


Motivations for contributing

Those who pay, rarely play ...

2

Top 10 financial contributors to UN peacekeeping budget



... and those who play rarely pay *Top 10 contributors to UN peacekeeping operations*



= 1000 troops, police or UN military experts

Source: United Nations as of 31 October 2015

Motivations for state participation

3

- realist motives – to **support own interests**
- idealist motives – to **promote norms and values** (international peace and security, cooperation, multilateralism)
- liberal motives – to contribute to the **continuation of status quo** and **foster values** such as democratization and good governance
- **prestige** (smaller or developing states)
- **national image and reputation**
- fulfillment of **responsibilities**, expression of **commitment** to the UN
- **training and experience**
- **profit** (payment from the UN for each soldier)
- campaign to become **nonpermanent members of the SC** (e.g. Morocco, Spain, Czech Republic)

Small states and CMOs

4

- **limited role** in international politics
- influence by **acting through IOs**
- often **included in peace operations** (political reasons)
 - “international image”, legitimacy
 - ambition to play a role too („we-too“ phenomenon)
- a lot of small states have gained a **reputation as peacekeepers**
- history of small states’ participation in peace operations:
 - **earlier peace operations** – small states contributed police
 - **interwar years** – small states started to participate militarily
 - **during the CW** – small states perceived as better peacekeepers X policies still set by powers

- **advantages** of small states' participation in CMO:
 - absence of a power status → **less polarized reactions**
 - **involvement or interest in a conflict less obvious** (colonial past either forgotten, minimal or non-existing)
 - **positive / crucial role in negotiations** (easier to act as “honest brokers”, risk less “loss of face”)
 - attempt **to do the best** in order to show their ability
 - limited defence budgets → **more flexible and used to improvise**

- *Do you see any disadvantages?*

- **disadvantages** of small states' participation in CMO:
 - **carry less weight in the international system** → difficult to influence policy
 - **kept out of decision-making processes** → influence on their troops
 - **appear less convincingly** in an operation (not backed up by an intense military force)
 - able to contribute only **limited contingents**
 - possible **shortages in modern equipment**
 - **harder to bear casualties**

Motives

7

- to answer **outside pressures** (from allies or organizations)
 - ▣ to lend a multinational character to missions; to increase the legitimacy
- to contribute to the **maintenance of global peace and security**
- to make **positive impression** on the world stage, to build image and prestige
- **down payment for potential assistance** of the international community
 - ▣ Baltic States – fearing inference of Russia
- to demonstrate the **ability to contribute to an operation**
 - ▣ Central and Eastern European states – NATO membership

- to **repay a debt** for an “own” peacekeeping operation in the past
- to **keep armed forces occupied outside the country** rather than meddling into domestic affairs
 - ▣ esp. Third world states where the military is not entirely under civilian control
- to profit **financially**
- to benefit by **receiving equipment**
- to get **experience**
- to get **contact with other military forces**

Financing UN peacekeeping operations

Financing UN peacekeeping operations

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- **two basic budget levels** within the UN:
 - regular budget (5bn USD)
 - peacekeeping budget (8,4bn USD)
- UN PKOs generally financed through their own **separate budget**
- standard practice established with the authorization of **UNEF I** (**special account** created)
- exceptions funded through the **regular UN budget**
 - **military observer missions** with small budget (e.g. UNTSO in the Middle East, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan)
- possible **funding by the parties** to the conflict (e.g. UNYOM in Yemen)

Financing UN peacekeeping operations

11


- **basic guidelines** for sharing the financial burden of PK set in 1960s:
 - **collective responsibility** of all member states
 - member states encouraged to make **voluntary contributions**
 - economically **less developed countries** – limited capacity to make contributions
 - **permanent members** of the SC – special responsibility for peace and security

- the SC requested to open a **special account** into which the member states would contribute according to a **graded scale**:
 - 63,15 % paid by the five **permanent members** of the SC (Group A)
 - 34,78 % by economically **developed states** that are not permanent members of the SC (Group B)
 - 2,02 % by economically **less developed states** (Group C)
 - 0,05 % by economically **least developed states** (Group D)

Peacekeeping operations expenditures

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Figure 1. | **U.N. Peacekeeping Budget, 1950-2013**



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SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING

17 October 2016

Content

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- **What does “success” mean?**
- **Overall record of UN peacekeeping**
 - Stories of success
 - Stories of failure
- **Causes of failure**
 - “Lessons learned”
- **How about giving it all up?**

What does “success” mean?

