

MODERN CHALLENGES OF UN PEACEKEEPING

25 October 2016

“Lessons learned”

2

- **“Lessons learned” reports** in cooperation with troop contributing countries, NGOs and academic institutions
- **Lessons Learned Unit** within the DPKO established in 1995
- **“An Agenda for Peace”** (1992) – B. Boutros-Ghali; first comprehensive UN report; early 1990s euphoria about the ability of the UN to accomplish new tasks + warning about the emerging gap between means and ends
- **“Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”** (1995) – step back from radical innovations of the AfP; involvement in peacekeeping only
- **Lessons learned report on Somalia** (1995) – related to the UN in/ability to use force effectively and appropriately; necessity of clear mandates, adequate means, improved coordination, better public information campaigns and humanitarian assistance strategy

“Lessons learned”

3

- **Lessons learned report on Rwanda (1996)** – avoidance of peace enforcement (reflection of the contraction period); dismissed the argument that UNAMIR should have been able to use force to protect civilians
- **Lessons learned report on Srebrenica (1999)** – unusually frank and detailed appraisal; inadequacy of symbolic deterrence, ambivalence about using force, blind insistence on the ideology of impartiality

„Lessons learned”

4

- **“Brahimi Report”** (2000) – high-level panel lead by L. Brahimi; the most comprehensive “lessons learned” appraisal; need for clear and achievable mandates, better preventive action and peace building strategy, use of integrated mission planning etc.
- **smaller “lessons learned”** focused on particular missions or issues connected with PK (use of force, gender issues, human rights issues)
- implementation record of these reports = **mixed results**
- **2010 UN GA Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations** – reversal?

Current challenges

5

- Same old, same old
- Move toward peace enforcement
- Local ownership mantra
- Outsourcing conundrum
- Conditional support
- Wrongful conduct

Same old, same old - resources

6

- **Authority over armed forces**
 - ▣ National contingents may be withheld, reassigned, reconstituted, or withdrawn
- **National caveats**
 - ▣ Limitations by national contributors must be observed, fine line of communication
- **Peace doesn't always reflect the situation on the ground, nor is it always inclusive**
 - ▣ The character of the peace to keep is fluctuant
 - ▣ Victories may leave spoilers
 - ▣ Negotiated settlements may leave malcontents

Peace enforcement taking over?

7

- **Brahimi report replaced by R2P**
- **No peace to keep is overcome**
- **From “robust” mandates to “stabilization”**
- **Robust peacekeeping is not peace enforcement.** Robust peacekeeping is distinct from peace enforcement where use of force is at the strategic level and pursued often without the consent of the host nation/and or main parties to the conflict. The threat and use of force in robust peacekeeping is at the tactical level, limited in time and space, and aimed at countering or containing specific spoiler and residual or looming threat in a conflict or post-conflict environment. Large scale violence or one where the major parties are engaged in violent conflict is no longer a robust peacekeeping context. Robust missions are not configured or intended to address any systemic breakdown in a political process (*UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2010*)

Peace enforcement taking over?

8

- Complex political emergencies require **stabilization more often**
 - ▣ Coupled with POC mandates, result in the necessity of fast and robust reactions

- **Enforcement includes danger of interstate tensions**, as Africans keep peace next door via peace enforcement
 - ▣ Main peacekeeper contributors are close to conflicts they invest in (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia) – fine line to **meddling**

- Drones, intelligence gathering, **counterinsurgency tactics** from other
los
 - ▣ Changing the nature of UN missions under Chapter VII

Local ownership

9

- Local ownership and cooperation
- Outreach
 - Presentations
 - Teams
 - Quick impact projects
 - Building of centers but NOT development
- Increases legitimacy of UN peacebuilding
- Increases peace sustainability
- Increases democratic reform

Local ownership

10

- **Goes two ways**
- Preventing “engineered” democracy projects promoting strategic interests of present international forces
- vs.
- Preventing overinclusion vs. exclusion

- **Support for local solution vs. local support for international solution?**

- Elections not the best answer?
 - ▣ Lessons learned in late 1990s, yet still perpetuated

“Outsourcing”

11

- **Authorizing regional organizations**
 - Coalition Gulf 1991, or AMISOM in Somalia 2007
- **Deployment delays**
 - Serval Mali 2012
- **Enforcement**
- **Funding lack**
 - 1997 ECOMOG, Sierra Leone
- **Strike force requirement**
 - Force Intervention Brigade DRC 2013
- **High risk of combat**
- **Offer acceptance**
 - Libya 2011
- **“Rehatting” going the other way?**

Support conditionality

12

- Enforcement and conditionality of support since 2010s
- When governments (interim or otherwise) rely on UN support in the field:
- **HRDDP - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy** on UN support to non-UN security forces
- Withdraws support if HR aren't respected by supported army (FARDC)
 - Hard bargaining position when accusations mounting

Wrongful conduct

13

- **Wrongful conduct – who's to blame?**
 - UN may not be held accountable at any court
- Peacekeepers are **guaranteed immunity in the host state** judicial system
 - High recurrence of sexual assault allegations
 - Court martials are a rare occurrence
 - Entire contingents may be affected (DRC units from MINUSCA)
- **Reluctance to assign blame**, official reports may not reflect intelligence
 - Rwandan role in homicides in Mali

Wrongful conduct

14

- Preying on vulnerable individuals causes **irreparable damage to UN reputation** – as does a lack of repercussions for perpetrators
 - Number of prostitutes in Cambodia rose from 6,000 in 1992 to 25,000 at the height of peace mission (Whitworth 2004:67)

- At the same time Gender is an issue in:
 - Civilian personnel 30%
 - Police forces 20%
 - Armed forces 7%

Sources

- Bratt, D. (1996): *Defining Peacekeeping Success: The Experience of UNTAC*, Peacekeeping & International Relations, Vol XXV, No 4, pp. 3-5.
- Bureš, O. (2008): *United Nations Peacekeeping: Bridging the Capabilities-Expectations Gap*, Saarbrücken, VDM Verlag.
- Heldt, B. (2001): *Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions*, National Defence College of Sweden, Stockholm.
- Luttwak, E. N. (1999): "Give War a Chance." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 36-44.
- Pushkina, D. (2006): *A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission*, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol XIII, No 2, pp. 133-149.
- UN: *Charter of the United Nations*, on-line text (<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>).
- UN (2000): *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Summary of Recommendations*, on-line text (http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/).
- UN DPKO (1996): *Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda*, on-line text (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/lessons/rwanda.htm>).
- Yilmaz, M. E. (2005): *UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, *International Journal of World Peace*, Vol XXII, No 2, pp. 13-28.