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DAFT VERSION
Paper prepared for the Eleventh Biennial International Conference of the European
Union Studies Association, Los Angeles, Ca., April 23-25, 2009
Comprehensive Approaches to Crisis Management
Analytical perspectives and operative concepts of international
organisations
Christian Mölling & Claudia Major
COMMENTS WELCOME
Contact
Christian Mölling
Center for Security Studies (CSS)
ETH Zurich
moelling@sipo.gess.ethz.ch
Dr. Claudia Major
Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, France ;
University of Birmingham, UK
claudia.major@sciences-po.org
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1 Introduction1
The changing nature of crises has forced security actors, be they national or multinational,
to reconsider their responses. As a result, the character of crisis management is changing:
today, an effective response to crises has to adapt to several interacting developments.
First, the fields of activities expand while the related objectives tend to diversify. While
classical peacekeeping essentially meant to contain the potential for military escalation,
current missions are often expected to manage societal, economic and political
transformation. Consequently, the number of relevant and necessary actors has grown.
The military establishment and governments no longer influence the situation on the
ground alone. Also local actors and groups with a wide range of interest intervene. A final
dimension of change concerns the timing and duration of such interventions. Today, it may
span from preventive engagement over crisis management up to post-conflict-
management.
How can a successful and efficient response to these challenges be assured? The answer
to this fundamental question has been labelled “comprehensive approach” (CA). As a
generic term, it describes an all-encompassing response to both, new and ongoing
demands in crisis management. It intends to promote the external and internal
coordination of policy instruments and the coherence of common objectives between
different actors. However, the term is not a single, clear cut concept. Quite the opposite, it
subsumes a number of very heterogeneous approaches and instruments generated by
national governments and international organisations to reinvigorate the way they plan and
carry out crisis management operations.
1
The authors would like to thank their interview interlocutors from the EU, NATO and UN for their time, efforts and
comments on this paper. The responsibility for the text remains entirely with the authors.
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In the light of this diversity the aim of this paper is twofold: On a conceptual level, it aims to
clarify the main issues in current crisis management discussed under “comprehensive
approaches”. What challenges aim these concepts to address? What conceptual and
practical problems do they face?
Building upon this basic conceptual understanding, the paper will then turn to the practical
level when asking how precisely international organisations (IO) such as NATO, EU and
UN aim to respond to the general need of CA. The paper will explore to what extent the
IOs have developed their own concepts for CA, which problems NATO, the UN and the EU
sought to tackle with these concepts, and to what extent these concepts have had an
impact on the planning and implementation of missions so far. It will give an initial account
on the existing concepts by sketching out the content of the core documents. In terms of
implementation, it is worth underlining that CA still is a comparatively young area. Hence,
reliable and meaningful empirical data to assess the implementation of CA’s for specific
actors like the three IOs under study here have not yet been sufficiently generated and
made accessible. Especially, “Lessons Learned” reports are more often than not classified.
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2 Mapping out analytical approaches
CA has become a label to designate a multitude of developments in the area of security
governance. Its initial (political) advantage lies in its constructive ambiguity which leaves
room for various interpretations. However, this has also led to a confusion about what the
terms actually means.
Instead of adding yet another definition, this paper aims to contribute to the mapping of
different conceptions and to offer analytical access to the debates and concepts. However,
unlike most definitions of CA that begin with the changing mission character, we argue that
the perceived security problem is a better starting point. It constitutes the point of
reference for the missions and is supposedly also the ultimate point of assessment of a
mission’s failure or success. Contrary, debates over how to improve intra-organisational
cooperation may loose touch with the original problem. The adjustment of the structure,
cooperation etc of a mission is not an aim in itself but must serve to alleviate the initially
identified problem which was used to legitimise the operation. Moreover, while it is a
common place to identify especially problems between civilian and military agencies, these
distinctions are not of primary concern. We perceive this as only one problem amongst
several other areas where room for improvement can be identified.
2.1 Security problems and their influence on mission design
The initial problem which made CAs necessary is the changing nature of crisis or of their
perception. Since the end of the Cold War, crises and situations of instability are perceived
as becoming more complex. This applies to reasons and dynamics as well as to threats
and impacts. War, which during the Cold War was more of a probability than a reality,
increasingly became a reality while also considerably changing its face. Instead of mass
armies clashing hypothetically along the “River Weser”-line, the new conflicts were
characterized by actual mass killings carried out by militias, paramilitaries or mercenaries
while the state as actor lost in importance. Moreover, the interconnectedness of war and
economy (rent-seeking actors)2
but also of security and development3
have been
highlighted. Eventually, the new crises “work” without direct violence. Poverty, famine and
migration highlight the non-violence related reasons for deadly consequences. Failing
states and failed states set the scene for violent or criminal activities of non-state actors.
Today, international terrorism, drug and human trafficking, corruption and organized crime
have been defined as some of the most commonly recognised threats in the world.4
Resulting conflicts involve a complex interplay of civilians, military groups, armed non-state
actors, international organizations and the media.
2
D. Lalive d’Epinay / A. Schnabel 2007
3
Chandler 2007
4
UNSG 2005; European Council 2003
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Clearly the perception of increased complexity5
led to a response in terms of security
policy and action. Most important for the change in perception and reaction on these
issues is possibly the anticipated or experienced interdependence on a de-territorialized
dimension. The growing interconnectedness as one effect of globalization and the reduced
protective function of geography as another have changed the taxonomy of threats and
security.
Changing mission character: In response to the changes in perceived problems and the
subsequent experienced inefficiency of responses, the nature of conflict management has
changed rapidly in the last decades. Military missions on the Balkans, Somalia and
elsewhere experienced painfully that classical peacekeeping has become ineffective in the
light of the new types of crises and conflicts. More generally, military tools alone are
increasingly perceived as insufficient.
Generally, to be efficient, responses had to address the growing complexity, which meant
that they had to respond to this conundrum of multifaceted and interacting reasons,
dynamics, threats and impacts. Consequently, today’s crises demand a broader range of
tasks. As a result, also the character of crisis management missions had to change. Not
only that the list of tasks to be accomplished displayed an enhanced complexity. These
tasks and activities were also increasingly interacting. Today the scope of objectives offers
the following range:
• (humanitarian assistance)
• Security (safe and secure environment)
• Rule of law
• Functioning political institutions
• Social development
• Economic sustainability.
Moreover, experiences have shown that no single agency, government or organization is
able to tackle the challenges on its own. Instead, the specialized capacities of several
agencies and actors are needed to manage the various aspects of a crisis. Thus, current
missions also distinguish themselves by a higher number of different actors involved.
Every mission has to be understood as part of a wider system. This may comprise:6
• Other international organisations and agencies – civilian or military
• International NGOs
• Donors
• International public and media.
Additionally, a complex set of actors unfolds in a mission’s host country/theatre, consisting
of :
5
Whether the complexity has objectively increased or only the perception is of less importance at this point.
6
De Coning 2007: 5
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• National, regional and local administrations or governmental agencies,
• Political, religious or other societal entities like parties, , unions, etc.;
• The civil society, embodied in local NGOs;
• Private sector – economic entities,
• Media,
• Local conflict rent seekers (procurer, human trafficker, drug dealers),
• Elements of organized crime,
• Neighbouring countries.
2.2 Comprehensive approaches as a response to complexity of
problems and missions
Both actors and tasks must be coordinated to ensure an effective response to the initial
security problem. This results in the necessity to develop a multilayered, comprehensive
strategy. Ideally, it should ensure a greater harmonization of definition, planning and
execution of the overall mission.
Principally, such approaches can have two fundamental dimensions. They may address…
a) the internal interaction i.e. the interaction among mission elements. This
comprises two subcategories:
o Vertical interaction: the interaction of agency departments of other units at
superior and inferior levels. The levels are defined by formal authority such
as minister and departments, or
o Horizontal interaction: the interaction of agencies, departments or other
units at the same level of hierarchy.
b) external interaction i.e. missions response to a security problem or tasks which
obviously lie outside the mission itself. These can be subdivided into
o in-theatre challenges: Usually missions are deployed in geographical
proximity of the security problem. Here, interaction takes place on a
physical and daily basis. It is influenced by the local circumstances and by
the actors themselves. The actors in turn try to influence the circumstances
as a response to the security problem.
o institutional challenges: sources of problems might have their origin
outside the geographical proximity of the theatre. E.g. the trading market for
blood diamonds is not in Western Africa; also access to bank accounts
holding money that fuels civil wars is usually not related to the war spot but
to an institution.
A broad variety of terms, concepts and approaches to crisis management strategies have
surfaced during recent years to answer these demands. Such responses have been
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developed on both the national and the international levels. Besides their content wise
diversity, the arbitrary terminology has created problems to approach them in a consistent
analytical manner.
Broadly speaking, domestic concepts can be subsumed under the term “Whole of
Government” (WoG) approaches. These attempts to coordinate governmental responses
either relate to the interdepartmental coordination of activities or the coordination of
executing agents on the ground. Examples are the Canadian “3D”7
, the UKs “Stabilisation
Units” (Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit – PCRU) and the US “Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization”.
The concepts of IOs such as EU, NATO and UN followed a similar aim/objective, but
considerably differ in content and terminology. While the EU speaks of Civil Military
Coordination (CMCO), NATO recently adopted the “Comprehensive Approach” as a
guiding principle and the UN emphasises “System-wide Coherence” and “Integrated
Missions”. However, their relation both among each other and regarding the national
approaches is not without contradictions.
