MODERN CHALLENGES
OF UN PEACEKEEPING
25 October 2016
“Lessons learned”
 “Lessons learned” reports in cooperation with troop contributing countries,
NGOs and academic institutions
 Lessons Learned Unit within the DPKO established in 1995
 “An Agenda for Peace” (1992) – B. Boutros-Ghali; first comprehensive UN
report; early 1990s euphoria about the ability of the UN to accomplish new
tasks + warning about the emerging gap between means and ends
 “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” (1995) – step back from radical
innovations of the AfP; involvement in peacekeeping only
 Lessons learned report on Somalia (1995) – related to the UN in/ability to
use force effectively and appropriately; necessity of clear mandates,
adequate means, improved coordination, better public information campaigns
and humanitarian assistance strategy
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“Lessons learned”
 Lessons learned report on Rwanda (1996) –
avoidance of peace enforcement (reflection of
the contraction period); dismissed the
argument that UNAMIR should have been able
to use force to protect civilians
 Lessons learned report on Srebrenica
(1999) – unusually frank and detailed
appraisal; inadequacy of symbolic deterrence,
ambivalence about using force, blind insistence
on the ideology of impartiality
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„Lessons learned”
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 “Brahimi Report” (2000) – high-level panel lead by L.
Brahimi; the most comprehensive “lessons learned”
appraisal; need for clear and achievable mandates, better
preventive action and peace building strategy, use of
integrated mission planning etc.
 smaller “lessons learned” focused on particular missions
or issues connected with PK (use of force, gender issues,
human rights issues)
 implementation record of these reports = mixed results
 2010 UN GA Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations – reversal?
Current challenges
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 Same old, same old
 Move toward peace enforcement
 Local ownership mantra
 Outsourcing conundrum
 Conditional support
 Wrongful conduct
Same old, same old - resources
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 Authority over armed forces
 National contingents may be withheld, reassigned, reconstituted, or
withdrawn
 National caveats
 Limitations by national contributors must be observed, fine line of
communication
 Peace doesn’t always reflect the situation on the
ground, nor is it always inclusive
 The character of the peace to keep is fluctuant
 Victories may leave spoilers
 Negotiated settlements may leave malcontents
Peace enforcement taking over?
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 Brahimi report replaced by R2P
 No peace to keep is overcome
 From “robust” mandates to “stabilization”
 Robust peacekeeping is not peace enforcement. Robust peacekeeping is
distinct from peace enforcement where use of force is at the strategic level and
pursued often without the consent of the host nation/and or main parties to the
conflict. The threat and use of force in robust peacekeeping is at the tactical
level, limited in time and space, and aimed at countering or containing specific
spoiler and residual or looming threat in a conflict or post-conflict environment.
Large scale violence or one where the major parties are engaged in violent
conflict is no longer a robust peacekeeping context. Robust missions are not
configured or intended to address any systemic breakdown in a political
process (UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, 2010)
Peace enforcement taking over?
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 Complex political emergencies require stabilization more often
 Coupled with POC mandates, result in the necessity of fast and
robust reactions
 Enforcement includes danger of interstate tensions, as Africans
keep peace next door via peace enforcement
 Main peacekeeper contributors are close to conflicts they invest in
(Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia) – fine line to meddling
 Drones, intelligence gathering, counterinsurgency tactics from other
Ios
 Changing the nature of UN missions under Chapter VII
Local ownership
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 Local ownership and cooperation
 Outreach
 Presentations
 Teams
 Quick impact projects
 Building of centers but NOT development
 Increases legitimacy of UN peacebuilding
 Increases peace sustainability
 Increases democratic reform
Local ownership
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 Goes two ways
 Preventing “engineered” democracy projects promoting strategic
interests of present international forces
 vs.
 Preventing overinclusion vs. exclusion
 Support for local solution vs. local support for international
solution?
 Elections not the best answer?
 Lessons learned in late 1990s, yet still perpetuated
“Outsourcing”
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 Authorizing regional organizations
 Coalition Gulf 1991, or AMISOM in Somalia 2007
 Deployment delays
 Serval Mali 2012
 Enforcement
 Funding lack
 1997 ECOMOG, Sierra Leone
 Strike force requirement
 Force Intervention Brigade DRC 2013
 High risk of combat
 Offer acceptance
 Libya 2011
 “Rehatting” going the other way?
Support conditionality
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 Enforcement and conditionality of support since 2010s
 When governments (interim or otherwise) rely on UN
support in the field:
 HRDDP - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN
support to non-UN security forces
 Withdraws support if HR aren’t respected by supported
army (FARDC)
 Hard bargaining position when accusations mounting
Wrongful conduct
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 Wrongful conduct – who’s to blame?
 UN may not be held accountable at any court
 Peacekeepers are guaranteed immunity in the host
state judicial system
 High recurrence of sexual assault allegations
 Court martials are a rare occurrence
 Entire contingents may be affected (DRC units from MINUSCA)
 Reluctance to assign blame, official reports may not
reflect intelligence
 Rwandan role in homicides in Mali
Wrongful conduct
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 Preying on vulnerable individuals causes irreparable
damage to UN reputation – as does a lack of
repercussions for perpetrators
 Number of prostitutes in Cambodia rose for 6,000 in 1992 to 25,000 at the
height of peace mission (Whitworth 2004:67)
 At the same time Gender is an issue in:
 Civilian personnel 30%
 Police forces 20%
 Armed forces 7%
Sources
 Bratt, D. (1996): Defining Peacekeeping Success: The Experience of UNTAC, Peacekeeping
& International Relations, Vol XXV, No 4, pp. 3-5.
 Bureš, O. (2008): United Nations Peacekeeping: Bridging the Capabilities-Expectations Gap,
Saarbrücken, VDM Verlag.
 Heldt, B. (2001): Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions, National
Defence College of Sweden, Stockholm.
 Luttwak, E. N. (1999): “Give War a Chance.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 36-44.
 Pushkina, D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeping
Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol XIII, No 2, pp. 133-149.
 UN: Charter of the United Nations, on-line text (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/).
 UN (2000): Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Summary of
Recommendations, on-line text (http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/).
 UN DPKO (1996): Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda, on-line text
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/lessons/rwanda.htm).
 Yilmaz, M. E. (2005): UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, International Journal of
World Peace, Vol XXII, No 2, pp. 13-28.
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