Motivations for contributing
1
2
Motivations for state participation
 realist motives – to support own interests
 idealist motives – to promote norms and values (international peace and
security, cooperation, multilateralism)
 liberal motives – to contribute to the continuation of status quo and foster
values such as democratization and good governance
 prestige (smaller or developing states)
 national image and reputation
 fulfillment of responsibilities, expression of commitment to the UN
 training and experience
 profit (payment from the UN for each soldier)
 campaign to become nonpermanent members of the SC (e.g. Morocco,
Spain, Czech Republic)
3
Small states and CMOs
 limited role in international politics
 influence by acting through IOs
 often included in peace operations (political reasons)
 “international image”, legitimacy
 ambition to play a role too („we-too“ phenomenon)
 a lot of small states have gained a reputation as peacekeepers
 history of small states’ participation in peace operations:
 earlier peace operations – small states contributed police
 interwar years – small states started to participate militarily
 during the CW – small states perceived as better peacekeepers X policies
still set by powers
4
 advantages of small states’ participation in CMO:
 absence of a power status  less polarized reactions
 involvement or interest in a conflict less obvious (colonial past either
forgotten, minimal or non-existing)
 positive / crucial role in negotiations (easier to act as “honest brokers”,
risk less “loss of face”)
 attempt to do the best in order to show their ability
 limited defence budgets  more flexible and used to improvise
 Do you see any disadvantages?
5
 disadvantages of small states’ participation in CMO:
 carry less weight in the international system  difficult to
influence policy
 kept out of decision-making processes  influence on their
troops
 appear less convincingly in an operation (not backed up by an
intense military force)
 able to contribute only limited contingents
 possible shortages in modern equipment
 harder to bear casualties
6
Motives
 to answer outside pressures (from allies or organizations)
 to lend a multinational character to missions; to increase the
legitimacy
 to contribute to the maintenance of global peace and
security
 to make positive impression on the world stage, to build
image and prestige
 down payment for potential assistance of the international
community
 Baltic States – fearing inference of Russia
 to demonstrate the ability to contribute to an operation
 Central and Eastern European states – NATO membership
7
 to repay a debt for an “own” peacekeeping operation in the past
 to keep armed forces occupied outside the country rather than
meddling into domestic affairs
 esp. Third world states where the military is not entirely under civilian
control
 to profit financially
 to benefit by receiving equipment
 to get experience
 to get contact with other military forces
8
9
Financing UN peacekeeping
operations
Financing UN peacekeeping operations
10
 two basic budget levels within the UN:
 regular budget (5bn USD)
 peacekeeping budget (8,4bn USD)
 UN PKOs generally financed through their own separate budget
 standard practice established with the authorization of UNEF I
(special account created)
 exceptions funded through the regular UN budget
 military observer missions with small budget (e.g. UNTSO in the Middle
East, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan)
 possible funding by the parties to the conflict (e.g. UNYOM in
Yemen)
Financing UN peacekeeping operations
11
 basic guidelines for sharing the financial burden of PK set in 1960s:
 collective responsibility of all member states
 member states encouraged to make voluntary contributions
 economically less developed countries – limited capacity to make
contributions
 permanent members of the SC – special responsibility for peace and
security
 the SC requested to open a special account into which the member
states would contribute according to a graded scale:
 63,15 % paid by the five permanent members of the SC (Group A)
 34,78 % by economically developed states that are not permanent
members of the SC (Group B)
 2,02 % by economically less developed states (Group C)
 0,05 % by economically least developed states (Group D)
Peacekeeping operations expenditures
12
Sources
14
 Bellamy, A. J. – Williams, P. – Griffin, S. (2004): Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge, Polity Press.
 Bureš, O. (2008): United Nations Peacekeeping: Bridging the Capabilities-Expectations Gap, Saarbrücken, VDM
Verlag.
 Daniel, D. C. F. – Caraher, L. C. (2006): Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations and
Implications for Global Capacity, International Peacekeeping, Vol XIII, No 3, pp. 297-315.
 Diehl, P. (2008): Peace Operations, Cambridge, Polity Press.
 Global Policy (2005): Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures: 1947-2005, on-line text
(http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/pk_tables/expend.pdf)
 Ramsbotham, O. – Woodhouse, T. (1999): Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations, Santa
Barbara, ABC-Clio.