Generally, approaches and problems of coordination share more similarities on the
national than on the international level. The main difference is that IOs do not necessarily
act as independent and sovereign actors but depend heavily on their respective member
states. The latter lend authority as well as resources to the IO, thus enable them for action.
IO therefore embody a first level of coordination in that they offer an institutional
framework. A central feature of these settings is the top-down relationship between the
institutional level and the theatre level, that is, the mission. However, this authority does
not exist on the inter-organisational level, namely between two or more IOs.
Moreover, different kinds of organisations have responded to the changing problem
perceptions. Most obviously, the military had to recognise the need for increased and
enlarged cooperation. This was necessary not only to assure effectiveness and burden
sharing but also to increase legitimacy.
Step by step the military began to cooperate among and beyond military counterparts, i.e.
with departments and agencies, non-governmental organizations and local actors. A first
conceptual response to the demand was the creation of processes and institutions of civilmilitary
coordination (e.g. CIMIC). Created rather by accident during the Somalia
operations 1993-4, their original aim was to provide force protection. By taking over civilian
tasks to ease daily needs (e.g. building infrastructure and providing health care and food
supplies), but also by seeking active cooperation and contact with the local communities in
the theatre, the forces should increase the acceptance for their mission and shape their
perception as “helping hands” rather than occupants. Moreover, through gathering
information about the social and political structures etc. CIMIC is meant to increase the
situational awareness.
7
Diplomacy, Development & Defence
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The awareness of the importance of social networks for the mission’s success became
mingled with another strand of much more warfare related concepts. These changing
concepts of warfare resulted from the influence of information technology on the conduct
of warfare as well as from the desire of especially US-leaders to reform their armed forces.
Initiated by the digitalisation of warfare in the 1980, concepts like the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA), subsequently Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and later on Effects-Based
Approach to Operations (EBAO) signify the attempt to manage the increasing complexity.
They also resulted in the blurring and perceived expansion of the “battlefield” into nonmilitary
areas. Besides, the military began to develop civilian tools like Post Conflict
Reconstruction Units and also increasingly identified tasks it aimed to take over and which
were clearly other than war(-fighting) – so-called “operations other than war”, OOTW.8
Also the civilian side had to rethink its approaches towards crisis management. Their
responses are expressed in concepts like ‘crisis prevention’ and ‘comprehensive security’.
CAs are sometimes equated with holistic concepts. In fact, CAs to security can be traced
back long in history. The CSCE and its three dimensions or “baskets” (military-political,
economic and environmental, and human rights) have embodied the fundamental
elements of societies. Of course, the circumstances were those of a highly institutionalized
conflict with a rather low probability of violence. More recently the concept of “human
security” blew new live into such ideas, with focussing on the individual in actual or latent
crisis.9
2.3 Managing interaction: Current challenges and potential
options
The interaction of a mission’s different activities and instruments is a given fact. The
ultimate challenge is to form a combined and sustained effort to acquire and use the
available capacities and resources to reach a common objective. This should be achieved
through the coordination of these efforts.10
As a consequence, the mission as a whole
would be able to perceive, decide and act in a homogeneous manner.
On a very general level this already outlines three critical factors for the success of
coordination:
• Capacities and resources: This relates to all sorts of enabling factors for a
mission or its elements to carry out its tasks. It comprises funds as well as goods,
skills and knowledge of the individuals, but also rights and authorities, physical
infrastructure.
• Shared culture: common objectives, concepts and agreement on the instruments
to achieve these objectives. This would mark the degree to which a common
strategic approach exists.
8
Wilson 2004; Mölling/Neuneck: 2002
9
Kaldor
10
De Cronig 2007
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• Institutions: managing interaction is tantamount to institutionalising it. This
requires to set up institutions and procedures and to define relationships amongst
the interacting elements, mainly regarding responsibilities but also regularly
repeated processes.
These factors interact. However, key is the degree of shared ideas on problems,
appropriate means and concepts governing the use of instruments and implementation of
policies. Resources may be only available if the goal orientation meets the aims of the
donor. Actors may only participate in a coordinated effort if they agree on the objective of
this very effort.
These factors have to be kept in mind when approaching the challenge to organize
missions. They may also determine which forms of organization may support the missions
overall objective.
Cooperation as the institutionalization of interaction can be related to several operational
phases or elements of a mission:
• Mandating,
• Planning,
• Decision,
• Implementation, and
• Review.
Coordination can also display different forms or degrees of intensity:
• Coexistence is a very limited form of cooperation, if at all. Here, sceptical agencies
may not openly hinder others but they may as well not support the work of the
other. Some communication and de-conflicting may take place but interaction is
neither based on specific rules nor has it any time horizon.
• Cooperation: agencies co-operating by organizing activities (plan – implement) on
complementary tasks and aims while keeping organizational independence.
• Coordination: close to cooperation but implying a clearer hierarchical order in
which rights and authorities are defined that allow one to coordinate others.
• Integration: agencies fuse their interaction and thereby lose their independence.
Only one element has a leadership position.
Studies in organizational analysis as well as on interagency cooperation imply more
precise factors driving and impeding the management of interaction 11
:
11
Haugevik 2007: 8ff.
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Driving factors
12
• Organisational survival: maintaining the organisations relevance as the basis for
existence. Engaging in interaction is seen as a “marriage of convenience” that shall help to
ensure continued access to power and resources. Cf. NATO’s “out of area or out of
business”.
• Neutralizing competition: in cases where competences or tasks overlap organisations
may compete over authorities and resources. Here, engaging in cooperation may allow to
influence the perception of the other organisation and its decisions, to contain its influence
and to conceal own weaknesses. Cf. NATO-EU relationship.
• Lack of resources or capacities/efficiency: the organisation is not able to fulfil its tasks
with the given resources. Cooperation allows the access to additional resources or
capacities or their employment. Organisations may also cooperate if they can save existing
resources because they have overlapping tasks. Alternatively, “peripheral” tasks may be
outsourced to concentrate on the core problems. Cf. UN demand for EU rapid response
capabilities. Cooperation of EU and NATO member states cooperation in the area of
strategic airlift.
13
• Legitimisation: cooperation can have also a legitimizing effect on the conduct of missions.
E.g. the UN mandated mission enjoy a high legitimacy. Moreover the fact that several
actors are willing to engage in a crisis management endeavour can imply that participation
is an act of solidarity and a contribution to a collective effort of the international community.
Cf. UN-EU cooperation on DR Congo
• Shared values: The agencies can cooperate as they share the same aims and deriving
concepts. Thus cooperation would be based on shared norms and values with the aim to
further promote them.
• Organisational learning: here cooperation allows learning from accepted role models. It
provides the opportunity to improve the skills and knowledge of the own agencies.
• Consistency: The notion that ‘the one hand should know what the other is doing’ is
particularly relevant for governments that have several agencies (e.g. military,
development, and diplomatic). This is not solely a question of efficiency. It is also about
sending the right signals to domestic tax-payers as well as other actors in the field. It could
also apply to the motivation behind the UN Integrated Mission process, which was clearly
driven by the wish to make the UN a more coherent actor.
• Urgency: It is no secret that e.g. Western governments are faced not only with lack of
visible results, but are even confronted with a deterioration in some of their operations. This
applies particularly to Afghanistan and Iraq: hence, new solutions are needed. Improved
international coordination has been launched as one such solution.
• Security: In a globalised world, failed states are often seen as a security risk, for example
by becoming a training ground for terrorists. However, military means alone cannot create a
stable state. A whole range of activities is needed, ranging from humanitarian relief and
economic stabilisation to democratisation, the rule of law and security.
• Politics: Electorates in the West are growing increasingly impatient and less willing to
accept military losses. Patience with long-lasting military struggles is limited. This increases
the urgency to find additional tools for securing a territory and eventually withdrawing.
12
Drawing on Haugevik 2007: 8-16
13
SALIS or C17 initiative.
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Impeding factors 14
• Formalities: Various organisations may have conflicting mandates, no Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) to build cooperation on, or may face other formal and legal
impediments to collaboration.
• Cultures, mindsets, prejudices: The military and the humanitarian ‘worlds’ tend to look at
each other with suspicion, but this could also be said, for example, about the diplomatic
corps, the development communities, and between government ministries like the MoD and
the MFA.
• Bureaucratic rigidity: Despite good intentions, the organisational system of one actor may
not allow the necessary flexibility to adjust plans and budgets to the requirements of other
actors, and over time.
• Security: Humanitarian actors are very concerned with the preservation of the
humanitarian space – their freedom to operate neutrally and impartially in addressing
human suffering. This may require distance to other actors in the field.
• Funding: It is no secret that many organisations compete for funding from the same donors
– a zero–sum setting that risks hampering cooperation between them.
• Priorities: Different actors may share the strategic vision for an intervention. They may
nonetheless disagree on what is most important to do at what moment of time. .
• Resources: Far more funding tends to go to the military forces than, for example, to
development, even if the latter may often be the key to a successful intervention.
• Leadership: If actors have to be coordinated or have to cooperate, who is in charge? Is it
the UN, or is it the strongest actor (typically the military), or is it the main donor country?
• Authority: For a comprehensive approach to work, a more decentralised authority than it is
the case today in most IO’s is needed in many organisations.
• Local ownership: If the purpose of a comprehensive approach is to achieve the mission
objectives as effectively and fast as possible, the question of sustainability and local
ownership is pivotal. When shall authority be handed over, and to whom?
14
Friis/Jarmyr, 2008
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2.4 Current problems
While the need for a coordinated approach of the involved actors is commonly recognised
and regularly stated as primary objective, current missions show serious shortfalls in this
very area. Analysing the basic settings of the relevant actors in crisis management will
allow to understand the multiple challenges that are linked to the management of
interaction. This section will thus concentrate on explaining the principal settings, before
chapter three turns to analyse in more detail to the various concepts the different IOs
developed.