What does “success” mean?

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- discussion on **what actually is a PKO success**
- multiple **criteria** X no unity
- depending on the **point of view** one adopts, the same operation can be identified either as a success or failure
- **implications for policy making** (which model to adopt / avoid?)

Criteria of judging success

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- **conflict management** – reducing armed conflict, limiting casualties
- **conflict resolution** – addressing the underlying causes of conflict
 - ▣ not all peacekeeping missions have the task of solving the causes of a conflict!
- **mission mandate** X mission outcome
 - ▣ mandates often vague, complex, changing
- **prevention of the spill over**
- evaluation should be done in light of the **constraints under which missions operate!** (e.g. funding, equipment, personnel, the degree of cooperation of the conflict parties)
- long- or a short-term **perspective**

Overall record of UN peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping – overall record

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- many cases of success as well as failure, mostly - **mixed results**
- **failures always get more publicity than successes!** 1988 Nobel Peace Prize
- Diehl (1987): most operations accomplished a **minimization of armed conflict**, but ineffective in helping to **resolve the underlying sources of the dispute**
- Bratt (1996): 39 UN PKOs, 1948-1996:
 - **mandate performance** → 19 missions completely and 3 moderately successful
 - **conflict containment** → 11 missions completely and 3 moderately successful
 - **conflict resolution** → 21 missions completely and 4 moderately successful
 - **limitation of casualties** → 19 missions completely and 4 moderately successful

UN Peacekeeping – overall record

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Pushkina (2006): 17 UN PKO, 1945-1998:

- ▣ completion of the mandate
 - ▣ limiting violence
 - ▣ number of violent deaths
 - ▣ situation of refugees and internally displaced people
 - ▣ spread of conflict and return to war
- **success:** UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia), UNSMIH (Haiti), UNMIH (Haiti), UNPROFOR-Macedonia and UNPREDEP (Macedonia)
- **partial success:** UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNTAC (Cambodia) and ONUC (Congo)
- **failure:** UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNPROFOR-Croatia, UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNCRO (Croatia) and UNAMIR (Rwanda)

Stories of success

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- **ONUMOZ in Mozambique (1992-94)**
 - major violence ceased
 - demobilization implemented
 - overall security improved
 - stable environment for the return and resettlement of refugees

- **UNTAG in Namibia (1989-90)**
 - managed to run free and fair elections
 - ensured the withdrawal of South Africa's troops
 - cooperation of parties, support of the SC, timely provision of resources
 - model operation for many subsequent cases

- **UNTAET in East Timor (1999-2002) + UNMISSET follow-up**
 - managed to establish an effective administration
 - enabled refugees to return
 - ensured humanitarian assistance
 - supported capacity building for self-governance

ONUMOZ 1992-1994

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□ Set up for failure

- Delayed compliance, soaring budget, obstructions and ineffective command and control, parallel structures by humanitarian UNOHAC, incorrect assets – lacking air support or transport in a country with little infrastructure

FIRST COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY CONTINGENTS WAS ALSO A DISASTER WHO REFUSED TO SHARE INFORMATION WITH ANYONE, INCLUDING AJELLO, OR TO DEFINE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES IN ANYTHING BUT THE NARROWEST POSSIBLE TERMS.

10. IN FACT THE SMALL CONTINGENT OF MILITARY OBSERVERS CARRIED THE MAJORITY OF THE MISSION BURDEN AS THEY STAFFED ASSEMBLY AREAS, ASSISTED DEMOBILIZATION, COLLECTED ARMS CACHES AND VERIFIED WEAPONS DEPOSITS. THE BULK OF THE MILITARY CONTINGENTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SPENT THEIR TIME PATROLLING TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS IN A BENIGN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THREATENED ONLY BY AN OCCASIONAL FLAT TIRE. THEIR BIGGEST CHALLENGE CAME WHEN SOLDIERS DEMANDING DEMOBILIZATION OR FOOD WOULD RIOT. THEN THE BLUE HELMETS WERE USEFUL FOR DIRECTING TRAFFIC AWAY FROM THE DISTURBANCE AND IN DELIVERING SUPPLIES TO PLACATE THE SOLDIERS.