 S/RES/143 (1960), on-line text
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/32/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement)
 S/RES/1291 (2000), on-line text
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/313/35/PDF/N0031335.pdf?OpenElement)
 UN (2005): In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Report of the SecretaryGeneral,
on-line text (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf).
 UN (2012): Background Note UN Peacekeeping, on-line text
(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf)
 UN (2013): Department of Peacekeeping Operations (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/).
SUCCESS AND FAILURE
OF UN PEACEKEEPING
17 October 2016
Content
 What does “success” mean?
 Overall record of UN peacekeeping
 Stories of success
 Stories of failure
 Causes of failure
 “Lessons learned”
 How about giving it all up?
16
What does “success” mean?
17
What does “success” mean?
 discussion on what actually is a PKO success
 multiple criteria X no unity
 depending on the point of view one adopts, the
same operation can be identified either as a
success or failure
 implications for policy making (which model to
adopt / avoid?)
18
Criteria of judging success
 conflict management – reducing armed conflict, limiting casualties
 conflict resolution – addressing the underlying causes of conflict
 not all peacekeeping missions have the task of solving the causes of a
conflict!
 mission mandate X mission outcome
 mandates often vague, complex, changing
 prevention of the spill over
 evaluation should be done in light of the constrains under which
missions operate! (e.g. funding, equipment, personnel, the degree of
cooperation of the conflict parties)
 long- or a short-term perspective
19
Overall record of UN peacekeeping
20
UN peacekeeping – overall record
 many cases of success as well as failure, mostly - mixed results
 failures always get more publicity than successes! 1988 Nobel
Peace Prize
 Diehl (1987): most operations accomplished a minimization of armed
conflict, but ineffective in helping to resolve the underlying sources
of the dispute
 Bratt (1996): 39 UN PKOs, 1948-1996:
 mandate performance  19 missions completely and 3 moderately
successful
 conflict containment  11 missions completely and 3 moderately
successful
 conflict resolution  21 missions completely and 4 moderately successful
 limitation of casualties  19 missions completely and 4 moderately
successful
21
UN Peacekeeping – overall record
Pushkina (2006): 17 UN PKO, 1945-1998:
 completion of the mandate
 limiting violence
 number of violent deaths
 situation of refugees and internally displaced people
 spread of conflict and return to war
 success: UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNTAES
(Eastern Slavonia), UNSMIH (Haiti), UNMIH (Haiti), UNPROFORMacedonia
and UNPREDEP (Macedonia)
 partial success: UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNTAC (Cambodia) and ONUC
(Congo)
 failure: UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNPROFORCroatia,
UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNCRO (Croatia) and UNAMIR
(Rwanda)
22
Stories of success
 ONUMOZ in Mozambique (1992-94)
 major violence ceased
 demobilization implemented
 overall security improved
 stable environment for the return and resettlement of refugees
 UNTAG in Namibia (1989-90)
 managed to run free and fair elections
 ensured the withdrawal of South Africa’s troops
 cooperation of parties, support of the SC, timely provision of resources
 model operation for many subsequent cases
 UNTAET in East Timor (1999-2002) + UNMISET follow-up
 managed to establish an effective administration
 enabled refugees to return
 ensured humanitarian assistance
 supported capacity building for self-governance
23
ONUMOZ 1992-1994
 Set up for failure
 Delayed compliance, soaring budget, obstructions and ineffective
command and control, parallel structures by humanitarian
UNOHAC, incorrect assets – lacking air support or transport in a
country with little infrastructure
24
ONUMOZ 1992-1994
 Strong suits
 high donations, strong leadership (Ajello), aggressive diplomacy
 Success
 will to demobilize stronger, than UN capacity –
employment of large number of NGOs
 dilligent peace commissions oversight
 emphasis on observers rather than troop presence
1000/6500
 media engagement
25
Story of success to failure and back?
 MONUC/MONUSCO DRC 1999+
 successful elections
 2 year peace
 22,000 troops
 repeated violations of the Lusaka agreement
 rape capitol of the world
 east controlled by armed groups
 foreign involvement and support
 loss of government control (M23, LRA)
26
Success achieved by UN?