The principal setting
(International) Organisation: IOs consist of a HQ and a mission deployed in theatre.
However, IOs cannot be understood as completely independent actors. Related to the
critical factors identified in chapter 2.3, they depend heavily on their member states (MS).
Their national politics towards the IO but also vis-à-vis the crisis spot itself play a
significant role. Often MS retain the command over the governmental instruments used in
a mission. This applies not only to the military units but also to government-sponsored aid
for reconstruction, development etc. The relevant national agencies do not necessarily
subordinate to an IO strategy for the mission, or put differently, the strategy of the IO is
limited by the instruments provided by the national governments. Moreover MS define the
general aims as well as the mission specific objectives of an IO, thereby representing the
magnitude and degree of shared culture. Eventually they also define the general
guidelines for procedures and limits of institutionalisation.
National politics have another problem dimension: interministerial and interdepartmental
cooperation occurs only to a very limited amount. Current administrative procedures very
rarely allow for a coherent and common national strategy or national contributions to
international strategies respectively. The necessary coordination or even integration of
departmental activities is blocked for several reasons, such as competition over resources
or authority.
IO - Headquarters (HQ): here, HQs are understood as the central functional unit, not a
physical or military body. The HQ represents the highest body that has legitimate authority
vis-à-vis a mission. It hosts the political-strategic level as it is responsible to define and
authorize the conduct of a mission and relates this to the wider aims of the IO. Below the
political-strategic level, HQs often also host a military strategic level, a civilian strategic
level, or both. They consist of decision making bodies as well as supporting departmental
structures. It is here that missions are planned, implemented and supported. These levels
take orders or directives from the political strategic level, give advice to it and report to it.
This interaction also reflects the interaction of wider aims of the organization and the
objectives of a single mission.
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While this highlights the political control over military and civilian instruments, the precise
relationship among the mentioned elements within a HQ, their relative freedom of
manoeuvre and importance to a mission differ among IOs.
IO-Mission: the mission is the executive part of the organization that is deployed into the
theatre. A mission can consist of military or civilian agencies/units or both.
Theatre: describes the location where a mission is deployed. The theatre is characterized
by geographical, social, political and economic factors. They build the framework of
conditions in which the mission is deployed and under which it has to work.
Civilian agencies: In contrast to the common understanding which often constrains them
to simply being the opposite of the military, civilian agencies have very different faces.
First, the sectors in which they work can span over the areas broadly listed below:
• Humanitarian aid,
• Development,
• Law,
• Human rights, and
• Conflict transformation.
This also gives an impression of the diversity of aims the agencies may head for.
Second, civilian agencies in theatre can have a very different status, reaching for example
from international to local, governmental to non-governmental agencies, interest groups
etc..15
Especially NGOs are not necessarily part of a mission. Moreover NGOs comprise
very different governance structures. They not necessarily dispose of a HQ, thus
coordination with the other actors in theatre at the political-strategic level is complicated by
those different structures. Civilian agencies may also differ regarding their size, resources,
geographical distribution, and potential impact.
Military agencies/units: besides classical armed forces of different parties and of the
mission itself, contemporary settings often comprise de-facto military actors such as
militias, mercenaries etc. In fact, the traditional distinction between armed groups and
unarmed civilians no longer describes the reality in theatre as civilians may become
militias, host them or turn into a target of them, thus becoming involved in violent activities.
International Institutions: Unlike actors that are mainly present on the local level/in
theatre, International Institutions represent regional or global mechanisms of regulation
that are not necessarily physically present on the local level. They can however potentially
affect the situation in theatre significantly. This concerns e.g. financial institutions such as
the International Monetary Funds, but also economic markets for goods and services, may
they be related to wheat, diamonds, oil or opium.
15
NATO 2003
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The security situation in the theatre is the result of the relationship among these factors,
agents in the field and local representations of external effects such as markets. As soon
as the mission is deployed to in the theatre, it becomes part of this overall interactive
network of relationships.
Picture 1: A simplified and non exhaustive sketch of the different relevant entities in crisis
management and of their vertical and horizontal interacting relationships.
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Having unfolded the principal setting, a matrix of potential interactions and related
problems can be drawn. In addition, the time dimension has to be taken into account, i.e.
the different phases from the beginning of a mission to its conclusion, covering the
different steps from prevention to post-conflict. Moreover, the resulting challenge to
manage the transformation from one phase to another as well as the timing and duration
of effects, their immediate impact and final outcome has to be considered.
Civ Mil HQ Mission Theatre Phase
Civ
Mil
HQ
Mission
Theatre
Phase
Instead of exhaustively discussing every cell of the matrix, we will concentrate on some of
the most important current problems in the practical management of interaction.
Civ mil
A main problem to cooperation lies in the lack of knowledge about the organisational
identities, security concerns and working procedures of the cooperation partner.16
In
addition, also much cherished stereotypes about ‘the other’ hamper cooperation.
First of all, the military has not yet recognised that the civilian side is a very fragmented
group which covers a wide range of activities (see above). These problems may not exist
on the strategic level, given that here a certain awareness prevails. Nonetheless, this does
not mean that limitations which result from different understandings and procedures have
been solved.
A second problem consists in the different perceptions on the security needs. Some
civilian agencies cannot work without the protection of the military. Moreover some
agencies seek to exchange information with the military on secure and insecure areas.
Contrary, other agencies, especially most NGOs, consider impartiality as their best
protection. This means for them to explicitly keep the military at distance.17
For the military, civilian agencies operating without protection or at least coordination not
only risk their lives but also hamper the operational freedom of the military. They would
have to take into account their presence in a combat area and potentially assure their
protection during combat, even if not requested by the civilian side, or against their will.
16
Haugevik/Carvalho 2007
17
Eide et al 2005
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Other differences are related to the daily routines and the way work is planned and
conducted. Not only the military planning culture often differs from the civilian way of doing
things, also the aims and strategies rarely harmonise.18
Civ-civ
The civilian sector itself is fragmented across several lines, such as between groups
focusing primarily on development or human rights. In addition, the number of agencies
involved in the “humanitarian business” is growing. As the funds not necessarily grow,
agencies have to compete for donors.19
Another line runs along “big and small fishes”,
such as UN field organizations and NGOs. Sometimes, the partly heavy impact of UN field
organisations simply neutralizes the work of smaller agencies and replace it by their own
not necessarily better solutions.
Mil-mil
The concept of “military culture”, which is often cited to explain the relative coherence of
military agencies vis-à-vis civilian ones, is to some extent misleading: despite several
commonalities, there is not such a thing as an universal military culture. Afghanistan is an
excellent example of how different strategic cultures impact upon the conduct of a single
agency (NATO) operation with multinational components. Members of the military
establishment of different countries defend not only diverging professional views, concepts
and approaches to grand strategy. The national contingencies also influence the conduct
of an operation by their different assumptions on the political objective of an operation, the
most effective strategy, calculation of appropriateness from their perspective or the
operational methods of achieving it.20
Therefore, the organisational culture of the military
considerably influences both the way a security problem is addressed and the effective
security policy outcome.21
Moreover, military operations are limited by the mandate and the national legal obligation
to act in accordance with it. These are expressed in the national rules of engagement and
the respective caveats.
HQ level VS “in theatre” perspective
General tensions exist between the perceptions and aims of the two levels. On the one
hand they represent the differences between theory and practice, that is, between the
planning of a mission and its effective implementation. As planning incorporates clear cut
policy objectives but also assumptions about the situations on the ground and the impact
of the mission, it creates a more or less arbitrary design of a mission. These plans often
18
Courley 2000
19
Haugevik/Carvalho: 2007: 8-9
20
Klein 1991
21
Klein1991, Kier 1997, Lantis 2003
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clash with the reality on the ground. As policy objectives rarely change, the HQ level
insists on the implementation of the original mission objective. Conversely, the mission in
theatre often discovers a situation which considerably differs from what was initially
perceived during the planning. Missions then tend to react on this situation, using the
freedom and resources given to them to implement a mission in a way they consider
appropriated.
Time horizons: short – long-term aims
The question of timing and phases is directly related to the diversity aims of the different
fields and activities. Short term aims sometimes risks to conflict with long term objectives.
Very often, crisis management focuses in its first phase on humanitarian assistance in
order to ease vital problems. However, to substantially address a crisis and lay the basis
for sustainable results, a potential dependence on international settings, be it humanitarian
aid or military protection, has to be avoided and local self sufficient structures needs to be
developed. The challenge is hence to link short term and long terms aims in a
comprehensive approach.
Mission VS Theatre
The degree and magnitude to which a mission intervenes in the theatre can also define the
later dependency on the mission and the ability to create local ownership as the
prerequisite for sustainable success of the mission. The danger is that a mission
establishes parallel structures outside the established social, political and economic
context of the theatre. While people may gain individual profits out of these structures they
may not see the need to transform their social structures into sustainable ones. Interim
governments, inaugurated and supported by missions, often seek to stay in power.
Decision makers may impede the political transformation into a democratic system as they
fear to be re-elected.
Concluding remarks:
Despite piles of slides and drafted concepts on CA, the conceptual and empirical
challenges seem to be underrated. The sheer quantity of actors, their different objectives
as well as objections, and the resulting concepts pose the first hurdles. The high variance
in priorities, processes and suggested end states results in a situation in which different
optima and balances coexist. Coordination is often hampered as the aims and interests of
actors involved differ significantly. Rivalry among mission entities over leadership and
resources, duplication of efforts or working on cross-purposes are just some of the
shortcomings that contribute to a sub optimal result of current crises management
approaches. One reason is that inter-organisational cooperation in crisis management is
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quite a young practice. The organisations concerned are engaged in early learning cycles.
