities, C2 structures
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ECOWAS
 15 members, established in 1975
 370 mil. Population, very low HDI
 Following EC EU integration model
 1981 Protocol, Article 4:
 ECOWAS is compelled to intervene in internal armed conflict
within any Member State engineered and supported actively from
outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire
Community
 legitimate internal intervention clause (unlike AU or UN)
 ECOWAS peacekeeping force – ECOMOG
 Soon to become ESF (within the AU ASF)
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ECOWAS crisis management
 Goals reframed within AU APSA
 conflict prevention, management and resolution; humanitarian action and disaster
response; post-conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and
disarmament; counter-terrorism and the prevention and combating of transnational
organized crime; border management; capacity building, training and
knowledge sharing; and resource mobilization
 Current formula
 Crisis political solution (mediation, facilitation)
Council of the Wise sanctions/suspension of
membership (AU element since 2012 Mali) vanguard
force deployment to separate stabilization
force upgraded conversion to UN mission
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ECOWAS crisis prevention?
 Reactionary rather than preventive (apart from economic
integration and development support)
 however success in Guinea Bissau (2003) and Togo (2005)
 ECOWAS Early Warning System
 only 30 field monitors
 effective subsidiary of the CEWS
 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
 admission of ECOWAS shortcomings and insufficient
capabilities to deal with
 ungovernable regions (Niger delta, Ghana/Mali/Niger borders)
 population boom (430 mil. by 2020 – 45% under 15)
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ECOMOG force
 Formerly ad hoc, BUT with UN mandate
 1999 - Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security
 ECOWAS CMOs often serve as interim bridgeheads,
before re-hatting to UN forces
 very fast ability to deploy
 stopgap forces mostly without ANY civilian
components
 but preparing for future UN force structure with
increased fact-finding and civilian oversight
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ECOMOG/ESF operations
 Liberia 1990-1998, 2003 (3500 troops)
 12,000 troops
 Sierra Leone 1996-1999
 13,000 troops
 Guinea-Bissau 1998-2000 (1000 troops)
 anti-LURD 2001
 1,800 troops
 Cote d’Ivoire 2002
 2000 troops
 Mali 2012 
7,400 troops
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