 UNAMSIL – Sierra Leone 1999-2005
 failure of ECOWAS
 success through peace enforcement? Role of GB – Operation Pallisier
 enforcement of Lomé Peace Agreements
 DDR, SSR, Truth and Reconciliation commission
 economic recovery
 UNMIL – Liberia 2003+
 ECOWAS success, Nigerian mediation
 Post-violence, post-regional intervention
 Stabilization and economic recovery
 SSR
27
Stories of failure
 UNOSOM in Somalia (1992-95)
 difficult environment of a failed state
 warlords fighting against the UN presence
 after the killing of 18 American soldiers, US closed support to the mission
 US presidential directive  conditions for US involvement in UN peacekeeping:
possibility to advance US interests, acceptable risk, clear exit strategy etc.
 UNAMIR in Rwanda (1993-96)
 weak political will in the SC after Somali experience
 information about genocide overlooked
 lack of necessary resources
 withdrawal after 10/2500 troop deaths
 UNPROFOR in Bosnia (1992-95)
 no peace to keep  UN soldiers trapped between the belligerents, frequent target
 the fall of Srebrenica (“safe haven”)  massacre of 8 000 Bosniak men
28
Causes of failure
29
Causes of failure
 lack of political will
 intrastate conflict as a domestic issue (principle of non-intervention, to avoid
precedents)
 unwillingness to engage in distant places outside the sphere of interests
 lack of resources
 mismatch between poor resources and broad tasks
 inadequate mandates
 too broad, too vague or out-of-date
 need for clear, appropriate mandates, reflecting the realities on the ground
 cooperation of the actors of the conflict
 spoilers that are against mission’s presence
 diplomatic or enforcement measures to ensure compliance with mission’s mandate
 suitability of traditional principles?
 same principles X different conditions
30
“Lessons learned”
 “Lessons learned” reports in cooperation with troop contributing countries,
NGOs and academic institutions
 Lessons Learned Unit within the DPKO established in 1995
 “An Agenda for Peace” (1992) – B. Boutros-Ghali; first comprehensive UN
report; early 1990s euphoria about the ability of the UN to accomplish new
tasks + warning about the emerging gap between means and ends
 “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” (1995) – step back from radical
innovations of the AfP; involvement in peacekeeping only
 Lessons learned report on Somalia (1995) – related to the UN in/ability to
use force effectively and appropriately; necessity of clear mandates,
adequate means, improved coordination, better public information campaigns
and humanitarian assistance strategy
31
“Lessons learned”
 Lessons learned report on Rwanda (1996) – avoidance of peace
enforcement (reflection of the contraction period); dismissed the argument
that UNAMIR should have been able to use force to protect civilians
 Lessons learned report on Srebrenica (1999) – unusually frank and
detailed appraisal; inadequacy of symbolic deterrence, ambivalence about
using force, blind insistence on the ideology of impartiality
 “Brahimi Report” (2000) – high-level panel lead by L. Brahimi; the most
comprehensive “lessons learned” appraisal; need for clear and achievable
mandates, better preventive action and peace building strategy, use of
integrated mission planning etc.
 smaller “lessons learned” focused on particular missions or issues
connected with PK (use of force, gender issues, human rights issues)
 implementation record of these reports = mixed results
32
How about giving it all up… and to
„give war a chance“?
What do you think about Edward Luttwak’s
conclusions about peacekeeping?
Try to find arguments (1) supporting and
(2) opposing Luttwak’s conclusions.
33
Sources
 Bratt, D. (1996): Defining Peacekeeping Success: The Experience of UNTAC, Peacekeeping
& International Relations, Vol XXV, No 4, pp. 3-5.
 Bureš, O. (2008): United Nations Peacekeeping: Bridging the Capabilities-Expectations Gap,
Saarbrücken, VDM Verlag.
 Heldt, B. (2001): Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions, National
Defence College of Sweden, Stockholm.
 Luttwak, E. N. (1999): “Give War a Chance.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 36-44.
 Pushkina, D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeping
Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol XIII, No 2, pp. 133-149.
 UN: Charter of the United Nations, on-line text (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/).
 UN (2000): Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Summary of
Recommendations, on-line text (http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/).
 UN DPKO (1996): Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda, on-line text
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/lessons/rwanda.htm).
 Yilmaz, M. E. (2005): UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, International Journal of
World Peace, Vol XXII, No 2, pp. 13-28.
34