Formalized frameworks exist more seldom than ad hoc arrangements.22
3 International Organisations: Concepts for coordination
in crisis management
Building upon the previous conceptual considerations, this chapter will deliver a
description of the existing concepts in the EU, NATO and the UN. All three IOs have
developed individual concepts to implement comprehensive approaches in order to
address the growing complexity of missions and to improve their own limited success in
tackling crises. The UN designed the concept of “Integrated Missions”, the EU has
developed the “Civil-Military Coordination” and NATO has recently formulated the
“Comprehensive Approach”. Although these concepts are still blueprints, they are crucial
in that they indicate not only the willingness and increasing ability of the IO to adapt to
current challenges but also display the degree to which they are able to cooperate. Here,
the similarity of the identified problems but also of the appropriate means and instruments
is crucial to determine future opportunities to enhance inter-organizational cooperation.
The paper begins with a short analysis of the changing perceptions of the mission’s
environment and the resulting challenges for the relevant actors. It then turns to describe
the existing concepts that attempt to enhance the coordination between instruments and
actors at the inter- or intra-organisational level. This overview will be organised along a
recurring pattern based on the following questions:
a) What problems did the IOs identify regarding the conduct of a mission?
b) Which approaches towards coordination and coherence have so far been
developed?
c) What are the aims of the concepts?
d) Which means do the concepts foresee?
e) Which role do these concepts already play in the planning and implementation
of missions?
The sections on each IO will be completed with some comments offering a first estimation
on the pros and cons of the presented concepts.
22
Haugevik 2007
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3.1 European Union
Problems identified
For the EU, the starting point for a comprehensive approach is the intra-organisational
level: that is, the Union focuses on the internal coordination of its different instruments for
crisis management. The EU’s basic problem has in fact for a long time been the
fragmentation of its instruments for crisis management across two pillars: Within the first
pillar, the EU Commission is in charge of the long-term civilian instruments and controls
the bulk of resources. In the second pillar, the EU Council disposes with CFSP and ESDP
of the tools for more rapid reactions, including the military dimension. This fragmentation of
responsibilities, resources and means lead to a situation where initiatives in the best case
run in parallel, but in the worst case run counter each other. As the European Security
Strategy (2003) pointed out:
“Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of
which has its own structure and rationale. The challenge now is to bring
together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance
programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian
capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have
an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first
condition for development.”23
However, the EU also recognised the need for inter-organizational coordination,
particularly with regard to NATO and the UN, in view of ensuring the successful
implementation of a comprehensive approach. The necessity for and the challenges of
coordination with NATO already surfaced in 1999 during the Kosovo intervention. Recent
experiences from the EU’s cooperation with the UN in DR Congo reiterated the importance
of the issue.24
.
Recently, an additional perspective surfaced in the EU debates: the “security development
nexus”. The term recognizes that both dimensions codetermine the overall success of a
mission and hence underlines the need to combine and coordinate different instruments,
policies and resources. Such efforts have been bundled in the concept of security sector
reform (SSR).
23
European Council 2003
24
Major 2007: 6
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Approaches towards coordination and coherence
As a multidimensional actor, the EU is characterised by the parallel existence of several
policy frameworks, each of which pretends to be comprehensive. Focusing especially on
the intergovernmental pillar, the 2003 Concept of Civil Military Coordination (CMCO) is the
hallmark of doctrinal development. Accordingly, in the context of CFSP/ESDP, CMCO
aims to address “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU
actors.”25
. It is perceived as part of a comprehensive approach that will allow ensuring,
within the EU, an effective co-ordination of the full range of its instruments.
However, since its inception in 1999, the ESDP - located in the second EU pillar - aimed to
combine civilian and military aspects of a mission. It thus developed civilian, military and
integrated structures and procedures to implement a comprehensive approach towards
crisis management. Subsequently, a wide range of civilian and military instruments has
been set up.26
Herein, CIMIC became an additional part under the overall framework of
CMCO.
Aims
The CMCO-Concept aims to achieve the overall coordination of civilian and military
instruments but also of the different civilian instruments at the strategic level already during
the planning phase of a mission.27
It insists upon the “culture of co-ordination” 28
as an
“essential element in ensuring overall coherence in the EU’s response to a crisis”29
. The
concept is based on continued co-operation and shared political objectives, and depends
on very detailed preparations at the working level.
More precisely, the CMCO aims especially to organize the planning process of a mission.
In this early stage, CMCO as a process seeks to optimize the interplay of areas such as
capabilities, logistics, personnel, resources etc, at both the strategic and the operative
levels. The resulting increased coherence should enhance the effectiveness of ESDP
crisis management efforts.30
Means
Since the inception of ESDP, the EU has been very active to create and sustain an
interface between military and civilian structures. It introduced several procedural and
25
EU Council 2003a: 2
26
Gordon 2006: 350
27
EU Council 2003a: 2 “ […] in the context of CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the
actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU response to the crisis.”
28
EU Council 2003a: 2
29
ibid.
30
Reinhardt 2006: 4-5
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doctrinal changes at the strategic level and created new capabilities for planning,
command and control, and execution of EU crisis management. Moreover, the EU sought
to close the existing gaps vis-à-vis the Commission instruments and external actors.
At the strategic level, the ESDP disposed already in its initial phase of the institutional
structures, processes and concepts to handle conflict management in a comprehensive
way.31
The core institution of ESDP, the “Political and Security Committee” (PSC), is
already during the planning phase of a crisis response mission advised jointly by the EU Military
Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM).
They offer advise on all aspects of an envisaged response. Likewise, the Crisis
Management Procedures (CMP)32
attempt to ensure a comprehensive approach to crisis
management especially in the planning phase of a response. They indicate at which
phases of an institutional crisis response, civilian and military actors and expertise shall be
taken into account. Moreover, the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is expected to
tackle the mission in a comprehensive way. It is the guiding document for the planning and
conduct of individual EU missions. The CMC is a legal act and represents the central
instrument to assure the EU’s CA to operations. It not only reflects civilian and military
aspects but also explains the lines of command, the mission’s objective and the role of
other actors.33
The 2003 CMCO-concept calls for an institutional adaptation of ESDP procedures and
doctrines at the politico-strategic and the operational levels. As it was not officially
adopted, the concept depends on the political support it will receive and the informal
diffusion of the proposed “culture of coordination” it will enjoy. It is envisaged that the PSC,
who exercises political control and strategic direction during EU missions, would drive the
CMCO towards ensuring coordination.
In 2006, the EU published yet another document that outlines the various steps that can
be taken in crisis situations. The report focuses on the improvement of inter-agency
cooperation.34
Additionally, several documents were influenced by the “comprehensive
approach”. They aim to ensure that related aspects are mainstreamed into the different
areas of mission planning and execution. Examples are
• Crisis Management Procedures (CMP),
• Guidelines for Joint Fact Finding Missions,
• Guidelines for EU Crisis Response Information Activities and a
31
The initial phase of ESDP here describes the phase from ESDP’s inception in 1999 up to 2003, when the EU
reached the operational stage.
32
European Council 2003c
33
C. Mölling 2009: 13
34
European Council: „CMCO: Framework paper of possible solutions fort the management of EU Crisis
Management Operations”, EU document, 8926/06, p. 2
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• Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning.35
The minor flaw all these documents have however in common is their legally non-binding
character.
Besides, the EU has attempted to enhance the integration of civilian and military
aspects through the development of its institutional structure. Since 2005, the EU
disposes of the Civil Military Cell. This unit within the EU-Military Staff (EUMS) shall assist
the planning of autonomous EU missions with civil-military character.36
For purely military
tasks the EU disposes of other well-established options, mainly national headquarters
provided by five member states (France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK).
Additionally, the EUMS hosts since 2007 the Operations Centre (OpCen). It can be tasked
with the command and control of a mission with up to 2000 personnel if no other (national
or Berlin Plus) command and control structure is available. The most recent step was to
set up, in 2007, a “Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) – so to say a civilian
HQ - that also hosts the newly created post of a civilian operations commander. He/she
shall provide command and control at the strategic level of civilian ESDP operations from
the planning phase onwards.
A recent initiative to move towards a more integrated approach at the strategic level has
been launched at the informal meeting of the EU heads of states and governments at
Hampton Court, UK, in 2005. Independently from what the member states possibly
intended, the EU Council Secretariat interpreted the Hampton Court decisions as an
invitation to replace the existing structures by new ones which would assure a
comprehensive approach to strategy, planning and operations.37
However, both
fundamental disagreements over the new structures proposed by Solana and the
uncertain future of the Lisbon Treaty, which also would have had serious implications for
the internal crisis management structures of the EU, made that further steps have so far
been postponed.
Several steps have been made in view of improving the cooperation between the EU
Commission and the Council. In order to integrate the Commission’s expertise and gain
access to its capabilities and resources for crisis management, the Commission has been
invited to participate in relevant meetings of the PSC, the CIVCOM and the RELEX - the
35
Gebhard 2007: 6
36
Quille et al. 2006
37
Council of the European Union 2005: 9.
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external relations Counsellors group of the EU Council. Moreover, two delegates of the
Commission are sent to the Civil Military Cell of the EUMS.