ONUMOZ 1992-1994

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- Strong suits
 - ▣ high donations, strong leadership (Ajello), aggressive diplomacy

- Success
 - ▣ will to demobilize stronger, than UN capacity – employment of large number of NGOs
 - ▣ diligent peace commissions oversight
 - ▣ emphasis on observers rather than troop presence
1000/6500
 - ▣ media engagement

Story of success to failure and back?

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- **MONUC/MONUSCO DRC 1999+**
 - successful elections
 - 2 year peace
 - 22,000 troops

 - repeated violations of the Lusaka agreement
 - rape capitol of the world
 - east controlled by armed groups
 - foreign involvement and support
 - loss of government control (M23, LRA)

Success achieved by UN?

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- **UNAMSIL – Sierra Leone 1999-2005**
 - failure of ECOWAS
 - success through peace enforcement? Role of GB – Operation Pallisier
 - enforcement of Lomé Peace Agreements
 - DDR, SSR, Truth and Reconciliation commission
 - economic recovery

- **UNMIL – Liberia 2003+**
 - ECOWAS success, Nigerian mediation
 - Post-violence, post-regional intervention
 - Stabilization and economic recovery
 - SSR

Stories of failure

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- **UNOSOM in Somalia (1992-95)**
 - difficult environment of a failed state
 - warlords fighting against the UN presence
 - after the killing of 18 American soldiers, US closed support to the mission
 - US presidential directive → conditions for US involvement in UN peacekeeping: possibility to advance US interests, acceptable risk, clear exit strategy etc.

- **UNAMIR in Rwanda (1993-96)**
 - weak political will in the SC after Somali experience
 - information about genocide overlooked
 - lack of necessary resources
 - withdrawal after 10/2500 troop deaths

- **UNPROFOR in Bosnia (1992-95)**
 - no peace to keep → UN soldiers trapped between the belligerents, frequent target
 - the fall of Srebrenica (“safe haven”) → massacre of 8 000 Bosniak men

Causes of failure

Causes of failure

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- **lack of political will**
 - intrastate conflict as a domestic issue (principle of non-intervention, to avoid precedents)
 - unwillingness to engage in distant places outside the sphere of interests
- **lack of resources**
 - mismatch between poor resources and broad tasks
- **inadequate mandates**
 - too broad, too vague or out-of-date
 - need for clear, appropriate mandates, reflecting the realities on the ground
- **cooperation of the actors of the conflict**
 - spoilers that are against mission's presence
 - diplomatic or enforcement measures to ensure compliance with mission's mandate
- **suitability of traditional principles?**
 - same principles X different conditions

“Lessons learned”

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- **“Lessons learned” reports** in cooperation with troop contributing countries, NGOs and academic institutions
- **Lessons Learned Unit** within the DPKO established in 1995
- **“An Agenda for Peace”** (1992) – B. Boutros-Ghali; first comprehensive UN report; early 1990s euphoria about the ability of the UN to accomplish new tasks + warning about the emerging gap between means and ends
- **“Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”** (1995) – step back from radical innovations of the AfP; involvement in peacekeeping only
- **Lessons learned report on Somalia** (1995) – related to the UN in/ability to use force effectively and appropriately; necessity of clear mandates, adequate means, improved coordination, better public information campaigns and humanitarian assistance strategy

“Lessons learned”

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- **Lessons learned report on Rwanda** (1996) – avoidance of peace enforcement (reflection of the contraction period); dismissed the argument that UNAMIR should have been able to use force to protect civilians
- **Lessons learned report on Srebrenica** (1999) – unusually frank and detailed appraisal; inadequacy of symbolic deterrence, ambivalence about using force, blind insistence on the ideology of impartiality
- **“Brahimi Report”** (2000) – high-level panel lead by L. Brahimi; the most comprehensive “lessons learned” appraisal; need for clear and achievable mandates, better preventive action and peace building strategy, use of integrated mission planning etc.
- **smaller “lessons learned”** focused on particular missions or issues connected with PK (use of force, gender issues, human rights issues)
- implementation record of these reports = **mixed results**

How about giving it all up... and to „give war a chance“?

What do you think about Edward Luttwak's conclusions about peacekeeping?

Try to find arguments (1) supporting and (2) opposing Luttwak's conclusions.

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