Via the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) the Commission can make available resources
for immediate use in a crisis situation – one of the most thorny issues surrounding the kick
off of a mission. The RRM has recently been subsumed under the Instrument for Stability
(IfS).38
The EU Commission thus strives to enhance its portfolio of instruments towards
international crises.
An addition, the Lisbon Treaty contains a series of changes designed to make the EU a
more coherent actor in the field of crisis management. One of the most significant
innovations concerns the creation of the post of a High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It should allow to increase the coherence in the
formulation and implementation of EU external policies while also providing the Union with
more visibility and continuity in its external representation. The new post integrates the
positions and functions of the EU Commissioner for External Relations and the High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which are in turn abolished.
Acting as vice-president of the Commission and chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, the
task of the new High Representative is to assure effective inter-institutional coordination
between Community elements of EU external relations and CFSP.
A second novelty consists in the creation of an European External Action Service (EEAS).
Designed to support the High Representative, the EEAS will be an inter-pillar service
which should gradually replace the old structures in view of improving the cooperation
between the Council Secretariat and the Commission and effectively linking the scattered
instruments for crisis management.
Operational level: The post of EU Special Representatives (EU SR), first introduced in
1999, serves as a coordination hub for the different tasks the EU aims to assure in a
particular region.39
EU SR cover a wide geographical scope, reaching from Afghanistan to
Moldova or the Middle East peace process. As a representative of the SG/HR, the EUSR
coordinates operational activities with the EU Presidency, the Commission and the
missions of member states while chairing a coordination group that reports to the SG/HR.
The role of the EUSR increasingly consists in assuring the coordination of ESDP missions
as a whole. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EUSR hold “local political guidance” vis-à-vis the
military commander as well as the head of mission of the police mission (EUPM).
Field level: In March 2002, the EU adopted its own CIMIC concept as a means mainly for
the tactical level. Accordingly: “Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and
co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of the EU-led Crisis
Management Operation and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population
38
European Parliament and European Council, 2006.
39
Grevi 2007
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and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations
and agencies.”40
CIMIC is to carry out three main tasks:
• civil-military liaison,
• support to the civil environment,
• support to the military force.
CIMIC is thus to be understood as part of the more comprehensive CMCO-concept.
Consistent with the classical NATO concept, the EU CIMIC concept focuses on the
support of a military operation in a civilian environment.41
Role of the concepts during planning and implementation
At the strategic level, the PSC, EUMC and CIVCOM are the core institutions. They are
primarily advisory bodies but can also file initiatives. Given that the official documents are
not available, it is however difficult to assess to what extent the PSC effectively merges the
different advices into a comprehensive approach within the Crisis Management Concept.
Nonetheless, the aim to assure the coherence of the overall approach of a mission has
regularly been introduced into the Joint Actions, which define the legal basis of EU
operations. For the EU’s Chad mission for example, the link between the EUSR, the
Operations Commander, the EU presidency and the High Representative is clearly stated.
They “shall ensure close coordination of their respective activities with respect to the
implementation of this Joint Action.“42
On the operational level, since the nomination of the first EU SR in 1999, their number
grew up to eleven in 2008.43
A report by Giovanni Grevi points out the challenges EUSR
have to deal with when carrying out their tasks on the ground. It seems that once
“parachuted into the job”44
EUSRs are given little help to deal with the challenges in the
field which the position of being the “face on the EU” on the ground involves. The lack of
administrative support; a lack of funds, of allocated time (mandates of originally 6 months,
now a year); the need of better security arrangements45
- all this shows how much room for
improvement for the implementation of the EUSR concept still exists. However what has
improved already is the cooperation on the ground, i.e. within the mission and vis-à-vis
third actors. Moreover, frequent briefings of the PSC by the EUSRs raised the situational
awareness and thus obviously increased te responsiveness of the strategic level to field
level problems.
40
Council of the European Union: 2002: 10
41
For a longer description on EU CIMIC issues see: H. G. Erhart: 2007 12-21
42
Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the European Union military operation in the Republic
of Chad and in the Central African Republic
43
Grevi, 2007: 29
44
Grevi, 2007: 23
45
Grevi 2007: 29
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CIMIC is to a large extent part of current missions, even since the beginning. The EUMS,
usually responsible for the initial planning of operations, ensures that CIMIC aspects
receive the necessary attention. However, this also poses a problem: it is most often the
military staff who plans CIMIC and carries it out; and military personnel often tends to
neglect civilian considerations.46
Comments
The EU has made enormous efforts to integrate civil and military aspects of crisis
management. For the areas of strategic planning, a comprehensive approach is palpable:
the CMCO forms the core, and is further completed by other documents and the
institutional set up. Moreover the EUSR as well as CIMIC show the awareness and the
tangible deeds the EU produced to engage with the problems it identified.
What has been left aside until today is the inter-organisational level. Here, no solid
doctrine exists. Besides EU liaison teams operating in the UN Department for
Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) as well as at NATOs Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE), the EU has settled several political agreements. These concern
i.a. NATO and the UN. However, both are very general in nature and do not primarily
address the contribution to an inter-organisational comprehensive approach. Moreover,
the practice, such as the EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo in 2006, revealed the existence
of thorny problems at this very level, which have not yet been sufficiently addressed.47
This
concerns especially the implementation of lessons identified from previous
interorganisational operations, which could improve future performance.
Leaving this general deficit on the inter-organisational level aside, the EU has nonetheless
come up with a solid strategy that first of all incorporates and coordinates all the concepts
and procedures that have been put on the agenda since 1999. It witnesses the awareness
of the EU and hence gives hope that further commitments be made to assure a sustained
success of comprehensive approaches.
The initial phase of ESDP was characterised by a steady dynamic in the creation and
evolution of concepts and institutions. Here, the bitter rows over the 2003 Iraq war were
crucial. Revealing considerable intra-European cleavages, they first threatened to break
apart CFSP/ESDP and then eventually resulted in a renewed EU commitment in form of
the ESS in December 2003. Beyond its “psychological healing” character, the ESS
identifies multilateralism as a defining feature of EU external action and outlines a general
vision for the EU’s external finality. With the ESS as political road map of the EU and the
46
M. Reinhard, 2006, p. 9
47
Major 2008
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explicit will of the member states to integrate military responses within an essentially
civilian framework; the “pursuit of a more genuinely multidimensional’ approach to crisis
response and conflict prevention”48
has become easier to achieve.
Today, the EU has entered a phase of implementation. Steps towards institutional
coherence in order to promote comprehensive security may be seen more as an
adjustment and consolidation of the existing acquis than of great new ideas. However, only
if it enters the every day routine of the EU, the culture of cooperation will become reality.
Unfortunately, the postponed ratification of the Lisbon Treaty means that its
groundbreaking opportunities to significantly improve the institutional coherence in the
area of crisis management will not be used in a foreseeable future. 49
48
S. Gordon, ibid, pg. 350
49
European Parliament 2008
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3.2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Problems identified
Stating that the geographical location of threats is no longer of importance, NATO has
identified threats to international security on a global scale. With this perceived change in
threats, NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer defines a serious paradigm shift
caused by two factors; “the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization.”
With threats “getting global”, old security paradigms that roamed during the Cold War have
been swapped with an “engagement paradigm”50
. This shift from deterrence to
engagement requires NATO to address security challenges at their source, in other words,
to view security functionally, rather than geographically.
More palpable lessons have resulted from NATO operations. Since 1992, the Alliance has
continuously conducted operations. The lessons identified from those carried out in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as the NATO disaster relief operation
in Pakistan in 2005 and NATO’s support to the African Union in Darfur, have underlined
the fact that NATO is never alone in the theatre. Thus, NATO has to ensure effective coordination
between a wide spectrum of actors from the international community, both
military and civilian, as the essential key to achieve sustainable results.
In a keynote address by a senior NATO official on “Afghanistan and the importance of a
comprehensive approach”, the limitations and areas of necessary improvement have been
defined more precisely as:
• the need for broader and timelier Allied political-military assessments and planning
of operations;
• the improvement of lessons learned process;
• the enhancement of co-operation with external actors;
• the need for further efforts of public messaging and public diplomacy.
Approaches towards coordination and coherence
At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO Allies agreed that a comprehensive approach engaging
all these actors was required to meet the challenges of operational environments such as
Afghanistan and Kosovo. For NATO, a comprehensive approach is a “broader approach to
military planning that takes into account all the military and civilian aspects of a NATO
engagement through the entire duration of an operation.”51
It promotes “cooperation and
50
Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the IISS Annual Conference, 7
th
September
2007, www.iiss.org
51
Press Kit- NATO Summit meetings of Heads of State and Government Bucharest, Romania, 2-4 April 2008, p. 3
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coordination between the international organizations, individual agencies and NGO’s, as
well as the host government.”52
NATO as a military alliance realizes its limitations for a comprehensive approach, and
therefore views itself as one actor in a larger Comprehensive Approach that comprises the
entire international community.
Aims
NATO very broadly defines its aim to increase the cooperation and interaction between
military and civilian structures, to develop a more coherent and structured approach to
cooperation in the field, and to assure more structured relations at the institutional level.
NATO seeks to “contribute to a comprehensive approach for the international community
as a whole”53
that aims to increase the coherence and co-ordination activity between the
diverse and complex structures. More specifically, success in Afghanistan but also in
Kosovo is contingent on a “seamless coordination between the relevant political, economic
and military players”.54
Means
NATO’s first doctrine of civil-military co-operation - CIMIC55
- was officially established in
2002. CIMIC aims to facilitate the “co-operation between a NATO commander and all parts
of the civilian environment with his Joint Operations Area”.56
More generally, it seeks to
provide the interface between civilian and military structures for NATO. It emphasizes the
importance of cooperation with national and local governments as well as with other IO’s
and NGO’s. CIMIC is an instrument established only at the field level. Its core functions
are:
1. Civil Military liaison,
2. support to the civil environment, and
3. support to the force.
Besides, NATO’s strategic commanders also refer to the Effects-Based Approach to
Operation (EBAO). This concept is operational since 2004. EBAO aims to take into
account non-military aspects in the planning and conduct of operations. The ultimate goal
is the “unity of effort” of all instruments of power with a full range of missions. Therefore all
military and non-military instruments are to be integrated into a comprehensive
application.57
52
Keynote address by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero at the GLOBSEC
Conference, 17 January 2008
53
NATO Press Kit, ibid, p. 340
54
Keynote address by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero at the GLOBSEC
Conference, 17 January 2008
55
CIMIC is the “co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the missions, between the ANT commander and civil
actors, including national populations and local authorities, as well as international , national and non-governmental
organization and agencies.” NATO IMS MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, January 2002
56
NATO IMS MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, January 2002.
57
Pierre Claude Nolin (Canada), General Rapporteur, “177 STC 06 E – Interoperability: the need for transatlantic
harmonization”, accessed 24.06.08, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=1004
No circulation – DAFT VERSION – not for citation
Moreover, EBAO focuses on generating knowledge simultaneously as planning, execution
and assessment of engagement space take place. In this context, the idea behind EBAO
is to plan and operate a mission based on the desired end state instead of being based on
available capabilities and instruments. All relevant strategic objectives of the actors are
analysed to identify their centre of gravity (CG). Based on those CGs, desired effects are
developed to identify actors who are capable of either support or counter them.
While not a new idea, EBAO is an attempt to institutionalize the so far intuitive approaches
that many military commanders have exercised during periods of war. It is also the result
of the experiences gained from engagements in the complex nature of modern conflict,
where military forces are operating across the spectrum of conflict, dealing with other
forces, non-military organizations and all kind of other relevant actors and where the
interactions are many and multifaceted.58
Closely linked to EBAO, the Multi-National Experience 5 (MNE 5) is one of the most recent
steps to learn more about how to fully coordinate nations and organisations engaged in a
crisis management operation throughout the whole operation. It is designed as a
comprehensive international program to further the conceptual development and
cooperation within multinational and multifunctional peace operations. It aims to link IO
planning instruments like the UN Integrated Missions Concept, and NATO’s
Comprehensive Approach. Under the umbrella of NATO, several selected countries
cooperate to define common challenges with regard to a comprehensive approach and to
subsequently identify solutions. The key focus of MNE 5 is on the improvement of
processes, procedures and organizational designs that are needed to facilitate stability in
crises.59
First sound results of the MNE5 are not expected before summer 2009.
Another tool that aims to facilitate a comprehensive approach is the NATO Network
Enabled Capability (NNEC).60
It was introduced in January 2006 with the “NATO Network
Enabled Capability vision and concept”.61
The concept aligns different parts of the
operational environment through a networked information structure.62
Its backbone is the
added value of information sharing to improve situational awareness.
According to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NNEC is a necessary
tool for NATO to remain “effective, credible and relevant in the 21st
century.”63
This turn
towards a more pragmatic approach has often been considered the result of the
58
D. Lowe, S. Ng: 2004 Effects-based operations: language, meaning and the effects-based approach
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ccrp/ebo_language.pdf; date accessed 24.06.08
59
interview with U.S. Army Maj. Thomas Dillingham, the experiment's director, 10th January 2007,
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/USJFCOM_Bringing_Together_Multiple_Agencies_For_Multinational_Experiment_5_999.h
tml
60
NNEC initiative aims to ensure that the Alliance’s multinational forces are wired for the 21
st
century operations,
able to share and exchange information effectively enough to achieve information and decision superiority.
61
http://www.act.nato.int/events/documents/06nnec3/visionconcept.pdf
62
M. Bartoli “Assessing NATO transformation”, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/art3.html,
63
Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Munich Conference of Security Policy, 9
February 2007.
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experience of NATO operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans.64
The NNEC is hence
considered a part of NATO’s transformation.
At a strategic level, NATO developed in 2006 the Comprehensive Political Guidance
(CPG) to support the 1999 Security Concept. The CPG is meant to build the framework for
NATO’s ongoing transformation for the next 10-15 years, with the aim to “increase the
coherence through an effective management mechanism”.65
This “effective management mechanism” is the core element of the CPG to ensure
coherence and harmonization among the various planning disciplines outlined in the CPG
document. It is consequently perceived as a catalyst for NATO’s continuing transformation.
A further practical step toward civ-mil cooperation has been made within the Allied
Command Transformation (ACT) project when setting up, in 2007 a Civil-Military Fusion
Centre. It should form the main component of a Civil-Military Overview (CFO/CMO)
capability. The Centre seeks to improve interaction between civil and military actors.66
Recognizing the crucial need to share information at both the intra-organizational level and
with external structures and actors, the Centre is designed to offer a holistic overview of a
complex crisis, to provide users with access to the relevant information through functional
experts and to allow the sharing of civil and military information. By doing so, it mainly
aims to increase transparency and trusts between military and civil structures, which is
considered the prerequisite for effective cooperation. It hence seeks to explore “innovative
ways to collect and disseminate all relevant civil and military information on crisis response
operations in order to begin creating a shared sense of situational awareness among the
global community.”67
The most recent steps to turn the CPG into an operative concept in support of NATO`s
comprehensive approach have been made at the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit. Heads of
states and governments agreed to install a CA task force and to appoint an assistant
secretary general as a focal point for all CA matters. Furthermore, they adopted an “Action
Plan”. This list of tasks aims to develop and implement NATO contributions to a
comprehensive approach and improve NATO’s role in a wider Comprehensive Approach
to crisis management by the international community.68
It is an action plan to assure better
use of NATO crisis management capabilities, to improve the application of lessons learned
processes, to make better use of NATO training, education and exercise opportunities, to
64
NATO Press Kit, p. 339
65
NATO document “Comprehensive Political Guidance” Nov 2006
66
Ibid
67
Ibid
68
Press Kit- NATO Summit meetings of Heads of State and Government Bucharest, Romania, 2-4 April 2008, p. 3
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enhance cooperation with external actors such as UN and EU, and to increase the
effectiveness of public messaging. 69
However, despite NATO’s proclaimed policy of transparency, more precise information on
NATO’s plans and central documents related to CA are not yet accessible to the public.
Therefore, no detailed assessment can be offered at present.
Role of the concept during planning and implementation
At the field level, the NATO concept of CIMIC has become a reality in Afghanistan since
December 2002 with the NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s). They first
operated under the US led coalition. Subsequently, ISAF has gradually taken over the
responsibility. Although led by individual lead nations, the military components of PRTs
come under the command of the ISAF Commander.70
Currently, 26 PRTs are active on the
ground in Afghanistan.71
PRTs should set the frame for military and civilian personnel to work together to provide
stability on the ground. They were set up to “assist and facilitate local authorities to create
a secure environment in order to enable the government, international and non
governmental organization to carry out reconstruction activities.”72
PRTs are hence
considered the practical translation of CIMIC at the field level. In fact, the PRT concept
goes beyond the classical CIMIC doctrine: the tasks of the PRTs are extended and aim to
achieve sustainable results as building blocks for the independent development of local
societies.
However, several challenges materialized on the ground and prevented PRTs from
operating smoothly. This mainly concerns the fundamental differences in the operating
modes of civil and military personnel, and limitations such as national caveats.
The CPG, which was also meant to be a driving force for the Alliance’s development, has
not yet shown a serious impact on the course of NATO so far. However, one has also to
take into consideration that the CPG is a relatively new tool. It has to be transferred to the
field level and effectively applied in order to make a difference. Hence, it might be too early
to collect reliable data to assess its success.
Below this level, several concepts have been put in place on which NATO is still working.
EBAO as well as NNEC propose guidance or capabilities, yet none are visibly
implemented in an overall manner.
69
Keynote address by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero at the GLOBSEC
Conference, 17 January 2008,
70
NATO/ISAF: “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)”, www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html
71
NATO: “ISAF Key Fact and Figures Placemat”, 10 June 2008,
www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf
72
Rietjens 2008
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Regarding the Fusion Centre, a prototype web portal of CFO/CMO is currently in place.73
It
is used for Afghanistan, with over 700 users registered since its inception on 26 January
2008. However, the reluctance of other IO’s and NGO’s to trust and use such a capability
has been noticed. Such reluctance is reported to be perceptible whenever NATO attempts
to accommodate its settings into civilian structures.
NATO, still mainly considered a military alliance, clearly struggles to convince about its
neutrality and about its capacity and sincere willingness to include civilian aspects.74
Overall, it is questionable whether NATO can take the role of a liaison point between the
military and civilian structures, or if an independent body would not be more appropriated
to ensure the trustworthiness of such an infrastructure.75
Perhaps what is necessary for
NATO is not so much to focus on creating infrastructure for co-operation, but rather to
build up trust between itself and other operating structures in the field. Thus, CFC/CMO is
certainly a pragmatic solution to a comprehensive approach for NATO. But it
underestimates the challenge of building trust between NATO and other structures.
However, co-operation is reliant on trust, infrastructure only comes second.
Comments
What does this mean for the overall future of NATO? Since 1999, NATO has identified
new threats and has subsequently developed operating concepts to counter such threats.
However, they have not yet been satisfactorily implemented. NATO mainly remains a
military alliance and mutual defence organization for its member states. A comprehensive
approach to operations requires NATO to change its identity as a military entity and to be
receptive to civilian structures.
So far, CA is yet in a conceptual stage and still struggles to be implemented. The issue of
a comprehensive approach is certainly on NATO’s agenda. Here, the 60th
anniversary in
spring 2009 might come up with a new Strategic Concept, mentioned at both sides of the
Atlantic, that takes into account a comprehensive approach.
The CPG, as a support of 1999 Security Concept, is NATO’s first step to cast aside its
Cold War identity and to embrace the new environment. Yet another bureaucratic layer
might not be a facilitating mechanism in NATO’s transformation process. The CPG’s
overall objective is certainly to produce an aligned planning process, consistent guidance
and “harmonized requirements and supporting structures.”76
But the concept remains
73
The Portal was set up on the 28
th
of January 2008, with over 700 users from various NATO commands: JFC
Brunssum, JFC Naples, JC Lisbon, HQ ISAF, SHAPE, and NATO Headquarters in Brussels, see
https://cmo.act.nato.int/Pages/Login.aspx
74
An example from Afghanistan, if PRT’s worked in close physical proximity to NGO’s, then community “would no
longer distinguish between military roles and civilian implemented assistance. Blurring of roles can have a negative impact
on the NGO’s, security risks if civilian humanitarians are perceived as collaborating with an unwanted military presence and
channeling intelligence to it.” Rietjens, ‘2008
75
A consortium of nations, NGO’s and NATO is the proposed solution, however, no visible results are at present
available on this development.
76
CPG, 2006, pg.1-6, pg. 6
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vague as to how NATO will produce such an aligned planning process or how it will
improve its military-civilian relationship, whose significance its continuously stresses. In
fact, the CPG is so far not an obligation for any NATO operations.
EBAO and CIMIC shed light on the established fact that crises in the international system
need further co-ordination with non-military structures and new international actors.
However, the several concepts that exist and with which NATO is experimenting are
currently only loosely bound together. Neither their role nor relation among each other nor
the role with regard to the CPG at the strategic level is clarified. Besides, it is not indicated
to what extent they will be implemented and thus support a future comprehensive
approach.
It may be perceived as a step forward that NATO positions itself as a contributor among
others in a larger comprehensive approach. The mentioned reluctance to trust NATO
however poses a serious hurdle for any proposed change of course. Key to NATO’s
success in this regard will be to show enormous and sustained efforts to link with civilian
elements at the strategic and the field levels. This may be even more difficult for NATO as
it does not possess a civilian structure and units within the organization. Thus establishing
a link to NATO means for NGOs etc. today always not only to link themselves to a military
organization, but also in practical terms to directly speak to military personnel. Even if
innovative steps like the “fusion center” and the NATO Crisis Management Cell consist of
civilian personnel, NATO’s image within the civil society and among relevant civilian actors
remains that of a military organisation, dominated by interests of the Western state. While
such perceptions may be to a certain degree fuelled by stereotypes, they nevertheless
prevent important actors to become partners of NATO.
3.3 The United Nations
The UN’s primary and enduring mission since its creation has been to save “succeeding
generations from the scourge of war.”77
As the most active organization in the area of
peacekeeping operations (PKO), the UN was hence also the most struck by the
fundamental changes of the conditions and character of PKOs. Since the late 1980’ies, it
had to adapt to a paradigm shift in peacekeeping from traditional monitoring of ceasefires
and patrolling buffer zones towards highly complex scenarios often characterized by interstate,
ethnic or tribal conflicts, and civil wars that frequently resulted in disorder, socialeconomic
depression and failed states.
77
stated in the Preamble of the UN Charter
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Problems identified
This new environment required the tasks of UN engagement to be broadened. A growing
number of UN PKOs have become multidimensional, that is, composed of a range of
components including military, police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human rights,
humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender.78
This increased on the one hand the demand of personnel and expertise. On the other, the
expanding set of tasks also increased the complexity of missions, both internally and
externally. This growing number of UN PKOs has forced member states as well as the UN
General Secretariat to recognize the need to develop a “comprehensive doctrine that
better defines what modern UN peacekeeping operations have become.”79
A first fundamental review of the UN PKO endeavours in the 1990es showed however that
the UN had until then largely failed to adapt to the mentioned challenges. The Brahimi
report (2000) highlighted the following problems:80
• the lack of effective collection and assessment of information at the UN HQ level
• a lack of flexibility and autonomy granted to leaders in field missions
• a lack of capacity to deploy more complex operations rapidly and sustain them
effectively
• a lack of critical planning at HQ level for peace operations.
In other words, the UN lacks the complete bandwidth of capabilities and expertise for
planning of a mission as well as its execution.
With these problems identified, the report put forward the idea of “Integrated Missions”.
Moreover, in 2001, the Security Council stated the need for a more effective and
comprehensive response to peacekeeping within the UN system: “The Security Council
reaffirms that the quest for peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and
determined approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their
economic and social dimensions […] The Security Council recognizes that
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building are often closely interrelated. The
Council stresses that this interrelationship requires a comprehensive approach in order
to preserve the results achieved and prevent the recurrence of conflicts.”81
78
Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit,
Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations, 2003, p. 1
79
U. Solinas, S. Ahmed, P. Keating, ‘Shaping the future of Un peace operations: is there a doctrine in the house?’,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, March 2007, 20:1, pp. 11-28, p. 12
80
The Brahimi Report, UNO, 2000, p .1, paragraph 6
81
Security Council 4278
th
Meeting (AM), 20/02/2001, Press Release SC/7014 “Security Council addresses
comprehensive approach to peace-building in presidential statement”,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7014.doc.htm
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In 2005, the Secretary General published his report “In Larger Freedom” which i.a.
called for the “strengthening of tools to deliver the military and civilian support needed
to prevent wars and end wars as well as to build a sustainable peace.”82
According to Cedric de Coning, the UN system faces three main challenges with regard to
PKOs :
- “facilitating its own internal coherence
- supporting and encouraging coherence among all the international or external
actors
- facilitating and supporting coherence between the external and internal
actors.”83
At an intra-organisational level, there is a need to streamline the entire UN system for the
long-term recovery of conflict zones. The UN has identified a lack of consistency in
planning, execution and assessment between its development, humanitarian and security
agencies.84
When implemented at the planning and design stage, a comprehensive
approach can prevent duplication of efforts between UN security, humanitarian and
development departments.85
Approaches towards coordination and coherence
The UN’s adaptation efforts have culminated in the integrated missions (IM) concept. IM
refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and
coordination processes of the different elements of the UN units are integrated into a
single country-level UN system, when it undertakes complex peace building missions.86
The IM Concept has been established as the guiding principle for future post-conflict
complex operation by the 2005 „Note of the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions.87
Aims
This concept should be understood as an initiative to achieve system-wide coherence
across the UN. Coherence can be defined as the “effort to direct the wide range of
82
“In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”, Report of the Secretary-General,
A/59/2005, p. 26
83
Cedric de Coning, “Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions”, NUPI
report, Security in Practice, No. 5, 2007, p. 5
84
K. Friis, P. Jarmyr, “Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management”
NUPI, 2008, p. 3
85
Speech by the Latvian President in the General Assembly, September 2007,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23980&Cr=general&Cr1=debate&Kw1=general+assembly&Kw2=&Kw3=,
accessed 25 June 2008
86
C. de Coning 2007: The implications of the Integrated Missions concept for Training in United Nations and African
Union Peace operations, published on the website of “The African Peace Support Trainers Association”, 17 July 2007,
http://www.apsta-africa.org/news/article17072007.php#_edn8
87
Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-General, 9 December 2005; see also the
Revised Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 17 January 2006
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activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law
and security dimensions of a peace building system towards common strategic
objectives.”88
With coherence comes coordination; the “systematic utilization of policy
instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner.”89
The overall aim of the IM is to create a balance between the need for a security response
and the need to ensure that all perspectives of developmental, human rights and gender
are taken into account.90
By applying such an integrated process, the UN seeks to
maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different
capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. Today, the UN encompasses a
high number of multidimensional peacekeeping operations; where this integrated approach
is taken into effect. Eventually, an IM relies on a common vision of the strategic goal at the
specific country level, shared by all UN actors.
Means
To generate IMs, the UN has established the “Integrated Missions Planning Process”
(IMPP) at the strategic level. It builds the framework to facilitate the full planning cycle of
the multidimensional PKOs from an advance planning stage, to review and transition
planning.91
The IMPP seeks to initiate a process to generate a common strategic objective. It should
result from “a deliberative effort by all elements of the UN system to achieve a shared
understanding of the mandates and functions of the various elements of the UN presence
at country level and to use this understanding to maximize UN effectiveness, efficiency
and impact in all aspects of its work.”92
A common strategic objective shall ensure a
comprehensive but also coordinated operational approach, among the political, security,
development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian and lastly UN actors at
country level. 93
The IMPP thus delivers the missing doctrinal background for the mission planning as well
as the procedural guidance. However, the IMPP also has its limitations, as it cannot
coordinate all planning processes and activities carried out by the UN or even external
units. The high number of actors involved, each with different roles and goals, explains
why an IMPP often struggles to be fully coherent and integrated. Moreover, the IMPP has
to take into consideration other assessments and planning processes that work in parallel
with the IMPP, such as the Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal (CHAP) and Joint
88
C. de Coning 2007 p. 7
89
C. de Coning, ibid
90
C. de Coning, ibid, p. 15
91
Integrated Mission Planning Process, Guidelines Endorsed by Secretary General on 13 June 2006, p. 3 (IMPP)
92
IMPP document, ibid
93
UN document, “Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)”, Guidelines endorsed by Secretary-General on 13
June 2006, p. 3
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Assessment Missions (JAM). This raises two questions: how coherent can the resulting
propositions be in the light of such a complex planning process; and how likely is the
effective implementation of potentially very comprehensive planning propositions at the
field level?
At the operational level, the Special Representative of the Secretary General /Head of
Mission (SRSG/HOM) has all operational authority over the PKO’s activities, military,
police and civilian resources.94
The SRSG/HOM is a civilian who reports to the Secretary
General through the Under-Secretary-General for PKO at UN HQ. The SRSG/HOM with
its deputies form a Mission Leadership Team (MLT), which is responsible to oversee the
implementation of an IM. The UN HQ personnel and the MLT need to play mutually
supporting roles, both in developing a political strategy as well as during its subsequent
execution.
The recently published Capstone Doctrine (DPKO 2008) is the last step in the clear
doctrinal evolution towards a comprehensive approach95
Due to its novelty and its rather
all-inclusive character it will not be part of this assessment.
Role of the concepts during planning and implementation
Although the UN has already applied the IM concept on many occasions, there is no clear
understanding of what qualifies as an integrated mission. It is certainly easy to define on
the conceptual level. But on the field level, a grey area persists. In theory, the UN
approaches the issue of IMs from three perspectives:
1. restoration of stability, law and order; protection of civilians;
2. providing foundations for long-term recovery;
3. development and democratic governance.
However, IMs pose various challenges, and it is often difficult to implement the IMPP
concept operationally. Donor behaviour in particular exemplifies the lack of resource
coordination if one dwells into the abundance of studies and recommendations.
Duplication, unnecessary overlaps and gaps in the “provision of humanitarian assistance”
demonstrate that such an issue continues to be a challenge for the IMPP. 96
Nonetheless, there are successful examples where the IM concept was implemented,
such as the UN operation in Burundi. A UN Integrated Bureau for Burundi was created as
94
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “United Nations Peacekeeping operations: Principles and guidelines”,
January 2008, p. 68 (Capstone Doctrine)
95
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “United Nations Peacekeeping operations: Principles and guidelines”,
January 2008, p. 56 (Capstone Doctrine)
96
B. Eide, E., Kaspersen, A.T., Kent, R. & von Hippel, K. (2005) Report on Integrated Missions: Practical
Perspectives and Recommendations, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) pg. 17-28
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a coherent and coordinated response “under the Chairmanship of the Executive
Representative of the UN Secretary General.”97
The underlying principles of the IMPP
were taken into account at the planning stage, and highlighted the importance of flexibility
within IMs concept. Similarly, operations in Sierra Leone demonstrate also that IM
approaches can be successful at a planning level.98
Comments
The concept of IMs cannot step away from the inherent problem of conflicting priorities
between agencies during PKOs. In Liberia, tensions between political and
developmental/humanitarian actors were visible. The UNMIL pressured agencies
responsible for reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) to provide support for
reintegration, while those agencies did not agree about the short term goal.99
Such
tensions show that the IM concept is still in a starting phase, and that particularly
mechanisms that provide channels of communication between the different agencies have
to be set up.
UN EU NATO
Hallmark documents “In larger Freedom” (2005)
Brahimi Report (2000)
EU security strategy (2003) Comprehensive political
guidance (2006)
Core concepts and
Instruments at strategic level
Capstone doctrine (2008)
Integrated missions (2006)
CMCO (2003)
Crisis Management
Procedures CMP (2003)
Crisis Management Concept
(individual mission)
CA Action plan (2008)
Effects Based Approach to
Operations - EBAO (2006)
Concepts and instruments
theatre level
UN special representative EU special representative /
CIMIC
CIMIC/PRTs
97
UN Integrated Office in Burundi, http://binub.turretdev.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=20&Itemid=48
98
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomil.htm
99
Friis, and Jarmyr 2008: 11
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4 Final comments
As it stands today, all kind of actors, civilian, military, state and non-state, international as
well as domestic and local, are in a continuous learning cycle regarding crisis
management. Especially the external actors intervening into current crisis situation still
struggle to adapt to the new challenges sourcing in the changing nature of crisis.
The management of the increased complexity of contemporary crisis management is
becoming the primary objective. Otherwise external intervention into crisis can neither be
effective nor legitimate. Only if the diversity of interests, instruments and objectives
become harmonized, aiming towards a common strategy, a meaningful contribution to
global security can be achieved. This should also be the yardstick for the divers
comprehensive approaches, discussed in this paper.
On the conceptual level, the paper has outlined the various dimensions such a CA has to
tackle. Here it becomes obvious that a rather functional approach is doomed to fail as it
does not take into account the various reasons for which actors participate in a mission or
refrain from it. Thus it is not only the external security problem that defines the actual
response in terms of the mission design but also the aims of the actors and notably the
way they are integrated into the mission.
The diversity of concepts aims etc. represents a structural determinant. However this does
not mean that all interests and resulting conflicts related to a mission are legitimate. If one
would accept this, the room for improvement would shrink to a marginal space. Instead, it
seems legitimate to expect that international organisations serve their original aims. Turf
wars, rivalry among mission entities over leadership and resources, duplication of efforts
or working on cross-purposes that lead to serious shortcomings and consequently
contribute to a sub optimal result of current crises management approaches are by no
means acceptable.
One of the most important implications is that the assessment of the success or failure of a
mission has to be based on its contribution to solutions of a crisis, not to its problems.
While the paper seriously takes into account the different reasons for inefficiencies and
differences among actors, the aim is to make these challenges and the underlying issues
transparent in order to manage them, not to only understand them.
On a very general practical level, the different IOs share similar perceptions of the
problems. But their responses towards the problems are shaped in a very path dependent
way. While EU and UN both take consciously into account the well known inner structure
and frictions within their organizations, NATO seemingly neglects this dimension. As it is
rather implausible that NATO works without such frictions, the question is hence to which
results a possible neglect of such problems may lead.
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All three IOs struggle to cope with the diversity of issues that have to be effectively
coordinated from the planning phase onwards. Therefore, particular attention is paid to the
planning process and the participating institutions. Here, the common aim is to achieve a
shared vision or understanding of the operation. But who is proposing or even imposing
this vision? And how to assure that it is shared? NATO’s solutions are at least
straightforward. In the tradition of information based warfare it proposes the generation
and sharing of information. But it is a long known problem that sharing information does
not generate a shared interpretation of reality and priorities.
Thus, external actors but even internal departments may not necessarily be willing to
share the vision. Their participation is however inevitable. This implies the necessity to
make compromises. Here, the idea of coherence within the CA reaches its limits.
Differences in mindsets, corporate culture and terminology between the various actors can
be assumed to be the rule - not an exemption from it. But to what extent is an actor like
NATO, the EU or the UN willing to adopt a concept from another organisation? Thus it may
be worth investing more energy into scenarios where communality exists even if only to a
limited extent.
Moreover, in the context of inter-organisational cooperation, a harmonization of structures
and processes is not likely to be achieved in a mid-term period. All three organisations are
continuously further developing and thus differentiating their internal planning procedures
without taking systematically into account what the other organisations are doing. There is
consequently a risk that the processes will become more disparate rather than more
homogenous. Thus, liaison elements, memorandums of understandings and political
agreements will presumably mark the future. In this case IOs can nonetheless prepare
themselves for ad hoc organization of inter-organisational cooperation, mainly by having
constantly liaison teams operating in the other organisations. The experience and
knowledge gained in this way form other IOs may eventually be an accepted source of
expertise on procedures and relevant actors for the own organisation.
The influence of the described concepts on reality of crisis management seems to be fairly
limited, with the noticeable exception of the UN however. The EU shows a high level of
professionalism, well organized planning stages and increased endeavours towards
coherence. Nevertheless, although combined or integrated structures and standard
procedures exist for the EU, the Union operates de facto rather through more informal
rules and processes. These keep institutions like the CivMil Cell largely outside the
planning process. Additionally, the EU lacks the experience of any integrated deployments
of its instruments. Thus, the instruments as well as the planning processes have not been
put to an ultimate test.
Moreover, new initiatives for the EU only envisage gradual changes. Here, the UN and
especially NATO concepts appear to at least attempt to envisage a real reform. Taking into
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account that the UN is by far the biggest organisation in the area of crisis managements as
well as the oldest of those assessed here, its achievements are honourable. Not at least
its size and age also induce a lot of reluctance, inherent inertia, and bureaucratic
stalemate.
NATO seems to be overly concerned with organisational survival. Although several other
concepts that are still waiting to be fully implemented, the Alliance declared CA its new
priority. While this essentially might be a turn into the right direction, the impression of an
inflation of new concepts and the unexplained relationship of CA towards the other
concepts may undermine the potentials for NATO’s inner transformation. Its ability to
cooperate with external actors will seriously depend on NATO’s capacity to regain trust.
Eventually it remains the question of where coordination should actually take place. More
precisely, which level within the line of command is the most appropriated for assure
coordination? Shall the HQ or political strategic level exert Command and Control in a top
down approach? Coordination from the top can offer a coherent framework of action. On
the other hand, freedom of action at the field level may be necessary to allow for
appropriate reaction towards specific circumstances on the ground.
It seems indeed unfeasible to plan for local circumstances. Moreover, should adaptations
become necessary, they would have to be approved through the full line of command.
What the strategic level can assure however is the authority, the resources and the
coordination mechanisms through which the local units of the IO can execute their work
within a comprehensive approach at the local level.
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NATO CIMIC doctrine 2003:
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